Re: The codical-material universe
On Saturday, September 15, 2018 at 10:27:07 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: > > On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 12:22 PM Bruno Marchal > wrote: > > >> >>> you claim nonphysical calculations can be performed, but you also >>> say space and time and even spacetime are physical, so how can you have >>> change without them and how can you have calculations without change? >> >> > > >> *The changes are digital, discrete.* >> > > Changes in what? You say electrons, atoms, photons, neutrinos, > gravitational waves, time, space and even spacetime are all matter, so the > change can't be with respect to any of them; so what's changing and with > respect to what? And how can you make a calculation without changing > something? > > >>Electromagnetic waves of 650 nanometers is physical , the color red is >>> a qualia and can be produced without Electromagnetic waves of any sort. >> >> > > >*One reason more to understand that the qualia can raise just with any >> number relations mimicking the relevant brain parts relation in >> arithmetic. * >> > > And yet you agree that "even qualia is matter". And please note that in a > MRI scanner similar parts of the brain light up when one sees a red lights > and when one just thinks about a red light. And also note that the brain is > made of matter that obeys the laws of physics. > > >> *>If some primary matter is at play for consciousness, can you explain >> what role it has, and what it is?* > > > If matter is primary then obviously I can't say what its made of, if I > could it wouldn't be primary. And if it's primary then it's needed to > perform calculations. And after saying consciousness is the way that data > feels when it is being processed there is simply nothing more that can be > said about consciousness. > > >>the blueprints for a 747 airliner can fly me to London. >> >> >> *>The analogy does not work. A machine is more than a blueprint.* >> > > A machine needs 2 things, data and matter. The blueprints supply the data > but I can't fly to London on half a machine. > > >*But the step 3 can be done with robots instead of human, and if you >> disbelieve in first person indeterminacy,* >> > > I don't believe in "first person indeterminacy" and I don't disbelieve in > it either because there is nothing in it to believe or disbelieve. There is > no there there. If you could specify who exactly what "the first person" is > in a world that contains "the first person" duplicating machines I might > perhaps be able to tell you what I think about it, but until then the idea > is far worse than just being wrong, it is gibberish. > > >> > tell me how you program the robot so that he [] >> > > As always in your thought "experiments" the gibberish kicks in > immediately. Right at the start you postulate a world that contains both " > *THE*" and "*HE*" duplicating machines so your reference to "*the*" robot > and "*he*" no longer refers to anything unique. > > >> > i*s able to predict the results of opening the door after pushing on >> the button.* >> > > Well I predict that before the doors open there will only be one conscious > mind regardless of how many brains have been duplicated. And I predict the > moment the doors are opened revealing 2 different things there will be 2 > conscious minds. And I predict the mind that observes Moscow will become > the Moscow Man. And I predict the mind that observes Washington will > become the Washington Man. And there is nothing more to predict. > > >> *> The robot survive, by computationalism (or even without in this case), >> and the robot can predict with certainty that he will not write in his >> personal diary that he is seeing both city at once,* > > > No, that is incorrect, "*THE* robot" can't predict that and neither can > anybody else because you haven't specified what or who the prediction is > supposed to be about. > > > So, if you have an algorithm just show it to us. >> > > I will show you such a algorithm as soon as you show me a algorithm to > determine what one and only one thing will happen to 1 banana after 1 > banana becomes 2 bananas. But even then you'd have no way of knowing if my > prediction turned out to be correct or not because even after the > "exparament" is long over you *STILL* couldn't say if the correct > prediction turned out to be Moscow or Washington. And that my dear Bruno is > why this isn't a exparament at all and it's not even a thought exparament, > it is just a showcase displaying your massive confusion and the difficulty > you have in handling philosophical matters. > > >> *>The question makes sense, as you have agreed that we survive such an >> experience,* > > > I have agreed that if survival today means being able to remember being > the Helsinki Man yesterday and somebody remembers today then the Helsinki > Man has survived today. And obviously if that's what the word means and if > we have Helsinki Man
Re: The codical-material universe
On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 12:22 PM Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>> you claim nonphysical calculations can be performed, but you also say >> space and time and even spacetime are physical, so how can you have change >> without them and how can you have calculations without change? > > >> *The changes are digital, discrete.* > Changes in what? You say electrons, atoms, photons, neutrinos, gravitational waves, time, space and even spacetime are all matter, so the change can't be with respect to any of them; so what's changing and with respect to what? And how can you make a calculation without changing something? >>Electromagnetic waves of 650 nanometers is physical , the color red is a >> qualia and can be produced without Electromagnetic waves of any sort. > > >*One reason more to understand that the qualia can raise just with any > number relations mimicking the relevant brain parts relation in > arithmetic. * > And yet you agree that "even qualia is matter". And please note that in a MRI scanner similar parts of the brain light up when one sees a red lights and when one just thinks about a red light. And also note that the brain is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics. > *>If some primary matter is at play for consciousness, can you explain > what role it has, and what it is?* If matter is primary then obviously I can't say what its made of, if I could it wouldn't be primary. And if it's primary then it's needed to perform calculations. And after saying consciousness is the way that data feels when it is being processed there is simply nothing more that can be said about consciousness. >>the blueprints for a 747 airliner can fly me to London. > > > *>The analogy does not work. A machine is more than a blueprint.* > A machine needs 2 things, data and matter. The blueprints supply the data but I can't fly to London on half a machine. >*But the step 3 can be done with robots instead of human, and if you > disbelieve in first person indeterminacy,* > I don't believe in "first person indeterminacy" and I don't disbelieve in it either because there is nothing in it to believe or disbelieve. There is no there there. If you could specify who exactly what "the first person" is in a world that contains "the first person" duplicating machines I might perhaps be able to tell you what I think about it, but until then the idea is far worse than just being wrong, it is gibberish. > > tell me how you program the robot so that he [] > As always in your thought "experiments" the gibberish kicks in immediately. Right at the start you postulate a world that contains both "*THE*" and " *HE*" duplicating machines so your reference to "*the*" robot and "*he*" no longer refers to anything unique. > > i*s able to predict the results of opening the door after pushing on > the button.* > Well I predict that before the doors open there will only be one conscious mind regardless of how many brains have been duplicated. And I predict the moment the doors are opened revealing 2 different things there will be 2 conscious minds. And I predict the mind that observes Moscow will become the Moscow Man. And I predict the mind that observes Washington will become the Washington Man. And there is nothing more to predict. > *> The robot survive, by computationalism (or even without in this case), > and the robot can predict with certainty that he will not write in his > personal diary that he is seeing both city at once,* No, that is incorrect, "*THE* robot" can't predict that and neither can anybody else because you haven't specified what or who the prediction is supposed to be about. > So, if you have an algorithm just show it to us. > I will show you such a algorithm as soon as you show me a algorithm to determine what one and only one thing will happen to 1 banana after 1 banana becomes 2 bananas. But even then you'd have no way of knowing if my prediction turned out to be correct or not because even after the "exparament" is long over you *STILL* couldn't say if the correct prediction turned out to be Moscow or Washington. And that my dear Bruno is why this isn't a exparament at all and it's not even a thought exparament, it is just a showcase displaying your massive confusion and the difficulty you have in handling philosophical matters. > *>The question makes sense, as you have agreed that we survive such an > experience,* I have agreed that if survival today means being able to remember being the Helsinki Man yesterday and somebody remembers today then the Helsinki Man has survived today. And obviously if that's what the word means and if we have Helsinki Man duplicating machines then the Helsinki Man will have more than one path into the future. However I no longer know what you mean by "survive" and I don't think you know either. > *>and you agreed that any copies will not be directly aware of the other > copies,* > Yes. >*they differentiate once the box is open.* > Yes > *So, there
