Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 12 August 2017 at 13:13, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On 12/08/2017 12:23 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 12 August 2017 at 12:12, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On 12/08/2017 3:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 11 Aug 2017, at 13:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>

 Are you telling us that P(W) ≠ P(M) ≠ 1/2. What do *you* expect when
> pushing the button in Helsinki?
>

 I expect to die, to be 'cut', according to the protocol. The guys in W
 and M are two new persons, and neither was around in H to make any
 prediction whatsoever.

>>>
>>> Fair enough.
>>>
>>> You think the digital mechanism thesis is wrong.
>>>
>>
>> Correct.
>>
>> There is a fundamental problem with your person-duplication thought
>> experiments. This is that the way in which you interpret the scenario
>> inherently involves an irreducible 1p-3p confusion. The first person (1p)
>> concerns only things that the person can experience directly for himself.
>> It cannot, therefore, involve things that he is told by other people,
>> because such things are necessarily third person (3p) knowledge --
>> knowledge which he does not have by direct personal experience. So our
>> subject does not know the protocol of the thought experiment from direct
>> experience (he has only been told about it, 3p). When he presses the button
>> in the machine, he can have no 1p expectations about what will happen
>> (because he has not yet experienced it). He presses the button in the
>> spirit of pure experimental enquiry -- "what will happen if I do this?" His
>> prior probability for any particular outcome is zero. So when he presses
>> the button in Helsinki, and opens the door to find himself in Moscow, he
>> will say, "WTF!". In particular, he will not have gained any 1p knowledge
>> of duplication. In fact, he is for ever barred from any such knowledge.
>>
>> If he repeats the experiment many times, he will simply see his
>> experiences as irreducibly random between M and W, with some probability
>> that he can estimate by keeping records over a period of time. If you take
>> the strict 1p view of the thought experiment, the parallel with the early
>> development of QM is more evident. In QM, no-one has the 3p knowledge that
>> all possible outcomes are realized (in different worlds).
>>
>> So, before pressing the button in H, his prior probabilities are p(M) =
>> p(W) = 0, with probably, p(H) = 1. On the other hand, if you allow 3p
>> knowledge of the protocol to influence his estimation of probabilities
>> before the experiment, you can't rule out 3p knowledge that he can gain at
>> any time after pressing the button. In which case, the 1p-3p confusion is
>> complete, p(M) = p(W) = 1, and he can expect to see both cities. In that
>> case, the pure 1p view becomes irrelevant.
>
>
> The subject directly experiences the details of the experimental protocol,
> through hearing or reading about it. All knowledge is 1p; information from
> the external world comes to me via my senses and affects my knowledge.
>
>
> You render the 1p-3p distinction meaningless.
>

First person experience is individual and private. The third person point
of view is the view of an external observer. Suppose person A is observed
laughing by person B. The behaviour - the laughing - can be observed by
anyone; this is the third person point of view. Person A might be
experiencing happiness or amusement; this is the first person point of view
and only person A himself has it. Finally, person B has visual and auditory
experiences and knowledge of the outside world (there are laughing entities
in it), and this is again from the first person point of view. I would say
that knowledge is a type of experience, and therefore always first person
and private; information is that which is third person communicable. But
perhaps this last point is a matter of semantics.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Bruce Kellett]

On 12/08/2017 12:23 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 12 August 2017 at 12:12, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On 12/08/2017 3:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Aug 2017, at 13:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Are you telling us that P(W) ≠ P(M) ≠ 1/2. What do
*you* expect when pushing the button in Helsinki?


I expect to die, to be 'cut', according to the protocol.
The guys in W and M are two new persons, and neither was
around in H to make any prediction whatsoever.


Fair enough.

You think the digital mechanism thesis is wrong.


Correct.

There is a fundamental problem with your person-duplication
thought experiments. This is that the way in which you interpret
the scenario inherently involves an irreducible 1p-3p confusion.
The first person (1p) concerns only things that the person can
experience directly for himself. It cannot, therefore, involve
things that he is told by other people, because such things are
necessarily third person (3p) knowledge -- knowledge which he does
not have by direct personal experience. So our subject does not
know the protocol of the thought experiment from direct experience
(he has only been told about it, 3p). When he presses the button
in the machine, he can have no 1p expectations about what will
happen (because he has not yet experienced it). He presses the
button in the spirit of pure experimental enquiry -- "what will
happen if I do this?" His prior probability for any particular
outcome is zero. So when he presses the button in Helsinki, and
opens the door to find himself in Moscow, he will say, "WTF!". In
particular, he will not have gained any 1p knowledge of
duplication. In fact, he is for ever barred from any such knowledge.

If he repeats the experiment many times, he will simply see his
experiences as irreducibly random between M and W, with some
probability that he can estimate by keeping records over a period
of time. If you take the strict 1p view of the thought experiment,
the parallel with the early development of QM is more evident. In
QM, no-one has the 3p knowledge that all possible outcomes are
realized (in different worlds).

So, before pressing the button in H, his prior probabilities are
p(M) = p(W) = 0, with probably, p(H) = 1. On the other hand, if
you allow 3p knowledge of the protocol to influence his estimation
of probabilities before the experiment, you can't rule out 3p
knowledge that he can gain at any time after pressing the button.
In which case, the 1p-3p confusion is complete, p(M) = p(W) = 1,
and he can expect to see both cities. In that case, the pure 1p
view becomes irrelevant.


The subject directly experiences the details of the experimental 
protocol, through hearing or reading about it. All knowledge is 1p; 
information from the external world comes to me via my senses and 
affects my knowledge.


You render the 1p-3p distinction meaningless.

Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 12 August 2017 at 12:12, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On 12/08/2017 3:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 11 Aug 2017, at 13:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Are you telling us that P(W) ≠ P(M) ≠ 1/2. What do *you* expect when
 pushing the button in Helsinki?

>>>
>>> I expect to die, to be 'cut', according to the protocol. The guys in W
>>> and M are two new persons, and neither was around in H to make any
>>> prediction whatsoever.
>>>
>>
>> Fair enough.
>>
>> You think the digital mechanism thesis is wrong.
>>
>
> Correct.
>
> There is a fundamental problem with your person-duplication thought
> experiments. This is that the way in which you interpret the scenario
> inherently involves an irreducible 1p-3p confusion. The first person (1p)
> concerns only things that the person can experience directly for himself.
> It cannot, therefore, involve things that he is told by other people,
> because such things are necessarily third person (3p) knowledge --
> knowledge which he does not have by direct personal experience. So our
> subject does not know the protocol of the thought experiment from direct
> experience (he has only been told about it, 3p). When he presses the button
> in the machine, he can have no 1p expectations about what will happen
> (because he has not yet experienced it). He presses the button in the
> spirit of pure experimental enquiry -- "what will happen if I do this?" His
> prior probability for any particular outcome is zero. So when he presses
> the button in Helsinki, and opens the door to find himself in Moscow, he
> will say, "WTF!". In particular, he will not have gained any 1p knowledge
> of duplication. In fact, he is for ever barred from any such knowledge.
>
> If he repeats the experiment many times, he will simply see his
> experiences as irreducibly random between M and W, with some probability
> that he can estimate by keeping records over a period of time. If you take
> the strict 1p view of the thought experiment, the parallel with the early
> development of QM is more evident. In QM, no-one has the 3p knowledge that
> all possible outcomes are realized (in different worlds).
>
> So, before pressing the button in H, his prior probabilities are p(M) =
> p(W) = 0, with probably, p(H) = 1. On the other hand, if you allow 3p
> knowledge of the protocol to influence his estimation of probabilities
> before the experiment, you can't rule out 3p knowledge that he can gain at
> any time after pressing the button. In which case, the 1p-3p confusion is
> complete, p(M) = p(W) = 1, and he can expect to see both cities. In that
> case, the pure 1p view becomes irrelevant.


The subject directly experiences the details of the experimental protocol,
through hearing or reading about it. All knowledge is 1p; information from
the external world comes to me via my senses and affects my knowledge.



-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Bruce Kellett]

On 12/08/2017 3:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Aug 2017, at 13:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Are you telling us that P(W) ≠ P(M) ≠ 1/2. What do *you* expect when 
pushing the button in Helsinki?


I expect to die, to be 'cut', according to the protocol. The guys in 
W and M are two new persons, and neither was around in H to make any 
prediction whatsoever.


Fair enough.

You think the digital mechanism thesis is wrong.


Correct.

There is a fundamental problem with your person-duplication thought 
experiments. This is that the way in which you interpret the scenario 
inherently involves an irreducible 1p-3p confusion. The first person 
(1p) concerns only things that the person can experience directly for 
himself. It cannot, therefore, involve things that he is told by other 
people, because such things are necessarily third person (3p) knowledge 
-- knowledge which he does not have by direct personal experience. So 
our subject does not know the protocol of the thought experiment from 
direct experience (he has only been told about it, 3p). When he presses 
the button in the machine, he can have no 1p expectations about what 
will happen (because he has not yet experienced it). He presses the 
button in the spirit of pure experimental enquiry -- "what will happen 
if I do this?" His prior probability for any particular outcome is zero. 
So when he presses the button in Helsinki, and opens the door to find 
himself in Moscow, he will say, "WTF!". In particular, he will not have 
gained any 1p knowledge of duplication. In fact, he is for ever barred 
from any such knowledge.


If he repeats the experiment many times, he will simply see his 
experiences as irreducibly random between M and W, with some probability 
that he can estimate by keeping records over a period of time. If you 
take the strict 1p view of the thought experiment, the parallel with the 
early development of QM is more evident. In QM, no-one has the 3p 
knowledge that all possible outcomes are realized (in different worlds).


So, before pressing the button in H, his prior probabilities are p(M) = 
p(W) = 0, with probably, p(H) = 1. On the other hand, if you allow 3p 
knowledge of the protocol to influence his estimation of probabilities 
before the experiment, you can't rule out 3p knowledge that he can gain 
at any time after pressing the button. In which case, the 1p-3p 
confusion is complete, p(M) = p(W) = 1, and he can expect to see both 
cities. In that case, the pure 1p view becomes irrelevant.


Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 12 August 2017 at 11:16, John Clark  wrote:

> On Fri, Aug 11, 2017 at 6:01 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> ​>> ​
>>> Let me ask you
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>> ​a different question, do you think the following 2 questions are
>>> equivalent?​
>>> 1) What will *I*
>>> ​see​
>>>  tomorrow?
>>> 2) What will Stathis Papaioannou see tomorrow?
>>> ​If they are equivalent then ​
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>> ​(aka *I*) will see 2 cities tomorrow.  ​
>>> John Clark says they are equivalent, what does
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>> ​say?​
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> They are not equivalent if duplication will occur. There will be two
>> Stathis Papaioannous who will see two different things.
>>
>
> ​OK.
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> We will have to start referring to them using different proper nouns, eg
>> SP1 and SP2.
>>
>
> ​OK.
>
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> However, there is only ever one "I", correctly used by each copy
>>
>
> ​
> True. Even in a world with "I" duplicating machines when looking from the
> present into the past
> ​ ​
> there is always only one "I".  All conscious beings will
> ​only ​
> remember one
> ​​
> continuous​
> ​ ​
> thread. However the past and the future are NOT symmetrical so none of
> this
> ​is​
>  true when looking from the present into the future. And the question is
> about the future, and it contains the personal pronoun "I", so the answer
> to the question isn't just unknown the answer does not exist and what is
> worse it never will. So it's not a question. In that situation proper nouns
> must be used in all questions about the future, personal pronouns just
> generate silly nonsense.
>
> ​> ​
>> Personal pronouns capture the peculiar and probabilistic nature of
>> personal identity
>
>
> ​The very concept of probability becomes meaningless ​if after the
> probabilistic prediction there is no way to ever know if the prediction
> turned out to be right or not. And that is exactly what will happen if
> personal pronouns are used in the prediction and personal pronoun
> duplicating machines exist.
>

Before the duplication SP bet that "I will see W". After the duplication
SP1 sees W and SP2 sees M. SP1 says "I was right, I see W" and gets a
reward. SP2 says "I was wrong, I see M" and does not get a reward. Everyone
agrees that this is fair, no-one disputes who should get the reward.



-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[John Clark]

On Fri, Aug 11, 2017 at 6:01 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

​>> ​
>> Let me ask you
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>> ​a different question, do you think the following 2 questions are
>> equivalent?​
>> 1) What will *I*
>> ​see​
>>  tomorrow?
>> 2) What will Stathis Papaioannou see tomorrow?
>> ​If they are equivalent then ​
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>> ​(aka *I*) will see 2 cities tomorrow.  ​
>> John Clark says they are equivalent, what does
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>> ​say?​
>>
>
> ​> ​
> They are not equivalent if duplication will occur. There will be two
> Stathis Papaioannous who will see two different things.
>

​OK.


> ​> ​
> We will have to start referring to them using different proper nouns, eg
> SP1 and SP2.
>

​OK.



> ​> ​
> However, there is only ever one "I", correctly used by each copy
>

​
True. Even in a world with "I" duplicating machines when looking from the
present into the past
​ ​
there is always only one "I".  All conscious beings will
​only ​
remember one
​​
continuous​
​ ​
thread. However the past and the future are NOT symmetrical so none of this
​is​
 true when looking from the present into the future. And the question is
about the future, and it contains the personal pronoun "I", so the answer
to the question isn't just unknown the answer does not exist and what is
worse it never will. So it's not a question. In that situation proper nouns
must be used in all questions about the future, personal pronouns just
generate silly nonsense.

​> ​
> Personal pronouns capture the peculiar and probabilistic nature of
> personal identity


​The very concept of probability becomes meaningless ​if after the
probabilistic prediction there is no way to ever know if the prediction
turned out to be right or not. And that is exactly what will happen if
personal pronouns are used in the prediction and personal pronoun
duplicating machines exist.

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sat, 12 Aug 2017 at 3:35 am, John Clark  wrote:

> On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 7:45 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> "What will I see tomorrow?" is meaningful and does not contain any false
>> propositions.
>
>
> ​If all meaning is beaten out of the personal pronoun "I"​
>
> ​as Bruno does then it's not false and it's not a proposition either, it's
> just a ASCII character.​
>
> Let me ask you
> Stathis Papaioannou
> ​a different question, do you think the following 2 questions are
> equivalent?​
>
> 1) What will *I*
> ​see​
>  tomorrow?
> 2) What will Stathis Papaioannou see tomorrow?
>
> ​If they are equivalent then ​
> Stathis Papaioannou
> ​(aka *I*) will see 2 cities tomorrow.  ​
> John Clark says they are equivalent, what does
> Stathis Papaioannou
> ​ say?​
>

They are not equivalent if duplication will occur. There will be two
Stathis Papaioannous who will see two different things. We will have to
start referring to them using different proper nouns, eg SP1 and SP2.
However, there is only ever one "I", correctly used by each copy and every
other individual in the world to refer to himself.


> ​> ​
>> Humans who are fully aware that there will be multiple copies understand
>> the question and can use it consistently,
>
>
> ​I agree, they can use it consistently but they can also use it
> inconsistently so it's important to be careful. And none of this comes to
> us as second nature that we can know intuitively without thinking because
> up to now nobody has actually seen much less used a people duplicating
> machine. It's the same thing with Relativity and Quantum Mechanics, they
> seem very odd (but not logically inconsistent) because we don't experience
> either in our everyday life, we move too slow and are too big. But odd
> isn't the same as untrue.
>
> Some may consider all this airy philosophical speculation of no more
> practical significance than the number of angels that can dance on a pin,
> and perhaps it is right now but sometime in the next century correctly
> answering questions like these will gain life or death practical
> importance. ​
>
>
> ​> ​
>> Probabilities can be consistently calculated using the assumption that I
>> will experience being one and only one of the multiple future copies,
>
>
> ​Probabilities can NOT be used until we've nailed down the meaning of the
> personal pronoun "I", or better yet just get rid of the pronouns and use
> the proper noun. And I still want to know why we keep talking about the
> accuracy or inaccuracy of predictions when that has nothing to do with our
> continuous feeling of self.  I also want to know why so many believe that
> looking from the present into the future is symmetrical with looking from
> the present back into the past.
>

Personal pronouns capture the peculiar and probabilistic nature of personal
identity in these cases, which can't be captured using just proper nouns.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[John Clark]

On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 8:11 PM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

>
​> ​
> Not everyone will be successful in this scenario.


​It's not even clear to me that *anyone* would win the bet. Today you are
about to be duplicated and you bet me $10 that tomorrow you, that is to say
the person who remembers being ​you today, will see Moscow. So what
happens? Tomorrow you come up to me and make the case that Bruce Kellett
sees Moscow and so should get the $10, but you also come up to me and make
a equally strong case that Bruce Kellett does not see Moscow and so should
not get the $10. What to do? It depends on the details of the bet and I've
never seen them spelled out.

Or perhaps you could make a bet not with me but with yourself, if you see
Moscow then your doppelganger who doesn't see Moscow must give you $10, if
you see Washington then your doppelganger who doesn't see Washington must
give you $10. But then you'd just be passing the money back and forth
forever.

​> ​
> :-)). This is the problem of "monster sequences" that is so troublesome
> for understanding probability in Everett QM.


I think the main sticking point in Everett's idea
​i​
s how to obtain probabilities
​, such as the ​
Born rule
​, when infinity is involved. Perhaps the multiverse ​doesn't contain an
infinite number of branches just a astronomically large number of them.

​John K Clark​

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[John Clark]

On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 7:45 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

​> ​
> "What will I see tomorrow?" is meaningful and does not contain any false
> propositions.


​If all meaning is beaten out of the personal pronoun "I"​

​as Bruno does then it's not false and it's not a proposition either, it's
just a ASCII character.​

Let me ask you
Stathis Papaioannou
​a different question, do you think the following 2 questions are
equivalent?​

1) What will *I*
​see​
 tomorrow?
2) What will Stathis Papaioannou see tomorrow?

​If they are equivalent then ​
Stathis Papaioannou
​(aka *I*) will see 2 cities tomorrow.  ​
John Clark says they are equivalent, what does
Stathis Papaioannou
​ say?​

​> ​
> Humans who are fully aware that there will be multiple copies understand
> the question and can use it consistently,


​I agree, they can use it consistently but they can also use it
inconsistently so it's important to be careful. And none of this comes to
us as second nature that we can know intuitively without thinking because
up to now nobody has actually seen much less used a people duplicating
machine. It's the same thing with Relativity and Quantum Mechanics, they
seem very odd (but not logically inconsistent) because we don't experience
either in our everyday life, we move too slow and are too big. But odd
isn't the same as untrue.

Some may consider all this airy philosophical speculation of no more
practical significance than the number of angels that can dance on a pin,
and perhaps it is right now but sometime in the next century correctly
answering questions like these will gain life or death practical
importance. ​


​> ​
> Probabilities can be consistently calculated using the assumption that I
> will experience being one and only one of the multiple future copies,


​Probabilities can NOT be used until we've nailed down the meaning of the
personal pronoun "I", or better yet just get rid of the pronouns and use
the proper noun. And I still want to know why we keep talking about the
accuracy or inaccuracy of predictions when that has nothing to do with our
continuous feeling of self.  I also want to know why so many believe that
looking from the present into the future is symmetrical with looking from
the present back into the past.

John K Clark ​

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Aug 2017, at 13:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 11/08/2017 7:13 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Aug 2017, at 02:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 11/08/2017 9:45 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


"What will I see tomorrow?" is meaningful and does not contain  
any false propositions. Humans who are fully aware that there  
will be multiple copies understand the question and can use it  
consistently, and as I have tried to demonstrate even animals  
have an instinctive understanding of it. Probabilities can be  
consistently calculated using the assumption that I will  
experience being one and only one of the multiple future copies,  
and these probabilities can be used to plan for the future and to  
run successful business ventures. If you still insist it is  
gibberish that calls into question your usage of the word  
"gibberish ".


Not everyone will be successful in this scenario. No matter how  
mane duplications cycles are gone through, there will always be  
one individual at the end who has not received any reward at all  
(he has never seen Washington :-)). This is the problem of  
"monster sequences" that is so troublesome for understanding  
probability in Everett QM.



? You might elaborate. It looks like the white rabbit problem.


It has nothing to do with the white rabbit problem. In the  
duplication model, each iteration gives W and M, each with unit  
probability.


In the third person view. OK. That is part of the enunciation of the  
problem which will concerned the first person points of view.






This is a trivial consequence of the fact that there is a person  
created in W and in M every time, so we know in advance that these  
occur necessarily.


OK. (assuming mechanism)



So after N iterations of the duplication (each person is re- 
duplicated on each iteration) so there are 2^N sequences after N  
iterations.


Indeed.




One of these sequences will be N occurrences of M, and one will be N  
occurrences of W. So the prediction of the person with N occurrences  
of M, based on induction from his past experiences, will be M, with  
p =1.


Not if the person is rational and understand mechanism. Even if you  
have thrown a perfect coin 1000 times and get head, the probability to  
get head is still 1/2.
If the iteration is continued, most of the copies will confirmed that  
p = 1 was wrong, and by definition of the first person and mechanism,  
we have to take their feelings into account.








Similarly, for the person with N occurrences of W, his prediction  
will be p(W) = 1.


Similarly wrong.



People from other sequences predict W or M with varying  
probabilities. Very few actually predict p(W) = p(M) = 1/2.



They are incompressible in the limit, which appears quickly. 1/2 is  
provably the best bet, due to that provable incompressibility of the  
vast majority of sequences.







In the duplication scenario, the third person view enables one to  
put a natural measure over these sequences -- just by counting the  
number of sequences with particular relative frequencies. The low  
measure (probability) sequences are those known as "monster  
sequences" in Everett QM, and they can be seen to be of small  
measure in the classical duplication scenario.


Very good; so you did get the point. That was not apparent from above.






The problem in QM is that no external observer is possible.



That is the problem with Copenhagen QM.





A probabilistic interpretation then becomes problematic because we  
cannot count over all the sequences: we only have the one sequence  
that we actually observe, and we can have no way of knowing whether  
or not what we have observed is a "monster sequence". This gives  
rise to the question as to whether observation can ever be a  
reliable guide for determining the underlying probabilities -- how  
can we use any sequence of observed results as a test of some  
theory? The sequence we have observed might, for all we know, be  
some 'monster sequence' of very low probability.


Yes, that is science.

We cannot prove there is a reality, and no experience can prove  
anything about that possible (or not) reality.


But we have beliefs, some more solid than other, and when we do  
experiences, either our beliefs are confirmed, and we learn nothing,  
or our beliefs are refuted, and we learn something. If a very solid  
belief is refuted, we learn a lot.







The problem is usually circumvented by assuming a probabilistic  
model from the start, but that is imposed from the outside and does  
not arise from the theory itself.


Until Everett realized that the probabilities were *first person  
(plural)*, and relative. But he uses digital mechanism, which  
"aggravates" the situation, in the sense that now we have to extract  
the universal wave from a sum on all computations, or explain why the  
classical aberrant dreams are rare, and, question, are their rare in  
the near death first person experience.






Deutsch and 

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Bruce Kellett]

On 11/08/2017 7:13 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Aug 2017, at 02:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 11/08/2017 9:45 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


"What will I see tomorrow?" is meaningful and does not contain any 
false propositions. Humans who are fully aware that there will be 
multiple copies understand the question and can use it consistently, 
and as I have tried to demonstrate even animals have an instinctive 
understanding of it. Probabilities can be consistently calculated 
using the assumption that I will experience being one and only one 
of the multiple future copies, and these probabilities can be used 
to plan for the future and to run successful business ventures. If 
you still insist it is gibberish that calls into question your usage 
of the word "gibberish ".


Not everyone will be successful in this scenario. No matter how mane 
duplications cycles are gone through, there will always be one 
individual at the end who has not received any reward at all (he has 
never seen Washington :-)). This is the problem of "monster 
sequences" that is so troublesome for understanding probability in 
Everett QM.



? You might elaborate. It looks like the white rabbit problem.


It has nothing to do with the white rabbit problem. In the duplication 
model, each iteration gives W and M, each with unit probability. This is 
a trivial consequence of the fact that there is a person created in W 
and in M every time, so we know in advance that these occur necessarily. 
So after N iterations of the duplication (each person is re-duplicated 
on each iteration) so there are 2^N sequences after N iterations. One of 
these sequences will be N occurrences of M, and one will be N 
occurrences of W. So the prediction of the person with N occurrences of 
M, based on induction from his past experiences, will be M, with p =1. 
Similarly, for the person with N occurrences of W, his prediction will 
be p(W) = 1. People from other sequences predict W or M with varying 
probabilities. Very few actually predict p(W) = p(M) = 1/2.


In the duplication scenario, the third person view enables one to put a 
natural measure over these sequences -- just by counting the number of 
sequences with particular relative frequencies. The low measure 
(probability) sequences are those known as "monster sequences" in 
Everett QM, and they can be seen to be of small measure in the classical 
duplication scenario.


The problem in QM is that no external observer is possible. A 
probabilistic interpretation then becomes problematic because we cannot 
count over all the sequences: we only have the one sequence that we 
actually observe, and we can have no way of knowing whether or not what 
we have observed is a "monster sequence". This gives rise to the 
question as to whether observation can ever be a reliable guide for 
determining the underlying probabilities -- how can we use any sequence 
of observed results as a test of some theory? The sequence we have 
observed might, for all we know, be some 'monster sequence' of very low 
probability.


The problem is usually circumvented by assuming a probabilistic model 
from the start, but that is imposed from the outside and does not arise 
from the theory itself. Deutsch and Wallace get around the problem in 
this way -- they assume at the outset that small amplitudes correspond 
to small probabilities, so monster sequences are assumed to be very 
unlikely, and observed frequencies are assumed to converge towards the 
true underlying probabilities. But then, this convergence is not 
uniform, or even necessarily monotonic: the best one can say is that 
observed frequencies tend to converge only /in probability/ to the true 
probabilities. Hence there is circularity inherent in any such approach 
to probability in Everett QM, where every outcome occurs with 
probability equal to one. Deutsch and Wallace do not avoid this 
circularity in their attempts to derive the Born Rule.


I see the problem with mechanism, (indeed that is the result of the 
UDA: there is a measure on first person experience problem), but in 
Everett the problem is solved by Feynman phase randomization, itself 
justifiable from Gleason theorem. Then the math of self-reference 
shows that, very possibly, Gleason theorem will probably solve the 
classical case too, given that we find quantum logics at the place needed.


Everett does not solve the measure problem, or give any non-circular 
account of probability in QM: Feynman phase randomization is a possible 
solution to white rabbits, but it has nothing to do with the origin of 
probabilities.


Gleason's theorem does not avoid the circularity problem either. All 
that Gleason's theorem demonstrates is that for space of greater than 
two dimensions, any viable probabilistic interpretation has to accord 
with the Born Rule. But that does not demonstrate that one can actually 
have a probabilistic interpretation in the many worlds case. Zurek is 
quite dismissive of 

Re: A profound lack of profundity

[Bruno Marchal]

On 11 Aug 2017, at 02:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 11/08/2017 9:45 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


"What will I see tomorrow?" is meaningful and does not contain any  
false propositions. Humans who are fully aware that there will be  
multiple copies understand the question and can use it  
consistently, and as I have tried to demonstrate even animals have  
an instinctive understanding of it. Probabilities can be  
consistently calculated using the assumption that I will experience  
being one and only one of the multiple future copies, and these  
probabilities can be used to plan for the future and to run  
successful business ventures. If you still insist it is gibberish  
that calls into question your usage of the word "gibberish ".


Not everyone will be successful in this scenario. No matter how mane  
duplications cycles are gone through, there will always be one  
individual at the end who has not received any reward at all (he has  
never seen Washington :-)). This is the problem of "monster  
sequences" that is so troublesome for understanding probability in  
Everett QM.



? You might elaborate. It looks like the white rabbit problem. I see  
the problem with mechanism, (indeed that is the result of the UDA:  
there is a measure on first person experience problem), but in Everett  
the problem is solved by Feynman phase randomization, itself  
justifiable from Gleason theorem. Then the math of self-reference  
shows that, very possibly, Gleason theorem will probably solve the  
classical case too, given that we find quantum logics at the place  
needed.


Are-you defending John Clark? That would be nice! He convinces nobody  
since years, and some helps might be handy.


Are you telling us that P(W) ≠ P(M) ≠ 1/2. What do *you* expect  
when pushing the button in Helsinki?


Bruno




Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.