Re: What is more primary than numbers?

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 8:43:59 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:02 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 9:36:39 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:53 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>


 On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:27:45 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
> I think truth is primitive.
>
> Jason
>


 As a matter of linguistics (and philosophy),  *truth* and *matter* are 
 linked:

 "As a matter of fact, ..."
 "The truth of the matter is ..."
 "It matters that ..."
 ...
 [ https://www.etymonline.com/word/matter ]

>>>
>>> I agree they are linked.  Though matter may be a few steps removed from 
>>> truth.  Perhaps one way to interpret the link more directly is thusly:
>>>
>>> There is an equation whose every solution (where the equation happens to 
>>> be *true*, e.g. is satisfied when it has certain values assigned to its 
>>> variables) maps its variables to states of the time evolution of the wave 
>>> function of our universe.  You might say that we (literally not 
>>> figuratively) live within such an equation.  That its truth reifies what we 
>>> call matter.
>>>
>>> But I think truth plays an even more fundamental roll than this.  e.g. 
>>> because the following statement is *true* "two has a successor" then 
>>> there exists a successor to 2 distinct from any previous number.  
>>> Similarly, the *truth* of "9 is not prime" implies the existence of a 
>>> factor of 9 besides 1 and 9.
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>>

 Schopenhauer 's view: "A judgment has *material truth* if its concepts 
 are based on intuitive perceptions that are generated from sensations. If 
 a 
 judgment has its reason (ground) in another judgment, its truth is called 
 logical or formal. If a judgment, of, for example, pure mathematics or 
 pure 
 science, is based on the forms (space, time, causality) of intuitive, 
 empirical knowledge, then the judgment has transcendental truth."
 [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth ]


>>> I guess I am referring to transcend truth here. Truth concerning the 
>>> integers is sufficient to yield the universe, matter, and all that we see 
>>> around us.
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> In my view there is basically just *material* (from matter) truth and 
>> *linguistic* (from language) truth.
>>
>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/06/18/to-tell-the-truth/ ] 
>>
>> Relations and functions are linguistic: relational type theory (RTT) , 
>> functional type theory (FTT) languages.
>>
>> Numbers are also linguistic beings, the (fictional) semantic objects of 
>> Peano arithmetic (PA).
>>
>> Numbers can be "materialized" via *nominalization *(cf. Hartry Field, 
>> refs. in [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hartry_Field ]).
>>
>>
> Assuming the primacy of matter assumes more and explains less, than 
> assuming the primacy of arithmetical truth.
>
> Jason
>



In today's era of mathematics, Joel David Hamkins (@JDHamkins 
) has shown there is a "multiverse" of 
truths:

*The set-theoretic multiverse*
[ https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4223 ]


*The multiverse view in set theory, introduced and argued for in this 
article, is the view that there are many distinct concepts of set, each 
instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe. The universe view, 
in contrast, asserts that there is an absolute background set concept, with 
a corresponding absolute set-theoretic universe in which every 
set-theoretic question has a definite answer. The multiverse position, I 
argue, explains our experience with the enormous diversity of set-theoretic 
possibilities, a phenomenon that challenges the universe view. In 
particular, I argue that the continuum hypothesis is settled on the 
multiverse view by our extensive knowledge about how it behaves in the 
multiverse, and as a result it can no longer be settled in the manner 
formerly hoped for.*


What this means is that for mathematics (a language category), truth 
depends on the language.

- pt

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

[Brent Meeker]

On 12/9/2018 6:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:53 PM Brent Meeker > wrote:


They are fundamental only in the sense that one can use them as
axioms.  So their fundamentalism is circular.

Brent

On 12/9/2018 7:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

But I think truth plays an even more fundamental roll than this. 
e.g. because the following statement is */true/* "two has a
successor" then there exists a successor to 2 distinct from any
previous number.  Similarly, the */truth/* of "9 is not prime"
implies the existence of a factor of 9 besides 1 and 9.



That position was defensible before Godel, but not after.  He showed 
mathematical truth cannot be based on axioms.


But he didn't show it could be based on something else.

Brent

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

[Jason Resch]

On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:02 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 9:36:39 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:53 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:27:45 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:


 I think truth is primitive.

 Jason

>>>
>>>
>>> As a matter of linguistics (and philosophy),  *truth* and *matter* are
>>> linked:
>>>
>>> "As a matter of fact, ..."
>>> "The truth of the matter is ..."
>>> "It matters that ..."
>>> ...
>>> [ https://www.etymonline.com/word/matter ]
>>>
>>
>> I agree they are linked.  Though matter may be a few steps removed from
>> truth.  Perhaps one way to interpret the link more directly is thusly:
>>
>> There is an equation whose every solution (where the equation happens to
>> be *true*, e.g. is satisfied when it has certain values assigned to its
>> variables) maps its variables to states of the time evolution of the wave
>> function of our universe.  You might say that we (literally not
>> figuratively) live within such an equation.  That its truth reifies what we
>> call matter.
>>
>> But I think truth plays an even more fundamental roll than this.  e.g.
>> because the following statement is *true* "two has a successor" then
>> there exists a successor to 2 distinct from any previous number.
>> Similarly, the *truth* of "9 is not prime" implies the existence of a
>> factor of 9 besides 1 and 9.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Schopenhauer 's view: "A judgment has *material truth* if its concepts
>>> are based on intuitive perceptions that are generated from sensations. If a
>>> judgment has its reason (ground) in another judgment, its truth is called
>>> logical or formal. If a judgment, of, for example, pure mathematics or pure
>>> science, is based on the forms (space, time, causality) of intuitive,
>>> empirical knowledge, then the judgment has transcendental truth."
>>> [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth ]
>>>
>>>
>> I guess I am referring to transcend truth here. Truth concerning the
>> integers is sufficient to yield the universe, matter, and all that we see
>> around us.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>
>
>
> In my view there is basically just *material* (from matter) truth and
> *linguistic* (from language) truth.
>
> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/06/18/to-tell-the-truth/ ]
>
> Relations and functions are linguistic: relational type theory (RTT) ,
> functional type theory (FTT) languages.
>
> Numbers are also linguistic beings, the (fictional) semantic objects of
> Peano arithmetic (PA).
>
> Numbers can be "materialized" via *nominalization *(cf. Hartry Field,
> refs. in [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hartry_Field ]).
>
>
Assuming the primacy of matter assumes more and explains less, than
assuming the primacy of arithmetical truth.

Jason

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

[Jason Resch]

On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:53 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> They are fundamental only in the sense that one can use them as axioms.
> So their fundamentalism is circular.
>
> Brent
>
> On 12/9/2018 7:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> But I think truth plays an even more fundamental roll than this.  e.g.
> because the following statement is *true* "two has a successor" then
> there exists a successor to 2 distinct from any previous number.
> Similarly, the *truth* of "9 is not prime" implies the existence of a
> factor of 9 besides 1 and 9.
>
>
>
That position was defensible before Godel, but not after.  He showed
mathematical truth cannot be based on axioms.

Jason

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

[Brent Meeker]

They are fundamental only in the sense that one can use them as axioms.  
So their fundamentalism is circular.


Brent

On 12/9/2018 7:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
But I think truth plays an even more fundamental roll than this.  e.g. 
because the following statement is */true/* "two has a successor" then 
there exists a successor to 2 distinct from any previous number.  
Similarly, the */truth/* of "9 is not prime" implies the existence of 
a factor of 9 besides 1 and 9.


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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 6:03:27 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 7 Dec 2018, at 21:17, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 9:39:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 7 Dec 2018, at 12:38, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 4:14:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
>> *computationalism 
>> is indeed false*, and it should be replaced by what I call *real 
>> computationalism* (where I am adopting the "real" label from Galen 
>> Strawson):
>>
>>
>> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
>> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
>> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
>> opinion private, if I have one.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>
>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ 
>> ]
>>
>>  -pt
>>
>>
>> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>  
>
> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
> ] — 
> where *there are no such things as mathematical objects* — if 
> computation is considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then 
> computationalism is fiction.)
>
>
>
> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
> physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
> math-fictionanlist.
>
> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
> arithmetic.
>
> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z 
> such x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon 
> exists”. I can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t 
> conceive waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and 
> not have solutions.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
 Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
 ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
 (like us).

 "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist. 


 That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) 
 than in the moon.
 Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot 
 use the computationalist theory of mind.
 I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical 
 objects are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not 
 aware of the pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.




 Example: The Turing 
 machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
 https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
  
 ].


 Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
 immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. 
 But the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, and 
 their existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 
 0/10, it will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...




 (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since 
 a computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
 "boring”.)



 I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
 machine) in Turing sense.



 So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 



 Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in 
 some non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.

 Bruno



>>> I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in
>>>
>>> http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/  - International Center of Unconventional 
>>> Computing
>>> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ - Unconventional Computation and Natural 
>>> Computation 2019 TOKYO, June 3-7, 2019
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconventional_computing
>>> etc.
>>>
>>>
>>> Does it assumes that Church’s thesis is false?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> One just uses the term  *unconventional computation* or *unconventional 
>>> computing* - a widely used term - and people will understand the 
>>> non-standard non-assumptions.
>>>
>>>
>>> Widely used does not mean that the notion is 

Re: What is more primary than numbers?

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 9:36:39 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:53 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:27:45 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> I think truth is primitive.
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>
>>
>> As a matter of linguistics (and philosophy),  *truth* and *matter* are 
>> linked:
>>
>> "As a matter of fact, ..."
>> "The truth of the matter is ..."
>> "It matters that ..."
>> ...
>> [ https://www.etymonline.com/word/matter ]
>>
>
> I agree they are linked.  Though matter may be a few steps removed from 
> truth.  Perhaps one way to interpret the link more directly is thusly:
>
> There is an equation whose every solution (where the equation happens to 
> be *true*, e.g. is satisfied when it has certain values assigned to its 
> variables) maps its variables to states of the time evolution of the wave 
> function of our universe.  You might say that we (literally not 
> figuratively) live within such an equation.  That its truth reifies what we 
> call matter.
>
> But I think truth plays an even more fundamental roll than this.  e.g. 
> because the following statement is *true* "two has a successor" then 
> there exists a successor to 2 distinct from any previous number.  
> Similarly, the *truth* of "9 is not prime" implies the existence of a 
> factor of 9 besides 1 and 9.
>
> Jason
>
>
>  
>
>>
>> Schopenhauer 's view: "A judgment has *material truth* if its concepts 
>> are based on intuitive perceptions that are generated from sensations. If a 
>> judgment has its reason (ground) in another judgment, its truth is called 
>> logical or formal. If a judgment, of, for example, pure mathematics or pure 
>> science, is based on the forms (space, time, causality) of intuitive, 
>> empirical knowledge, then the judgment has transcendental truth."
>> [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth ]
>>
>>
> I guess I am referring to transcend truth here. Truth concerning the 
> integers is sufficient to yield the universe, matter, and all that we see 
> around us.
>
> Jason
>



In my view there is basically just *material* (from matter) truth and 
*linguistic* (from language) truth.

[ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/06/18/to-tell-the-truth/ ] 

Relations and functions are linguistic: relational type theory (RTT) , 
functional type theory (FTT) languages.

Numbers are also linguistic beings, the (fictional) semantic objects of 
Peano arithmetic (PA).

Numbers can be "materialized" via *nominalization *(cf. Hartry Field, refs. 
in [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hartry_Field ]).

- pt

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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

[agrayson2000]

On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 10:27:37 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 6 Dec 2018, at 14:20, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 11:21:38 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 5 Dec 2018, at 17:19, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 3:37:13 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 2 Dec 2018, at 21:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 2:02:43 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



 On 12/2/2018 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 30 Nov 2018, at 19:22, Brent Meeker  wrote:



 On 11/30/2018 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 Perspectivism is a form of modalism.


 Nietzsche is vindicated.


 Interesting. If you elaborate, you might change my mind on Nietzche, 
 perhaps!
 All what I say is very close the Neoplatonism and Negative Theology 
 (capable only of saying what God is not).

 Bruno


 From  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/
 6.2 Perspectivism

 Much of Nietzsche’s reaction to the theoretical philosophy of his 
 predecessors is mediated through his interest in the notion of 
 perspective. 
 He thought that past philosophers had largely ignored the influence of 
 their own perspectives on their work, and had therefore failed to control 
 those perspectival effects (*BGE* 6; see *BGE* I more generally). 
 Commentators have been both fascinated and perplexed by what has come to 
 be 
 called Nietzsche’s “perspectivism”, and it has been a major concern in a 
 number of large-scale Nietzsche commentaries (see, e.g., Danto 1965; 
 Kaulbach 1980, 1990; Schacht 1983; Abel 1984; Nehamas 1985; Clark 1990; 
 Poellner 1995; Richardson 1996; Benne 2005). There has been as much 
 contestation over exactly what doctrine or group of commitments belong 
 under that heading as about their philosophical merits, but a few points 
 are relatively uncontroversial and can provide a useful way into this 
 strand of Nietzsche’s thinking.

 Nietzsche’s appeals to the notion of perspective (or, equivalently in 
 his usage, to an “optics” of knowledge) have a positive, as well as a 
 critical side. Nietzsche frequently criticizes “dogmatic” philosophers for 
 ignoring the perspectival limitations on their theorizing, but as we saw, 
 he simultaneously holds that the operation of perspective makes a positive 
 contribution to our cognitive endeavors: speaking of (what he takes to be) 
 the perversely counterintuitive doctrines of some past philosophers, he 
 writes,

 Particularly as knowers, let us not be ungrateful toward such resolute 
 reversals of the familiar perspectives and valuations with which the 
 spirit 
 has raged against itself all too long… : to see differently in this way 
 for 
 once, *to want* to see differently, is no small discipline and 
 preparation of the intellect for its future “objectivity”—the latter 
 understood not as “disinterested contemplation” (which is a non-concept 
 and 
 absurdity), but rather as the capacity to have one’s Pro and Contra *in 
 one’s power*, and to shift them in and out, so that one knows how to 
 make precisely the *difference* in perspectives and affective 
 interpretations useful for knowledge. (*GM* III, 12)

 This famous passage bluntly rejects the idea, dominant in philosophy at 
 least since Plato, that knowledge essentially involves a form of 
 objectivity that penetrates behind all subjective appearances to reveal 
 the 
 way things really are, independently of any point of view whatsoever. 
 Instead, the proposal is to approach “objectivity” (in a revised 
 conception) asymptotically, by exploiting the difference between one 
 perspective and another, using each to overcome the limitations of others, 
 without assuming that anything like a “view from nowhere” is so much as 
 possible. There is of course an implicit criticism of the traditional 
 picture of a-perspectival objectivity here, but there is equally a 
 positive 
 set of recommendations about how to pursue knowledge as a finite, limited 
 cognitive agent.


 Thanks. But I do not oppose perspectivism with Plato, and certainly not 
 with neoplatonism, which explains everything from the many perspective of 
 the One, or at least can be interpreted that way.

 Pure perspectivism is an extreme position which leads to pure 
 relativism, which does not make sense, as we can only doubt starting from 
 indubitable things (cf Descartes). But Nietzsche might have been OK, as 
 the 
 text above suggested a “revised conception” of objective. 

 With mechanism, you have an ablate truth (the sigma_1 arithmetical 
 truth), 

Re: What is more primary than numbers?

[Jason Resch]

On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:53 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:27:45 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>> I think truth is primitive.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>
>
> As a matter of linguistics (and philosophy),  *truth* and *matter* are
> linked:
>
> "As a matter of fact, ..."
> "The truth of the matter is ..."
> "It matters that ..."
> ...
> [ https://www.etymonline.com/word/matter ]
>

I agree they are linked.  Though matter may be a few steps removed from
truth.  Perhaps one way to interpret the link more directly is thusly:

There is an equation whose every solution (where the equation happens to be
*true*, e.g. is satisfied when it has certain values assigned to its
variables) maps its variables to states of the time evolution of the wave
function of our universe.  You might say that we (literally not
figuratively) live within such an equation.  That its truth reifies what we
call matter.

But I think truth plays an even more fundamental roll than this.  e.g.
because the following statement is *true* "two has a successor" then there
exists a successor to 2 distinct from any previous number.  Similarly, the
*truth* of "9 is not prime" implies the existence of a factor of 9 besides
1 and 9.

Jason




>
> Schopenhauer 's view: "A judgment has *material truth* if its concepts
> are based on intuitive perceptions that are generated from sensations. If a
> judgment has its reason (ground) in another judgment, its truth is called
> logical or formal. If a judgment, of, for example, pure mathematics or pure
> science, is based on the forms (space, time, causality) of intuitive,
> empirical knowledge, then the judgment has transcendental truth."
> [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth ]
>
>
I guess I am referring to transcend truth here. Truth concerning the
integers is sufficient to yield the universe, matter, and all that we see
around us.

Jason

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 8 Dec 2018, at 00:51, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Dec 7, 2018 at 6:40 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >> Physics CAN safely assume that neither Aristotle nor any other ancient 
> >> Greek fossil can be of the slightest help in answering modern cutting edge 
> >> scientific questions. 
> 
> > But we re not doing physics, but metaphysics.
> 
> The trouble with metaphysics is it's too easy, because it doesn't use the 
> scientific method

Since 529.

Metaphysics has been done with the scientific attitude before. It is not easy 
to come back to this because in this filed, since 529 we have been brainswahedq 
by fairy tales, and this includes taking the primitive material reality for 
granted.





> but does allow invisible evidence any theory will work just fine because 
> there are no facts they need to fit. There are a infinite number of 
> metaphysical theories and one is as good as the other.


Not at all. When we do it with the scientific method, we get experimental means 
to verify it.

As quantum mechanics confirms (up to now) mechanism, we can say that we have 
good empirical reason to disbelieve in physicalism or materialism.

Your belief in primary matter on the contrary, is sustained without any 
experimental evidence at all.





>  
> > take Aristotle’s theology
> 
> Please!

No, your remark above show how much it is necessary for you to remember that 
there was another rational conception of reality before Aristotle, and it fits 
better with the contemporary facts (Gödel, Einstein, QM, …).

You talk like if the consciousness problem was solved. I am OK that 
consciousness is easier than intelligence to solve, but it is not so easy when 
we assume mechanism, which enforce to come back to the pre-aristotelian 
conception of reality.

When you invoke matter to make a computation real, you invoke the Aristotelian 
religion. That is just irrational. 




>  
> > Aristotle theology, and [[ Plato was [...] Aristotle, who did not [...]
> 
> And the longest fossilized turd from a extinct thing was 40 inches long and 
> sold for $8,000 in 2014. I guess if something is old enough somebody will 
> think it has value. You can read all about this massive turd here"
> 
> OLD FOSSILIZED TURD 
> 
>  
> > closer to Plato, even Pythagorus, than to Aristotle.
> 
> It's interesting, out of all the ancient Greeks you keep yammering about you 
> never mention the greatest of them all Archimedes, and he was a mathematician 
> and an excellent one. 

Bt we don’t discuss mathematics here. Of course Archimedes was a great guy, no 
doubt, but he was not an expert in metaphysics and theology.



>  
> 
> >>SHOW Me this mystical Turing Machine of yours that doesn't need matter or 
> >>physics make a calculation, don't tell me about it, don't claim to have a 
> >>proof about it, just SHOW ME it making a calculation. And there is nothing 
> >>fuzzy about that request.  
> 
> > I have done that, but then you criticise it as being “invisible”.
> 
> Yes how unreasonable for me not to be impressed by invisible evidence.  


That is what lead you, and others to think that mathematics is conventional. 
Even Einstein did do, until Gödel explained him his mistake.

Numbers are invisible. All the subject matter of mathematics is invisible, yet 
arguably quite “real” and senseful. Then indeed, with mechanism we get the 
theorem that the physical reality emerge from the number arithmetical 
self-reference.



> 
>  > there is no paper showing that primary matter exists.
> 
> Two can play this game, I have invisible evidence it does exist.  

Then explain them. 

An evidence does not need to be visible, but it still needs to be given and 
shared. I can conceive some mathematical evidence for Matter, but eventually, I 
found none. Quite the contrary.




>  
> > You speculate on something, just to prevent scientific testing. That is 
> > unscientific.
> 
> But of course accepting invisible evidence is very very scientific. 


Mathematics is entirely based on invisible evidence. 

Plato was skeptical on just that: the visible evidence, as the dream argument 
shows that visibility is not a criterion of truth.

The idea that visibility is evidence is exactly the Aristotelian theology, well 
recasted in christianity through St-Thomas, who famously said that he believes 
only in what he sees. 


> 
> > Human are made of matter and obey to physics, sure, but that does not mean 
> > that this matter is primitive.
> 
> But it does mean matter can do something numbers can’t.


That inference is not valid if used to defend your idea that some Matter 
exists. Only matter exists, but that one is phenomenological in arithmetic. I 
use “Matter”, with a big M, to denote Aristotle’s notion of matter, with its 
ontological primary existence.



>  
> >> Did you know that of all the people that have extended his work Godel 
> >> thought 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 7 Dec 2018, at 21:17, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 9:39:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 7 Dec 2018, at 12:38, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 4:14:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
>> computationalism is indeed false, and it should be replaced by what I 
>> call real computationalism (where I am adopting the "real" label from 
>> Galen Strawson):
> 
> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
> opinion private, if I have one.
> 
> Bruno
>> 
>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ 
>>  ]
>> 
>>  -pt
>> 
>> 
> 
> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>  
> 
> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
> ] — where 
> there are no such things as mathematical objects — if computation is 
> considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then computationalism is 
> fiction.)
> 
> 
 
 
 You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
 physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
 math-fictionanlist.
 
 But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
 arithmetic.
 
 I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such 
 x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. I 
 can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive 
 waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not have 
 solutions.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 
 Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
 ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
 (like us).
 
 "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist.
>>> 
>>> That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) than 
>>> in the moon.
>>> Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot use 
>>> the computationalist theory of mind.
>>> I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical objects 
>>> are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not aware of 
>>> the pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 Example: The Turing 
 machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
 https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
  
 
  ].
>>> 
>>> Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
>>> immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. 
>>> But the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, and 
>>> their existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 
>>> 0/10, it will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since a 
 computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
 "boring”.)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
>>> machine) in Turing sense.
>>> 
>>> 
 
 So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in some 
>>> non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in
>>> 
>>> http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/   - International Center 
>>> of Unconventional Computing
>>> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/  - 
>>> Unconventional Computation and Natural Computation 2019 TOKYO, June 3-7, 
>>> 2019
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconventional_computing 
>>> 
>>> etc.
>> 
>> Does it assumes that Church’s thesis is false?
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> One just uses the term  unconventional computation or unconventional 
>>> computing - a widely 

Re: What is more primary than numbers?

[Philip Thrift]

On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:27:45 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
> I think truth is primitive.
>
> Jason
>


As a matter of linguistics (and philosophy),  *truth* and *matter* are 
linked:

"As a matter of fact, ..."
"The truth of the matter is ..."
"It matters that ..."
...
[ https://www.etymonline.com/word/matter ]

Schopenhauer 's view: "A judgment has *material truth* if its concepts are 
based on intuitive perceptions that are generated from sensations. If a 
judgment has its reason (ground) in another judgment, its truth is called 
logical or formal. If a judgment, of, for example, pure mathematics or pure 
science, is based on the forms (space, time, causality) of intuitive, 
empirical knowledge, then the judgment has transcendental truth."
[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth ]


- pt

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