Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:
OK. Remember the goal, to find the, or a, TOE.
What I suggest, at least, is that with comp, any first order logical
specification of any universal machine, will do.
Well, okay. I just get the feeling that a TOE doesn't
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Jul 2011, at 22:08, benjayk wrote:
OK. Remember the goal, to find the, or a, TOE.
What I suggest, at least, is that with comp, any first order logical
specification of any universal machine, will do.
Well, okay. I just get the feeling that a TOE doesn't
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Arithmetic just happens to be powerful enough to point towards it.
All other
universal systems accomplish the same. So to say just number
relations exist
and all else is an epistemological view on that is a very narrow
interpretation.
Arithmetical truth
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The notion of a TOE usually is used in a reductionist sense, as a
theory that can be used to predict everything.
A TOE should do that, in principle at least.
Of course it should be able to predict everything which is
predictible, in the right condition. No one
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 31 Jul 2011, at 18:24, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Arithmetic just happens to be powerful enough to point towards it.
All other
universal systems accomplish the same. So to say just number
relations exist
and all else is an epistemological view
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 31 Jul 2011, at 19:31, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The notion of a TOE usually is used in a reductionist sense, as a
theory that can be used to predict everything.
A TOE should do that, in principle at least.
Of course it should be able to predict
Frankly I am a bit tired of this debate (to some extent debating in general),
so I will not respond in detail any time soon (if at all). Don't take it as
total disinterest, I found our exchange very interesting, I am just not in
the mood at the moment to discuss complex topics at length.
Bruno
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Aug 2011, at 23:14, benjayk wrote:
Frankly I am a bit tired of this debate (to some extent debating in
general),
so I will not respond in detail any time soon (if at all). Don't
take it as
total disinterest, I found our exchange very interesting, I am
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Then computer science provides a theory of consciousness, and
explains how
consciousness emerges from numbers,
How can consciousness be shown to emerge from numbers when it is
already
assumed at the start?
In
John Mikes wrote:
Dear benjamin if this is your name (benjayk?)
Yep.
John Mikes wrote:
I believe this post is not 'joining' the chorus of the debate. Or is it?
Benjayk wrote:
*Consciousness is simply a given*
OK, if you just disclose ANYTHING about it as you formulate that 'given
John Mikes wrote:
benjayk wrote:
*Sorry, I can't follow you... You do not accept the concept of
consciousness
**and then want an origin for it?*
I see you did not follow me... I asked for some identification to that
mystical noumenon we are talking about exactly* to make
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Aug 2011, at 21:50, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Then computer science provides a theory of consciousness, and
explains how
consciousness emerges from numbers,
How can consciousness be shown
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
On Mon, Aug 8, 2011 at 1:56 PM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:
I am getting a bit tired of labouring this point, but honestly your
theory
is postulating something that seems nonsensical to me. Why on earth would
I
believe in the truth of something
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Aug 2011, at 20:56, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Aug 2011, at 21:50, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Then computer science provides a theory of consciousness, and
explains how
We are going in circles, because I am just totally unable to explain what I
mean. I guess because words can't convey what I want to convey. Probably I
am trying to argue something that is incommunicable, like you kindly
reminded me. On many levels I could just agree with you. But on a very
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Aug 2011, at 23:07, benjayk wrote:
We are going in circles, because I am just totally unable to explain
what I
mean. I guess because words can't convey what I want to convey.
Probably I
am trying to argue something that is incommunicable, like you
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
All I can say to the debate whether your TOE is dependent on
consciousness
is that it may not assume consciousness, but this doesn't mean it's
independent of it, or prior to it.
I would say of course, except that independent and 'prior are a
, not to speak of the possibly existing subtle energies that go beyond
the brain, that may be essential to our functioning. The way that
computational power of the brain is estimated now relies on a quite
reductionstic view of what the brain is and what it does.
benjayk
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Jason Resch-2 wrote:
On Tue, Aug 16, 2011 at 7:03 AM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:
Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 15, 10:43 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
I am more worried for the biologically handicapped in the future.
Computers
will get faster
Stathis Papaioannou-2 wrote:
On Tue, Aug 16, 2011 at 10:03 PM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
Also, we have no reliable way of measuring the computational power of the
brain, not to speak of the possibly existing subtle energies that go
beyond
the brain, that may
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Aug 2011, at 20:50, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
All I can say to the debate whether your TOE is dependent on
consciousness
is that it may not assume consciousness, but this doesn't mean
it's
independent of it, or prior
meekerdb wrote:
On 8/16/2011 7:50 AM, benjayk wrote:
And the problem with the reductionist view is?
It seeks to dissect reality into pieces,
And also to explain how the pieces interact in reality.
Right, otherwise there is little use in dissecting. But the very concept
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
On Tue, Aug 16, 2011 at 9:32 AM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
On Tue, Aug 16, 2011 at 7:03 AM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:
Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 15, 10:43 pm, Jason Resch jasonre
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Aug 2011, at 17:27, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Aug 2011, at 20:50, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
All I can say to the debate whether your TOE is dependent on
consciousness
is that it may not assume
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Aug 2011, at 20:13, benjayk wrote:
It depends on what we mean with primitive ontological entity.
What we assume to exist (or to make sense) explicitly when we
build a
theory.
You could define this as primitive ontological entity, but honestly
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Aug 2011, at 18:49, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Aug 2011, at 20:13, benjayk wrote:
It depends on what we mean with primitive ontological entity.
What we assume to exist (or to make sense) explicitly when we
build a
theory.
You could
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Aug 2011, at 22:43, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Aug 2011, at 18:49, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Aug 2011, at 20:13, benjayk wrote:
Hm... OK. I am not sure that there are valid 3-communicable theories
about
fundamental
in sense
that is needed for anything to make sense, including numbers.
benjayk
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Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Aug 2011, at 14:03, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Aren't you restricting your notion of
what is explainable of what your own theory labels explainable with
its own
assumptions?
Yes, but this is due to its TOE aspect: it explains what
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Aug 2011, at 23:31, benjayk wrote:
I won't answer to this post in detail, simply because I find it
unsatisfying
to discuss details that are very easy to see for me, yet hardly
communicable.
Honestly, for all intents and purposes I have come
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Aug 2011, at 13:50, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Aug 2011, at 23:31, benjayk wrote:
I won't answer to this post in detail, simply because I find it
unsatisfying
to discuss details that are very easy to see for me, yet hardly
communicable
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Aug 2011, at 00:23, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Aug 2011, at 13:50, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Aug 2011, at 23:31, benjayk wrote:
I won't answer to this post in detail, simply because I find it
unsatisfying
the pain higher
later, as it is often the case in deny and delusion with respect to
our more probable history.
Yeah, no way around the pain, ultimately. It will come to you, whether you
want it or not.
benjayk
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I just had an interesting idea with regards to our
ontological/epistemological debate. Could it be that the number 0 is
conscious itself, by virtue of being itself (and all numbers share that
property, because the make just sense relative to 0)? This would pretty much
merge our ideas, because we
COMP is the attempt to solve the mind-body problem with basing everything on
computations. But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined,
namely the very foundation of computations. We can define computations in
terms of numbers relations, and we can define number relations in terms of
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Sep 2011, at 17:26, benjayk wrote:
COMP is the attempt to solve the mind-body problem with basing
everything on
computations.
This is not correct. Comp is the assumption that the brain functions
without extra magic, or that the brain is just
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Just a little correction. I wrote (on 30 Sep 2011) :
On 30 Sep 2011, at 17:26, benjayk wrote:
COMP is the attempt to solve the mind-body problem with basing
everything on
computations.
This is not correct. Comp is the assumption that the brain functions
Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sep 30, 11:26 am, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
COMP is the attempt to solve the mind-body problem with basing everything
on
computations. But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined,
namely the very foundation of computations. We can
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Just a little correction. I wrote (on 30 Sep 2011) :
On 30 Sep 2011, at 17:26, benjayk wrote:
snip
The only thing that COMP does is to propose a complicated thought
construct
which essentially
their seeings (like
all animals does, because it works very well locally).
Yes, I don't agree with this either. But I also don't believe the dogma that
numbers is outside there, and obeys laws, etc...
benjayk
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meekerdb wrote:
On 10/4/2011 1:44 PM, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined,
namely the very foundation of computations. We can define
computations in
terms of numbers relations, and we can define number
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
I don't see why.
Concrete objects can be helpful to grasp elementary ideas about
numbers for *some* people, but they might be embarrassing for others
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Oct 2011, at 22:44, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
But then one 3-thing remains uncomputable, and undefined,
namely the very foundation of computations. We can define
computations in
terms of numbers relations, and we can
mind).
1+1=2 is a feature of God with respect to the fact that concrete objects and
measurements tend to behave like that, not as an independent fact.
benjayk
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Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2011, at 13:14, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
I don't see why.
Concrete objects can be helpful to grasp elementary ideas about
to an internal view right now? The only thing that you
can find is consciousness being conscious of itself (even an person that
consciousness belongs to is absent, the person is just an object in
consciousness).
You abstract so much that you miss the obvious.
benjayk
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Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
I'm not saying that arithmetic isn't an internally consistent logic
with unexpected depths and qualities, I'm just saying it can't turn
blue or taste like broccoli.
Assuming non-comp.
There is no assumption needed
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2011, at 20:51, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2011, at 13:14, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
I don't see why
benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2011, at 20:51, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2011, at 13:14, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Oct 2011, at 21:59, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Oct 2011, at 18:29, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2011, at 21:00, benjayk wrote:
I'm not saying that arithmetic isn't an internally consistent
logic
with unexpected depths and qualities, I'm just saying it can't
turn
blue
meekerdb wrote:
On 10/10/2011 1:50 PM, benjayk wrote:
I am aware of that. It is obvious that this is what you searching. The
point
is, if you try to explain concsciousness you are applying a concept to
something that just doesn't fit what is talked about. Explaining
consciousness
of it conclusions follow, as they only
follow if I am actually a machine, and not if I just happen to survive being
substituted with a machine (or something arbitrarily else) even when I am
not a machine.
benjayk
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should love UDA (but can hate AUDA; which keep mechanism, despite UDA,
and go on to show it mlakes sense already to the UMs and LUMs).
OK. I am not a materialist at all, but I really don't mind what I am called.
You can call me materialist if matter is God / consciousness.
benjayk
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terren wrote:
Hey Benjay,
On Tue, Oct 11, 2011 at 2:11 PM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
Honestly, I won't bother to study a theory in much depth that I hold to
be
utterly implausible at the start.
I have to wonder why you're putting so much energy into refuting
wealthy (and bit more
happy, maybe).
benjayk
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to answer only one paragraph which I might find more
important, or summing up others.
Don't bother. You are just wasting your time, frankly I have no interest in
this discussion anymore.
benjayk
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Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Oct 2011, at 22:50, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
If you are really humble, just don't make any statements about
whether you
reasoning is valid or not.
I don't defend any truth but I am still offering a reasoning to you.
If you find it invalid
universe, rather
control is just a phenomenon arising in consciousness like all other
phenomena eg feelings and perceptions.
benjayk
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Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Oct 18, 10:00 am, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote:
Craig Weinberg wrote:
Here’s a little thought experiment about free will. Let’s say that
there exists a technology which will allow us to completely control
another person’s neurology. What
to an individual (usually not to the materialist
of course, since he is more objective than that). Just matter matters,
because this is how it is.
They start from the assumption that matter is all that is, and therefore
they end with that conclusion, no matter what appears to be the case.
benjayk
not sure that materialists will help you much there, when I discuss(ed)
with them, it seems to me it is largly a frustrating waste of time. But if
it is fun to you, why not, I just observed in me that I often was leading
discussions because I felt compelled to, not because it was fun.
benjayk
will.
benjayk
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To post
, since it is only about us. And even we can't do that, we
can just recognize it.
benjayk
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(the subject just dies, and consciousness
continues from memory loss).
This would also explain positive near death experiences: As the person dies,
consciousness feels itself opening up, as more consistent future experiences
become available.
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intuition (does it really seem probable that all persons
grow abitrarily old?) and with observation (people do actually die) than
other forms of immortality.
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Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/10/30 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Nick Prince-2 wrote:
This is similar to my speculations in an earlier topic post
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/browse_thread/thread/4514b50b8eb469c3/c49c3aa24c265a4b?lnk=gstq=homomorphic
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/10/30 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/10/30 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Nick Prince-2 wrote:
This is similar to my speculations in an earlier topic post
http://groups.google.com
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/11/1 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/10/30 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/10/30 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Nick Prince-2 wrote
, of course), and see the true greatness of what we are which is
beyond all of this. And this is immortal, with death merely being a
relative
end, just like sleeping.
benjayk
Well if immortality is something which do not preseve the person... then
it
is death.
For the person. The point
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/11/3 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
You picture consciousness as something inherently personal. But you
can
be
conscious without there being any sense of personhood, or any
experience
related to a particular
being conscious and not feeling to be a
seperate individual (an I). In science, we never have found any such thing
as an I.
benjayk
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it (clearly when it is over I am beyond it).
But even during very horrible circumstances it seems that it is possible to
feel being untouched by it. Like the yogis that bear horrible pain without
any visible sign of disturbance.
benjayk
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in general.
benjayk
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meekerdb wrote:
On 11/7/2011 9:50 AM, benjayk wrote:
meekerdb wrote:
How great was that?
I don't know. Being a fetus might be a peaceful experience, or like
sleep.
But the point is that it doesn't matter how great the experience was,
So what's your evidence that there is *any
meekerdb wrote:
On 11/7/2011 12:02 PM, benjayk wrote:
I think we only fear the elimination of personhood because we confuse
being
conscious as an ego with being conscious. We somehow think that if we in
the
state of feeling to be a seperate individual cease to exist, we as
conscious
suffering
makes it very clear that something is going wrong, which is going to happen
a lot of times as long as you are ignorant about what's real and what's
important).
What do you think (or feel) about this idea? Isn't it too good to be
*false*?
benjayk
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fear becomes just a tool to sense whether there is an
actually imminent danger, not something that is constantly (whether
obviously or subtly) determining the way we live our lifes.
benjayk
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the goodness wager: What is there to
lose if you believe that reality is fundamentally good (without making an
image what this has to mean, and without attaching to this belief, since
these may have bad consequences)?
benjayk
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. It might be a very long and
rough ride until they realize it, but it really is nothing compared to the
reward of finally being free (and recognizing it).
benjayk
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expect, in terms of consistency,
controllability and scope.
benjayk
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Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/11/10 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Spudboy100 wrote:
In a message dated 11/9/2011 7:27:48 AM Eastern Standard Time,
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com writes:
Probably the one that is most convincing is direct experience. Try
.
Someone not being you.
But consciousness is not a someone. It is just experiencing.
You confuse consciousness with persons, or experience that is particular to
a person.
benjayk
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we don't yet understand (even though that gets
increasingly implausible), since the laws are so damn complex.
benjayk
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isn't that apparent yet,
as it is still in its embryonal stage of its unfoldment in the manifest
world.
benjayk
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until we have to come to earth (or whatever
exists then) again.
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Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Nov 2011, at 18:39, benjayk wrote:
I have a few more ideas to add, considering how this singularity
might work
in practice.
I think that actually consciousness does not start in a linear
fashion in
our coherent material world, but creates an infinity
didn't make a computer game, but we can start to play it.
benjayk
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the computational measure).
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the computational measure).
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Jason Resch-2 wrote:
On Thu, Nov 24, 2011 at 2:44 PM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
On Wed, Nov 23, 2011 at 1:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 11/23/2011 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
The simulation argument:
http
on the faith that subjective self-reference will
develop a world for the digital brain that is similar to the old world
(though that seems very unlikely to me), but this is not YES qua computatio.
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any conclusion to be drawn).
benjayk
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and clear manner.
As long as we cling to knowledge, we are looking at our ideas of reality and
ourselves, not at reality as it actually is.
benjayk
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Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Nov 2011, at 18:44, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer.
If you can add and multiply, or if you can play the Conway game of
life, then you can understand that you are at least a computer
of spatially defined and non-fuzzy
stuff, like bricks or something).
benjayk
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Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The steps rely on the substitution being perfect, which they will
never
be.
That would contradict the digital and correct level assumption.
No. Correctly functioning means good enough
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/12/5 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The steps rely on the substitution being perfect, which they will
never
be.
That would contradict
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/12/6 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
2011/12/5 benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
The steps rely
to finally relax into our true infinite consciousness
and be really free. It isn't so important what we do, the things go the way
they do anyway.
benjayk
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Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am just not arguing at all for what
your argument(s) seeks to refute.
I know that. It might be your problem. You have independent reason to
*believe* in the conclusion of comp. You just seems
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