On Apr 24, 4:39 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Any content of consciousness can be an illusion. Consciousness itself
cannot, because without consciousness there is no more illusion at all.
- just catching up with the thread, but I feel compelled to comment
that this is beautifully
Forgive me in advance if this has been covered adequately before in
the list, but the following occurs to me with respect to 'Bostrom'
style assessments of where I should expect my 'current' OM to be
situated with respect to the total population of OMs in which I exist.
Presumably, I should
2009/6/16 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com:
Forgive me in advance if this has been covered adequately before in
the list, but the following occurs to me with respect to 'Bostrom'
style assessments of where I should expect my 'current' OM to be
situated with respect to the total
With Bruno and his mighty handful engaged in the undodgeable (though
constantly dodged) task of working towards an elementary grasp of the
technical underpinnings of COMP, and patently lacking the fortitude of
these valorous Stakhanovites, I have been spending my time lurking,
reading and musing.
On 17 July, 08:08, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
But taking a more platonic view, abstract concepts also exist. And if
this is so, could we not just as well say that our conscious
subjective experience is formed from particular configurations of
these platonically existing
, was the beginning of it all?
And it is this ...
Existence that multiplied itself
For sheer delight of being
And plunged into numberless trillions of forms
So that it might
Find
Itself
Innumerably
- Original Message -
From: David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com
To: everything-list
2009/7/19 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com:
In your view, Bruno (or David, or anyone else who has an opinion),
what kinds of things actually exist? What does it mean to say that
something exists?
This is naturally the $64k question for this list - or any other, for
that matter (pun
On 22 July, 16:01, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Ma connection at home is again functioning. I am happy to have solved
the problem rather quickly.
On 22 Jul 2009, at 13:54, David Nyman wrote:
2009/7/22 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
You thought you could make fun
to
attribute to it above, and that this is a sufficient basis for
deriving the knowable and provable aspects of 'what is RITSIAR' whilst
at least being able to refer in some sense to its deeper
unknowablility.
David
On 22 Jul 2009, at 17:56, David Nyman wrote:
2009/7/19 Rex Allen rexallen
abstract worlds etc) that emerge from them. The terminology,
however, remains elusive.
David
David Nyman wrote:
2009/7/23 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
If I understand you correctly, this is similar to the explication of I by
Thomas Metzinger in his book The Ego Tunnel. He
in such a
foundational personal presence. This is what, I think, rescues the
intuition of the One from a mere functionless substrate: it stands for
the foundational intuition of a continuously present and personal
whole, prior to any notions of differentiation whatsoever.
David
David Nyman wrote:
2009/7/23
On 23 July, 05:38, Brian Tenneson tenn...@gmail.com wrote:
You have written about it, and at least two of its properties, and so it
is not completely ineffable, yes?
So I think it is effable even if it is exceedingly difficult to
describe fully. What I'm having trouble believing is that it
?
And it is this ...
Existence that multiplied itself
For sheer delight of being
And plunged into numberless trillions of forms
So that it might
Find
Itself
Innumerably
- Original Message -
From: David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2009 8:38
- Original Message -
From: David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2009 8:38 PM
Subject: Dreams and Machines
With Bruno and his mighty handful engaged in the undodgeable (though
constantly dodged) task
Well said
Thanks to everyone who responded to my initial sally on dreams and
machines. Naturally I have arrogated the right to plagiarise your
helpful comments in what follows, which is an aphoristic synthesis of
my understanding of the main points that have emerged thus far. I
hope this will be helpful
, but I think we're still
broadly in agreement, as before :-)
David
David Nyman wrote:
Thanks to everyone who responded to my initial sally on dreams and
machines. Naturally I have arrogated the right to plagiarise your
helpful comments in what follows, which is an aphoristic synthesis
On 27 July, 12:25, Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote:
Hopefully, by the end of this conversation
without end I will know in what sense I am real!!
Don't count on it ;-)
D
On 27/07/2009, at 11:40 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:
Hi Kim,
RITSIAR means real in the sense that I am
approach,
and specifically in the way it seeks to resolve the 0-1-3-person
conundrums that - even if it turns out to be unsupportable as a whole
- would remain a core feature of any successor theory.
David
On 26 Jul 2009, at 16:52, David Nyman wrote:
Thanks to everyone who responded to my
On 27 July, 12:25, Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote:
Could somebody kindly tell me/explain to me what RITSIAR means? I
cannot find any explanation of this in the threads which mention it.
On a (slightly) more serious note, to the best of my recollection the
expression 'real in the
prejudice, and on the
basis of the above, flatly erroneous. To say the least, any such
relation is moot, absent a radically deeper insight into the mind-body
problem.
David
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 26 Jul 2009, at 16:52, David Nyman wrote:
Thanks to everyone who responded to my initial sally
Marchal wrote:
On 26 Jul 2009, at 16:52, David Nyman wrote:
Thanks to everyone who responded to my initial sally on dreams and
machines. Naturally I have arrogated the right to plagiarise your
helpful comments in what follows, which is an aphoristic synthesis of
my understanding of the main
jungle. But could we try grandma's version
again? Even heroic failure would teach us something.
David
On 27 Jul 2009, at 16:25, David Nyman wrote:
On 27 July, 09:46, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
... yet, the shadows of braids and links(*) appear somehow in the two
matter
this heroic failure can help the grandma a little bit,
Yes, it helps when we go more slowly and step by step, so that the
ignoramus can keep up.
David
On 28 Jul 2009, at 02:56, David Nyman wrote:
2009/7/27 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
Actually, the real axiom is a self-duplicability principle
- in the Wittgensteinian sense - on what they
*are*.
David
David Nyman wrote:
2009/7/27 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
That's a bit of a straw man you're refuting. I've never heard anyone claim
that
the mind is the brain. The materialist claim is that the mind is what the
brain does, i.e. the mind
I've always accepted in its essentials) of who I am
- so who
David
On 28 Jul 2009, at 13:38, David Nyman wrote:
Actually, I do follow the first six steps of the UD reasoning; my own
'beam me up, Scotty' reasoning had led me to similar conclusions. So,
no problem with this. But I do have
into that.
John Mikes
On Mon, Jul 27, 2009 at 7:34 PM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/7/27 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
That's a bit of a straw man you're refuting. I've never heard anyone
claim that
the mind is the brain. The materialist claim
; of
French claret (cask), 1707; of honey (a cask), 1585; of pork (a cask),
1800; of soldiers (a band or company); of tobacco, 1886; of wine (a
cask).
Fascinating. Is any of the above relevant to your meaning?
David
On 29 Jul 2009, at 16:09, David Nyman wrote:
2009/7/28 Bruno Marchal marc
the option of
inventing a totally new vocabulary, but I would despair of holding
anyone's attention in the attempt (and probably not even my own).
David
David Nyman wrote:
...
In my various ramblings, I've tried to cut the whole Gordian knot of
what can coherently be said to exist
when I ask your brain a question it's your hands that reply? That
might explain a lot!
David ;-)
On 29 Jul 2009, at 19:15, David Nyman wrote:
On 29 July, 17:32, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Gosh, David, you are a champion for the difficult questions.
Merci maitre, but I really
2009/7/30 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
[[sound of footsteps]]]
Please allow me to introduce myself ...
Avaunt, ye blood-sucking fiend!
Van Helsing (retd.)
On 27 July, 14:17, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 27 July, 12:25, Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote:
Could
2009/7/30 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com:
It seems to me that the primary meaning of to exist is to be conscious.
But what causes conscious experience? Well, I'm beginning to think
that nothing causes it. Our conscious experience is fundamental,
uncaused, and irreducible.
Why do we think
2009/7/30 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Unless an argument is put forward for Platonism being
preferable to materialism, it doesn't get off the ground.
But surely it's already up in the air?
David
On 28 July, 00:34, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
AFAICS, until these 'under
that everything else is forgotten.
So that, if you like, is the 'appearance' of mindlessness.
David
On 30 July, 23:55, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/7/30 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Cart before the horse:
Why should anyone believe in an ontological gap that isn't backed
On 31 July, 11:43, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
There are many bad solutions too. Finding a good solution
means having an exat grasp of the problem, not saying in some
vague way that mind and matter are different things.
Do elaborate. It would be really helpful to have an exactly stated
2009/7/31 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com:
I don't see that the electron's experiential aspect contributes in any
way to my experience of electrons. And, in a easier to visualize
vein, the same goes for chairs. Maybe there's something that it's
like to be a chair, but this is irrelevant to
2009/7/31 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com:
So yes, I've no doubt that one can explain consciousness by pointing
to some more fundamental process that you infer from the contents of
our conscious experience.
But since this more fundamental substrate in turn requires an
explanation, your net
her what she meant.
David
I comment on Rex's post, as quoted by David, and then I comment
David's post.
On 30 Jul 2009, at 22:34, David Nyman wrote:
2009/7/30 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com:
It seems to me that the primary meaning of to exist is to be
conscious.
Hmm.. I do
I note that the recent posts by Peter Jones - aka the mysterious 1Z,
and the originator of the curiously useful 'real in the sense I am
real' or RITSIAR - occurred shortly after my taking his name in vain.
Hmm...
Anyway, this signalled the resumption of a long-running debate about
the
humanly. We can speculate
about reality's 'human' type aspects of partial hints we can humanly
approach and make a pars pro toto dream of it - we are wrong for sure.
Have a healthy mountain-climb in Scottland
John M
On Fri, Jul 31, 2009 at 5:39 PM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote
2009/8/7 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
If it isn;t RITSIAR, it cannot be generating me. Mathematical
proofs only prove mathematical existence, not onltolgical
existence. For a non-Platonist , 23 exists mathematically,
but is not RITSIAR. The same goes for the UD
Is an atom RITSIAR? Is a
these specific positions where they are resorted to.
If you are prepared to confront what has actually been said,
specifically and point for point, we may make progress, but otherwise
I fear we shan''t get much further.
David
On 30 July, 23:55, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/7
2009/8/10 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
Bruno, I'm broadly in agreement with your comments, and merely
re-emphasise a few points below on which I'm being a stickler. Also,
I have some further comments and questions on step 8.
In this light
it becomes self-evident that any and all
2009/8/10 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
But strictly speaking (I am also a stickler), the first person can
never identify herself to *any* representation, she share this with
the 0-person ONE, or the non differentiate (arithmetical) truth. The
knower does not know who he is. Relatively to
On 9 Aug, 07:41, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
Rex, just a few general points on your posts. The various 'existence'
arguments I've been putting forward recently are intended precisely to
show how our first-person world of meaning and intention is embedded
in a more general environment
2009/8/11 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
Asap. I am busy. Too much things to do. Hope I will find some
windows ...
No problem Bruno - whenever you have a moment to spare.
David
Best,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
2009/8/11 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com:
You speak as if though we have a choice as to how we behave! This I
can't see at all.
Whether our behavior is caused subatomic particles or arithmetic, or
is completely uncaused, there is no room for libertarian free will.
Whether will is free,
2009/8/11 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
Bruno, thanks for your detailed responses which I will peruse closely.
Meanwhile, I finally managed to locate on FOR an apparently coherent
summary of the MGA (which I understand to be the essence of UDA-8).
Here is my understanding of it:
The MGA
2009/8/12 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
The solution then seems obviously to be to throw one or other of these
supposed causal principles out, i.e.:
1) either it is the case that consciousness simply supervenes on
particular physical activities whose computational status is
irrelevant;
2009/8/12 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
I will not stickle on that point :)
Can we say that?
Sure - why be pointilleux about it?
Now, is the ONE a person? I still don't know if that make sense (in
machine's theology). Who knows?
I suspect we need to interview the One. Maybe Oprah?
D
2009/8/13 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com:
Causality. Causality. Causalty. Hmmm.
So really I am arguing against causal explanations. I think this the
core of my current argument. The feeling that something is happening
*NOW* is just another example of qualia I think. The certainty of
2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
Hi David,
This is a nice post, but you are still putting the horse before the cart.
Now I can see that you have not yet grasp the main UDA point. Hope you have
no problem with being frank, and a bit undiplomatical, OK?
Don't worry Bruno, nothing
2009/8/14 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I think need to take a hard line on RITSIAR. I feel that the key lies
in what Bruno terms the certainty of the ontological first person
(OFP): i.e. the sine qua non of reality as it is uniquely available to
us. Since this is inescapably the foundation of
2009/8/16 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
So I lean towards the idea that only our conscious experiences are
real. Things obviously exist as contents of conscious experiences.
I deeply disagree here. Even to understand a word like content I
have to believe in some more basic entities
2009/8/16 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com:
On Sat, Aug 15, 2009 at 9:11 PM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
Here's what I think is the problem with all this:
H. I didn't see anything in your post that seemed like an actual
problem for my view.
But weren't you were arguing
2009/8/16 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com:
On Sun, Aug 16, 2009 at 5:42 PM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/16 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com:
On Sat, Aug 15, 2009 at 9:11 PM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
Here's what I think is the problem with all this:
2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
Here we are back on our little theological divergence.
I will provide a commentary in terms of my own 'theory', as far as I
can. Any references I make to comp in what follows are intended very
generally. No doubt there will be obscurities, but I will
2009/8/17 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Look, I have already said that I am not going to get into an argument
about which pixies exist.
Forgive me for butting in, but I wonder whether there is a level at
which your metaphysical disagreement is perhaps somewhat more
resolvable? It might be
Bruno. How might I take part in such an interview?
David
Bruno
On 17 Aug 2009, at 03:54, David Nyman wrote:
2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
Here we are back on our little theological divergence.
I will provide a commentary in terms of my own 'theory', as far as I
can
2009/8/17 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Yep. I have no problem with any of that
Really? Let's see then.
The paraphrase condition means, for example, that instead of adopting a
statement like unicorns have one horn as a true statement about reality
and thus being forced to accept
2009/8/17 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I am trying to persuade Bruno that his argument has an implict
assumption of Platonism that should be made explicit. An assumption
of Platonism as a non-observable background might be
justifiiable in the way you suggest, but it does need
to be
On 17 Aug, 17:45, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
I've seen John Baez suggest that
For a moment I thought you said Joan Baez (I guess I shouldn't have
stayed up so late watching Woodstock - the director's cut).
Were those really the days?
D
On 17 Aug, 15:23, ronaldheld
2009/8/18 Jesse Mazer wrote:
Peter Jones wrote:
Primary matter is very much related to the fact that some theories of
physics work and other do not. It won't tell you which ones work, but
it will tell you why there is a difference. It solves the white rabbit
problem. We don't see logically
2009/8/18 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
The paraphrase condition means, for example, that instead of adopting a
statement like unicorns have one horn as a true statement about reality
and thus being forced to accept the existence of unicorns, you could
instead paraphrase this in
On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no
doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be primitive,
assuming comp. Matter is more or less the border of the ignorance of
universal machines (to be
On 19 Aug, 01:31, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
It seems that your argument uses MGA to
conclude that no physical instantaion is needed so
Turing-emulable=Turing-emulated. It
seems that all you can conclude is one cannot *know* that they have a correct
argument
showing
On 19 Aug, 01:31, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
It seems that your argument uses MGA to
conclude that no physical instantaion is needed so
Turing-emulable=Turing-emulated. It
seems that all you can conclude is one cannot *know* that they have a correct
argument
showing
On 19 Aug, 01:51, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
I think you are right that the MGA is at the crux. But I don't know whether
to regard it
as proving that computation need not be physically instantiated or as a
reductio against
the yes doctor hypothesis. Saying yes to the
009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is a
physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware. The
paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that
*any* human concept is *eliminable*
No,
2009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Yes, of course, this is precisely my point, for heaven's sake. Here's
the proposal, in your own words: assuming physicalism the class of
consciousness-causing processes might not coincide with any proper
subset of the class of computational
On 19 Aug, 09:36, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also
argued this, in a somewhat different form. Peter's position I think
is that 1) and 2) are
On 19 Aug, 16:41, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I am sorry Peter, but CTM + PM just does not work, and it is a good
news, because if we keep CTM, we get a sort of super generalization of
Darwin idea that things evolve.
We still don't have a definite response from Peter as to
2009/8/19 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com:
I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is a
physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware. The
paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that
*any* human concept is *eliminable*
2009/8/19 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
1) What motivates the assumption of different theoretical postulates
of primitiveness, contingency and necessity?
Is that question really important? It is a bit a private question.
Typical motivation for comp, are that it is very plausible under a
2009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is a
physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware. The
paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that
*any* human concept is *eliminable*
2009/8/19 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 19 Aug, 13:35, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
It doesn't. It just has to be *amenable* of spelling out: i.e. if it
is a posteriori compressed - for example into 'computational' language
- then this demands that it be *capable
2009/8/19 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com:
I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is a
physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware. The
paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that
*any* human concept is
On 20 Aug, 10:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 20 Aug 2009, at 02:07, David Nyman wrote:
2009/8/19 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com:
I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation
is a
physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware
2009/8/20 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 20 Aug, 13:30, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 20 Aug, 10:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
But also - just to dispose once and for all of this particular point -
I want to be sure that you understand that I'm not arguing
On 20 Aug, 10:09, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
OK. It's invalid because you can't have computaiton with zero phyiscal
activity.
But that is **precisely** the conclusion of the reductio that MGA
proposes. MGA claims precisely that - as you say - since it is
implausible to
2009/8/20 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com:
http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@googlegroups.com/msg16244.html
and http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@googlegroups.com/msg16257.html
Thanks, Jesse - I'll take a look.
David
...this notion of causal structure isn't totally
On 21 Aug, 09:37, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Yes, of course you're right - perhaps I didn't phrase my response to
Jesse clearly enough. In my discussion with Peter about Quinean
'eliminative paraphrasing', I was pursuing the same conclusion that
you attribute to Dennett as
2009/8/21 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
My rhetorical question was how do we reach a state of certainty about
'what it is to be' on the basis of 'what it is to describe'.
Why do we need certainty?
OK. Perhaps: how do we achieve the most inclusive understanding possible?
To which
my
On 21 Aug, 19:04, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Explaining away qua reduction is nto the same as
explaining away qua elimination.
Well, either way he's explaining away, as you yourself point out
below. But it's a false distinction, as I point out below.
But also - just
2009/8/23 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/8/22 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
That's an interesting question and one that I think relates to the
importance of context. A scan of your brain would capture all the
information in the
2009/8/24 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com:
2009/8/24 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com:
In the example of the alien brain, as has been pointed out, the
context of meaning is to be discovered only in the its own local
embodiment of its history and current experience. In Stathis
2009/8/24 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com:
In the example of the alien brain, as has been pointed out, the
context of meaning is to be discovered only in the its own local
embodiment of its history and current experience. In Stathis' example
of *our* hypothesized observation of the
2009/8/24 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com:
2009/8/24 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com:
Having said all this, it is interesting to reconsider your formulation
the brain did its thing without us understanding it, creating its own
context. What is it about *being* the brain
On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
But you see Brent, here you confirm that materialist are religious in
the way they try to explain, or explain away the mind body problem. I
can imagine that your consciousness supervene on something
uncomputable in the universe. But we
category.
David
2009/8/24 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com:
Having said all this, it is interesting to reconsider your formulation
the brain did its thing without us understanding it, creating its own
context. What is it about *being* the brain that causes this context
to be self-referentially
On 17 Aug, 01:02, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote:
Hi Rex
Recalling your interest in Chalmers: I was re-reading Facing Up to
the Problem of Consciousness recently, and I realised - I think for
the first time - that his own double-aspect theory of information is
effectively a
On 25 Aug, 14:32, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
Let's say the alien brain in its initial environment produced a
certain output when it was presented with a certain input, such as a
red light. The reconstructed brain is in a different environment and
is presented with a blue
of the aphorism that the meaning of a communication
is the response it elicits. Just consider the regress of nested
interpretations *that* implies!
David
On Mon, Aug 24, 2009 at 8:33 AM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/24 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
recently, and
the challenges posed by some of the excellent responses. I've still
got some things I want to say, and I will consider carefully the best
way to articulate them. As ever, feedback - not least your own - will
be indispensable.
David
David Nyman wrote:
2009/8/25 John Mikes jami
2009/8/26 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com:
To me, 60% of David's posts are intricately worded works of Ciceronian
prose that eloquently make points of great depth and insight...and the
other 40% are intricately worded works of eye-crossingly impenetrable
prose of which I can make neither
, can we still lay claim to
a monistic ontology, in any sense that doesn't beggar the term?
David
2009/8/26 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com:
On 25 Aug, 14:32, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
Let's say the alien brain in its initial environment produced a
certain output when
with the extrinsic in this way leaves us with 'being' as a
fundamentally intrinsic notion. Not doing so is an implicit appeal to
dualism.
David
David Nyman wrote:
2009/8/26 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com:
With the example of the light, you alter the photoreceptors in the
retina so
2009/8/26 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com:
It seems as though we can comprehend 'mind' only in terms of some
self-instantiating, self-interpreting context, in which meaning
depends always on the self-relating logic of differentiation and
interaction. Hence the 'perspective' of mind is
the point.
David
David Nyman wrote:
2009/8/26 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I don't see that. I conjectured that with sufficient knowledge of the
environment in which the alien functioned and input-outputs at the
corresponding level, one could provide and account of the alien's
2009/8/26 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com:
2009/8/26 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com:
With the example of the light, you alter the photoreceptors in the
retina so that they respond the same way when to a blue light that
they would have when exposed to a red light.
Ah, so the alien
) as
a) ontological and b) uniquely so, one is still unconsciously
categorising in terms of Descartes' two substances, however the
vocabulary masks this. But perhaps this is what you mean by just
words?
David
2009/8/27 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com:
There's something trickier here, too
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