Re: Questions about the Equivalence Principle (EP) and GR

[Alan Grayson]

Did Einstein "derive" the field equation using the 5 postulates of GR, or 
did he guess what they had to be based on what the postulates implied? I 
ask this because I recall reading that the field equations published in his 
1916 paper were those he had rejected around 1913. How could the final 
equations be "derived" if they were rejected earlier? The fact that he 
later adds the cosmological constant to satisfy a stable universe seems to 
suggest he was making guesses based on what he thought the postulates 
implied. AG

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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 7:47 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 10:18 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 7:02 PM Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 9:36 AM Jason Resch 
>>> wrote:
>>>

 On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 3:09 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
 everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
> Would it make a difference if they compute the same function?
>

 Not from the perspective of the function.  If the computation is truly
 the same, there is no way the software can determine it's hardware.


> If so  then you might as well say it would make a difference if they
> were run on different hardware.
>

 From the outside it might seem different.  E.g. instead of silicon some
 other element, foreign to the chemistry of this universe, might make for a
 more appropriate substrate.

>>>
>>> But the computations that comprise a conscious mind also, ipso facto,
>>> comprise the whole universe.
>>>
>>
>> I don't see how this follows. Is the computer on your desk the whole
>> universe?  Is it not able to run an isolated computation which is not
>> affected by what other parts of the universe are doing?
>>
>
> The computer on my desk is not conscious!
>

Maybe. I'm not sure we can conclude anything so easily.  But in any case it
can illustrate the point that a computation need not be identical with the
whole of the universe that contains it.


>
>
>> So if the computations are the same, the conscious, AND THE UNIVERSE in
>>> which it resides, are the same. There can, therefore, be no "outside" from
>>> which the consciousnesses and universes are different.
>>>
>>
>> Couldn't what we take to be the physical universe be a simulation run in
>> computer within a very different universe?  Clearly then the outside and
>> inside view would be very different.
>>
>
> But the theory is that the physical universe is a statistical construct
> over all computations running through your conscious self.
>

You're jumping ahead to the final result of the computation, and continue
to jump back and forth between different levels/definitions of universe.
To clarify, let me enumerate stages of the argument such that we can be
clear which one we are speaking of:

1. Your brain can be replaced with a functionally equivalent physical
component which implements its functions digitally (here we change nothing
about our assumption of what the physical universe is)
2. Following from #1, your consciousness can supervene on an appropriately
programmed digital computer
3. Due to Church Turing and #2, the underlying implementation of the
computer (the programming language, the physical material, the laws of
physics, the universe it happens to run in) are irrelevant, only the
functional equivalence at the low-enough level (substitution level) is
important to preserve consciousness (note that nothing to this point has
changed anything about our assumption of reality, the ontology, etc.)
4. Assuming arithmetical realism (which implies the existence of all
computations) and #3, this implies all conscious states exist in
arithmetic. (this makes redundant the assumption of physical universes that
are distinct from physical universes, here we modify our ontological
assumptions about what a physical universe is)
5. Given #4, and the fact that an infinite number of indistinguishable
programs implement your conscious state (e.g. different below your
substitution level), and given that these programs may diverge in the
future, then making predictions about future experiences (the focus of
physics) now becomes a statistical question regarding the distribution of
unique programs existing below your substitution level.  We have now
reached the "reversal" (the laws of physics can be derived from the
arithmetic concerning conscious programs which exist arithmetically, here
we acknowledge that no observer exists in any single universe).

So from the evolution of the view of what is meant by physical universe, we
see there are at least 3 connotations:
A) The first view where a universe is a causally isolated physical
structure which may or may not contain observers
B) The second view where a universe is a relatively stable (perhaps shared)
observation in the mind of some observer(s)
C) The third view where there exists a unified set of metaphysical laws,
applicable to all observers, and in principle these laws can be derived
from the arithmetic of self-reference, there is no longer the notion of an
observer which belongs to a universe as each observer is supported by an
infinity of similar, but distinct computations


So when you say "the theory is that the physical universe is a statistical
construct over all the computations running through your conscious self",
you are correct that this is the logical end and conclusion of the theory
of computationalism.  But when I said you could implement any consciousness
in any 

Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 10:54 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 5/9/2019 5:18 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
> >
> > That all subjectively indistinguishable computations going through
> > that state are a possibility means the consciousness cannot identify
> > itself with any one particular thread of computation. In this sense
> > that consciousness is not the same as one of the programs passing
> > through that state.  But to say the consciousness is not identical
> > with one of the computations is different from saying that computation
> > is not conscious.  If none of the threads of computation resulted in
> > consciousness, you wouldn't magically get consciousness once you
> > reached an infinite number of them.  The only thing you gain with the
> > infinite number of all the computations going through that state is
> > the correct statistics regarding the future evolution of that conscious.
>
> "The state" seems a problematic concept to me.  It tries to roughly
> equate a state of consciousness, a thought, with a state of a Turing
> machine (plus tape).  But saying yes to the doctor implies a much lower
> level of substitution than "a thought".  Thoughts come from perceptions,
> among other things, which are not complete thoughts or "states of
> consciousness".  So it is not at all clear what it means for
> "computations going thru that state" when the state may refer to
> thousands of steps of the Turing machine.  Is a computation thread that
> share 999 of the states "going thru the state"?  And to further
> complicate this mapping between thoughts and machine states, there
> sequence of machine states is the same at the temporal order of thoughts.
>

I think the level of confusion is even greater than this. In order to
develop the YD+CT argument, one must assume the existence of a physical
world that is independent of the consciousness one is trying to emulate in
a computer. But if this physical world is just statistics over the
computations through the conscious state, then altering the physical world
(by constructing the computer to replace the brain) must alter the
conscious state, since the physical world is not independent of the
conscious state in that case. If the YD+CT argument based on the assumption
of an independent physical world leads to the conclusion that there is no
independent physical world, then you have a reductio ad absurdum, and the
argument cannot be valid.

Bruce

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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/9/2019 5:18 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


That all subjectively indistinguishable computations going through 
that state are a possibility means the consciousness cannot identify 
itself with any one particular thread of computation. In this sense 
that consciousness is not the same as one of the programs passing 
through that state.  But to say the consciousness is not identical 
with one of the computations is different from saying that computation 
is not conscious.  If none of the threads of computation resulted in 
consciousness, you wouldn't magically get consciousness once you 
reached an infinite number of them.  The only thing you gain with the 
infinite number of all the computations going through that state is 
the correct statistics regarding the future evolution of that conscious.


"The state" seems a problematic concept to me.  It tries to roughly 
equate a state of consciousness, a thought, with a state of a Turing 
machine (plus tape).  But saying yes to the doctor implies a much lower 
level of substitution than "a thought".  Thoughts come from perceptions, 
among other things, which are not complete thoughts or "states of 
consciousness".  So it is not at all clear what it means for 
"computations going thru that state" when the state may refer to 
thousands of steps of the Turing machine.  Is a computation thread that 
share 999 of the states "going thru the state"?  And to further 
complicate this mapping between thoughts and machine states, there 
sequence of machine states is the same at the temporal order of thoughts.


Brent



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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 10:18 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 7:02 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 9:36 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 3:09 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>>

 Would it make a difference if they compute the same function?

>>>
>>> Not from the perspective of the function.  If the computation is truly
>>> the same, there is no way the software can determine it's hardware.
>>>
>>>
 If so  then you might as well say it would make a difference if they
 were run on different hardware.

>>>
>>> From the outside it might seem different.  E.g. instead of silicon some
>>> other element, foreign to the chemistry of this universe, might make for a
>>> more appropriate substrate.
>>>
>>
>> But the computations that comprise a conscious mind also, ipso facto,
>> comprise the whole universe.
>>
>
> I don't see how this follows. Is the computer on your desk the whole
> universe?  Is it not able to run an isolated computation which is not
> affected by what other parts of the universe are doing?
>

The computer on my desk is not conscious!


> So if the computations are the same, the conscious, AND THE UNIVERSE in
>> which it resides, are the same. There can, therefore, be no "outside" from
>> which the consciousnesses and universes are different.
>>
>
> Couldn't what we take to be the physical universe be a simulation run in
> computer within a very different universe?  Clearly then the outside and
> inside view would be very different.
>

But the theory is that the physical universe is a statistical construct
over all computations running through your conscious self. So any external
universe is part of that construct through your consciousness. So appealing
to an external universe running a simulation does not help at all.

Remember, consciousness is the sum over all computation that pass through
>> that particular conscious state, so in this theory your AI, be it in
>> silicon or the Game of Life, cannot be conscious, because it is a single
>> computation.
>>
>
> That all subjectively indistinguishable computations going through that
> state are a possibility means the consciousness cannot identify itself with
> any one particular thread of computation. In this sense that consciousness
> is not the same as one of the programs passing through that state.  But to
> say the consciousness is not identical with one of the computations is
> different from saying that computation is not conscious.
>

The trouble here is that that is an unproven assumption. If the future of
any conscious moment depends on the statistics over the infinite number of
computations running through that state, then a single computation gives a
conscious moment that does not have a coherent future. Neither does a
single computation exist in a coherent world, since physics, and the
appearance of matter, is also the result of the statistics over the
infinite number of computations. And consciousness must be embedded in a
coherent "world" in order to exist. This makes one suspect that YD + CT,
leading to computationalism, is not a coherent theory.

Bruce

If none of the threads of computation resulted in consciousness, you
> wouldn't magically get consciousness once you reached an infinite number of
> them.  The only thing you gain with the infinite number of all the
> computations going through that state is the correct statistics regarding
> the future evolution of that conscious.
>
> Jason
>

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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 7:02 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 9:36 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>>
>> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 3:09 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Would it make a difference if they compute the same function?
>>>
>>
>> Not from the perspective of the function.  If the computation is truly
>> the same, there is no way the software can determine it's hardware.
>>
>>
>>> If so  then you might as well say it would make a difference if they
>>> were run on different hardware.
>>>
>>
>> From the outside it might seem different.  E.g. instead of silicon some
>> other element, foreign to the chemistry of this universe, might make for a
>> more appropriate substrate.
>>
>
> But the computations that comprise a conscious mind also, ipso facto,
> comprise the whole universe.
>

I don't see how this follows. Is the computer on your desk the whole
universe?  Is it not able to run an isolated computation which is not
affected by what other parts of the universe are doing?


> So if the computations are the same, the conscious, AND THE UNIVERSE in
> which it resides, are the same. There can, therefore, be no "outside" from
> which the consciousnesses and universes are different.
>

Couldn't what we take to be the physical universe be a simulation run in
computer within a very different universe?  Clearly then the outside and
inside view would be very different.



> Remember, consciousness is the sum over all computation that pass through
> that particular conscious state, so in this theory your AI, be it in
> silicon or the Game of Life, cannot be conscious, because it is a single
> computation.
>

That all subjectively indistinguishable computations going through that
state are a possibility means the consciousness cannot identify itself with
any one particular thread of computation. In this sense that consciousness
is not the same as one of the programs passing through that state.  But to
say the consciousness is not identical with one of the computations is
different from saying that computation is not conscious.  If none of the
threads of computation resulted in consciousness, you wouldn't magically
get consciousness once you reached an infinite number of them.  The only
thing you gain with the infinite number of all the computations going
through that state is the correct statistics regarding the future evolution
of that conscious.

Jason

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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 9:36 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

>
> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 3:09 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>>
>> Would it make a difference if they compute the same function?
>>
>
> Not from the perspective of the function.  If the computation is truly the
> same, there is no way the software can determine it's hardware.
>
>
>> If so  then you might as well say it would make a difference if they were
>> run on different hardware.
>>
>
> From the outside it might seem different.  E.g. instead of silicon some
> other element, foreign to the chemistry of this universe, might make for a
> more appropriate substrate.
>

But the computations that comprise a conscious mind also, ipso facto,
comprise the whole universe. So if the computations are the same, the
conscious, AND THE UNIVERSE in which it resides, are the same. There can,
therefore, be no "outside" from which the consciousnesses and universes are
different. Remember, consciousness is the sum over all computation that
pass through that particular conscious state, so in this theory your AI, be
it in silicon or the Game of Life, cannot be conscious, because it is a
single computation.

Bruce

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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 3:09 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 5/9/2019 12:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 2:21 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 5/9/2019 11:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 12:06 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/9/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 3 May 2019, at 15:27, Terren Suydam  wrote:
>>>
>>> One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is associated
>>> with the way information is processed.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That is mechanism, but then you inherit infinitely many
>>> body-representation in arithmetic, and the mind-body problem becomes in
>>> part a justification of the appearances from a statistic to all
>>> computations going through our brain. Then incompleteness explains what
>>> this take the shape of a quantum reality.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> This is substrate independent - the fact that a brain is physical is
>>> beside the point. You could implement a brain in software, and insofar as
>>> the same kinds of information processing occur, it would be conscious in
>>> the same kind of way.
>>>
>>>
>>> Only if it exists in the same kind of world.
>>>
>>>
>> Church-Turing implies that the world is irrelevant, so long as it is
>> possible to build a computer in some universe, it is possible to
>> instantiate/access any conscious state from that universe.
>>
>>
>> But the same inference implies that all universes are the same.
>>
>
> That doesn't follow.  It's more like saying one universe is  FORTRAN and
> another is LISP.  Both have the property of universality, but they operate
> very differently.
>
>
> Would it make a difference if they compute the same function?
>

Not from the perspective of the function.  If the computation is truly the
same, there is no way the software can determine it's hardware.


> If so  then you might as well say it would make a difference if they were
> run on different hardware.
>

>From the outside it might seem different.  E.g. instead of silicon some
other element, foreign to the chemistry of this universe, might make for a
more appropriate substrate.


> Then you might have other universes where universal machines can't be
> built.
>
>
>> If a universe is just whatever can be computed
>>
>
> I didn't say a universe is what can be computed, only that in universes
> where computers can be built, then any conscious state can be accessed
> (according to the computational theory of mind).
>
>
> Then it's not clear to me what you mean by "can be" and "accessed".
>

Here I want to be careful not to use the word create or generate, as Bruno
would point out that you can't really create conscious states, they already
exist. Just like no one can create the number 5.  But you can create a
consciousness that you would otherwise not have direct access to, and be
able to interview it, converse with it, etc. by realizing it in your local
environment and feeding inputs into it and reading outputs from the
emulation.


>   Bruno's idea is that if computation exists, and it does in arithmetic,
> then all conscious states
>

I would add a small clarification, (which I think you implied but did not
state) "if all computation exists" then "all conscious states exist" --
assuming computationalism


> (and I say implicitly therefore all physics) exists.
>

I think Bruno uses the word physics a bit differently than in the sense you
and I might, as the science of making predictions of future experiences.
In this sense, you might say there is a different physics for each mind,
but you could also say there is a single (overarching) "meta-physics" or
"trans-physics"  whose more general rules are applicable to all experiences
of all minds.


>   Does accessed=exists?
>

Think of it like a GoL universe, which we might take to exist a priori
under some form of mathematical realism.  By running a computer simulation
of that GoL universe, we can access it, explore it, run experiments in it,
extract information from it, and so on.  This is what I meant by accessing
the conscious state.  It is is perhaps more correctly thought of as
"recreating" rather than "creating".

Jason


>
> Brent
>
>
> Jason
>
>
>> then there are no different universes and to say the physics of the
>> universe is simulated and "not primary" is the same as saying everything in
>> the universe is simulated and not primary.  This the end point of
>> everythingism in which it devolves into nothingism.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>   This is little different from saying you could have a representation of
>> the first 100 binary digits of Pi in many different kinds of universes, so
>> long as their physics allows for digital representations.
>>
>> Deep-Blue running on a computer in this universe is the same Deep Blue as
>> one running in an a computer in the 

Re: The religion of AI

[John Clark]

On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 4:06 PM 'Cosmin Visan'  <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>>I have no idea what you mean by "free will" and, because you obviously
>> haven't given the matter any serious thought, you don't know what you mean
>> by "free will" either. However I do know there are only 2 posabilities,
>> events happen because of cause and effect or they don't.
>
>
> *> Only because you don't have absolute will it doesn't mean you don't
> have limited will. I see a lot of strawman fallacy around here.*
>

Did you choose to respond to my post for a reason? If you did then your
very response demonstrates the falsehood of the idea you're trying to
convey. On the other hand if you responded for no reason then you are being
irrational and irrational arguments are obviously not to be taken
seriously. And if there is anything in the world we can be absolutely
positively 100% certain of its that you either did or you didn't.

I have said many times before there is no law of logic that demands every
event have a cause and I stand by that, however every argument that claims
to be logical must have a cause.

 John K Clark

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Re: for Cosmin

[Terren Suydam]

Thanks for the trip down memory lane, but I don't see your point.

On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 5:43 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Thursday, May 9, 2019 at 4:31:11 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>
>> Since consciousness is not a material thing, ...
>>
>
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GnMvj9HETZw
>
>
> @philipthrift
>
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> 
> .
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>

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Re: for Cosmin

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, May 9, 2019 at 4:31:11 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
>
> Since consciousness is not a material thing, ...
>
 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GnMvj9HETZw


@philipthrift

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Re: for Cosmin

[Terren Suydam]

Since consciousness is not a material thing, a metaphysics in which the
primary reality is not physical makes it possible to reconcile the link
between brains and minds.

On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 4:05 PM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> And what has this to do with consciousness ?
>
> On Thursday, 9 May 2019 00:40:59 UTC+3, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>
>> For me it boils down to that a theory of everything in which all possible
>> worlds exist is more plausible than one in which only world does.
>>
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Re: The religion of AI

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

OK, what limits it?  physics?

Brent

On 5/9/2019 1:06 PM, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List wrote:
Only because you don't have absolute will it doesn't mean you don't 
have limited will. I see a lot of strawman fallacy around here.


On Thursday, 9 May 2019 00:17:06 UTC+3, Brent wrote:

So you can will yourself to experience new qualia?

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Re: for Cosmin

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/9/2019 1:05 PM, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List wrote:

And what has this to do with consciousness ?

On Thursday, 9 May 2019 00:40:59 UTC+3, Terren Suydam wrote:

For me it boils down to that a theory of everything in which all
possible worlds exist is more plausible than one in which only
world does.



I suspect that arises from a lack of reflection on what "all possible" 
might mean.


Brent

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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/9/2019 12:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 2:21 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:




On 5/9/2019 11:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 12:06 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



On 5/9/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 3 May 2019, at 15:27, Terren Suydam
mailto:terren.suy...@gmail.com>>
wrote:

One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is
associated with the way information is processed.



That is mechanism, but then you inherit infinitely many
body-representation in arithmetic, and the mind-body problem
becomes in part a justification of the appearances from a
statistic to all computations going through our brain. Then
incompleteness explains what this take the shape of a
quantum reality.





This is substrate independent - the fact that a brain is
physical is beside the point. You could implement a brain
in software, and insofar as the same kinds of information
processing occur, it would be conscious in the same kind of
way.


Only if it exists in the same kind of world.


Church-Turing implies that the world is irrelevant, so long as it
is possible to build a computer in some universe, it is possible
to instantiate/access any conscious state from that universe.


But the same inference implies that all universes are the same.


That doesn't follow.  It's more like saying one universe is  FORTRAN 
and another is LISP.  Both have the property of universality, but they 
operate very differently.


Would it make a difference if they compute the same function?  If so  
then you might as well say it would make a difference if they were run 
on different hardware.


Then you might have other universes where universal machines can't be 
built.


If a universe is just whatever can be computed


I didn't say a universe is what can be computed, only that in 
universes where computers can be built, then any conscious state can 
be accessed (according to the computational theory of mind).


Then it's not clear to me what you mean by "can be" and "accessed". 
Bruno's idea is that if computation exists, and it does in arithmetic, 
then all conscious states (and I say implicitly therefore all physics) 
exists.  Does accessed=exists?


Brent



Jason

then there are no different universes and to say the physics of
the universe is simulated and "not primary" is the same as saying
everything in the universe is simulated and not primary. This the
end point of everythingism in which it devolves into nothingism.

Brent


  This is little different from saying you could have a
representation of the first 100 binary digits of Pi in many
different kinds of universes, so long as their physics allows for
digital representations.

Deep-Blue running on a computer in this universe is the same Deep
Blue as one running in an a computer in the Game-of-Life
universe, or on a computer in an alternate (of the 10^500) other
string theory universes. CT implies it is impossible for any
software to determine its underlying hardware, and this in
determinism extends to the underlying physics of that hardware.'

Jason



I find this idea compelling because it makes the link
between brains and consciousness without requiring matter,
and provides a framework for understanding consciousnesses
of other kinds of machines.  All that's required is to
assume there is something it is like for computation to occur.


Yes. Then it is sad that so few people are aware that the
notion of computation is a purely arithmetical definition,
so that we don’t need to assume more than Robison
arithmetic. Worst, we cannot assume more, without exploding
the number of aberration histories.


Doesn't this worry you, that you are trimming your theory to
get a desired outcome?   Is it empiricism?


This makes mechanism testable, by comparing the physics
emerging from the self-referential statistics on all
computations with the inferred physics. And it match well,
were physics itself miss the relation with the first person
perspective, necessarily (assuming mechanism). A materialist
has a way out: to invoke infinite to make the link
brain-mind one-one, which it cannot be once we do the
digital truncation.


That's only because you are assuming the mind is
infinite...which seems a little arrogant.

Brent
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Re: The religion of AI

['Cosmin Visan' via Everything List]

Only because you don't have absolute will it doesn't mean you don't have 
limited will. I see a lot of strawman fallacy around here.

On Thursday, 9 May 2019 00:17:06 UTC+3, Brent wrote:
>
> So you can will yourself to experience new qualia?
>

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Re: for Cosmin

['Cosmin Visan' via Everything List]

And what has this to do with consciousness ?

On Thursday, 9 May 2019 00:40:59 UTC+3, Terren Suydam wrote:
>
> For me it boils down to that a theory of everything in which all possible 
> worlds exist is more plausible than one in which only world does.
>
>

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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 2:21 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 5/9/2019 11:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 12:06 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 5/9/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 3 May 2019, at 15:27, Terren Suydam  wrote:
>>
>> One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is associated
>> with the way information is processed.
>>
>>
>>
>> That is mechanism, but then you inherit infinitely many
>> body-representation in arithmetic, and the mind-body problem becomes in
>> part a justification of the appearances from a statistic to all
>> computations going through our brain. Then incompleteness explains what
>> this take the shape of a quantum reality.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> This is substrate independent - the fact that a brain is physical is
>> beside the point. You could implement a brain in software, and insofar as
>> the same kinds of information processing occur, it would be conscious in
>> the same kind of way.
>>
>>
>> Only if it exists in the same kind of world.
>>
>>
> Church-Turing implies that the world is irrelevant, so long as it is
> possible to build a computer in some universe, it is possible to
> instantiate/access any conscious state from that universe.
>
>
> But the same inference implies that all universes are the same.
>

That doesn't follow.  It's more like saying one universe is  FORTRAN and
another is LISP.  Both have the property of universality, but they operate
very differently.  Then you might have other universes where universal
machines can't be built.


> If a universe is just whatever can be computed
>

I didn't say a universe is what can be computed, only that in universes
where computers can be built, then any conscious state can be accessed
(according to the computational theory of mind).

Jason


> then there are no different universes and to say the physics of the
> universe is simulated and "not primary" is the same as saying everything in
> the universe is simulated and not primary.  This the end point of
> everythingism in which it devolves into nothingism.
>
> Brent
>
>   This is little different from saying you could have a representation of
> the first 100 binary digits of Pi in many different kinds of universes, so
> long as their physics allows for digital representations.
>
> Deep-Blue running on a computer in this universe is the same Deep Blue as
> one running in an a computer in the Game-of-Life universe, or on a computer
> in an alternate (of the 10^500) other string theory universes. CT implies
> it is impossible for any software to determine its underlying hardware, and
> this in determinism extends to the underlying physics of that hardware.'
>
> Jason
>
>
>>
>> I find this idea compelling because it makes the link between brains and
>> consciousness without requiring matter, and provides a framework for
>> understanding consciousnesses of other kinds of machines.  All that's
>> required is to assume there is something it is like for computation to
>> occur.
>>
>>
>> Yes. Then it is sad that so few people are aware that the notion of
>> computation is a purely arithmetical definition, so that we don’t need to
>> assume more than Robison arithmetic. Worst, we cannot assume more, without
>> exploding the number of aberration histories.
>>
>>
>> Doesn't this worry you, that you are trimming your theory to get a
>> desired outcome?   Is it empiricism?
>>
>> This makes mechanism testable, by comparing the physics emerging from the
>> self-referential statistics on all computations with the inferred physics.
>> And it match well, were physics itself miss the relation with the first
>> person perspective, necessarily (assuming mechanism). A materialist has a
>> way out: to invoke infinite to make the link brain-mind one-one, which it
>> cannot be once we do the digital truncation.
>>
>>
>> That's only because you are assuming the mind is infinite...which seems a
>> little arrogant.
>>
>> Brent
>> --
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>> "Everything List" group.
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>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/9/2019 11:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 12:06 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:




On 5/9/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 3 May 2019, at 15:27, Terren Suydam mailto:terren.suy...@gmail.com>> wrote:

One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is
associated with the way information is processed.



That is mechanism, but then you inherit infinitely many
body-representation in arithmetic, and the mind-body problem
becomes in part a justification of the appearances from a
statistic to all computations going through our brain. Then
incompleteness explains what this take the shape of a quantum
reality.





This is substrate independent - the fact that a brain is
physical is beside the point. You could implement a brain in
software, and insofar as the same kinds of information
processing occur, it would be conscious in the same kind of way.


Only if it exists in the same kind of world.


Church-Turing implies that the world is irrelevant, so long as it is 
possible to build a computer in some universe, it is possible to 
instantiate/access any conscious state from that universe.


But the same inference implies that all universes are the same.  If a 
universe is just whatever can be computed then there are no different 
universes and to say the physics of the universe is simulated and "not 
primary" is the same as saying everything in the universe is simulated 
and not primary.  This the end point of everythingism in which it 
devolves into nothingism.


Brent

  This is little different from saying you could have a representation 
of the first 100 binary digits of Pi in many different kinds of 
universes, so long as their physics allows for digital representations.


Deep-Blue running on a computer in this universe is the same Deep Blue 
as one running in an a computer in the Game-of-Life universe, or on a 
computer in an alternate (of the 10^500) other string theory 
universes. CT implies it is impossible for any software to determine 
its underlying hardware, and this in determinism extends to the 
underlying physics of that hardware.'


Jason



I find this idea compelling because it makes the link between
brains and consciousness without requiring matter, and provides
a framework for understanding consciousnesses of other kinds of
machines. All that's required is to assume there is something it
is like for computation to occur.


Yes. Then it is sad that so few people are aware that the notion
of computation is a purely arithmetical definition, so that we
don’t need to assume more than Robison arithmetic. Worst, we
cannot assume more, without exploding the number of aberration
histories.


Doesn't this worry you, that you are trimming your theory to get a
desired outcome?   Is it empiricism?


This makes mechanism testable, by comparing the physics emerging
from the self-referential statistics on all computations with the
inferred physics. And it match well, were physics itself miss the
relation with the first person perspective, necessarily (assuming
mechanism). A materialist has a way out: to invoke infinite to
make the link brain-mind one-one, which it cannot be once we do
the digital truncation.


That's only because you are assuming the mind is infinite...which
seems a little arrogant.

Brent
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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 12:06 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 5/9/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 3 May 2019, at 15:27, Terren Suydam  wrote:
>
> One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is associated
> with the way information is processed.
>
>
>
> That is mechanism, but then you inherit infinitely many
> body-representation in arithmetic, and the mind-body problem becomes in
> part a justification of the appearances from a statistic to all
> computations going through our brain. Then incompleteness explains what
> this take the shape of a quantum reality.
>
>
>
>
> This is substrate independent - the fact that a brain is physical is
> beside the point. You could implement a brain in software, and insofar as
> the same kinds of information processing occur, it would be conscious in
> the same kind of way.
>
>
> Only if it exists in the same kind of world.
>
>
Church-Turing implies that the world is irrelevant, so long as it is
possible to build a computer in some universe, it is possible to
instantiate/access any conscious state from that universe.  This is little
different from saying you could have a representation of the first 100
binary digits of Pi in many different kinds of universes, so long as their
physics allows for digital representations.

Deep-Blue running on a computer in this universe is the same Deep Blue as
one running in an a computer in the Game-of-Life universe, or on a computer
in an alternate (of the 10^500) other string theory universes. CT implies
it is impossible for any software to determine its underlying hardware, and
this in determinism extends to the underlying physics of that hardware.'

Jason


>
> I find this idea compelling because it makes the link between brains and
> consciousness without requiring matter, and provides a framework for
> understanding consciousnesses of other kinds of machines.  All that's
> required is to assume there is something it is like for computation to
> occur.
>
>
> Yes. Then it is sad that so few people are aware that the notion of
> computation is a purely arithmetical definition, so that we don’t need to
> assume more than Robison arithmetic. Worst, we cannot assume more, without
> exploding the number of aberration histories.
>
>
> Doesn't this worry you, that you are trimming your theory to get a desired
> outcome?   Is it empiricism?
>
> This makes mechanism testable, by comparing the physics emerging from the
> self-referential statistics on all computations with the inferred physics.
> And it match well, were physics itself miss the relation with the first
> person perspective, necessarily (assuming mechanism). A materialist has a
> way out: to invoke infinite to make the link brain-mind one-one, which it
> cannot be once we do the digital truncation.
>
>
> That's only because you are assuming the mind is infinite...which seems a
> little arrogant.
>
> Brent
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
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> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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> 
> .
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
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Re: Church's Thesis

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, May 9, 2019 at 11:56:41 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 6 May 2019, at 01:40, cloud...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> *The Church-Turing thesis is one of the most useless ideas ever invented.*
>
>
>
> You know that?
>


I just say that *CTT* (as it is acronymized) is a type of dogmatic theism 
(like YHWH ). 

Better to ignore it.


@philipthrift

 

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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, May 9, 2019 at 8:22:38 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 9 May 2019, at 13:03, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, May 9, 2019 at 5:34:29 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 3 May 2019, at 16:10, cloud...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> The general response here is that there has never existed a program that 
>> has executed outside a computer. And computers are made of matter.
>>
>>
>> That is false. Programs have been discovered in arithmetic, like prime 
>> numbers. Computations are number relation (the sigma_1 one).
>>
>> “
>>
>
> Who discovered arithmetic and where is it?
>
>
> Arithmetic is known by human before they developed written language, and 
> the first proof of sophisticated result, are 5000 years old, with the 
> tablets showing those ancient people got all Pythagorean triples. 
>
>
>
>
> I get the idea that Arthur Conan Doyle "discovered" Sherlock Holmes, and 
> he "is" in books and people's brains (imaginations).
>
>
> Arithmetic has been found independently by Chinese, Indian, europeans, 
> etc. Everyone agree on all arithmetical proposition, without any exception. 
> It is used all the time, everyday, and your laptop would cease functioning 
> if only one arithmetical proposition would be false. Sherlock Holmes is a 
> creation of the mind by Doyle. You can meet human approximating him, but 
> even if they look very similar, it is not Sherlock Holmes, by definition.
>
>
>
> But arithmetic actually has no more reality than that, outside of its 
> operations in brains and man-made things. One can say DNA or other natural 
> things is "doing" arithmetic and so forth. That kind of thing.
>
> But where is this thing you call arithmetic?
>
>
> Numbers, and arithmetical relation are out of the category of things to 
> which “where” applies, unless you define “where” in some arithmetical 
> sense, like when we say that 10^100 is far from 0, but of course, this is 
> not used in the physical sense. 
>
> On the contrary, the physical “whereness” is derived from mechanism and 
> arithmetic.
>
> The theory of everything is explicitly given by classical logic +
>
> 1) 0 ≠ s(x)
> 2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
> 3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 
> 4) x+0 = x
> 5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
> 6) x*0=0
> 7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
>
> If you eliminate just one axiom from that theory, you get very interesting 
> theories, but none is Turing complete.
>
> We can use anything Turing equivalent. I have proven recently and 
> explicitly on this list that the following theory is Turing complete:
>
> 1) If A = B and A = C, then B = C
> 2) If A = B then AC = BC
> 3) If A = B then CA = CB
> 4) KAB = A
> 5) SABC = AC(BC)
>
> Those two theories lead to the same machine theology, and thus the same 
> physics, and up to now, it fits with Nature, and explains entirely what is 
> consciousness and where it comes from. 
>
> Bruno
>
>
>


I still don't get how a unique physics comes out of a particular Theory Of 
Arithmetic (TOA)  --  Is a theory of dark matter already lurking within TOA 
ready to be derived? -- but as for arithmetic being "universal" among 
cultures, arithmetical abilities are also found in other animals, like 
birds.

   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bird_intelligence


Just as there is panexperientialism -- experientiality at various (proto) 
levels is found universally in all matter 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism#Panexperientialism

-- and panlinguisticism -- ditto language -- there is panarithmeticalism.

Matter has all these aspects: experiential, grammatical, arithmetical.

@philipthrift



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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 6 May 2019, at 09:44, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 4:41 PM Jason Resch  > wrote:
> On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 1:19 AM Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> 
> This is essentially the point that both Turing and Goedel made when they 
> pointed out that human consciousness is not Turing emulable -- it involves 
> intuitive leaps that are not algorithmic, presumable coming from an uncodable 
> environment.
> 
> Could you provide citations to Turing and Godel's thoughts on this?  In my 
> view Turing was the founder of functionalism/computationalism, when in his 
> 1950 paper "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" he wrote:
> 
> “The fact that Babbage's Analytical Engine
> was to be entirely mechanical will help us rid ourselves of a superstition. 
> Importance is often
> attached to the fact that modern digital computers are electrical, and the 
> nervous system is also
> electrical. Since Babbage's machine was not electrical, and since all digital 
> computers are in a sense
> equivalent, we see that this use of electricity cannot be of theoretical 
> importance. [...] If we wish to
> find such similarities we should look rather for mathematical analogies of 
> function.”
> 
> As for Godel, while I am aware of instances where his ideas have been 
> misapplied by some philosophers to argue that human consciousness is not 
> Turing emulable, I am not aware of any writings of Godel where he expressed 
> such ideas. It is hard for me to believe Godel himself misunderstood his own 
> ideas to the extent necessary to believe human mathematicians somehow  immune 
> to its implications.  According to Godel's 14 points (his own personal 
> philosophy) it suggests he sees nothing special about the material 
> composition, and he also believes all problems (including art) can be 
> addressed through systematic methods. This suggests to me he would be a 
> proponent of at least "weak AI", which again is sufficient for my thought 
> experiment.
> 
> 1. The world is rational.
> 2. Human reason can, in principle, be developed more highly (through certain 
> techniques).
> 3. There are systematic methods for the solution of all problems (also art, 
> etc.).
> 4. There are other worlds and rational beings of a different and higher kind.
> 5. The world in which we live is not the only one in which we shall live or 
> have lived.
> 6. There is incomparably more knowable a priori than is currently known.
> 7. The development of human thought since the Renaissance is thoroughly 
> intelligible (durchaus einsichtige).
> 8. Reason in mankind will be developed in every direction.
> 9. Formal rights comprise a real science.
> 10. Materialism is false.
> 11. The higher beings are connected to the others by analogy, not by 
> composition.
> 12. Concepts have an objective existence.
> 13. There is a scientific (exact) philosophy and theology, which deals with 
> concepts of the highest abstractness; and this is also most highly fruitful 
> for science.
> 14. Religions are, for the most part, bad– but religion is not.
> 
> (Emphasis mine)
> 
> Jason
> 
> I base these comments on an analysis in a paper by Copeland and Shagrir, in 
> the book "Computability: Turing, Goedel, Church, and Beyond" (MIT Press, 
> 2015). The main argument is that "In about 1970, Goedel wrote a brief note 
> entitled 'A Philosophical Error in Turing's Work' (1972; in Goedel's 
> Collected Works)." "In the postscript, Goedel also raised the intriguing 
> 'question of whether there exist finite non-mechanical procedures'; and he 
> observed that the generalised incompleteness results 'do not establish any 
> bounds for the powers of human reason, but rather for the potentialities of 
> pure formalism in mathematics."
> 
> "A philosophical error in Turing's work. Turing in [section 9 of "On 
> Computable Numbers" (1936, 75-76)} gives an argument which is supposed to 
> show that mental procedures cannot go beyond mechanical procedures. However 
> ... what Turing disregards completely is the fact that mind, in its use, is 
> not static, but constantly developing …


Yes, to be a sequence of machines, with or without oracle. That will not change 
anything with the consequence of YD + TC.
Actually this follows from work by Turing and Feferman. 




> Although at each stage the number and precision of the abstract terms at our 
> disposal may be finite, both (and, therefore, also Turing's number of 
> distinguishable states of mind) may converge toward infinity in the course of 
> the application of the procedure. (Geode 1972, 306).”

No problem with this. That cannot be used to refute CT. It can make the price 
growing for relatively physical articficial brains, but they are free in 
elementary arithmetic.



> 
> Further: "What Turing disregards completely is the fact that mind, in its 
> use, is not static, but constantly developing.

OK. The sequence of machine I alluded too in my previous 

Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/9/2019 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 4 May 2019, at 02:32, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:




On 5/3/2019 2:00 PM, cloudver...@gmail.com wrote:



On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 3:26:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 5/3/2019 12:00 PM, cloud...@gmail.com  wrote:



If "consciousness doesn't supervene on physical [or material]
computation" then does that mean there is realm for (A)
consciousness and one for (B) physical [or material] computation?


No, the theory is that all possible computations (the UD) exist
and they instantiate all conscious thoughts, including those we
call perception of an external reality.   There isn't anymore to
reality; it's just the statistical regularities among the
different threads of the UD.  At least that's Bruno's idea.

Brent




There could be *UD-computing* that is being executed by the brain. 
One can't rule this out a priori.


I just say if so, it is being executed in a material substrate - 
*the brain!*


There is no heavenly realm where UD-computing is churning away.


The question is whether there is a realm consisting of arithmetic.


If there is none, then there is no more physical science at all. To 
have any physical science capable of explaining brains, or even my 
laptop, you need to assume that 2+2=4 and its consequences.


But you don't have to assume "primitive arithmetic".  You adduce all you 
need empirically.




Primary matter is not something observable, in any direct way.


Neither is arithmetic.

Brent

We can only asses or refute it by meaning numbers, that is, 
experimental physics.


Now, with just a bit more than arithmetic, we can define the realm of 
arithmetic: it is the structure (N, 0, +, x). It is used in the 
definition of real and complex numbers, which are assumed in most 
physical theories.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/9/2019 4:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 4 May 2019, at 02:28, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:




On 5/3/2019 1:35 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:



On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 4:19 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:




On 5/3/2019 11:44 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:


On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 1:10 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:

I think that is right.  But when you consider some
simplified cases, e.g. a computation written out on paper
(or Bruno's movie graph) it becomes apparent that
consciousness must ultimately refer to other things.


Right, the movie graph argument shows that consciousness
doesn't supervene on physical computation. Nevertheless, the
character of my consciousness still corresponds with the kind
of cybernetic system implemented by e.g. my brain and body, as
instantiated by the infinity of programs going through my state.


What makes it "your state"?  It's just a bunch of programs. Why
those programs and not others?


It's the set of programs that implements the body/brain used to 
construct my inner world.


But that doesn't explain why there is such a thing as "your inner 
world" that is separate from "my inner world".  Why don't the 
programs produce overlapping or mixing "inner worlds".



Much is made of "self-awareness" but this is usually just
having an internal model of one's body, or social standing
or some other model of the self.  It is not consciousness
of consciousness...that is only a temporal reflection: "I
was conscious just now."


I see it a little differently. The self-model/ego is a
higher-order construct that organizes the system in a holistic
way.


? That sounds like a kind of dualism.  You're postulating
something that creates a "higher-order construct".  If you're
following Bruno's idea things have to just come out of the UD
threads.  There's nothing to create anything more.


For the self-image construct, I mean 'construct' in the same way 
that anything we learn is a construct. The self-image represents a 
higher-order construct on top of the types of constructs that, say, 
a dog might employ. A dog has a self-image of a certain type, but 
with humans (for whom I'll call the self-image 'ego' to 
differentiate from animal self-image), the ego's construction is 
conceptual and requires language. The ego is a narrative, and that 
narrative acts to organize the system as a whole.




We take this for granted - it's the water we swim in - but our
minds are radically re-organized as children by the taught
narrative that we have an identity


You don't have teach a kid he has an identity. He knows who's
hungry.  He has a view point.


Just like a dog. But a kid knows his name (learned) and can answer 
the question, "why did you do that?". The answer to that question is 
also largely learned. We are told who to be, what's right, wrong, 
appropriate, taboo, etc., for the culture we grow up in. IOW why I 
do something is filtered through learned cultural constructs. Most 
of the time the answer amounts to a justification in terms of what's 
appropriate, logical, or some other descriptor that benefits me in 
some way relative to the implicit values I'm socialized to.  This 
form of self-image is of a higher order than whatever self-image my 
dog has.


I don't disagree with any of that, but I don't see that any of it is 
entailed by there being the infinite programs of the UD.


Doesn't the UD include all it's computations, which are not only 
infinite but uncountable.


Brent



Just to be precise, all programs are finite. The universal 
programs/machine/number are finite. The UD is a finite object, a 
number itself.


The computations can be infinite. Like "being prime” has an infinite 
extension (meaning).


Whatever 3-p things does the UD, is provable in Robinson arithmetic. 
The 1p-things of the machine do escape the ontological realities. 
Arithmetic seen from inside is infinitely bigger and complex than the 
3p arithmetic. The Löbian machine all know this already.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 6 May 2019, at 08:19, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 3:59 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
> On 5/5/2019 10:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>  
> On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 10:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
>> On 5/5/2019 7:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> On 5/5/2019 5:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
 On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
 >>> > wrote:
 
 
 On 5/5/2019 3:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
> How do we know other humans are conscious (we don't, we can only suspect 
> it).
> 
> Why do we suspect other humans are conscious (due to their outwardly 
> visible behaviors).
> 
> Due to the Church-Turing thesis, we know an appropriately programmed 
> computer can replicate any finitely describable behavior.  Therefore a 
> person with an appropriately programmed computer, placed in someone's 
> skill, and wired into the nervous system of a human could perfectly mimic 
> the behaviors, speech patterns, thoughts, skills, of any person you have 
> ever met.
> 
> Do you dispute any of the above? 
 
 It assumes you could violate Holevo's theorem to obtain the necessary 
 program.
 
 
 You could find the program by chance or by iteration (for the purposes of 
 the thought experiment).
>>> 
>>> In those cases you could never know that you had been successful.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The question wasn't whether or not we would succeed, but given that we know 
>>> it is possible to succeed, given there ezists a program that could convince 
>>> you it was your friend, why doubt it is consciousness?
>> 
>> I don't think I would doubt it was conscious even if it just acted as 
>> intelligent as some stranger.  But note that it would have to be 
>> interactive.  So I think Wegner's point is that makes its computations not 
>> finitely describable.
>> 
>> Who is Wegner in this context, and what was his point?
>> 
>> I don't see how any computation could be not finitely describable, given 
>> that any programs can be expressed as a finite integer.
> 
> This guy, Peter Wegner, that pt referred to indirectly. 
> http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf 
>   His point is that 
> human consciousness is an interactive program that receives arbitrary and 
> unknown inputs from the environment and is modified by those inputs.  He 
> calls this model a PTM, Persistent Turing Machine, because it keeps a memory 
> and doesn't overwrite it.  Of course you can say that whatever the 
> environmental input is, it can be included in the TM code, but then it is 
> potentially inifinite.
> 
> Brent
> 
> This is essentially the point that both Turing and Goedel made when they 
> pointed out that human consciousness is not Turing emulable

Turing is mechanist. I am not sure what make you think that Turing would have 
said that “consciousness is not Turing emulable” (although it is a sophisticate 
truth of mechanism, but not known at the time of Turing). In fact Turing opted 
the positivism of his time, and consider only the question through the 
behaviour. He said only that consciousness is not testable, except through 
behaviour (and invented his “Turing test” for that matter. He would have 
admitted YD and of course CT.

For Gödel, it is more complex, but he also defended version of mechanism, 
taking into account that a concrete machine is a sequence of machines,, but he 
added CT, and would have doubted YD, but only because he did not see that YD+CT 
is opposite to naturalism. Gödel was linking, despite his platonism, mechanism 
and materialism. My contribituon is that mechanism is antipode of 
weak-materialism.




> -- it involves intuitive leaps that are not algorithmic, presumable coming 
> from an uncodable environment.

Even without. Even for the universal machine doing nothing more than 
self-introspection, her consciousness (related to []p & p) is not definable, 
for reason related to the fact that knowledge and truth are not definable by 
any machine, when the range of that knowledge and truth is vast enough to 
encompass the machine itself.
Now, no machine can know which computations support her, and this too add to 
the non computability of an environment, when there is one (which is always a 
relative indexical notion).

Bruno




> 
> Bruce
> 
> -- 
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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/9/2019 3:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 3 May 2019, at 19:09, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:


I think that is right.  But when you consider some simplified cases, 
e.g. a computation written out on paper (or Bruno's movie graph) it 
becomes apparent that consciousness must ultimately refer to other 
things.  Much is made of "self-awareness" but this is usually just 
having an internal model of one's body, or social standing or some 
other model of the self.  It is not consciousness of 
consciousness...that is only a temporal reflection: "I was conscious 
just now."  In general terms we could say consciousness is awareness 
of the evironment, where that includes one's body.  Damasio 
identifies emotions as awareness of the bodies state.  The point is 
that the stuff of which we are aware and which we find agreement with 
other people's awareness is what we infer to be the physical world.  
It might be possible to be conscious in some sense without a physical 
world, but it would be qualitatively different.


How could a brain make a person aware that his brain is implemented in 
a ontological physical reality, or in the arithmetical reality?


Only the observation will differ, and only if mechanism is false.

Why assume matter, when the illusion ion matter can be explained, 
without it, and *cannot be explained* with it, unless bringing 
infinities in the ontology?


"Ontology" is just  a philosopher's fancy word for "what I think 
exists".  Reality is what it is.  There cannot be physical reality vs 
arithmetical reality.  Did you never read Stanislaw Lem's story in which 
to prevent a sadistic king from torturing his subjects, Trurl the 
constructor creates a simulated world in which the king can torture 
simulated subjects.  But then it  is pointed that the pain of the 
simulated subjects is real too.


Brent



Bruno






Brent

On 5/3/2019 6:27 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is 
associated with the way information is processed. This is substrate 
independent - the fact that a brain is physical is beside the point. 
You could implement a brain in software, and insofar as the same 
kinds of information processing occur, it would be conscious in the 
same kind of way.


I find this idea compelling because it makes the link between brains 
and consciousness without requiring matter, and provides a framework 
for understanding consciousnesses of other kinds of machines.  All 
that's required is to assume there is something it is like for 
computation to occur.


Terren

On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 2:26 AM > wrote:




On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 8:03:52 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 5/2/2019 4:55 PM, cloud...@gmail.com wrote:



On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 5:37:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 5/2/2019 11:39 AM, cloud...@gmail.com wrote:


Apparently *matter* is not "reducible" to just the
physics a couple of particles.


Then you're not a materialist.  You think there is
matter plus something else, that everyone calls "mind",
but you're going to call it "matter" and add it to
everyone else's list of matter so you can still call
yourself a materialist.

Brent




But everything reducing to the physics of particles is
thought of as *physicalism* (not materialism):


  *Physicalism and materialism*

Reductive physicalism
...is
normally assumed to be incompatible with panpsychism.
Materialism , if
held to be distinct from physicalism, is compatible with
panpsychism insofar as mental properties



What mental properties?  intention? reflection?
remembering?  That's what I mean by saying attributing
"experience" to matter is an unprincipled half-measure.

Brent


Brains are matter, just as livers, legs, trees, tables, rocks,
comets, planets, stars, cockroaches, galaxies, bacteria  .. are
matter.

Brains produce intentions, reflections, remembrances, ... .

So (at least some) matter of the cosmos has psychical (mental)
properties.

The body+mind idea, the idea that mind is something separate
from body, is perhaps the worst idea ever invented.

@philipthrift
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 6 May 2019, at 03:09, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> That's part of my argument with Bruno concerning the environment.  He agrees 
> that the simulation of one's brain would have to include at least a local 
> part of the environment, but he sees this as mere small expansion in the 
> scope of the simulation which must also be computable. 


But that follows from YD+CT. 

I use the notion of generalised brain to avoid you objection. The brain is 
whatever you feel we need to emulate, at some level, so that a digital 
emulation, done physically (at first) makes you fell no difference.

If you tell me, or your doctor, that we need to emulate the entire cluster of 
galaxies around the Milky Way, no problem (if you can afford the artifcial 
brain).

All what I prove depends on the (necessary non constructive) existence of some 
level of substitution. If the environment plays some part in your brain 
processing, so that the usual sensor entry in the body are not enough, and 
perhaps the gravitational wave have to be taken into account, there is no 
problem, as long as a digital truncation exists.

With mechanism, for a period of time, you get only finite amounts of 
information through the sensors, so you cannot use the need of an environment 
to refute the UDA. Or you introduce some magic in the environment, but then you 
argue against mechanism.





> Cleland seems to take the other extreme that a conscious program is 
> necessarily interactive and what it interacts with is uncomputable (although 
> what we know is that it's not practical to compute it).

The language ADA would be useful to emulate such interactions, but Cleland does 
not provide one clue why this is not Turing emulable. I am not sure the paper 
give any argument. There is there only a presentation of a certain type of 
computation, and the paper has actually nothing to do with CT.

Bruno





> 
> Brent
> 
> On 5/5/2019 4:40 PM, cloudver...@gmail.com  
> wrote:
>> 
>> I don't have answers to any of these questions, but I do know this:
>> 
>> The Church-Turing thesis is one of the most useless ideas ever invented.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Is the church-Turing thesis true?
>> Carol E. Cleland
>> https://philpapers.org/rec/CLEITC 
>> 
>> The Church-Turing thesis makes a bold claim about the theoretical limits to 
>> computation. It is based upon independent analyses of the 
>> general notion of an effective procedure proposed by Alan Turing and Alonzo 
>> Church in the 1930''s. As originally construed, the thesis applied only to 
>> the number theoretic functions; it amounted to the claim that there were no 
>> number theoretic functions which couldn't be computed by a Turing machine 
>> but could be computed by means of some other kind of effective procedure. 
>> Since that time, however, other interpretations of the thesis have appeared 
>> in the literature. In this paper I identify three domains of application 
>> which have been claimed for the thesis: (1) the number theoretic functions; 
>> (2) all functions; (3) mental and/or physical phenomena. Subsequently, I 
>> provide an analysis of our intuitive concept of a procedure which, unlike 
>> Turing''s, is based upon ordinary, everyday procedures such as recipes, 
>> directions and methods; I call them mundane procedures. I argue that mundane 
>> procedures can be said to be effective in the same sense in which Turing 
>> machine procedures can be said to be effective. I also argue that mundane 
>> procedures differ from Turing machine procedures in a fundamental way, viz., 
>> the former, but not the latter, generate causal processes. I apply my 
>> analysis to all three of the above mentioned interpretations of the 
>> Church-Turing thesis, arguing that the thesis is (i) clearly false under 
>> interpretation (3), (ii) false in at least some possible worlds (perhaps 
>> even in the actual world) under interpretation (2), and (iii) very much open 
>> to question under interpretation (1)
>> 
>> cf http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf 
>> 
>> 
>> etc.
>> 
>> @philipthrift
>> 
>> On Sunday, May 5, 2019 at 5:49:22 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>> How do we know other humans are conscious (we don't, we can only suspect it).
>> 
>> Why do we suspect other humans are conscious (due to their outwardly visible 
>> behaviors).
>> 
>> Due to the Church-Turing thesis, we know an appropriately programmed 
>> computer can replicate any finitely describable behavior.  Therefore a 
>> person with an appropriately programmed computer, placed in someone's skill, 
>> and wired into the nervous system of a human could perfectly mimic the 
>> behaviors, speech patterns, thoughts, skills, of any person you have ever 
>> met.
>> 
>> Do you dispute any of the above?  If you encountered a close friend who had 
>> to get a computer replacement for his 

Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/9/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 3 May 2019, at 15:27, Terren Suydam > wrote:


One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is 
associated with the way information is processed.



That is mechanism, but then you inherit infinitely many 
body-representation in arithmetic, and the mind-body problem becomes 
in part a justification of the appearances from a statistic to all 
computations going through our brain. Then incompleteness explains 
what this take the shape of a quantum reality.





This is substrate independent - the fact that a brain is physical is 
beside the point. You could implement a brain in software, and 
insofar as the same kinds of information processing occur, it would 
be conscious in the same kind of way.


Only if it exists in the same kind of world.



I find this idea compelling because it makes the link between brains 
and consciousness without requiring matter, and provides a framework 
for understanding consciousnesses of other kinds of machines.  All 
that's required is to assume there is something it is like for 
computation to occur.


Yes. Then it is sad that so few people are aware that the notion of 
computation is a purely arithmetical definition, so that we don’t need 
to assume more than Robison arithmetic. Worst, we cannot assume more, 
without exploding the number of aberration histories.


Doesn't this worry you, that you are trimming your theory to get a 
desired outcome?   Is it empiricism?


This makes mechanism testable, by comparing the physics emerging from 
the self-referential statistics on all computations with the inferred 
physics. And it match well, were physics itself miss the relation with 
the first person perspective, necessarily (assuming mechanism). A 
materialist has a way out: to invoke infinite to make the link 
brain-mind one-one, which it cannot be once we do the digital truncation.


That's only because you are assuming the mind is infinite...which seems 
a little arrogant.


Brent

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Church's Thesis

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 6 May 2019, at 01:40, cloudver...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> I don't have answers to any of these questions, but I do know this:
> 
> The Church-Turing thesis is one of the most useless ideas ever invented.


You know that?



> 
> 
> 
> Is the church-Turing thesis true?
> Carol E. Cleland
> https://philpapers.org/rec/CLEITC 
> 
> The Church-Turing thesis makes a bold claim about the theoretical limits to 
> computation. It is based upon independent analyses of the general notion of 
> an effective procedure proposed by Alan Turing and Alonzo Church in the 
> 1930''s. As originally construed, the thesis applied only to the number 
> theoretic functions; it amounted to the claim that there were no number 
> theoretic functions which couldn't be computed by a Turing machine but could 
> be computed by means of some other kind of effective procedure. Since that 
> time, however, other interpretations of the thesis have appeared in the 
> literature. In this paper I identify three domains of application which have 
> been claimed for the thesis: (1) the number theoretic functions; (2) all 
> functions; (3) mental and/or physical phenomena. Subsequently, I provide an 
> analysis of our intuitive concept of a procedure which, unlike Turing''s, is 
> based upon ordinary, everyday procedures such as recipes, directions and 
> methods; I call them mundane procedures. I argue that mundane procedures can 
> be said to be effective in the same sense in which Turing machine procedures 
> can be said to be effective. I also argue that mundane procedures differ from 
> Turing machine procedures in a fundamental way, viz., the former, but not the 
> latter, generate causal processes. I apply my analysis to all three of the 
> above mentioned interpretations of the Church-Turing thesis, arguing that the 
> thesis is (i) clearly false under interpretation (3), (ii) false in at least 
> some possible worlds (perhaps even in the actual world) under interpretation 
> (2), and (iii) very much open to question under interpretation (1)
> 
> cf http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf 
> 
> 


That type of refutation is proposed by the universal machine too, but with 
mechanism, this does not violate the Church Turing thesis. So, to argue against 
the classical usual Church’s thesis, by proposing an formal procedure is bound 
to fail, or to admit interpretation involving the first person of the machine, 
which in this case does not violate CT. The paper fail to give a computable 
function not Turing emulable.

Tha auhor is not aware that CT is formulated here in the extensional version, 
in term of set of computable function from N to N. But the extensional CT 
entails an intensional version, which asserts that not only all universal 
numbers compute the same class of functions, but that they can imitate the 
manner in which the computations are done. For example, you can write a Fortan 
program emulating a pattern of the game of life, itself emulating a von Neumann 
extended boolean graph, itself emulating the the 10^1000 x 10^1000 
Heseinberg-Dirac-Feynman matrix emulating our galactic quantum field emulating 
each of us right.

People confuse computation, and the ten thousand higher level notion, to begin 
with provability, which has deep relation with computability but are 
importantly quite different notions (computability is universal, absolute, but 
provability is relative and has no universal predicate, making G, G* 
extraordinary as they axiomatic the propositional level of what is true and 
what machine can prove about their provability for a very large class of 
entities (the Löbian entities). 




Church was anticipated by Emil Post in the 1920s, and by Babbage I as I argue 
in my long text, as Babbage is said to have been more sorry for the non 
understanding of its functional language than for the non understanding of its 
universal machine, which makes me think that he got the point he saw their deep 
mathematical equivalence.

There are empirical evidences for CT: the fact that anyone trying to violate it 
did not succeed, the fact that very different definition of “intuitively 
computable” have all lead to the same class of functions, the fact that some of 
those definition occurred with different motivation (like Shoenfinkel’s 
discovery of the combinators), but led again to the same class. The fact that a 
quantum computer cannot violate CT, etc.

And there is one hyper-strong theoretical evidence for CT, which is that the 
set of of those functions computed by digital number, executed by universal 
number, is close for Cantor’s transendental diagonal procedure. At fist sight 
that seems impossible, especially after Gödel proved his incompleteness 
theorem, showing that provability cannot be "universal “ (complete) using that 
diagonal technic.

Where is the error in the following reasoning?  If there 

Re: Bernardo Kastrup: "Analytic Idealism: A consciousness-only ontology) '

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/9/2019 2:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
ll sciences are born from theology, which remind us that the belief in 
any reality out of personal consciousness requires an act of faith.


This is false.  Belief in an external reality is not "an act of faith".  
It's not an "act" at all, much less a conscious one.  It is a hard-wired 
basis of belief provided by evolution.  Something obvious on a 
physicalist theory of the world.


Brent

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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 5:22 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 3 May 2019, at 15:27, Terren Suydam  wrote:
>
> One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is associated
> with the way information is processed.
>
>
>
> That is mechanism, but then you inherit infinitely many
> body-representation in arithmetic, and the mind-body problem becomes in
> part a justification of the appearances from a statistic to all
> computations going through our brain. Then incompleteness explains what
> this take the shape of a quantum reality.
>


Hi Bruno,

Could you please explain or point me to some sources on how incompleteness
leads to the quantum? What would the alternative be if not incompleteness?

Jason



>
>
>
>
> This is substrate independent - the fact that a brain is physical is
> beside the point. You could implement a brain in software, and insofar as
> the same kinds of information processing occur, it would be conscious in
> the same kind of way.
>
> I find this idea compelling because it makes the link between brains and
> consciousness without requiring matter, and provides a framework for
> understanding consciousnesses of other kinds of machines.  All that's
> required is to assume there is something it is like for computation to
> occur.
>
>
> Yes. Then it is sad that so few people are aware that the notion of
> computation is a purely arithmetical definition, so that we don’t need to
> assume more than Robison arithmetic. Worst, we cannot assume more, without
> exploding the number of aberration histories. This makes mechanism
> testable, by comparing the physics emerging from the self-referential
> statistics on all computations with the inferred physics. And it match
> well, were physics itself miss the relation with the first person
> perspective, necessarily (assuming mechanism). A materialist has a way out:
> to invoke infinite to make the link brain-mind one-one, which it cannot be
> once we do the digital truncation.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> Terren
>
> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 2:26 AM  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 8:03:52 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/2/2019 4:55 PM, cloud...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 5:37:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



 On 5/2/2019 11:39 AM, cloud...@gmail.com wrote:


 Apparently *matter* is not "reducible" to just the physics a couple of
 particles.


 Then you're not a materialist.  You think there is matter plus
 something else, that everyone calls "mind", but you're going to call it
 "matter" and add it to everyone else's list of matter so you can still call
 yourself a materialist.

 Brent



>>>
>>> But everything reducing to the physics of particles is thought of as
>>> *physicalism* (not materialism):
>>> *Physicalism and materialism*
>>>
>>> Reductive physicalism
>>> ...is normally
>>> assumed to be incompatible with panpsychism. Materialism
>>> , if held to be distinct
>>> from physicalism, is compatible with panpsychism insofar as mental
>>> properties
>>>
>>>
>>> What mental properties?  intention?  reflection? remembering?  That's
>>> what I mean by saying attributing "experience" to matter is an unprincipled
>>> half-measure.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>> Brains are matter, just as livers, legs, trees, tables, rocks, comets,
>> planets, stars, cockroaches, galaxies, bacteria  .. are matter.
>>
>> Brains produce intentions, reflections, remembrances, ... .
>>
>> So (at least some) matter of the cosmos has psychical (mental) properties.
>>
>> The body+mind idea, the idea that mind is something separate from body,
>> is perhaps the worst idea ever invented.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 5 May 2019, at 15:25, Terren Suydam  wrote:
> 
> You keep trotting out the term "cybernetic delusion" as if it's a problem. 
> But it's just an assumption I make, that consciousness is identified with 
> cybernetic dynamics.


I guess what you mean, but sometimes the devil is in the details, especially 
when discussing fundamental matter.

Cybernetics dynamics, without further precision is typically 3p. Consciousness 
is typically 1p, so we can  associate them, but we cannot identify them, and 
indeed, with mechanism, the conscious person cannot identify its consciousness 
with anything 3p describable, but it can still associate it to all machine 
simulating him/her at the relevant level (in arithmetic or equivalent).

To call mechanism an illusion is indeed not a scientific attitude, unless it is 
a confusion of a reasoning, which seems to not be the case.



> I'm exploring the consequences of that idea, which are compelling IMO.
> 
> You or anyone else can feel free to adopt or not adopt that assumption. But 
> it's not a delusion. Calling it that suggests there's a more correct way to 
> view consciousness. But you haven't been clear about what that is, 
> vacillating between "only certain kinds of matter can be conscious" and "all 
> matter is conscious". If you adopt panpsychism, you fall prey to the 
> cybernetic delusion yourself. And when you don't, you fail to explain what 
> privileges certain kinds of matter over others. It seems pretty clear to me 
> that there's no principled way to do that... any explanation of why brains 
> can be conscious but not computers starts to sound suspiciously like "spirit" 
> and "soul", in the sense that you're invoking some property of matter that 
> cannot be detected.

Yes, we wait for a theory. 

Bruno



> 
> Terren
> 
> On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 4:57 AM  > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 8:30:00 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
> On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 9:15 PM 'Cosmin Visan'   <>> wrote:
> 
> 
> > What happens in cases of telepathy is [...]. For example, in cases of dream 
> > telepathy [...] This clearly is a case of dream telepathy.
> 
> OK, there was little doubt before but you just made it official, Cosmin Visan 
> is a crackpot.
> 
>  John K Clark
> 
>  
> 
> 
> 
> Telepathy I doubt pretty bigly, but the cybernetic delusion is a really 
> crackpot idea.
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
>  
> 
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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, May 9, 2019 at 8:00:15 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 6 May 2019, at 10:10, cloud...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
> Is there a calculus of experience?
>
>
> Yes, the logic of the first person knowledge ([]p ), which is given by a 
> very precise modal logic, known as S4Grz1. That is more the logic of the 
> experienceable, and for the “immediate experience" it is given by the logic 
> of the 5th mode of self-reference ([]p & <>t & p).
>
> The axioms and how to use them is given in my paper. I can say more is 
> asked. 
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
Whether that suffices for a calculus of experience 

cf. http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Models_of_consciousness

A *model of consciousness 
* is a theoretical 
description that relates *brain * 
properties 
of consciousness  (e.g., 
fast irregular electrical activity, widespread brain 
 activation) to *phenomenal* 
properties 
of consciousness (e.g., qualia , 
a first-person-perspective, the unity of a conscious scene). Because of the 
diverse nature of these properties (Seth et al. 2005), useful models can be 
either mathematical/logical or verbal/conceptual.


I suppose can be proposed in the scheme of theories compared with all the 
others.

But there may not be a "theory" in the conventions sense at all.

High-level conceptual models can provide insights into the processes 
implemented by the neural mechanisms underlying consciousness 
, without necessarily 
specifying the mechanisms themselves. Several such models propose 
variations of the notion that consciousness arises from brain-based 
simulation of organism-environment interactions. These models illuminate in 
particular two fundamental aspects of phenomenology: the attribution of 
conscious experience to an experiencing ‘self’, and the first-person 
perspective that structures each conscious scene.

,,,

Because consciousness is a rich biological phenomenon, it is likely that a 
satisfactory scientific theory of consciousness will require the 
specification of detailed mechanistic models. The models of consciousness 
surveyed in this article vary in terms of their level of abstraction as 
well as in the aspects of phenomenal experience that they are proposed to 
explain. At present, however, no single model of consciousness appears 
sufficient to account fully for the multidimensional properties of 
conscious experience. Moreover, although some of these models have gained 
prominence, none has yet been accepted as definitive, or even as a 
foundation upon which to build a definitive model.

@philipthrift

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 3 May 2019, at 05:05, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tue, Apr 30, 2019 at 6:03 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
>> On 29 Apr 2019, at 18:03, Telmo Menezes > > wrote:
>> 
> 
>  
>> 
>>> 
>>> where S4Grz (the logic of []p & p) obeys to a logic of (temporal) knowledge 
>>> of an unnameable subject. The first consider the second as mysterious, the 
>>> second knows, but cannot justify it through words or any representation.
>> 
>> "The unnamable is the eternally real.
> 
> OK. I would have put it like “the eternally real is unnamable.
> 
> 
> 
> This exchange made me think of this: 
> http://taotechingdaily.com/1-the-eternal-tao/ 
> 
> 
> "The Tao that can  be told is not the Eternal Tao.
> The name that can be named is not the Eternal Name.”

Yes. In my English paper, I compare the machine theology with Plotinus 
theology, but Lao-Ze played the role of the human mystic in my long French 
version. Not just Lao-Ze, also Lie-Ze and Chuan-Ze.

The taoist were very close to the neoplatonist, but, like the Aristotelian, 
they eventually fall in the "trap of theology”, and indeed, there has been 
“taoist armies”, which were the most feared by the people. I am still looking 
for finding how exactly this could have happened. 

Bruno



> 
> Jason
> 
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Re: Does all computation generate heat?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 8 May 2019, at 20:41, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/8/2019 9:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 3 May 2019, at 20:17, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 5/3/2019 8:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 3 May 2019, at 14:06, Quentin Anciaux  > wrote:
> 
> Pleasure for the all loving god to have creatures to torture ?
> 
> But the problem of evil is not that simple.
 
 Indeed.
 
 But note that just the second theorem of Gödel provides a clue.
 
 With provable(p) written []p
 consistent(p) = ~provable(~p) = <>p
 f = false, t = true
 consistent = ~[]f = <>t = consistent(t),
 
 Gödel’s second I. Theorem, put in equivalent version:
 
 <>t -> ~[]<>t
 
 <>t -> <>~<>t
 <>t -> <>[]f
 
 It is that last one where the clue is the more apparent:
 
 Said by PA, or ZF, or any sound Löbian machine: it says the following:
 
 If I am consistent, then it is consistent that I am inconsistent
>>> 
>>> Notice however that this assumes you know what t and f are.
>> 
>> No, that is not assumed. t and f are only boolean constant. In the 
>> arithmetical interpretation, you can take any simple theorems of your 
>> (Church-Turing universal) theory (that you are supposed to believe in). 
>> Usually t is interested by “1=1” and f by “~(1=1)”. But in the combinators t 
>> is interpreted by K and f by KI.
>> 
>> With digital mechanism, just to define what is a digital machine, we need 
>> some acknowledgement on elementary arithmetic, for which we do have a notion 
>> of truth, indeed made mathematically precise by Tarski. In the usual 
>> mathematical sense, and not definable in arithmetic, like all good notion of 
>> god should be.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>>   In the formalism they are just markers that are invariant under the rules 
>>> of inference. 
>> 
>> Yes, except that here they correspond to direct conclusion of the logical 
>> rule. Now “1” is represented by "s(0)” (or its Gödel number), and what you 
>> say will apply to all symbols, or symbols of symbols. The interpretation is 
>> in the truth, that is here is the stantard model of arithmetic (the 
>> structure (N, 0, s, +, x). 
>> Your remark applies also to brain and (physical or not) realities.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> In the semantics they refer to some model. 
>> 
>> Exactly.
>> 
>> 
>>> Beware of the priest who tells you he knows the real model.
>> 
>> Exactly. 
> 
> Above you are telling us the standard model of arithmetic is the real model.

Like everyone. In this case, the standard model can be shown to be the least 
model, and the intersection of all models. Nobody believe in non standard 
natural number, as they are infinite. Non standard natural number can be used 
in non standard analysis, but all the understanding on “non standard” makes 
precise sense in arithmetic, because we do have a good intuition of what the 
standard numbers are.

Keep in mind that a non standard model contains all the standard numbers 0, 1, 
2, …, plus infinite objects which have infinitely any predecessor 
(transitively). 

Keep in mind that we assume computationalism. In the non standard model of 
arithmetic, addition and multiplication are already NOT computable. 

The understanding of the natural numbers corresponds to the standard model. But 
“finite” is not a first order property, so we can’t define the natural numbers 
entirely in first order logic, and the non standard model is a mess due to that 
restriction. The standard model can be defined in analysis, as much well as any 
limit of a Cauchy sequence.

The standard model is the intersection of on what everybody agree on the 
natural numbers. It is taught in primary school. You need to learn a bit of 
mathematical logic to even grasp the notion of non standard numbers, and that 
requires also the understanding of standard numbers.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> The universal machine which knows that she is universal say no better, 
>> indeed.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
 
 Or
 
 If I am consistent then it is consistent that I will prove a falsity
 
 Peano arithmetic, or ZF, remains consistent when adding the axiom that 
 they are (respectively) inconsistent.
 
 Loosely, this says:
 
 If shit does not happen, shit might happen.
 
 This might be part of the shadow explaining the origin of evil ([]f) in 
 the internal states realised in arithmetic.
 
 Bruno
 
 PS Exercise; show that Gödel’s theorem (in its modal form) is just Löb’s 
 formula with p replaced by false( f).
 
 Solution: Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, 
 
 with p = f, this becomes
 
 []f([]f -> f) -> []f
 
 Which is, as ~p = (p -> f), obvious by truth table of ~ and ->.
 
 [](~[]f) -> []f

Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 9 May 2019, at 13:03, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, May 9, 2019 at 5:34:29 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 3 May 2019, at 16:10, cloud...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> The general response here is that there has never existed a program that has 
>> executed outside a computer. And computers are made of matter.
> 
> That is false. Programs have been discovered in arithmetic, like prime 
> numbers. Computations are number relation (the sigma_1 one).
> 
> “
> 
> Who discovered arithmetic and where is it?

Arithmetic is known by human before they developed written language, and the 
first proof of sophisticated result, are 5000 years old, with the tablets 
showing those ancient people got all Pythagorean triples. 



> 
> I get the idea that Arthur Conan Doyle "discovered" Sherlock Holmes, and he 
> "is" in books and people's brains (imaginations).

Arithmetic has been found independently by Chinese, Indian, europeans, etc. 
Everyone agree on all arithmetical proposition, without any exception. It is 
used all the time, everyday, and your laptop would cease functioning if only 
one arithmetical proposition would be false. Sherlock Holmes is a creation of 
the mind by Doyle. You can meet human approximating him, but even if they look 
very similar, it is not Sherlock Holmes, by definition.


> 
> But arithmetic actually has no more reality than that, outside of its 
> operations in brains and man-made things. One can say DNA or other natural 
> things is "doing" arithmetic and so forth. That kind of thing.
> 
> But where is this thing you call arithmetic?

Numbers, and arithmetical relation are out of the category of things to which 
“where” applies, unless you define “where” in some arithmetical sense, like 
when we say that 10^100 is far from 0, but of course, this is not used in the 
physical sense. 

On the contrary, the physical “whereness” is derived from mechanism and 
arithmetic.

The theory of everything is explicitly given by classical logic +

1) 0 ≠ s(x)
2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 
4) x+0 = x
5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
6) x*0=0
7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

If you eliminate just one axiom from that theory, you get very interesting 
theories, but none is Turing complete.

We can use anything Turing equivalent. I have proven recently and explicitly on 
this list that the following theory is Turing complete:

1) If A = B and A = C, then B = C
2) If A = B then AC = BC
3) If A = B then CA = CB
4) KAB = A
5) SABC = AC(BC)

Those two theories lead to the same machine theology, and thus the same 
physics, and up to now, it fits with Nature, and explains entirely what is 
consciousness and where it comes from. 

Bruno




> 
> @philipthrift
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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 9 May 2019, at 12:49, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, May 9, 2019 at 5:15:32 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 3 May 2019, at 08:26, cloud...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 8:03:52 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 5/2/2019 4:55 PM, cloud...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 5:37:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 5/2/2019 11:39 AM, cloud...@gmail.com <> wrote:
 
 Apparently matter is not "reducible" to just the physics a couple of 
 particles.
>>> 
>>> Then you're not a materialist.  You think there is matter plus something 
>>> else, that everyone calls "mind", but you're going to call it "matter" and 
>>> add it to everyone else's list of matter so you can still call yourself a 
>>> materialist.
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> But everything reducing to the physics of particles is thought of as 
>>> physicalism (not materialism):
>>> Physicalism and materialism  
>>> 
>>> Reductive physicalism 
>>> ...is normally assumed 
>>> to be incompatible with panpsychism. Materialism 
>>> , if held to be distinct from 
>>> physicalism, is compatible with panpsychism insofar as mental properties
>>> 
>> 
>> What mental properties?  intention?  reflection? remembering?  That's what I 
>> mean by saying attributing "experience" to matter is an unprincipled 
>> half-measure.
>> 
>> Brent
>>  
>> 
>> Brains are matter, just as livers, legs, trees, tables, rocks, comets, 
>> planets, stars, cockroaches, galaxies, bacteria  .. are matter.
>> 
>> Brains produce intentions, reflections, remembrances, ... .
>> 
>> So (at least some) matter of the cosmos has psychical (mental) properties.
>> 
>> The body+mind idea, the idea that mind is something separate from body, is 
>> perhaps the worst idea ever invented.
> 
> At least we agree on this. That is dualism, and is easily shown insane.
> 
> Now, what can be proved is that Mechanism is incompatible with weak 
> materialism (that is with both dualism and physicalism/materialism). I have 
> shown that we can test mechanism, and that up to now, thanks to Quantum 
> Mechanics which confirms Mechanism and its consequences.
> 
> Materialisme/physicalism have problem of its own:
> - what is it?
> - why does it seem to obey mathematical laws
> - why consciousness? How matter is related to consciousness?
> 
> Materialist tends to either eliminate consciousness, or dismiss it as a 
> unimportant details, or introduce identity thesis which requires strong 
> ontological infinity axioms, or Oracle, for which we have no evidences today.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> I wrote this earlier today in response to a Philip Goff interview:
> https://twitter.com/philipthrift/status/1126415043959107584
> 
> 
> I say (following Auden) "Matter is much / Odder than we thought". The 
> scientists (physicists mainly)  I have read have a peculiarly antiseptic idea 
> of what matter is: It cannot have experiential properties.

Yes, that the idea. We can predict it, but we don’t attribute mind to matter to 
predict it. People talk of inert matter. Consciousness is attribute to people, 
person, living creature, but to attribute life or consciousness was common 
before Darwin and molecular biology. The reduction of the wave packet in QM has 
revived a bit the idea, but without success.




> Thus science—and matter, as they present it—has a big blind spot in it.

I agree, but it is not “science”. It is “science” with the Aristotelian 
metaphysical/theological assumption of a primary matter. It is a theology, that 
has been shown incompatible with the mechanist hypothesis.



> 
> 
> (There is a group today self-called "phenomenological materialists".) The 
> problem is not materialism. The problem is that (for the most part) 
> scientists have the wrong idea of what matter is. Ancient Greek materialists 
> were better than today's scientists in this regard.

Actually you are right. Aristotle defines matter by what is indeterminate, like 
Plotinus, when he made a rather precise theory of God and intellect, and 
explains matter by where God loses control, and it makes a lot of sense with 
mechanism, where matter is also defined by a (first person plural) 
indetermination, (the statistic on our relative continuation) and of course QM 
introduces also an indetermination in Nature. 

Bruno



> 
> @philipthrift
> 
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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 6 May 2019, at 10:10, cloudver...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, May 5, 2019 at 4:25:59 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 5/5/2019 2:06 PM, cloud...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> I of course think that "consciousness arises from the function of matter in 
>> some configurations" (the conscious brain is nothing but the cells and 
>> chemicals operating inside the skull), but it's doing more than information 
>> processing. It's doing experience processing. People can deliberate until 
>> the cows come home why information processing is sufficient or is not 
>> sufficient. If one is already an "information processing is sufficient for 
>> consciousness" fan, then nothing will probably change their belief in that.
>> 
>> The brain is an experience processing engine. Experience cannot be reduced 
>> to information.
> 
> The question is whether it can be reduced to a physical process and if so 
> what processes produce experience?  Does information processing that produces 
> intelligence also produce experience?  If not, there can be philosophical 
> zombies.
> 
> Brent
> 
> 
> 
> That's the right questions, right there.
> 
> Another:
> 
> Is there a calculus of experience?

Yes, the logic of the first person knowledge ([]p ), which is given by a very 
precise modal logic, known as S4Grz1. That is more the logic of the 
experienceable, and for the “immediate experience" it is given by the logic of 
the 5th mode of self-reference ([]p & <>t & p).

The axioms and how to use them is given in my paper. I can say more is asked. 

Bruno




> 
> (like one for motion, thermodynamics, electromagnetism, ...)
> 
> @philipthrift
>  
> 
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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 4 May 2019, at 23:10, cloudver...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> I am not a chemist, biochemist, or neurochemist, but of the list of 
> alternatives listed:
> 
> 1 Shadow biosphere 
> 
> 2 Alternative-chirality biomolecules 
> 
> 3 Non-carbon-based biochemistries 
> 3.1
>Silicon biochemistry 
> 
> 3.2   Other exotic element-based biochemistries 
> 
> 4 Arsenic as an alternative to phosphorus 
> 
> 5 Non-water solvents 
> 5.1
>  Ammonia 
> 
> 5.2   Methane and other hydrocarbons 
> 5.2.1
>Azotosome 
> 
> 5.3   Hydrogen fluoride 
> 
> 5.4   Hydrogen sulfide 
> 
> 5.5   Silicon dioxide and silicates 
> 
> 5.6   Other solvents or cosolvents 
> 
> 
There is nothing there known to be not-Turing emulable. 
That is like saying that LISP is better than ALGOL, which is certainly the case 
in some application, and not in another.

There is no doubt that biological computing, and quantum computers are very 
interesting thing, but for metaphysics, they don’t need to be assumed, as they 
exist, including their dynamic,  in arithmetic.

Bruno



> I assume there could possibly be an "alternative brain" that could be made.
> 
> Do you see a possibility with silicon (as it was addressed in the silicon 
> section 3.1)? It seems doubtful.
> 
> 
> (And  of course this has nothing to do with the cybernetic delusion.)
> 
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 2:19:46 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> Why isn't a silicon based cpu a "biochemical alternative"?  Your links are 
> about life and reproduction.  So if AI robots can make other AI robots they'd 
> be biochemical.
> 
> Brent
> 
> On 5/4/2019 9:35 AM, cloud...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> This is more than the 20th time I have said here there could be conscious 
>> beings made of biochemical alternatives: 
>> 
>> Hypothetical types of biochemistry
>> 
>> 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_types_of_biochemistry 
>> 
>> cf: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organosilicon 
>> 
>> 
>> This obviously has nothing to do with Searle's argument or your cybernetic 
>> delusion.
>> 
>> @philipthrift
>> 
>> On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 11:10:33 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
>> Let's say we were visited by aliens and we were able to communicate with 
>> them such that it seemed   obvious they were conscious. 
>> 
>> Then, we discovered that their nervous systems, or whatever the analog of 
>> such was, was constituted from silicon, but let's call it organic, wet, and 
>> so on, just an alternative chemistry.
>> 
>> What then? Are they zombies?
>> 
>> What if after talking to them for a while and attributing consciousness to 
>> them based on that, they revealed that they were actually robots constructed 
>> by an alien race on their home planet. Zombies?
>> 
>> On Sat, May 4, 2019, 11:49 AM Terren Suydam > wrote:
>> It's not a delusion if you're starting from the same assumptions I am. Your 
>> assumptions involve a delusion from my perspective, which is that there's 
>> something special about biological material that makes it conscious, but 
>> not, potentially, computers.
>> 
>> Sometimes you invoke panpsychism, but when you do that, you again make it 
>> possible for computers to be conscious. I'm not sure where you stand, but 
>> either way, you're either allowing consciousness in computers or you have to 
>> say what's so special about wetware.
>> 
>> On Sat, May 4, 2019, 11:25 AM > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> But you have contributed to establishing a term:
>> 
>> cybernetic delusion -  the delusion that software or programming in a 
>> conventional computer device (even one 

Re: The religion of AI

[John Clark]

On Wed, May 8, 2019 'Cosmin Visan' v 
wrote:

> No. By rationality.
>

If something is rational then there is a reason, a cause, for it doing what
it did. If it was irrational then there was no reason, no cause, for it
doing  what it did. There has long been a word for events without causes,
"random".

> Decisions which are taken using free will.


I have no idea what you mean by "free will" and, because you obviously
haven't given the matter any serious thought, you don't know what you mean
by "free will" either. However I do know there are only 2 posabilities,
events happen because of cause and effect or they don't.

  John K Clark


>

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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 4 May 2019, at 16:58, cloudver...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> It seems people will remain in the delusion that software or programming in a 
> conventional computer device - even with many processors - will achieve 
> consciousness. Searle's Chinese Room argument still does apply here, as 
> anyone should clearly be able to see.

Not at all. Robert Searle argument confuse the activity of a program, with the 
activity of the program of a program emulating the first program.

I can simulate Einstein brain, but that does not make me into Einstein. It just 
gives me the opportunity to discuss with Einstein.


> 
> One can wave the magic word "cybernetic" around all one wants, but it is 
> clearly not useful.
> 
> There are lots of delusions in the world: Ghosts, spirits, gods, and the 
> "cybernetic" one above is among them.

You talk a bit like if you knew the truth. But your theory is not enough clear 
so that I can see a theory in the usual term of the word.

Bruno




> 
> 
> @pphilipthrift
> 
> On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 9:42:40 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
> I'm beginning to suspect that you're a chatbot... a pretty good one - the 
> best I've seen, even. Your responses are syntactically correct and seemingly 
> relevant semantically, but whenever I or anyone else tries to pin you down 
> and get you to articulate specifics, your response is inevitably to quote 
> some article or another. Getting closer to passing the Turing Test - give 
> your creator my respect.
> 
> On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 10:15 AM > wrote:
> 
> I understand basically what your idea is, but "cybernetic dynamics" reminds 
> me of Norbert Weiner's subject of cybernetics, something I read about decades 
> ago:
> 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cybernetics:_Or_Control_and_Communication_in_the_Animal_and_the_Machine
>  
> 
> 
> One should be able to replace every neural+glial cell with a synthetic one, 
> but the technology has to advance:
> 
> 
> https://neo.life/2018/05/the-birth-of-wetware/ 
> 
> 
> ...
> 
> Pink juice
> 
> Koniku’s chemical sensor is still in development, so what Agabi and Sadrian 
> show me is likely to continue evolving for some time. On the outside, it 
> sports a globular, gray-green shell with a vaguely alien look, about eight 
> inches wide. Inside, metal architecture supports a silicon chip with spidery 
> wires converging in the center, where networked neurons sit inside a clear 
> bubble made of a biocompatible polymer.
> 
> When a client tells Koniku what substance it wants to sense, the company 
> identifies cellular receptors that would ordinarily bind to that substance. 
> Then it creates neurons that have those receptors. To do that, it uses 
> gene-editing technology to tweak the DNA of neuron precursors. Koniku obtains 
> those from a supplier, which manipulates skin or blood cells from mice into 
> blank-slate cells known as induced pluripotent stem cells.
> 
> Once Koniku has nurtured these engineered precursors into living neurons, 
> they could, in theory, smell odors like a drug-sniffing dog might. Or they 
> could detect any number of substances that have corresponding receptors. Some 
> receptors are more sensitive and narrowly tuned to attach to one substance. 
> Others are, as Agabi puts it, more “promiscuous,” accepting an entire class 
> of chemicals, like nitrates. The Koniku Kore contains neurons with both types 
> of receptors.
> 
> After they’ve created their mix of customized neurons, Agabi and his 
> colleagues use the Death Star laser to build a polymer structure for the 
> neurons to sit on. Then they place the cells on that structure and wait for 
> them to begin to network together among a set of mushroom-shaped electrodes. 
> Ultimately, a few “reporter” neurons will serve as the essential 
> neuron-silicon connection. This means they are both connected to the neuron 
> network and “plugged in” to the chip using the natural process of 
> endocytosis, in which a cell gradually engulfs foreign matter. Agabi says 
> Koniku has developed a special DNA coating for its electrodes. When a neuron 
> tries to engulf the DNA, it creates a seal that will later let the electrode 
> pick up electrical signals the neuron produces when its receptors bind to a 
> given chemical or class of chemicals.
> 
> Almost all of this technology was around before Koniku, though not exactly in 
> this arrangement. Perhaps the newest element here is what Agabi calls “pink 
> juice.” The usual life span of a neuron in a lab is counted in days or weeks, 
> but Koniku’s neurons can survive for up to two months. That’s because they’re 
> bathed in pink juice, which feeds them and keeps them alive.
> 
> At first, Agabi won’t tell me the exact recipe beyond saying that they’re a 
> mix of “vitamins, minerals, and sugars.” But I piece some of it together by 
> 

Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 4 May 2019, at 17:25, cloudver...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> But you have contributed to establishing a term:
> 
> cybernetic delusion -  the delusion that software or programming in a 
> conventional computer device (even one with many processors) will ever 
> achieve consciousness

Nothing can create consciousness or truth, so that expression is ambiguous. It 
can be true, even with mechanism. In that sense, mechanism explain why no 
machine can be conscious, as they can only borrow consciousness from truth, 
which is not a concept definable in any machine or humain language. We 
understand it only because each of us to that borrowing at each instant.

Bruno




> 
> 
> That is useful.
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> 
> On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 9:58:09 AM UTC-5, cloud...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> It seems people will remain in the delusion that software or programming in a 
> conventional computer device - even with many processors - will achieve 
> consciousness. Searle's Chinese Room argument still does apply here, as 
> anyone should clearly be able to see.
> 
> One can wave the magic word "cybernetic" around all one wants, but it is 
> clearly not useful.
> 
> There are lots of delusions in the world: Ghosts, spirits, gods, and the 
> "cybernetic" one above is among them.
> 
> 
> @pphilipthrift
> 
> On Saturday, May 4, 2019 at 9:42:40 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
> I'm beginning to suspect that you're a chatbot... a pretty good one - the 
> best I've seen, even. Your responses are syntactically correct and seemingly 
> relevant semantically, but whenever I or anyone else tries to pin you down 
> and get you to articulate specifics, your response is inevitably to quote 
> some article or another. Getting closer to passing the Turing Test - give 
> your creator my respect.
> 
> On Sat, May 4, 2019 at 10:15 AM > wrote:
> 
> I understand basically what your idea is, but "cybernetic dynamics" reminds 
> me of Norbert Weiner's subject of cybernetics, something I read about decades 
> ago:
> 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cybernetics:_Or_Control_and_Communication_in_the_Animal_and_the_Machine
>  
> 
> 
> One should be able to replace every neural+glial cell with a synthetic one, 
> but the technology has to advance:
> 
> 
> https://neo.life/2018/05/the-birth-of-wetware/ 
> 
> 
> ...
> 
> Pink juice
> 
> Koniku’s chemical sensor is still in development, so what Agabi and Sadrian 
> show me is likely to continue evolving for some time. On the outside, it 
> sports a globular, gray-green shell with a vaguely alien look, about eight 
> inches wide. Inside, metal architecture supports a silicon chip with spidery 
> wires converging in the center, where networked neurons sit inside a clear 
> bubble made of a biocompatible polymer.
> 
> When a client tells Koniku what substance it wants to sense, the company 
> identifies cellular receptors that would ordinarily bind to that substance. 
> Then it creates neurons that have those receptors. To do that, it uses 
> gene-editing technology to tweak the DNA of neuron precursors. Koniku obtains 
> those from a supplier, which manipulates skin or blood cells from mice into 
> blank-slate cells known as induced pluripotent stem cells.
> 
> Once Koniku has nurtured these engineered precursors into living neurons, 
> they could, in theory, smell odors like a drug-sniffing dog might. Or they 
> could detect any number of substances that have corresponding receptors. Some 
> receptors are more sensitive and narrowly tuned to attach to one substance. 
> Others are, as Agabi puts it, more “promiscuous,” accepting an entire class 
> of chemicals, like nitrates. The Koniku Kore contains neurons with both types 
> of receptors.
> 
> After they’ve created their mix of customized neurons, Agabi and his 
> colleagues use the Death Star laser to build a polymer structure for the 
> neurons to sit on. Then they place the cells on that structure and wait for 
> them to begin to network together among a set of mushroom-shaped electrodes. 
> Ultimately, a few “reporter” neurons will serve as the essential 
> neuron-silicon connection. This means they are both connected to the neuron 
> network and “plugged in” to the chip using the natural process of 
> endocytosis, in which a cell gradually engulfs foreign matter. Agabi says 
> Koniku has developed a special DNA coating for its electrodes. When a neuron 
> tries to engulf the DNA, it creates a seal that will later let the electrode 
> pick up electrical signals the neuron produces when its receptors bind to a 
> given chemical or class of chemicals.
> 
> Almost all of this technology was around before Koniku, though not exactly in 
> this arrangement. Perhaps the newest element here is what Agabi calls “pink 
> juice.” The usual life span of a neuron in a lab is counted in days or 

Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 4 May 2019, at 02:28, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/3/2019 1:35 PM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 4:19 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 5/3/2019 11:44 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>> 
>>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 1:10 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> I think that is right.  But when you consider some simplified cases, e.g. a 
>>> computation written out on paper (or Bruno's movie graph) it becomes 
>>> apparent that consciousness must ultimately refer to other things. 
>>> 
>>> Right, the movie graph argument shows that consciousness doesn't supervene 
>>> on physical computation. Nevertheless, the character of my consciousness 
>>> still corresponds with the kind of cybernetic system implemented by e.g. my 
>>> brain and body, as instantiated by the infinity of programs 
>>>   going through my state.
>> 
>> What makes it "your state"?  It's just a bunch of programs. Why those 
>> programs and not others?
>> 
>> It's the set of programs that implements the body/brain used to construct my 
>> inner world.
> 
> But that doesn't explain why there is such a thing as "your inner world" that 
> is separate from "my inner world".  Why don't the programs produce 
> overlapping or mixing "inner worlds".
> 
>>>  
>>> Much is made of "self-awareness" but this is usually just having an 
>>> internal model of one's body, or social standing or some other model of the 
>>> self.  It is not consciousness of consciousness...that is only a temporal 
>>> reflection: "I was conscious just now." 
>>> 
>>> I see it a little differently. The self-model/ego is a higher-order 
>>> construct that organizes the system in a holistic way.
>> 
>> ? That sounds like a kind of dualism.  You're postulating something that 
>> creates a "higher-order construct".  If you're following Bruno's idea things 
>> have to just come out of the UD threads.  There's nothing to create anything 
>> more.
>> 
>> For the self-image construct, I mean 'construct' in the same way that 
>> anything we learn is a construct. The self-image represents a higher-order 
>> construct on top of the types of constructs that, say, a dog might employ. A 
>> dog has a self-image of a certain type, but with humans (for whom I'll call 
>> the self-image 'ego' to differentiate from animal self-image), the ego's 
>> construction is conceptual and requires language. The ego is a narrative, 
>> and that narrative acts to organize the system as a whole.
>>  
>> 
>>> We take this for granted - it's the water we swim in - but our minds are 
>>> radically re-organized as children by the taught narrative that we have an 
>>> identity
>> 
>> You don't have teach a kid he has an identity.  He knows who's hungry.  He 
>> has a view point.
>> 
>> 
>> Just like a dog. But a kid knows his name (learned) and can answer the 
>> question, "why did you do that?". The answer to that question is also 
>> largely learned. We are told who to be, what's right, wrong, appropriate, 
>> taboo, etc., for the culture we grow up in. IOW why I do something is 
>> filtered through learned cultural constructs. Most of the time the answer 
>> amounts to a justification in terms of what's appropriate, logical, or some 
>> other descriptor that benefits me in some way relative to the implicit 
>> values I'm socialized to.  This form of self-image is of a higher order than 
>> whatever self-image my dog has. 
> 
> I don't disagree with any of that, but I don't see that any of it is entailed 
> by there being the infinite programs of the UD.

Just to be precise, all programs are finite. The universal 
programs/machine/number are finite. The UD is a finite object, a number itself. 

The computations can be infinite. Like "being prime” has an infinite extension 
(meaning).

Whatever 3-p things does the UD, is provable in Robinson arithmetic. The 
1p-things of the machine do escape the ontological realities. Arithmetic seen 
from inside is infinitely bigger and complex than the 3p arithmetic. The Löbian 
machine all know this already. 

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 4 May 2019, at 02:32, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/3/2019 2:00 PM, cloudver...@gmail.com  
> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 3:26:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 5/3/2019 12:00 PM, cloud...@gmail.com  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> If "consciousness doesn't supervene on physical [or material] computation" 
>>> then does that mean there is realm for (A) consciousness and one for (B) 
>>> physical [or material] computation?
>> 
>> No, the theory is that all possible computations (the UD) exist and they 
>> instantiate all conscious thoughts, including those we call perception of an 
>> external reality.   There isn't anymore to reality; it's just the 
>> statistical regularities among the different threads of the UD.  At least 
>> that's Bruno's idea.
>> 
>> Brent
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> There could be UD-computing that is being executed by the brain. One can't 
>> rule this out a priori.
>> 
>> I just say if so, it is being executed in a material substrate - the brain!
>> 
>> There is no heavenly realm where UD-computing is churning away.
> 
> The question is whether there is a realm consisting of arithmetic.

If there is none, then there is no more physical science at all. To have any 
physical science capable of explaining brains, or even my laptop, you need to 
assume that 2+2=4 and its consequences.

Primary matter is not something observable, in any direct way. We can only 
asses or refute it by meaning numbers, that is, experimental physics. 

Now, with just a bit more than arithmetic, we can define the realm of 
arithmetic: it is the structure (N, 0, +, x). It is used in the definition of 
real and complex numbers, which are assumed in most physical theories.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 4 May 2019, at 01:55, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 7:50 PM  > wrote:
> 
> > I don't believe in the "functional equivalence" principle
> 
> If you don't believe in that then logically you must believe you are the only 
> conscious being in the universe.

Philipp Thrift (cloudver...@gmail.com ) is at 
least coherent, as he believes in primary matter, and reject Mechanism.

The logical problem, is for those who believe in both primary matter (or 
physicalism) AND in the idea that the brain is Turing emulable.  Like Cosmin, 
and you, John, if I remember well.

Bruno



> 
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> 
>  
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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 4 May 2019, at 00:08, cloudver...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> Well we know some matter has a psychical aspect: human brains.
> 
> Unless one is a consciousness denier.
> - https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/ 
> 
> 
> @philipthrift


But we don’t know if PRIMITIVE matter exist. That is a strong assumption in 
Metaphysics. That is why it is already seen as a god in both Plato and 
Aristotle. But invoking God in an argument is invalid.

No problem if you assume it as an hypothesis, then my work give you an argument 
that we are not Turing emulable, which seems to me to make thing complex for no 
reason, except making mechanism false.

It confirms, what has been debated already a lot here, that it confirms that 
non-mechanism is a sort of racism. It evokes a God (even if a non personal one) 
just to make some entities into zombie. Non-mechanist should wait for some 
evidence of non-mechanism at least.

Bruno 



> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 4:58:04 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
> Panpsychism of any flavor that identifies matter with a psychic aspect is 
> subject to the problems I described earlier. 
> 
> It never occurred to me to google something like "theoretical psychology" 
>  but there's a lot 
> there. How much of it is interesting, I don't know. 
> 
> I think as we flesh out the connectome, theoretical psychology will take on 
> more legitimacy and importance.
> 
> 
> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 5:16 PM > wrote:
> 
> There is a whole spectrum of panpsychisms (plural) - from micropsychism to 
> cosmophychism:
> 
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/ 
> 
> cf. https://www.iep.utm.edu/panpsych/ 
> 
> That is not a "real science" yet is its basic problem of course. But 
> consciousness science in general really isn't yet either.
> 
> One would think there would be a group of theoretical psychologists - there 
> is theoretical physics, chemistry, and biology, but theoretical psychology is 
> in a much weirder state - who would be involved.
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> 
> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 3:48:40 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
> My question for panpsychists is similar to my question for Cosmin: what does 
> it buy you in terms of explanations or predictions?
> 
> Just blanket-asserting that all matter is conscious doesn't tell me anything 
> about consciousness itself. For example, what would it mean for my 
> fingernails to be conscious?  Does my fingernail consciousness factor in 
> somehow to my own experience of consciousness?  If so, how? What about all 
> the other parts of my body, about individual cells?  Does the bacteria living 
> in my body contribute its consciousness somehow? It quickly runs aground on 
> the same rocks that arguments about "soul" do - there's no principled way to 
> talk about it that elucidates relationships between brains, bodies, and 
> minds. Panpsychism does nothing to explain the effect of drugs on 
> consciousness, or brain damage. Like Cosmin's ideas, it's all just post-hoc 
> rationalization. Panpsychism is the philosophical equivalent of throwing your 
> hands up and saying "I dunno, I guess it's all conscious somehow!"
> 
> What I'm suggesting posits that consciousness arises from the cybernetic 
> organization of a system, that what the system experiences, as a whole, is 
> identified with the informational-dynamics captured by that organization. 
> This yields explanations for the character of a given system's 
> consciousness... something panpsychism cannot do.
> 
> Terren
> 
> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 3:57 PM > wrote:
> 
> I see the coin made (as the ones lying on my desk right now made of metal) of 
> matter.
> 
> The two sides of the coin (of matter) are physical and psychical:
> 
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/ 
> 
> 
> 
> If ὕ – the first Greek letter for “hyle”, upsilon (υ) with diacritics dasia 
> and oxia (U+1F55) – is used for the symbol of matter, φ (phi) for physical, + 
> ψ (psi) for psychical, then
> 
> 
> 
>ὕ = φ + ψ
>  
> (i.e., the combination of physical and psychical properties is a more 
> complete view of what matter is). The physical is the (quantitative) 
> behavioral aspect of matter – the kind that is formulated in mathematical 
> language in current physics, for example – whereas the psychical is the 
> (qualitative) experiential aspect of matter, at various levels, from brains 
> on down. There is no reason in principle for only φ to the considered by 
> science and for ψ to be ignored by science.
> 
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 2:10:05 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
> I see them as two sides of the same coin - as in, you don't get one without 

Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 3 May 2019, at 22:26, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/3/2019 12:00 PM, cloudver...@gmail.com  
> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> If "consciousness doesn't supervene on physical [or material] computation" 
>> then does that mean there is realm for (A) consciousness and one for (B) 
>> physical [or material] computation?
> 
> No, the theory is that all possible computations (the UD) exist and they 
> instantiate all conscious thoughts, including those we call perception of an 
> external reality.   There isn't anymore to reality; it's just the statistical 
> regularities among the different threads of the UD.  At least that's Bruno's 
> idea.

To be sure, the existence of the UD is a logical consequence of elementary 
arithmetic with Church's thesis or Turing’s thesis. Peano arithmetic can prove 
that it emulates Robinson Arithmetic, and that such an emulation is a universal 
dovetailing. 

You would not say that Riemann’s conjecture requires the assumption that an 
infinity of prime numbers exist. You will just refer to Euclide’s proof that 
there is an infinity or primes. Same for the UD.

That the UD instantiates thought follows from the mechanist assumption. That 
entails the necessity to derive physics from a statistics on all computation 
(actually on all relative first person experience supported by all computation 
continuing us) is also a logical consequence of mechanism.

Anyone can say that a computation in arithmetic cannot be conscious, because it 
has not been blessed with Holy Matter, but then it has to abandon Mechanism, 
because the digitalist surgeon does not mention any role of matter in the 
digital computation which is supposed to  support the mind of the candidate.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
>> 
>> Is A like some spirit or ghost that invades the domain of B? Or does B 
>> invade A?
>> 
>> @philipthrift
>> 
>> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 1:44:34 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
>> 
>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 1:10 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>> > wrote:
>> I think that is right.  But when you consider some simplified cases, e.g. a 
>> computation written out on paper (or Bruno's movie graph) it becomes 
>> apparent that consciousness must ultimately refer to other things. 
>> 
>> Right, the movie graph argument shows that consciousness doesn't supervene 
>> on physical computation. Nevertheless, the character of my consciousness 
>> still corresponds with the kind of cybernetic system implemented by e.g. my 
>> brain and body, as instantiated by the infinity of programs going through my 
>> state.
>>  
>> Much is made of "self-awareness" but this is usually just having an internal 
>> model of one's body, or social standing or some other model of the self.  It 
>> is not consciousness of consciousness...that is only a temporal reflection: 
>> "I was conscious just now." 
>> 
>> I see it a little differently. The self-model/ego is a higher-order 
>> construct that organizes the system in a holistic way. We take this for 
>> granted - it's the water we swim in - but our minds are radically 
>> re-organized as children by the taught narrative that we have an identity 
>> and this unitary identity is the cause of our behavior (when the evidence 
>> shows that we merely rationalize our behavior in terms of that narrative). 
>> Point being, the way the cybernetic system is organized takes a quantum leap 
>> in complexity as a result - and this is responsible for the subjective 
>> awareness of ourselves as people. 
>> 
>> In the dream state (except for lucid dreaming), our self-model is not 
>> energized - ongoing experience in dreams is not organized in terms of that 
>> narrative of being someone. When lucid dreaming begins, it is because we can 
>> say "I am dreaming", which is to say that the self-model becomes active. In 
>> that moment, the character of that dream consciousness changes dramatically.
>>  
>> In general terms we could say consciousness is awareness of the evironment, 
>> where that includes one's body.  Damasio identifies emotions as awareness of 
>> the bodies state.  The point is that the stuff of which we are aware and 
>> which we find agreement with other people's awareness is what we infer to be 
>> the physical world.  It might be possible to be conscious in some sense 
>> without a physical world, but it would be qualitatively different.
>> 
>> Yes. However, it's not clear what it would mean for a conscious agent to 
>> experience something that wasn't a "physical" world, even if the environment 
>> was completely virtual. The Matrix illustrates that nicely.
>> 
>> Terren
>>  
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> On 5/3/2019 6:27 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>> One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is associated with 
>>> the way information is processed. This is substrate independent - the fact 
>>> that a brain is physical is beside the point. You could implement a brain 
>>> in software, and insofar as the same 

Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 3 May 2019, at 21:00, cloudver...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> If "consciousness doesn't supervene on physical [or material] computation" 
> then does that mean there is realm for (A) consciousness and one for (B) 
> physical [or material] computation?

I assume mechanism all along.

There is only one realm: elementary arithmetical truth, that you can conceive 
as the set of true arithmetical proposition. That contains the fact that 2+2=4, 
but also existential and universal proposition, like Ex(x+2=4) or Ax(x+y=y+x). 
That contains all elementary statement of computer science, like the machine I 
on input j stop after k steps with output y, or like: the 6789th register of 
machine 8789754300346662309 on input 67 is not-empty at its 8453504th step 
of computation, etc. The computation is in the true relation between the 
number, not in the syntactical description (number) describing a computation. A 
computation is not the same as a description of a computation. That is a key 
point to understand Mechanism. 

Consciousness too belongs to the arithmetical truth, but unlike computations, 
does not admit any definition of or description in arithmetic, like the 
arithmetical truth itself, it is not a syntactical being, it has to refer to 
some reality (a non syntactical notion), but with mechanism, the arithmetical 
TRUTH, as opposed to anything syntactical does matter.

Then the material phenomenology emerges from the differentiation of 
consciousness on the infinities of history realised (syntactically and 
semantically) in the arithmetical reality.




> 
> Is A like some spirit or ghost that invades the domain of B? Or does B invade 
> A?


Nobody invades anything. There is the arithmetical reality (which after Gödel 
has to be understood as something beyond all theories, all syntaxes, all 
machines, all words, all numbers), which can be see from inside, in 8 different 
modes, three of them contributing to the material lasting" hallucination”.

The physical realm can be seen as the surface of a sphere? The mind is the 
interior of the sphere, but the sphere is infinite, as its border is an 
internal projection, like rails which joint ad the infinite, although they 
never really cross. 

There is only numbers, and the mind of the numbers is associated with the truth 
related to some of its relation with other (universal) numbers.

Adding matter makes no sense if we assume mechanism, and makes sense only for 
those who want mechanism to be false. Yet, doing an ontological commitment to 
avoid some entities, which behaves as if they have a soul, to deprive them of a 
soul, is not quite scientific. It is like inventing a new particle that nobody 
has seen to contradict a theory. That is very not convincing.

Bruno




> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 1:44:34 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
> 
> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 1:10 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> > wrote:
> I think that is right.  But when you consider some simplified cases, e.g. a 
> computation written out on paper (or Bruno's movie graph) it becomes apparent 
> that consciousness must ultimately refer to other things. 
> 
> Right, the movie graph argument shows that consciousness doesn't supervene on 
> physical computation. Nevertheless, the character of my consciousness still 
> corresponds with the kind of cybernetic system implemented by e.g. my brain 
> and body, as instantiated by the infinity of programs going through my state.
>  
> Much is made of "self-awareness" but this is usually just having an internal 
> model of one's body, or social standing or some other model of the self.  It 
> is not consciousness of consciousness...that is only a temporal reflection: 
> "I was conscious just now." 
> 
> I see it a little differently. The self-model/ego is a higher-order construct 
> that organizes the system in a holistic way. We take this for granted - it's 
> the water we swim in - but our minds are radically re-organized as children 
> by the taught narrative that we have an identity and this unitary identity is 
> the cause of our behavior (when the evidence shows that we merely rationalize 
> our behavior in terms of that narrative). Point being, the way the cybernetic 
> system is organized takes a quantum leap in complexity as a result - and this 
> is responsible for the subjective awareness of ourselves as people. 
> 
> In the dream state (except for lucid dreaming), our self-model is not 
> energized - ongoing experience in dreams is not organized in terms of that 
> narrative of being someone. When lucid dreaming begins, it is because we can 
> say "I am dreaming", which is to say that the self-model becomes active. In 
> that moment, the character of that dream consciousness changes dramatically.
>  
> In general terms we could say consciousness is awareness of the evironment, 
> where that includes one's body.  Damasio identifies emotions as awareness of 
> the bodies state.  The point is that the 

Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, May 9, 2019 at 5:34:29 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 3 May 2019, at 16:10, cloud...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> The general response here is that there has never existed a program that 
> has executed outside a computer. And computers are made of matter.
>
>
> That is false. Programs have been discovered in arithmetic, like prime 
> numbers. Computations are number relation (the sigma_1 one).
>
> “
>

Who discovered arithmetic and where is it?

I get the idea that Arthur Conan Doyle "discovered" Sherlock Holmes, and he 
"is" in books and people's brains (imaginations).

But arithmetic actually has no more reality than that, outside of its 
operations in brains and man-made things. One can say DNA or other natural 
things is "doing" arithmetic and so forth. That kind of thing.

But where is this thing you call arithmetic?

@philipthrift

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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, May 9, 2019 at 5:15:32 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 3 May 2019, at 08:26, cloud...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 8:03:52 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/2/2019 4:55 PM, cloud...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 5:37:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/2/2019 11:39 AM, cloud...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Apparently *matter* is not "reducible" to just the physics a couple of 
>>> particles.
>>>
>>>
>>> Then you're not a materialist.  You think there is matter plus something 
>>> else, that everyone calls "mind", but you're going to call it "matter" and 
>>> add it to everyone else's list of matter so you can still call yourself a 
>>> materialist.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> But everything reducing to the physics of particles is thought of as 
>> *physicalism* (not materialism):
>> *Physicalism and materialism*  
>>
>> Reductive physicalism 
>> ...is normally 
>> assumed to be incompatible with panpsychism. Materialism 
>> , if held to be distinct from 
>> physicalism, is compatible with panpsychism insofar as mental properties 
>>
>>
>> What mental properties?  intention?  reflection? remembering?  That's 
>> what I mean by saying attributing "experience" to matter is an unprincipled 
>> half-measure.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>  
>
> Brains are matter, just as livers, legs, trees, tables, rocks, comets, 
> planets, stars, cockroaches, galaxies, bacteria  .. are matter.
>
> Brains produce intentions, reflections, remembrances, ... .
>
> So (at least some) matter of the cosmos has psychical (mental) properties.
>
> The body+mind idea, the idea that mind is something separate from body, is 
> perhaps the worst idea ever invented.
>
>
> At least we agree on this. That is dualism, and is easily shown insane.
>
> Now, what can be proved is that Mechanism is incompatible with weak 
> materialism (that is with both dualism and physicalism/materialism). I have 
> shown that we can test mechanism, and that up to now, thanks to Quantum 
> Mechanics which confirms Mechanism and its consequences.
>
> Materialisme/physicalism have problem of its own:
> - what is it?
> - why does it seem to obey mathematical laws
> - why consciousness? How matter is related to consciousness?
>
> Materialist tends to either eliminate consciousness, or dismiss it as a 
> unimportant details, or introduce identity thesis which requires strong 
> ontological infinity axioms, or Oracle, for which we have no evidences 
> today.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
I wrote this earlier today in response to a Philip Goff interview:
https://twitter.com/philipthrift/status/1126415043959107584


I say (following Auden) "Matter is much / Odder than we thought". The 
scientists (physicists mainly)  I have read have a peculiarly antiseptic 
idea of what matter is: It cannot have experiential properties. Thus 
science—and matter, as they present it—has a big blind spot in it.


(There is a group today self-called "phenomenological materialists".) The 
problem is not materialism. The problem is that (for the most part) 
scientists have *the wrong idea *of what matter is. Ancient Greek 
materialists were better than today's scientists in this regard.

@philipthrift

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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 3 May 2019, at 20:48, cloudver...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> Consciousness "executing" in an immaterial (nonphysical) realm is what 
> Christians call Heaven. God made this place.

God is that place. But it is no more than (sigma_1) arithmetical truth. 

The christian believe in Matter, and either use it as a god, or introduce a god 
above, but none of those ideas can work with mechanism. You need infinities in 
the ontology, and why introduce them to just avoid that some machine can think. 



> 
> Mormons have a more material afterlife idea, I think.

“Apparently material”, yes. Digital Machines too.

Bruno



> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 12:10:04 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> I think that is right.  But when you consider some simplified cases, e.g. a 
> computation written out on paper (or Bruno's movie graph) it becomes apparent 
> that consciousness must ultimately refer to other things.  Much is made of 
> "self-awareness" but this is usually just having an internal model of one's 
> body, or social standing or some other model of the self.  It is not 
> consciousness of consciousness...that is only a temporal reflection: "I was 
> conscious just now."  In general terms we could say consciousness is 
> awareness of the evironment, where that includes one's body.  Damasio 
> identifies emotions as awareness of the bodies state.  The point is that the 
> stuff of which we are aware and which we find agreement with other people's 
> awareness is what we infer to be the physical world.  It might be possible to 
> be conscious in some sense without a physical world, but it would be 
> qualitatively different.
> 
> Brent
> 
> On 5/3/2019 6:27 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>> One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is associated with 
>> the way information is processed. This is substrate independent - the fact 
>> that a brain is physical is beside the point. You could implement a brain in 
>> software, and insofar as the same kinds of information processing occur, it 
>> would be conscious in the same kind of way.
>> 
>> I find this idea compelling because it makes the link between brains and 
>> consciousness without requiring matter, and provides a framework for 
>> understanding consciousnesses of other kinds of machines.  All that's 
>> required is to assume there is something it is like for computation to occur.
>> 
>> Terren
>> 
>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 2:26 AM > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 8:03:52 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 5/2/2019 4:55 PM, cloud...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 5:37:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 5/2/2019 11:39 AM, cloud...@gmail.com <> wrote:
 
 Apparently matter is not "reducible" to just the physics a couple of 
 particles.
>>> 
>>> Then you're not a materialist.  You think there is matter plus something 
>>> else, that everyone calls "mind", but you're going to call it "matter" and 
>>> add it to everyone else's list of matter so you can still call yourself a 
>>> materialist.
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> But everything reducing to the physics of particles is thought of as 
>>> physicalism (not materialism):
>>> Physicalism and materialism  
>>> 
>>> Reductive physicalism 
>>> ...is normally assumed 
>>> to be incompatible with panpsychism. Materialism 
>>> , if held to be distinct from 
>>> physicalism, is compatible with panpsychism insofar as mental properties
>>> 
>> 
>> What mental properties?  intention?  reflection? remembering?  That's what I 
>> mean by saying attributing "experience" to matter is an unprincipled 
>> half-measure.
>> 
>> Brent
>>  
>> 
>> Brains are matter, just as livers, legs, trees, tables, rocks, comets, 
>> planets, stars, cockroaches, galaxies, bacteria  .. are matter.
>> 
>> Brains produce intentions, reflections, remembrances, ... .
>> 
>> So (at least some) matter of the cosmos has psychical (mental) properties.
>> 
>> The body+mind idea, the idea that mind is something separate from body, is 
>> perhaps the worst idea ever invented.
>> 
>> @philipthrift
> 
> 
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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 3 May 2019, at 20:44, cloudver...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> All software that has ever run has run on computers made of materials and 
> assembled in factories.


Not at all. If you believe in things like the distribution of prime numbers, 
used in physics (btw), then you have to believe that all computations are run 
in arithmetic, and matter emerges from this.

Bruno



> 
> There is no spiritual/heavenly realm - as fat as I know - where software is 
> running.
> 
> Can you show me such a place? Have you seen it?
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 9:33:58 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
> What happened to "only brains can be conscious"? 
> 
> Are you familiar with virtual machines?  Machines simulated in software?
> 
> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 10:10 AM > wrote:
> 
> 
> The general response here is that there has never existed a program that has 
> executed outside a computer. And computers are made of matter.
> 
> Now one can  generalize "computer": There were things like the abacus and 
> slide rule, that executed "programs". Or one executes programs in the head 
> (so to speak). But this is the brain,. Again, matter. Or one takes one's hand 
> and a pencil or pen and executes a program on a piece of paper.  Again. all 
> matter 
> 
> Now one can watch a movie (like 2001 with the HAL 9000)  or read a book of 
> fiction where there is a program running on a some computer. But this is a 
> fictional story.
> 
> One can imagine a program running on an imaginary computer, but this 
> imagining is all done in the brain. Matter.
> 
> But give me an example of a program running in a "matter free" environment: 
> No brains, hands, pencils, computers, abacuses, slide rules, around.
> 
> Is it like some ghost out on its own in some immaterial realm?
> 
> 
> @philipthift
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 8:27:35 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
> One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is associated with 
> the way information is processed. This is substrate independent - the fact 
> that a brain is physical is beside the point. You could implement a brain in 
> software, and insofar as the same kinds of information processing occur, it 
> would be conscious in the same kind of way.
> 
> I find this idea compelling because it makes the link between brains and 
> consciousness without requiring matter, and provides a framework for 
> understanding consciousnesses of other kinds of machines.  All that's 
> required is to assume there is something it is like for computation to occur.
> 
> Terren
> 
> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 2:26 AM > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 8:03:52 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 5/2/2019 4:55 PM, cloud...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 5:37:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 5/2/2019 11:39 AM, cloud...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Apparently matter is not "reducible" to just the physics a couple of 
>>> particles.
>> 
>> Then you're not a materialist.  You think there is matter plus something 
>> else, that everyone calls "mind", but you're going to call it "matter" and 
>> add it to everyone else's list of matter so you can still call yourself a 
>> materialist.
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> But everything reducing to the physics of particles is thought of as 
>> physicalism (not materialism):
>> Physicalism and materialism  
>> 
>> Reductive physicalism 
>> ...is normally assumed 
>> to be incompatible with panpsychism. Materialism 
>> , if held to be distinct from 
>> physicalism, is compatible with panpsychism insofar as mental properties
>> 
> 
> What mental properties?  intention?  reflection? remembering?  That's what I 
> mean by saying attributing "experience" to matter is an unprincipled 
> half-measure.
> 
> Brent
>  
> 
> Brains are matter, just as livers, legs, trees, tables, rocks, comets, 
> planets, stars, cockroaches, galaxies, bacteria  .. are matter.
> 
> Brains produce intentions, reflections, remembrances, ... .
> 
> So (at least some) matter of the cosmos has psychical (mental) properties.
> 
> The body+mind idea, the idea that mind is something separate from body, is 
> perhaps the worst idea ever invented.
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 3 May 2019, at 19:09, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> I think that is right.  But when you consider some simplified cases, e.g. a 
> computation written out on paper (or Bruno's movie graph) it becomes apparent 
> that consciousness must ultimately refer to other things.  Much is made of 
> "self-awareness" but this is usually just having an internal model of one's 
> body, or social standing or some other model of the self.  It is not 
> consciousness of consciousness...that is only a temporal reflection: "I was 
> conscious just now."  In general terms we could say consciousness is 
> awareness of the evironment, where that includes one's body.  Damasio 
> identifies emotions as awareness of the bodies state.  The point is that the 
> stuff of which we are aware and which we find agreement with other people's 
> awareness is what we infer to be the physical world.  It might be possible to 
> be conscious in some sense without a physical world, but it would be 
> qualitatively different.

How could a brain make a person aware that his brain is implemented in a 
ontological physical reality, or in the arithmetical reality?

Only the observation will differ, and only if mechanism is false.

Why assume matter, when the illusion ion matter can be explained, without it, 
and *cannot be explained* with it, unless bringing infinities in the ontology?

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
> On 5/3/2019 6:27 AM, Terren Suydam wrote:
>> One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is associated with 
>> the way information is processed. This is substrate independent - the fact 
>> that a brain is physical is beside the point. You could implement a brain in 
>> software, and insofar as the same kinds of information processing occur, it 
>> would be conscious in the same kind of way.
>> 
>> I find this idea compelling because it makes the link between brains and 
>> consciousness without requiring matter, and provides a framework for 
>> understanding consciousnesses of other kinds of machines.  All that's 
>> required is to assume there is something it is like for computation to occur.
>> 
>> Terren
>> 
>> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 2:26 AM > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 8:03:52 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 5/2/2019 4:55 PM, cloud...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 5:37:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 5/2/2019 11:39 AM, cloud...@gmail.com <> wrote:
 
 Apparently matter is not "reducible" to just the physics a couple of 
 particles.
>>> 
>>> Then you're not a materialist.  You think there is matter plus something 
>>> else, that everyone calls "mind", but you're going to call it "matter" and 
>>> add it to everyone else's list of matter so you can still call yourself a 
>>> materialist.
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> But everything reducing to the physics of particles is thought of as 
>>> physicalism (not materialism):
>>> Physicalism and materialism  
>>> 
>>> Reductive physicalism 
>>> ...is normally assumed 
>>> to be incompatible with panpsychism. Materialism 
>>> , if held to be distinct from 
>>> physicalism, is compatible with panpsychism insofar as mental properties
>>> 
>> 
>> What mental properties?  intention?  reflection? remembering?  That's what I 
>> mean by saying attributing "experience" to matter is an unprincipled 
>> half-measure.
>> 
>> Brent
>>  
>> 
>> Brains are matter, just as livers, legs, trees, tables, rocks, comets, 
>> planets, stars, cockroaches, galaxies, bacteria  .. are matter.
>> 
>> Brains produce intentions, reflections, remembrances, ... .
>> 
>> So (at least some) matter of the cosmos has psychical (mental) properties.
>> 
>> The body+mind idea, the idea that mind is something separate from body, is 
>> perhaps the worst idea ever invented.
>> 
>> @philipthrift
>> -- 
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
>> "Everything List" group.
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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 3 May 2019, at 16:10, cloudver...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> The general response here is that there has never existed a program that has 
> executed outside a computer. And computers are made of matter.

That is false. Programs have been discovered in arithmetic, like prime numbers. 
Computations are number relation (the sigma_1 one).

“Computer” is ambiguous. In this list, I use it to refer to physical 
implementation of the universal number.

Yet physical has to be, and is, explained in the phenomenology of the universal 
numbers.



> 
> Now one can  generalize "computer": There were things like the abacus and 
> slide rule, that executed "programs". Or one executes programs in the head 
> (so to speak). But this is the brain,.

Assuming that brain exist primarily, but that begs the question. 



> Again, matter. Or one takes one's hand and a pencil or pen and executes a 
> program on a piece of paper.  Again. all matter 
> 
> Now one can watch a movie (like 2001 with the HAL 9000)  or read a book of 
> fiction where there is a program running on a some computer. But this is a 
> fictional story.
> 
> One can imagine a program running on an imaginary computer, but this 
> imagining is all done in the brain. Matter.
> 
> But give me an example of a program running in a "matter free" environment: 
> No brains, hands, pencils, computers, abacuses, slide rules, around.
> 
> Is it like some ghost out on its own in some immaterial realm?

That is explained in Gödel, despite he miss the notion of machine and 
computation, but the math is already there. Then it has been made explicit by 
all the logicians after Gödel. It is long to explain, because programming a 
universal number in arithmetic is lengthy. Let me give you just one example. 
How to implement a sequence of register containing the number 89 677 89 ? A 
typical way consists in using exponential, and the fundamental theorem of 
arithmetic which says that all number have a unique decomposition in prime. So, 
if p_i represents the its prime number, you can encode the sequence of register 
with content 89 677 89 by (p_1^89)*(p_2^677)*(p_3^89), i.e. 
(2^89)*(3^677)*(5^89). You can intuit that using such register can be realised 
by sequence of division, etc. Eventually, it can be shown that the full working 
of any universal number can be realised by number relations of that kind. This 
is made in details in all reasonable textbook in theoretical computer science.

Bruno





> 
> 
> @philipthift
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, May 3, 2019 at 8:27:35 AM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
> One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is associated with 
> the way information is processed. This is substrate independent - the fact 
> that a brain is physical is beside the point. You could implement a brain in 
> software, and insofar as the same kinds of information processing occur, it 
> would be conscious in the same kind of way.
> 
> I find this idea compelling because it makes the link between brains and 
> consciousness without requiring matter, and provides a framework for 
> understanding consciousnesses of other kinds of machines.  All that's 
> required is to assume there is something it is like for computation to occur.
> 
> Terren
> 
> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 2:26 AM > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 8:03:52 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 5/2/2019 4:55 PM, cloud...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 5:37:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 5/2/2019 11:39 AM, cloud...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Apparently matter is not "reducible" to just the physics a couple of 
>>> particles.
>> 
>> Then you're not a materialist.  You think there is matter plus something 
>> else, that everyone calls "mind", but you're going to call it "matter" and 
>> add it to everyone else's list of matter so you can still call yourself a 
>> materialist.
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> But everything reducing to the physics of particles is thought of as 
>> physicalism (not materialism):
>> Physicalism and materialism  
>> 
>> Reductive physicalism 
>> ...is normally assumed 
>> to be incompatible with panpsychism. Materialism 
>> , if held to be distinct from 
>> physicalism, is compatible with panpsychism insofar as mental properties
>> 
> 
> What mental properties?  intention?  reflection? remembering?  That's what I 
> mean by saying attributing "experience" to matter is an unprincipled 
> half-measure.
> 
> Brent
>  
> 
> Brains are matter, just as livers, legs, trees, tables, rocks, comets, 
> planets, stars, cockroaches, galaxies, bacteria  .. are matter.
> 
> Brains produce intentions, reflections, remembrances, ... .
> 
> So (at least some) matter of the cosmos has psychical (mental) properties.
> 
> The body+mind idea, the idea that mind is something separate from body, is 
> perhaps the worst idea ever invented.
> 
> 

Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 3 May 2019, at 15:27, Terren Suydam  wrote:
> 
> One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is associated with 
> the way information is processed.


That is mechanism, but then you inherit infinitely many body-representation in 
arithmetic, and the mind-body problem becomes in part a justification of the 
appearances from a statistic to all computations going through our brain. Then 
incompleteness explains what this take the shape of a quantum reality.




> This is substrate independent - the fact that a brain is physical is beside 
> the point. You could implement a brain in software, and insofar as the same 
> kinds of information processing occur, it would be conscious in the same kind 
> of way.
> 
> I find this idea compelling because it makes the link between brains and 
> consciousness without requiring matter, and provides a framework for 
> understanding consciousnesses of other kinds of machines.  All that's 
> required is to assume there is something it is like for computation to occur.

Yes. Then it is sad that so few people are aware that the notion of computation 
is a purely arithmetical definition, so that we don’t need to assume more than 
Robison arithmetic. Worst, we cannot assume more, without exploding the number 
of aberration histories. This makes mechanism testable, by comparing the 
physics emerging from the self-referential statistics on all computations with 
the inferred physics. And it match well, were physics itself miss the relation 
with the first person perspective, necessarily (assuming mechanism). A 
materialist has a way out: to invoke infinite to make the link brain-mind 
one-one, which it cannot be once we do the digital truncation.

Bruno




> 
> Terren
> 
> On Fri, May 3, 2019 at 2:26 AM  > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 8:03:52 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 5/2/2019 4:55 PM, cloud...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 5:37:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 5/2/2019 11:39 AM, cloud...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Apparently matter is not "reducible" to just the physics a couple of 
>>> particles.
>> 
>> Then you're not a materialist.  You think there is matter plus something 
>> else, that everyone calls "mind", but you're going to call it "matter" and 
>> add it to everyone else's list of matter so you can still call yourself a 
>> materialist.
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> But everything reducing to the physics of particles is thought of as 
>> physicalism (not materialism):
>> Physicalism and materialism  
>> 
>> Reductive physicalism 
>> ...is normally assumed 
>> to be incompatible with panpsychism. Materialism 
>> , if held to be distinct from 
>> physicalism, is compatible with panpsychism insofar as mental properties
>> 
> 
> What mental properties?  intention?  reflection? remembering?  That's what I 
> mean by saying attributing "experience" to matter is an unprincipled 
> half-measure.
> 
> Brent
>  
> 
> Brains are matter, just as livers, legs, trees, tables, rocks, comets, 
> planets, stars, cockroaches, galaxies, bacteria  .. are matter.
> 
> Brains produce intentions, reflections, remembrances, ... .
> 
> So (at least some) matter of the cosmos has psychical (mental) properties.
> 
> The body+mind idea, the idea that mind is something separate from body, is 
> perhaps the worst idea ever invented.
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> -- 
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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 3 May 2019, at 08:26, cloudver...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 8:03:52 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 5/2/2019 4:55 PM, cloud...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, May 2, 2019 at 5:37:26 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 5/2/2019 11:39 AM, cloud...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Apparently matter is not "reducible" to just the physics a couple of 
>>> particles.
>> 
>> Then you're not a materialist.  You think there is matter plus something 
>> else, that everyone calls "mind", but you're going to call it "matter" and 
>> add it to everyone else's list of matter so you can still call yourself a 
>> materialist.
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> But everything reducing to the physics of particles is thought of as 
>> physicalism (not materialism):
>> Physicalism and materialism  
>> 
>> Reductive physicalism 
>> ...is normally assumed 
>> to be incompatible with panpsychism. Materialism 
>> , if held to be distinct from 
>> physicalism, is compatible with panpsychism insofar as mental properties
>> 
> 
> What mental properties?  intention?  reflection? remembering?  That's what I 
> mean by saying attributing "experience" to matter is an unprincipled 
> half-measure.
> 
> Brent
>  
> 
> Brains are matter, just as livers, legs, trees, tables, rocks, comets, 
> planets, stars, cockroaches, galaxies, bacteria  .. are matter.
> 
> Brains produce intentions, reflections, remembrances, ... .
> 
> So (at least some) matter of the cosmos has psychical (mental) properties.
> 
> The body+mind idea, the idea that mind is something separate from body, is 
> perhaps the worst idea ever invented.

At least we agree on this. That is dualism, and is easily shown insane.

Now, what can be proved is that Mechanism is incompatible with weak materialism 
(that is with both dualism and physicalism/materialism). I have shown that we 
can test mechanism, and that up to now, thanks to Quantum Mechanics which 
confirms Mechanism and its consequences.

Materialisme/physicalism have problem of its own:
- what is it?
- why does it seem to obey mathematical laws
- why consciousness? How matter is related to consciousness?

Materialist tends to either eliminate consciousness, or dismiss it as a 
unimportant details, or introduce identity thesis which requires strong 
ontological infinity axioms, or Oracle, for which we have no evidences today.

Bruno



> 
> @philipthrift
> 
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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 2 May 2019, at 20:15, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
> 
> Any finite execution trace can be replaced by a finite lookup map.

The problem is that, given a (finite) program, you cannot bound the trace in 
advance, so for most programs, you cannot translate it into a finite look-up 
table. It is also a problem for a program which never stop, but still make 
important processing, like a universal dovetailer. It is finite program, which 
generate and execute all program. How would you build a finite look up table to 
encode it?




> So it is always finite. So up to N steps you can implements with a finite 
> lookup table. Unless you have an infinite execution you have to have an 
> infinite lookup table...but you can approximate the execution with a finite 
> lookup table up to N steps... To fill it, you have to execute a correct 
> implementation in the first place. 

In that sense I am OK, but the look-up table will be infinite in most case, and 
belongs more to the semantic than to the syntax. I shout that you were claiming 
that we can replace any program by finite look-up table.
Apology if I misunderstand you.

Bruno


> 
> 
> 
> Le jeu. 2 mai 2019 à 17:44, Bruno Marchal  > a écrit :
> 
>> On 1 May 2019, at 21:41, Quentin Anciaux > > wrote:
>> 
>> Map lookup is a valid implementation for any program you can conceive, 
>> albeit a very ineffective one… 
> 
> ?
> 
> An implementation must be finite. For most programs, to implement them with a 
> look up table would need an infinite look up table.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> The chinese room is such implementation... And as much as my parts are not 
>> me, i'm not the sum of my parts...
>> 
>> Quentin
>> 
>> Le mer. 1 mai 2019 à 20:34, Terren Suydam > > a écrit :
>> 
>> I would argue for "pancyberpsychism" (I'm no good at naming - is there a 
>> name for that already?) which is to say that there it is something it is 
>> like to do information processing of any kind. However, the quality of the 
>> consciousness involved in that processing is related to its dynamics. So 
>> banging on a rock involves a primitive form of information processing, as 
>> vibrations ripple through the rock - there it is something it is like for 
>> that rock to be banged on. For ongoing consciousness, some sort of feedback 
>> loop must be involved. A thermostat would be a primitive example of this, or 
>> a simple oscillating electric circuit. The main idea is that consciousness 
>> is associated with cybernetic organization and has nothing to do with 
>> substrate, which might be material or virtual. 
>> 
>> In the Chinese Room example the cybernetic characteristics of the thought 
>> experiment lack any true feedback mechanism. This is the case with most 
>> instances of software as we know it - e.g. traditional chess engines. There 
>> is something it is like to be them, but it's not anything we would recognize 
>> in terms of ongoing subjective awareness. One could argue that operation 
>> systems (including Mars Rovers) embody the cybernetic dynamics necessary for 
>> ongoing experience, but I'd guess that what it's like to be an operating 
>> system would be pretty alien. 
>> 
>> With biological brains, it's all about feedback and recursivity. Small 
>> insects with rudimentary nervous systems are totally recursive, feeding 
>> sensory data in and processing it continuously. So insect consciousness is 
>> much closer to our own than ordinary Von-Neumann architecture 
>> data-processing.
>> 
>> As nervous systems get more complex, feeding in more data and processing 
>> data in much more sophisticated ways, the consciousness involved would 
>> likewise be experienced in a richer way.
>> 
>> Humans, with our intricate conceptual, language-based self-models, achieve 
>> true self-consciousness. The self-model is a quantum leap forward, giving us 
>> the ability to say "I am". The ego gets a bad rap but it's responsible for 
>> our ability to notice ourselves and live within and create ongoing 
>> narratives about what we are, in relation to what we aren't.  This explains 
>> why ego-dissolving psychedelics lead to such profound changes in 
>> consciousness.
>> 
>> Terren
>> 
>> On Wed, May 1, 2019 at 3:02 PM Quentin Anciaux > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> Le mer. 1 mai 2019 à 18:13, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List 
>> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
>> a écrit :
>> How is a computer conscious ? Magic ? Are you even aware of the Chinese Room 
>> argument ?
>> 
>> Yes, and how is the chinese room not conscious ? Because you have to 
>> associate it either to the dumb person acting as processor or the rules ? 
>> The chinese room as a whole information processing unit is conscious. If you 
>> ask it, it will tell you so... Prove it is not.
>> 
>> Quentin
>> 
>> 
>> -- 
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>> "Everything 

Re: Bernardo Kastrup: "Analytic Idealism: A consciousness-only ontology) '

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 6 May 2019, at 20:34, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 10:47 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> > On 3 May 2019, at 20:09, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> >  > > wrote:
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On 5/3/2019 7:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> The current darkness comes from the separation of theology from science, 
> >> making exact science inexact and human science inhuman.
> >> 
> >> Religion is the only goal,
> > 
> > That's the kind of absolutist pronouncement that priests and despots have 
> > used to justify oppression and atrocities from auto-de-fe' to Buchenwald.
> 
> I could have put that truth, or meaning, or value, is the only goal, but, 
> normally, with what follow, i.e. “science is the only mean”, people should 
> understand that this assume the minimum spiritual maturity of those who knows 
> that in the religion domain, the argument-per-authority is not just not 
> valid, it is catastrophic.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> > 
> >> 
> >> Science is the only mean.
> > 
> > And every person is an end.
> 
> Absolutely.
> 
> Which should invite to be skeptic on all metaphysics which threat the 
> existence of persons.
> 
> Theology is today full of BS, not because theology is BS, only because 
> theology has been separated from science, with the goal to use it as a way to 
> control people. The prohibition of medication, and the idea that a government 
> can have a word on this, in place of you or your doctor, is the same 
> phenomenon. It is how liars get power, by appropriating the domain out of the 
> serious and modest inquirers. The USSR did that with genetics, because 
> theology was already just forbidden, and materialism (even the strong 
> version) was obligatory. It is always the use of the argument per authority, 
> in place of questions and other questions.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> I just found this quote by Godel, where he concluded mostly the same:
> 
> There would be no danger of an atomic war if advances in history, the science 
> of right and of state, philosophy, psychology, literature, art, etc. were as 
> great as in physics. But instead of such progress, one is struck by 
> significant regresses in many of the spiritual sciences. [123]
> 
>  http://kevincarmody.com/math/goedel.html 
> 
> 
> Jason

The consequences of Mechanism assess many statement made by Gödel, including 
his skepticism toward naturalism. Unfortunately, like many, he taught that 
mechanism was a trick to defend materialism and naturalism, where, as I try to 
explain, mechanism and materialism are at the antipodes of each other.

Then Gödel was too much a mathematical realist. He was a set realist, on which 
I am rather neutral. With mechanism, finite set realism is assured, but the 
axiom of infinity is probably inconsistent at the ontological level. It would 
reintroduce too many “histories” and the white rabbits would come back (not 
that we can be sure they are eliminated with Mechanism, or even with the 
inferred quantum mechanics).

Gödel, like all those at the origin of Mathematical Logic (Boole, de Morgan, 
Peirce (the father)), was interested in theology, as illustrated by his 
formalisation of the Ontological Argument. Smullyan too. But, as Cohen 
explained, the theological motivation of mathematical logic has been forced to 
be hidden to permit the professionalisation of mathematics in the 18th century. 

All sciences are born from theology, which remind us that the belief in any 
reality out of personal consciousness requires an act of faith.

Each period of the human history where theology belonged to science have been 
enlightened, peaceful and prosperous. When theology is done with the scientific 
attitude, nobody agrees except on the necessity of research and dialogs. Once 
God is given a literal name, we get the lies, the war, the poverty. We get the 
feeling of superiority and inferiority, and the humans stop to recognise 
themselves in the others, leading to paranoïa and hysteria.

It is important, and unclear from the quite of Gödel, if he realised that when 
theology is back to science, we are just able to admit our ignorance, and 
become modest in the field. It is the claim of truth which is fatal in science 
and even more so in the fundamental science. Bringing back theology in science 
is equivalent to bringing back doubt, modesty, eventually even moral. The 
problem is that by separating theology from science, many get a wrong 
conception of science, like if it was truth by definition, when it is only 
doubt by definition. The idea that science = truth is not science, but 
scientism. 

Now, people want religion to be consolating, comforting, and based on wishful 
thinking. Maybe the humans are still a long way from this. Lies have their role 
too, both in arithmetic and in the human life. I am not still sure how to open 
the mind to people so that they can accept our