On 21 October 2014 17:58, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 20 Oct 2014, at 00:56, David Nyman wrote:
On 19 October 2014 17:48, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Oct 2014, at 15:26, David Nyman wrote:
On 19 October 2014 02:10, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
On 18 October 2014 14:22, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
Weak emergence of consciousness. The emergent phenomenon is
distinguishable from the physical processes constituting it in the way
any system is distinguishable from its parts, while still being
fundamentally nothing more
On 19 October 2014 02:10, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
Whether I find it satisfactory or not is a different question. The point I
was making is that people who find it satisfactory express this belief
idea by claiming that consciousness does not exist.
Assuming that you
On 19 October 2014 17:48, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 19 Oct 2014, at 15:26, David Nyman wrote:
On 19 October 2014 02:10, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
Whether I find it satisfactory or not is a different question. The point I
was making is that people who
On 15 October 2014 14:38, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
I guess he would say, as Dennett does, that zombies are impossible.
But how is the statement there is no subjective impression consistent
with the view that zombies are impossible? Surely the very definition of a
zombie is
On 15 October 2014 19:32, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
If Churchland logic is applied in the case of comp, it leads to the the
idea that not only the first person is eliminated, but also all references
to the gluons, quarks, electron, bosons, fermions, waves, probability,
taxes, etc.
On 16 October 2014 13:31, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
If consciousness is merely a side-effect of conscious-like behaviour then
zombies are impossible.
What do you mean by a side effect? Do you mean something that would
necessarily be physically incoherent (according to
On 16 October 2014 19:54, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
I think it's a matter of semantics. I'm sure Graziano experiences what I
experience, given my use of the word experience, but due to his
understanding of what underpins this experience he chooses to say it
doesn't really
On 16 October 2014 19:54, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
A necessary side-effect roughly equates to the idea of weak emergence.
Weak emergence of what, precisely? And in what way could this emergent
something be distinguishable from the physical processes constituting it?
David
On 16 October 2014 18:05, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/16/2014 5:59 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 16 October 2014 13:31, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
If consciousness is merely a side-effect of conscious-like behaviour
then zombies are impossible.
What do
On 14 October 2014 11:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
It is not uncommon for believer to accept a contradiction to save their
faith, which appears to be of the type *blind*.
Yes indeed. It also puts me in mind of Sherlock Holmes's famous dictum:
When you have eliminated the
On 13 October 2014 15:43, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Well, some people might say just information processing, and that is like
using some god to *explain* everything, instead of trying to formulate the
problem.
This is doubly so in the use of the term information, which is a word
On 13 October 2014 16:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
That is the difference between []p and []p p. The difference is null,
extensionally, from the point of view or the arithmetical truth. But the
difference is huge from both the body and soul points of view. Neither []p
nor []p p
On 14 October 2014 11:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
They eliminate consciousness because they grasp that it is the only way to
keep the aristotelian belief in a creation intact.
I seem to be motivated to comment at some length on this topic! It must be
because of what I've been
no idea whether this insight will lead, in the end, to a
correct TOE, but it seems clear that it does require computation to take
explanatory priority over physics.
David
On 8/23/2014 9:09 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 23 August 2014 05:02, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
*What we observe
won't comment on them specifically. If I've read you
wrongly on this I'd be grateful for clarification.
David
On 8/22/2014 6:46 PM, David Nyman wrote:
I must confess that I've been reading the MGA revisited thread with a
certain sense of frustration (notwithstanding that Russell has made
I must confess that I've been reading the MGA revisited thread with a
certain sense of frustration (notwithstanding that Russell has made a
pretty good fist of clarifying some key points). My frustration is that I
have never been able to see why we need an elaborate reductio like the MGA
to
that a fundamental concept
of this sort would strike us as being at some remove from any putative
elaboration at the human scale. The devil, as ever, will be found in the
detail.
David
On 8/18/2014 4:23 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 18 August 2014 23:27, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com
On 19 August 2014 07:10, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
What we know is that the brain can generate consciousness. The brain is not
a digital computer running a program, but if it can be simulated by one,
and if the simulation is conscious, and if the program can be run in
On 19 August 2014 21:35, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I can agree. But it is not entirely, as I suspect you might prefer, a
reversal between 3p reality and 1p reality, as we continue to have a big 3p
reality: the arithmetical reality which contains computer science and the
machine's
On 18 August 2014 12:19, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Then the arithmetical realism suggests the existence of approximation of
physical realities, without observers. The falling leaf will make a sound
(a 3p wave), but of course, without observers, there will be no perception
or
On 18 August 2014 14:15, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
OK that may be true, but without an observer, nothing will exist to select
out that computation from the chaotic infinities. I don't know how you can
say that the leaf meaningfully exists, because other computational threads
will destroy
On 18 August 2014 23:27, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
I'm not entirely clear on Bruno's argument on this last point. The way
I see it, if a brain is simulated by a computer program, what is being
simulated is the physics; and if comp is true, that means that
simulating the
On 30 July 2014 09:03, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I think (maybe pace David) that materialism explains well consciousness, by
using comp. The problem is that such explanation makes *matter*
incomprehensible.
Well I must confess I'm not entirely pacified yet. Surely the whole point
On 30 July 2014 00:26, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
And there I was worrying about CERN destroying the world
Yeah, I was careful to take this shot on a long lens!
David
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On 29 July 2014 18:41, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
It is thought as a reductio ad absurdum. If consciousness supervenes on the
physical activity, then it supervenes on the movie, But there is no
computation in the movie, only a description of a computation, so
consciousness does not
, with my bag, and everything in it (including also
some cannabis and salvia!). Quite efficacious the police here, very gentle
too.
Yes, that's cool :)
Wow.
David
On 25 Jul 2014, at 17:37, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 July 2014 22:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
To put
On 28 July 2014 11:25, Kim Jones kimjo...@ozemail.com.au wrote:
Actually, comp is terrifying.
Rest assured, it terrifies me too. I think the terror stems, in a sense,
from the persistent (and I guess, at the terrestrial level, essential)
illusion of control. The idea that I could be
On 27 July 2014 19:38, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote:
Again I am asking about the logic that explains *why* we should abandon the
notion of a primitive universal computation given that we agree with
steps 1-6. I thought when you said the UD would dominate, you were trying
to give an
Hilarious! I've always had a soft spot for Searle. He writes very
well, he's much more entertaining than most philosophers and his
riveting 1984 series of Reith Lectures on the BBC re-ignited my
fascination with the topic. But his would-be-simple solution of the
mind-body problem holds up only so
to see if we disagree, or if it is just a problem of vocabulary, I
will make comment which might, or not be like I am nitpicking, and that
*might* be the case, and then I apologize.
On 23 Jul 2014, at 15:38, David Nyman wrote:
Recent discussions, mainly with Brent and Bruno, have really got me
On 23 July 2014 17:49, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote:
So, why not adopt a Tegmark-like view where a physical universe is
*nothing more* than a particular abstract computation, and that can give us
a well-defined notion of which sub-computations are performed within it by
various
On 27 July 2014 17:27, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote:
I don't see why that should follow at all, as long as there are multiple
infinite computations running rather than the UDA being the only one,
I may be missing some other point you're making, but I think this is
already dealt with
of computers are already
subsumed within the infinite redundancy of UD*.
David
On Sun, Jul 27, 2014 at 1:13 PM, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 27 July 2014 17:27, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote:
I don't see why that should follow at all, as long as there are multiple
infinite
.
I am rereading the Quran and the Bhagavad Gita, it might help for this.
Cool :-)
David
On 23 Jul 2014, at 21:59, David Nyman wrote:
On 23 July 2014 18:25, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You miss, and perhaps David's too (?), the fact that above a threshold of
relative
On 24 July 2014 22:44, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
So I think you just saying I am missing the qualia - but that's the part
that I think it is unreasonable to ask for an explanation of. In what terms
can it be explained - I'd say none. And I don't think your explanation in
terms of
On 24 July 2014 18:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
This may clarify (or provoke) discussion of Moscow vs. Washington. It's
interesting that Carroll and Sebens use FPI and Sean says it increases his
confidence in Everett's MWI. But in his penultimate paragraph he
essentially lays out
Recent discussions, mainly with Brent and Bruno, have really got me
thinking again about the issues raised by CTM and the UDA. I'll try to
summarise some of my thoughts in this post. The first thing to say, I
think, is that the assumption of CTM is equivalent to accepting the
existence of an
On 23 July 2014 18:25, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You miss, and perhaps David's too (?), the fact that above a threshold of
relative complexity, the lower level is not relevant for the description of
the higher level. It would be like asking why Obama has been elected?,
and getting
Have you read Julian Jaynes The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown
of the Bicameral Mind?
Great book! Even if they are impossible to verify in detail, Jaynes's ideas
are a terrific stimulus to thinking about both the function and the origin
of consciousness (in the 3p sense). By the way, I
https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embeddedv=uhRhtFFhNzQ
This is a TED video of David Chalmers on the Hard Problem. His basic ideas
will be pretty well known to most of us on this list although
interestingly, he now seems less equivocal about panpsychism than in The
Conscious Mind. He
On 14 July 2014 02:36, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But from the above I'm led to wonder whether you've actually read the MGA,
so I repeat them here for convenient reference:
Hi Brent - did you see my response to this?
David
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On 16 July 2014 14:02, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
but I would say it is very likely that having mindreading-empathy deficits
on the autistic spectrum would tend to result in a strong bias against
idealism, panpsychism, free will, or the hard problem of consciousness.
I must
the physical
existence of an infinitely-running UD can be proved beyond a
peradventure.
David
On 7/13/2014 5:38 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 13 July 2014 22:01, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Well, if you still hold to your earlier opinion, you should agree
that, in terms
to resist any
analogous de-construction.
David
On 14 Jul 2014, at 02:38, David Nyman wrote:
On 13 July 2014 22:01, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Well, if you still hold to your earlier opinion, you should agree
that, in terms of an explanatory hierarchy based on an ontology
points to a possible resolution of the apparently inner with the
apparently outer, aka the paradox of phenomenal judgement, or more
simply the mind-body problem.
David
On 11 Jul 2014, at 09:41, David Nyman wrote:
On 11 July 2014 00:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
As I understand
On 12 July 2014 20:34, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Of course they wouldn't because 17 is a prime number is a tautology. It's
true simply in virtue of it's meaning like x is x. But is it a fact about
the world or just a fact about language?
I must confess to being somewhat
attitude here, and I draw the same conclusion,
but I still think it a pity to miss any potential opportunity to
de-construct the notion of physical computation in its own terms.
David
On 13 Jul 2014, at 14:19, David Nyman wrote:
On 11 July 2014 19:21, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote
On 11 July 2014 00:54, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
As I understand the MGA it assumes physicalism and then purports to show
that computation still exists with minimal or zero physical activity - it
evaucates the physics and keeps the computation.
For heaven's sake, Brent! This is
On 10 July 2014 04:35, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I'm not sure about physics. I think the point of the MGA is that matter
isn't primary? (As I've already mentioned, I'm not 100% au fait with the
MGA.)
It tries to show that by leading you to accept a scenario in which there
is no
On 7 July 2014 20:13, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
So no, there's no heresy involved in such an idea
unless, IMHO, it is a blind for eliminativism.
Why? Is eliminativism then the heresy? I'm not even sure what
'eliminativism' means in this context. You seem to argue that reductive
On 10 July 2014 19:39, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
In short, under physicalism, a 'computation' *just is* a particular
sequence of physical states. Indeed what else could it be? The states, so
to speak, come first and hence the notion that those states 'implement a
computation' is
otherwise feature in our explanations.
This entails what Bruno calls the
reversal of physics and machine psychology.
That's possible, but I don't see it as the only possibility.
Granted, I guess. But would you care to suggest some viable alternatives?
David
On 7/10/2014 12:49 PM, David
can buy that.
OK, sold. How many would you like?
;-) David
On 7/5/2014 5:08 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 5 July 2014 06:27, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Ok, maybe it's mostly a matter of semantics. I don't exclude things as
not
existing just because they are not part of the primitive
, but
always according to the specifics of the logic and statistics
extractable from comp. At least, that is the hypothesis and the
project.
David
On 7/4/2014 6:14 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 4 July 2014 22:36, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Do you wish to say that
mountains have *ontological
, on the other.
Neither of these options is particularly easy to swallow.
David
On 3 Jul 2014, at 9:09 am, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
Yes, primary belief, though necessarily incorrigible in the first
instance, is nonetheless vulnerable in the second instance to
correction
take a look :-)
David
On 01 Jul 2014, at 14:00, David Nyman wrote:
Whatever its independent merits or demerits, and its inherent
complexity, ISTM that comp gets closer to a way of posing questions
that might in the end yield more satisfying and complete answers. As
it happens, in so doing
expect
this to lead to better predictions, of course, but over a broader and
deeper range than that accessible by less comprehensive explanations.
David
On 7/1/2014 4:42 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 1 July 2014 22:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
The point, again in principle at least
you didn't mean to say
that this implies a dependency on any theory of knowledge in
particular, other than it be capable of being represented
quasi-classically. Is that accurate?
David
On 7/2/2014 8:51 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 2 July 2014 01:24, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Well, I
Some recent discussions have centred on the (putative) features of
hierarchical-reductionist ontologies, and whether comp (whatever its
intrinsic merits or deficiencies) should be considered as just another
candidate theory in that category, This prompts me to consider what
fundamental question a
argument has also been that Bruno's theory,
whatever else its merits or demerits, is not reductive in the relevant
sense; so far I haven't seen you respond directly to these points.
David
On 7/1/2014 5:00 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Some recent discussions have centred on the (putative) features
encounters
with comp.
David
On 7/1/2014 1:32 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 1 July 2014 19:24, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I think you have created a strawman exhaustively-reducible physical or
material ontology. Sure, physicists take forces and matter as
working
assumptions
On 29 June 2014 05:47, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
t's the materialist hat (I'm not sure which colour it is). Calling
bullshit! on comp and similar ideas without stopping to understand them
seems to stem from a religious belief in materialism (Bill Taylor on the
FOAR forum is another
On 27 June 2014 12:24, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
I can call forth spirits from the vasty deep!
Why, so can I, and so can any man; but do they come when you do call them?
(Shakespeare, I'm not sure which play offhand, or who said it ... or if I
quoted it accurately ... but I'm sure you
On 26 June 2014 23:12, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Ok, thanks. I think I grasp your idea. But ISTM you are taking fiction
and artefact to mean untrue or non-existent. I don't see that is
justified. Just because a water molecule is made of three atoms doesn't
make it a fiction. If
On 27 June 2014 05:02, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
Well my original phrase was convenient fiction and it was only intended to
be considered relevant in a context of what is and isn't fundamental /
primitive. Obviously the convenient fictions ARE very convenient, for
example I prefer to be
. Indeed the systemic inter-dependence of its explanatory
entities make a schema of this sort, as Bruno is wont to say, a veritable
vaccine against reductionism.
But is it correct? That's another question.
David
On 26 Jun 2014, at 8:07 am, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
The principal
PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 25 June 2014 22:01, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Note that I have not argued that the ability to 3p engineer consciousness
will do anything to explain or diminish 1p conscious experience. I just
predict it will become a peripheral fact that consciousness
On 26 June 2014 00:08, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
You mean reducible in explanation, but not eliminable in fact.
Temperature is explained by kinetic energy of molecules, but you can't
eliminate temperature and keep kinetic energy of molecules. There's a
difference between eliminating in an
On 26 June 2014 20:38, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I don't understand your point? Are you saying that if there is a basement
level explanation then everything above is a fiction? I think of fiction
= untrue. If there is not a basement, then every explanation is a
fiction, since
On 25 June 2014 17:26, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The problem is that, in the final analysis - and it is precisely the
*final* analysis that we are considering here - such theories need take no
account of any intermediate level of explanation in order to qualify as
theories of
On 14 June 2014 04:32, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I thought I'd been pretty clear that it's ill defined, a point on which I
agree with Bruno. I tried to define it in the exchange with David, but he
seemed to reject my definition and just assumed everybody knows what it
means.
As I
On 13 June 2014 01:27, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But although we may speculate that consciousness and physical events both
depend on computation (perhaps only in the sense of being consistently
described) it doesn't follow that a UD exists or the conscious/physical
world is an
On 13 June 2014 03:52, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I think you are assuming the point in question, i.e. that all the physical
interactions of brains with the painting and the rest of the world are
irrelevant and that the physical description of the painting is *just* the
pigment on
On 13 June 2014 20:44, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
under
physicalism, in accounting for the origin of matter (which is basic).
This makes it coherent, at least in principle, to ask for an
exhaustive physical accounting of any given state of affairs. In the
final analysis *everything*
On 13 June 2014 23:01, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
and
their relation to modes of arithmetical truth. Absent those states and
modes, there would be no physics, no observer and nothing to observe.
At least that's Bruno's theory.
Well yes, it was Bruno's theory that I originally
On 12 June 2014 04:09, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Of course most physicists think the
mind/body problem is too ill defined a problem to tackle right now.
But this is Bruno's whole point and aim, isn't it? Given that the
whole subject area is indeed a quagmire of confusion, he sets
On 13 June 2014 00:23, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 6/12/2014 8:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
That said, we might still at this stage wish to point out - and
indeed it might seem at first blush to be defensible - that such
fictions, or artefacts, could, at least in principle, be
On 12 June 2014 16:03, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Well, I guess that's my stab for now.
Wow!
Thanks (I think) ;-)
David
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On 13 June 2014 02:42, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Simply because you can give something you call a basic accounting of a
painting by specifying the placement of pigments on a canvas doesn't
preclude also describing it as a Monet of water lillies. You've chosen a
level and called it
I can adduce as a counter example to the latter, by the way,
is the collapse hypothesis which, far from being such a consequence,
is rather an ad hoc interpolation.)
Well, I guess that's my stab for now.
David
On 6/10/2014 4:22 PM, David Nyman wrote:
But to reiterate once more,
if we
On 11 June 2014 00:36, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
PS I'm not trying to take any credit for anything here, just saying I had a
vague hunch that was in the same area. You've done all the hard work of
thinking through what it actually implies.
Thanks Liz and too kind. But it's always a boost
On 10 June 2014 04:09, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
They're along for the ride like temperature is alftr on the kinetic
energy of molecules. Before stat mech, heat was regarded as an immaterial
substance. It was explained by the motion of molecules; something that is
3p observable
at least the outline of a re-contextualisation that
might permit the extrapolation of explanation beyond what may well
appear, under different assumptions, as some sort of absolute limit.
David
On 6/10/2014 4:37 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 10 June 2014 04:09, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote
. To complete the
analogy one must rather imagine something that is both self-interpreting
and self-filtering (at this point one also importing The Library of Babel
into the picture!). Et voila - the UDA!
David
On 07 Jun 2014, at 17:23, David Nyman wrote:
On 12 February 2014 11:17, Bruno Marchal
On 8 June 2014 22:47, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Ready? Have you bought the Mendelson?
OK, I give in. I just found a reasonably-priced second-hand copy of the
Mendelson on Abebooks - should be here in a few days. Oh, and by the way,
I'm presently reading and enjoying Hines's Return
On 12 February 2014 11:17, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
At step seven, the primitive materialist can still invoke a physicalist
form of ultrafinitism, to prevent the comp reversal between physics and
arithmetic (or number theology).
If I've grasped this, it's that one could attempt
On 31 May 2014 13:06, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hawking has all my sympathy for the warning against authoritative argument,
but he lost all his credits by implying that theology or religion are the
guilty one, when it is only human stupidity, that of course any
institutionalized
On 23 April 2014 17:25, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Samuel Clemens? Was is not Mark Twain? I missed a post perhaps.
Same guy, different name.
David
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On 17 March 2014 13:56, Gabriel Bodeen gabebod...@gmail.com wrote:
If there isn't already, there needs to be some fiction about Buddhist
comp-believers trying to escape immortality.
To quote Wikipedia: In Indian religions, the attainment of nirvana is
moksha, liberation from the cycle of
On 10 March 2014 17:43, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
or to bet on normal higher level of simulation, like with Böstrom
Could you elaborate?
David
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On 27 February 2014 21:35, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
When I last took a look at constructor theory, it wasn't much of a
theory. I know David's been working on it, when he's not doing the
chat show circuit, but hadn't heard any major development in it
announced, so haven't
On 27 February 2014 16:43, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thursday, February 27, 2014 9:47:33 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
On 27 February 2014 14:02, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote:
In other words, why, in a functionalist/materialist world would we need
On 27 February 2014 22:22, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
Only when interpreted by an observer. An electrical circuit has only
voltages and currents, not bits. To an observer, a voltage on a data
line might be interpreted as 1 if it is greater than 3V, and zero if
it is less
On 26 February 2014 17:04, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Hi David,
On 24 Feb 2014, at 17:32, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 February 2014 15:50, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 24 Feb 2014, at 02:41, David Nyman wrote:
On 24 February 2014 01:04, chris peck chris_peck
On 28 February 2014 16:44, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Friday, February 28, 2014 8:29:52 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
On 27 February 2014 16:43, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thursday, February 27, 2014 9:47:33 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote:
On 27
http://edge.org/conversation/constructor-theory
I don't recall if the list has discussed these ideas of David Deutsch
recently. The link is to an Edge interview in which he discusses his view
that mathematicians are mistaken if they believe that information or
computation are purely abstract
On 27 February 2014 14:02, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
In other words, why, in a functionalist/materialist world would we need a
breakable program to keep telling us that our hand is not Alien? When you
start by assuming that I'm always wrong, then it becomes very easy to
On 26 February 2014 12:58, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
The alien hand syndrome, as originally defined, was used to describe
cases involving anterior corpus callosal lesions producing involuntary
movement and a concomitant inability to distinguish the affected hand from
an
On 24 February 2014 11:27, ghib...@gmail.com wrote:
Yo David, You said somewhere you had a thought for how consciousness might
be. I'm into that one at the moment so I'd be interested to hear anything
you have to say. Assuming it's not secret squirrel - which if it is mazel
tov geezer you go
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