### Re: Planck Length

```
> On 21 Jan 2019, at 00:17, Lawrence Crowell
> wrote:
>
> On Sunday, January 20, 2019 at 9:16:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 19 Jan 2019, at 01:42, Lawrence Crowell > > wrote:
>>
>> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 6:31:06 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 17 Jan 2019, at 09:22, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:25:16 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>>> On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 8:03 AM > wrote:
>>>
>>> > How does one calculate Planck length using the fundamental constants G,
>>> > h, and c, and having calculated it, how does one show that measuring a
>>> > length that small with photons of the same approximate wave length, would
>>> > result in a black hole? TIA, AG
>>>
>>> In any wave the speed of the wave is wavelength times frequency and
>>> according to Planck E= h*frequency  so E= C*h/wavelength.  Thus the smaller
>>> the wavelength the greater the energy. According to Einstein energy is just
>>> another form of mass (E = MC^2) so at some point the wavelength is so small
>>> and the light photon is so energetic (aka massive) that the escape velocity
>>> is greater than the speed of light and the object becomes a Black Hole.
>>>
>>> Or you can look at it another way, we know from Heisenberg that to
>>> determine the position of a particle more precisely with light you have to
>>> use a smaller wavelength, and there is something called the  "Compton
>>> wavelength" (Lc) ; to pin down the position of a particle of mass m to
>>> within one Compton wavelength would require light of enough energy to
>>> create another particle of that mass. The formula for the Compton
>>> Wavelength is Lc= h/(2PI*M*c).
>>>
>>> Schwarzschild told us that the radius of a Black Hole (Rs), that is to say
>>> where the escape velocity is the speed of light  is:  Rs= GM/c^2. At some
>>> mass Lc will equal Rs and that mass is the Planck mass, and that Black Hole
>>> will have the radius of the Planck Length, 1.6*10^-35 meters.
>>>
>>> Then if you do a little algebra:
>>> GM/c^2 = h/(2PI*M*c)
>>> GM= hc/2PI*M
>>> GM^2 = hc/2*PI
>>> M^2 = hc/2*PI*G
>>> M = (hc/2*PI*G)^1/2and that is the formula for the Planck Mass , it's
>>> .02 milligrams.
>>>
>>> And the Planck Length turns out to be (G*h/2*PI*c^3)^1/2 and the Planck
>>> time is the time it takes light to travel the Planck length.
>>>
>>> The Planck Temperature Tp is sort of the counterpoint to Absolute Zero, Tp
>>> is as hot as things can get because the black-body radiation given off by
>>> things when they are at temperature Tp have a wavelength equal to the
>>> Planck Length, the distance light can move in the Planck Time of 10^-44
>>> seconds. The formula for the Planck temperature is Tp = Mp*c^2/k where Mp
>>> is the Planck Mass and K is Boltzmann's constant and it works out to be
>>> 1.4*10^32 degrees Kelvin.  Beyond that point both Quantum Mechanics and
>>> General Relativity break down and nobody understands what if anything is
>>> going on.
>>>
>>> The surface temperature of the sun is at 5.7 *10^3  degrees Kelvin so if it
>>> were 2.46*10^28 times hotter it would be at the Planck Temperature, and
>>> because radiant energy is proportional to T^4 the sun would be 3.67*10^113
>>> times brighter. At that temperature to equal the sun's brightness the
>>> surface area would have to be reduced by a factor of 3.67*10^113, the
>>> surface area of a sphere is proportional to the radius squared, so you'd
>>> have to reduce the sun's radius by (3.67*10^113)^1/2, and that is
>>> 6.05*10^56. The sun's radius is 6.95*10^8   meters and  6.95*10^8/
>>> 6.05*10^56  is 1.15^10^-48 meters.
>>>
>>> That means a sphere at the Planck Temperature with a radius 10 thousand
>>> billion times SMALLER than the Planck Length would be as bright as the sun,
>>> but as far as we know nothing can be that small. If the radius was 10^13
>>> times longer it would be as small as things can get and the object would be
>>> (10^13)^2 = 10^26 times as bright as the sun. I'm just speculating but
>>> perhaps that's the luminosity of the Big Bang; I say that because that's
>>> how bright things would be if the smallest thing we think can exist was as
>>> hot as we think things can get.
&g```

### Re: UDA and the origin of physics

```
> On 20 Jan 2019, at 19:23, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, January 20, 2019 at 8:52:54 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 15 Jan 2019, at 12:56, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, January 15, 2019 at 5:33:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> > On 14 Jan 2019, at 20:27, Brent Meeker > wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > On 1/14/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >> The physics comes from the first person statistical interference between
>> >> those dreams.
>> >
>> > Where can this "person" be to make a statisical inference, if there are
>> > only the dreams?
>> >
>>
>> That person makes the inference in the dreams, and test them in the mean
>> (most normal, in the Gaussian sense) consistent extensions where it
>> consciousness differentiate.
>>
>> Those dream are not “nocturnal” type of dream. A dream here is just a
>> computation supporting a Löbian machine, which itself supports a person ([]p
>> ). The measure one is given either by []p & p (p sigma_1), or just []p &
>> <>t. “[]p” alone cannot work, because G adds “cul-de-sac world” at any
>> transition, and we have to get rid of them, to get the default hypotheses
>> used in probability or credibility theory.
>>
>> We do reverse engineering somehow. We extract the geometry of the universe
>> (the accessibility relations) from the modal logic of the
>> observable/predictable, which is derived from the “material variants” of G
>> (mainly Z).
>>
>> With mechanism, there are no other way, unless adding a magical selection
>> principle, but that would make impossible to trust any digitalist doctors.
>> Would you say yes to a doctor who says that the transplant needs some
>> prayer?
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> But what exactly counts as a digital implant?
>>
>>  Likely, neurosurgeons in the future will be replacing neurons and groups of
>> neurons in human brains with synthetic neurons made of some sort of
>> materials, perhaps including silicon, but also biopolymers …
>
>
> An implant can be said digital if it is emulable at the relevant substitution
> level (that we cannot know for sure, that is why it is a sort of bet).
>
> If the primitive matter plays a role, it has to be non Turing emulable at
> all, but there are no evidences for this, and some contrary evidences do
> exist.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Suppose you replace one neuron (e.g. w/[OEBN],

w/[OEBN] ?

> but something of that kind) in a human brain. Everything's fine. The you
> replace a group of neurons. Everything's fine. Eventually all neurons are
> replaced. Is the result an emulation?

That would be magic. But if the “artificial neurons” functions with digital
circuitry, and all is fine, then the consciousness supervene of computation,
and it is emulated in infinitely many exemplar in the Arithmetical Reality, and
no machine can feel the difference between a digital emulation done by a
physical reality, or by a god, or by arithmetic, and so physics has to be
retrieved on all computations which emulates our digital consistent extensions.
That explains the quantum aspect of nature (statistical interfering of
infinities of computations, quantum logic).

>
> [OEBN] An organic electronic biomimetic neuron enables auto-regulated
> neuromodulation

Ah! OK.

> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0956566315300610
> <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0956566315300610>
>
> Abstract
>
> Current therapies for neurological disorders are based on traditional
> medication and electric stimulation. Here, we present an organic electronic
> biomimetic neuron, with the capacity to precisely intervene with the
> underlying malfunctioning signaling pathway using endogenous substances. The
> fundamental function of neurons, defined as
> chemical-to-electrical-to-chemical signal transduction, is achieved by
> connecting enzyme-based amperometric biosensors and organic electronic ion
> pumps. Selective biosensors transduce chemical signals into an electric
> current, which regulates electrophoretic delivery of chemical substances
> without necessitating liquid flow. Biosensors detected neurotransmitters in
> physiologically relevant ranges of 5–80 µM, showing linear response above 20
> µm with approx. 0.1 nA/µM slope. When exceeding defined threshold
> concentrations, biosensor output signals, connected via custom
> hardware/software, activated local or distant neurotransmi```

### Re: Planck Length

```
> On 19 Jan 2019, at 11:36, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, January 19, 2019 at 2:36:23 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 18 Jan 2019, at 15:44, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, January 18, 2019 at 7:36:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 17 Jan 2019, at 21:02, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 12:45:31 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 1/17/2019 12:22 AM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>>> Later I'll post some questions I have about your derivation of the Planck
>>>> length, but for now here's a philosophical question; Is there any
>>>> difference between the claim that space is discrete, from the claim or
>>>> conjecture that we cannot in principle measure a length shorter than the
>>>> Planck length?
>>>> TIA, AG
>>>
>>> The theory that predicts there is a shortest measured interval assumes a
>>> continuum.  There's no logical contradiction is this. But physicists tend
>>> to have a positivist attitude and think that a theory that assumes things,
>>> like arbitrarily short intervals, might be better expressed and simpler in
>>> some way that avoids those assumptions.  This attitude does not assume the
>>> mathematics itself is the reality, but only a description of reality; so
>>> there can be different descriptions of the same reality.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> A theory that does this assumes a continuous mathematics.
>>> But that doesn't mean every theory has to.
>>>
>>> As Max Tegmark's little lecture to physicists says:
>>>
>>> Our challenge as physicists is to discover ... infinity-free equations.
>>>
>>> http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/crux/2015/02/20/infinity-ruining-physics/#.XEDdLs9KiCQ
>>>
>>> <http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/crux/2015/02/20/infinity-ruining-physics/#.XEDdLs9KiCQ>
>>>
>>> Unless he is wrong in his premise, of course!
>>
>>
>> That assumes non-mechanism, and thus bigger infinities. Tegmark is right: we
>> cannot assume infinity at the ontological level (just the finite numbers 0,
>> s(0), s(s(0)), …). But the physical reality is phenomenological, and
>> requires infinite domain of indetermination, making some “observable” having
>> an infinite range. The best candidate could be graham-Preskill frequency
>> operator (that they use more or less rigorously to derive the Born rule from
>> some “many-worlds” interpretation of QM.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I think it is possible some of this can be approached with what is referred
>> to as higher-type computing, where
>>
>>
>> -  the characterization of the sets that can be exhaustively searched [1] by
>> an algorithm, in the sense of Turing, in finite time, as those that are
>> topologically compact
>>
>> - infinite sets that can be completely inspected in finite time in an
>> algorithmic way, which perhaps defies intuition
>>
>> [1] Exhaustible sets in higher-type computation
>>  https://arxiv.org/abs/0808.0441 <https://arxiv.org/abs/0808.0441>
>>
>>
>>
>> from Martin Escardo's page
>>  http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/ <http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/>
>>
>>  - pt
>
>
> That is the constructive move. With mechanism, this is given by S4Grz1,
> and/or typing the combinators. It corresponds to the first person. Tegmark
> seems oscillate between third and first person views, but when taking
> mechanism seriously *in the cognitive science* (and not in physics), we have
> to take both points of view, and derive their relations from self-reference.
> As I said, the 1p/3p relation is more subtle than the bird/frog change of
> scale.
>
> You might try to explain Haskell monad for infinite search in finite time.
> Mechanism explains this from the first person point of view, but is not seen
> as being something algorithmic.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> The key to the higher-type computing approach
>
> from Infinite sets that admit fast exhaust```

### Re: Planck Length

```
> On 19 Jan 2019, at 01:42, Lawrence Crowell
> wrote:
>
> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 6:31:06 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 17 Jan 2019, at 09:22, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:25:16 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>> On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 8:03 AM > wrote:
>>
>> > How does one calculate Planck length using the fundamental constants G, h,
>> > and c, and having calculated it, how does one show that measuring a length
>> > that small with photons of the same approximate wave length, would result
>> > in a black hole? TIA, AG
>>
>> In any wave the speed of the wave is wavelength times frequency and
>> according to Planck E= h*frequency  so E= C*h/wavelength.  Thus the smaller
>> the wavelength the greater the energy. According to Einstein energy is just
>> another form of mass (E = MC^2) so at some point the wavelength is so small
>> and the light photon is so energetic (aka massive) that the escape velocity
>> is greater than the speed of light and the object becomes a Black Hole.
>>
>> Or you can look at it another way, we know from Heisenberg that to determine
>> the position of a particle more precisely with light you have to use a
>> smaller wavelength, and there is something called the  "Compton wavelength"
>> (Lc) ; to pin down the position of a particle of mass m to within one
>> Compton wavelength would require light of enough energy to create another
>> particle of that mass. The formula for the Compton Wavelength is Lc=
>> h/(2PI*M*c).
>>
>> Schwarzschild told us that the radius of a Black Hole (Rs), that is to say
>> where the escape velocity is the speed of light  is:  Rs= GM/c^2. At some
>> mass Lc will equal Rs and that mass is the Planck mass, and that Black Hole
>> will have the radius of the Planck Length, 1.6*10^-35 meters.
>>
>> Then if you do a little algebra:
>> GM/c^2 = h/(2PI*M*c)
>> GM= hc/2PI*M
>> GM^2 = hc/2*PI
>> M^2 = hc/2*PI*G
>> M = (hc/2*PI*G)^1/2and that is the formula for the Planck Mass , it's
>> .02 milligrams.
>>
>> And the Planck Length turns out to be (G*h/2*PI*c^3)^1/2 and the Planck time
>> is the time it takes light to travel the Planck length.
>>
>> The Planck Temperature Tp is sort of the counterpoint to Absolute Zero, Tp
>> is as hot as things can get because the black-body radiation given off by
>> things when they are at temperature Tp have a wavelength equal to the Planck
>> Length, the distance light can move in the Planck Time of 10^-44 seconds.
>> The formula for the Planck temperature is Tp = Mp*c^2/k where Mp is the
>> Planck Mass and K is Boltzmann's constant and it works out to be 1.4*10^32
>> degrees Kelvin.  Beyond that point both Quantum Mechanics and General
>> Relativity break down and nobody understands what if anything is going on.
>>
>> The surface temperature of the sun is at 5.7 *10^3  degrees Kelvin so if it
>> were 2.46*10^28 times hotter it would be at the Planck Temperature, and
>> because radiant energy is proportional to T^4 the sun would be 3.67*10^113
>> times brighter. At that temperature to equal the sun's brightness the
>> surface area would have to be reduced by a factor of 3.67*10^113, the
>> surface area of a sphere is proportional to the radius squared, so you'd
>> have to reduce the sun's radius by (3.67*10^113)^1/2, and that is
>> 6.05*10^56. The sun's radius is 6.95*10^8   meters and  6.95*10^8/
>> 6.05*10^56  is 1.15^10^-48 meters.
>>
>> That means a sphere at the Planck Temperature with a radius 10 thousand
>> billion times SMALLER than the Planck Length would be as bright as the sun,
>> but as far as we know nothing can be that small. If the radius was 10^13
>> times longer it would be as small as things can get and the object would be
>> (10^13)^2 = 10^26 times as bright as the sun. I'm just speculating but
>> perhaps that's the luminosity of the Big Bang; I say that because that's how
>> bright things would be if the smallest thing we think can exist was as hot
>> as we think things can get.
>>
>> John K Clark
>>
>> Later I'll post some questions I have about your derivation of the Planck
>> length, but for now here's a philosophical question; Is there any difference
>> between the claim that space is discrete, from the claim or conjecture that
>> we cannot in principle measure a length shorter than the Planck length?
>> TIA, AG
>
> That is a very good question. I have no answer. I don’t th```

### Re: The semantic view of theories and higher-order languages

```
> On 19 Jan 2019, at 00:14, John Clark  wrote:
>
> On Fri, Jan 18, 2019 at 8:30 AM Bruno Marchal  <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
>
> >Nwe cannot assume, neither a physical universe, nor analysis or set theory.
> >Since recently, I have realised that we cannot even assume the induction
> >axioms,
>
> Induction says that things are usually pretty much the same from one moment
> of time to the next and from one point in space to a nearby one,

That is the case for inductive inference, but here I was alluding to the
induction axioms, which are used only in deduction.

The induction axioms on the numbers is

P(0) & [For all n (P(n) -> P(s(n)))] ->. For all n P(n).

Or, for the combinators, it is

P(K) & P(S) & [For all x y ((P(x) & P(y)) -> P(xy)) -> For all x P(x)

I do think that inductive inference has deep relation with mathematical
induction, though. But that is beyond the cope of this post.

> if Everett is right (and my hunch is he is) for some universes that would be
> true, but such  a chaotic universe would not have structures capable of
> producing thought or consciousness. Therefore  it is not only safe for us to
> assume induction we DO assume it and we could not survive in the physical
> world longer than about 45 seconds without it. At this very second although I
> have no detailed knowledge of the wiring involved and have not seen the
> blueprints I am assuming that when I hit the key marked "I" on my keyboard a
> "I" symbol will appear on my screen; I assume it will happen this time
> because that's what usually happened in the past, the only time it didn't was
> when my keyboard was defective a few years ago but that was quickly replaced.

But when used in physics, this type of inductive inference assume not only a
reality, but a “brain-mind” identity, which is not consistent with the
mechanist hypothesis.

Bruno

>
>  John K Clark
>
>
>
>
> --
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```

### Re: Solomonoff induction and mechanism

```

> On 16 Jan 2019, at 05:05, Russell Standish  wrote:
>
> On Fri, Jan 11, 2019 at 06:14:14PM -0800, Mason Green wrote:
>> Solomonoff’s method of induction seems like a good fit for a mechanist view
>> of things. For instance, it could be used to assign a relative probability
>> to the universe being generated by a universal dovetailer: 2^(-K) * m, where
>> K is the Kolmogorov complexity of the universal dovetailer and m is the
>> measure the dovetailer assigns to universes like ours.
>>
>> This formula implies that a (more complex) non-universal dovetailer might be
>> preferable _if_ it assigned a much higher measure to universes like ours.
>> Such a dovetailer might, for instance, output only (or mostly) habitable
>> worlds, instead of outputting mostly uninhabitable worlds as the standard UD
>> does, and the higher resulting measure would offset the increased Kolmogorov
>> complexity.
>
> It doesn't work like that. Let's say that the mᵢ is the measure of
> our universe by program i, and Kᵢ the Kolmogorov complexity of that
> program, with respect to some fixed reference universal machine U.
>
> Then for any universal dovetailer u, m_u will be >= ∑ⱼ 2^{-Kⱼ} mⱼ, so
> there will be at most only be a short constant difference Kᵤ in
> complexity between the universe implemented on universal dovetailer
> and the one implemented on the non-universal dovetailer. Once you sum
> over all programs, m=∑ⱼ2^{-Kⱼ}mⱼ, converges to a value that is basic 2
> to the power of the complexity of our universe. The sum will be
> dominated by contributions from universal dovetailers, as these are
> such short programs.
>
>
>>
>> If we live in a highly “atypical” universe, that might also affect how we
>> should do Solomonoff induction. For instance if we knew that we lived in a
>> universe with much less suffering than an “average” inhabited universe, that
>> could imply we were generated by a dovetailer that doesn’t like suffering.
>> If the opposite is true and we live in a “mean world”, that means we might
>> be generated by a sadistic dovetailer, etc.
>>
>
> One could say this about any property, such as the density of black
> holes present, or flatness of the universe. It is the stuff of
> anthropic reasoning. However, computing the measure of even those
> formulae expressed above in known to be highly intractible, so what
> tends to happen is a bunch of heuristics are assumed about the
> measure, which may well make the whole argument devoid of meaning…

The measure is on the first person experiences, which needs the “theaetetus'
solution" of the “knower” problem. It works, because incompleteness refutes
Socrate’s refutation, and it also, provides, thanks to incompleteness again,
the distinction between private non communicable knowledge, and sharable
beliefs, or even the locally sharable first person *plural* relative measure on
the physical predictions. Physics still needs an identity thesis to make its
prediction, and that one is only locally correct, but globally, and
fundamentally, inoperative.

Bruno

>
>
> --
>
>
> Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au
>
>
> --
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```

### Re: UDA and the origin of physics

```
> On 15 Jan 2019, at 12:56, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, January 15, 2019 at 5:33:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > On 14 Jan 2019, at 20:27, Brent Meeker >
> > wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > On 1/14/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> The physics comes from the first person statistical interference between
> >> those dreams.
> >
> > Where can this "person" be to make a statisical inference, if there are
> > only the dreams?
> >
>
> That person makes the inference in the dreams, and test them in the mean
> (most normal, in the Gaussian sense) consistent extensions where it
> consciousness differentiate.
>
> Those dream are not “nocturnal” type of dream. A dream here is just a
> computation supporting a Löbian machine, which itself supports a person ([]p
> ). The measure one is given either by []p & p (p sigma_1), or just []p &
> <>t. “[]p” alone cannot work, because G adds “cul-de-sac world” at any
> transition, and we have to get rid of them, to get the default hypotheses
> used in probability or credibility theory.
>
> We do reverse engineering somehow. We extract the geometry of the universe
> (the accessibility relations) from the modal logic of the
> observable/predictable, which is derived from the “material variants” of G
> (mainly Z).
>
> With mechanism, there are no other way, unless adding a magical selection
> principle, but that would make impossible to trust any digitalist doctors.
> Would you say yes to a doctor who says that the transplant needs some prayer?
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> But what exactly counts as a digital implant?
>
>  Likely, neurosurgeons in the future will be replacing neurons and groups of
> neurons in human brains with synthetic neurons made of some sort of
> materials, perhaps including silicon, but also biopolymers …

An implant can be said digital if it is emulable at the relevant substitution
level (that we cannot know for sure, that is why it is a sort of bet).

If the primitive matter plays a role, it has to be non Turing emulable at all,
but there are no evidences for this, and some contrary evidences do exist.

Bruno

>
> - pt
>
> --
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> "Everything List" group.
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```

### Re: Coherent states of a superposition

```
> On 18 Jan 2019, at 18:50, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 18, 2019 at 12:09:58 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 17 Jan 2019, at 14:48, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 12:36:07 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 17 Jan 2019, at 09:33, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 3:58:48 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 1/16/2019 7:25 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Monday, January 14, 2019 at 6:12:43 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 1/13/2019 9:51 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>>>> This means, to me, that the arbitrary phase angles have absolutely no
>>>>> effect on the resultant interference pattern which is observed. But isn't
>>>>> this what the phase angles are supposed to effect? AG
>>>>
>>>> The screen pattern is determined by relative phase angles for the
>>>> different paths that reach the same point on the screen.  The relative
>>>> angles only depend on different path lengths, so the overall phase angle
>>>> is irrelevant.
>>>>
>>>> Brent
>>>>
>>>> Sure, except there areTWO forms of phase interference in Wave Mechanics;
>>>> the one you refer to above, and another discussed in the Stackexchange
>>>> links I previously posted. In the latter case, the wf is expressed as a
>>>> superposition, say of two states, where we consider two cases; a
>>>> multiplicative complex phase shift is included prior to the sum, and
>>>> different complex phase shifts multiplying each component, all of the form
>>>> e^i (theta). Easy to show that interference exists in the latter case, but
>>>> not the former. Now suppose we take the inner product of the wf with the
>>>> ith eigenstate of the superposition, in order to calculate the probability
>>>> of measuring the eigenvalue of the ith eigenstate, applying one of the
>>>> postulates of QM, keeping in mind that each eigenstate is multiplied by a
>>>> DIFFERENT complex phase shift.  If we further assume the eigenstates are
>>>> mutually orthogonal, the probability of measuring each eigenvalue does NOT
>>>> depend on the different phase shifts. What happened to the interference
>>>> demonstrated by the Stackexchange links? TIA, AG
>>>>
>>> Your measurement projected it out. It's like measuring which slit the
>>> photon goes through...it eliminates the interference.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>> That's what I suspected; that going to an orthogonal basis, I departed from
>>> the examples in Stackexchange where an arbitrary superposition is used in
>>> the analysis of interference. Nevertheless, isn't it possible to transform
>>> from an arbitrary superposition to one using an orthogonal basis? And
>>> aren't all bases equivalent from a linear algebra pov? If all bases are
>>> equivalent, why would transforming to an orthogonal basis lose
>>> interference, whereas a general superposition does not? TIA, AG
>>
>> I don’t understand this. All the bases we have used all the time are
>> supposed to be orthonormal bases. We suppose that the scalar product (e_i
>> e_j) = delta_i_j, when presenting the Born rule, and the quantum formalism.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>> Generally, bases in a vector space are NOT orthonormal.
>
> Right. But we can always build an orthonormal base with a decent scalar
> product, like in Hilbert space,
>
>
>
>> For example, in the vector space of vectors in the plane, any pair of
>> non-parallel vectors form a basis. Same for any general superposition of
>> states in QM. HOWEVER, eigenfunctions with distinct eigenvalues ARE
>> orthogonal.
>
> Absolutely. And when choosing a non degenerate observable/measuring-device,
> we work in the base of its eigenvectors. A superposition is better seen as a
> sum of some eigenvectors of some observable. That is the crazy thing in QM.
> The same particle can be superposed in the state of being here and there. Two
> different positions of one particle can be superposed.
>
> This is a common misinterpretation. Just because a wf can be expressed in
> different ways (as a vector in the plane can be expressed in uncountably many
> different bases), doesn't mea```

### Re: Planck Length

```
> On 18 Jan 2019, at 15:44, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 18, 2019 at 7:36:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 17 Jan 2019, at 21:02, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 12:45:31 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 1/17/2019 12:22 AM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> Later I'll post some questions I have about your derivation of the Planck
>>> length, but for now here's a philosophical question; Is there any
>>> difference between the claim that space is discrete, from the claim or
>>> conjecture that we cannot in principle measure a length shorter than the
>>> Planck length?
>>> TIA, AG
>>
>> The theory that predicts there is a shortest measured interval assumes a
>> continuum.  There's no logical contradiction is this. But physicists tend to
>> have a positivist attitude and think that a theory that assumes things, like
>> arbitrarily short intervals, might be better expressed and simpler in some
>> way that avoids those assumptions.  This attitude does not assume the
>> mathematics itself is the reality, but only a description of reality; so
>> there can be different descriptions of the same reality.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
>> A theory that does this assumes a continuous mathematics.
>> But that doesn't mean every theory has to.
>>
>> As Max Tegmark's little lecture to physicists says:
>>
>> Our challenge as physicists is to discover ... infinity-free equations.
>>
>> http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/crux/2015/02/20/infinity-ruining-physics/#.XEDdLs9KiCQ
>>
>> <http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/crux/2015/02/20/infinity-ruining-physics/#.XEDdLs9KiCQ>
>>
>> Unless he is wrong in his premise, of course!
>
>
> That assumes non-mechanism, and thus bigger infinities. Tegmark is right: we
> cannot assume infinity at the ontological level (just the finite numbers 0,
> s(0), s(s(0)), …). But the physical reality is phenomenological, and requires
> infinite domain of indetermination, making some “observable” having an
> infinite range. The best candidate could be graham-Preskill frequency
> operator (that they use more or less rigorously to derive the Born rule from
> some “many-worlds” interpretation of QM.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> I think it is possible some of this can be approached with what is referred
> to as higher-type computing, where
>
>
> -  the characterization of the sets that can be exhaustively searched [1] by
> an algorithm, in the sense of Turing, in finite time, as those that are
> topologically compact
>
> - infinite sets that can be completely inspected in finite time in an
> algorithmic way, which perhaps defies intuition
>
> [1] Exhaustible sets in higher-type computation
>  https://arxiv.org/abs/0808.0441
>
>
> from Martin Escardo's page
>  http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/
>
>  - pt

That is the constructive move. With mechanism, this is given by S4Grz1, and/or
typing the combinators. It corresponds to the first person. Tegmark seems
oscillate between third and first person views, but when taking mechanism
seriously *in the cognitive science* (and not in physics), we have to take both
points of view, and derive their relations from self-reference. As I said, the
1p/3p relation is more subtle than the bird/frog change of scale.

You might try to explain Haskell monad for infinite search in finite time.
Mechanism explains this from the first person point of view, but is not seen as
being something algorithmic.

Bruno

>
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### Re: Planck Length

```
> On 17 Jan 2019, at 21:02, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 12:45:31 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
> On 1/17/2019 12:22 AM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> Later I'll post some questions I have about your derivation of the Planck
>> length, but for now here's a philosophical question; Is there any difference
>> between the claim that space is discrete, from the claim or conjecture that
>> we cannot in principle measure a length shorter than the Planck length?
>> TIA, AG
>
> The theory that predicts there is a shortest measured interval assumes a
> continuum.  There's no logical contradiction is this. But physicists tend to
> have a positivist attitude and think that a theory that assumes things, like
> arbitrarily short intervals, might be better expressed and simpler in some
> way that avoids those assumptions.  This attitude does not assume the
> mathematics itself is the reality, but only a description of reality; so
> there can be different descriptions of the same reality.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
> A theory that does this assumes a continuous mathematics.
> But that doesn't mean every theory has to.
>
> As Max Tegmark's little lecture to physicists says:
>
> Our challenge as physicists is to discover ... infinity-free equations.
>
> http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/crux/2015/02/20/infinity-ruining-physics/#.XEDdLs9KiCQ
>
> Unless he is wrong in his premise, of course!

That assumes non-mechanism, and thus bigger infinities. Tegmark is right: we
cannot assume infinity at the ontological level (just the finite numbers 0,
s(0), s(s(0)), …). But the physical reality is phenomenological, and requires
infinite domain of indetermination, making some “observable” having an infinite
range. The best candidate could be graham-Preskill frequency operator (that
they use more or less rigorously to derive the Born rule from some
“many-worlds” interpretation of QM.

Bruno

>
> - pt
>
>
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```

### Re: The semantic view of theories and higher-order languages

```
> On 18 Jan 2019, at 09:49, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
> The semantic view of theories and higher-order languages
> Laurenz Hudetz
>
> "every family of set-theoretic structures has an associated language of
> higher-order logic and an up to signature isomorphism unique model-theoretic
> counterpart"
>
> Several philosophers of science construe models of scientific theories as
> set-theoretic structures. Some of them moreover claim that models should not
> be construed as structures in the sense of model theory because the latter
> are language-dependent. I argue that if we are ready to construe models as
> set-theoretic structures (strict semantic view), we could equally well
> construe them as model-theoretic structures of higher-order logic (liberal
> semantic view). I show that every family of set-theoretic structures has an
> associated language of higher-order logic and an up to signature isomorphism
> unique model-theoretic counterpart, which is able to serve the same purposes.
> This allows to carry over every syntactic criterion of equivalence for
> theories in the sense of the liberal semantic view to theories in the sense
> of the strict semantic view. Taken together, these results suggest that the
> recent dispute about the semantic view and its relation to the syntactic view
> can be resolved.

It cannot do that in the Mechanist Frame, where we cannot assume, neither a
physical universe, nor analysis or set theory. Since recently, I have realised
that we cannot even assume the induction axioms, but we can use it in the
definition of the Löbian entities, whose existence is then a consequence of the
theories without induction. Of course, we need induction at the meta level, and
even the whole of informal mathematics, like in any science pointing toward
some reality independent of us.

Bruno

>
> - pt
>
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### Re: Coherent states of a superposition

```
> On 17 Jan 2019, at 14:48, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 12:36:07 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 17 Jan 2019, at 09:33, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 3:58:48 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 1/16/2019 7:25 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, January 14, 2019 at 6:12:43 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 1/13/2019 9:51 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>>> This means, to me, that the arbitrary phase angles have absolutely no
>>>> effect on the resultant interference pattern which is observed. But isn't
>>>> this what the phase angles are supposed to effect? AG
>>>
>>> The screen pattern is determined by relative phase angles for the different
>>> paths that reach the same point on the screen.  The relative angles only
>>> depend on different path lengths, so the overall phase angle is irrelevant.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>> Sure, except there areTWO forms of phase interference in Wave Mechanics;
>>> the one you refer to above, and another discussed in the Stackexchange
>>> links I previously posted. In the latter case, the wf is expressed as a
>>> superposition, say of two states, where we consider two cases; a
>>> multiplicative complex phase shift is included prior to the sum, and
>>> different complex phase shifts multiplying each component, all of the form
>>> e^i (theta). Easy to show that interference exists in the latter case, but
>>> not the former. Now suppose we take the inner product of the wf with the
>>> ith eigenstate of the superposition, in order to calculate the probability
>>> of measuring the eigenvalue of the ith eigenstate, applying one of the
>>> postulates of QM, keeping in mind that each eigenstate is multiplied by a
>>> DIFFERENT complex phase shift.  If we further assume the eigenstates are
>>> mutually orthogonal, the probability of measuring each eigenvalue does NOT
>>> depend on the different phase shifts. What happened to the interference
>>> demonstrated by the Stackexchange links? TIA, AG
>>>
>> Your measurement projected it out. It's like measuring which slit the photon
>> goes through...it eliminates the interference.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>> That's what I suspected; that going to an orthogonal basis, I departed from
>> the examples in Stackexchange where an arbitrary superposition is used in
>> the analysis of interference. Nevertheless, isn't it possible to transform
>> from an arbitrary superposition to one using an orthogonal basis? And aren't
>> all bases equivalent from a linear algebra pov? If all bases are equivalent,
>> why would transforming to an orthogonal basis lose interference, whereas a
>> general superposition does not? TIA, AG
>
> I don’t understand this. All the bases we have used all the time are supposed
> to be orthonormal bases. We suppose that the scalar product (e_i e_j) =
> delta_i_j, when presenting the Born rule, and the quantum formalism.
>
> Bruno
>
> Generally, bases in a vector space are NOT orthonormal.

Right. But we can always build an orthonormal base with a decent scalar
product, like in Hilbert space,

> For example, in the vector space of vectors in the plane, any pair of
> non-parallel vectors form a basis. Same for any general superposition of
> states in QM. HOWEVER, eigenfunctions with distinct eigenvalues ARE
> orthogonal.

Absolutely. And when choosing a non degenerate observable/measuring-device, we
work in the base of its eigenvectors. A superposition is better seen as a sum
of some eigenvectors of some observable. That is the crazy thing in QM. The
same particle can be superposed in the state of being here and there. Two
different positions of one particle can be superposed. Using a non orthonormal
base makes only things more complex.

> I posted a link to this proof a few months ago. IIRC, it was on its

But all this makes my point. A vector by itself cannot be superposed, but can
be seen as the superposition of two other vectors, and if those are
orthonormal, that gives by the Born rule the probability to obtain the "Eigen
result” corresponding to the measuring apparatus with Eigen vectors given by
that orthonormal base.

I’m still not sure about what you would be missing.

Bruno

>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>```

### Re: Coherent states of a superposition

```
> On 17 Jan 2019, at 09:33, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 3:58:48 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
>
> On 1/16/2019 7:25 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Monday, January 14, 2019 at 6:12:43 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 1/13/2019 9:51 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> This means, to me, that the arbitrary phase angles have absolutely no
>>> effect on the resultant interference pattern which is observed. But isn't
>>> this what the phase angles are supposed to effect? AG
>>
>> The screen pattern is determined by relative phase angles for the different
>> paths that reach the same point on the screen.  The relative angles only
>> depend on different path lengths, so the overall phase angle is irrelevant.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>> Sure, except there areTWO forms of phase interference in Wave Mechanics; the
>> one you refer to above, and another discussed in the Stackexchange links I
>> previously posted. In the latter case, the wf is expressed as a
>> superposition, say of two states, where we consider two cases; a
>> multiplicative complex phase shift is included prior to the sum, and
>> different complex phase shifts multiplying each component, all of the form
>> e^i (theta). Easy to show that interference exists in the latter case, but
>> not the former. Now suppose we take the inner product of the wf with the ith
>> eigenstate of the superposition, in order to calculate the probability of
>> measuring the eigenvalue of the ith eigenstate, applying one of the
>> postulates of QM, keeping in mind that each eigenstate is multiplied by a
>> DIFFERENT complex phase shift.  If we further assume the eigenstates are
>> mutually orthogonal, the probability of measuring each eigenvalue does NOT
>> depend on the different phase shifts. What happened to the interference
>> demonstrated by the Stackexchange links? TIA, AG
>>
> Your measurement projected it out. It's like measuring which slit the photon
> goes through...it eliminates the interference.
>
> Brent
>
> That's what I suspected; that going to an orthogonal basis, I departed from
> the examples in Stackexchange where an arbitrary superposition is used in the
> analysis of interference. Nevertheless, isn't it possible to transform from
> an arbitrary superposition to one using an orthogonal basis? And aren't all
> bases equivalent from a linear algebra pov? If all bases are equivalent, why
> would transforming to an orthogonal basis lose interference, whereas a
> general superposition does not? TIA, AG

I don’t understand this. All the bases we have used all the time are supposed
to be orthonormal bases. We suppose that the scalar product (e_i e_j) =
delta_i_j, when presenting the Born rule, and the quantum formalism.

Bruno

>
> --
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### Re: Planck Length

```
> On 17 Jan 2019, at 09:22, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:25:16 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 8:03 AM > wrote:
>
> > How does one calculate Planck length using the fundamental constants G, h,
> > and c, and having calculated it, how does one show that measuring a length
> > that small with photons of the same approximate wave length, would result
> > in a black hole? TIA, AG
>
> In any wave the speed of the wave is wavelength times frequency and according
> to Planck E= h*frequency  so E= C*h/wavelength.  Thus the smaller the
> wavelength the greater the energy. According to Einstein energy is just
> another form of mass (E = MC^2) so at some point the wavelength is so small
> and the light photon is so energetic (aka massive) that the escape velocity
> is greater than the speed of light and the object becomes a Black Hole.
>
> Or you can look at it another way, we know from Heisenberg that to determine
> the position of a particle more precisely with light you have to use a
> smaller wavelength, and there is something called the  "Compton wavelength"
> (Lc) ; to pin down the position of a particle of mass m to within one Compton
> wavelength would require light of enough energy to create another particle of
> that mass. The formula for the Compton Wavelength is Lc= h/(2PI*M*c).
>
> Schwarzschild told us that the radius of a Black Hole (Rs), that is to say
> where the escape velocity is the speed of light  is:  Rs= GM/c^2. At some
> mass Lc will equal Rs and that mass is the Planck mass, and that Black Hole
> will have the radius of the Planck Length, 1.6*10^-35 meters.
>
> Then if you do a little algebra:
> GM/c^2 = h/(2PI*M*c)
> GM= hc/2PI*M
> GM^2 = hc/2*PI
> M^2 = hc/2*PI*G
> M = (hc/2*PI*G)^1/2and that is the formula for the Planck Mass , it's .02
> milligrams.
>
> And the Planck Length turns out to be (G*h/2*PI*c^3)^1/2 and the Planck time
> is the time it takes light to travel the Planck length.
>
> The Planck Temperature Tp is sort of the counterpoint to Absolute Zero, Tp is
> as hot as things can get because the black-body radiation given off by things
> when they are at temperature Tp have a wavelength equal to the Planck Length,
> the distance light can move in the Planck Time of 10^-44 seconds. The formula
> for the Planck temperature is Tp = Mp*c^2/k where Mp is the Planck Mass and K
> is Boltzmann's constant and it works out to be 1.4*10^32 degrees Kelvin.
> Beyond that point both Quantum Mechanics and General Relativity break down
> and nobody understands what if anything is going on.
>
> The surface temperature of the sun is at 5.7 *10^3  degrees Kelvin so if it
> were 2.46*10^28 times hotter it would be at the Planck Temperature, and
> because radiant energy is proportional to T^4 the sun would be 3.67*10^113
> times brighter. At that temperature to equal the sun's brightness the surface
> area would have to be reduced by a factor of 3.67*10^113, the surface area of
> a sphere is proportional to the radius squared, so you'd have to reduce the
> sun's radius by (3.67*10^113)^1/2, and that is  6.05*10^56. The sun's radius
> is 6.95*10^8   meters and  6.95*10^8/ 6.05*10^56  is 1.15^10^-48 meters.
>
> That means a sphere at the Planck Temperature with a radius 10 thousand
> billion times SMALLER than the Planck Length would be as bright as the sun,
> but as far as we know nothing can be that small. If the radius was 10^13
> times longer it would be as small as things can get and the object would be
> (10^13)^2 = 10^26 times as bright as the sun. I'm just speculating but
> perhaps that's the luminosity of the Big Bang; I say that because that's how
> bright things would be if the smallest thing we think can exist was as hot as
> we think things can get.
>
> John K Clark
>
> Later I'll post some questions I have about your derivation of the Planck
> length, but for now here's a philosophical question; Is there any difference
> between the claim that space is discrete, from the claim or conjecture that
> we cannot in principle measure a length shorter than the Planck length?
> TIA, AG

That is a very good question. I have no answer. I don’t think physicists have
an answer either, and I do think that this requires the solution of the
“quantum gravity” or the “quantum space-time” problem.
With loop-gravity theory, I would say that the continuum is eventually replaced
by something discrete, but not so with string theory; for example. With
Mechanism, there are argument that something must stay “continuous”, but it
might be only the distribution of probability (the real-complex amplitude).

Bruno

>
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> ```

### Re: UDA and the origin of physics

```

> On 14 Jan 2019, at 20:27, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/14/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> The physics comes from the first person statistical interference between
>> those dreams.
>
> Where can this "person" be to make a statisical inference, if there are only
> the dreams?
>

That person makes the inference in the dreams, and test them in the mean (most
normal, in the Gaussian sense) consistent extensions where it consciousness
differentiate.

Those dream are not “nocturnal” type of dream. A dream here is just a
computation supporting a Löbian machine, which itself supports a person ([]p
). The measure one is given either by []p & p (p sigma_1), or just []p & <>t.
“[]p” alone cannot work, because G adds “cul-de-sac world” at any transition,
and we have to get rid of them, to get the default hypotheses used in
probability or credibility theory.

We do reverse engineering somehow. We extract the geometry of the universe (the
accessibility relations) from the modal logic of the observable/predictable,
which is derived from the “material variants” of G (mainly Z).

With mechanism, there are no other way, unless adding a magical selection
principle, but that would make impossible to trust any digitalist doctors.
Would you say yes to a doctor who says that the transplant needs some prayer?

Bruno

> Brent
>
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### Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

```
> On 14 Jan 2019, at 21:23, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/14/2019 4:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 13 Jan 2019, at 21:33, Brent Meeker
>>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 1/13/2019 6:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 20:51, Brent Meeker
>>>>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 1/11/2019 2:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>> I suspect Planck constant to be not computable, because if we extract QM
>>>>>> from arithmetic, the Planck constant might very well related to the
>>>>>> mechanist substitution level.
>>>>> Planck's constant is not dimensionless. So its value is 1...in proper
>>>>> units.
>>>> Could you give those proper units? I expect one to be possibly
>>>> non-computable, but I would be very glad to hear that this is not the case.
>>> Are you pulling my leg, Bruno?  h=1 action  c=1 speed  G=1 gravitate
>> I have a problem with this. One physicist during a course needed to set 2*PI
>> = 1, too.
>>
>> So my question would be, can you give me what is a meter, and a second, in
>> that units.
>
> meter = 6.188e34 [hbar*G/c^3]^0.5
>
> second = 1.855e43 [hbar*G/c^5]^0.5
>
>
>> Or, can you give me a formula giving sense to how we could measure h or
>> h-bar? E = hf, can we compute experimentally h by using this?
>
> You can't measure h or c in SI units; they are defined constants:
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_redefinition_of_SI_base_units
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_redefinition_of_SI_base_units>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Planck_constant#Particle_accelerator
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Planck_constant#Particle_accelerator>
>
>
>>
>> I am not good with unit. That does not exist in mathematics, of course. And
>> I am just trying to see what it could mean for h to be non computable, in
>> case that would mean something. Is c computable? (I use the idea that a real
>> number is computable if we can generate all its decimal, whenever units is
>> chosen.
>
> It's not a matter of units.  Units are arbitrary.  The question is what are
> the dimensions...and that is theory dependent.  In Newtonian physics, length
> and duration, were dimensionally different.  In relativity they have the same
> dimensionality; so it makes sense to rotate spacetime by a Lorentz
> transformation.  So to answer a question like, "Is h computable" you have to
> have a theory of physics that relates the value of h to other things...in
> your theory, to things consciously observable.

Thank you Brent. Normally, there should be a relation between the uncertainty
relation, notably time/emergy (DE.Dt >= h-bar/2) and the substitution level
(which determines the first person indeterminacy domain in arithmetic). But
there is a lot of work to do before we get to something like this, if only
become the dimensions are “theory-dependent”, but the theory is what we have to
derive first, and the dimension after.

Bruno

>
> Brent
>
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### Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

```

> On 13 Jan 2019, at 21:33, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/13/2019 6:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 20:51, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 1/11/2019 2:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> I suspect Planck constant to be not computable, because if we extract QM
>>>> from arithmetic, the Planck constant might very well related to the
>>>> mechanist substitution level.
>>> Planck's constant is not dimensionless. So its value is 1...in proper units.
>> Could you give those proper units? I expect one to be possibly
>> non-computable, but I would be very glad to hear that this is not the case.
>
> Are you pulling my leg, Bruno?  h=1 action  c=1 speed  G=1 gravitate

I have a problem with this. One physicist during a course needed to set 2*PI =
1, too.

So my question would be, can you give me what is a meter, and a second, in that
units. Or, can you give me a formula giving sense to how we could measure h or
h-bar? E = hf, can we compute experimentally h by using this?
I am not good with unit. That does not exist in mathematics, of course. And I
am just trying to see what it could mean for h to be non computable, in case
that would mean something. Is c computable? (I use the idea that a real number
is computable if we can generate all its decimal, whenever units is chosen.

Bruno

>
> Brent
>
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### Re: UDA and the origin of physics

```
> On 13 Jan 2019, at 21:08, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, January 13, 2019 at 9:22:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 23:36, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 8:41:19 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 12:40, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 5:24:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:03:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires,
>>>>>>>> werewolves, that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in
>>>>>>>> computer simulations of stories of them …
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of
>>>>>>> “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of
>>>>>>> observable, you can infer that either:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Mechanism is false, or
>>>>>>> You are dreaming, or
>>>>>>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry
>>>>>>> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we
>>>>>>> see exactly what mechanism predicts.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical
>>>>>> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so
>>>>>> low that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the
>>>>>> observable one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also
>>>>>> problematical to me.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta
>>>>>>> as the fundamental elements of nature.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an
>>>>>> existing theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without
>>>>>> assuming it. What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if
>>>>>> invisible horses pull the car?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of
>>>>>> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are
>>>>>> not the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism,
>>>>>> which is inconsistent with mechanism.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing
>>>>>>> (QuIP) machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum)
>>>>>>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
>>>>```

### Re: Solomonoff induction and mechanism

```

> On 12 Jan 2019, at 03:14, Mason Green  wrote:
>
> Solomonoff’s method of induction seems like a good fit for a mechanist view
> of things. For instance, it could be used to assign a relative probability to
> the universe being generated by a universal dovetailer: 2^(-K) * m, where K
> is the Kolmogorov complexity of the universal dovetailer and m is the measure
> the dovetailer assigns to universes like ours.
>
> This formula implies that a (more complex) non-universal dovetailer might be
> preferable _if_ it assigned a much higher measure to universes like ours.

That works for the individual mind, and with some luck for the first person
plural physics, but you have to drive them from the universal dovetailing (if
not you will reintroduce some identity thesis hardly compatible with
computationalism (even with oracles).

> Such a dovetailer might, for instance, output only (or mostly) habitable
> worlds, instead of outputting mostly uninhabitable worlds as the standard UD
> does, and the higher resulting measure would offset the increased Kolmogorov
> complexity.

That leads to technical difficulties, although a subpart of this might explains
the “thermodynamical part of physics”, relying on the laws of big numbers. But
to make all this works, I am not sure it possible with taking into account the
“mental” abilities of the universal-observers.

>
> If we live in a highly “atypical” universe, that might also affect how we
> should do Solomonoff induction. For instance if we knew that we lived in a
> universe with much less suffering than an “average” inhabited universe,

?

What do you mean by “suffering” in an inhabited universe?

> that could imply we were generated by a dovetailer that doesn’t like
> suffering. If the opposite is true and we live in a “mean world”, that means
> we might be generated by a sadistic dovetailer, etc.

If such a malevolent or benevolent program exists, it has to be explained by
the sum on all universal dovetailing, that any single universal dovetailer
produces. The initial one does not matter, and I use the sigma_1 arithmetic
sentences (equivalent to their own provability at the G* level) to start with
(or sometimes the combinators, which are more handy but much less known).

Bruno

>
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### Re: UDA and the origin of physics

```

> On 12 Jan 2019, at 02:25, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/11/2019 2:36 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> Of course there are math professors (Dr. Z at Rutgers) who teach on the
>>> evils of Platonism. And "Truth" is like God, as Rorty said.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> That is a good summary of Plato. Hirsschberger sum up Plato by saying that
>> the God of Plato is Truth. Not the one we make public, but the one we search.
>>
>> Now, all my life I have got the feeling that Plato is dismissed, and badly
>> seen, notably in opposition to Aristotle. But Aristotle did not understood
>> Plato, except in a curious passage of the “metaphysics” where he seems to
>> suddenly got the point, and seems to come back to Plato without saying (but
>> that is an optimistic reading of Aristotle’s metaphysics, To be sure I found
>> some scholars who saw that too, like Gerson.
>>
>> That "truth is God" makes sense for a computationalist, because “truth” when
>> encompassing the description of a machine at its correct substitution level,
>> is no more definable by that machine. Yes, Truth, and semantics, is very
>> much like the platonician notion of God. You force me to agree with Rorty on
>> this!
>>
>
> At the same time Rorty said,"Truth is like God" he was a "strict atheist”.

I thought on this. Plato defines God by “Ultimate Truth” with a meliorative
respectful sense of Truth.

Maybe Rorty said this to dismiss Truth, as much as the “God” of the “naive
current authoritarian” religion.
But Rorty take some “nature” for granted, and this is the ciment of the current
observation of nature, and by the theoretical consequences of Mechanism.

> He was also a pragmatist, meaning he thought the measure of truth was solely
> whether it worked.

That is, ITSM, rather more instrumentalism and relativism, than pragmatism, but
may be that is close.

Bruno

> So I'd gather that Rorty didn't think that "truth" was very useful idea;
> which is confirmed by him being called an "ironist" by his friends.
>
> Brent
>
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### Re: UDA and the origin of physics

```
> On 11 Jan 2019, at 23:36, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 8:41:19 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 12:40, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 5:24:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:03:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires,
>>>>>>> werewolves, that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in
>>>>>>> computer simulations of stories of them …
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of
>>>>>> “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of
>>>>>> observable, you can infer that either:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Mechanism is false, or
>>>>>> You are dreaming, or
>>>>>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry
>>>>>> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see
>>>>>> exactly what mechanism predicts.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer.
>>>>>
>>>>> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical
>>>>> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so
>>>>> low that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the
>>>>> observable one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also
>>>>> problematical to me.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as
>>>>>> the fundamental elements of nature.
>>>>>
>>>>> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an
>>>>> existing theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without
>>>>> assuming it. What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if
>>>>> invisible horses pull the car?
>>>>>
>>>>> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of
>>>>> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not
>>>>> the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which
>>>>> is inconsistent with mechanism.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing
>>>>>> (QuIP) machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum)
>>>>>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
>>>>>
>>>>> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary
>>>>> variant of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would
>>>>> entail the existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes
>>>>> both consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The universe (now ```

### Re: UDA and the origin of physics

```

> On 11 Jan 2019, at 21:04, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/11/2019 3:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Anyway, the question is if it is true or false. In mathematics, mechanism
>> restricts realism only to finite mathematics, or arithmetic. This is
>> basically the idea that 2+2=4, and that this is true independently of me.
>
> But "true"and "exist" are different things.

Yes. True in a model, means satisfied in that model. Now “Ex(x = k)” is true in
a model, if k exists in the model.

For exemple “Ex(x = s(s(0))” is true in all models of arithmetic, and is true
in particular in the standard model of arithmetic. The structure/model (N, 0,
+, x) satisfies “Ex(x = s(s(0))”.

> Mathematics uses "exist" to mean "satisfies some predicate”

Satisfies some formula (build with some predicate or legality). Yes, OK.

> .  But we don't think Waston existed because he satisfied "the companion of
> Homes”.

It exists in the model satisfying the “axioms” of the “theory”, which we take
as granted when, for entertaining purpose, we want do some awake dreaming, like
TV and Novels make possible.

Is our reality a model of that theory? Of course we know that this is fewly
possible. But we do assume that the reality/model in which Watson and Holmes do
exist is enough similar to us so that we can be sure that Holmes will not loss
his pipe all along the history we follow.

Bruno

>
> Brent
>
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### Re: Coherent states of a superposition

```
> On 13 Jan 2019, at 07:24, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, January 13, 2019 at 4:13:24 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Saturday, January 12, 2019 at 8:41:23 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>
>
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 7:40:13 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
>
> On 1/11/2019 1:54 AM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>
>> How can you prepare a system in any superposition state if you don't know
>> the phase angles beforehand? You fail to distinguish measuring or assuming
>> the phase angles from calculating them. One doesn't need Born's rule to
>> calculate them. Maybe what Bruce meant is that you can never calculate them,
>> but you can prepare a system with any relative phase angles. AG
>
> In practice you prepare a "system" (e.g. a photon) in some particular but
> unknown phase angle. Then you split the photon, or entangle it with another
> photon, so that you have two with definite relative phase angles, and with
> the same frequency,  then those two branches of the photon wave function can
> interfere, i.e. the photon the interferes with itself as in the Young's slits
> experiment.  So you only calculate the relative phase shift of the two
> branches of the wf of the photon, which is enough to define the interference
> pattern.
>
> Brent
>
> Can a photon be split without violating conservation of energy? In any event,
> I see my error on this issue of phase angles, and will describe it, possibly
> to show I am not a complete idiot when it comes to QM. Stayed tuned. AG
>
> Maybe I spoke too soon. I don't think I've resolved the issue of arbitrary
> phase angles for components of a superposition of states. For example, let's
> say the superposition consists of orthonormal eigenstates, each multiplied by
> a probability amplitude. If each component is multiplied by some arbitrary
> complex number representing a new phase angle, the probability of *measuring*
> the eigenvalue corresponding to each component doesn't change due to the
> orthonormality (taking the inner product of the sum or wf, and then its norm
> squared). But what does apparently change is the probability *density*
> distribution along the screen, say for double slit experiment. But the
> eigenvalue probabilities which don't change with an arbitrary change in phase
> angle, represent positions along the screen via the inner product, DO seem to
> *shift* in value -- that is, the new phases have the effect of changing the
> probability *density* -- and this fact. if it is a fact, contradicts my
> earlier conclusion that changing the relative phase angles does NOT change
> the calculated probability occurrence for each eigenvalue. Is it
> understandable what my issue is here? TIA, AG
>
> IOW, if I change the phase angles, the interference changes and therefore the
> probability density changes, but this seems to contradict the fact that
> changing the phase angles has no effect on the probability of occurrences of
> the measured eigenvalues. AG

I have some difficulties to understand what you don’t understand. You seem to
know the Born rule.

Imagine some superposition, 1/(sqrt(2)(up + down) say. If you multiply this by
any complex number e^phi, the Born rule will show that the probabilities does
not change. But if, by using Stern Gerlach device, or David Albert’s
nothing-box, which is just a phase shifter, place on the path of the
"down-particle”, to get
1/(sqrt(2)(up + e^phi down), the Born rule shows that this does change the
probability of the outcome, in function of phi.

Yes, it is hard to believe that a photon or an election “split” on two
different path, and we can shift the phase of just one path, using that
phase-shifter “nothing box”. Albert called it a “nothing box” because, for any
particle going through it, it does not change any possible measurement result
that you can do on the particles, unless it is put on the term of a vaster
superposition, like in an interferometer.

Bruno

>
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Visit this group ```

### Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

```

> On 11 Jan 2019, at 20:51, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/11/2019 2:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> I suspect Planck constant to be not computable, because if we extract QM
>> from arithmetic, the Planck constant might very well related to the
>> mechanist substitution level.
>
> Planck's constant is not dimensionless. So its value is 1...in proper units.

Could you give those proper units? I expect one to be possibly non-computable,
but I would be very glad to hear that this is not the case.

Bruno

>
> Brent
>
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### Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

```
> On 13 Jan 2019, at 00:28, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, January 12, 2019 at 4:17:56 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
> On 1/12/2019 2:51 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 7:19:06 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 1/11/2019 1:57 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:46:35 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 1/11/2019 6:01 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 8:18 PM Brent Meeker >
wrote:

> The fine structure constant is e^2/hbar*c.  Those three values are
> measured independent of any Feynman diagrams

Absolutely correct. So if you use Feynman diagrams to predict what some
physical system is going to do, such as a physical system of 2 electrons
being hit by a photon of light with a wavelength small enough to contain
enough energy to prevent the electrons
repulsion, then you'd better get a number very close to the Fine Structure
Constant. If you don't then Feynman Diagrams aren't any good.

They didn't use 12,672 Feynman Diagrams because they wanted to know what
the Fine Structure Constant was, they already knew what that number was to
many decimal places from exparament, they used 12,672 Feynman Diagrams
because they wanted to see if Feynman Diagrams worked. And it turned out
they worked spectacularly well in that situation, and that gives
scientists great confidence they can use Feynman Diagrams in other
situations to calculate what other physical systems will do that involve
the Electromagnetic Force.
>>>
>>> There's always an interplay between theory and experiment.  It's completely
>>> analogous to Maxwell's discovery that light is EM waves. There were already
>>> experimental values of the permittivity and permeability of the vacuum and
>>> there were values for the speed of light.  Maxwell showed that his theory
>>> of EM predicted waves and using the permittivity and permeability values
>>> the speed of the waves matched that of light.  Now the speed of light is a
>>> defined constant and so are the permittivity and permeability of the
>>> vacuum.  So the connecting of the three values by a theory allows their
>>> values to be defined.  In the case of the anomalous magnetic moment of the
>>> electron, hbar and c are already defined constants.  So quantum field
>>> theory (for which Feynman diagrams are just a calculational tool) linked
>>> them and e to g.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If Feynman Diagrams (tools) are sufficient (to match experimental data)
>>> then Quantum Field Theory can be thrown in the wastebasket.
>>
>> ?? Feynman Diagrams are just a mathematical trick for summing up terms to
>> approximate the propagator of QFT.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>> You just make Feynman Diagrams the fundamental elements of the theory, and
>> propagators derived from them.
>
> How many diagrams?  The propagator has a clear interpretation as connecting
> the field at x with the field at y.  Feynman showed that his diagrams
> provided a good mnemonic for the infinite number of terms that would sum to
> the propagator.  If you take the diagrams as fundamental you then need to
> specify how many.
>
>>
>> Just like histories are made fundamental, and Hilbert Spaces are derived
>> from them.
>
> Hilbert spaces are infinite dimensional vector spaces.  So you have the same
> problem: How many histories?
>
> Brent
>
>>
>> https://arxiv.org/abs/1002.0589
>>
>>
>> Theories do not come from Mount Olympus.
>>
>> - pt
>
>
> As many histories/diagrams as you need. There are supercomputers now.
>
>
> But what do physicists really think is closer to actual reality?  Something
> closer to Histories/Diagrams or to a Hilbert Space. Do some really think that
> in fact  material reality is actually an infinite-dimensional Hilbert Space?
>
> That is so freaking bizarre, isn't it, when you think about it.

Reality is freaking bizarre, but we get used to it. When I learned that Earth
was round, and the the movement of the sun was due to the spinning of the
Earth, I found that freaking bizarre. Then, when a man walked on the moon, I
was already unable to not find the idea very natural, almost obvious.

With mechanism, the physical reality is not an Hilbert space, but it (should)
looks like that (or close) when seen from the set-referentially (in the
arithmetical sense) correct internal views of arithmetic or any universal
system.

Bruno

>
> - pt
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> .
> To post to this group, send email to ```

### Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

```
> On 12 Jan 2019, at 23:17, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/12/2019 2:51 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 7:19:06 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 1/11/2019 1:57 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:46:35 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 1/11/2019 6:01 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 8:18 PM Brent Meeker >
wrote:

> The fine structure constant is e^2/hbar*c.  Those three values are
> measured independent of any Feynman diagrams

Absolutely correct. So if you use Feynman diagrams to predict what some
physical system is going to do, such as a physical system of 2 electrons
being hit by a photon of light with a wavelength small enough to contain
enough energy to prevent the electrons repulsion, then you'd better get a
number very close to the Fine Structure Constant. If you don't then
Feynman Diagrams aren't any good.

They didn't use 12,672 Feynman Diagrams because they wanted to know what
the Fine Structure Constant was, they already knew what that number was to
many decimal places from exparament, they used 12,672 Feynman Diagrams
because they wanted to see if Feynman Diagrams worked. And it turned out
they worked spectacularly well in that situation, and that gives
scientists great confidence they can use Feynman Diagrams in other
situations to calculate what other physical systems will do that involve
the Electromagnetic Force.
>>>
>>> There's always an interplay between theory and experiment.  It's completely
>>> analogous to Maxwell's discovery that light is EM waves. There were already
>>> experimental values of the permittivity and permeability of the vacuum and
>>> there were values for the speed of light.  Maxwell showed that his theory
>>> of EM predicted waves and using the permittivity and permeability values
>>> the speed of the waves matched that of light.  Now the speed of light is a
>>> defined constant and so are the permittivity and permeability of the
>>> vacuum.  So the connecting of the three values by a theory allows their
>>> values to be defined.  In the case of the anomalous magnetic moment of the
>>> electron, hbar and c are already defined constants.  So quantum field
>>> theory (for which Feynman diagrams are just a calculational tool) linked
>>> them and e to g.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If Feynman Diagrams (tools) are sufficient (to match experimental data)
>>> then Quantum Field Theory can be thrown in the wastebasket.
>>
>> ?? Feynman Diagrams are just a mathematical trick for summing up terms to
>> approximate the propagator of QFT.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>> You just make Feynman Diagrams the fundamental elements of the theory, and
>> propagators derived from them.
>
> How many diagrams?  The propagator has a clear interpretation as connecting
> the field at x with the field at y.  Feynman showed that his diagrams
> provided a good mnemonic for the infinite number of terms that would sum to
> the propagator.  If you take the diagrams as fundamental you then need to
> specify how many.
>
>>
>> Just like histories are made fundamental, and Hilbert Spaces are derived
>> from them.
>
> Hilbert spaces are infinite dimensional vector spaces.  So you have the same
> problem: How many histories?

The aleph_1 one on which your consciousness can differentiate, but in practice
we can use only the aleph_0 local pieces of histories (which are indexical sets
of past/memories+future/accessible-worlds).

Bruno

>
> Brent
>
>>
>> https://arxiv.org/abs/1002.0589
>>
>>
>> Theories do not come from Mount Olympus.
>>
>> - pt
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>> .
>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
>> .
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>> .
>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout
>> .
>
>
> --
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> .
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
> ```

### Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

```
> On 12 Jan 2019, at 11:51, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 7:19:06 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
> On 1/11/2019 1:57 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:46:35 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 1/11/2019 6:01 AM, John Clark wrote:
>>> On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 8:18 PM Brent Meeker > wrote:
>>>
>>> > The fine structure constant is e^2/hbar*c.  Those three values are
>>> > measured independent of any Feynman diagrams
>>>
>>> Absolutely correct. So if you use Feynman diagrams to predict what some
>>> physical system is going to do, such as a physical system of 2 electrons
>>> being hit by a photon of light with a wavelength small enough to contain
>>> enough energy to prevent the electrons repulsion, then you'd better get a
>>> number very close to the Fine Structure Constant. If you don't then Feynman
>>> Diagrams aren't any good.
>>>
>>> They didn't use 12,672 Feynman Diagrams because they wanted to know what
>>> the Fine Structure Constant was, they already knew
>>> what that number was to many decimal places from exparament, they used
>>> 12,672 Feynman Diagrams because they wanted to see if Feynman Diagrams
>>> worked. And it turned out they worked spectacularly well in that situation,
>>> and that gives scientists great confidence they can use Feynman Diagrams in
>>> other situations to calculate what other physical systems will do that
>>> involve the Electromagnetic Force.
>>
>> There's always an interplay between theory and experiment.  It's completely
>> analogous to Maxwell's discovery that light is EM waves. There were already
>> experimental values of the permittivity and permeability of the vacuum and
>> there were values for the speed of light.  Maxwell showed that his theory of
>> EM predicted waves and using the permittivity and permeability values the
>> speed of the waves matched that of light.  Now the speed of light is a
>> defined constant and so are the permittivity and permeability of the vacuum.
>>  So the connecting of the three values by a theory allows their values to be
>> defined.  In the case of the anomalous magnetic moment of the electron, hbar
>> and c are already defined constants.  So quantum field theory (for which
>> Feynman diagrams are just a calculational tool) linked them and e to g.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> If Feynman Diagrams (tools) are sufficient (to match experimental data) then
>> Quantum Field Theory can be thrown in the wastebasket.
>
> ?? Feynman Diagrams are just a mathematical trick for summing up terms to
> approximate the propagator of QFT.
>
> Brent
>
>
> You just make Feynman Diagrams the fundamental elements of the theory, and
> propagators derived from them.
>
> Just like histories are made fundamental, and Hilbert Spaces are derived from
> them.
>
> https://arxiv.org/abs/1002.0589

That is a very good paper, I think it is the right approach, and probably the
closer to what Digital Mechanism is going too. Just that the histories are not
fundamental with mechanism, as they are the sigma_1 sentences with formal truth
and/or consistency additions ([]p & p, []p & <>t, []p & <>t & p).

Bruno

>
> Theories do not come from Mount Olympus.
>
> - pt
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> .
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
> .
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
> .
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout
> .

--
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"Everything List" group.
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```

### Re: UDA and the origin of physics

```
> On 11 Jan 2019, at 12:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 5:24:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:03:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, werewolves,
>>>>>> that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer
>>>>>> simulations of stories of them …
>>>>>
>>>>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of
>>>>> “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of
>>>>> observable, you can infer that either:
>>>>>
>>>>> Mechanism is false, or
>>>>> You are dreaming, or
>>>>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry
>>>>> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>>>>>
>>>>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see
>>>>> exactly what mechanism predicts.
>>>>>
>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer.
>>>>
>>>> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical
>>>> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so
>>>> low that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the
>>>> observable one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also
>>>> problematical to me.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as
>>>>> the fundamental elements of nature.
>>>>
>>>> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an existing
>>>> theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without assuming it.
>>>> What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if invisible horses
>>>> pull the car?
>>>>
>>>> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of
>>>> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not
>>>> the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is
>>>> inconsistent with mechanism.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing
>>>>> (QuIP) machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum)
>>>>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
>>>>
>>>> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary variant
>>>> of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail the
>>>> existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both
>>>> consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up
>>>>> stories about vampires and werewolves.
>>>>
>>>> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist
>>>> hypothesis.
>>>>
>>>> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To
>>>> avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a
>>>> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting,
&```

### Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

```
> On 11 Jan 2019, at 12:18, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:16:13 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:03, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 8:27:20 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>> On Fri, Jan 11, 2019 at 12:18 PM Brent Meeker > wrote:
>> On 1/10/2019 4:21 PM, John Clark wrote:
>>> So even Feynman knew that there was no theoretical value for the FSC, alpha.
>>>
>>> No,  he knew very well there was a theory that could come up with a value
>>> because his own Feynman Diagrams could do it. But what he didn't know and
>>> what nobody knows is why his theory came up with that particular pure
>>> number when he never specifically stuck that number into the rules on how
>>> the diagrams should operate.
>>
>> The fine structure constant is e^2/hbar*c.  Those three values are measured
>> independent of any Feynman diagrams of quantum field theory.  The
>> calculation using Feynman diagrams is of the anamolous magnetic moment.   A
>> correction to the value of g that depend on relativistic effects (hence the
>> occurence of c in the denominator).  The anamolous magnetic moment can be
>> measure experimentally and using Feynman's diagrams and the measured values
>> of e, hbar, and c a value can be calculated that includes the relativistic
>> effects of quantum field theory. That's why the agreement with measurement
>> is significant.
>>
>> Right. The relation between fundamental physical constants, alpha =
>> e^2/hbar*c, is the closest one gets to a "theoretical" value for the FSC.
>> But that defines it in terms of other measured quantities. (Except that
>> these days, c is a defined number, not a measured physical parameter.) The
>> CODATA group use these theoretical relationships between constants, together
>> with the best available measurements, to make simultaneous fits to all the
>> constants and the data.That is where independent, "best values" for these
>> parameters come from. It is using these in the Feynman diagram calculation
>> of corrections to g-2 that gives the remarkable agreement between theory and
>> experiment. The point, though, is that the value of the FSC used in
>> calculating g-2 must be obtained independently of the g-2 measurement or
>> else it is not a test of QED.. Conversely, of course, the g-2 measurement
>> can be use to estimate the FSC independently of other measurements.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> As the Robert Geroch, James Hartle paper points out
>>
>> the issue of whether the existence of an algorithm to implement a theory
>> as a criterion for acceptable physical theories.
>>
>> if you want measurable constants to be computable, adopt a theory that does
>> so.
>
> Some constant might be intrinsically not computable. Normally, the physical
> laws should at some point take into account the probability of (self)
> halting, which would introduce a non computable constant in nature, although
> it would be computable from the halting oracle. Mechanism prevents the
> physical reality from being entirely computable. I suspect Planck constant to
> be not computable, because if we extract QM from arithmetic, the Planck
> constant might very well related to the mechanist substitution level.
>
> We cannot choose a theory according to our metaphysical state, especially in
> metaphysics. It has to be corroborated by the facts.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Just as an example of another theory
>
> The Cellular Automaton Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
> Gerard ’t Hooft
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1405.1548.pdf
>
> What is computable in that theory?

Everything apparently, which makes it incompatible with mechanism, ironically
enough.

I am not convinced either that super-determinisms makes sense, but this
requires more thought.

I will take some time to read that book, but a first glance shows that it does
not distinguish 3p, 1p, 1p-plural, so if mechanism is correct, something is
necessarily missing.

If QM is true and Mechanism is true, logicians and physicists should meet at
the middle of the mind-body bridge, but ’t Hooft might depart a bit from the
part of Everett which confirms mechanism.

>
> Not saying this theory is a good one, but a theory is a theory is a theory.

Yes, that follows from x = x. We agree on everything apparently (despite
working in antipodal conception of reality).

Bruno

>
>```

### Re: UDA and the origin of physics

```
> On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:03:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, werewolves,
>>>>> that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer
>>>>> simulations of stories of them …
>>>>
>>>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of “bettable”.
>>>> If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of observable, you can
>>>> infer that either:
>>>>
>>>> Mechanism is false, or
>>>> You are dreaming, or
>>>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry
>>>> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>>>>
>>>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see
>>>> exactly what mechanism predicts.
>>>>
>>>> Bruno
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer.
>>>
>>> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical
>>> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so low
>>> that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the observable
>>> one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical
>>> to me.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as
>>>> the fundamental elements of nature.
>>>
>>> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an existing
>>> theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without assuming it.
>>> What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if invisible horses
>>> pull the car?
>>>
>>> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of
>>> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not
>>> the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is
>>> inconsistent with mechanism.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing (QuIP)
>>>> machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum)
>>>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
>>>
>>> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary variant
>>> of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail the
>>> existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both
>>> consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up
>>>> stories about vampires and werewolves.
>>>
>>> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist
>>> hypothesis.
>>>
>>> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To
>>> avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a
>>> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting,
>>> especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as
>>>
>>> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in
>>> matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go
>>> in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary
>>> matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian,
>>> Mechanism would be judged reason```

### Re: The Case Against Quantum Computing

```
> On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:23, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
> “This scheme, like all other schemes for quantum computation, relies on
> speculative technology, does not in its current form take into account all
> possible sources of noise, unreliability and manufacturing error, and
> probably will not work.”
>
> Maybe they are right - quantum chips will only ultimately only be useful in
> generating random numbers - but the above does sound like "fuel-powered
> machines will never fly" in the 1800s.

Yes, especially with the error-tolerant types of quantum computation. It is the
author (Dyakonov) which relies on negative speculative ideas about technology
limitation, and as you illustrate, that is never a good idea. No doubt that
quantum computations are very hard to realise, but for an argument of
impossibility, I would need more sustained argumentation. I tend to agree with
the rebuttal that Brent has also linked to.

Bruno

>
> - pt
>
>
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 5:45:47 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> Interesting articles.
>
> Brent
>
>
>  Forwarded Message
>
> Another rebuttal:
> https://www.hpcwire.com/2019/01/09/the-case-against-the-case-against-quantum-computing/
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Nov 21, 2018 at 1:57 PM :
> > In the IEEE Spectrum last week, Mikhail Dyakonov presented his overview of
> > the field:
> >
> > https://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/hardware/the-case-against-quantum-computing
> >
> >
> >
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> .
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
> .
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> .
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> .

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```

### Re: Interference of probability waves

```
> On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:02, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>
> If probability values are always positive and between 0 and 1, how does one
> get destructive interference, or constructive interfering probability values
> within the acceptable range? Brent once answered this question but I have
> completely forgotten the answer. AG

The “whole problem of QM” is there. The coefficients of the terms in the
superposition are the “amplitude of probability”, and they can be negative. The
probability is given by the square of the amplitude of probability. As long as
we don’t make any observation, the wave acts like a wave, and the amplitudes
can be added or subtracted. To get the probability for the measurement result
on phi, we take the square of the amplitude (in the base corresponding to what
we want to measure).

With Everett (non collapse), measurement is only self-entanglement. Normally
the Born rule should be justified from this, and some justification exists,
either based on frequency-operator (like Graham, Preskill, and others) or by
using Gleason theorem, etc.

Note that I do not claim that Everett formulation of QM solves all conceptual
problems of QM. But mechanism might and should. The psi wave correspond to a
description of a first person plural reality in a context of many computations,
like mechanism justifies, except that the price is the needed to get the waves
from the logic of the measure one observable (provable, true and consistent).
That makes mechanism testable, and QM confirms it, but there are many
arithmetical-physics proposition which needs to still be tested.

Bruno

>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> .
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> .
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```

### Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

```
> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:03, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 8:27:20 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 11, 2019 at 12:18 PM Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> On 1/10/2019 4:21 PM, John Clark wrote:
>> So even Feynman knew that there was no theoretical value for the FSC, alpha.
>>
>> No,  he knew very well there was a theory that could come up with a value
>> because his own Feynman Diagrams could do it. But what he didn't know and
>> what nobody knows is why his theory came up with that particular pure number
>> when he never specifically stuck that number into the rules on how the
>> diagrams should operate.
>
> The fine structure constant is e^2/hbar*c.  Those three values are measured
> independent of any Feynman diagrams of quantum field theory.  The calculation
> using Feynman diagrams is of the anamolous magnetic moment.   A correction to
> the value of g that depend on relativistic effects (hence the occurence of c
> in the denominator).  The anamolous magnetic moment can be measure
> experimentally and using Feynman's diagrams and the measured values of e,
> hbar, and c a value can be calculated that includes the relativistic effects
> of quantum field theory. That's why the agreement with measurement is
> significant.
>
> Right. The relation between fundamental physical constants, alpha =
> e^2/hbar*c, is the closest one gets to a "theoretical" value for the FSC. But
> that defines it in terms of other measured quantities. (Except that these
> days, c is a defined number, not a measured physical parameter.) The CODATA
> group use these theoretical relationships between constants, together with
> the best available measurements, to make simultaneous fits to all the
> constants and the data.That is where independent, "best values" for these
> parameters come from. It is using these in the Feynman diagram calculation of
> corrections to g-2 that gives the remarkable agreement between theory and
> experiment. The point, though, is that the value of the FSC used in
> calculating g-2 must be obtained independently of the g-2 measurement or else
> it is not a test of QED.. Conversely, of course, the g-2 measurement can be
> use to estimate the FSC independently of other measurements.
>
> Bruce
>
>
> Brent
>
>
>
>
>
>
> As the Robert Geroch, James Hartle paper points out
>
> the issue of whether the existence of an algorithm to implement a theory
> as a criterion for acceptable physical theories.
>
> if you want measurable constants to be computable, adopt a theory that does
> so.

Some constant might be intrinsically not computable. Normally, the physical
laws should at some point take into account the probability of (self) halting,
which would introduce a non computable constant in nature, although it would be
computable from the halting oracle. Mechanism prevents the physical reality
from being entirely computable. I suspect Planck constant to be not computable,
because if we extract QM from arithmetic, the Planck constant might very well
related to the mechanist substitution level.

We cannot choose a theory according to our metaphysical state, especially in
metaphysics. It has to be corroborated by the facts.

Bruno

>
> - pt
>
>
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> .
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
> .
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> .

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To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

```

### Re: Coherent states of a superposition

```
> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:54, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 9:07:50 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 10 Jan 2019, at 22:08, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 11:07:51 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 07:58, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 11:37:13 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>>> <http://gmail.com/> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 2:52:27 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 10:45:01 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>> On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 9:42 AM > wrote:
>>> On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:46:41 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <>
>>> wrote:
>>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:46:13 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <>
>>> wrote:
>>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 10:13:57 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <>
>>> wrote:
>>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 9:42:51 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 10:52 PM > wrote:
>>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 11:42:06 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <>
>>> wrote:
>>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 9:57:41 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 2:36 AM > wrote:
>>>
>>> Thanks, but I'm looking for a solution within the context of interference
>>> and coherence, without introducing your theory of consciousness. Mainstream
>>> thinking today is that decoherence does occur, but this seems to imply
>>> preexisting coherence, and therefore interference among the component
>>> states of a superposition. If the superposition is expressed using
>>> eigenfunctions, which are mutually orthogonal -- implying no mutual
>>> interference -- how is decoherence possible, insofar as coherence, IIUC,
>>> doesn't exist using this basis? AG
>>>
>>> I think you misunderstand the meaning of "coherence" when it is used off an
>>> expansion in terms of a set of mutually orthogonal eigenvectors. The
>>> expansion in some eigenvector basis is written as
>>>
>>>|psi> = Sum_i (a_i |v_i>)
>>>
>>> where |v_i> are the eigenvectors, and i ranges over the dimension of the
>>> Hilbert space. The expansion coefficients are the complex numbers a_i.
>>> Since these are complex coefficients, they contain inherent phases. It is
>>> the preservation of these phases of the expansion coefficients that is
>>> meant by "maintaining coherence". So it is the coherence of the particular
>>> expansion that is implied, and this has noting to do with the mutual
>>> orthogonality or otherwise of the basis vectors themselves. In decoherence,
>>> the phase relationships between the terms in the original expansion are
>>> lost.
>>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>>> I appreciate your reply. I was sure you could ascertain my error --
>>> confusing orthogonality with interference and coherence. Let me have your
>>> indulgence on a related issue. AG
>>>
>>> Suppose the original wf is expressed in terms of p, and its superposition
>>> expansion is also expressed in eigenfunctions with variable p. Does the
>>> phase of the original wf carry over into the eigenfunctions as identical
>>> for each, or can each component in the superposition have different phases?
>>> I ask this because the probability determined by any complex amplitude is
>>> independent of its phase. TIA, AG
>>>
>>> The phases of the coefficients are independent of each other.
>>>
>>> When I formally studied QM, no mention was made of calculating the phases
>>> since, presumably, they don't effect probability calculations. Do you have
>>> a link which explains how they're calculated? TIA, AG
>>>
>>> I found some links on physics.stackexchange.com
>>> <http://physics.stackexchange.com/> which show that relative phases can
>>> effect probabilities, but none so far about how to calculate any phase
>>> angle. AG
>>>
>>> Here's the answer if anyone's interested. But what's the question? How are
>>> wf phase angles calculated? Clearly, if you solve for the eigenfunctions of
>>> some QM operator such as the p operator, any phase angle is possible; its
>>> val```

### Re: UDA and the origin of physics

```
> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, werewolves,
>>>> that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer
>>>> simulations of stories of them …
>>>
>>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of “bettable”.
>>> If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of observable, you can
>>> infer that either:
>>>
>>> Mechanism is false, or
>>> You are dreaming, or
>>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry
>>> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>>>
>>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see
>>> exactly what mechanism predicts.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer.
>>
>> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical
>> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so low
>> that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the observable
>> one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical to
>> me.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as
>>> the fundamental elements of nature.
>>
>> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an existing
>> theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without assuming it.
>> What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if invisible horses
>> pull the car?
>>
>> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of
>> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not
>> the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is
>> inconsistent with mechanism.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing (QuIP)
>>> machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum)
>>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
>>
>> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary variant
>> of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail the
>> existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both
>> consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up
>>> stories about vampires and werewolves.
>>
>> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist
>> hypothesis.
>>
>> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To
>> avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a
>> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting,
>> especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as
>>
>> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in matter
>> and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go in the
>> opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary matter
>> that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, Mechanism
>> would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves Mechanism.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would be a
>> surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)
>
>
> When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from
> physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I do
> not defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of any
> universal machine “rich enough” ```

### Re: Coherent states of a superposition

```
> On 10 Jan 2019, at 22:08, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 11:07:51 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 07:58, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 11:37:13 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>> <http://gmail.com/> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 2:52:27 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 10:45:01 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>> On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 9:42 AM > wrote:
>> On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:46:41 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <>
>> wrote:
>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:46:13 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <>
>> wrote:
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 10:13:57 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <>
>> wrote:
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 9:42:51 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 10:52 PM > wrote:
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 11:42:06 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <>
>> wrote:
>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 9:57:41 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 2:36 AM > wrote:
>>
>> Thanks, but I'm looking for a solution within the context of interference
>> and coherence, without introducing your theory of consciousness. Mainstream
>> thinking today is that decoherence does occur, but this seems to imply
>> preexisting coherence, and therefore interference among the component states
>> of a superposition. If the superposition is expressed using eigenfunctions,
>> which are mutually orthogonal -- implying no mutual interference -- how is
>> decoherence possible, insofar as coherence, IIUC, doesn't exist using this
>> basis? AG
>>
>> I think you misunderstand the meaning of "coherence" when it is used off an
>> expansion in terms of a set of mutually orthogonal eigenvectors. The
>> expansion in some eigenvector basis is written as
>>
>>|psi> = Sum_i (a_i |v_i>)
>>
>> where |v_i> are the eigenvectors, and i ranges over the dimension of the
>> Hilbert space. The expansion coefficients are the complex numbers a_i. Since
>> these are complex coefficients, they contain inherent phases. It is the
>> preservation of these phases of the expansion coefficients that is meant by
>> "maintaining coherence". So it is the coherence of the particular expansion
>> that is implied, and this has noting to do with the mutual orthogonality or
>> otherwise of the basis vectors themselves. In decoherence, the phase
>> relationships between the terms in the original expansion are lost.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>> I appreciate your reply. I was sure you could ascertain my error --
>> confusing orthogonality with interference and coherence. Let me have your
>> indulgence on a related issue. AG
>>
>> Suppose the original wf is expressed in terms of p, and its superposition
>> expansion is also expressed in eigenfunctions with variable p. Does the
>> phase of the original wf carry over into the eigenfunctions as identical for
>> each, or can each component in the superposition have different phases? I
>> ask this because the probability determined by any complex amplitude is
>> independent of its phase. TIA, AG
>>
>> The phases of the coefficients are independent of each other.
>>
>> When I formally studied QM, no mention was made of calculating the phases
>> since, presumably, they don't effect probability calculations. Do you have a
>> link which explains how they're calculated? TIA, AG
>>
>> I found some links on physics.stackexchange.com
>> <http://physics.stackexchange.com/> which show that relative phases can
>> effect probabilities, but none so far about how to calculate any phase
>> angle. AG
>>
>> Here's the answer if anyone's interested. But what's the question? How are
>> wf phase angles calculated? Clearly, if you solve for the eigenfunctions of
>> some QM operator such as the p operator, any phase angle is possible; its
>> value is completely arbitrary and doesn't effect a probability calculation.
>> In fact, IIUC, there is not sufficient information to solve for a unique
>> phase. So, I conclude,that the additional information required to uniquely
>> determine a phase angle for a wf, lies in boundary conditions. If the
>> problem of specifying a wf is defined as a boundary value problem, then, I
>> believe, a unique phase angle can be calculated. CMIIAW. AG
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>&```

### Re: Coherent states of a superposition

```
> On 10 Jan 2019, at 21:33, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 11:07:51 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 07:58, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 11:37:13 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>> <http://gmail.com/> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 2:52:27 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 10:45:01 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>> On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 9:42 AM > wrote:
>> On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:46:41 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <>
>> wrote:
>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:46:13 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <>
>> wrote:
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 10:13:57 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <>
>> wrote:
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 9:42:51 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 10:52 PM > wrote:
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 11:42:06 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <>
>> wrote:
>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 9:57:41 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 2:36 AM > wrote:
>>
>> Thanks, but I'm looking for a solution within the context of interference
>> and coherence, without introducing your theory of consciousness. Mainstream
>> thinking today is that decoherence does occur, but this seems to imply
>> preexisting coherence, and therefore interference among the component states
>> of a superposition. If the superposition is expressed using eigenfunctions,
>> which are mutually orthogonal -- implying no mutual interference -- how is
>> decoherence possible, insofar as coherence, IIUC, doesn't exist using this
>> basis? AG
>>
>> I think you misunderstand the meaning of "coherence" when it is used off an
>> expansion in terms of a set of mutually orthogonal eigenvectors. The
>> expansion in some eigenvector basis is written as
>>
>>|psi> = Sum_i (a_i |v_i>)
>>
>> where |v_i> are the eigenvectors, and i ranges over the dimension of the
>> Hilbert space. The expansion coefficients are the complex numbers a_i. Since
>> these are complex coefficients, they contain inherent phases. It is the
>> preservation of these phases of the expansion coefficients that is meant by
>> "maintaining coherence". So it is the coherence of the particular expansion
>> that is implied, and this has noting to do with the mutual orthogonality or
>> otherwise of the basis vectors themselves. In decoherence, the phase
>> relationships between the terms in the original expansion are lost.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>> I appreciate your reply. I was sure you could ascertain my error --
>> confusing orthogonality with interference and coherence. Let me have your
>> indulgence on a related issue. AG
>>
>> Suppose the original wf is expressed in terms of p, and its superposition
>> expansion is also expressed in eigenfunctions with variable p. Does the
>> phase of the original wf carry over into the eigenfunctions as identical for
>> each, or can each component in the superposition have different phases? I
>> ask this because the probability determined by any complex amplitude is
>> independent of its phase. TIA, AG
>>
>> The phases of the coefficients are independent of each other.
>>
>> When I formally studied QM, no mention was made of calculating the phases
>> since, presumably, they don't effect probability calculations. Do you have a
>> link which explains how they're calculated? TIA, AG
>>
>> I found some links on physics.stackexchange.com
>> <http://physics.stackexchange.com/> which show that relative phases can
>> effect probabilities, but none so far about how to calculate any phase
>> angle. AG
>>
>> Here's the answer if anyone's interested. But what's the question? How are
>> wf phase angles calculated? Clearly, if you solve for the eigenfunctions of
>> some QM operator such as the p operator, any phase angle is possible; its
>> value is completely arbitrary and doesn't effect a probability calculation.
>> In fact, IIUC, there is not sufficient information to solve for a unique
>> phase. So, I conclude,that the additional information required to uniquely
>> determine a phase angle for a wf, lies in boundary conditions. If the
>> problem of specifying a wf is defined as a boundary value problem, then, I
>> believe, a unique phase angle can be calculated. CMIIAW. AG
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>&```

### Re: Materialism and Mechanism

```
> On 10 Jan 2019, at 21:01, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 11:20:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 11:20, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:44:40 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 15:20, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> In terms of processing, I distinguish experience processing from
>>> information processing.
>>
>>
>> OK. That is important, but the machines do that too. Information processing
>> is like computing and proving, and can be described in 3p terms. It is the
>> “[]p” in the list of self-referential modes. But the (Löbian) machine is
>> aware that she cannot know, nor even define precisely, her own correctness,
>> and that she cannot prove, if true, the equivalence between []p and “[]p &
>> p”, so she is bounded to find Theatetetus definition of the soul or of the
>> knower, which is pure 1p, and does not admits any pure 3p description. I
>> would say that this might corresponds to your “experience” processing.
>>
>> Then, eventually the notion of “matter” can be explained in term of the
>> number experience processing (sharable for the quanta, and non sharable for
>> the qualia). There is no need to invoke some inert substance that nobody can
>> define nor test.
>>
>> All computers (physical universal machine) and the non material universal
>> machine are equivalent with respect to computability and emulability. Please
>> note that they are NOT equivalent with respect to provability, even if, when
>> self-referentially correct, their provability predicate will all obey to the
>> same theology (G*), but will differ in their interpretation, contents, etc.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/
>>> <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/>
>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/
>>>
>>> <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/>
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>
>> This is interesting for a programming semantics (e.g. denotational)
>> perspective, for experiential processing.
>>
>> This reminds me of Galen Strawson's argument (which has nothing to do with
>> stochasticism or determinism) about "ree will. He has a definition of "self"
>> such that your self is a real thing
>
> OK.
>
>
>
>> (that includes your consciousness, which is also a real thing),
>
> OK.
>
>
>> and to say your self has free will can't really be right, since you can't
>> say (seriously) "I am free to not be my self" (since it is your self that is
>> doing that): Whatever you chose, it is your self that is choosing.
>
>
> Once a universal machine introspect itself relatively to some universal
> number, it becomes aware that it can predict itself completely and free-will
> is a vague term alluding to the management of decision in absence of complete
> information.
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> "Experience Processing": Maybe not this year [ International Conference on
>> Unconventional Computation and Natural Computation 2019
>> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ <http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/> ] …
>
> I recently (it is nt used in my papers) consider that it implies a lot to
> admit that all universal machine are maximally conscious, and that the
> provability predicate (seen as an ideal self-referentially correct
> brain/body) only filters the consciousness of the universal machine. When
> unrpogrammed, and without input, its consciousness is quite different from
> the mundane consciousness, it is more like a highly dissociated state of
> consciousness, out of time and space, which needs a lot of spatio-temproral
> experiences to develop the aproprioperception of a body. In the humain brain,
> that sense is basically innate.
>
> The experience is not “processed” by a code, it is a truth filtered by a
> body/code.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> It the brain is biocomputing, as the human is a biocomputer [
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_biocomputer ], then it is indeed
> processing experience. (Processing is what computers do.)

Does biocomputing violate Church’s thesis? If yes, give me a biocomputable
function from N to N which is not Turing-computable. If no, then the
biocomputati```

### Re: UDA and the origin of physics

```
> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, werewolves,
>>> that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer
>>> simulations of stories of them …
>>
>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of “bettable”.
>> If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of observable, you can
>> infer that either:
>>
>> Mechanism is false, or
>> You are dreaming, or
>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry
>> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>>
>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see
>> exactly what mechanism predicts.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer.
>
> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical universe
> is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so low that we
> need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the observable one) to
> get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical to me.
>
>
>
>
>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as the
>> fundamental elements of nature.
>
> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an existing
> theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without assuming it.
> What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if invisible horses
> pull the car?
>
> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of nature
> comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not the
> metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is
> inconsistent with mechanism.
>
>
>
>
>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing (QuIP)
>> machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum)
>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
>
> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary variant of
> provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail the existence
> of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both consciousness and
> matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
>
>
>
>>
>> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up
>> stories about vampires and werewolves.
>
> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist
> hypothesis.
>
> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To avoid
> repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a conclusion
> because we have another theory is not that much interesting, especially when
> the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as your use of many
>
> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in matter
> and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go in the
> opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary matter
> that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, Mechanism
> would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves Mechanism.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would be a
> surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)

When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from
physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I do not
defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of any universal
machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) that they are
universal. Then we can test that theory as it implies the physical laws.

>
> At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a possible
> denotational semantics for experiential processing, which takes place in
> matter.

That seems a bit weird. Denotatotional semantics is OK (although to rough for
this complex subject), but why assume Matter, when a theory implies it
appearances. If we get a discrepancy between physics and machine’s physics, it
will make sense to suppose some matter, and mech```

### Re: Materialism and Mechanism

```
> On 9 Jan 2019, at 11:20, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:44:40 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 15:20, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>
>>
>> In terms of processing, I distinguish experience processing from information
>> processing.
>
>
> OK. That is important, but the machines do that too. Information processing
> is like computing and proving, and can be described in 3p terms. It is the
> “[]p” in the list of self-referential modes. But the (Löbian) machine is
> aware that she cannot know, nor even define precisely, her own correctness,
> and that she cannot prove, if true, the equivalence between []p and “[]p &
> p”, so she is bounded to find Theatetetus definition of the soul or of the
> knower, which is pure 1p, and does not admits any pure 3p description. I
> would say that this might corresponds to your “experience” processing.
>
> Then, eventually the notion of “matter” can be explained in term of the
> number experience processing (sharable for the quanta, and non sharable for
> the qualia). There is no need to invoke some inert substance that nobody can
> define nor test.
>
> All computers (physical universal machine) and the non material universal
> machine are equivalent with respect to computability and emulability. Please
> note that they are NOT equivalent with respect to provability, even if, when
> self-referentially correct, their provability predicate will all obey to the
> same theology (G*), but will differ in their interpretation, contents, etc.
>
> Bruno
>
>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/
>> <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/>
>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/
>>
>> <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/>
>>
>> - pt
>>
>
> This is interesting for a programming semantics (e.g. denotational)
> perspective, for experiential processing.
>
> This reminds me of Galen Strawson's argument (which has nothing to do with
> stochasticism or determinism) about "ree will. He has a definition of "self"
> such that your self is a real thing

OK.

> (that includes your consciousness, which is also a real thing),

OK.

> and to say your self has free will can't really be right, since you can't say
> (seriously) "I am free to not be my self" (since it is your self that is
> doing that): Whatever you chose, it is your self that is choosing.

Once a universal machine introspect itself relatively to some universal number,
it becomes aware that it can predict itself completely and free-will is a vague
term alluding to the management of decision in absence of complete information.

>
>
>
> "Experience Processing": Maybe not this year [ International Conference on
> Unconventional Computation and Natural Computation 2019
> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ <http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/> ] …

I recently (it is nt used in my papers) consider that it implies a lot to admit
that all universal machine are maximally conscious, and that the provability
predicate (seen as an ideal self-referentially correct brain/body) only filters
the consciousness of the universal machine. When unrpogrammed, and without
input, its consciousness is quite different from the mundane consciousness, it
is more like a highly dissociated state of consciousness, out of time and
space, which needs a lot of spatio-temproral experiences to develop the
aproprioperception of a body. In the humain brain, that sense is basically
innate.

The experience is not “processed” by a code, it is a truth filtered by a
body/code.

Bruno

>
> - pt
>
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### Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

```
> On 10 Jan 2019, at 07:39, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 6:49:05 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 11:38 AM John Clark  > wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 5:01 PM Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>
> > Rubbish. The fine structure constant is not computable by Feynman diagrams.
> > What might be confusing you is that QED calculations of physically
> > measurable  things like the Lamb Shift and g-2 for the electron depend on
> > the value of the FSC.
>
> How is using Feynman diagrams to compute the Lamb Shift Shift (which depends
> on the Fine Structure Constant) different from using Feynman diagrams to
> compute the Fine Structure Constant?  After all physics didn't determine the
> Lamb Shift from the Fine Structure Constant, they determined the Fine
> Structure Constant by looking at the Lamb Shift, in fact the very very fine
> lines in the spectrum of Hydrogen is how the Fine Structure Constant got its
> name.
>
> The following 2012 article in Physical Review letters describes a QED
> calculation involving 12,672 tenth order Feynman diagrams used to calculate
> both the magnetic moment of the electron and the inverse of the Fine
> Structure Constant and obtaining a value of 137.035999173 which is almost
> exactly the same as the experimentally derived value:
>
> That is an experimentally derived value!
>
> Improved Value of the Fine Structure Constant
>
>
> John K Clark
>
> Your original claim was that the fine structure constant was computable. But
> it is not computable from first principles, it is a physical constant that
> must be measured. The fact that computations might be involved in getting the
> value from measurements does not mean that the FSC is itself computable.
>
> You have to define what you mean by "computable". The FSC is a measured
> quantity, not computable in the way pi or e are computable from mathematical
> formulae.
>
> Bruce
>
>
>
> Constants enter the vocabulary of physics by means of theories. A constant is
> an entity of a theory, but a constant is not an entity of nature. Nature may
> have constancy, but it's theories that have constants.
>
>Theory != Nature.

A theory of nature is certainly different of nature, like the brain+telescope
is different from a far away galaxy.

Note that a theory of the arithmetical reality (like PA or even ZF) is also
different than the arithmetical reality.

Then, a theory of arithmetic can be seen as a number, like the Gödel number of
the provability predicate, and a large part of the metamathematics is emulated
in arithmetic. The arithmetical reality reflects the “talks” of the numbers
itself. Physics is retrieved by what the machine can predict in some first
person plural partially sharable way.

Geometry, analysis, and physics are the unavoidable tools that the “number”
invents to understand themselves. But consciousness of the human type can
require a relative rarity combined with a huge continuous explosion in the
multiple representation. The bottom is highly and completely symmetrical, but
from inside we break the symmetries (“we” the universal machines).

Bruno

>
> - pt
>
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### Re: UDA and the origin of physics

```
> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, werewolves,
>> that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer simulations
>> of stories of them …
>
> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of “bettable”. If
> you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of observable, you can infer
> that either:
>
> Mechanism is false, or
> You are dreaming, or
> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry
> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>
> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see
> exactly what mechanism predicts.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer.

That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical universe
is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so low that we need
to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the observable one) to get “my”
consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical to me.

> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as the
> fundamental elements of nature.

You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an existing
theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without assuming it. What
if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if invisible horses pull the
car?

Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of nature
comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not the
metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is
inconsistent with mechanism.

> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing (QuIP)
> machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum)
> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.

With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary variant of
provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail the existence
of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both consciousness and
matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?

>
> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up
> stories about vampires and werewolves.

The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist
hypothesis.

Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To avoid
repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a conclusion
because we have another theory is not that much interesting, especially when
the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as your use of many

All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in matter
and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go in the
opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary matter that
I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, Mechanism would be
judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves Mechanism.

Bruno

>
>
>
> - pt
>
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### Re: Coherent states of a superposition

```
> On 9 Jan 2019, at 07:58, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 11:37:13 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 2:52:27 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>
>
> On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 10:45:01 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 9:42 AM > wrote:
> On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:46:41 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:46:13 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 10:13:57 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <>
> wrote:
> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 9:42:51 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 10:52 PM > wrote:
> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 11:42:06 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <>
> wrote:
> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 9:57:41 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 2:36 AM > wrote:
>
> Thanks, but I'm looking for a solution within the context of interference and
> coherence, without introducing your theory of consciousness. Mainstream
> thinking today is that decoherence does occur, but this seems to imply
> preexisting coherence, and therefore interference among the component states
> of a superposition. If the superposition is expressed using eigenfunctions,
> which are mutually orthogonal -- implying no mutual interference -- how is
> decoherence possible, insofar as coherence, IIUC, doesn't exist using this
> basis? AG
>
> I think you misunderstand the meaning of "coherence" when it is used off an
> expansion in terms of a set of mutually orthogonal eigenvectors. The
> expansion in some eigenvector basis is written as
>
>|psi> = Sum_i (a_i |v_i>)
>
> where |v_i> are the eigenvectors, and i ranges over the dimension of the
> Hilbert space. The expansion coefficients are the complex numbers a_i. Since
> these are complex coefficients, they contain inherent phases. It is the
> preservation of these phases of the expansion coefficients that is meant by
> "maintaining coherence". So it is the coherence of the particular expansion
> that is implied, and this has noting to do with the mutual orthogonality or
> otherwise of the basis vectors themselves. In decoherence, the phase
> relationships between the terms in the original expansion are lost.
>
> Bruce
>
> I appreciate your reply. I was sure you could ascertain my error -- confusing
> orthogonality with interference and coherence. Let me have your indulgence on
> a related issue. AG
>
> Suppose the original wf is expressed in terms of p, and its superposition
> expansion is also expressed in eigenfunctions with variable p. Does the phase
> of the original wf carry over into the eigenfunctions as identical for each,
> or can each component in the superposition have different phases? I ask this
> because the probability determined by any complex amplitude is independent of
> its phase. TIA, AG
>
> The phases of the coefficients are independent of each other.
>
> When I formally studied QM, no mention was made of calculating the phases
> since, presumably, they don't effect probability calculations. Do you have a
> link which explains how they're calculated? TIA, AG
>
> I found some links on physics.stackexchange.com
>  which show that relative phases can
> effect probabilities, but none so far about how to calculate any phase angle.
> AG
>
> Here's the answer if anyone's interested. But what's the question? How are wf
> phase angles calculated? Clearly, if you solve for the eigenfunctions of some
> QM operator such as the p operator, any phase angle is possible; its value is
> completely arbitrary and doesn't effect a probability calculation. In fact,
> IIUC, there is not sufficient information to solve for a unique phase. So, I
> conclude,that the additional information required to uniquely determine a
> phase angle for a wf, lies in boundary conditions. If the problem of
> specifying a wf is defined as a boundary value problem, then, I believe, a
> unique phase angle can be calculated. CMIIAW. AG
>
> Bruce
>
> I could use a handshake on this one. Roughly speaking, if one wants to
> express the state of a system as a superposition of eigenstates, how does one
> calculate the phase angles of the amplitudes for each eigenstate? AG
>
> One doesn't. The phases are arbitrary unless one interferes the system with
> some other system.
>
> Bruce
>
> If the phases are arbitrary and the system interacts with some other system,
> the new phases presumably are also arbitrary. So there doesn't seem to be any
> physical significance, yet this is the heart of decoherence theory as I
> understand it. What am I missing? TIA, AG
>
>  Also, as we discussed, the phase angles determine interference. If they can
> be chosen arbitrarily, it seems as if interference has no physical
> significance. AG
>
> Puzzling, isn't it? We have waves in Wave Mechanics. Waves interfere with
> each ```

### Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

```
> On 6 Jan 2019, at 17:10, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> I am trying to make a list of what properties are comparable between two
> universes and which properties are incomparable.

What do you mean by “universes”? If it means “physical universe”, and if
Mechanism is postulated, I am not sure it makes sense to compare two physical
universe, although it can make sense to talk about different digital
approximation of a universe.

> I think this has applications regarding what knowledge can be extracted via
> simulation of (from one's POV) other abstract realities and worlds (which may
> be actual from someone else's point of view).
>
> So far this is what I have, but would appreciate other's insights/corrections:
>
> Incomparable properties:
> Sizes (e.g., how big is something in another universe, is a galaxy in that
> universe bigger or smaller than a planet in our universe?)
> Distances (what possible meaning could a meter have in that other universe?)
> Strength of forces (we could say how particles are affected by these forces
> in their universe, but not how they would translate if applied to our own)
> Time (how long it takes for anything to happen in that other universe)
> Age (when it began, how long the universe has existed)
> Speeds (given neither distance nor time is comparable)
> Present (what the present time is in the other universe)
> Position (it has no relative position, or location relative to our own
> universe)
> Comparable properties:
> Information content (how many bits are needed to describe state)
> Computational complexity (how many operations need to be computed to advance)
> Dimensionality of its objects (e.g. spacetime, strings, etc.)
> Entropy
> Plankian/discrete units (e.g. in terms of smallest physically meaningful
> units)
> Unsure:
> Mass? (given forces are not comparable, but also related to energy)
> Energy (given its relation to both entropy and mass)
>
> So if we simulate some other universe, we can describe and relate it to our
> own physical universe in similar terms of information content, computational
> complexity, dimensionality, discrete units, etc. but many things seem to have
> no meaning at all: time, distance, size.
>
> Do these reflect limits of simulation, or are they limits that apply to our
> own universe itself?

All universal machine in arithmetic have the same universe, or set of physical
laws, as they are truly machine-invariant. Only the geographies and histories
can differ, so your question becomes is mass, energy, entropy, dimension, age,
etc.. geographic-historical or physical?

> e.g., if everything in this universe was made 100X larger, and all forces
> similarly scaled, would we notice?  Perhaps incomparable properties are
> things that are variant (and illusory) in an objective sense.

If we don’t notice, it is the same, except for the weigh, which depends on
which representation emulate which experiences in arithmetic.

>
> A final question, are they truly "causally disconnected" given we can
> simulate them? E.g. if we can use computers to temporarily compel matter in
> our universe to behave like things in that simulated universe, then in some
> sense isn't that a causal interaction?  What things can travel through such
> portals of simulation beyond information?

I am not sure this makes sense. There is no “universe” of that kind, I would
say (when we postulate mechanism). There is only interfering (statistically)
histories/computations-seen-from-inside (seen by the Löbian machine supported
by those computations).

Bruno

>
> Jason
>
> P.S.
>
> It is interesting that when we consider mathematical/platonic objects, we
> likewise face the same limits in terms of being able to understand them.
> e.g., we can't point to the Mandlebrot set, nor compare its size in terms of
> physical units.
>
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### UDA and the origin of physics

```
> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 3:03:19 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
> On 1/6/2019 3:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 5 Jan 2019, at 22:18, Brent Meeker >
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On 1/5/2019 1:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 19:35, Brent Meeker  >>>> > wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> On 1/4/2019 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>>>>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 05:16, Brent Meeker  >>>>>> > wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> On 1/3/2019 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>>>>>> As a scientist, I just count the evidences, and evaluate the
> >>>>>>> plausibility of the big picture proposed.I predicted the many-world
> >>>>>>> appearances much before I realised the physicists were already open
> >>>>>>> to this for empirical reason. Once you understand that there are
> >>>>>>> infinitely many computations going through you actual state,
> >>>>>> What does it mean "your actual state"?   How is it defined within the
> >>>>>> UD?
> >>>>> It is defined indexically, like in a block universe, but in a more
> >>>>> precise way through the Gödel number of a Löbian machine in the []p & X
> >>>>> modes (with X in {p, <>t, <>t & p}, p being limited to the sigma_1
> >>>>> (semi-computable) arithmetical sentences.
> >>>> I don't think I understand that.  You're saying that within all the UD
> >>>> computations there are ones that implement specific Lobian machines and
> >>>> their interactions with some world they are embedded in?
> >>> This comes from the first person indeterminacy on the computations.
> >> Every computation is a person?
> > That would be a category error. We can only say that a person is associated
> > to (infinitely many) computations, which are those bringing your state
> > through your brain/body/history here and now.
>
> That is sufficiently vague so as to be meaningless.  Which infinitely
> many computations?  Sometimes you write as if the computations are
> instantiating conscious thoughts.  But other places you refer to the
> computations as being "below our substitution level" implying that they
> are simulations of the brain or lower.
>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >> What does it mean "a computation"? ...one of the threads of the UD?  or
> >> some state of the UD?
> > A thread in the UD, or anything equivalent with the sequence (on s):
> > phi_i,s (j), where the s is for the sth step of the computation. The UD run
> > all phi_i,s (j), for all, i, j, and s.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >>> To have a probability notion, we need to define the measure one by []p &
> >>> <>t. (Because with the logic G we don’t have []p -> <>t, and we need the
> >>> “<>t” to avoid the cul-de-sac (cf the typical default hypothesis in
> >>> probability theory).
> >>>
> >>> The FPI is on all computations (sigma_1 sentences), but they are
> >>> restricted by being those implementing consistent extensions on the
> >>> Löbian machine “you are”.
> >> Consistent in what sense?  Just not proving a contradiction...how does
> > Löbian machine, which can be or not consistent. The FPI is on the thread
> > which supports the consistent extension. (“Supports”, not “is”).
>
> Another vague term.  What does "supports" mean?
>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >> or does it mean consistent in the sense of representing a quasi-classical
> >> world in which the electron's spin measures either UP of DOWN but not
> >> both?
> > No, that is for latter, and it concerns the “consistent continuations” as
> > seen in the observable modes ([]p & X, with X being p, or <>p, or <>p & p),
> > p sigma_1. It does not mean <>p (consistent p), but <>p v p, or, <>p v p v
> > []f.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >&```

### UDA and the origin of physics

```

> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:03, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/6/2019 3:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 5 Jan 2019, at 22:18, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 1/5/2019 1:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 19:35, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 1/4/2019 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 05:16, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 1/3/2019 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>> As a scientist, I just count the evidences, and evaluate the
>>>>>>>> plausibility of the big picture proposed.I predicted the many-world
>>>>>>>> appearances much before I realised the physicists were already open to
>>>>>>>> this for empirical reason. Once you understand that there are
>>>>>>>> infinitely many computations going through you actual state,
>>>>>>> What does it mean "your actual state"?   How is it defined within the
>>>>>>> UD?
>>>>>> It is defined indexically, like in a block universe, but in a more
>>>>>> precise way through the Gödel number of a Löbian machine in the []p & X
>>>>>> modes (with X in {p, <>t, <>t & p}, p being limited to the sigma_1
>>>>>> (semi-computable) arithmetical sentences.
>>>>> I don't think I understand that.  You're saying that within all the UD
>>>>> computations there are ones that implement specific Lobian machines and
>>>>> their interactions with some world they are embedded in?
>>>> This comes from the first person indeterminacy on the computations.
>>> Every computation is a person?
>> That would be a category error. We can only say that a person is associated
>> to (infinitely many) computations, which are those bringing your state
>> through your brain/body/history here and now.
>
> That is sufficiently vague so as to be meaningless.

We assume Church’s thesis. "All computations" is very well defined.

> Which infinitely many computations?

For s equal to 0, s(0), s(s(0)) … all phi_i,s(ji). That notion is phi_i
independent for the first person statistics.

> Sometimes you write as if the computations are instantiating conscious
> thoughts.  But other places you refer to the computations as being "below our
> substitution level" implying that they are simulations of the brain or lower.

Consciousness is a first person attribute associated to any Löbian machine
emulated in computations. Reread step 7 perhaps. I don’t see what you seem to
miss. Below our substitution level, the details of the computation does not
matter, and you cannot know if you are in a computation where some election is
up or down in the relevant history, and this “triggers” the (global) first
person indeterminacy on all diverging  locally non distinguishable
computations, like in the Washington/Moscow thought experience.

>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> What does it mean "a computation"? ...one of the threads of the UD?  or
>>> some state of the UD?
>> A thread in the UD, or anything equivalent with the sequence (on s): phi_i,s
>> (j), where the s is for the sth step of the computation. The UD run all
>> phi_i,s (j), for all, i, j, and s.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>> To have a probability notion, we need to define the measure one by []p &
>>>> <>t. (Because with the logic G we don’t have []p -> <>t, and we need the
>>>> “<>t” to avoid the cul-de-sac (cf the typical default hypothesis in
>>>> probability theory).
>>>>
>>>> The FPI is on all computations (sigma_1 sentences), but they are
>>>> restricted by being those implementing consistent extensions on the Löbian
>>>> machine “you are”.
>>> Consistent in what sense?  Just not proving a contradiction...how does
>> Löbian machine, which can be or not consistent. The FPI is on the thread
>> which supports the consistent extension. (“Supports”, not “is”).
>
> Another vague term.  What does "supports" mean?

What is vague here? “Supports” means “emulates”, in the sense of Church,
Turing, …, like in u emulates x on y w```

### Re: Materialism and Mechanism

```
> On 6 Jan 2019, at 15:20, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 8:04:20 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
> On Sun, Jan 6, 2019 at 4:47 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 6:02:39 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 2:05 PM Philip Thrift > wrote:
>
>
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:52:19 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>
>
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:02:53 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 6:13 AM Philip Thrift > wrote:
>
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 4:26:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 17:25, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>
>> Physicists today (as I've observed) are not (for the most part) real
>> materialists.
>
>
> That is true, and physicists have rarely problem with the consequence of
> Mechanism. Now, some physicist can be immaterialist, but still physicalist
> (like Tegmark was at some moment at least). The physical reality would be a
> mathematical reality among others, but with computationalism, the physical
> reality comes from a more global mathematical phenomenon based on the
> behaviour/semantics of the material mode of self-rereyence (involving
> probabilities, i.e., for those who have studied the self-referential modes
> available, the []p & X modes, with X being either p, or <>t, or p & <>t).
>
> This makes mechanism testable, and if quantum mechanics did not exist, I
> would have thought that Mechanism is already refuted.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> "Physicalism"/"Physical" are words that needs deprecating, as they can mean
> (to some philosophers of science) "can be reduced to physics", and physics is
> what is currently-accepted in the physics scientific community.
>
> (When I use "physical", I mean it in the sense of being "explainable" by
> physics.)
>
> It gets worse: "In this entry, I will adopt the policy of using both terms
> ['materialism' and 'physicalism'] interchangeably, though I will typically
> refer to the thesis we will discuss as ‘physicalism’."
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/
> <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/>
>
> Better to just use "materialism" and reject the use of "physicalism" (unless
> it refers to a the particular meaning of "can be reduced to physics"), though
> materialism has a "weak" and "strong" definition.
>
> Galen Strawson defines what "hard-nosed materialism" is:
>
>
>
> The important distinction, which may be lost in your definitions, is whether
> "primariness" is assumed or not.  These diagrams I made highlight the
> difference:
>
>
> Primary Physicalism (Physics is at the bottom, and cannot be explained or
> derived from anything else):
>
>
> Non-Primary Physicalism (Physics is not at the bottom, and can be explained
> or derived from something more fundamental):
>
>
> You could also be agnostic on the question, let's call someone with that
> belief a "Primary Physicalism Agnostic".
>
> Currently, scientists have collected zero evidence in favor of Primary
> Physicalism. So if you strongly believe it, you might want to consider why it
> is you believe in something so strongly despite there being no evidence for
> it.
>
>
>
>
> But what exactly would be a "test for Mechanism"?
>
>
> If you replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet functionally
> equivalent replacement and experience no change in consciousness.
>
> The existence and utility of cochlear implants can be seen as a loose
> confirmation of digital mechanism.
>
> Jason
>
>
>
> A question remains though: Can chemistry (or biology for that matter) be
> reduced to physics? By that it is typically meant "Can problems of
> theoretical chemistry be reduced to The Standard Model?"
>
> See  List of unsolved problems in chemistry
> -  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_chemistry
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_chemistry>
>
> Except for a leap of faith ("The Standard Model can explain all of these open
> problems in chemistry"), there could be chemical properties not reducible to
> physical properties.
>
> Doesn't that require chemical reactions that v```

### Re: "No black-hole singularities" in an undated loop-quantum-gravity theory

```

> On 5 Jan 2019, at 22:18, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/5/2019 1:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 19:35, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 1/4/2019 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 05:16, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 1/3/2019 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>> As a scientist, I just count the evidences, and evaluate the
>>>>>> plausibility of the big picture proposed.I predicted the many-world
>>>>>> appearances much before I realised the physicists were already open to
>>>>>> this for empirical reason. Once you understand that there are infinitely
>>>>>> many computations going through you actual state,
>>>>> What does it mean "your actual state"?   How is it defined within the UD?
>>>> It is defined indexically, like in a block universe, but in a more precise
>>>> way through the Gödel number of a Löbian machine in the []p & X modes
>>>> (with X in {p, <>t, <>t & p}, p being limited to the sigma_1
>>>> (semi-computable) arithmetical sentences.
>>> I don't think I understand that.  You're saying that within all the UD
>>> computations there are ones that implement specific Lobian machines and
>>> their interactions with some world they are embedded in?
>> This comes from the first person indeterminacy on the computations.
>
> Every computation is a person?

That would be a category error. We can only say that a person is associated to
(infinitely many) computations, which are those bringing your state through

> What does it mean "a computation"? ...one of the threads of the UD?  or some
> state of the UD?

A thread in the UD, or anything equivalent with the sequence (on s): phi_i,s
(j), where the s is for the sth step of the computation. The UD run all phi_i,s
(j), for all, i, j, and s.

>
>> To have a probability notion, we need to define the measure one by []p &
>> <>t. (Because with the logic G we don’t have []p -> <>t, and we need the
>> “<>t” to avoid the cul-de-sac (cf the typical default hypothesis in
>> probability theory).
>>
>> The FPI is on all computations (sigma_1 sentences), but they are restricted
>> by being those implementing consistent extensions on the Löbian machine “you
>> are”.
> Consistent in what sense?  Just not proving a contradiction...how does

Löbian machine, which can be or not consistent. The FPI is on the thread which
supports the consistent extension. (“Supports”, not “is”).

> or does it mean consistent in the sense of representing a quasi-classical
> world in which the electron's spin measures either UP of DOWN but not both?

No, that is for latter, and it concerns the “consistent continuations” as seen
in the observable modes ([]p & X, with X being p, or <>p, or <>p & p), p
sigma_1. It does not mean <>p (consistent p), but <>p v p, or, <>p v p v []f.

>
>
>> There is no “world” per, only computations “rich enough” to continue
>> consistently your history (the “world” will be apparent only).
>
> So will it be apparently consistent?

Yes.

> What would it mean for it to be inconsistent?

To get a contradiction at some bottom level. To prove that 0 is equal to 1.

>   Logic is timeless so if it proves X and then it proves not-X that is a
> contradiction.  But FP experience is not timeless,  so X can be true now and
> not-X true later and there is no contradiction.

I military myself to sound (and thus automatically consistent) machine. Real
machine in real life have a non monotonic layer so that they can revise their
opinion. That is not needed to solve the mind body problem and to derive the
physical appearance from arithmetic. To interview inconsistent machine would be
like interviewing a sick people believing that he is Napoleon to study
Napoleon’s life.

>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>> Of coure, "actual state" does not refer to anything in the mind-block
>>>> picture (which is just the structure (N, 0, +, *)). The actual state is
>>>> purely phenomenological.
>>> ?? This is supposed to explain phenomenology in terms of computations.  I
>>> understand computations, like Turing machines, have states.  But I don't
>>> un```

### Re: [SUSPICIOUS MESSAGE] Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

```
> On 4 Jan 2019, at 17:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 4, 2019 at 10:02:51 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 3 Jan 2019, at 15:41, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 3, 2019 at 7:46:58 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 2 Jan 2019, at 21:09, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 2, 2019 at 1:07:37 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 2, 2019 at 12:30:22 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 2, 2019 at 8:44:36 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 30 Dec 2018, at 19:02, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Sunday, December 30, 2018 at 7:35:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 30 Dec 2018, at 08:33, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> There is no "even" or "odd" prior to the existence of matter.
>>>>
>>>> With some act of faith in some notion of matter. No problem with this,
>>>> unless this is used in conjunction with Mechanism.
>>>>
>>>> But there is a problem with this view in the foundations of physics, as
>>>> physicist presuppose numbers in their theories. That works FAPP, but is a
>>>> problem, even without mechanism, in the materialistic ontologies.
>>>>
>>>> Bruno
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> By "matter" I just mean all "the stuff" there is.
>>>
>>>
>>> That leaves unclear if that “stuff which is” is primary or not. Up to now,
>>> matter is a prediction of Mechanism, but not as stuff, more as element of
>>> (sharable) long dreams (computation seen from “inside” (to be short).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> "Numbers" are merely (human-made) language entities used in communicating
>>>
>>> I doubt less 2+2=4 than the existence of the humans. I need to assume 2+2=4
>>> to understand any experiment and theory in physics. With mechanism, we
>>> explain human from relations on which everybody (enough serious) agree on.
>>> If numbers were creation by human, why does that creation hits back so
>>> strongly? Personally, I tend to believe that elementary arithmetical
>>> statement, provable or not, are true independently of us. Matter, human’s
>>> psychology, etc… needs a simpler explanation than simply assuming them.
>>>
>>> All what Mechanism needs to assume is one (any one) universal machine or
>>> machinery.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The relationship between mathematics and matter (or, really, between math
>>> and science) - Why does math work so well? - the ‘indispensability
>>> question’ - is discussed in depth:
>>>
>>> SEP: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/
>>> <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/>
>>> IEP:  https://www.iep.utm.edu/mathfict/ <https://www.iep.utm.edu/mathfict/>
>>>
>>> I wrote a post on a my 'cheap' version:
>>>
>>> Mathematical pulp fictionalism
>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/08/26/mathematical-pulp-fictionalism/
>>> <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/08/26/mathematical-pulp-fictionalism/>
>>>
>>> I have no reason to believe that all of mathematics (numbers, ...,
>>> (mathematical) Turing machines, ...) is nothing more than language - which
>>> is something generated by material beings.
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I have no reason to believe that all of mathematics (numbers, ...,
>>> (mathematical) Turing machines, ...) is anything more than language - which
>>> is something generated by material beings.
>>>
>>>
>>> I caught that!
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>>
>>> When one thinks of "1+1=2", "|+|=||", etc. one thinks of, say, "There's a
>>> stick and another stick side by side. What do you call that?"
>>>
>>> Where do people get the idea that there are  numbers in heaven that they
>>```

### Re: "No black-hole singularities" in an undated loop-quantum-gravity theory

```

> On 4 Jan 2019, at 19:35, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/4/2019 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 05:16, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 1/3/2019 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> As a scientist, I just count the evidences, and evaluate the plausibility
>>>> of the big picture proposed.I predicted the many-world appearances much
>>>> before I realised the physicists were already open to this for empirical
>>>> reason. Once you understand that there are infinitely many computations
>>>> going through you actual state,
>>> What does it mean "your actual state"?   How is it defined within the UD?
>>
>> It is defined indexically, like in a block universe, but in a more precise
>> way through the Gödel number of a Löbian machine in the []p & X modes (with
>> X in {p, <>t, <>t & p}, p being limited to the sigma_1 (semi-computable)
>> arithmetical sentences.
>
> I don't think I understand that.  You're saying that within all the UD
> computations there are ones that implement specific Lobian machines and their
> interactions with some world they are embedded in?

This comes from the first person indeterminacy on the computations. To have a
probability notion, we need to define the measure one by []p & <>t. (Because
with the logic G we don’t have []p -> <>t, and we need the “<>t” to avoid the
cul-de-sac (cf the typical default hypothesis in probability theory).

The FPI is on all computations (sigma_1 sentences), but they are restricted by
being those implementing consistent extensions on the Löbian machine “you are”.
There is no “world” per, only computations “rich enough” to continue
consistently your history (the “world” will be apparent only).

>
>>
>> Of coure, "actual state" does not refer to anything in the mind-block
>> picture (which is just the structure (N, 0, +, *)). The actual state is
>> purely phenomenological.
>
> ?? This is supposed to explain phenomenology in terms of computations.  I
> understand computations, like Turing machines, have states.  But I don't
> understand these "actual states”.

I am not sure to understand your problem here. All mind state are actual from
the first person point of view. The definition of “[]p” is already an
indexical, and you can add axioms like “I am in Helsinki” or “I am in
Washington”, which change the actual state/machine (but G and G* still applies
to them). The phenomenologies are given by the hypostases. The physical
phenomenologies is given by the sigma_1 sentences structured by the mode of
each “material” hypostases (the one given by the X above).

>
>> We cannot define it in any 3p terms. It is pure 1p, but with mechanism,
>
> But the idea is to explain 1p experience in 3p terms, i.e. in terms of
> computations.

At the meta level only. We can define, like Theaetetus, knowledge (which is 1p)
by “[]p & p”, but only because we limit ourself, non constructively, to sound
machine. The machine itself cannot do that: “[]p & p” cannot be define in the
language of the machine, for reason similar as the fact that they cannot define
truth.

This explains why the 1p “I” has to look non definable by each concerned entity
indexically, and non constructively, to the machine, if you are OK to define
consciousness by (immediate, with <>t) knowable, indubitable, but also non
rationally justifiable (provable) and non definable. Consciousness is just the
name we give to that personal feeling.

You see that consciousness has no 3p definition from the machine’s point of
view. But “we”, who knows that the machine is sound (because we limit ourself
to such machine) can know and prove this. The machine can do the same about any
machine supposed to be correct.

>
>
>> its (meta) logic is captured by the (3p describable if the machine assumes
>> Mechanism) material mode.
>> We know that intuitively: the actual state of the guy in Moscow is “I am in
>> Moscow”, and the actual state of the guy in Washington is “I am in
>> Washington”. Both are correct, but as everyone know (except John
>> apparently), both the W and M guys  feel their actual state as being very
>> different of the mental state of their counterpart.
>
> The trouble with that explanation is that you have jumped from description in
> terms of a UD, to a description in terms of a world with Washington and
> Moscow and a duplicating machine.  Leaving a chasm of explanation between the
> two.

Which chasm? Keep in mind that (at the meta-level) we assume```

### Re: [SUSPICIOUS MESSAGE] Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

```
> On 3 Jan 2019, at 15:41, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 3, 2019 at 7:46:58 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 2 Jan 2019, at 21:09, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, January 2, 2019 at 1:07:37 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, January 2, 2019 at 12:30:22 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, January 2, 2019 at 8:44:36 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 30 Dec 2018, at 19:02, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, December 30, 2018 at 7:35:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 30 Dec 2018, at 08:33, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>>
>>>> There is no "even" or "odd" prior to the existence of matter.
>>>
>>> With some act of faith in some notion of matter. No problem with this,
>>> unless this is used in conjunction with Mechanism.
>>>
>>> But there is a problem with this view in the foundations of physics, as
>>> physicist presuppose numbers in their theories. That works FAPP, but is a
>>> problem, even without mechanism, in the materialistic ontologies.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> By "matter" I just mean all "the stuff" there is.
>>
>>
>> That leaves unclear if that “stuff which is” is primary or not. Up to now,
>> matter is a prediction of Mechanism, but not as stuff, more as element of
>> (sharable) long dreams (computation seen from “inside” (to be short).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> "Numbers" are merely (human-made) language entities used in communicating
>>
>> I doubt less 2+2=4 than the existence of the humans. I need to assume 2+2=4
>> to understand any experiment and theory in physics. With mechanism, we
>> explain human from relations on which everybody (enough serious) agree on.
>> If numbers were creation by human, why does that creation hits back so
>> strongly? Personally, I tend to believe that elementary arithmetical
>> statement, provable or not, are true independently of us. Matter, human’s
>> psychology, etc… needs a simpler explanation than simply assuming them.
>>
>> All what Mechanism needs to assume is one (any one) universal machine or
>> machinery.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> The relationship between mathematics and matter (or, really, between math
>> and science) - Why does math work so well? - the ‘indispensability question’
>> - is discussed in depth:
>>
>> SEP: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/
>> <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/>
>> IEP:  https://www.iep.utm.edu/mathfict/ <https://www.iep.utm.edu/mathfict/>
>>
>> I wrote a post on a my 'cheap' version:
>>
>> Mathematical pulp fictionalism
>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/08/26/mathematical-pulp-fictionalism/
>> <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/08/26/mathematical-pulp-fictionalism/>
>>
>> I have no reason to believe that all of mathematics (numbers, ...,
>> (mathematical) Turing machines, ...) is nothing more than language - which
>> is something generated by material beings.
>>
>> - pt
>>
>>
>>
>> I have no reason to believe that all of mathematics (numbers, ...,
>> (mathematical) Turing machines, ...) is anything more than language - which
>> is something generated by material beings.
>>
>>
>> I caught that!
>>
>> - pt
>>
>>
>> When one thinks of "1+1=2", "|+|=||", etc. one thinks of, say, "There's a
>> stick and another stick side by side. What do you call that?"
>>
>> Where do people get the idea that there are  numbers in heaven that they are
>
> When we assume digital mechanism, only numbers (or equivalent) can think, and
> get deluded in confusing the (quite real) physical appearance, with an
> ontological being.
>
> The idea that mathematics is just language does not make sense to me.
>
> It is a confusion between “2+2=4” and the fact that 2+2=4.
>
> Once a mathematical realm is enough to possess Turing universal numbers, it
> kicks strongly back, and indeed such a realm is not amenable completely to
> *any* theory or language.
>
> The mathematical theorie```

### Re: "No black-hole singularities" in an undated loop-quantum-gravity theory

```

> On 4 Jan 2019, at 05:16, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/3/2019 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> As a scientist, I just count the evidences, and evaluate the plausibility of
>> the big picture proposed.I predicted the many-world appearances much before
>> I realised the physicists were already open to this for empirical reason.
>> Once you understand that there are infinitely many computations going
>> through you actual state,
>
> What does it mean "your actual state"?   How is it defined within the UD?

It is defined indexically, like in a block universe, but in a more precise way
through the Gödel number of a Löbian machine in the []p & X modes (with X in
{p, <>t, <>t & p}, p being limited to the sigma_1 (semi-computable)
arithmetical sentences.

Of coure, "actual state" does not refer to anything in the mind-block picture
(which is just the structure (N, 0, +, *)). The actual state is purely
phenomenological. We cannot define it in any 3p terms. It is pure 1p, but with
mechanism, its (meta) logic is captured by the (3p describable if the machine
assumes Mechanism) material mode.
We know that intuitively: the actual state of the guy in Moscow is “I am in
Moscow”, and the actual state of the guy in Washington is “I am in Washington”.
Both are correct, but as everyone know (except John apparently), both the W and
M guys  feel their actual state as being very different of the mental state of
their counterpart.

All indexicals are treated directly or indirectly with Kleene’s second
recursion theorem. Like G and G* are shown arithmetically complete by using
that theorem, or its equivalent formal version (Gödel diagonal lemma).

Bruno

>
> Brent
>
>> you can understand that we have to see the trace of those computations when
>> looking at ourself at a finer grained level than our substitution level.
>> Then the rest is math, and more quantitative predictions.
>
> --
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```

### Re: "No black-hole singularities" in an undated loop-quantum-gravity theory

```
> On 3 Jan 2019, at 02:26, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, January 2, 2019 at 12:18:50 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 30 Dec 2018, at 18:56, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, December 30, 2018 at 12:10:12 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> > On 24 Dec 2018, at 16:29, Mason Green > wrote:
>> >
>> > David Deutsch suggested something like this I (that individual universes
>> > are discrete, but the multiverse as a whole is continuous).
>> >
>> > “within each universe all observable quantities are discrete, but the
>> > multiverse as a whole is a continuum. When the equations of quantum theory
>> > describe a continuous but not-directly-observable transition between two
>> > values of a discrete quantity, what they are telling us is that the
>> > transition does not take place entirely within one universe. So perhaps
>> > the price of continuous motion is not an infinity of consecutive actions,
>> > but an infinity of concurrent actions taking place across the multiverse.”
>> > January, 2001 The Discrete and the Continuous
>>
>> This is consistent with Digital Mechanism, and plausibly mandatory too. The
>> computations evolves discretly, vertically in the universal computational
>> deployment (the tiny sigma_1 arithmetic), but the first person indeterminacy
>> is horizontal and takes into account infinitely many computations. But the
>> precise topology and cardinality remains open problems.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>> Applying this to a horse race, one not only gets dIscrete multiple
>> universes, one for each horse as the winner,
>
> Why? I don’t see this. Horses could be classical machine, in which case the
> same horse is the winner in all, or quasi-all universes.
>
> You believe that everything that's possible to happen, must happen; ergo Many
> Worlds.

I prove that all computations are run in arithmetic, with relative proportion,
handled by the math of self)-reference.

I don’t believe in any world, nor even that the notion of (physical) world make
sense, at least when using my working hypothesis.

I do not assume a physical world, nor a physical theory. That is what we have
to explain.

> Horses are classical objects, so you can reject this example of the fallacy
> in your thinking by modeling a situation with similar outcomes in a quantum
> setting. AG

In this case, I was (temporally, for the sake of the discussion) assuming the
SWE, but nothing more.

>>  but assuming space is continuous, an additional uncountable set of
>> universes for each winner, where the losers have different positions when
>> the winner crosses the finish end line. This is not only beautiful. but
>> utterly sublime. Wouldn't you agree? AG
>
> Yes, the multiplication would occur (assuming space continuous). But the same
> horse would still be the winner, except perhaps if two horses are so close
> that in some universe another one wins the race, due to that location
> superposition. Yet, if the horse behaves classically, with respect to their
> muscular force and strategy, the winner will be the same in some majority
> (say) of worlds. That is a good thing, as it makes it possible for large
> creature to have a partial control on their destiny, and take a lift instead
> of jumping through a window. Of course such a classical appearance have to be
> explained from the quantum formalism, and with mechanism, such quantum
> formalism has to be justified from the statistics on many computations (of
> all types).
>
> If you recast the horse race in a quantum context, which shouldn't be too
> difficult, you will see that your *bias* that all things which are possible
> to happen, MUST happen, leads to an absurdity. Try this; imagine several
> electrons fired simultaneously, and the winner is the one which lands at the
> positive extremity. No broken legs here, but I think one could massage this
> model to include that as well. AG

Yes, but that would be like, prior to the horse race, of putting them
explicitly in a superposition state, like giving them some drugs according to
some quantum choice. But without that, QM will predict the same horse will win
in all “quasi-classical” reality.

As a scientist, I just count the evidences, and evaluate the plausibility of
the big picture proposed.I predicted the many-world appearances much before I
realised the physicists were already open to this for empirical reason. Once
you understand that there are infinitely many computations going through you
actual state, you can understand that we have to see the trace of those
computations ```

### Re: [SUSPICIOUS MESSAGE] Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

```
> On 2 Jan 2019, at 21:09, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, January 2, 2019 at 1:07:37 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> On Wednesday, January 2, 2019 at 12:30:22 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> On Wednesday, January 2, 2019 at 8:44:36 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 30 Dec 2018, at 19:02, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, December 30, 2018 at 7:35:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 30 Dec 2018, at 08:33, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>
>>> There is no "even" or "odd" prior to the existence of matter.
>>
>> With some act of faith in some notion of matter. No problem with this,
>> unless this is used in conjunction with Mechanism.
>>
>> But there is a problem with this view in the foundations of physics, as
>> physicist presuppose numbers in their theories. That works FAPP, but is a
>> problem, even without mechanism, in the materialistic ontologies.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> By "matter" I just mean all "the stuff" there is.
>
>
> That leaves unclear if that “stuff which is” is primary or not. Up to now,
> matter is a prediction of Mechanism, but not as stuff, more as element of
> (sharable) long dreams (computation seen from “inside” (to be short).
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> "Numbers" are merely (human-made) language entities used in communicating
>
> I doubt less 2+2=4 than the existence of the humans. I need to assume 2+2=4
> to understand any experiment and theory in physics. With mechanism, we
> explain human from relations on which everybody (enough serious) agree on. If
> numbers were creation by human, why does that creation hits back so strongly?
> Personally, I tend to believe that elementary arithmetical statement,
> provable or not, are true independently of us. Matter, human’s psychology,
> etc… needs a simpler explanation than simply assuming them.
>
> All what Mechanism needs to assume is one (any one) universal machine or
> machinery.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> The relationship between mathematics and matter (or, really, between math and
> science) - Why does math work so well? - the ‘indispensability question’ - is
> discussed in depth:
>
> SEP: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/
> <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/>
> IEP:  https://www.iep.utm.edu/mathfict/ <https://www.iep.utm.edu/mathfict/>
>
> I wrote a post on a my 'cheap' version:
>
> Mathematical pulp fictionalism
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/08/26/mathematical-pulp-fictionalism/
> <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/08/26/mathematical-pulp-fictionalism/>
>
> I have no reason to believe that all of mathematics (numbers, ...,
> (mathematical) Turing machines, ...) is nothing more than language - which is
> something generated by material beings.
>
> - pt
>
>
>
> I have no reason to believe that all of mathematics (numbers, ...,
> (mathematical) Turing machines, ...) is anything more than language - which
> is something generated by material beings.
>
>
> I caught that!
>
> - pt
>
>
> When one thinks of "1+1=2", "|+|=||", etc. one thinks of, say, "There's a
> stick and another stick side by side. What do you call that?"
>
> Where do people get the idea that there are  numbers in heaven that they are

When we assume digital mechanism, only numbers (or equivalent) can think, and
get deluded in confusing the (quite real) physical appearance, with an
ontological being.

The idea that mathematics is just language does not make sense to me.

It is a confusion between “2+2=4” and the fact that 2+2=4.

Once a mathematical realm is enough to possess Turing universal numbers, it
kicks strongly back, and indeed such a realm is not amenable completely to
*any* theory or language.

The mathematical theories used language, and are limited by the language to get
the whole truth, which shows that such a truth is fundamentally above language
and larger than syntactical or mechanical construction.
The beauty, is that once a universal machine is Löbienne, like when believing
in sufficiently powerful induction axioms, the machine get aware of its own
limitations with respect to some truth. That is how and why they develop
religion, i.e. a conception of reality with the idea that such a reality is
beyond their rational means, but not necessarily beyond personal reflection and
personal experience.

With mechanism, we have the pro```

### Re: [SUSPICIOUS MESSAGE] Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

```

> On 31 Dec 2018, at 02:37, Russell Standish  wrote:
>
> On Sat, Dec 29, 2018 at 09:02:26AM -0800, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 12/29/2018 1:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> I use number because people are more familiar with them. Most people can
>>> easily conceived that “17 is odd” is true independently of them, but
>>> would have an harder time to conceive that KKK=K independent of them,
>>> even if this does not mean much more than the first (left) projection of
>>> (K, K) is K.
>>
>> That's a good example.  People would immediately recognize that KKK=K is
>> just a convention.  They are deceived that "17 is odd" is an eternal truth
>> independent of human thought because they generalize from their experience
>> with physically countable things.
>>
>> Brent
>
> This would be a dry argument if instead we simply insisted that all
> that is fundamental is a universal machine and all its
> computations. That immediately bootstraps the Robinson integers
> IIUC. So in a way - integer arithmetic is a convention, our convention
> if you like, for looking at computations.

We can see it that way. I have illustrated this recently in showing how the
combinators laws

Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)

Entails the existence of numbers and their addition and multiplication laws.
And of course, that was just a step when showing that S and K are Turing
universal.

All what a (digital) mechanist needs to assume is one universal machinery. The
rest is either redundant, or contradictory.

I use numbers because it is the “universal system” better known by most, even
if many ignore that (N,0,+,*) is Turing universal, which is not entirely
obvious to show, but was shown implicitly in Gödel 1931, and explicitly by
Church, Post, Turing, Kleene and others in the following decade.

Bruno

>
>
> --
>
>
> Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au
>
>
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### Re: [SUSPICIOUS MESSAGE] Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

```
> On 30 Dec 2018, at 19:02, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 30, 2018 at 7:35:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 30 Dec 2018, at 08:33, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>> There is no "even" or "odd" prior to the existence of matter.
>
> With some act of faith in some notion of matter. No problem with this, unless
> this is used in conjunction with Mechanism.
>
> But there is a problem with this view in the foundations of physics, as
> physicist presuppose numbers in their theories. That works FAPP, but is a
> problem, even without mechanism, in the materialistic ontologies.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> By "matter" I just mean all "the stuff" there is.

That leaves unclear if that “stuff which is” is primary or not. Up to now,
matter is a prediction of Mechanism, but not as stuff, more as element of
(sharable) long dreams (computation seen from “inside” (to be short).

>
> "Numbers" are merely (human-made) language entities used in communicating

I doubt less 2+2=4 than the existence of the humans. I need to assume 2+2=4 to
understand any experiment and theory in physics. With mechanism, we explain
human from relations on which everybody (enough serious) agree on. If numbers
were creation by human, why does that creation hits back so strongly?
Personally, I tend to believe that elementary arithmetical statement, provable
or not, are true independently of us. Matter, human’s psychology, etc… needs a
simpler explanation than simply assuming them.

All what Mechanism needs to assume is one (any one) universal machine or
machinery.

Bruno

>
> - pt
>
> --
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### Re: "No black-hole singularities" in an undated loop-quantum-gravity theory

```
> On 30 Dec 2018, at 18:56, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 30, 2018 at 12:10:12 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > On 24 Dec 2018, at 16:29, Mason Green >
> > wrote:
> >
> > David Deutsch suggested something like this I (that individual universes
> > are discrete, but the multiverse as a whole is continuous).
> >
> > “within each universe all observable quantities are discrete, but the
> > multiverse as a whole is a continuum. When the equations of quantum theory
> > describe a continuous but not-directly-observable transition between two
> > values of a discrete quantity, what they are telling us is that the
> > transition does not take place entirely within one universe. So perhaps the
> > price of continuous motion is not an infinity of consecutive actions, but
> > an infinity of concurrent actions taking place across the multiverse.”
> > January, 2001 The Discrete and the Continuous
>
> This is consistent with Digital Mechanism, and plausibly mandatory too. The
> computations evolves discretly, vertically in the universal computational
> deployment (the tiny sigma_1 arithmetic), but the first person indeterminacy
> is horizontal and takes into account infinitely many computations. But the
> precise topology and cardinality remains open problems.
>
> Bruno
>
> Applying this to a horse race, one not only gets dIscrete multiple universes,
> one for each horse as the winner,

Why? I don’t see this. Horses could be classical machine, in which case the
same horse is the winner in all, or quasi-all universes.

>  but assuming space is continuous, an additional uncountable set of universes
> for each winner, where the losers have different positions when the winner
> crosses the finish end line. This is not only beautiful. but utterly sublime.
> Wouldn't you agree? AG

Yes, the multiplication would occur (assuming space continuous). But the same
horse would still be the winner, except perhaps if two horses are so close that
in some universe another one wins the race, due to that location superposition.
Yet, if the horse behaves classically, with respect to their muscular force and
strategy, the winner will be the same in some majority (say) of worlds. That is
a good thing, as it makes it possible for large creature to have a partial
control on their destiny, and take a lift instead of jumping through a window.
Of course such a classical appearance have to be explained from the quantum
formalism, and with mechanism, such quantum formalism has to be justified from
the statistics on many computations (of all types).

Bruno

>
>
>
> >
> > --
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```

### Re: The structure of the world from pure numbers

```
> On 29 Dec 2018, at 15:33, Lawrence Crowell
> wrote:
>
> I urge caution with anything Tipler writes. In looking at this paper it is
> clearly long, but at least not mathematically dense. I am not sure what he
> means in the abstract by saying the CMBR is SU(2)_L.
>
> If you want to look at ideas that connect mathematics and number theory to
> physics I would consider the Langlands program. Also the partition of
> integers by Brunier and Ono, how many ways can the integer N be derived by
> the addition of smaller integers, leads to mock Ramanjuan forms and ways that
> quantum states may be integrated in partition functions or path integrals. I
> think the fundamental set of quantum state have some Godel number
> relationship with the zeros of the Riemann zeta function.

String theory has also deep relations with Number theory, and the physical
smells in every part of Number theory. The boson string theory can be use to
make new original proof in Number theory.

I suspect that the distribution of the prime numbers might encapsulate the
whole Turing complexity of numbers, and that could, if RH is correct, makes the
zeros of Riemann zeta function into the spectrum of a universal quantum
dovetailer.  The Riemann zeta function is already able to emulate all
analytical functions in subparts of its domain (a result obtained by Voronin).

Yet, to get the qualia, it is better to derive this from the self-reference
logic.

Integers partition is a fascinating subject indeed. Probably more easy than the
Langlands program.

Knot theory is also very important to study the role of math in physics,
independently of mechanism.
With mechanism, knot theory should emerge from some “Reidemester moves” hidden
(I suppose) in the grading of the material hypostases (as we get an infinity of
similar, but different quantum logics, with the []^n p & <>^m t variants.

Bruno

>
> LC
>
> On Friday, December 28, 2018 at 11:16:09 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> Frank Tipler wrote this 2005 paper, I am curious if others are familiar with
> it, and what your thoughts on it are:
>
>
>
>
> I found it to be quite interesting. He claims that the dream of quantum
> gravity eliminating infinities from the standard model cannot succeed, and
> also that the entropy of the initial conditions of the universe was zero.
>
> Jason
>
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### Re: [SUSPICIOUS MESSAGE] Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

```
> On 30 Dec 2018, at 08:33, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, December 29, 2018 at 5:32:52 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
> On 12/29/2018 2:44 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, December 29, 2018 at 3:39:25 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 12/29/2018 12:50 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, December 29, 2018 at 11:02:30 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/29/2018 1:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> > I use number because people are more familiar with them. Most people
>>> > can easily conceived that “17 is odd” is true independently of them,
>>> > but would have an harder time to conceive that KKK=K independent of
>>> > them, even if this does not mean much more than the first (left)
>>> > projection of (K, K) is K.
>>>
>>> That's a good example.  People would immediately recognize that KKK=K is
>>> just a convention.  They are deceived that "17 is odd" is an eternal
>>> truth independent of human thought because they generalize from their
>>> experience with physically countable things.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>>> I was thinking that if there is a group X of objects of the same mass, if X
>>> can be split into two groups A and B separated by a distance such that A
>>> and B pull (gravitate towards) each other equally, then X is even.
>>
>> Forces are equal and opposite (from conservation of momentum) no matter how
>> the objects are grouped.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>> (or something like that)
>>>
>>> So gravity knows even and odd. :)
>>>
>>> - pt
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I thought gravity could tell the difference between even and odd, like there
>> is no way to separate an odd number of pennies on a balance scale [
>> https://www.mathsisfun.com/definitions/balance-scales.html
>> <https://www.mathsisfun.com/definitions/balance-scales.html> ] and have the
>> scales be in balance.
>
> OK.  That's comparing the attraction to a third body (the Earth) not into two
> groups that gravitate toward each other.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
>
> Anyway, my main point of the example of course:
>
> There is no "even" or "odd" prior to the existence of matter.

With some act of faith in some notion of matter. No problem with this, unless
this is used in conjunction with Mechanism.

But there is a problem with this view in the foundations of physics, as
physicist presuppose numbers in their theories. That works FAPP, but is a
problem, even without mechanism, in the materialistic ontologies.

Bruno

>
> - pt
>
> --
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```

### Re: [SUSPICIOUS MESSAGE] Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

```

> On 29 Dec 2018, at 18:02, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/29/2018 1:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> I use number because people are more familiar with them. Most people can
>> easily conceived that “17 is odd” is true independently of them, but would
>> have an harder time to conceive that KKK=K independent of them, even if this
>> does not mean much more than the first (left) projection of (K, K) is K.
>
> That's a good example.  People would immediately recognize that KKK=K is just
> a convention.

But it is not. The notation, the context, and the choice of the domain of
interest are human, and sometimes conventional, but that is true in all
domains. I can study the moon, or Saturn, …

If I use the theory of combinators, I can prove that 17 is odd, using only
standard definitions.
If I use the theory of numbers, I can prove that KKK = K, using only standard
definitions.

(I could say more when I explain what is a model/reality for the combianators,
with examples).

>   They are deceived that "17 is odd" is an eternal truth independent of human
> thought because they generalize from their experience with physically
> countable things.

"17 is odd" is just a trivial mathematical fact, out of the category of time
and space.

Bruno

>
> Brent
>
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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 29 Dec 2018, at 21:28, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/29/2018 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 24 Dec 2018, at 20:45, Brent Meeker >> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/24/2018 5:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 24 Dec 2018, at 00:23, Brent Meeker >>>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 12/23/2018 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 22 Dec 2018, at 23:08, Brent Meeker >>>>>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 12/21/2018 10:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> With Mechanism, physics has to be the same for all “observers” aka
>>>>>>>> universal machines, and indeed physics has to be independent of the
>>>>>>>> initial theory (phi_independent, or “machine independent” in the sense
>>>>>>>> of theoretical computer scientist (recursion theory does not depend on
>>>>>>>> which universal machinery we talk about).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Indeed, physics becomes simply the “measure one expectation” of the
>>>>>>>> universal machine on all computations going through (any) of its
>>>>>>>> states. All the rest will be contingent and can be called geographical
>>>>>>>> and/or historical. Our mundane consciousness requires long and deep
>>>>>>>> histories.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So what expectation has measure 1.0?  Can you show that it includes
>>>>>>> conservation of energy-momentum for example?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You should revise the basics. The answer is no of course. There is not
>>>>>> yet energy, physical time, … It is not even on the horizon.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Soling the mind body is not simple. But physics as metaphysics is simply
>>>>>> wrong with mechanism, so to solve the mind body problem, there is no
>>>>>> other choice, unless you know a better theory, of course.
>>>>>
>>>>> Of course there are other choices: (1)  Mechanism is wrong
>>>>
>>>> Sure. That is what we can test. It fits well the fact until now, unlike
>>>> the materialist metaphysics.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> (2) Your argument is wrong
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Of course, that remains always a possibility, but you cannot assume this,
>>>> you have to find the mistake.
>>>
>>> One mistake is in inferring from the possibility of "accidental"
>>> implementations of computations instantiating conscious thoughts that no
>>> physical implementation is required at all.
>>
>> That is equivalent with the creationist critic of the theory of evolution.
>> They could say that the mistake is in inferring from the possibility of
>> “accidental” implementations of computations in a physical reality
>> instantiating conscious thoughts that no God intervention if required at all.
>>
>> The mistake done here by the creationist or the materialist  is in invoking
>> an ontological commitment to avoid testing a simpler (shorter) theory which
>> avoids that ontological commitment..
>
> It's not a commitment.  It's an empirical observation.

I don’t think so. Physicist measure numbers, and correlate them in extrapolated
mathematical relation; with diverse possible interpretations (as QM illustrates
well). An ontology always ask for some faith.

>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> Another is supposing that an "ideal machine" that knows/believes/proves
>>> every theorem of arithmetic is a reasonable model of conscious thought.
>>
>>
>> It is not a model/theory of conscious thought. It is just that any sound
>> digital machine looking inward discovers immediate indubitable (and thus
>> knowable) truth which are non sharable,
>
> If they are knowable, why aren't they sharable?  You seem to be trapped by
> identifying know=provab```

### Re: [SUSPICIOUS MESSAGE] [SUSPICIOUS MESSAGE] Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

```
> On 29 Dec 2018, at 11:55, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, December 29, 2018 at 3:58:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 27 Dec 2018, at 21:57, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>> What if conventional mathematics itself is in error by assuming its primary
>> elements are numbers?
>
> Conventional mathematics is informal. It does not assume primary notion. Now,
> numbers are implicitly accepted as elementary notion, but so are finite sets,
> combination, strings of symbols, etc.
>
> With mechanism, all you need to assume explicitly is one universal machinery.
> If you use the comboantors S and K, the numbers can be defined, like with
> Barendrecht numbers VfI, Vf(VfI), Vf(Vf(VfI))), … as I have illustrated
> recently in the Combinator Thread, or like with Church’s numbers, etc.
> We could have used the Game-of-Life Patterns, or the lambda expression, or a
> von Neuman (virtual) machine, etc.
>
> I use number because people are more familiar with them. Most people can
> easily conceived that “17 is odd” is true independently of them, but would
> have an harder time to conceive that KKK=K independent of them, even if this
> does not mean much more than the first (left) projection of (K, K) is K.
>
>
>> (There is arguably something to category/type theory that maybe gets away
>> from this.)
>>
>>
>> What if primary elements include/are non-numbers - (qualitative*)
>> experiences?
>
> I do not conceive easily that the qualitative can be primary. It is like
> starting from the mystery (qualia, consciousness) to explain the simple
> With mechanism, the qualitative requires some machinery (neurons,
> transistors, or numbers, or finite sets, symbols, etc.).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>> *
>
>> HUMANA.MENTE Journal of Philosophical Studies
>> Vol 9 No 31 (2016)
>> <http://secure-web.cisco.com/1CkaiNXRGzWchgHfNBqNKroaJrcns3uH0YBtGTrkZD2KTsb3sVBMlhrDHl29E706AuB3SwsD0fvRH4NqYnmzUIXofMpNU6E_x9GT48hIfbo0m0KcBuqAL_-1QKMKQUg14jqK7ytvHouTxK0qdeTbt--vTzwJvORikO4Valawnv_-xtgkN5DLUaQy6efIJvrmDOLAjFJgb1n0YbDJwveNMQPhpIP1UeJAn-HiAB4GekvkC8cuhPriDLNfSjaMBaQGe/http%3A%2F%2Fwww.humanamente.eu%2Findex.php%2FHM%2Fissue%2Fview%2F23>:
>>  The Enactive Approach to Qualitative Ontology: In Search of New Categories
>>
>> Introduction
>> <https://secure-web.cisco.com/1k7nAyNFY-mc26iFQjBROVBdnvhU6d9dhNsc4YlGN27WCP23XO9pYsD568zs_bF0F8R80TC9xnDT8m6KZuhE-b3ZwD1RFeu-sXHdR4hZE369i3ZmBh-VWRQ6ZfjsFHozKhblgzSocdCNtJ9GI1b7OKvCurFfGJ6UjydKlb4UtrE-bzIh9xw9G-ZAF-Q923Fc8rahqnQDAoRUVHieGeiBmXdSsmPDbExFuxSTVQVWhqiyfJNlSmvHZA4u30po8TGIs/https%3A%2F%2Fphilarchive.org%2Farchive%2FPACITT>:
>> – the enactive approach opposes the Cartesian bifurcation of reality into
>> psychological and physical
>> – complements quantitative categories, offering a mathematical treatment of
>> qualitative aspects of reality
>>
>>
>
>
> In  "the qualitative requires some machinery (neurons, transistors, or
> numbers, or finite sets, symbols, etc.)":
>
> Neurons and transistors are typically seen as being made of matter -
> chemicals, atoms, etc. -

They are made of matter, but that does not mean that such a matter is required,
and indeed, computation are realised without matter too, in any Turing complete
reality (like the sigma_1 segment of the arithmetical truth).

If some matter play some role, either that role is Turing emulable, and this
means that we have to refine the the choice of the mechanist substitution
level, or that is not possible, but that would mean there is no substitution
level, and that we are infinite non computable entities, and we can’t say yes
to the digitalist surgeon (and thus mechanism would be wrong).

> whereas numbers, finite sets, symbols are something else (whatever
> mathematical ontology one has).

Well, yes, they are immaterial entities. Elementary ideas, if you want; but
simpler than anything else. All scientists agrees on use and meaning (which is
actually part of the mystery, but here the math shows that we have to assume
them: universal entities cannot be derived from non universal one.

>
> But matter itself has psychical (in addition to physical/numerical)
> constituents, according to the "enactive approach" (above).

I have never see an evidence for primary matter, and I don’t see what it could
mean that such primary matter can have psychical ability.

Maybe you could try to tell me what you mean by “matter”, so that I can make

I am not asking a metaphysical question. I am just trying to understand what
you mean by “matter”.

Bruno

>
> - pt
>
>
>
>```

### Re: The structure of the world from pure numbers

```
> On 28 Dec 2018, at 18:15, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> Frank Tipler wrote this 2005 paper, I am curious if others are familiar with
> it, and what your thoughts on it are:
>
>
>
>
> I found it to be quite interesting. He claims that the dream of quantum
> gravity eliminating infinities from the standard model cannot succeed, and
> also that the entropy of the initial conditions of the universe was zero.

Nice find. I was not aware of that paper. Tipler is usually rather good. Of
course, he is blinded by the beauty, and seems unaware of the mystery (the
mind-body problem). Numbers have qualitative intensional feature, as we know
since Gödel, and that has to be taken into account in metaphysics. (And should
be intuitively obvious for a mechanist who does not throw away consciousness
and persons). Yet, there is a nice mind-openness to Plato, and that is nice. I
will dig more on the paper later probably. The approach is still rather
physicalist.

Bruno

>
> Jason
>
> --
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```

### Re: "No black-hole singularities" in an undated loop-quantum-gravity theory

```

> On 24 Dec 2018, at 16:29, Mason Green  wrote:
>
> David Deutsch suggested something like this I (that individual universes are
> discrete, but the multiverse as a whole is continuous).
>
> “within each universe all observable quantities are discrete, but the
> multiverse as a whole is a continuum. When the equations of quantum theory
> describe a continuous but not-directly-observable transition between two
> values of a discrete quantity, what they are telling us is that the
> transition does not take place entirely within one universe. So perhaps the
> price of continuous motion is not an infinity of consecutive actions, but an
> infinity of concurrent actions taking place across the multiverse.” January,
> 2001 The Discrete and the Continuous

This is consistent with Digital Mechanism, and plausibly mandatory too. The
computations evolves discretly, vertically in the universal computational
deployment (the tiny sigma_1 arithmetic), but the first person indeterminacy is
horizontal and takes into account infinitely many computations. But the precise
topology and cardinality remains open problems.

Bruno

>
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```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 23 Dec 2018, at 21:28, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 11:18:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 21 Dec 2018, at 19:05, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 11:12:18 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 21 Dec 2018, at 01:07, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, December 20, 2018 at 3:40:53 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 3:13 AM Bruno Marchal > wrote:
>>>
>>> Is not 333’s oddness timeless?
>>>
>>> Category error.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On category error:
>>>
>>> I've never understood "category error" [
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_mistake
>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_mistake> ]. (Some philosopher I
>>> read about recently gave a talk on the non-existence of category errors.
>>> Good.)
>>>
>>> Is 333's oddness timeless? is a perfectly reasonable question.
>>>
>>> To the immaterialist, the answer could be "yes".
>>> To the materialist, the answer could not be "no”.
>>
>> That makes sense only if the materialist describe how 333 depends on time.
>> But then I suppose he has a different definition than the usual one, and
>> that requires clarification.
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> It all depends.
>>>
>>> There is a type of dualists who say 333 is one category (nonphysical) and
>>> time (as in spacetime) is in another category (physical), but this dualism
>>> is just mixed-up confusion to me.
>>
>> And to me to. But I guess you defends a materialist monism. That contradicts
>> Mechanism.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Gilbert Ryle's initial rendition of "category error" (about mind) stands in
>>> contradiction to Galen Strawson on that topic.
>>
>> The problem with the materialist is that they need to make consciousness
>> into an illusion, and that is already jeopardise by the Cartesian Cogito. As
>> I said, it is easier to explain the illusion of matter to a conscious being
>> (especially if he remembers its dream) than to explain the illusion of
>> consciousness to a piece of matter. Now, once we work in the Digital
>> Mechanist frame, things get clearer and deeper.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>> But in 2019:
>>
>> Out: Eliminative ("Mechanistic") Materialism
>
> You use “mechanism” in his pre-Gödelian reductionist sense. After Gödel,
> reductionism is simply refuted, even the reductionist conception of numbers
> and machine, to begin with.
>
>
>
>> In:Experiential Materialism
>>
>> "I think we need to radically rethink our understanding of matter in order
>> to explain consciousness,
>
>
> Sure. Mechanism attributes souls to "numbers-in-relations” and in a testable
> way, as the laws of the observable are explained explicitly through them.
>
> And our understanding of matter is revised radically, as it becomes a product
> of the universal differentiating consciousness of the universal (Turing)
> numbers.
>
>
>
>
>> in something like the way Einstein radically rethought the nature of space
>> and time.”
>
> You can see Everett-Feynman generalising already Einstein on the quantum
> reality, and Mechanism extends this idea on the whole arithmetical reality
> (in which the Everett-Feynam part should appear, and seems to appear, as a
> sort of border/projection.
>
> No need of design, no need of designer, just the arithmetical reality as seen
> by the universal numbers of measure one minus epsilon.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>>
>> - Philip Goff [ http://www.philipgoffphilosophy.com/
>> <http://www.philipgoffphilosophy.com/> ]
>>
>
>
>
>
> If some higher-order Gödelian arithmetical process is involved in some sense
> in the making of consciousness, then it's matter that is doing it.

I don’t see evidences for this, nor theoretical reason (other than the
materialist ontological commitment, which is better to avoid in metaphysics
when we apply the scientific method.

>
> Matter and Arithmetic are like Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers.

Arithmetic is far less mysterious than mind and matter. For matter, we can say
that modern physics has made it even more mysterious. If we want a primitive
matter notion, it cannot be boolean (like the Aristotelian```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 25 Dec 2018, at 00:54, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 1:16:36 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 24 Dec 2018, at 00:15, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 5:37:21 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 22 Dec 2018, at 03:29, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, December 22, 2018 at 2:03:06 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 8:50 PM > wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, December 22, 2018 at 1:42:06 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 11:40 AM John Clark > wrote:
>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 7:30 PM Jason Resch > wrote:
>>>
>>> >>>> The Schrodinger equation describes the quantum wave function using
>>> >>>> complex numbers, and that is not observable so it's subjective in the
>>> >>>> same way that lines of latitude and longitude are. However the square
>>> >>>> of the absolute value of the wave function is observable because that
>>> >>>> produces a probability that we can measure in the physical world that
>>> >>>> is objective, provided  anything deserves that word; but it also
>>> >>>> yields something that is not deterministic.
>>>
>>> >>> It is still deterministic.
>>>
>>> >>That depends on what "it" refers to. The quantum wave function is
>>> >>deterministic but the physical system associated with it is not.
>>>
>>> > This is incorrect.
>>>
>>> What a devastating retort, you sure put me in my place! Jason ,the
>>> Schrodinger equation is deterministic and describes the quantum wave
>>> function, but that function is an abstraction and is unobservable, to get
>>> something you can see you must square the absolute value of the wave
>>> function and that gives you the probability you will observe a particle at
>>> any spot; but Schrodinger's equation has an "i" in it , the square root of
>>> -1, and that means very different quantum wave functions can give the exact
>>> same probability distribution when you square it; remember with i you get
>>> weird stuff like i^2=i^6 =-1 and i^4=i^100=1. That's why we only get
>>> probabilities not certainties.
>>>
>>> >>> Schrodinger's equation does not say this is what happened, it just says
>>> >>> that you have ended up with a system with many sets of observers, each
>>> >>> of which observed different outcomes.
>>>
>>> >>That's what Many World's claims it means but that claim is controversial,
>>> >>but what is not controversial is the wave function the Schrodinger
>>> >>equation describes mathematically.  Consider the wave functions of these
>>> >>2 systems:
>>> 1) An  electron of velocity V starts at X  and after one second it is
>>> observed at point Y and then goes on for  another second.
>>> 2) An electron of the same velocity V starts at the same point X and then
>>> goes on for 2 seconds.
>>>
>>> The wave functions of these 2 systems are NOT the same and after you've
>>> taken the square of the absolute value of both you will find radically
>>> different probabilities about where you're likely to find the electron
>>> after 2 seconds. And as I said this is not controversial, people disagree
>>> over quantum interpretations but nobody disagrees over the mathematics, and
>>> the mathematical objects that the Schrodinger equation describes in those
>>> two systems are NOT the same.
>>>
>>> > If you model the system to be measured, and the experimenter making the
>>> > measurement, the Schrodinger wave equation tells you unambiguously the
>>> > system [...]
>>>
>>> The Schrodinger wave equation tells precisely, unambiguously and
>>> deterministically what the wave function associated with the system will be
>>> but it says nothing unambiguously about the system itself. We do know the
>>> square of the absolute value of the wave function gives us the probability
>>> of obtaining a certain value if we measure a particular aspect of the
>>> system, but other than that things become controversial. Some people (the
>>> shut up and calculate people```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 24 Dec 2018, at 20:45, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/24/2018 5:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 24 Dec 2018, at 00:23, Brent Meeker >> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/23/2018 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 22 Dec 2018, at 23:08, Brent Meeker >>>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 12/21/2018 10:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>
>>>>>> With Mechanism, physics has to be the same for all “observers” aka
>>>>>> universal machines, and indeed physics has to be independent of the
>>>>>> initial theory (phi_independent, or “machine independent” in the sense
>>>>>> of theoretical computer scientist (recursion theory does not depend on
>>>>>> which universal machinery we talk about).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Indeed, physics becomes simply the “measure one expectation” of the
>>>>>> universal machine on all computations going through (any) of its states.
>>>>>> All the rest will be contingent and can be called geographical and/or
>>>>>> historical. Our mundane consciousness requires long and deep histories.
>>>>>
>>>>> So what expectation has measure 1.0?  Can you show that it includes
>>>>> conservation of energy-momentum for example?
>>>>
>>>> You should revise the basics. The answer is no of course. There is not yet
>>>> energy, physical time, … It is not even on the horizon.
>>>>
>>>> Soling the mind body is not simple. But physics as metaphysics is simply
>>>> wrong with mechanism, so to solve the mind body problem, there is no other
>>>> choice, unless you know a better theory, of course.
>>>
>>> Of course there are other choices: (1)  Mechanism is wrong
>>
>> Sure. That is what we can test. It fits well the fact until now, unlike the
>> materialist metaphysics.
>>
>>
>>
>>> (2) Your argument is wrong
>>>
>>
>>
>> Of course, that remains always a possibility, but you cannot assume this,
>> you have to find the mistake.
>
> One mistake is in inferring from the possibility of "accidental"
> implementations of computations instantiating conscious thoughts that no
> physical implementation is required at all.

That is equivalent with the creationist critic of the theory of evolution. They
could say that the mistake is in inferring from the possibility of “accidental”
implementations of computations in a physical reality instantiating conscious
thoughts that no God intervention if required at all.

The mistake done here by the creationist or the materialist  is in invoking an
ontological commitment to avoid testing a simpler (shorter) theory which avoids
that ontological commitment..

> Another is supposing that an "ideal machine" that knows/believes/proves every
> theorem of arithmetic is a reasonable model of conscious thought.

It is not a model/theory of conscious thought. It is just that any sound
digital machine looking inward discovers immediate indubitable (and thus
knowable) truth which are non sharable, non provable and non rationally
justifiable, which explains pretty well  the “conscious” experience, without
any supplementary ontological commitment.

Bruno

>
> Brent
>
> --
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```

### Re: [SUSPICIOUS MESSAGE] Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

```
> On 27 Dec 2018, at 21:57, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, December 27, 2018 at 6:55:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 24 Dec 2018, at 14:55, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 6:55:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 23 Dec 2018, at 13:39, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 5:20:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 21 Dec 2018, at 11:06, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 3:18:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain)
>>>>
>>>> Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the
>>>> (non-digital) brain?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The
>>>>> brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates
>>>>> with symbols.
>>>>
>>>> I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could work.
>>>> Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to now, I
>>>> see only a magical use of word.
>>>>
>>>> For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any
>>>> words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional
>>>> symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if
>>>> there is a theory, or just idea-associations.
>>>>
>>>> Bruno
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Whether psychicals (experiential states) go down to, say insects, that's
>>>> one thing scientists are studying:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> https://secure-web.cisco.com/1L-w-yVlIdFYVShzZaeNau0eFudakfOgUw5EoTXb-83M1S2_Ca8rxAun9cwXFnyCp3rZQyLz7lyGWNE1B4Zn1QTBnIKKWOdXW2yzKnRUFnSylfpNCQ3vwOLSntIdU1Kl-bT9eoWMchWAFgyEIY1BR0P6d0it9s-yvTCVmpEhLYQoebOTRTqmiwhTHHm80pScZLrIYZDjF6YLhuCHUjlQbdBvDNrc1xKrrpwnGjYhpszXDaEZI1_12z7CZjn_jWHsC/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Whether they go down to cells, molecules, particles, ... ,that's another
>>>> thing (the next chapter):
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> https://secure-web.cisco.com/1I0rM7nlqsHucDUuLhE30yvCN_pY26lwelEhG9NqrGwfPsSQ6nbLPI8HX1tJML9OFwNHqdy7e_fVf3_93KbKB1cK-VYHm1Srrc5IhWX6IhyGHPmG0YMmN7kSg_s5c3c4bomvpiP-OucF_AsxHHHPrbHgq3-uqNTT4eMrVhazG2uUQ02ICdtDfFMfkrEND3F30NYhahXGYRUzMtFQoTQn13Ft0WoDHyPzcfG9Yx5DWVKzRMfLaJcdI5jJLmWeWaztW/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.penguin.co.uk%2Fbooks/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On experiential semantics (for brain-as-computer): The toy example as I've
>>>> given before is to think of a Turing-type computer, but instead of
>>>> operating with symbols, it is operating with emojis - but the emojis have
>>>> actual (material!) realization as experience.
>>>
>>>
>>> You lost me. One of my goal is to explain “matter”, and with mechanism, we
>>> cannot assume it at the start. Mechanism makes any role for some primary
>>> matter being quite magical.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>```

### Re: "No black-hole singularities" in an undated loop-quantum-gravity theory

```
> On 24 Dec 2018, at 20:58, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/24/2018 5:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 24 Dec 2018, at 07:44, Brent Meeker >> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/23/2018 8:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Sat, Dec 22, 2018 at 9:33 PM Brent Meeker >>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 12/22/2018 12:04 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Theoretical physicists developed a theory called loop quantum gravity in
>>>>> the 1990s that marries the laws of microscopic physics, or quantum
>>>>> mechanics, with gravity, which explains the dynamics of space and time.
>>>>> Ashtekar, Olmedos and Singh's new equations describe black holes in loop
>>>>> quantum gravity and showed that black hole singularity does not exist.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> "In Einstein's theory, space-time is a fabric that can be divided as
>>>>> small as we want. This is essentially the cause of the singularity where
>>>>> the gravitational field becomes infinite. In loop quantum gravity, the
>>>>> fabric of space-time has a tile-like structure, which cannot be divided
>>>>> beyond the smallest tile. My colleagues and I have shown that this is the
>>>>> case inside black holes and therefore there is no singularity," Singh
>>>>> said.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> "These tile-like units of geometry--called 'quantum excitations'-- which
>>>>> resolve the singularity problem are orders of magnitude smaller than we
>>>>> can detect with today's technology, but we have precise mathematical
>>>>> equations that predict their behavior," said Ashtekar, who is one of the
>>>>> founding fathers of loop quantum gravity.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But is this consistent with https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.5191v2
>>>> <https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.5191v2> which showed spacetime to be smooth
>>>> down to 1/525 of the Planck length?
>>>>
>>>> Brent,
>>>>
>>>> Wouldn't this be a successful prediction of Bruno's theory?  In another
>>>> predictions that space and time would be continuous (not discrete),
>>>> therefore it would predict LQG is false, and then
>>>> https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.5191v2 <https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.5191v2>
>>>> would be a confirmation of that.
>>>
>>> First, I don't see that his theory even predicts a topoloical space.
>>
>> By the semantics available for S4Grz1, and the X1* logics.
>
> How does that define open sets?

Because S4Grz interprets (in a technical precise sense) Intuitionist logic, and
add some structure to the topological interpretation of the truth value, common
in intuitionistic semantic.

The OR is union of open sets, the AND is the intersection, the negation is the
larger open set disjoint from a set. It is easy to show that this gives an
algebraical model for intuitionist logic, and to build a counter-example for
the excluded middle (using the topology of the real line, or any other
topological space, but grr endows them with richer structures. Same for the
quantum logic. In that sense, mechanism does predict new things in physics, and
should be tested.

>
>> But intuitively, you can see them arising from the fact that the first
>> person indeterminacy has a continuum range, as the DU multiplies all
>> histories on all oracles (real numbers) in the limit of all computations,
>> which cannot be avoided from the first person views associated to the
>> machine.
>
> But you haven't even defined a first persons' "views", appearance from a
> given place.

Yes I do! That is what the “<>t” in the variant of G given by “[]p & <>t” is
all about. The place is the reality I bet.
Universal machine get that sensation because they can’t avoid their
incompleteness which brings that nuance. It is an “instinctive” bet on some
(indexical) large notion of reality.

> You need metric space and physiscs for that.

Only for th```

### Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

```
> On 24 Dec 2018, at 14:55, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 6:55:46 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 23 Dec 2018, at 13:39, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 5:20:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 21 Dec 2018, at 11:06, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 3:18:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>>
>>>> The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain)
>>>
>>> Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the
>>> (non-digital) brain?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The
>>>> brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates
>>>> with symbols.
>>>
>>> I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could work.
>>> Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to now, I
>>> see only a magical use of word.
>>>
>>> For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any
>>> words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional
>>> symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if
>>> there is a theory, or just idea-associations.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Whether psychicals (experiential states) go down to, say insects, that's
>>> one thing scientists are studying:
>>>
>>>
>>> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/
>>>
>>> <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/>
>>>
>>> Whether they go down to cells, molecules, particles, ... ,that's another
>>> thing (the next chapter):
>>>
>>>
>>> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
>>>
>>> <https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On experiential semantics (for brain-as-computer): The toy example as I've
>>> given before is to think of a Turing-type computer, but instead of
>>> operating with symbols, it is operating with emojis - but the emojis have
>>> actual (material!) realization as experience.
>>
>>
>> You lost me. One of my goal is to explain “matter”, and with mechanism, we
>> cannot assume it at the start. Mechanism makes any role for some primary
>> matter being quite magical.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> But the point is: Matter is not Mechanistic.
>> Matter is Experientialistic.
>>
>> That's the whole thing!
>
> But Mechanism implies exactly this: matter is experientialistic (first
> person, phenomenological) and indeed not emulable by any Turing machine, and
> so Mechanism explains the existence of a non mechanistic phenomenological
> matter. For example, to copy any piece of matter, we would need to run the
> entire universal dovetailing in a finite time, this entails a “non-cloning”
> theorem for matter, confirmed by QM.
> In arithmetic, the universal machines are confronted with many non computable
> things, including first person and consciousness, and matter. Most
> arithmetical truth are not computable, and the matter indeterminacy inherit
> it by the First Person Indeterminacy on all computations.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> Engineers might be happy with imperfect cloning of matter.

But engineers and physicist will not claim that matter is primary or
fundamental. They are neutral on fictionalism in physics. There is no problem
there. The problem is only with “religious dogmatic believer” who forbid to
doubt physicalism.

Bruno

>
>
> - pt
>
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### Re: "No black-hole singularities" in an undated loop-quantum-gravity theory

```
> On 24 Dec 2018, at 07:44, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/23/2018 8:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Dec 22, 2018 at 9:33 PM Brent Meeker > > wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 12/22/2018 12:04 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Theoretical physicists developed a theory called loop quantum gravity in
>>> the 1990s that marries the laws of microscopic physics, or quantum
>>> mechanics, with gravity, which explains the dynamics of space and time.
>>> Ashtekar, Olmedos and Singh's new equations describe black holes in loop
>>> quantum gravity and showed that black hole singularity does not exist.
>>>
>>>
>>> "In Einstein's theory, space-time is a fabric that can be divided as small
>>> as we want. This is essentially the cause of the singularity where the
>>> gravitational field becomes infinite. In loop quantum gravity, the fabric
>>> of space-time has a tile-like structure, which cannot be divided beyond the
>>> smallest tile. My colleagues and I have shown that this is the case inside
>>> black holes and therefore there is no singularity," Singh said.
>>>
>>>
>>> "These tile-like units of geometry--called 'quantum excitations'-- which
>>> resolve the singularity problem are orders of magnitude smaller than we can
>>> detect with today's technology, but we have precise mathematical equations
>>> that predict their behavior," said Ashtekar, who is one of the founding
>>> fathers of loop quantum gravity.
>>>
>>
>> But is this consistent with https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.5191v2
>>  which showed spacetime to be smooth down
>> to 1/525 of the Planck length?
>>
>> Brent,
>>
>> Wouldn't this be a successful prediction of Bruno's theory?  In another
>> predictions that space and time would be continuous (not discrete),
>> therefore it would predict LQG is false, and then
>> https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.5191v2  would
>> be a confirmation of that.
>
> First, I don't see that his theory even predicts a topoloical space.

By the semantics available for S4Grz1, and the X1* logics. But intuitively, you
can see them arising from the fact that the first person indeterminacy has a
continuum range, as the DU multiplies all histories on all oracles (real
numbers) in the limit of all computations, which cannot be avoided from the
first person views associated to the machine.

> Second, Newton said space is a continuum so it's not a prediction peculiar to
> Bruno.

Like the very existence of a physical observable universe, this is explained by
Mechanism. Aristotle took this for granted, and Newton assumed the continuum at
the start, which is not an explanation, even if that was a very clever move to
get the correct local prediction. Note that Newton was aware that his theory
was on shaky metaphysical base, though.

Now, Mechanism predicts only that some observable are continuous. To derive
that time or position are such observable would need to get a notion of space,
which in the mechanist approach is the most difficult things to get. We will
get first the mathematics of knots, and derive space from there, perhaps.
String theory suggest that space could be a continuum, unlike Quantum Loop
Gravity, and mathematically, string theory seems to be favoured by Mechanism,
but that remains quite beyond … the mathematical logical tools available today
...

Bruno

>
> Brent
>
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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 24 Dec 2018, at 01:45, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 1:21 PM Bruno Marchal  <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
>>
>> The particles are (local) Lorentz invariants.  But how do Lorentz
>> transformations show up in the computations (of the Ud?)?
>
> This is explained in Vic Stenger’s book, in a way which shows that physics is
> already in a large part derivable from simple invariance principles.
>
>
> Hi Bruno,
>
> Do you recall which of his books this is? (
> https://www.amazon.com/Victor-J.-Stenger/e/B000APH2GA
> <https://www.amazon.com/Victor-J.-Stenger/e/B000APH2GA> )
>

Hi Jason,

I was alluding to “The comprehensible cosmos”: this one:

https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1591024242/ref=dbs_a_def_rwt_bibl_vppi_i0

A very good one!

Bruno

> Jason
>
>
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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 24 Dec 2018, at 00:23, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/23/2018 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 22 Dec 2018, at 23:08, Brent Meeker >> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/21/2018 10:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>> ...
>>>>
>>>> With Mechanism, physics has to be the same for all “observers” aka
>>>> universal machines, and indeed physics has to be independent of the
>>>> initial theory (phi_independent, or “machine independent” in the sense of
>>>> theoretical computer scientist (recursion theory does not depend on which
>>>> universal machinery we talk about).
>>>>
>>>> Indeed, physics becomes simply the “measure one expectation” of the
>>>> universal machine on all computations going through (any) of its states.
>>>> All the rest will be contingent and can be called geographical and/or
>>>> historical. Our mundane consciousness requires long and deep histories.
>>>
>>> So what expectation has measure 1.0?  Can you show that it includes
>>> conservation of energy-momentum for example?
>>
>> You should revise the basics. The answer is no of course. There is not yet
>> energy, physical time, … It is not even on the horizon.
>>
>> Soling the mind body is not simple. But physics as metaphysics is simply
>> wrong with mechanism, so to solve the mind body problem, there is no other
>> choice, unless you know a better theory, of course.
>
> Of course there are other choices: (1)  Mechanism is wrong

Sure. That is what we can test. It fits well the fact until now, unlike the
materialist metaphysics.

> (2) Your argument is wrong
>

Of course, that remains always a possibility, but you cannot assume this, you
have to find the mistake.

Bruno

> Brent
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> It could have been possible that the logic of physics would have collapsed
>>>> into classical logic,
>>>
>>> No.  It could have been possible that your theory incorrectly predicted the
>>> logic of physics collapsed.  Which would have been bad for  your theory,
>>> but would have had no effect on physics.
>>
>> If the theory incorrectly predict something, it has to be abandoned. Your
>> way of phrasing things seems strange to me. The notion of incorrect
>> prediction is fuzzy. If mechanism incorrectly predict that an electron
>> weight is one kilogram, then, we correct the prediction, and if we find it
>> is 2 kilos, we still abandon the theory (unless get some further
>> explanation, like the presence of hyper bosons with negative masses happing
>> to keep up the appearances …
>
> But you don't predict anything like that.  You assume that elements
> implementing computations could be substituted for parts of the human brain
> with noticeable effect.  So that's one thing that could be wrong.  It might
> be that you have to use atoms and molecules.  The rest of your agrument, that
> cosmic rays could intervene to repair brain damage also seems doubtful.  And
> your reliance on quantum mechanics may well be undermined by the quantum
> theory of gravity.  Your theory doesn't predict anything and it only
> retrodicts a few aspects of QM.
>
> Brent
>
>>
>> I have no theory. Digital Mechanism is already implicit in Darwin theory of
>> evolution, and molecular biology has confirmed the (relative) digital aspect
>> of it.
>>
>> All hamiltonian use in physics are computable, and QM preserves
>> computability, so non mechanism is speculating on appeal to magical
>> thinking, without evidences.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>> for example if incompleteness was false and arithmetic complete, in that
>>>> case there would be a infinite “landscape” of geographies/histories
>>>> possible, and the laws of physics would be trivial somehow, that is empty.
>>>> Thanks to incompleteness the logic of physics (that is, the logic of the
>>>> measure one on the sigma_1 sentences (the logic of []p & <>t); obeys a non
>>>> trivial logic quantum, and orthomodular logic suggesting the probabilities
>>>> are not trivial, and suggesting also that the logico-physical bottom (the
>>>> leaves of the UD, the sigma_1 true sentences) is symmetrical from that
>>>> “observable” view point.
>>>
>>> But the probabilities you've derived are```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 24 Dec 2018, at 00:15, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 5:37:21 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 22 Dec 2018, at 03:29, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, December 22, 2018 at 2:03:06 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 8:50 PM > wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, December 22, 2018 at 1:42:06 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 11:40 AM John Clark > wrote:
>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 7:30 PM Jason Resch > wrote:
>>
>> >>>> The Schrodinger equation describes the quantum wave function using
>> >>>> complex numbers, and that is not observable so it's subjective in the
>> >>>> same way that lines of latitude and longitude are. However the square
>> >>>> of the absolute value of the wave function is observable because that
>> >>>> produces a probability that we can measure in the physical world that
>> >>>> is objective, provided  anything deserves that word; but it also yields
>> >>>> something that is not deterministic.
>>
>> >>> It is still deterministic.
>>
>> >>That depends on what "it" refers to. The quantum wave function is
>> >>deterministic but the physical system associated with it is not.
>>
>> > This is incorrect.
>>
>> What a devastating retort, you sure put me in my place! Jason ,the
>> Schrodinger equation is deterministic and describes the quantum wave
>> function, but that function is an abstraction and is unobservable, to get
>> something you can see you must square the absolute value of the wave
>> function and that gives you the probability you will observe a particle at
>> any spot; but Schrodinger's equation has an "i" in it , the square root of
>> -1, and that means very different quantum wave functions can give the exact
>> same probability distribution when you square it; remember with i you get
>> weird stuff like i^2=i^6 =-1 and i^4=i^100=1. That's why we only get
>> probabilities not certainties.
>>
>> >>> Schrodinger's equation does not say this is what happened, it just says
>> >>> that you have ended up with a system with many sets of observers, each
>> >>> of which observed different outcomes.
>>
>> >>That's what Many World's claims it means but that claim is controversial,
>> >>but what is not controversial is the wave function the Schrodinger
>> >>equation describes mathematically.  Consider the wave functions of these 2
>> >>systems:
>> 1) An  electron of velocity V starts at X  and after one second it is
>> observed at point Y and then goes on for  another second.
>> 2) An electron of the same velocity V starts at the same point X and then
>> goes on for 2 seconds.
>>
>> The wave functions of these 2 systems are NOT the same and after you've
>> taken the square of the absolute value of both you will find radically
>> different probabilities about where you're likely to find the electron after
>> 2 seconds. And as I said this is not controversial, people disagree over
>> quantum interpretations but nobody disagrees over the mathematics, and the
>> mathematical objects that the Schrodinger equation describes in those two
>> systems are NOT the same.
>>
>> > If you model the system to be measured, and the experimenter making the
>> > measurement, the Schrodinger wave equation tells you unambiguously the
>> > system [...]
>>
>> The Schrodinger wave equation tells precisely, unambiguously and
>> deterministically what the wave function associated with the system will be
>> but it says nothing unambiguously about the system itself. We do know the
>> square of the absolute value of the wave function gives us the probability
>> of obtaining a certain value if we measure a particular aspect of the
>> system, but other than that things become controversial. Some people (the
>> shut up and calculate people) say that's the only thing the math is telling
>> us, but others (the Many World and Copenhagen and Pilot Wave people) say the
>> math is telling us more than that but disagree about what that is. But
>> everybody agrees about the math itself, and if an observation is made forget
>> about what the math may mean the very mathematics of the Schrodinger wave
>> changes.
>>
>> > If you don't believe me, consider what would happen if y```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 24 Dec 2018, at 00:32, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 4:45:35 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 22 Dec 2018, at 18:59, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, December 22, 2018 at 12:18:33 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 20 Dec 2018, at 16:35, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, December 20, 2018 at 12:46:06 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 19 Dec 2018, at 16:52, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 19, 2018 at 12:01:07 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 18 Dec 2018, at 07:57, Bruce Kellett > wrote:
>
> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 5:42 PM > wrote:
> On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 5:31:06 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> But we are talking about definitions of objects, not axioms of a theory. We
> know that any axiomatic theory will necessarily be incomplete -- there will
> be formulae in the theory that are neither theorems nor the negation of
> theorems.
>
> Based on the examples I previously offered, that QM and SR are axiomatic
> theories, can we conclude they're incomplete? AG
>
> Such theories of physics are not axiomatic theories. The things you referred
> to are broad principles, not axioms.
>
> That is right. Most theories in math and physics are not axiomatic.
>
> Concerning physics, nonsense! There's no difference between "the general
> principles" defining quantum mechanics and SR, and the "axioms" defining
> these theories. In SR, the genius of Einstein in 1905 was to put the theory
> on an axiomatic basis which rendered Lorentz's ether theory irrelevant. AG
>
> I guess you are using the term “axiomatic” in a more general sense that most
> logicians use that term.
>
> An "axiom" is any statement one assumes to be true. AG
>
> That is a general meaning in general philosophy. In logic an axiom is just a
> formula, or even a machine, and has nothing to do with truth a priori.
>
> IMO, your comment, while possibly true in a technical sense, is just
> obfuscating BS. For example, for non relativistic QM, we assume
> Schroedinger's equation is "true", or correctly represents how the wf
> evolves. Give me a break. AG
>
> The whole point of doing metaphysics or theology with the scientific attitude
> would consist in understanding that this kind of nuance and definition are
> not obfuscating anything. On the contrary, they help to be more clear, and to
> prevent the use of metaphysical biases.
>
> When doing physics, we can assume informally that the SWE is correct, but
> when doing Mechanist metaphysics, we can’t,
>
> Why not? It's a good hypothesis or axiom that correctly predicts the behavior
> of the wf (for non relativistic QM). What would you replace it with? AG

It does it well FAPP, but to relate it to the first person experience, it uses
an identity brain-mind which is invalid when we assume mechanism. So physics
uses an implicit reference to an ontological commitment, involving infinities
for which we have no evidence, and which would contradicts most known theories,
from evolution to QM.

It is the point of the UDA reasoning. I do not claim this is entirely obvious.
Physics works well, but it cannot predict anything if we assume mechanism, the
laws must be derived in a certain way so at to get the correct type of
supervenience on mind on computations allowed by computer science/arithmetic.

With mechanism, we must use any Turing complete theory, minus induction axioms,
and minus infinity axioms. We must derive the SWE (assuming it physically
correct) from the statistics on all computations. Invoking a “real matter” does
not work better than invoking “God” or something. It just does not work. If you
predict an eclipse, you still cannot predict you will feel to see an eclipse,
as you would need to assume absence of Boltzman Brain in the universe … and in
arithmetic, but that is not possible: they are there.

Bruno

>
> and this is just an example, so it helps to use the terms with they standard
> meaning in science, and not with imprecise meanings which usually only hides
> the (open) problems.
>
>
>
> I know only Carnap and Bunge to have attempted axiomatic (in the stricter)
> logician sense for physics.
>
> Absent a Theory of Everything, there is no possible axiomatic structure "for
> physics". AG
>
> They failed,
>
> It was a project doomed to failure because there is no such thing as a
> general theory of physics for which it could be applied. AG
>
> Not yet. The problem of physics is that its meaning/semantics is still not
> abstracted from some metaphysical commitment.
> By se```

### Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

```
> On 23 Dec 2018, at 13:39, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 5:20:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 21 Dec 2018, at 11:06, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 3:18:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>
>>> The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain)
>>
>> Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the
>> (non-digital) brain?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The
>>> brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates
>>> with symbols.
>>
>> I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could work.
>> Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to now, I see
>> only a magical use of word.
>>
>> For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any
>> words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional
>> symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if
>> there is a theory, or just idea-associations.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Whether psychicals (experiential states) go down to, say insects, that's one
>> thing scientists are studying:
>>
>>
>> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/
>>
>> <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/>
>>
>> Whether they go down to cells, molecules, particles, ... ,that's another
>> thing (the next chapter):
>>
>>
>> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
>>
>> <https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html>
>>
>>
>>
>> On experiential semantics (for brain-as-computer): The toy example as I've
>> given before is to think of a Turing-type computer, but instead of operating
>> with symbols, it is operating with emojis - but the emojis have actual
>> (material!) realization as experience.
>
>
> You lost me. One of my goal is to explain “matter”, and with mechanism, we
> cannot assume it at the start. Mechanism makes any role for some primary
> matter being quite magical.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> But the point is: Matter is not Mechanistic.
> Matter is Experientialistic.
>
> That's the whole thing!

But Mechanism implies exactly this: matter is experientialistic (first person,
phenomenological) and indeed not emulable by any Turing machine, and so
Mechanism explains the existence of a non mechanistic phenomenological matter.
For example, to copy any piece of matter, we would need to run the entire
universal dovetailing in a finite time, this entails a “non-cloning” theorem
for matter, confirmed by QM.
In arithmetic, the universal machines are confronted with many non computable
things, including first person and consciousness, and matter. Most arithmetical
truth are not computable, and the matter indeterminacy inherit it by the First
Person Indeterminacy on all computations.

Bruno

>
> - pt
>
>
>
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### Re: Are you smarter than a 5th grade amoeba?

```Cool.

I do not think that I am smarter than a bacteria or an amoeba.

The amoeba taught me everything including the questions(*).

For the precise relations see my paper “amoeba, planaria and dreaming machines”.

Bruno

(*) https://www.amazon.com/Amoebas-Secret-Bruno-Marchal/dp/1495992799

> On 23 Dec 2018, at 11:01, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
> Ucnucs (Unconventional computing / natural computing scientists) party.
>
>
> As detailed in a paper published this week in Royal Society Open Science
> <https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.180396>, the amoeba used
> by the researchers is called Physarum polycephalum, which has been used as a
> biological computer in several other experiments
> <https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn23713-slime-mould-could-make-memristors-for-biocomputers/>.
>  The reason this amoeba is considered especially useful in biological
> computing
> <https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/jpgdgd/engineers-develop-key-building-block-for-sophisticated-bio-computers>
>  is because it can extend various regions of its body to find the most
> efficient way to a food source and hates light.
>
> https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/gy7994/an-amoeba-based-computer-calculated-approximate-solutions-to-a-very-hard-math-problem
>
> - pt
>
> On Saturday, December 22, 2018 at 8:09:39 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> Bruno should enjoy this.
>
> Brent
>
>
>  Forwarded Message
>
> This is a cool bio hack, but is this approach ever going to be faster
> and/or cheaper than an electronic computer for the same precision of
> optimization?
>
> https://phys.org/news/2018-12-amoeba-approximate-solutions-np-hard-problem.html
>
> <https://phys.org/news/2018-12-amoeba-approximate-solutions-np-hard-problem.html>
>
>
> Amoeba finds approximate solutions to NP-hard problem in linear time
>
> December 20, 2018 by Lisa Zyga, Phys.org
>
> Researchers have demonstrated that an amoeba--a single-celled organism
> consisting mostly of gelatinous protoplasm--has unique computing
> abilities that may one day offer a competitive alternative to the
> methods used by conventional computers.
>
> The researchers, led by Masashi Aono at Keio University, assigned an
> amoeba to solve the Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP). The TSP is an
> optimization problem in which the goal is to find the shortest route
> between several cities, so that each city is visited exactly once, and
> the start and end points are the same.
>
> https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rsos.180396
> <https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rsos.180396>
>
> Remarkable problem-solving ability of unicellular amoeboid organism
> and its mechanism
>
> Choosing a better move correctly and quickly is a fundamental skill of
> living organisms that corresponds to solving a computationally
> demanding problem. A unicellular plasmodium of Physarum polycephalum
> searches for a solution to the travelling salesman problem (TSP) by
> changing its shape to minimize the risk of being exposed to aversive
> light stimuli. In our previous studies, we reported the results on
> the eight-city TSP solution. In this study, we show that the time
> taken by plasmodium to find a reasonably high-quality TSP solution
> grows linearly as the problem size increases from four to eight.
> Interestingly, the quality of the solution does not degrade despite
> the explosive expansion of the search space. Formulating a
> computational model, we show that the linear-time solution can be
> achieved if the intrinsic dynamics could allocate intracellular
> resources to grow the plasmodium terminals with a constant rate, even
> while responding to the stimuli. These results may lead to the
> development of novel analogue computers enabling approximate solutions
> of complex optimization problems in linear time.
>
>
>
> --
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> "Everything List" group.
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"Eve```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 22 Dec 2018, at 23:20, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 9:08 AM Brent Meeker  <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
> On 12/21/2018 10:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> ...
>>
>> With Mechanism, physics has to be the same for all “observers” aka universal
>> machines, and indeed physics has to be independent of the initial theory
>> (phi_independent, or “machine independent” in the sense of theoretical
>> computer scientist (recursion theory does not depend on which universal
>>
>> Indeed, physics becomes simply the “measure one expectation” of the
>> universal machine on all computations going through (any) of its states. All
>> the rest will be contingent and can be called geographical and/or
>> historical. Our mundane consciousness requires long and deep histories.
>
> So what expectation has measure 1.0?  Can you show that it includes
> conservation of energy-momentum for example?
>
>>
>> It could have been possible that the logic of physics would have collapsed
>> into classical logic,
>
> No.  It could have been possible that your theory incorrectly predicted the
> logic of physics collapsed.  Which would have been bad for  your theory, but
> would have had no effect on physics.
>
>> for example if incompleteness was false and arithmetic complete, in that
>> case there would be a infinite “landscape” of geographies/histories
>> possible, and the laws of physics would be trivial somehow, that is empty.
>> Thanks to incompleteness the logic of physics (that is, the logic of the
>> measure one on the sigma_1 sentences (the logic of []p & <>t); obeys a non
>> trivial logic quantum, and orthomodular logic suggesting the probabilities
>> are not trivial, and suggesting also that the logico-physical bottom (the
>> leaves of the UD, the sigma_1 true sentences) is symmetrical from that
>> “observable” view point.
>
> But the probabilities you've derived are either zero or one...which I'd say
> are trivial.
>
>>
>> The core physical laws are invariant for all universal (Löbian) machine (in
>> the Classical Digital Frame of course). It is first person plural
>> indeterminacy on all relative computations.
>>
>> That is why we can detect experimentally if mechanism is false (assuming
>> that we are not in a malevolent second order emulation, where we are just
>> lied) by comparing the physics “sum on all computations”
>
> But what does it mean to "sum on all computations"?
>
>> with the physics of the “actually” observable predictions.
>
> What is an observation in these computations?
>
>> If there is a discrepancy, mechanism is refuted, or we are in the normal
>> (gaussian) world, but “captured in some simulation trying to prevent we got
>> the right laws of physics (something rather absurde, and which requires an
>> infinite work on the par of the liar).
>>
>> If Planck constant is derivable from mathematical constant coming from the
>> semantics of the “material hypostases” (the S4Grz1, Z1*, X1* logics), then
>> it is part of the laws. If the Planck constant is shown to be not derivable
>> from them, then it is “geographical”, and some region of the
>> “multi-multi-verse” might have a different one.
>
> That's just saying either my theory applies to X, or X is an exception.
>
>>
>> The quantum seems to be the digital seen from inside. Mechanism saves the
>> quantum and symmetries from being contingent geographies. The laws of
>> physics are laws, indeed, mathematical laws derivable from the mathematics
>> of the universal (Gödel-Löbian) machines.
>>
>> Number theory might suggest shortcut toward physics, and explain why group
>> theory plays a so big role in physics, and why it seems the unitary group
>> imposes itself and how this is related to a measure one on a universal
>> Turing structure. The particles are group invariants, so that light help to
>> get the bosons and the fermions.
>
> The particles are (local) Lorentz invariants.  But how do Lorentz
> transformations show up in the computations (of the Ud?)?
>
> It's all just burble, Brent. He has no idea how to get any useful results
> from any of this…….

You would have study the papers, you would know that it is hard to give a more
refutable theory than Mechanism.

I recall and insist that you are the one, who like Clarck, invoke you
ontological commitment, to evacuate a problem, and not testing a simple and
general theory, which is not mine (it is already in Descartes, and```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 22 Dec 2018, at 23:20, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 9:08 AM Brent Meeker  <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
> On 12/21/2018 10:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> ...
>>
>> With Mechanism, physics has to be the same for all “observers” aka universal
>> machines, and indeed physics has to be independent of the initial theory
>> (phi_independent, or “machine independent” in the sense of theoretical
>> computer scientist (recursion theory does not depend on which universal
>>
>> Indeed, physics becomes simply the “measure one expectation” of the
>> universal machine on all computations going through (any) of its states. All
>> the rest will be contingent and can be called geographical and/or
>> historical. Our mundane consciousness requires long and deep histories.
>
> So what expectation has measure 1.0?  Can you show that it includes
> conservation of energy-momentum for example?
>
>>
>> It could have been possible that the logic of physics would have collapsed
>> into classical logic,
>
> No.  It could have been possible that your theory incorrectly predicted the
> logic of physics collapsed.  Which would have been bad for  your theory, but
> would have had no effect on physics.
>
>> for example if incompleteness was false and arithmetic complete, in that
>> case there would be a infinite “landscape” of geographies/histories
>> possible, and the laws of physics would be trivial somehow, that is empty.
>> Thanks to incompleteness the logic of physics (that is, the logic of the
>> measure one on the sigma_1 sentences (the logic of []p & <>t); obeys a non
>> trivial logic quantum, and orthomodular logic suggesting the probabilities
>> are not trivial, and suggesting also that the logico-physical bottom (the
>> leaves of the UD, the sigma_1 true sentences) is symmetrical from that
>> “observable” view point.
>
> But the probabilities you've derived are either zero or one...which I'd say
> are trivial.
>
>>
>> The core physical laws are invariant for all universal (Löbian) machine (in
>> the Classical Digital Frame of course). It is first person plural
>> indeterminacy on all relative computations.
>>
>> That is why we can detect experimentally if mechanism is false (assuming
>> that we are not in a malevolent second order emulation, where we are just
>> lied) by comparing the physics “sum on all computations”
>
> But what does it mean to "sum on all computations"?
>
>> with the physics of the “actually” observable predictions.
>
> What is an observation in these computations?
>
>> If there is a discrepancy, mechanism is refuted, or we are in the normal
>> (gaussian) world, but “captured in some simulation trying to prevent we got
>> the right laws of physics (something rather absurde, and which requires an
>> infinite work on the par of the liar).
>>
>> If Planck constant is derivable from mathematical constant coming from the
>> semantics of the “material hypostases” (the S4Grz1, Z1*, X1* logics), then
>> it is part of the laws. If the Planck constant is shown to be not derivable
>> from them, then it is “geographical”, and some region of the
>> “multi-multi-verse” might have a different one.
>
> That's just saying either my theory applies to X, or X is an exception.
>
>>
>> The quantum seems to be the digital seen from inside. Mechanism saves the
>> quantum and symmetries from being contingent geographies. The laws of
>> physics are laws, indeed, mathematical laws derivable from the mathematics
>> of the universal (Gödel-Löbian) machines.
>>
>> Number theory might suggest shortcut toward physics, and explain why group
>> theory plays a so big role in physics, and why it seems the unitary group
>> imposes itself and how this is related to a measure one on a universal
>> Turing structure. The particles are group invariants, so that light help to
>> get the bosons and the fermions.
>
> The particles are (local) Lorentz invariants.  But how do Lorentz
> transformations show up in the computations (of the Ud?)?
>
> It's all just burble, Brent. He has no idea how to get any useful results
> from any of this…….

This means that you have not study any of my papers. You remark is as much

Bruno

>
> Bruce
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 22 Dec 2018, at 23:08, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/21/2018 10:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> ...
>>
>> With Mechanism, physics has to be the same for all “observers” aka universal
>> machines, and indeed physics has to be independent of the initial theory
>> (phi_independent, or “machine independent” in the sense of theoretical
>> computer scientist (recursion theory does not depend on which universal
>>
>> Indeed, physics becomes simply the “measure one expectation” of the
>> universal machine on all computations going through (any) of its states. All
>> the rest will be contingent and can be called geographical and/or
>> historical. Our mundane consciousness requires long and deep histories.
>
> So what expectation has measure 1.0?  Can you show that it includes
> conservation of energy-momentum for example?

You should revise the basics. The answer is no of course. There is not yet
energy, physical time, … It is not even on the horizon.

Soling the mind body is not simple. But physics as metaphysics is simply wrong
with mechanism, so to solve the mind body problem, there is no other choice,
unless you know a better theory, of course.

>
>>
>> It could have been possible that the logic of physics would have collapsed
>> into classical logic,
>
> No.  It could have been possible that your theory incorrectly predicted the
> logic of physics collapsed.  Which would have been bad for  your theory, but
> would have had no effect on physics.

If the theory incorrectly predict something, it has to be abandoned. Your way
of phrasing things seems strange to me. The notion of incorrect prediction is
fuzzy. If mechanism incorrectly predict that an electron weight is one
kilogram, then, we correct the prediction, and if we find it is 2 kilos, we
still abandon the theory (unless get some further explanation, like the
presence of hyper bosons with negative masses happing to keep up the
appearances …

I have no theory. Digital Mechanism is already implicit in Darwin theory of
evolution, and molecular biology has confirmed the (relative) digital aspect of
it.

All hamiltonian use in physics are computable, and QM preserves computability,
so non mechanism is speculating on appeal to magical thinking, without
evidences.

>
>> for example if incompleteness was false and arithmetic complete, in that
>> case there would be a infinite “landscape” of geographies/histories
>> possible, and the laws of physics would be trivial somehow, that is empty.
>> Thanks to incompleteness the logic of physics (that is, the logic of the
>> measure one on the sigma_1 sentences (the logic of []p & <>t); obeys a non
>> trivial logic quantum, and orthomodular logic suggesting the probabilities
>> are not trivial, and suggesting also that the logico-physical bottom (the
>> leaves of the UD, the sigma_1 true sentences) is symmetrical from that
>> “observable” view point.
>
> But the probabilities you've derived are either zero or one...which I'd say
> are trivial.

Not at all, that gives a quantum logic for the yes-no experiences, and if it is
the right type, you will get a Gleason theorem (as it should be with
Mechanism), and derives the other probabilities from this.

Anyway, no other theories works today, I think. Physics works, because it makes
a listing assumption which is just non sensical with digital mechanism. You
need infinite amount of energy/information to localise a soul in a body when
you assume mechanism.

>
>>
>> The core physical laws are invariant for all universal (Löbian) machine (in
>> the Classical Digital Frame of course). It is first person plural
>> indeterminacy on all relative computations.
>>
>> That is why we can detect experimentally if mechanism is false (assuming
>> that we are not in a malevolent second order emulation, where we are just
>> lied) by comparing the physics “sum on all computations”
>
> But what does it mean to "sum on all computations”?

UDA gives the intuitive meaning, with the UD pictures for the true sigma_1
sentences.

AUDA gives the mathematics of the measure one, and how to proceed from that, if
you are interested in metaphysics (nothing to do with physics a priori: to use
metaphysics for doing physics, is like is like using the LARC to taste a pizza).

>
>> with the physics of the “actually” observable predictions.
>
> What is an observation in these computations?

instead of 5. It is a local measurement, usually kept in some memory for
further comparisons.

>
>> If there is a discrepancy, mechani```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 22 Dec 2018, at 22:36, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/22/2018 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 21 Dec 2018, at 03:22, Bruce Kellett >> <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 1:03 PM Jason Resch >> <mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 7:05 PM Bruce Kellett >> <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 11:45 AM Jason Resch >> <mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> 1. It is a prediction of eternal inflation and string theory.
>>>
>>> String theory and its "landscape" are very speculative, and unlikely to
>>> have any relation to the real world -- there is no evidence that string
>>> theory is even a coherent theory! Eternal inflation, although popular, is
>>> only one possibility for inflation, and even inflationary theory itself is
>>> not well-established science.
>>>
>>> I agree they are speculative, but they are on the side many many universes.
>>> Meanwhile there is no evidence for "the only universe that exists is the
>>> one I can see".
>>>
>>> The universe we see is the only one for which we have any concrete
>>> evidence, and that evidence is indubitable.
>>
>> That is of course a strong evidence for a physical reality, but unless we
>> buy the Aristotelian theology, “seeing” is not an evidence for a
>> metaphysical reality.
>
> That's sort of redefining what is meant by "reality”.

Yes, that is the point of scientific metaphysics or theology. If God appears to
not be omnipotent, we change the definition, like if Earth is not flat we adopt
the new theory.

Expect “reality” to defeat all theories and all definitions, but still, with
luck, being at least less and less wrong.

>
>>
>> I think the whole problem is here:  a confusion for the evidence for physics
>> with an evidence for a metaphysics. This has worked for 1500 years, only by
>> terror, violence, and then habits, and the constant hiding of the
>> (mind-body) problem under the rug (notably through “fairy tales”).
>
> Physics is the evidence for metaphysics, i.e. metaphysics is about physics,
> it seeks to explain why the world, including physics, is what it is.

Physics is as much an evidence for Aristotle than Plato, and its remarkable use
of mathematics is an evidence for Plato. If string theory is correct, the
reason why photon have no mass is related to the distribution of the prime
numbers (!).

Metaphysics is not about physics, although it has relation with it. To identify
physics and metaphysics *is* the Aristotelian move. It equates God with a
primitively material/physical universe.

It is bit like saying that one universal number win on all the other. That is
not excluded, and may be the physical laws are a quantum universal dovetailing,
but even if that is the case, to benefit of the G/G* separation (and get the
distinction qualia/quanta), we have to derive that special “physical” universal
number from self-reference.

Bruno

>
> Brent
>>
>> Physics is a wonderful science, but to make physics systematically, without
>> argument nor evidence,  into a metaphysics is a form of “modern”
>> charlatanism, when made consciously, and still a form of obscurantism when
>> done by ignorance. With science, doubts are mandatory.
>>
>> Bruno
>
>
> --
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```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 22 Dec 2018, at 13:54, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, December 22, 2018 at 3:53:36 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 21 Dec 2018, at 05:44, Jason Resch >
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 8:28 PM Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 1:07 PM Jason Resch > > wrote:
>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 7:11 PM Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 11:49 AM Jason Resch > > wrote:
>>
>> Do you believe other locations in space exist?
>>
>> They exist, but there is no sense in which they are simultaneous with my
>> existence.
>>
>> There are certain senses in which you could, but I mostly agree (as they are
>> not objective).
>>
>> They exist because events at other locations in my past light cone can
>> affect me, and I can affect events at other locations in my future light
>> cone.
>>
>> Okay, no problem with this.
>>
>> Do you believe other locations in time exist?
>>
>> I believe that I have a past, and will have a future, but I do not believe
>> that these exist in my present. Such an idea is clearly a linguistic
>> confusion.
>>
>> I agree.
>>
>> (I answer yes to both questions, that is all I mean by block time -- that
>> there is no privileged part of space time blessed with the property of
>> existence).
>>
>> The present is all that you can know exists. All else is idle speculation.
>>
>> But you just said there is no such thing as the present (since there is no
>> objective notion of simultaneity)
>>
>> I have never said that there is no such thing as the present. All I have
>> said is that the notion of a space-like hyper-surface of simultaneity is not
>> an objective notion.
>>
>> Okay I agree with this.  I happen to take this as evidence that the "passage
>> of time" is also not an objective notion.  What do you think about the
>> passage of time, is it purely a subjective notion in your view?
>>
>> The print moment exists now for ev very one of us individually.
>>
>> Of course, you can construct imaginary theories in which unicorns, fairies,
>> and Hogwarts Castle exist, but you would not have any evidence for any of
>> these.
>>
>> You just said you have evidence for the existence of objects in your past
>> light cone.  Why presume that they would disappear from existence?  What is
>> the motivation/justification for such an idea?
>>
>> I have no evidence that they exist now, since all I am currently aware of is
>> the record of their past existence as it is present to me now. The evidence
>> is that they existed in the past. Why is that not sufficient? I tend not to
>> believe in things, like fairies, for which I have no current evidence.
>>
>> This seems to be a trend that explains all aspects of your philosophy.  For
>> example, rejecting many-worlds, rejecting other universes, rejecting other
>> points in time, rejecting mathematical objects. It's based purely on what
>> you can see.  It is a theory of minimizing the number of objects in reality.
>> But to me this is not a correct application of Occam, which was about
>> simplifying theories by reducing their unnecessary assumptions, rather than
>> reducing the ontologies of those theories.
>>
>> So by lobbing off the assumption that some points in the past stop existing,
>> you get a larger universe, more points in spacetime exist (but this is
>> simpler, as you don't have to add a theory of how different events come into
>> or out of existence), or with many-worlds, if you drop the collapse
>> postulate, you get the same predictions, and a simpler theory (but a huge
>> number of unseen histories).  With this different philosophy/value system I
>> don't think we will ever agree on what makes for a better theory, for in all
>> these cases that we disagree, it comes down to my preference for a simpler
>> theory, and your preference for a simpler ontology.
>
> I would say that with Mechanism we get both a simple ontology (just 0, 1, 2,
> …) and a simple theory, just the two SK axioms, or the very elementary RA.
> Yet, we get a extremely rich phenomenology, unboundedly complex with sharable
> and non sharable truth, with infinitely many histories and cosmos/multivers,
> etc, and with many persons and their experiences (no risk to sacrifice souls
> and consciousness).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> Arithmetical entities cannot have real (unsimu```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 22 Dec 2018, at 13:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, December 22, 2018 at 3:42:04 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 21 Dec 2018, at 03:22, Bruce Kellett >
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>> The universe we see is the only one for which we have any concrete evidence,
>> and that evidence is indubitable.
>
> That is of course a strong evidence for a physical reality, but unless we buy
> the Aristotelian theology, “seeing” is not an evidence for a metaphysical
> reality.
>
> I think the whole problem is here:  a confusion for the evidence for physics
> with an evidence for a metaphysics. This has worked for 1500 years, only by
> terror, violence, and then habits, and the constant hiding of the (mind-body)
> problem under the rug (notably through “fairy tales”).
>
> Physics is a wonderful science, but to make physics systematically, without
> argument nor evidence,  into a metaphysics is a form of “modern”
> charlatanism, when made consciously, and still a form of obscurantism when
> done by ignorance. With science, doubts are mandatory.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> Physics (a collection of "accepted" formulated [in mathematical language]
> theories - the Standard Model, General Relativity - and "pending" ones -
> string theory, cosmic inflation, loop quantum gravity...) is a type of
> fictionalism. But is a different "genre" of fiction than mathematics.
>
> Fictions, Inference, and Realism
> Mauricio Suárez
> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5013/1/Fictions%2C_Inference%2C_and_Realism.pdf
>
>
> Abstract: It is often assumed without argument that fictionalism in the
> philosophy of science contradicts scientific realism. This paper is a
> critical analysis of this assumption. The kind of fictionalism that is at
> present discussed in philosophy of science is characterized, and
> distinguished from fictionalism in other areas. A distinction is then drawn
> between forms of fictional representation, and two competing accounts of
> fiction in science are discussed. I then outline explicitly what I take to be
> the argument for the incompatibility of scientific realism with fictionalism.
> I argue that some of its premises are unwarranted, and are moreover
> questionable from a fictionalist perspective. The conclusion is that
> fictionalism is neutral in the realism-antirealism debate, pulling neither in
> favor nor against scientific realism.

That confirms my felling that fictionalism will not get something new here.

All theologies are the fiction from the point of view of they antipodes
ontologies.

For a monist materialist, mind/consciousness is fiction.

For a monist idealist, matter is fiction.

Fictionalism is just a negative way to present some ontology, it seems to me.
It is “your god is not my god”.

Bruno

>
>
> - pt
>
>
>
> --
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```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 22 Dec 2018, at 03:29, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, December 22, 2018 at 2:03:06 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 8:50 PM > wrote:
>
>
> On Saturday, December 22, 2018 at 1:42:06 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 11:40 AM John Clark > wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 7:30 PM Jason Resch > wrote:
>
>  The Schrodinger equation describes the quantum wave function using
>  complex numbers, and that is not observable so it's subjective in the
>  same way that lines of latitude and longitude are. However the square of
>  the absolute value of the wave function is observable because that
>  produces a probability that we can measure in the physical world that is
>  objective, provided  anything deserves that word; but it also yields
>  something that is not deterministic.
>
> >>> It is still deterministic.
>
> >>That depends on what "it" refers to. The quantum wave function is
> >>deterministic but the physical system associated with it is not.
>
> > This is incorrect.
>
> What a devastating retort, you sure put me in my place! Jason ,the
> Schrodinger equation is deterministic and describes the quantum wave
> function, but that function is an abstraction and is unobservable, to get
> something you can see you must square the absolute value of the wave function
> and that gives you the probability you will observe a particle at any spot;
> but Schrodinger's equation has an "i" in it , the square root of -1, and that
> means very different quantum wave functions can give the exact same
> probability distribution when you square it; remember with i you get weird
> stuff like i^2=i^6 =-1 and i^4=i^100=1. That's why we only get probabilities
> not certainties.
>
> >>> Schrodinger's equation does not say this is what happened, it just says
> >>> that you have ended up with a system with many sets of observers, each of
> >>> which observed different outcomes.
>
> >>That's what Many World's claims it means but that claim is controversial,
> >>but what is not controversial is the wave function the Schrodinger equation
> >>describes mathematically.  Consider the wave functions of these 2 systems:
> 1) An  electron of velocity V starts at X  and after one second it is
> observed at point Y and then goes on for  another second.
> 2) An electron of the same velocity V starts at the same point X and then
> goes on for 2 seconds.
>
> The wave functions of these 2 systems are NOT the same and after you've taken
> the square of the absolute value of both you will find radically different
> probabilities about where you're likely to find the electron after 2 seconds.
> And as I said this is not controversial, people disagree over quantum
> interpretations but nobody disagrees over the mathematics, and the
> mathematical objects that the Schrodinger equation describes in those two
> systems are NOT the same.
>
> > If you model the system to be measured, and the experimenter making the
> > measurement, the Schrodinger wave equation tells you unambiguously the
> > system [...]
>
> The Schrodinger wave equation tells precisely, unambiguously and
> deterministically what the wave function associated with the system will be
> but it says nothing unambiguously about the system itself. We do know the
> square of the absolute value of the wave function gives us the probability of
> obtaining a certain value if we measure a particular aspect of the system,
> but other than that things become controversial. Some people (the shut up and
> calculate people) say that's the only thing the math is telling us, but
> others (the Many World and Copenhagen and Pilot Wave people) say the math is
> telling us more than that but disagree about what that is. But everybody
> the math may mean the very mathematics of the Schrodinger wave changes.
>
> > If you don't believe me, consider what would happen if you simulated an
> > experimenter's mind on a quantum computer, and then fed in as sensory input
> > one of the qubits registers prepared to be in a superposed state (0 and 1).
>
> I don't have a quantum computer and I don't have direct access to any mind
> other than my own so I can't do that, I could tell you my hunch about what I
> believe would happen and it's probably similar to your hunch but other
> people, including some very smart ones, disagree so we could be wrong.
>
>
> Such people disbelieve in the Schrodinger equation.
>
> Suppose (courtesy of Bruce) the SE represents a horse race with the
> probabilities varying wrt time. What's your view of the status of the SE when
> one horse wins and others loose? AG
>
>
> I am not sure I understand the question.
>
> Jason
>
> When the horse race is over (in this world), does it continue in other worlds
> where the losers get a chance to win, or ```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 21 Dec 2018, at 19:05, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 11:12:18 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 21 Dec 2018, at 01:07, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, December 20, 2018 at 3:40:53 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 3:13 AM Bruno Marchal > wrote:
>>
>> Is not 333’s oddness timeless?
>>
>> Category error.
>>
>>
>>
>> On category error:
>>
>> I've never understood "category error" [
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_mistake
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_mistake> ]. (Some philosopher I read
>> about recently gave a talk on the non-existence of category errors. Good.)
>>
>> Is 333's oddness timeless? is a perfectly reasonable question.
>>
>> To the immaterialist, the answer could be "yes".
>> To the materialist, the answer could not be "no”.
>
> That makes sense only if the materialist describe how 333 depends on time.
> But then I suppose he has a different definition than the usual one, and that
> requires clarification.
>
>
>
>>
>> It all depends.
>>
>> There is a type of dualists who say 333 is one category (nonphysical) and
>> time (as in spacetime) is in another category (physical), but this dualism
>> is just mixed-up confusion to me.
>
> And to me to. But I guess you defends a materialist monism. That contradicts
> Mechanism.
>
>
>>
>> Gilbert Ryle's initial rendition of "category error" (about mind) stands in
>> contradiction to Galen Strawson on that topic.
>
> The problem with the materialist is that they need to make consciousness into
> an illusion, and that is already jeopardise by the Cartesian Cogito. As I
> said, it is easier to explain the illusion of matter to a conscious being
> (especially if he remembers its dream) than to explain the illusion of
> consciousness to a piece of matter. Now, once we work in the Digital
> Mechanist frame, things get clearer and deeper.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> But in 2019:
>
> Out: Eliminative ("Mechanistic") Materialism

You use “mechanism” in his pre-Gödelian reductionist sense. After Gödel,
reductionism is simply refuted, even the reductionist conception of numbers and
machine, to begin with.

> In:Experiential Materialism
>
> "I think we need to radically rethink our understanding of matter in order to
> explain consciousness,

Sure. Mechanism attributes souls to "numbers-in-relations” and in a testable
way, as the laws of the observable are explained explicitly through them.

And our understanding of matter is revised radically, as it becomes a product
of the universal differentiating consciousness of the universal (Turing)
numbers.

> in something like the way Einstein radically rethought the nature of space
> and time.”

You can see Everett-Feynman generalising already Einstein on the quantum
reality, and Mechanism extends this idea on the whole arithmetical reality (in
which the Everett-Feynam part should appear, and seems to appear, as a sort of
border/projection.

No need of design, no need of designer, just the arithmetical reality as seen
by the universal numbers of measure one minus epsilon.

Bruno

>
> - Philip Goff [ http://www.philipgoffphilosophy.com/ ]
>
> - pt
>
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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 21 Dec 2018, at 16:13, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 8:56 AM Terren Suydam  > wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 11:35 PM Jason Resch  > wrote:
> We have no evidence nor reason to presume that we should be in a position to
> see everything that exists. In fact, we already know that not to be the case.
>  We know we can't see what lays beyond the cosmological horizon, for example.
>
> As to why I think there are likely many other universes with different laws,
> I have many separate reasons, and they all point in the same direction:
>
> 1. The trend of science has always been to humble humanity by showing us what
> exists is much larger than we assumed. (Out planet is one of many, our star
> is one of many, our galaxy is one of many, our Hubble volume is one of many,
> etc.)
> 2. It's suggested by our leading cosmological theory (eternal inflation is
> part of the standard model of cosmology, it is the default theory/assumption
> in that field of science)
> 3. It's suggested by the only theories we have that are compatible with QM
> and gravity
> 4. It explains the apparent fine tuning without resorting to intelligent
> design or fantastic luck
> 5. Multi-verse theories are often simpler than those that constrain
> possibility
> 6. It addresses the Wheeler question "Why these laws, not others"
> 7. There are many other perfectly sound and consistent equations (e.g. one
> where the gravitational constantly is a different value) why should this
> particular value for that free parameter be the only one to be "realized"
> 8. It's a conclusion of arithmetical realism
>
>
> How do you square the multiverse concept with what Bruno has asserted in the
> past - that the physics experienced by universal numbers is the same for all
> of them?
>
>
> When Bruno speaks to a universal physics, he is using a far more generalized
> notion of physics (e.g. what is extractable from the laws of self reference).

But we get a non trivial very rich quantum logic (and quantum mathematics for
the quantified extension), and by UDA they are physical laws.

That is the advantage of Mechanism: it makes physics into mathematical laws.
All the rest will be driven by the geographic-historical differentiating
consciousness flux associated with the universal numbers in arithmetic.

Physics can only speculate on the possible difference between geography and
universal laws. With mechanism, we get somehow that conceptual distinction at
the start. Physics is just the science of observable prediction. The
metaphysics of Mechanism makes them into law, and whatever not derivable
becomes contingent and variable.

>
> This might yield only a very basic set of constraints on physical laws, such
> as:
> Physical laws should be relatively simple (as simple as possible to be
> compatible with the observer's mind tied to that physical environment)
> Physical laws will be mostly computable
> Physical laws will be relatively stable
> Physical laws will yield at best probabilistic predictions (when considering
> questions below one's "substitution level")
> Physical laws must permit the construction of Turing machines
> Physical systems will appear to evolve in time
> Physical systems will appear to be continuous and linear
> Information will likely play a fundamental role
> Physical universes should appear to contain a large (perhaps infinite) number
> of observers

But, we have to get the whole mathematics of this, and this should include the
fundamental forces, the symmetrical hamiltonian, the reversibility of laws, the
particles, etc. The arithmetical constraints and arithmetical realism makes
physics reducible to self-reference, like quantum mechanics makes  chemistry
into a branch of physics “conceptually” (practically, rules of thumb are added,
as we cannot solve the equations in practice).

> Basic principals like these might serve as a universal physics, but in my
> view many things might remain open and contingent, such as:
> The mass of the electron
> Whether or not there are electrons, protons or any of the familiar particles
> we know
> The dimensionality of time and space
> Conservation laws
> The speed of light (if there is light)
> What the fundamental "stuff" is (are they Game of Life Cells, 10-dimensional
> strings, etc.)
OK. That is open problem, for the next generation. Meanwhile, mechanism can be
refuted also.

> There are many imaginable ways an observer's mind could be built and could
> arise.  Each of these imaginable ways is a "physical environment" for
> someone, but some of them are going to be much more common than others.

The observable with measure one must be the same for all universal machine.
Only the histories and geographies will remain contingent. (See my other
explanation of yesterday).

Bruno

>
> Jason
>
> --
> You received this message because you are ```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 21 Dec 2018, at 15:55, Terren Suydam  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 11:35 PM Jason Resch  > wrote:
> We have no evidence nor reason to presume that we should be in a position to
> see everything that exists. In fact, we already know that not to be the case.
>  We know we can't see what lays beyond the cosmological horizon, for example.
>
> As to why I think there are likely many other universes with different laws,
> I have many separate reasons, and they all point in the same direction:
>
> 1. The trend of science has always been to humble humanity by showing us what
> exists is much larger than we assumed. (Out planet is one of many, our star
> is one of many, our galaxy is one of many, our Hubble volume is one of many,
> etc.)
> 2. It's suggested by our leading cosmological theory (eternal inflation is
> part of the standard model of cosmology, it is the default theory/assumption
> in that field of science)
> 3. It's suggested by the only theories we have that are compatible with QM
> and gravity
> 4. It explains the apparent fine tuning without resorting to intelligent
> design or fantastic luck
> 5. Multi-verse theories are often simpler than those that constrain
> possibility
> 6. It addresses the Wheeler question "Why these laws, not others"
> 7. There are many other perfectly sound and consistent equations (e.g. one
> where the gravitational constantly is a different value) why should this
> particular value for that free parameter be the only one to be "realized"
> 8. It's a conclusion of arithmetical realism
>
>
> How do you square the multiverse concept with what Bruno has asserted in the
> past - that the physics experienced by universal numbers is the same for all
> of them?

Ah! I knew I have already explained this! In fact 8. and 7. contradicts each
other a little bit here. I would say.

Bruno

>
> Terren
>
> --
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> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> .
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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 22 Dec 2018, at 18:59, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, December 22, 2018 at 12:18:33 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 20 Dec 2018, at 16:35, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, December 20, 2018 at 12:46:06 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 19 Dec 2018, at 16:52, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 19, 2018 at 12:01:07 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 18 Dec 2018, at 07:57, Bruce Kellett > wrote:
>
> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 5:42 PM > wrote:
> On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 5:31:06 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> But we are talking about definitions of objects, not axioms of a theory. We
> know that any axiomatic theory will necessarily be incomplete -- there will
> be formulae in the theory that are neither theorems nor the negation of
> theorems.
>
> Based on the examples I previously offered, that QM and SR are axiomatic
> theories, can we conclude they're incomplete? AG
>
> Such theories of physics are not axiomatic theories. The things you referred
> to are broad principles, not axioms.
>
> That is right. Most theories in math and physics are not axiomatic.
>
> Concerning physics, nonsense! There's no difference between "the general
> principles" defining quantum mechanics and SR, and the "axioms" defining
> these theories. In SR, the genius of Einstein in 1905 was to put the theory
> on an axiomatic basis which rendered Lorentz's ether theory irrelevant. AG
>
> I guess you are using the term “axiomatic” in a more general sense that most
> logicians use that term.
>
> An "axiom" is any statement one assumes to be true. AG
>
> That is a general meaning in general philosophy. In logic an axiom is just a
> formula, or even a machine, and has nothing to do with truth a priori.
>
> IMO, your comment, while possibly true in a technical sense, is just
> obfuscating BS. For example, for non relativistic QM, we assume
> Schroedinger's equation is "true", or correctly represents how the wf
> evolves. Give me a break. AG

The whole point of doing metaphysics or theology with the scientific attitude
would consist in understanding that this kind of nuance and definition are not
obfuscating anything. On the contrary, they help to be more clear, and to
prevent the use of metaphysical biases.

When doing physics, we can assume informally that the SWE is correct, but when
doing Mechanist metaphysics, we can’t, and this is just an example, so it helps
to use the terms with they standard meaning in science, and not with imprecise
meanings which usually only hides the (open) problems.

> I know only Carnap and Bunge to have attempted axiomatic (in the stricter)
> logician sense for physics.
>
> Absent a Theory of Everything, there is no possible axiomatic structure "for
> physics". AG
>
> They failed,
>
> It was a project doomed to failure because there is no such thing as a
> general theory of physics for which it could be applied. AG
>
> Not yet. The problem of physics is that its meaning/semantics is still not
> abstracted from some metaphysical commitment.
> By separating science and religion, physics tends to be confused with
> metaphysics. Some posts in this list confirms this.
>
> Most physicists are not confused as you allege.

I agree. That is why I insist that there is no problem with physics or with
physicists. I make clear that the problem is with metaphysics. The Aristotelian
metaphysics is wrong. Now, some people are good in physics, but are not even
aware that the confusion between physics and metaphysics ïs* the main axiom of
the Aristotelian theology (with or without an important or trivial notion of
first god, matter being the second god, but still the main one for the
aristotelians (believer in primary matter, or physicalists).

The problem is not physics, but physicalism; when we assume the Mechanist
hypothesis.

> IMO, this line of discussion is just an effort to create strawmen. AG

No. It is fact that the God/Non-God debate hides the original question of
scientific theology: is there a universe existing fundamentally, in need to be
assumed or in need of faith (like the Aristotelian think), or is the physical
universe a symptom of a deeper non physical reality (like Pythagorus, Plato, …).

Physics is neutral on this; but physicalism is the Aristotelian theological
axiom. No problem, unless it used as a dogma for not testing simpler theories.

Mechanism works. Physicalism do not, at least with Mechanism.

Mechanism explains why there is an apparent universe, but also why its
mathematics split into a sharable theory of sharable quanta, and a partially
sharable theory of non sharable quanta ```

### Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

```
> On 21 Dec 2018, at 11:06, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, December 21, 2018 at 3:18:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>> The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain)
>
> Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the
> (non-digital) brain?
>
>
>
>
>
>
>> are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The
>> brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates with
>> symbols.
>
> I don’t understand. To be sure, I have no idea at all of this could work.
> Please try to explain like you would explain this to a kid. Up to now, I see
> only a magical use of word.
>
> For a logician, a theory works when you can substitute any words by any
> words. Maybe use the axiomatic presentation, with f_i for the functional
> symbols, and R_i for the relation symbols. If not, it is hard to see if there
> is a theory, or just idea-associations.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Whether psychicals (experiential states) go down to, say insects, that's one
> thing scientists are studying:
>
>
> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/do-insects-have-consciousness-180959484/
>
> Whether they go down to cells, molecules, particles, ... ,that's another
> thing (the next chapter):
>
>
> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
>
>
>
> On experiential semantics (for brain-as-computer): The toy example as I've
> given before is to think of a Turing-type computer, but instead of operating
> with symbols, it is operating with emojis - but the emojis have actual
> (material!) realization as experience.

You lost me. One of my goal is to explain “matter”, and with mechanism, we
cannot assume it at the start. Mechanism makes any role for some primary matter
being quite magical.

Bruno

>
> - pt
>
> --
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### Re: Babbage vs Turing

```
> On 22 Dec 2018, at 10:00, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, December 22, 2018 at 2:35:27 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> On Saturday, December 22, 2018 at 1:13:48 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com <>
> wrote:
> What are the key differences between their contributions to computer science?
> TIA, AG
>
> A century apart:
>
> 1837 - Analytical Engine
> 1936 - Turing Machine
>
> "[Charles Babbage's] Analytical Engine incorporated an arithmetic logic unit,
> control flow in the form of conditional branching and loops, and integrated
> memory, making it the first design for a general-purpose computer that could
> be described in modern terms as Turing-complete. In other words, the logical
> structure of the Analytical Engine was essentially the same as that which has
> [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytical_Engine
>  ]
>
> Turing sort of picked up where Babbage left off 100 years before.
>
> In retrospect, it is surprising that programming languages (which also
> logicians seemed oblivious to as well as mathematicians) took so long to
> originate.
>
> - pt
>
>
>
>
> Regarding programming, one shouldn't forget who was to be the "first
> programmer" for Babbage's AE.
>
> Ada Augusta, Countess of Lovelace
>
> http://www.fourmilab.ch/babbage/sketch.html

>From a text by Jacques Lafitte from 1911, Babbage would have Been more proud
>of its functional language that he invented to describe the plan of its “gear
>machine”, which makes me think that he discovered the concept of “universal
>machinery/universal machine”.

The first to discover the universal machine explicitly is, to my knowledge
Emile Post, and it includes hs understanding that “Church’s thesis”, is a form
of empirical laws, to be tested infinitely often.
Post anticipated the Lucas-Penrose argument, but also saw the machine response
and understood the non validity of such type of arguments. Post anticipated up
to the immaterialist consequence of Mechanism, but makes it appear in the
subject, probably influenced by Brouwer, so he was not so sure, and change its
mind after reading Turing (and coming back to a form of dualism).

To sum up Babbage discovery the universal purpose machine, and almost build it,
but the notion is rediscovered by the mathematicians when working on the
conceptual problem in the foundations of mathematics. (Gödel’s discover the
primitive recursive functions, a large subclass of thetotal computable
functions, but Turing will make precise the notion of universal machine, a set
numbers. Post, Kleene will do the equivalent work for the enumerable sets and
leads to Recursion Theory and the studies of the degrees of unsolvability of
the arithmetical problems. The war will motivate the buildings of such non
universal, at first, but quickly universal machines: the computers (physical
implementation of universal machine).

Ada Lovelace can be considered as the “inventor of subroutine” and even as the
first programmer, but some clock-bass machinery already occurred in the Antic
world, and were quite sophisticated.

Suze in Germany, von Neumann, others will be the first computers, then Steve
Jobs, thanks to the quantum based discovery of the transistors and their
miniaturisation.

Bruno

>
> - pt
>
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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 20 Dec 2018, at 16:35, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, December 20, 2018 at 12:46:06 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 19 Dec 2018, at 16:52, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 19, 2018 at 12:01:07 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 18 Dec 2018, at 07:57, Bruce Kellett > wrote:
>
> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 5:42 PM > wrote:
> On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 5:31:06 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> But we are talking about definitions of objects, not axioms of a theory. We
> know that any axiomatic theory will necessarily be incomplete -- there will
> be formulae in the theory that are neither theorems nor the negation of
> theorems.
>
> Based on the examples I previously offered, that QM and SR are axiomatic
> theories, can we conclude they're incomplete? AG
>
> Such theories of physics are not axiomatic theories. The things you referred
> to are broad principles, not axioms.
>
> That is right. Most theories in math and physics are not axiomatic.
>
> Concerning physics, nonsense! There's no difference between "the general
> principles" defining quantum mechanics and SR, and the "axioms" defining
> these theories. In SR, the genius of Einstein in 1905 was to put the theory
> on an axiomatic basis which rendered Lorentz's ether theory irrelevant. AG
>
> I guess you are using the term “axiomatic” in a more general sense that most
> logicians use that term.
>
> An "axiom" is any statement one assumes to be true. AG

That is a general meaning in general philosophy. In logic an axiom is just a
formula, or even a machine, and has nothing to do with truth a priori.

>
> I know only Carnap and Bunge to have attempted axiomatic (in the stricter)
> logician sense for physics.
>
> Absent a Theory of Everything, there is no possible axiomatic structure "for
> physics". AG
>
> They failed,
>
> It was a project doomed to failure because there is no such thing as a
> general theory of physics for which it could be applied. AG

Not yet. The problem of physics is that its meaning/semantics is still not
abstracted from some metaphysical commitment.
By separating science and religion, physics tends to be confused with
metaphysics. Some posts in this list confirms this.
Before we get serious on this, axiomatic cannot be used in physics, and even in
physicalist metaphysics.

Bruno

>
> but I think this should be pursued, as it will help for the type of
> consideration we have here, but that is a difficult task. Einstein was using
> the spirit of axiomatic thinking in SR, OK.
>
> Not merely "spirit", but concrete results. Einstein was able to derive the
> Lorentz transformation from his two postulates or axioms; namely, the
> Principle of Relativity and the invariance of the SoL for inertial frames,
> and in the process rendered Lorentz's ether theory irrelevant.  AG
>
> But like Euclid, he remains “intuitive” for the math part.
>
> Not merely intuitive, but concrete math results! See above. AG
>
> Same situation prevails for QM as far as axioms are concerned, but here
> there's nothing intuitive!  For wave mechanics, there are about 4 or 5
> postulates or axioms pulled out of a hat, from which the consequences follow.
> For Feynman's Path Integral model, there are 3 postulates, which have already
> been posted. AG
>
> Minkowski axiomatic is more like the use in logic, but then it is no more
> physics. The difficulty to axiomatic physics is … the nature of what we man
> by “universe”, or by a physical reality, or even a physical experimental
> device. We work with our intuitive model of this, for good practical reasons.
>
> Nothing intuitive about one of our best physics theory, QM, AG
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
> The same for mathematical logic: where formal axiomatic are the subject
> matter, but all proofs are given informally (with the notable exception of
> principle mathematica).
>
> Now, if we formalise a bit of quantum mechanics, we get quickly a theory rich
> enough to define universal machine or numbers, so QM, when seen formally, is
> incomplete for arithmetic. That does not mean that it is incomplete for
> physics, a notion which is also not very well defined. For SR? It will
> depends largely how we formalise it.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Bruce
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> To post to this group, s```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 21 Dec 2018, at 05:44, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 8:28 PM Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 1:07 PM Jason Resch  > wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 7:11 PM Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 11:49 AM Jason Resch  > wrote:
>
> Do you believe other locations in space exist?
>
> They exist, but there is no sense in which they are simultaneous with my
> existence.
>
> There are certain senses in which you could, but I mostly agree (as they are
> not objective).
>
> They exist because events at other locations in my past light cone can affect
> me, and I can affect events at other locations in my future light cone.
>
> Okay, no problem with this.
>
> Do you believe other locations in time exist?
>
> I believe that I have a past, and will have a future, but I do not believe
> that these exist in my present. Such an idea is clearly a linguistic
> confusion.
>
> I agree.
>
> (I answer yes to both questions, that is all I mean by block time -- that
> there is no privileged part of space time blessed with the property of
> existence).
>
> The present is all that you can know exists. All else is idle speculation.
>
> But you just said there is no such thing as the present (since there is no
> objective notion of simultaneity)
>
> I have never said that there is no such thing as the present. All I have said
> is that the notion of a space-like hyper-surface of simultaneity is not an
> objective notion.
>
> Okay I agree with this.  I happen to take this as evidence that the "passage
> of time" is also not an objective notion.  What do you think about the
> passage of time, is it purely a subjective notion in your view?
>
> The print moment exists now for ev very one of us individually.
>
> Of course, you can construct imaginary theories in which unicorns, fairies,
> and Hogwarts Castle exist, but you would not have any evidence for any of
> these.
>
> You just said you have evidence for the existence of objects in your past
> light cone.  Why presume that they would disappear from existence?  What is
> the motivation/justification for such an idea?
>
> I have no evidence that they exist now, since all I am currently aware of is
> the record of their past existence as it is present to me now. The evidence
> is that they existed in the past. Why is that not sufficient? I tend not to
> believe in things, like fairies, for which I have no current evidence.
>
> This seems to be a trend that explains all aspects of your philosophy.  For
> example, rejecting many-worlds, rejecting other universes, rejecting other
> points in time, rejecting mathematical objects. It's based purely on what you
> can see.  It is a theory of minimizing the number of objects in reality. But
> to me this is not a correct application of Occam, which was about simplifying
> theories by reducing their unnecessary assumptions, rather than reducing the
> ontologies of those theories.
>
> So by lobbing off the assumption that some points in the past stop existing,
> you get a larger universe, more points in spacetime exist (but this is
> simpler, as you don't have to add a theory of how different events come into
> or out of existence), or with many-worlds, if you drop the collapse
> postulate, you get the same predictions, and a simpler theory (but a huge
> number of unseen histories).  With this different philosophy/value system I
> don't think we will ever agree on what makes for a better theory, for in all
> these cases that we disagree, it comes down to my preference for a simpler
> theory, and your preference for a simpler ontology.

I would say that with Mechanism we get both a simple ontology (just 0, 1, 2, …)
and a simple theory, just the two SK axioms, or the very elementary RA. Yet, we
get a extremely rich phenomenology, unboundedly complex with sharable and non
sharable truth, with infinitely many histories and cosmos/multivers, etc, and
with many persons and their experiences (no risk to sacrifice souls and
consciousness).

Bruno

>
> Jason
>
> --
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> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> .
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> .
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> .

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To unsubscribe ```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 21 Dec 2018, at 03:22, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 1:03 PM Jason Resch  > wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 7:05 PM Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 11:45 AM Jason Resch  > wrote:
> 1. It is a prediction of eternal inflation and string theory.
>
> String theory and its "landscape" are very speculative, and unlikely to have
> any relation to the real world -- there is no evidence that string theory is
> even a coherent theory! Eternal inflation, although popular, is only one
> possibility for inflation, and even inflationary theory itself is not
> well-established science.
>
> I agree they are speculative, but they are on the side many many universes.
> Meanwhile there is no evidence for "the only universe that exists is the one
> I can see".
>
> The universe we see is the only one for which we have any concrete evidence,
> and that evidence is indubitable.

That is of course a strong evidence for a physical reality, but unless we buy
the Aristotelian theology, “seeing” is not an evidence for a metaphysical
reality.

I think the whole problem is here:  a confusion for the evidence for physics
with an evidence for a metaphysics. This has worked for 1500 years, only by
terror, violence, and then habits, and the constant hiding of the (mind-body)
problem under the rug (notably through “fairy tales”).

Physics is a wonderful science, but to make physics systematically, without
argument nor evidence,  into a metaphysics is a form of “modern” charlatanism,
when made consciously, and still a form of obscurantism when done by ignorance.
With science, doubts are mandatory.

Bruno

>
>
> 2. There is no known principal that prohibits other systems ruled by
> different laws.
>
> The idea that everything that is not forbidden must exist is a silly
> metaphysical notion.
>
>
> That's not the position I was advocating, though I think that notion is less
> silly than the idea that we should expect to be in a position to see
> everything that exists.
>
> Why? That is, in fact, all we have any direct evidence for.
>
>
> 3. The digits of the dimensionless constants at significance levels not
> important to life appear to be randomly distributed
>
> Appearances can be deceptive -- vide flat earth.
>
>
> What do you think determines the dimensionless constants?
>
> They may not be determined by some theory. Or they may be determined by some
> TOE. Who knows?
>
>
> 4. It is highly surprising that the dimensionless constants hold the values
> they do as if they were even slightly different, the universe would be too
> simple for any life to exist
>
> How do you know that?
>
>
> It is difficult to create systems that develop spontaneous complexity, as any
> programmer could tell you.  That our universe is such a system is surprising,
> given that most systems do not yield spontaneous complexity.
>
> Look, the Bayesian prior for any argument about the nature of the universe is
> that we exist. So there is nothing in the least surprising about the fact
> that the universe we observe is compatible with our existence. Anything else
> is just idle speculation.
>
> But that's not the correct prior to use.
>
> It is, you know. If you did not exist you could not be arguing about this. So
> your existence must be part of any prior about the nature of the universe we
> see. The prior must include total evidence available.
>
> Your assumption is that one and only one universe exists.
>
> That is all we have evidence for, but it is not so much an assumption as a
> well-founded conclusion.
>
> Starting from that assumption you must then ask what is the probability that
> life will exist in that one and only one universe.  Given that the
> probability is low, would suggest the initial assumption is wrong.  Of the 26
> dimensionless constants, lets say each one had a 50/50 chance of leading to
> catastrophe (no life) if in an invalid range.  Then the probability that all
> constants would be in the correct range is (1/2)^26 = 1 in 67 million.  We
> should then be (1 - (1/2)^26) sure that the universe we can see is not the
> only one.
>
> That is fallacious reasoning, since we do not have any evidence that the
> parameters were selected randomly from unknown distributions.
>
> Why do you believe there is only one inevitable possibility for the laws of
> physics? I've never heard any justification for that idea.
>
> Why do you think I believe that?
>
> You seemed to reject the idea of other possible physical systems ruled by
> different laws, and that the dimensionless constants are not from some random
> distribution.
>
> I reject these notions because there is no evidence for them. And if you
> assume this, it does not actually answer any questions, since you know that
> the universe in which you exist must be compatible with ```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 21 Dec 2018, at 03:03, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 7:05 PM Bruce Kellett  <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 11:45 AM Jason Resch  <mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 3:26 PM Bruce Kellett  <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 2:35 AM Jason Resch  <mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 5:01 AM Bruce Kellett  <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 8:18 PM Jason Resch  <mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:34 PM Bruce Kellett  <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 4:21 AM Bruno Marchal  <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> On 19 Dec 2018, at 12:59, Bruce Kellett  <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> Dynamics is the study of matter in motion. There are no clocks in arithmetic.
> Of course there is clock. The successor function implements it out of time
> and space.
>
> The fact that you can use one ordered sequence to index another ordered
> sequence does not constitute a clock.
>
> Nothing exists out of time and space, not even time and space themselves.
>
> Accordingly, you must reject:
> Membranes
> String theory landscape
> Eternal inflation
> The inside of black holes (yet another observer-dependent phenomenon)
> Other universes with different physics (it's amazing that our universe allows
> for life, assuming it's the only universe that exists)
> All of these ideas have at least some motivation/support. Why reject them out
> of hand?
>
> This is a very mixed list! Some of these have no evidential support, some are
> mere speculation, and other universes with different physics is a long
> stretch, not at all in accordance with present knowledge.  I do not reject
> all these possibilities, but we do need more data on some of them. None of
> them exist outside of space-time, however.
>
>  What do you think about the apparent fine-tuning of the universe? e.g.
> https://www.amazon.com/Just-Six-Numbers-Forces-Universe-ebook/dp/B00CW0H6JY
> <https://www.amazon.com/Just-Six-Numbers-Forces-Universe-ebook/dp/B00CW0H6JY>
>
> Isn't this a very strong statistical argument that other universes with
> different physical laws must exist?
>
> No. there is no evidence for that at all. Why should the constants of nature
> be a random selection from some distribution?
>
>
> 1. It is a prediction of eternal inflation and string theory.
>
> String theory and its "landscape" are very speculative, and unlikely to have
> any relation to the real world -- there is no evidence that string theory is
> even a coherent theory! Eternal inflation, although popular, is only one
> possibility for inflation, and even inflationary theory itself is not
> well-established science.
>
>
> I agree they are speculative, but they are on the side many many universes.
> Meanwhile there is no evidence for "the only universe that exists is the one
> I can see".
>
> 2. There is no known principal that prohibits other systems ruled by
> different laws.
>
> The idea that everything that is not forbidden must exist is a silly
> metaphysical notion.
>
>
> That's not the position I was advocating, though I think that notion is less
> silly than the idea that we should expect to be in a position to see
> everything that exists.
>
> 3. The digits of the dimensionless constants at significance levels not
> important to life appear to be randomly distributed
>
> Appearances can be deceptive -- vide flat earth.
>
>
> What do you think determines the dimensionless constants?
>
> 4. It is highly surprising that the dimensionless constants hold the values
> they do as if they were even slightly different, the universe would be too
> simple for any life to exist
>
> How do you know that?
>
>
> It is difficult to create systems that develop spontaneous complexity, as any
> programmer could tell you.  That our universe is such a system is surprising,
> given that most systems do not yield spontaneous complexity.
>
> Look, the Bayesian prior for any argument about the nature of the universe is
> that we exist. So there is nothing in the least surprising about the fact
> that the universe we observe is compatible with our existence. Anything else
> is just idle speculation.
>
> But that's not the correct prior to use.  Your assumption is that one and
> only one universe exists.  Starting from that assumption you must then ask
> what is the probability that life will ex```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 21 Dec 2018, at 01:07, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, December 20, 2018 at 3:40:53 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 3:13 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>
> Is not 333’s oddness timeless?
>
> Category error.
>
>
>
> On category error:
>
> I've never understood "category error" [
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_mistake ]. (Some philosopher I read
> about recently gave a talk on the non-existence of category errors. Good.)
>
> Is 333's oddness timeless? is a perfectly reasonable question.
>
> To the immaterialist, the answer could be "yes".
> To the materialist, the answer could not be "no”.

That makes sense only if the materialist describe how 333 depends on time. But
then I suppose he has a different definition than the usual one, and that
requires clarification.

>
> It all depends.
>
> There is a type of dualists who say 333 is one category (nonphysical) and
> time (as in spacetime) is in another category (physical), but this dualism is
> just mixed-up confusion to me.

And to me to. But I guess you defends a materialist monism. That contradicts
Mechanism.

>
> Gilbert Ryle's initial rendition of "category error" (about mind) stands in
> contradiction to Galen Strawson on that topic.

The problem with the materialist is that they need to make consciousness into
an illusion, and that is already jeopardise by the Cartesian Cogito. As I said,
it is easier to explain the illusion of matter to a conscious being (especially
if he remembers its dream) than to explain the illusion of consciousness to a
piece of matter. Now, once we work in the Digital Mechanist frame, things get
clearer and deeper.

Bruno

>
> - pt
>
> --
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```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 20 Dec 2018, at 22:40, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 3:13 AM Bruno Marchal  <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> On 19 Dec 2018, at 23:36, Bruce Kellett  <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 9:33 AM Jason Resch  <mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:18 PM Bruce Kellett > <mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:
>> From: Jason Resch mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:00 AM Bruce Kellett >> <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Of course they differ: in one case you have a purely local concept of the
>>> present; in the other case you require some global notion of a "present",
>>> which cannot even be uniquely defined.
>>>
>>>
>>> What exists?
>>>
>>> A: naive presentism: only a 3-dimensional space evolving in time (some
>>> particular "slice" of spacetime exists, which constantly changes)
>>> B: local-presents: Events, each in their position in space time, each in
>>> their own present time
>>> C: block-time: Events, each in their position in space time
>>>
>>> We both agree relativity rules out A.  But I struggle to see the difference
>>> between B and C (ontologically speaking), unless you are proposing the view
>>> that the only thing that exists is a single event (I don't think you are
>>> though).
>>
>> There are of the order of 10^80 protons in the visible universe. One does
>> not confuse this fact by imagining that there is only one proton..
>>
>> I think your problem with the ontology of the strictly local "present" is
>> that you still have in you mind some notion of an absolute, external time,
>> in which all these "presents" exist. Your description of "block time" in C
>> above makes precisely this mistake.
>>
>> I am only asking what exists in your theory, given you reject the notion of
>> the present as a global space-like hyperplane.
>>
>> The universe exists -- an infinity of present moments. Nothing exists
>> timelessly because that is incoherent.
>
>
> Is not the block-universe timeless?
>
> No. The concept of "timeless" involves an underlying time -- it means
> "unchanging in time”.

I don’t see this at all. Proof?

>
> Are not the physical laws supposed to be timeless?
>
> No.

Then I am not sure I understand what you mean by physical (or not) law.

>
> Is not 333’s oddness timeless?
>
> Category error.

Good. As I said, that is why I prefer the name: “out of time”.

>
>  Even out of the category of things to which the notion of time can be
> applied.
>
> Of course, you *assume* a primary physical universe.
>
> To use such a strong ontological hypothesis to prevent the testing of a
> simpler theory, which do not assume anything like that, is a poor use of
> philosophy.
>
> No, it is a sensible way to get useable results.

But that is not the goal here, which is in understanding.

>
> It is just saying to people that there is nothing interesting there.
>
> Yes, investigation shows that there is nothing to see here.

Which investigation? References?

Sorry Bruce, but physics use an identity mind-brain which does not make sense
with Mechanism.

>
> You are saying that your case is so true that there is no need for an
> investigation.
>
> No, I am not saying anything of the sort. All theories need to be tested,
> revised and improved.

OK. But physics miss all prediction, without using a principle of unicity which
does not work with Mechanism. Physics is incomplete in that regards. Arithmetic
*is* complete for this.

>
> It is an invalid appeal to the argument per authority to prevent the search
> of the truth.
>
> You are one to speak about appeals to authority.
> That is all you ever do. You do not provide evidence, you provide
> authorities, and tell us to go and read the authoritative texts……

I gave a proof, and of course references. That is usual in science. You appeal
to a philosophical conviction, and present it as it was true. In science, we
never claim truth. Especially in metaphysics.

Bruno

>
> Bruce
>
> --
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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 20 Dec 2018, at 22:35, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 2:46 AM Bruno Marchal  <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> On 19 Dec 2018, at 23:33, Bruce Kellett  <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 4:21 AM Bruno Marchal > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
>> On 19 Dec 2018, at 12:59, Bruce Kellett > <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> Dynamics is the study of matter in motion. There are no clocks in
>>> arithmetic.
>> Of course there is clock. The successor function implements it out of time
>> and space.
>>
>> The fact that you can use one ordered sequence to index another ordered
>> sequence does not constitute a clock.
>
> But it is all you need to implement a clock similar to the one used in, say,
> a von Neumann computer.
>
> No, a clock is a physical device, not a sequence of imaginary objects.

But “physical” is what we have to explain (assuming Mechanism, by the UDA).

>
>> Nothing exists out of time and space, not even time and space themselves.
> Assuming such absolute space and time exists in some absolute way, and for
> this you need to assume that the brain is not Turing emulable, and you are
> out of working hypothesis.
>
> You can have your hypothesis. But I am talking about what works in the world,
> not some arbitrary hypothesis.

But physics, despite its tremendous success in the (first person plural)
prediction needs an identity thesis which is refuted by all theories based on
mechanism. Darwin use mechanism, molecular biology used mechanism, and
QM-withput-reduction use mechanism. What is you alternative? You can’t have
both Mechanism and Physicalism.

Bruno

>
> Bruce
>
> --
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```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```

> On 20 Dec 2018, at 20:37, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/20/2018 2:09 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> How is it imaginary if they later confirm it?  i.e., they wait 1 year, and
>> compare their readings from telescopes of things 1 ly away from them, and
>> when they compare notes each one confirms that indeed their presents
>> contained a different set of objects on that day 1 year ago when they
>> crossed paths.
>
> If there was an event one light year away in one of their's "present" at the
> time they passed, the other will not agree that it was in his "present" at
> that moment.  But they will agree on the event and it's causal relation to
> other events...which is why physicsts don't assign any significance to these
> subjective "presents”.

Which is good methodology in physics, but a non-sense in metaphysics, or they
need to eliminate consciousness or Mechanism.

Bruno

>
> Brent
>
> --
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```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```
> On 20 Dec 2018, at 19:28, John Clark  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 10:42 AM Bruno Marchal  <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
>
> >> Without using matter/energy or the laws of physics how can you associate
> >> anything with anything?
>
> > The function 1/2 (m+n)(m+n+1) + m associates [...]
>
> Associates? But that was my question!

And my answer is in the quote.

> Without using matter/energy or the laws of physics how can you make
> associations of anything with anything?

Like above. Of course if by “associating” to mean physical association, then
you need to derive the physical reality from arithmetic, and use the physical
association, but those are still based on the non material association which
belongs to arithmetic. The function s associates n and n+1, to give another
very simple exemple.
I think you just assumed some primary physical reality. I do not. I derive it.

> And there are an infinite number of associations that can be made, so how did
> you pick the one you did and reject all the others?

I reject none. But they are structured by arithmetic, notably through reference
and self-reference by the person related to the numbers and numbers relation.
It is like in all sciences.

>
> > each natural number with each couple (n, m) of natural numbers. No physical
> > hypothesis at all is needed to prove that result.
>
> So to prove you can associate things without using matter/energy or the laws
> of physics you must first associate things without using matter/energy or the
> laws of physics.

The study of the kind of association I use is called “mathematics”.

Bruno

>
> John K Clark
>
>
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```

### Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

```
> On 20 Dec 2018, at 14:49, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, December 20, 2018 at 5:41:07 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 19 Dec 2018, at 19:36, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, December 19, 2018 at 9:19:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 18 Dec 2018, at 16:40, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> snip
>
>>>
>>>
>>> I should add: Why is fictionalism compelling?
>>>
>>> When you get down to the bottom of it, numbers are spiritual entities.
>>
>> I have no problem with that. I have some evidence for spiritual entities,
>> indeed all the mathematical notions are spiritual or immaterial, then
>> consciousness mind, etc.
>>
>>
>>
>>> Many are compelled to want to eliminate spiritual entities.
>>
>>
>> Like you apparently. If you put the spiritual entities, like numbers and
>> math in fictionalism, it will look you consider them as fiction, it seems to
>> me.
>>
>> I am problem driven. And my favorite problem is the mind-body problem. I
>> reduce the mind-body problem into the justification why universal spiritual
>> entities get the (admittedly persistent) impression of a primitively
>> material world. I found it. All universal “spiritual” entities go through
>> this.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> A: There is arithmetical reality where there are "simulated" entities that
>> surmise a material reality (but matter itself does not actually exist).
>>
>> M. There is material reality where arithmetic is a language (or language
>> group) created by material entities.
>
> But the arithmetical reality is not a language.
>
>
>
>>
>> But to have A producing matter in reality, or matter "emerging from" A
>> (A→M),  is a kind of dualism. And what would be the need for A→M if A is
>> enough?
>
> Because []p & <>t (prediction) is not the same as []p, from the point of view
> of the machine. It feels different. It obeys different laws. That difference
> of perception is explained in virtue of the arithmetical reality..
>
>
>
>>
>> In M, "mind" comes from the psychical states of matter (Strawson, et al.,
>> who say of course that the "mechanistic", "physicalistic", whatever
>> materialists are misguided).
>
>
> Which psychical states of matter?
>
> Should we give the right to vote to Milk and coffee?
>
> To have thinking, usually we bet on some form of dialog, and that is why a
> brain or a computer has so many connexions/relations. Why would we need a
> brain if there is some primary matter with the ability to think? Do you think
> a brain is not Turing emulable, or do you think a brain can be Turing
> emulated but that this would only make a p-zombie (someone acting like it was
> conscious, but isn’t?).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> That arithmetic is a language (or technically, a language group) leads to it
> (from a language theory perspective) includes both syntax & semantics.
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language_theory
> Formal semantics
>
> Main article: Formal semantics of programming languages
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_semantics_of_programming_languages>
> Formal semantics is the formal specification of the behavior of computer
> programs and programming languages. Three common approaches to describe the
> semantics or "meaning" of a computer program are denotational semantics
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denotational_semantics>, operational semantics
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operational_semantics> and axiomatic semantics
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiomatic_semantics>.
>
>

Wiki is not quite accurate on those matters. Better to separate the language,
the semantics, and the theories.  I use the notion of theory, to avoid the
“semantics” used in programming language (to avoid possible confusion).

> (From a fictionalist view, the objects of arithmetic are fictional objects: a
> fictional semantics.)

The point is that with Mechanism, primary physics is inconsistent. So we are
out of my working hypothesis.

>
>
> The psychical (experiential) states of matter (brain)

Why a brain? If matter can be conscious, what is the role of the (non-digital)
brain?

> are the real constituents (psychicals) of consciousness. The
> brain-as-computer operates with psychicals as a Turing-machine operates with
> symbols.```