Bruno:
I'd like to hear more details about MGA if you don't mind. I tried to
find the detailed description with no avail. Even though I am new and still
sipping through the snipits here, I feel the potential of this hypothesis. I
think the all the hard problems (mind/body, subjectivity/objectivity,
dualism/non-dual) are basically circular dependent, like two coupled
subsystems, perhaps neither of them fundamental. How do we gain ‘the outside
view’ of a closed-system if we are inside or we are the system? It’s like chess
pieces being aware of their existence and searching for underneath rules by
observation. I also like your ideas such as ‘self-observing ‘ideal’ machine
discovers the arithmetic truth by looking inside’ (pardon my poetic
distortion). How close can we look? The light is on but nobody’s home?
Gordon
--- On Thu, 11/13/08, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thursday, November 13, 2008, 9:38 AM
On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the
argument
with people interested in the matter.
True. You're tireless! (That's a complement.)
Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to
tell us what he means by a physical universe.
I totally agree. But most people will just wave their arms and say,
What do you mean? We're obviously in a physical universe.
What's
problematic about that?
I think there is a reason for that. Million of years of Darwinian
brain washing. But we can't complain, it has also been brain-building.
Note that the Greek are the first to rationally take a distance from
that, and by this move created modern science including theology as
the most fundamental science. But humanity was perhaps not mature
enough, so when Aristotle reintroduced the idea that matter is basic,
both scientist and theologian get back to it.
Of course poets and mystics know better
And then the burden is back on us to explain
why the concept of physical existence is more problematic than
it
seems. Burden Tennis.
This is the reason why I have developed the Movie Graph Argument
(hereafter MGA).
It is not a question of taste. It is a question of acknowledging use
of logic and assumptions, and finding either hidden assumptions, or
imprecise statements or invalid argument step(s).
I see your point. But there are issues of clarity or focus, and to
some extent those are a matter of taste. I'd like to read an essay (by
anyone) that lays out a clear argument in favor of the position that
computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious.
Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will
have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember
that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be
it soft or hard wired).
I
believe this argument can be made without reference to Loebian
machines, first-person indeterminacy, or teleportation thought-
experiments.
MGA is a completely different thought experiment. It looks a bit like
UDA, but it is deeply different.
I hope you don't find my criticism too annoying.
Not at all. But many in this list said it was obvious that the UD does
not need to be run, and I remember that I thought that explaining MGA
was not really necessary. Even you, right now, seem to agree that
computation does not need to be implemented. This does not motivate me
too much. The MGA is far more subtle than UDA, and it is a bit
frustrating to explain it to people who says in advance that they
already agree with the conclusion. Even Maudlin did complain to me
that few people have understand its Olympia reasoning. Many confuses
it with other type of criticism of comp.
It's easy for me to
sit on the sidelines and take potshots, while you've done a lot of
actual work. And remember that I do, in fact, believe that
computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious, so
you're usually preaching to the choir with me.
You see!
My point is that, I can
imagine Dennett reading your posts, and saying Ok, that makes sense
*if* we accept that computations don't need to be implemented in order
to be conscious. But I still don't see why I should believe
that.
Dennett, like many naturalist is not aware that the notion of
matter
is not obvious at all. The greeks were much more aware than all those
who followed, of the mind body problem (except Descartes and
Malebranche). Today people thought about the consciousness problem,
when the real trouble is in defining both mind and matter and relating
them. And Dennett seems not to be aware that modern physics has not
progressed at all in the hard problem of matter, on the contrary,
modern physics (quantum physics)
