### What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

```I am trying to make a list of what properties are comparable between two
universes and which properties are incomparable. I think this has
applications regarding what knowledge can be extracted via simulation of
(from one's POV) other abstract realities and worlds (which may be actual
from someone else's point of view).

So far this is what I have, but would appreciate other's
insights/corrections:

Incomparable properties:

- Sizes (e.g., how big is something in another universe, is a galaxy in
that universe bigger or smaller than a planet in our universe?)
- Distances (what possible meaning could a meter have in that other
universe?)
- Strength of forces (we could say how particles are affected by these
forces in their universe, but not how they would translate if applied to
our own)
- Time (how long it takes for anything to happen in that other universe)
- Age (when it began, how long the universe has existed)
- Speeds (given neither distance nor time is comparable)
- Present (what the present time is in the other universe)
- Position (it has no relative position, or location relative to our own
universe)

Comparable properties:

- Information content (how many bits are needed to describe state)
- Computational complexity (how many operations need to be computed to
- Dimensionality of its objects (e.g. spacetime, strings, etc.)
- Entropy
- Plankian/discrete units (e.g. in terms of smallest physically
meaningful units)

Unsure:

- Mass? (given forces are not comparable, but also related to energy)
- Energy (given its relation to both entropy and mass)

So if we simulate some other universe, we can describe and relate it to our
own physical universe in similar terms of information content,
computational complexity, dimensionality, discrete units, etc. but many
things seem to have no meaning at all: time, distance, size.

Do these reflect limits of simulation, or are they limits that apply to our
own universe itself?  e.g., if everything in this universe was made 100X
larger, and all forces similarly scaled, would we notice?  Perhaps
incomparable properties are things that are variant (and illusory) in an
objective sense.

A final question, are they truly "causally disconnected" given we can
simulate them? E.g. if we can use computers to temporarily compel matter in
our universe to behave like things in that simulated universe, then in some
sense isn't that a causal interaction?  What things can travel through such
portals of simulation beyond information?

Jason

P.S.

It is interesting that when we consider mathematical/platonic objects, we
likewise face the same limits in terms of being able to understand them.
e.g., we can't point to the Mandlebrot set, nor compare its size in terms
of physical units.

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### Re: Materialism and Mechanism

```On Sun, Jan 6, 2019 at 8:20 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
>
>
> Of course *physical, chemical, biological, psychical, sociological *laws
> (to run the spectrum) are all human inventions.
>
> The questions are about how these laws interrelate (and terms like *emergence,
> reduction, downward causation* are used).
>
> In terms of processing, I distinguish *experience processing* from
> *information
> processing.*
>
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/
>
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/
>
>
>From the above page:

But suppose there was hardware that supported experiential functionality
as well. Programs in a language with experiential modalities could execute
“for real” in that computing substrate, as opposed to the
informational-only supporting hardware.

*The connection between experience (phenomenal material consciousness) and
truth (experiential modal logic) would be that it is possible for there to
be different kinds of consciousness via alternative material substrates.*

What does this imply for philosophical zombies? ([1
], [2
],
[3
])
Are they possible within your theory?

Are you familiar with Chalmer's fading and dancing qualia thought
experiment? [4 ]
What does your theory predict regarding the behavior and experience of a
biological brain being replaced with some *information-only* hardware?

Jason

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### Re: Materialism and Mechanism

```On Sun, Jan 6, 2019 at 4:47 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 6:02:39 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 2:05 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:52:19 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:

On Saturday, January 5, 2019, Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:02:53 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 6:13 AM Philip Thrift
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 4:26:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
>>> wrote:

On 4 Jan 2019, at 17:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:

Physicists today (as I've observed) are not (for the most part)
real materialists.

That is true, and physicists have rarely problem with the
consequence of Mechanism. Now, some physicist can be immaterialist, but
still physicalist (like Tegmark was at some moment at least). The
physical
reality would be a mathematical reality among others, but with
computationalism, the physical reality comes from a more global
mathematical phenomenon based on the behaviour/semantics of the
material
mode of self-rereyence (involving probabilities, i.e., for those who
have
studied the self-referential modes available, the []p & X modes, with X
being either p, or <>t, or p & <>t).

This makes mechanism testable, and if quantum mechanics did not
exist, I would have thought that Mechanism is already refuted.

Bruno

>>>
>>>
>>> "Physicalism"/"Physical" are words that needs deprecating, as they
>>> can mean (to some philosophers of science) "can be reduced to physics",
>>> and
>>> physics is what is currently-accepted in the physics scientific
>>> community.
>>>
>>> (When I use "physical", I mean it in the sense of being
>>> "explainable" by physics.)
>>>
>>> It gets worse: "In this entry, I will adopt the policy of using both
>>> terms ['materialism' and 'physicalism'] interchangeably, though I will
>>> typically refer to the thesis we will discuss as ‘physicalism’."
>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/
>>>
>>> Better to just use "materialism" and reject the use of "physicalism"
>>> (unless it refers to a the particular meaning of "can be reduced to
>>> physics"), though materialism has a "weak" and "strong" definition.
>>>
>>> Galen Strawson defines what "hard-nosed materialism" is:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> The important distinction, which may be lost in your definitions, is
>> whether "primariness" is assumed or not.  These diagrams I made highlight
>> the difference:
>>
>>
>> *Primary Physicalism (Physics is at the bottom, and cannot be
>> explained or derived from anything else):*
>> [image: primary-physicalism.png]
>>
>> *Non-Primary Physicalism (Physics is not at the bottom, and can be
>> explained or derived from something more fundamental):*
>> [image: non-primary-physicalism.png]
>>
>> You could also be agnostic on the question, let's call someone with
>> that belief a "*Primary Physicalism Agnostic*".
>>
>> Currently, scientists have collected zero evidence in favor of
>> Primary Physicalism. So if you strongly believe it, you might want to
>> consider why it is you believe in something so strongly despite there
>> being
>> no evidence for it.
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But what exactly would be a "test for Mechanism"?
>>>
>>>
>> If you replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet
>> functionally equivalent replacement and experience no change in
>> consciousness.
>>
>> The existence and utility of cochlear implants can be seen as a loose
>> confirmation of digital mechanism.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>
>
>
> A question remains though: Can chemistry (or biology for that matter)
> be reduced to physics? By that it is typically meant "Can problems of
> theoretical chemistry be reduced to The Standard Model?"
>
> See  *List of unsolved problems in chemistry*
> -
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_chemistry
>
> Except for a leap of faith ("The Standard Model can explain all of
> these open problems in chemistry"), there could be chemical properties not
> reducible to physical properties.
>

Doesn't that require chemical reactions that violate physical laws?

>
> If that is the case, what is physical (as I have defined physical)
> does not cover what is chemical (much less biological).
>
> ```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 7:15 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 1/5/2019 4:56 PM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 12:13:16 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 1/5/2019 1:28 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> The relation is provided by the metric.  If you choose different
>>> coordinate systems (e.g. cylindrical or spherical or whatever) then there
>>> is different metric tensor.  So the integral along the path of g_ab dx^a
>>> dx^b is the same.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> *I assume you're showing why the proper time along a given path is the
>> same for all observers, and this has nothing to do with coordinate time
>> being unrelated to proper time. AG *
>>
>>
>> Coordinate time between events A and B is just delta(x^0) = x^0(B) -
>> x^0(A).  Just like the longitudinal distance between LA and NY is
>> Long(LA)-Long(NY).  But the driving distance between LA and NY depends on
>> the path you take and is an integral along that path which includes changes
>> in latitude:
>>
>> S^2 = INT_path g_ab dx^a dx^b = INT_path [ dlong*dlong*cos^2(lat) +
>> dlat*dlat]
>>
>> Notice the cos^2 factor because the space isn't  flat.
>>
>> So in GR coordinate time is related to proper time; it contributes a term
>> in accordance with the metric that describes the curvature of the
>> spacetime.  But there are other terms from the spatial coordinates and even
>> cross terms and the terms are weighted by the metric factors that describe
>> the shape of the space.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> *I think you mean that coordinate time is related to proper time as a path
> is traversed, *
>
>
> Right.  They are related, but not in a simple way.  Each increment of
> coordinate time along the paths contributes to the increment of proper
> time, but it is only one term of several.
>

I recommend Relativity Visualized:

https://www.amazon.com/Relativity-Visualized-Lewis-Carroll-Epstein/dp/093521805X

Jason

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### Re: Materialism and Mechanism

```On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 2:05 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:52:19 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:02:53 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:

On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 6:13 AM Philip Thrift
wrote:

>
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 4:26:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 17:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>> Physicists today (as I've observed) are not (for the most part) real
>> materialists.
>>
>>
>>
>> That is true, and physicists have rarely problem with the consequence
>> of Mechanism. Now, some physicist can be immaterialist, but still
>> physicalist (like Tegmark was at some moment at least). The physical
>> reality would be a mathematical reality among others, but with
>> computationalism, the physical reality comes from a more global
>> mathematical phenomenon based on the behaviour/semantics of the material
>> mode of self-rereyence (involving probabilities, i.e., for those who have
>> studied the self-referential modes available, the []p & X modes, with X
>> being either p, or <>t, or p & <>t).
>>
>> This makes mechanism testable, and if quantum mechanics did not
>> exist, I would have thought that Mechanism is already refuted.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>
>
> "Physicalism"/"Physical" are words that needs deprecating, as they can
> mean (to some philosophers of science) "can be reduced to physics", and
> physics is what is currently-accepted in the physics scientific community.
>
> (When I use "physical", I mean it in the sense of being "explainable"
> by physics.)
>
> It gets worse: "In this entry, I will adopt the policy of using both
> terms ['materialism' and 'physicalism'] interchangeably, though I will
> typically refer to the thesis we will discuss as ‘physicalism’."
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/
>
> Better to just use "materialism" and reject the use of "physicalism"
> (unless it refers to a the particular meaning of "can be reduced to
> physics"), though materialism has a "weak" and "strong" definition.
>
> Galen Strawson defines what "hard-nosed materialism" is:
>
>
>
The important distinction, which may be lost in your definitions, is
whether "primariness" is assumed or not.  These diagrams I made highlight
the difference:

*Primary Physicalism (Physics is at the bottom, and cannot be explained
or derived from anything else):*
[image: primary-physicalism.png]

*Non-Primary Physicalism (Physics is not at the bottom, and can be
explained or derived from something more fundamental):*
[image: non-primary-physicalism.png]

You could also be agnostic on the question, let's call someone with
that belief a "*Primary Physicalism Agnostic*".

Currently, scientists have collected zero evidence in favor of Primary
Physicalism. So if you strongly believe it, you might want to consider why
it is you believe in something so strongly despite there being no evidence
for it.

>
>
> But what exactly would be a "test for Mechanism"?
>
>
If you replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet
functionally equivalent replacement and experience no change in
consciousness.

The existence and utility of cochlear implants can be seen as a loose
confirmation of digital mechanism.

Jason

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> A question remains though: Can chemistry (or biology for that matter) be
>>> reduced to physics? By that it is typically meant "Can problems of
>>> theoretical chemistry be reduced to The Standard Model?"
>>>
>>> See  *List of unsolved problems in chemistry*
>>> -  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_chemistry
>>>
>>> Except for a leap of faith ("The Standard Model can explain all of these
>>> open problems in chemistry"), there could be chemical properties not
>>> reducible to physical properties.
>>>
>>
>> Doesn't that require chemical reactions that violate physical laws?
>>
>>
>>>
>>> If that is the case, what is physical (as I have defined physical) does
>>> not cover what is chemical (much less biological).
>>>
>>> Matter includes all levels of "stuff": physical, chemical, biological,
>>> psychical. So materialism is the agnostic position: It doesn't matter
>>> whether everything can be reduced to the physical or not.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In "replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet
>>> functionally equivalent replacement", mechanical could of course include
>>> biomechanical (as defined in *synthetic biology*), as there was no
>>> restriction of ```

### Re: Materialism and Mechanism

```On Saturday, January 5, 2019, Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:02:53 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 6:13 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 4:26:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 4 Jan 2019, at 17:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:

Physicists today (as I've observed) are not (for the most part) real
materialists.

That is true, and physicists have rarely problem with the consequence
of Mechanism. Now, some physicist can be immaterialist, but still
physicalist (like Tegmark was at some moment at least). The physical
reality would be a mathematical reality among others, but with
computationalism, the physical reality comes from a more global
mathematical phenomenon based on the behaviour/semantics of the material
mode of self-rereyence (involving probabilities, i.e., for those who have
studied the self-referential modes available, the []p & X modes, with X
being either p, or <>t, or p & <>t).

This makes mechanism testable, and if quantum mechanics did not exist,
I would have thought that Mechanism is already refuted.

Bruno

>>>
>>>
>>> "Physicalism"/"Physical" are words that needs deprecating, as they can
>>> mean (to some philosophers of science) "can be reduced to physics", and
>>> physics is what is currently-accepted in the physics scientific community.
>>>
>>> (When I use "physical", I mean it in the sense of being "explainable" by
>>> physics.)
>>>
>>> It gets worse: "In this entry, I will adopt the policy of using both
>>> terms ['materialism' and 'physicalism'] interchangeably, though I will
>>> typically refer to the thesis we will discuss as ‘physicalism’."
>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/
>>>
>>> Better to just use "materialism" and reject the use of "physicalism"
>>> (unless it refers to a the particular meaning of "can be reduced to
>>> physics"), though materialism has a "weak" and "strong" definition.
>>>
>>> Galen Strawson defines what "hard-nosed materialism" is:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> The important distinction, which may be lost in your definitions, is
>> whether "primariness" is assumed or not.  These diagrams I made highlight
>> the difference:
>>
>>
>> *Primary Physicalism (Physics is at the bottom, and cannot be explained
>> or derived from anything else):*
>> [image: primary-physicalism.png]
>>
>> *Non-Primary Physicalism (Physics is not at the bottom, and can be
>> explained or derived from something more fundamental):*
>> [image: non-primary-physicalism.png]
>>
>> You could also be agnostic on the question, let's call someone with that
>> belief a "*Primary Physicalism Agnostic*".
>>
>> Currently, scientists have collected zero evidence in favor of Primary
>> Physicalism. So if you strongly believe it, you might want to consider why
>> it is you believe in something so strongly despite there being no evidence
>> for it.
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But what exactly would be a "test for Mechanism"?
>>>
>>>
>> If you replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet
>> functionally equivalent replacement and experience no change in
>> consciousness.
>>
>> The existence and utility of cochlear implants can be seen as a loose
>> confirmation of digital mechanism.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>
>
>
> A question remains though: Can chemistry (or biology for that matter) be
> reduced to physics? By that it is typically meant "Can problems of
> theoretical chemistry be reduced to The Standard Model?"
>
> See  *List of unsolved problems in chemistry*
> -  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_chemistry
>
> Except for a leap of faith ("The Standard Model can explain all of these
> open problems in chemistry"), there could be chemical properties not
> reducible to physical properties.
>

Doesn't that require chemical reactions that violate physical laws?

>
> If that is the case, what is physical (as I have defined physical) does
> not cover what is chemical (much less biological).
>
> Matter includes all levels of "stuff": physical, chemical, biological,
> psychical. So materialism is the agnostic position: It doesn't matter
> whether everything can be reduced to the physical or not.
>
>
>
> In "replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet functionally
> equivalent replacement", mechanical could of course include biomechanical
> (as defined in *synthetic biology*), as there was no restriction of
> "mechanical".
>
>
Mechanism is the belief that any mechanical replacement will do, regardless
of what that mechanical component is made of, so long as that component is
functionally equivalent to the part replaced.  Mechanism is the belief held
by 99% of scientists, who say they brain is a machine, and there is no
magic in it.

Jason

>
> - pt
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to ```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Fri, Dec 28, 2018 at 4:09 PM Bruce Kellett
wrote:

> From: Jason Resch
>
>
> Clock desycnhronization is a different phenomenon and has a different
> cause and explanation than time dilation.
>
> Because of the relativity of simultaneity in SR, clock synchronization is
> not a global phenomenon -- it depends on the way in which the clocks are
> synchronized. So clocks synchronized by one method in one frame will not
> necessarily be synchronized in different frames. The time read on such
> clocks is local only, so will they will not necessarily agree when they are
> brought together.
>

You would agree that two atomic clocks in the same reference frame, 100
meters away synchronized by a flash of light exactly in between them are
synchronized, right?

Now assume there are two clocks each in both the front and rear of the
rocket, as well as a 5th clock exactly in the middle.  Roughly this is as
follows:

Clock1---Clock3---Clock4
Clock2Clock5

Clocks 2, 3, and 5 are atomic clocks, which count the number of vibrations
of some atom per second, and increment the nanosecond counter displayed on
the clock face when it has seen enough vibrations of that atom.  Clocks 1
and 4 are not atomic clocks, but are mere counters.  Every time clock 3
measures a vibration of the atom, it sends a light pulse to a sensor in
clock 1 and clock 4.  Clock 1 and clock 4 count these light pulses, and
when there have been enough light pulses to represent a nanosecond, they
too increment the nanosecond counter on the clock face.

At some time = 0, the rocket is at rest, and clock1 and clock4 are set to
0, then clock 3 turns on and sends the light pulses and clocks 1 and 4
begin counting.  The moment clock1 counts 1, clock2 is activated and sets
its counter to 1, and thereafter counts the vibrations of its own atom
under measurement. Likewise, the moment clock 4 measures its first light
flash, clock 5 is activated and begins counting its own atom's vibrations.

Do you agree at this point, all 5 clocks are synchronized, within their own
reference frame?

Now what happens from an external frame as this rocket accelerates to 0.8 c
in the direction facing rightwards? Outside this frame, one will see the
light flashes take slightly longer to reach clock4 which is moving away
from the light source of clock3, while clock1 will begin receiving the
light flashes slightly faster the absolute number or difference in timings
is proportional to both the length separating the clocks, as well as the
absolute speed of the rocket. This results in a permanent discrepancy
between clocks 1 and 4.

Now what of clocks 2 and 5? Do they not remain in complete agreement with
their local "light flash counting clocks" throughout this process?

What happens when the rocket comes to a rest, from the perspective of the
external at-rest observer, do the clocks not all resynchronize?

Can not everything in this experiment be explained in terms of special
relativity?

Jason

> The effects of time dilation are dependent on relative speed. But whether
> I bring the clocks together moving one of them at either 1 meter/second or
> 1 mm per year, they will still appear synchronized to the person on the
> ground.  You can calculate the time dilation effects of moving at 1 meter
> per second over the ship's length of 100 meters, it won't account for the
> 266.85 nanoseconds of clock descynrhonization that the observer on the
> ground sees.
>
> The effect is more related to length contraction than anything. If you see
> a length contracted object, you are simultaneously seeing "older" and
> "newer" parts of that object, the rear part of the object will be newer in
> time, while the forward part of the object will be the older part of the
> object.  Consider the observer on the ground watching the rocket gradually
> slow.  The entire part of the rocket is slowing at the exact same rate, but
> by the time it stops both clocks will again be perfectly synchronized.
> This resynchronization cannot be explained in terms of time dilation or
> different relative velocities.
>
> There are no "older" or "newer" parts of an object, because there is no
> such thing as an absolute time. Time is a purely local phenomenon:
> apparent clock rates are affected by relative motions.
>
> Because of general relativistic effects, slowing the rocket will cause the
> clock rates at the front and rear of the rocket to be different, so they
> will not remain synchronized, even if that concept made any sense in the
> first place.
>
>
> However, it can be explained in terms of objects in spacetime being
> 4-dimensional, and viewing acceleration or deceleration as the rotation of
> those 4-dimensional objects. (which ```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Fri, Dec 28, 2018 at 4:03 AM Bruce Kellett
wrote:

> From: Jason Resch
>
> On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 4:24 PM Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 25, 2018 at 4:59 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 12:30 AM Bruce Kellett
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 4:03 PM Jason Resch
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 11:06 PM Brent Meeker
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 12/23/2018 7:17 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > How can this be? The rocket is a rigid structure, the front and
>>>>>> rear
>>>>>> > clocks accelerate at the same rate.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> First, there are no rigid objects in relativity theory.  Otherwise
>>>>>> they
>>>>>> could be used for  FTL signaling.  Second, there is no simultaneity
>>>>>> at
>>>>>> different places, like the front and rear of the rocket.  So it is
>>>>>> frame
>>>>>> dependent whether the two ends of the rocket begin to accelerate at
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> same time.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> The level of clock desynchronization is proportional to the speed and
>>>>> the length of the rocket.   That it is one rocket doesn't even matter, it
>>>>> could be two rockets, which both separately accelerate at the same time
>>>>> given by a signal initiated from immediately between them.  This is just
>>>>> showing that length contraction is only a spatial length contraction. The
>>>>> length through space time is  constant, but when moving through space, an
>>>>> object's length will partially extend through space and partially extend
>>>>> through time.  To the extent that an object's length contracts you will
>>>>> see
>>>>> a corresponding increase in the reach through time.  (this is unrelated to
>>>>> acceleration effects, or rigidness).
>>>>>
>>>>> If it were related to rigidness, then the effect would disappear with
>>>>> the two separate rockets, but it doesn't. Similarly, if it were related to
>>>>> acceleration rates, rather than absolute velocity, it would be unrelated
>>>>> to
>>>>> the distance separating the clocks but it's not.  Here is an example of
>>>>> what I am talking about, just to be clear.
>>>>>
>>>>> If a 100 meter rocket accelerates to 80% of c, then it will length
>>>>> contract to 60 meters, but will also extend 80 meters through the
>>>>> dimension
>>>>> of time.  The total length remains 100 meters (0.6^2 + 0.8^2 = 1).
>>>>> However, clocks that were initially synchronized between the fore and aft
>>>>> parts of the rocket are separated by (80 meters / c) = 266.85 nanoseconds.
>>>>> If you take the clock from the front to the back you will see it speed up
>>>>> and resynchronize with the clock in the back when brought into proximity
>>>>> with the clock in the rear, likewise if you bring the clock from the rear
>>>>> towards the front it will slow until it resynchronizes with the clock in
>>>>> the front by the time it is brought into proximity with it.  You are
>>>>> carrying the clock through the time dimension as you move it towards the
>>>>> front or back of the ship.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I don't understand this. If the two clocks are moving at the same
>>>> velocity there is no difference in clock rate between them. That's why I
>>>> thought you were talking about the acceleration phase -- clock rates can
>>>> differ then, but if the two clocks are at either end of the rocket moving
>>>> inertially, and at rest wrt each other, then their rates are the same,
>>>> regardless of the distance apart.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> As seen by someone who perceives the rocket to be length contracted, the
>>> clocks will not appear to be in sync.
>>>
>>
>> That is factually wrong. The special relativistic apparent change in
>> clock rates depends only on the relative motion, so from the point of view
>> of someone at rest on the ground, the clocks at the front and rear of the
>> coasting rocket will be travelling at the same```

### The structure of the world from pure numbers

```Frank Tipler wrote this 2005 paper, I am curious if others are familiar
with it, and what your thoughts on it are:

I found it to be quite interesting. He claims that the dream of quantum
gravity eliminating infinities from the standard model cannot succeed, and
also that the entropy of the initial conditions of the universe was zero.

Jason

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```

### Re: CMBR and Horizon Problem

```On Tue, Dec 25, 2018 at 1:53 AM  wrote:

>
>
> On Tuesday, December 25, 2018 at 5:57:35 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 11:27 PM  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 25, 2018 at 2:13:46 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>>> wrote:

On Tuesday, December 25, 2018 at 12:35:24 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 6:28 PM  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 9:47:52 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 4:04 PM  wrote:
>>>

On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 8:25:11 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 6:40:03 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 12/23/2018 8:22 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 3:50:33 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/23/2018 4:47 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>> *If by "flat", you mean mathematically flat, like a plane
>>> extending infinitely in all directions, as opposed to
>>> asymptotically flat
>>> like a huge and expanding sphere,  you have to reconcile an
>>> infinitesimally
>>> tiny universe at the time of the BB, and simultaneously an
>>> infinitely large
>>> universe extending infinitely in all directions. AG*
>>>
>>>
>>> All that's "infinitesimally tiny" is the visible universe.  You
>>> must know that the Friedmann equation just defines the dynamics of
>>> a scale
>>> factor, not a size.
>>>
>>
>> *Are you claiming the visible universe at the BB was
>> infinitesimally tiny, but the non visible part was infinitely large
>> (mathematically flat), or huge (asymptotically flat)? AG *
>>
>>
>> Right.  Although we can't be sure whether it is actually flat or
>> just very big.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> *OK. Agreed. We seemed to disagree on this in the past, but maybe
> we miscommunicated. AG*
>

Here's what Ned Wright wrote.

Is the Universe really infinite or just really big?

We have observations that say that the radius of curvature of the
Universe is bigger than 70 billion light years. But the observations
allow
for either a positive or negative curvature, and this range includes
the
flat Universe with infinite radius of curvature. The negatively curved
space is also infinite in volume even though it is curved. So we know
empirically that the volume of the Universe is more than 20 times
bigger
than volume of the observable Universe. Since we can only look at small
piece of an object that has a large radius of curvature, it looks
flat. The
simplest mathematical model for computing the observed properties of
the
Universe is then flat Euclidean space. This model is infinite, but
what we
know about the Universe is that it is really big
.

*It is misleading. He's referring to the VISIBLE universe and
concludes it might be infinite in spatial extent. Impossible due to its

>>> It's only impossible if you believe the believe the big bang
>>> occurred only at a point, rather than everywhere.
>>>
>>> Consider that every point in space sees everything else around it
>>> flying away from it, such that if you rewound time, everything would
>>> return
>>> to a single point centered at that location. But this is true for every
>>> point in space, so the implication is that the BigBang didn't happen at
>>> one
>>> particular location long in the past, but at every point, including the
>>> period at the end of this sentence.
>>>
>>
>> *You seem inclined to extreme hypotheses for which there is no data.
>> AG *
>>
>>>
>>>
> This is the default "standard" model used used by cosmologists, it's
> called the concordance model, or the Lambda-CDM model. There is
> significant
> data for it.
>

*I don't believe it. AG *

>>>
>>> *I mean I don't believe your interpretation of the Concordance model. AG
>>> *
>>>

>>
>
> *When the movie is played in reverse, all points converge to a single
> point. This is for the observable ```

### Re: CMBR and Horizon Problem

```On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 11:27 PM  wrote:

>
>
> On Tuesday, December 25, 2018 at 2:13:46 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 25, 2018 at 12:35:24 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 6:28 PM  wrote:
>>>

On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 9:47:52 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 4:04 PM  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 8:25:11 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 6:40:03 AM UTC, Brent wrote:

On 12/23/2018 8:22 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 3:50:33 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/23/2018 4:47 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
> *If by "flat", you mean mathematically flat, like a plane
> extending infinitely in all directions, as opposed to asymptotically
> flat
> like a huge and expanding sphere,  you have to reconcile an
> infinitesimally
> tiny universe at the time of the BB, and simultaneously an infinitely
> large
> universe extending infinitely in all directions. AG*
>
>
> All that's "infinitesimally tiny" is the visible universe.  You
> must know that the Friedmann equation just defines the dynamics of a
> scale
> factor, not a size.
>

*Are you claiming the visible universe at the BB was
infinitesimally tiny, but the non visible part was infinitely large
(mathematically flat), or huge (asymptotically flat)? AG *

Right.  Although we can't be sure whether it is actually flat or
just very big.

Brent

>>>
>>> *OK. Agreed. We seemed to disagree on this in the past, but maybe we
>>> miscommunicated. AG*
>>>
>>
>> Here's what Ned Wright wrote.
>>
>> Is the Universe really infinite or just really big?
>>
>> We have observations that say that the radius of curvature of the
>> Universe is bigger than 70 billion light years. But the observations
>> allow
>> for either a positive or negative curvature, and this range includes the
>> flat Universe with infinite radius of curvature. The negatively curved
>> space is also infinite in volume even though it is curved. So we know
>> empirically that the volume of the Universe is more than 20 times bigger
>> than volume of the observable Universe. Since we can only look at small
>> piece of an object that has a large radius of curvature, it looks flat.
>> The
>> simplest mathematical model for computing the observed properties of the
>> Universe is then flat Euclidean space. This model is infinite, but what
>> we
>> know about the Universe is that it is really big
>> .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *It is misleading. He's referring to the VISIBLE universe and
>> concludes it might be infinite in spatial extent. Impossible due to its
>>
>>
>>
> It's only impossible if you believe the believe the big bang occurred
> only at a point, rather than everywhere.
>
> Consider that every point in space sees everything else around it
> flying away from it, such that if you rewound time, everything would
> return
> to a single point centered at that location. But this is true for every
> point in space, so the implication is that the BigBang didn't happen at
> one
> particular location long in the past, but at every point, including the
> period at the end of this sentence.
>

*You seem inclined to extreme hypotheses for which there is no data. AG
*

>
>
>>> This is the default "standard" model used used by cosmologists, it's
>>> called the concordance model, or the Lambda-CDM model. There is significant
>>> data for it.
>>>
>>
>> *I don't believe it. AG *
>>
>
> *I mean I don't believe your interpretation of the Concordance model. AG *
>
>>
>>

Jason

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```

### Re: CMBR and Horizon Problem

```On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 6:28 PM  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 9:47:52 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 4:04 PM  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 8:25:11 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>>> wrote:

On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 6:40:03 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/23/2018 8:22 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 3:50:33 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 12/23/2018 4:47 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> *If by "flat", you mean mathematically flat, like a plane extending
>> infinitely in all directions, as opposed to asymptotically flat like a
>> huge
>> and expanding sphere,  you have to reconcile an infinitesimally tiny
>> universe at the time of the BB, and simultaneously an infinitely large
>> universe extending infinitely in all directions. AG*
>>
>>
>> All that's "infinitesimally tiny" is the visible universe.  You must
>> know that the Friedmann equation just defines the dynamics of a scale
>> factor, not a size.
>>
>
> *Are you claiming the visible universe at the BB was infinitesimally
> tiny, but the non visible part was infinitely large (mathematically flat),
> or huge (asymptotically flat)? AG *
>
>
> Right.  Although we can't be sure whether it is actually flat or just
> very big.
>
> Brent
>

*OK. Agreed. We seemed to disagree on this in the past, but maybe we
miscommunicated. AG*

>>>
>>> Here's what Ned Wright wrote.
>>>
>>> Is the Universe really infinite or just really big?
>>>
>>> We have observations that say that the radius of curvature of the
>>> Universe is bigger than 70 billion light years. But the observations allow
>>> for either a positive or negative curvature, and this range includes the
>>> flat Universe with infinite radius of curvature. The negatively curved
>>> space is also infinite in volume even though it is curved. So we know
>>> empirically that the volume of the Universe is more than 20 times bigger
>>> than volume of the observable Universe. Since we can only look at small
>>> piece of an object that has a large radius of curvature, it looks flat. The
>>> simplest mathematical model for computing the observed properties of the
>>> Universe is then flat Euclidean space. This model is infinite, but what we
>>> know about the Universe is that it is really big
>>> .
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *It is misleading. He's referring to the VISIBLE universe and concludes
>>> it might be infinite in spatial extent. Impossible due to its finite age. I
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> It's only impossible if you believe the believe the big bang occurred
>> only at a point, rather than everywhere.
>>
>> Consider that every point in space sees everything else around it flying
>> away from it, such that if you rewound time, everything would return to a
>> single point centered at that location. But this is true for every point in
>> space, so the implication is that the BigBang didn't happen at one
>> particular location long in the past, but at every point, including the
>> period at the end of this sentence.
>>
>
> *You seem inclined to extreme hypotheses for which there is no data. AG *
>
>>
>>
This is the default "standard" model used used by cosmologists, it's called
the concordance model, or the Lambda-CDM model. There is significant data
for it.

Jason

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```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 4:24 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 25, 2018 at 4:59 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 12:30 AM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 4:03 PM Jason Resch
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 11:06 PM Brent Meeker
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 12/23/2018 7:17 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>> >
>>>>> > How can this be? The rocket is a rigid structure, the front and rear
>>>>> > clocks accelerate at the same rate.
>>>>>
>>>>> First, there are no rigid objects in relativity theory.  Otherwise
>>>>> they
>>>>> could be used for  FTL signaling.  Second, there is no simultaneity at
>>>>> different places, like the front and rear of the rocket.  So it is
>>>>> frame
>>>>> dependent whether the two ends of the rocket begin to accelerate at
>>>>> the
>>>>> same time.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> The level of clock desynchronization is proportional to the speed and
>>>> the length of the rocket.   That it is one rocket doesn't even matter, it
>>>> could be two rockets, which both separately accelerate at the same time
>>>> given by a signal initiated from immediately between them.  This is just
>>>> showing that length contraction is only a spatial length contraction. The
>>>> length through space time is  constant, but when moving through space, an
>>>> object's length will partially extend through space and partially extend
>>>> through time.  To the extent that an object's length contracts you will see
>>>> a corresponding increase in the reach through time.  (this is unrelated to
>>>> acceleration effects, or rigidness).
>>>>
>>>> If it were related to rigidness, then the effect would disappear with
>>>> the two separate rockets, but it doesn't. Similarly, if it were related to
>>>> acceleration rates, rather than absolute velocity, it would be unrelated to
>>>> the distance separating the clocks but it's not.  Here is an example of
>>>> what I am talking about, just to be clear.
>>>>
>>>> If a 100 meter rocket accelerates to 80% of c, then it will length
>>>> contract to 60 meters, but will also extend 80 meters through the dimension
>>>> of time.  The total length remains 100 meters (0.6^2 + 0.8^2 = 1).
>>>> However, clocks that were initially synchronized between the fore and aft
>>>> parts of the rocket are separated by (80 meters / c) = 266.85 nanoseconds.
>>>> If you take the clock from the front to the back you will see it speed up
>>>> and resynchronize with the clock in the back when brought into proximity
>>>> with the clock in the rear, likewise if you bring the clock from the rear
>>>> towards the front it will slow until it resynchronizes with the clock in
>>>> the front by the time it is brought into proximity with it.  You are
>>>> carrying the clock through the time dimension as you move it towards the
>>>> front or back of the ship.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I don't understand this. If the two clocks are moving at the same
>>> velocity there is no difference in clock rate between them. That's why I
>>> thought you were talking about the acceleration phase -- clock rates can
>>> differ then, but if the two clocks are at either end of the rocket moving
>>> inertially, and at rest wrt each other, then their rates are the same,
>>> regardless of the distance apart.
>>>
>>>
>> As seen by someone who perceives the rocket to be length contracted, the
>> clocks will not appear to be in sync.
>>
>
> That is factually wrong. The special relativistic apparent change in clock
> rates depends only on the relative motion, so from the point of view of
> someone at rest on the ground, the clocks at the front and rear of the
> coasting rocket will be travelling at the same velocity relative to him. So
> they will both appear to  be going either faster or slower at exactly the
> same rate, depending on the direction of the relative motion.
>

Then what is the meaning of this problem on page 42:

Two rockets fly past each other at 0.6 • c. A measures the length of the
other rocket B to be 40 m. What is the rest length of the rocket B, and how
much are the clocks at the tip and at the end of rocket B for A
desynchronized, ```

### Re: CMBR and Horizon Problem

```On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 4:04 PM  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 8:25:11 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 6:40:03 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/23/2018 8:22 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 3:50:33 AM UTC, Brent wrote:

On 12/23/2018 4:47 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

*If by "flat", you mean mathematically flat, like a plane extending
infinitely in all directions, as opposed to asymptotically flat like a huge
and expanding sphere,  you have to reconcile an infinitesimally tiny
universe at the time of the BB, and simultaneously an infinitely large
universe extending infinitely in all directions. AG*

All that's "infinitesimally tiny" is the visible universe.  You must
know that the Friedmann equation just defines the dynamics of a scale
factor, not a size.

>>>
>>> *Are you claiming the visible universe at the BB was infinitesimally
>>> tiny, but the non visible part was infinitely large (mathematically flat),
>>> or huge (asymptotically flat)? AG *
>>>
>>>
>>> Right.  Although we can't be sure whether it is actually flat or just
>>> very big.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> *OK. Agreed. We seemed to disagree on this in the past, but maybe we
>> miscommunicated. AG*
>>
>
> Here's what Ned Wright wrote.
>
> Is the Universe really infinite or just really big?
>
> We have observations that say that the radius of curvature of the Universe
> is bigger than 70 billion light years. But the observations allow for
> either a positive or negative curvature, and this range includes the flat
> Universe with infinite radius of curvature. The negatively curved space is
> also infinite in volume even though it is curved. So we know empirically
> that the volume of the Universe is more than 20 times bigger than volume of
> the observable Universe. Since we can only look at small piece of an object
> that has a large radius of curvature, it looks flat. The simplest
> mathematical model for computing the observed properties of the Universe is
> then flat Euclidean space. This model is infinite, but what we know about
> the Universe is that it is really big
> .
>
>
>
>
> *It is misleading. He's referring to the VISIBLE universe and concludes it
> might be infinite in spatial extent. Impossible due to its finite age. I
>
>
>
It's only impossible if you believe the believe the big bang occurred only
at a point, rather than everywhere.

Consider that every point in space sees everything else around it flying
away from it, such that if you rewound time, everything would return to a
single point centered at that location. But this is true for every point in
space, so the implication is that the BigBang didn't happen at one
particular location long in the past, but at every point, including the
period at the end of this sentence.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 12:30 AM Bruce Kellett
wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 4:03 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 11:06 PM Brent Meeker
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On 12/23/2018 7:17 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> >
>>> > How can this be? The rocket is a rigid structure, the front and rear
>>> > clocks accelerate at the same rate.
>>>
>>> First, there are no rigid objects in relativity theory.  Otherwise they
>>> could be used for  FTL signaling.  Second, there is no simultaneity at
>>> different places, like the front and rear of the rocket.  So it is frame
>>> dependent whether the two ends of the rocket begin to accelerate at the
>>> same time.
>>>
>>>
>> The level of clock desynchronization is proportional to the speed and the
>> length of the rocket.   That it is one rocket doesn't even matter, it could
>> be two rockets, which both separately accelerate at the same time given by
>> a signal initiated from immediately between them.  This is just showing
>> that length contraction is only a spatial length contraction. The length
>> through space time is  constant, but when moving through space, an object's
>> length will partially extend through space and partially extend through
>> time.  To the extent that an object's length contracts you will see a
>> corresponding increase in the reach through time.  (this is unrelated to
>> acceleration effects, or rigidness).
>>
>> If it were related to rigidness, then the effect would disappear with the
>> two separate rockets, but it doesn't. Similarly, if it were related to
>> acceleration rates, rather than absolute velocity, it would be unrelated to
>> the distance separating the clocks but it's not.  Here is an example of
>> what I am talking about, just to be clear.
>>
>> If a 100 meter rocket accelerates to 80% of c, then it will length
>> contract to 60 meters, but will also extend 80 meters through the dimension
>> of time.  The total length remains 100 meters (0.6^2 + 0.8^2 = 1).
>> However, clocks that were initially synchronized between the fore and aft
>> parts of the rocket are separated by (80 meters / c) = 266.85 nanoseconds.
>> If you take the clock from the front to the back you will see it speed up
>> and resynchronize with the clock in the back when brought into proximity
>> with the clock in the rear, likewise if you bring the clock from the rear
>> towards the front it will slow until it resynchronizes with the clock in
>> the front by the time it is brought into proximity with it.  You are
>> carrying the clock through the time dimension as you move it towards the
>> front or back of the ship.
>>
>
> I don't understand this. If the two clocks are moving at the same velocity
> there is no difference in clock rate between them. That's why I thought you
> were talking about the acceleration phase -- clock rates can differ then,
> but if the two clocks are at either end of the rocket moving inertially,
> and at rest wrt each other, then their rates are the same, regardless of
> the distance apart.
>
>
As seen by someone who perceives the rocket to be length contracted, the
clocks will not appear to be in sync.

Jason

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### Re: "No black-hole singularities" in an undated loop-quantum-gravity theory

```On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 11:49 PM Bruce Kellett
wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 3:45 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Sat, Dec 22, 2018 at 9:33 PM Brent Meeker
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On 12/22/2018 12:04 PM, Philip Thrift wrote
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Theoretical physicists developed a theory called loop quantum gravity in
>>> the 1990s that marries the laws of microscopic physics, or quantum
>>> mechanics, with gravity, which explains the dynamics of space and time.
>>> Ashtekar, Olmedos and Singh's new equations describe black holes in loop
>>> quantum gravity and showed that black hole singularity does not exist.
>>>
>>>
>>> "In Einstein's theory, space-time is a fabric that can be divided as
>>> small as we want. This is essentially the cause of the singularity where
>>> the gravitational field becomes infinite. In loop quantum gravity, the
>>> fabric of space-time has a *tile-like structure*, which cannot be
>>> divided beyond the smallest tile. My colleagues and I have shown that this
>>> is the case inside black holes and therefore there is no singularity,"
>>> Singh said.
>>>
>>> "These tile-like units of geometry--called 'quantum excitations'-- which
>>> resolve the singularity problem are orders of magnitude smaller than we can
>>> detect with today's technology, but we have precise mathematical equations
>>> that predict their behavior," said Ashtekar, who is one of the founding
>>> fathers of loop quantum gravity.
>>>
>>>
>>> But is this consistent with https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.5191v2 which
>>> showed spacetime to be smooth down to 1/525 of the Planck length?
>>>
>>
>> Brent,
>>
>> Wouldn't this be a successful prediction of Bruno's theory?  In another
>> predictions that space and time would be continuous (not discrete),
>> therefore it would predict LQG is false, and then
>> https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.5191v2 would be a confirmation of that.
>>
>
> How did Bruno predict that from a digital (integral) model)?
>

post from 2007, citing his work from 2004)

The essential idea is that the first person experience of a physical world,
and of making predictions or measurements involves infinite numbers of
competing programs going through and realizing the state of the observer's
mind at one point in time. Predicting what happens next, the outcome of an
experiment, a measurement of a particle's location, etc. involves the
statistics concerning the infinity of these programs. It means the physical
appearances/physical universe is itself not computable (not without
infinite time and resources), and this implies a continuum somewhere in
physics. (i.e. eechanism is incompatible with digital physics)

> And where did he make such a prediction?
>
>

(post from 2007, explaining the continuum)

(post from 2009, describing that physics cannot be entirely computational
if "I am a machine")

(post from 2009, pointing out that if digital physics is true, then
mechanism would be refuted)

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 11:06 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/23/2018 7:17 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
> >
> > How can this be? The rocket is a rigid structure, the front and rear
> > clocks accelerate at the same rate.
>
> First, there are no rigid objects in relativity theory.  Otherwise they
> could be used for  FTL signaling.  Second, there is no simultaneity at
> different places, like the front and rear of the rocket.  So it is frame
> dependent whether the two ends of the rocket begin to accelerate at the
> same time.
>
>
The level of clock desynchronization is proportional to the speed and the
length of the rocket.   That it is one rocket doesn't even matter, it could
be two rockets, which both separately accelerate at the same time given by
a signal initiated from immediately between them.  This is just showing
that length contraction is only a spatial length contraction. The length
through space time is  constant, but when moving through space, an object's
length will partially extend through space and partially extend through
time.  To the extent that an object's length contracts you will see a
corresponding increase in the reach through time.  (this is unrelated to
acceleration effects, or rigidness).

If it were related to rigidness, then the effect would disappear with the
two separate rockets, but it doesn't. Similarly, if it were related to
acceleration rates, rather than absolute velocity, it would be unrelated to
the distance separating the clocks but it's not.  Here is an example of
what I am talking about, just to be clear.

If a 100 meter rocket accelerates to 80% of c, then it will length contract
to 60 meters, but will also extend 80 meters through the dimension of
time.  The total length remains 100 meters (0.6^2 + 0.8^2 = 1).  However,
clocks that were initially synchronized between the fore and aft parts of
the rocket are separated by (80 meters / c) = 266.85 nanoseconds.  If you
take the clock from the front to the back you will see it speed up and
resynchronize with the clock in the back when brought into proximity with
the clock in the rear, likewise if you bring the clock from the rear
towards the front it will slow until it resynchronizes with the clock in
the front by the time it is brought into proximity with it.  You are
carrying the clock through the time dimension as you move it towards the
front or back of the ship.

Jason

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### Re: "No black-hole singularities" in an undated loop-quantum-gravity theory

```On Sat, Dec 22, 2018 at 9:33 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/22/2018 12:04 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
>
> Theoretical physicists developed a theory called loop quantum gravity in
> the 1990s that marries the laws of microscopic physics, or quantum
> mechanics, with gravity, which explains the dynamics of space and time.
> Ashtekar, Olmedos and Singh's new equations describe black holes in loop
> quantum gravity and showed that black hole singularity does not exist.
>
>
> "In Einstein's theory, space-time is a fabric that can be divided as small
> as we want. This is essentially the cause of the singularity where the
> gravitational field becomes infinite. In loop quantum gravity, the fabric
> of space-time has a *tile-like structure*, which cannot be divided beyond
> the smallest tile. My colleagues and I have shown that this is the case
> inside black holes and therefore there is no singularity," Singh said.
>
> "These tile-like units of geometry--called 'quantum excitations'-- which
> resolve the singularity problem are orders of magnitude smaller than we can
> detect with today's technology, but we have precise mathematical equations
> that predict their behavior," said Ashtekar, who is one of the founding
> fathers of loop quantum gravity.
>
>
> But is this consistent with https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.5191v2 which
> showed spacetime to be smooth down to 1/525 of the Planck length?
>

Brent,

Wouldn't this be a successful prediction of Bruno's theory?  In another
predictions that space and time would be continuous (not discrete),
therefore it would predict LQG is false, and then
https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.5191v2 would be a confirmation of that.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 10:44 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/23/2018 4:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 1:21 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> The particles are (local) Lorentz invariants.  But how do Lorentz
>> transformations show up in the computations (of the Ud?)?
>>
>>
>> This is explained in Vic Stenger’s book, in a way which shows that
>> physics is already in a large part derivable from simple invariance
>> principles.
>>
>>
> Hi Bruno,
>
> Do you recall which of his books this is? (
> https://www.amazon.com/Victor-J.-Stenger/e/B000APH2GA )
>
>
> The Comprehensible Cosmos.
>

Thanks Brent, and Russell (and Bruno for mentioning it).  I will read it.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 7:51 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/23/2018 4:04 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 23, 2018, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/22/2018 4:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 10:01 PM Brent Meeker
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/21/2018 5:43 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 12:46 PM Brent Meeker
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 12/20/2018 9:09 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>> > I am not advocating any global reference frame, just mentioning that
>>>> > for a particular observe, they can define a present that works for
>>>> > them (in their own reference frame). From their point of view they
>>>> can
>>>> > consider themselves at rest (whether they are or are not).
>>>>
>>>> They can define it in words, but can they define it physically.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> What is wrong with using the 3-d hyperspace perpendicular to their
>>> direction through spacetime?
>>>
>>>
>>> That's words.  How shall they determine whether event X in distant
>>> galaxy Y is simultaneous with their clock reading Z?  Is their "direction
>>> through spacetime" constant over billions of years?
>>>
>>
>> If the event occurred N-light years away, and light from that event
>> arrives in N-years, then it can be considered simultaneous with the
>> observer.
>>
>>
>> You mean it could have been considered simultaneous if the observer had
>> known it at the time and the observer had not changed motion in the
>> intervening years.
>>
>>
>> If their direction through spacetime changes, they must change their
>> interpretation of what constitutes the present.
>>
>>
>> So as I get up and walk to the garage, whole galaxies of events switch
>> from my past to my future. What is the physical significance of this?
>>
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
> Nothing, beyond showing we exist in a 4d spacetime with no objective
> present (a block time).
>
>
> That's what I thought you wanted to conclude.  But it doesn't follow.  The
> specious present is just a mathematical construct and has no physical
> significance.  It says no more than that one can make a 4D map.
>

So do you believe that presentism is compatible under relativity?  If one
puts two synchronized clocks (one at the front, and one at the read) of a
rocket, and then the rocket accelerates, the rocket attains a tilted
direction in space time, and while the rocket remains at a positive
velocity, the rear-ward clock will be "ahead in time" of the forward
clock.  The rocket is reaching through the dimension of time which explains
the discrepancy of the clocks.  When the rocket comes to rest, the rocket
will have "0" reach through the proper time dimension, and the clocks will
again appear synchronized.  If something can have an extent through the
proper time dimension, how can this be compatible with presentism?

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 1:21 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> The particles are (local) Lorentz invariants.  But how do Lorentz
> transformations show up in the computations (of the Ud?)?
>
>
> This is explained in Vic Stenger’s book, in a way which shows that physics
> is already in a large part derivable from simple invariance principles.
>
>
Hi Bruno,

Do you recall which of his books this is? (
https://www.amazon.com/Victor-J.-Stenger/e/B000APH2GA )

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sunday, December 23, 2018, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/22/2018 4:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 10:01 PM Brent Meeker
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/21/2018 5:43 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 12:46 PM Brent Meeker
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/20/2018 9:09 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> > I am not advocating any global reference frame, just mentioning that
>>> > for a particular observe, they can define a present that works for
>>> > them (in their own reference frame). From their point of view they can
>>> > consider themselves at rest (whether they are or are not).
>>>
>>> They can define it in words, but can they define it physically.
>>>
>>>
>> What is wrong with using the 3-d hyperspace perpendicular to their
>> direction through spacetime?
>>
>>
>> That's words.  How shall they determine whether event X in distant galaxy
>> Y is simultaneous with their clock reading Z?  Is their "direction through
>> spacetime" constant over billions of years?
>>
>
> If the event occurred N-light years away, and light from that event
> arrives in N-years, then it can be considered simultaneous with the
> observer.
>
>
> You mean it could have been considered simultaneous if the observer had
> known it at the time and the observer had not changed motion in the
> intervening years.
>
>
> If their direction through spacetime changes, they must change their
> interpretation of what constitutes the present.
>
>
> So as I get up and walk to the garage, whole galaxies of events switch
> from my past to my future. What is the physical significance of this?
>
>
> Brent
>

Nothing, beyond showing we exist in a 4d spacetime with no objective
present (a block time).

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 10:01 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/21/2018 5:43 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 12:46 PM Brent Meeker
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/20/2018 9:09 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> > I am not advocating any global reference frame, just mentioning that
>> > for a particular observe, they can define a present that works for
>> > them (in their own reference frame). From their point of view they can
>> > consider themselves at rest (whether they are or are not).
>>
>> They can define it in words, but can they define it physically.
>>
>>
> What is wrong with using the 3-d hyperspace perpendicular to their
> direction through spacetime?
>
>
> That's words.  How shall they determine whether event X in distant galaxy
> Y is simultaneous with their clock reading Z?  Is their "direction through
> spacetime" constant over billions of years?
>

If the event occurred N-light years away, and light from that event arrives
in N-years, then it can be considered simultaneous with the observer.

If their direction through spacetime changes, they must change their
interpretation of what constitutes the present.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 9:29 PM  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, December 22, 2018 at 2:03:06 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 8:50 PM  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, December 22, 2018 at 1:42:06 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 11:40 AM John Clark  wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 7:30 PM Jason Resch
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> The Schrodinger equation describes the quantum wave function
>>>>>>>>> using complex numbers, and that is not observable so it's subjective
>>>>>>>>> in the
>>>>>>>>> same way that lines of latitude and longitude are. However the square
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> the absolute value of the wave function is observable because that
>>>>>>>>> produces
>>>>>>>>> a probability that we can measure in the physical world that is
>>>>>>>>> objective,
>>>>>>>>> provided  anything deserves that word; but it also yields something
>>>>>>>>> that is
>>>>>>>>> not deterministic.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> >>> *It is still deterministic. *
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> >>That depends on what "it" refers to. The quantum wave function is
>>>>>>> deterministic but the physical system associated with it is not.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> > *This is incorrect.*
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> What a devastating retort, you sure put me in my place! Jason ,the
>>>>> Schrodinger equation is deterministic and describes the quantum wave
>>>>> function, but that function is an abstraction and is unobservable, to get
>>>>> something you can see you must square the absolute value of the wave
>>>>> function and that gives you the probability you will observe a particle at
>>>>> any spot; but Schrodinger's equation has an "i" in it , the square root of
>>>>> -1, and that means very different quantum wave functions can give the
>>>>> exact
>>>>> same probability distribution when you square it; remember with i you get
>>>>> weird stuff like i^2=i^6 =-1 and i^4=i^100=1. That's why we only get
>>>>> probabilities not certainties.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> >>> *Schrodinger's equation does not say this is what happened, it
>>>>>>>> just says that you have ended up with a system with many sets of
>>>>>>>> observers,
>>>>>>>> each of which observed different outcomes.*
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> >>That's what Many World's claims it means but that claim is
>>>>>>> controversial, but what is not controversial is the wave function the
>>>>>>> Schrodinger equation describes mathematically.  Consider the wave
>>>>>>> functions
>>>>>>> of these 2 systems:
>>>>>>> 1) An  electron of velocity V starts at X  and after one second it
>>>>>>> is observed at point Y and then goes on for  another second.
>>>>>>> 2) An electron of the same velocity V starts at the same point X and
>>>>>>> then goes on for 2 seconds.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The wave functions of these 2 systems are NOT the same and after
>>>>>>> you've taken the square of the absolute value of both you will find
>>>>>>> electron after 2 seconds. And as I said this is not controversial,
>>>>>>> people
>>>>>>> disagree over quantum interpretations but nobody disagrees over the
>>>>>>> mathematics, and the mathematical objects that the Schrodinger equation
>>>>>>> describes in those two systems are NOT the same.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *> If you model the system to be measured, and the experimenter
>>>>>&g```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 8:50 PM  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, December 22, 2018 at 1:42:06 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 11:40 AM John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 7:30 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>>
>>> >>>> The Schrodinger equation describes the quantum wave function using
>>>>>>> complex numbers, and that is not observable so it's subjective in the
>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>> way that lines of latitude and longitude are. However the square of the
>>>>>>> absolute value of the wave function is observable because that produces
>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>> probability that we can measure in the physical world that is objective,
>>>>>>> provided  anything deserves that word; but it also yields something
>>>>>>> that is
>>>>>>> not deterministic.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> >>> *It is still deterministic. *
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>That depends on what "it" refers to. The quantum wave function is
>>>>> deterministic but the physical system associated with it is not.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> > *This is incorrect.*
>>>>
>>>
>>> What a devastating retort, you sure put me in my place! Jason ,the
>>> Schrodinger equation is deterministic and describes the quantum wave
>>> function, but that function is an abstraction and is unobservable, to get
>>> something you can see you must square the absolute value of the wave
>>> function and that gives you the probability you will observe a particle at
>>> any spot; but Schrodinger's equation has an "i" in it , the square root of
>>> -1, and that means very different quantum wave functions can give the exact
>>> same probability distribution when you square it; remember with i you get
>>> weird stuff like i^2=i^6 =-1 and i^4=i^100=1. That's why we only get
>>> probabilities not certainties.
>>>
>>>
>>>> >>> *Schrodinger's equation does not say this is what happened, it
>>>>>> just says that you have ended up with a system with many sets of
>>>>>> observers,
>>>>>> each of which observed different outcomes.*
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>That's what Many World's claims it means but that claim is
>>>>> controversial, but what is not controversial is the wave function the
>>>>> Schrodinger equation describes mathematically.  Consider the wave
>>>>> functions
>>>>> of these 2 systems:
>>>>> 1) An  electron of velocity V starts at X  and after one second it is
>>>>> observed at point Y and then goes on for  another second.
>>>>> 2) An electron of the same velocity V starts at the same point X and
>>>>> then goes on for 2 seconds.
>>>>>
>>>>> The wave functions of these 2 systems are NOT the same and after
>>>>> you've taken the square of the absolute value of both you will find
>>>>> electron after 2 seconds. And as I said this is not controversial, people
>>>>> disagree over quantum interpretations but nobody disagrees over the
>>>>> mathematics, and the mathematical objects that the Schrodinger equation
>>>>> describes in those two systems are NOT the same.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *> If you model the system to be measured, and the experimenter making
>>>> the measurement, the Schrodinger wave equation tells you unambiguously the
>>>> system* [...]
>>>>
>>>
>>> The Schrodinger wave equation tells precisely, unambiguously and
>>> deterministically what the wave function associated with the system will be
>>> but it says nothing unambiguously about the system itself. We do know
>>> the square of the absolute value of the wave function gives us the
>>> probability of obtaining a certain value if we measure a particular aspect
>>> of the system, but other than that things become controversial. Some people
>>> (the shut up and calculate people) say that's the only thing the math is
>>> telling us, but others (the Many World and Copenhagen and Pilot Wave
>>> people) say the math is telling us more tha```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 1:01 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/20/2018 9:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 11:08 PM Brent Meeker
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/20/2018 8:54 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 10:30 PM Brent Meeker
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/20/2018 4:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 1:27 PM Brent Meeker
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 12/20/2018 1:49 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 8:05 PM John Clark
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:16 PM Jason Resch
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> *> The Shrodinger equation is deterministic.*
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes.
>>>>>
>>>>>  > *Quantum Randomness, like a moving present, is a subjective
>>>>>> phenomenon.*
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The Schrodinger equation describes the quantum wave function using
>>>>> complex numbers, and that is not observable so it's subjective in the same
>>>>> way that lines of latitude and longitude are. However the square of the
>>>>> absolute value of the wave function is observable because that produces a
>>>>> probability that we can measure in the physical world that is objective,
>>>>> provided  anything deserves that word; but it also yields something that
>>>>> is
>>>>> not deterministic.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> It is still deterministic.  If you say otherwise you are introducing
>>>> "collapse", and saying the other unobserved outcomes have stopped existing
>>>> and are no long part of the system.  Schrodinger's equation does not say
>>>> this is what happened, it just says that you have ended up with a system
>>>> with many sets of observers, each of which observed different outcomes.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You seem to think Schroedinger's equation was handed down to him on
>>>> stone tablets from God.
>>>>
>>>
>>> QM is the most accurate and successful theory in science. I will believe
>>> it until something better comes along.
>>>
>>>
>>> It was the most accurate and successful theory in science well before
>>> Everett came along.
>>>
>>
>>
>> It wasn't a mathematical theory until Everett came along and deleted the
>> unmathematical and loosely defined part that was incompatible with half a
>> dozen scientific principles.
>>
>>
>> The only "scientific principle" CI was incompatible with was a revulsion
>> for randomness.  As Roland Omnes' says it's a probabilistic theory, so it
>> predicts probabilities.
>>
>
> Also: it would be the only physical theory which held different principles
> at different scales / magical observers (or consciousness, or something
> else),
>
>
> You really have taken a religious attitude toward Schroedinger's equation.
>

I view it as taking a scientific attitude towards the collapse postulate.

> Have you considered that QM and gravity have not been reconciled and
> theories can be replaced?
>

Maybe the SE or maybe GR will need to be amended, but under no
circumstances do I see the collapse postulate making a come back.

>
> Bohr simply pointed out (correctly) that all measurement, all record
> keeping, all reports, all replication of experiments, all science depend on
> the existence of a classical realm.
>

Does it? We have computer memories that can store bits as single particles.

> If decoherence theory can derive this realm as a statistical phenomenon,
> fine; but it doesn't invalidate Bohr's point.
>

It is suspect for any physical theory to say it applies on small scales,
but not at these larger scales. Is there any other example of this in
physics?

>
> non-realism,
>
>
> That's pretty funny from someone who imagines an infinite continuum of
> "reality" in which everything and its contrary happens.
>

It is a realist viewpoint.

>
> violation of speed of light
>
>
> There's no more or less violation of relativity in CI than MWI.
> Correlations at space-like intervals show up in both
>
>
You don't agree that correlations in MWI can explained locally without
resorting to FTL influences?

> , time irreversibility,
>
>
> Irreversibility means some things happen and some don't.
>
>
Again, the only theory in all of physics to dispense with this deeply held
principle.

> inability to consider multiple observers, inability to describe universe
> prior to observers, non-linearity, discontinuous, etc.
>
>
> CI did not depend on conscious observers.  Instruments in the sense of
> leaving physical records were enough.
>
>
What counts as an instrument, or a record?

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 12:46 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/20/2018 9:09 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
> > I am not advocating any global reference frame, just mentioning that
> > for a particular observe, they can define a present that works for
> > them (in their own reference frame). From their point of view they can
> > consider themselves at rest (whether they are or are not).
>
> They can define it in words, but can they define it physically.
>
>
What is wrong with using the 3-d hyperspace perpendicular to their
direction through spacetime?

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 11:40 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 7:30 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> >>>> The Schrodinger equation describes the quantum wave function using
>>>>> complex numbers, and that is not observable so it's subjective in the same
>>>>> way that lines of latitude and longitude are. However the square of the
>>>>> absolute value of the wave function is observable because that produces a
>>>>> probability that we can measure in the physical world that is objective,
>>>>> provided  anything deserves that word; but it also yields something that
>>>>> is
>>>>> not deterministic.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> >>> *It is still deterministic. *
>>>>
>>>
>>> >>That depends on what "it" refers to. The quantum wave function is
>>> deterministic but the physical system associated with it is not.
>>>
>>
>> > *This is incorrect.*
>>
>
> What a devastating retort, you sure put me in my place! Jason ,the
> Schrodinger equation is deterministic and describes the quantum wave
> function, but that function is an abstraction and is unobservable, to get
> something you can see you must square the absolute value of the wave
> function and that gives you the probability you will observe a particle at
> any spot; but Schrodinger's equation has an "i" in it , the square root of
> -1, and that means very different quantum wave functions can give the exact
> same probability distribution when you square it; remember with i you get
> weird stuff like i^2=i^6 =-1 and i^4=i^100=1. That's why we only get
> probabilities not certainties.
>
>
>> >>> *Schrodinger's equation does not say this is what happened, it just
>>>> says that you have ended up with a system with many sets of observers, each
>>>> of which observed different outcomes.*
>>>>
>>>
>>> >>That's what Many World's claims it means but that claim is
>>> controversial, but what is not controversial is the wave function the
>>> Schrodinger equation describes mathematically.  Consider the wave functions
>>> of these 2 systems:
>>> 1) An  electron of velocity V starts at X  and after one second it is
>>> observed at point Y and then goes on for  another second.
>>> 2) An electron of the same velocity V starts at the same point X and
>>> then goes on for 2 seconds.
>>>
>>> The wave functions of these 2 systems are NOT the same and after you've
>>> taken the square of the absolute value of both you will find radically
>>> different probabilities about where you're likely to find the electron
>>> after 2 seconds. And as I said this is not controversial, people disagree
>>> over quantum interpretations but nobody disagrees over the mathematics, and
>>> the mathematical objects that the Schrodinger equation describes in those
>>> two systems are NOT the same.
>>>
>>
>> *> If you model the system to be measured, and the experimenter making
>> the measurement, the Schrodinger wave equation tells you unambiguously the
>> system* [...]
>>
>
> The Schrodinger wave equation tells precisely, unambiguously and
> deterministically what the wave function associated with the system will be
> but it says nothing unambiguously about the system itself. We do know the
> square of the absolute value of the wave function gives us the
> probability of obtaining a certain value if we measure a particular aspect
> of the system, but other than that things become controversial. Some people
> (the shut up and calculate people) say that's the only thing the math is
> telling us, but others (the Many World and Copenhagen and Pilot Wave
> people) say the math is telling us more than that but disagree about what
> that is. But everybody agrees about the math itself, and if an observation
> is made forget about what the math may mean the very mathematics of the
> Schrodinger
> wave changes.
>
>
>> > If you don't believe me, consider what would happen if you simulated
>> an experimenter's mind on a quantum computer, and then fed in as sensory
>> input one of the qubits registers prepared to be in a superposed state (0
>> and 1).
>>
>
> I don't have a quantum computer and I don't have direct access to any mind
> other than my own so I can't do that, I could tell you my hunch about what
> I believe would happen and it's probably similar to your hunch but other
> people, including some very smart ones, disagree so we could be wrong.
>
>
Such people disbelieve in the Schrodinger equation.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 8:56 AM Terren Suydam
wrote:

>
>
> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 11:35 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> We have no evidence nor reason to presume that we should be in a position
>> to see everything that exists. In fact, we already know that not to be the
>> case.  We know we can't see what lays beyond the cosmological horizon, for
>> example.
>>
>> As to why I think there are likely many other universes with different
>> laws, I have many separate reasons, and they all point in the same
>> direction:
>>
>> 1. The trend of science has always been to humble humanity by showing us
>> what exists is much larger than we assumed. (Out planet is one of many, our
>> star is one of many, our galaxy is one of many, our Hubble volume is one of
>> many, etc.)
>> 2. It's suggested by our leading cosmological theory (eternal inflation
>> is part of the standard model of cosmology, it is the default
>> theory/assumption in that field of science)
>> 3. It's suggested by the only theories we have that are compatible with
>> QM and gravity
>> 4. It explains the apparent fine tuning without resorting to intelligent
>> design or fantastic luck
>> 5. Multi-verse theories are often simpler than those that constrain
>> possibility
>> 6. It addresses the Wheeler question "Why these laws, not others"
>> 7. There are many other perfectly sound and consistent equations (e.g.
>> one where the gravitational constantly is a different value) why should
>> this particular value for that free parameter be the only one to be
>> "realized"
>> 8. It's a conclusion of arithmetical realism
>>
>>
> How do you square the multiverse concept with what Bruno has asserted in
> the past - that the physics experienced by universal numbers is the same
> for all of them?
>
>
When Bruno speaks to a universal physics, he is using a far more
generalized notion of physics (e.g. what is extractable from the laws of
self reference).

This might yield only a very basic set of constraints on physical laws,
such as:

- Physical laws should be relatively simple (as simple as possible to be
compatible with the observer's mind tied to that physical environment)
- Physical laws will be mostly computable
- Physical laws will be relatively stable
- Physical laws will yield at best probabilistic predictions (when
considering questions below one's "substitution level")
- Physical laws must permit the construction of Turing machines
- Physical systems will appear to evolve in time
- Physical systems will appear to be continuous and linear
- Information will likely play a fundamental role
- Physical universes should appear to contain a large (perhaps infinite)
number of observers

Basic principals like these might serve as a universal physics, but in my
view many things might remain open and contingent, such as:

- The mass of the electron
- Whether or not there are electrons, protons or any of the familiar
particles we know
- The dimensionality of time and space
- Conservation laws
- The speed of light (if there is light)
- What the fundamental "stuff" is (are they Game of Life Cells,
10-dimensional strings, etc.)

There are many imaginable ways an observer's mind could be built and could
arise.  Each of these imaginable ways is a "physical environment" for
someone, but some of them are going to be much more common than others.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```(Combing text from your two e-mails, hope you don't mind)

On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 12:38 AM Bruce Kellett
wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 4:59 PM Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 3:44 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 8:28 PM Bruce Kellett
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> I have no evidence that they exist now, since all I am currently aware
>>>> of is the record of their past existence as it is present to me now. The
>>>> evidence is that they existed in the past. Why is that not sufficient? I
>>>> tend not to believe in things, like fairies, for which I have no current
>>>> evidence.
>>>>
>>>
>>> This seems to be a trend that explains all aspects of your philosophy.
>>> For example, rejecting many-worlds, rejecting other universes, rejecting
>>> other points in time, rejecting mathematical objects. It's based purely on
>>> what you can see.  It is a theory of minimizing the number of objects in
>>> reality. But to me this is not a correct application of Occam, which was
>>> about simplifying theories by reducing their unnecessary assumptions,
>>> rather than reducing the ontologies of those theories.
>>>
>>
>
> SImplicity is in the eye of the beholder. "Theories should be as simple as
> possible, but no simpler." Besides Occam's tag is "Entia non sun
> multiplicanda praeter necessitatem" -- Entities should not be multiplied
> beyond necessity. This is certainly about the ontology. Modern tendencies
> to think Ockham was talking about hypotheses is a misrepresentation of the
> context of his remark

But is this not how scientists apply and use Occam today (in terms of
assumptions of a theory, rather than the entities resulting from the
theory)?
Here is the opening paragraph on Wikipedia describing Occam's razor:

"Occam's razor (also Ockham's razor or Ocham's razor (Latin: novacula
Occami); further known as the law of parsimony (Latin: lex parsimoniae)) is
the problem-solving principle that essentially states that the simplest
solution tends to be the correct one. *When presented with competing
hypotheses to solve a problem, one should select the solution with the
fewest assumptions.* The idea is attributed to English Franciscan friar
William of Ockham (c. 1287–1347), a scholastic philosopher and theologian."

Would you suggest that Wikipedia revise this?

On another front, Newton's idea was that the laws should be deduced from
> the phenomena, or data. When he was unable to deduce any simple laws from
> the available data on cometary motion, he left it at that, saying
> "Hypotheses non fingo": I do not feign hypotheses, declaring that 'whatever
> is not deduced from the phenomena must be called a hypothesis.'

There are certainly many scientists, before and after Ockham who considered
the utility of simplified theories a superior aim, including Newton:

- "We consider it a good principle to explain the phenomena by the
simplest hypothesis possible". Ptolemy
<https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ptolemy>.[2]
<https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor#cite_note-Franklin-2>
- "We are to admit no more causes of natural things other than such as
are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances. Therefore, to
the same natural effects we must, so far as possible, assign the same
causes". Isaac Newton <https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isaac_Newton>.
[5]
<https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor#cite_note-Hawking-5>
- "Whenever possible, substitute constructions out of known entities for
inferences to unknown entities". Bertrand Russell
<https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bertrand_Russell>.[6]
<https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor#cite_note-6>

So all, the things you seem to want would be ruled out by both Ockham and
> Newton as not being deduced from the data.

Have you ever wondered why Occam's razor is so successful (why it works)?
It can be derived from ensemble theories. This is described by:

*Ray Solomonoff:*
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solomonoff%27s_theory_of_inductive_inference

- Ray Solomonoff <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ray_Solomonoff>'s theory
of universal *inductive inference* is a theory of prediction based on
logical observations, such as predicting the next symbol based upon a given
series of symbols. The only assumption that the theory makes is that the
environment follows some unknown but computable
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computable_function> probability
distribution <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probability_distribution>.
It is a mathematical formalization of ```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 11:08 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/20/2018 8:54 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 10:30 PM Brent Meeker
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/20/2018 4:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 1:27 PM Brent Meeker
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/20/2018 1:49 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 8:05 PM John Clark  wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:16 PM Jason Resch
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> *> The Shrodinger equation is deterministic.*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yes.
>>>>
>>>>  > *Quantum Randomness, like a moving present, is a subjective
>>>>> phenomenon.*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The Schrodinger equation describes the quantum wave function using
>>>> complex numbers, and that is not observable so it's subjective in the same
>>>> way that lines of latitude and longitude are. However the square of the
>>>> absolute value of the wave function is observable because that produces a
>>>> probability that we can measure in the physical world that is objective,
>>>> provided  anything deserves that word; but it also yields something that is
>>>> not deterministic.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> It is still deterministic.  If you say otherwise you are introducing
>>> "collapse", and saying the other unobserved outcomes have stopped existing
>>> and are no long part of the system.  Schrodinger's equation does not say
>>> this is what happened, it just says that you have ended up with a system
>>> with many sets of observers, each of which observed different outcomes.
>>>
>>>
>>> You seem to think Schroedinger's equation was handed down to him on
>>> stone tablets from God.
>>>
>>
>> QM is the most accurate and successful theory in science. I will believe
>> it until something better comes along.
>>
>>
>> It was the most accurate and successful theory in science well before
>> Everett came along.
>>
>
>
> It wasn't a mathematical theory until Everett came along and deleted the
> unmathematical and loosely defined part that was incompatible with half a
> dozen scientific principles.
>
>
> The only "scientific principle" CI was incompatible with was a revulsion
> for randomness.  As Roland Omnes' says it's a probabilistic theory, so it
> predicts probabilities.
>

Also: it would be the only physical theory which held different principles
at different scales / magical observers (or consciousness, or something
else), non-realism, violation of speed of light, time irreversibility,
inability to consider multiple observers, inability to describe universe
prior to observers, non-linearity, discontinuous, etc.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 10:52 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/20/2018 8:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 10:10 PM Brent Meeker
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/20/2018 4:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 1:16 PM Brent Meeker
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/20/2018 1:11 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 5:39 PM Bruce Kellett
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 9:47 AM Brent Meeker
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 12/18/2018 6:34 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> That wasn't my question.  Do you believe your experience rules out the
>>>>> block universe?
>>>>>
>>>>> If you mean a pre-determined universe, I think that is ruled out by
>>>>> quantum randomness.  But I don't think our experience rules out there
>>>>> being
>>>>> a 4-dimensional map of all events.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Sure. General relativity gives us the idea of a 4-dimensional
>>>> Lorentzian manifold, over which one can lay a coordinate chart.
>>>> But that is not an ontology.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> But my point is it could be (and that it is a simpler theory if it is).
>>>
>>>
>>> But the inference often drawn from this picture is hyper-determinism.
>>> Hyper-determinism isn't impossible, but it's not implied by the fact that
>>> there can be 4-space map for labeling events.
>>>
>>
>> What is hyper determinism and how does it different from plain old
>> determinism?
>>
>>
>> It includes the behavior of the experimenters, so Alice and Bob don't
>> have any freedom to choose the orientation of detectors.  Gerard t'Hooft is
>>
>>
> Is it the same thing as super determinism?
>
> I don't think what I described is super-determinism, as what I described
> is a many-worlds theory.
>
>
> A many blocks theory?
>

Yes.  Perhaps not too unlike this:
http://www.weidai.com/qm-interpretation.txt

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 10:27 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/20/2018 4:37 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 1:25 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/20/2018 1:38 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 5:51 PM Brent Meeker
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/19/2018 4:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:00 AM Bruce Kellett
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 10:40 PM Jason Resch
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 11:14 PM Bruce Kellett <
>>>>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> From: Jason Resch
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 7:27 PM Bruce Kellett
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 12:19 PM Jason Resch
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:45 PM Bruce Kellett <
>>>>>>>> bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:27 AM Jason Resch
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:05 PM Bruce Kellett <
>>>>>>>>>> bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:02 AM Jason Resch <
>>>>>>>>>>> jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:23 PM John Clark <
>>>>>>>>>>>> johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Arithmetical computations don't change so there can't be a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> correspondence between them and the evolution of spacetime or
>>>>>>>>>>>>> with anything else that can change.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> "y = 2x+1" defines the arithmetical relation of "oddness".
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Solutions to this equation yield (compute) for *y* all
>>>>>>>>>>>> possible odd numbers.  *y* changes with respect to increasing
>>>>>>>>>>>> values of *x*, just as John Clark's brain changes with respect
>>>>>>>>>>>> to increasing values of *t*.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> How does 'x' change?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> With respect to y, and vice versa (like your brain state and your
>>>>>>>>>> location in spacetime).
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Poor analogy. Change in the physical world is governed by
>>>>>>>>> dynamics, described by equations with a veritable 't', called time.
>>>>>>>>> Time is
>>>>>>>>> probably only a local phenomenon, but I do not see any 'time'
>>>>>>>>> variable in
>>>>>>>>> arithmetic.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It depends on the equation.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> What equation? There are no dynamics in arithmetic.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There are computations.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But no dynamics.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm not sure what this means.  Not dynamic in what sense?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Dynamics is the study of matter in motion. There are no clocks in
>>>> arithmetic.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Matter only moves with respect to different times, likewise the state o```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 10:30 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/20/2018 4:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 1:27 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/20/2018 1:49 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 8:05 PM John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:16 PM Jason Resch
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> *> The Shrodinger equation is deterministic.*
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes.
>>>
>>>  > *Quantum Randomness, like a moving present, is a subjective
>>>> phenomenon.*
>>>
>>>
>>> The Schrodinger equation describes the quantum wave function using
>>> complex numbers, and that is not observable so it's subjective in the same
>>> way that lines of latitude and longitude are. However the square of the
>>> absolute value of the wave function is observable because that produces a
>>> probability that we can measure in the physical world that is objective,
>>> provided  anything deserves that word; but it also yields something that is
>>> not deterministic.
>>>
>>>
>> It is still deterministic.  If you say otherwise you are introducing
>> "collapse", and saying the other unobserved outcomes have stopped existing
>> and are no long part of the system.  Schrodinger's equation does not say
>> this is what happened, it just says that you have ended up with a system
>> with many sets of observers, each of which observed different outcomes.
>>
>>
>> You seem to think Schroedinger's equation was handed down to him on stone
>> tablets from God.
>>
>
> QM is the most accurate and successful theory in science. I will believe
> it until something better comes along.
>
>
> It was the most accurate and successful theory in science well before
> Everett came along.
>

It wasn't a mathematical theory until Everett came along and deleted the
unmathematical and loosely defined part that was incompatible with half a
dozen scientific principles.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 10:10 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/20/2018 4:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 1:16 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/20/2018 1:11 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 5:39 PM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 9:47 AM Brent Meeker
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 12/18/2018 6:34 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>
>>>> That wasn't my question.  Do you believe your experience rules out the
>>>> block universe?
>>>>
>>>> If you mean a pre-determined universe, I think that is ruled out by
>>>> quantum randomness.  But I don't think our experience rules out there being
>>>> a 4-dimensional map of all events.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Sure. General relativity gives us the idea of a 4-dimensional Lorentzian
>>> manifold, over which one can lay a coordinate chart.
>>> But that is not an ontology.
>>>
>>>
>> But my point is it could be (and that it is a simpler theory if it is).
>>
>>
>> But the inference often drawn from this picture is hyper-determinism.
>> Hyper-determinism isn't impossible, but it's not implied by the fact that
>> there can be 4-space map for labeling events.
>>
>
> What is hyper determinism and how does it different from plain old
> determinism?
>
>
> It includes the behavior of the experimenters, so Alice and Bob don't have
> any freedom to choose the orientation of detectors.  Gerard t'Hooft is the
>
>
Is it the same thing as super determinism?

I don't think what I described is super-determinism, as what I described is
a many-worlds theory.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 8:28 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 1:07 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 7:11 PM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 11:49 AM Jason Resch
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Do you believe other locations in space exist?
>>>>
>>>
>>> They exist, but there is no sense in which they are simultaneous with my
>>> existence.
>>>
>>
>> There are certain senses in which you could, but I mostly agree (as they
>> are not objective).
>>
>>
>>> They exist because events at other locations in my past light cone can
>>> affect me, and I can affect events at other locations in my future light
>>> cone.
>>>
>>
>> Okay, no problem with this.
>>
>>
>>> Do you believe other locations in time exist?
>>>>
>>>
>>> I believe that I have a past, and will have a future, but I do not
>>> believe that these exist in my present. Such an idea is clearly a
>>> linguistic confusion.
>>>
>>
>> I agree.
>>
>>
>>> (I answer yes to both questions, that is all I mean by block time --
>>>> that there is no privileged part of space time blessed with the property of
>>>> existence).
>>>>
>>>
>>> The present is all that you can know exists. All else is idle
>>> speculation.
>>>
>>
>> But you just said there is no such thing as the present (since there is
>> no objective notion of simultaneity)
>>
>
> I have never said that there is no such thing as the present. All I have
> said is that the notion of a space-like hyper-surface of simultaneity is
> not an objective notion.
>

Okay I agree with this.  I happen to take this as evidence that the
"passage of time" is also not an objective notion.  What do you think about
the passage of time, is it purely a subjective notion in your view?

> The print moment exists now for ev very one of us individually.
>

> Of course, you can construct imaginary theories in which unicorns,
>>> fairies, and Hogwarts Castle exist, but you would not have any evidence for
>>> any of these.
>>>
>>
>> You just said you have evidence for the existence of objects in your past
>> light cone.  Why presume that they would disappear from existence?  What is
>> the motivation/justification for such an idea?
>>
>
> I have no evidence that they exist now, since all I am currently aware of
> is the record of their past existence as it is present to me now. The
> evidence is that they existed in the past. Why is that not sufficient? I
> tend not to believe in things, like fairies, for which I have no current
> evidence.
>

This seems to be a trend that explains all aspects of your philosophy.  For
example, rejecting many-worlds, rejecting other universes, rejecting other
points in time, rejecting mathematical objects. It's based purely on what
you can see.  It is a theory of minimizing the number of objects in
reality. But to me this is not a correct application of Occam, which was
about simplifying theories by reducing their unnecessary assumptions,
rather than reducing the ontologies of those theories.

So by lobbing off the assumption that some points in the past stop
existing, you get a larger universe, more points in spacetime exist (but
this is simpler, as you don't have to add a theory of how different events
come into or out of existence), or with many-worlds, if you drop the
collapse postulate, you get the same predictions, and a simpler theory (but
a huge number of unseen histories).  With this different philosophy/value
system I don't think we will ever agree on what makes for a better theory,
for in all these cases that we disagree, it comes down to my preference for
a simpler theory, and your preference for a simpler ontology.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 8:22 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 1:03 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 7:05 PM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 11:45 AM Jason Resch
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> 1. It is a prediction of eternal inflation and string theory.
>>>>
>>>
>>> String theory and its "landscape" are very speculative, and unlikely to
>>> have any relation to the real world -- there is no evidence that string
>>> theory is even a coherent theory! Eternal inflation, although popular, is
>>> only one possibility for inflation, and even inflationary theory itself is
>>> not well-established science.
>>>
>>
>> I agree they are speculative, but they are on the side many many
>> universes.
>> Meanwhile there is no evidence for "the only universe that exists is the
>> one I can see".
>>
>
> The universe we see is the only one for which we have any concrete
> evidence, and that evidence is indubitable.
>
>

That's not evidence towards this being the only thing that exists.

>
>> 2. There is no known principal that prohibits other systems ruled by
>>>> different laws.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The idea that everything that is not forbidden must exist is a silly
>>> metaphysical notion.
>>>
>>>
>> That's not the position I was advocating, though I think that notion is
>> less silly than the idea that we should expect to be in a position to see
>> everything that exists.
>>
>
> Why? That is, in fact, all we have any direct evidence for.
>

We have no evidence nor reason to presume that we should be in a position
to see everything that exists. In fact, we already know that not to be the
case.  We know we can't see what lays beyond the cosmological horizon, for
example.

As to why I think there are likely many other universes with different
laws, I have many separate reasons, and they all point in the same
direction:

1. The trend of science has always been to humble humanity by showing us
what exists is much larger than we assumed. (Out planet is one of many, our
star is one of many, our galaxy is one of many, our Hubble volume is one of
many, etc.)
2. It's suggested by our leading cosmological theory (eternal inflation is
part of the standard model of cosmology, it is the default
theory/assumption in that field of science)
3. It's suggested by the only theories we have that are compatible with QM
and gravity
4. It explains the apparent fine tuning without resorting to intelligent
design or fantastic luck
5. Multi-verse theories are often simpler than those that constrain
possibility
6. It addresses the Wheeler question "Why these laws, not others"
7. There are many other perfectly sound and consistent equations (e.g. one
where the gravitational constantly is a different value) why should this
particular value for that free parameter be the only one to be "realized"
8. It's a conclusion of arithmetical realism

>
>>
>> 3. The digits of the dimensionless constants at significance levels not
>>>> important to life appear to be randomly distributed
>>>>
>>>
>>> Appearances can be deceptive -- vide flat earth.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> What do you think determines the dimensionless constants?
>>
>
> They may not be determined by some theory. Or they may be determined by
> some TOE. Who knows?
>

Exactly!

>
>
>>
>> 4. It is highly surprising that the dimensionless constants hold the
>>>> values they do as if they were even slightly different, the universe would
>>>> be too simple for any life to exist
>>>>
>>>
>>> How do you know that?
>>>
>>>
>> It is difficult to create systems that develop spontaneous complexity, as
>> any programmer could tell you.  That our universe is such a system is
>> surprising, given that most systems do not yield spontaneous complexity.
>>
>>
>>> Look, the Bayesian prior for any argument about the nature of the
>>> universe is that we exist. So there is nothing in the least surprising
>>> about the fact that the universe we observe is compatible with our
>>> existence. Anything else is just idle speculation.
>>>
>>
>> But that's not the correct prior to use.
>>
>
> It is, you know. If you did not exist you could not be arguing about this.
> So your existence must be part of any prior about the nature of the
> universe we see. The prior must include total evidence available.
>
>
>> Your assumption is that one and o```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 7:11 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 11:49 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 3:30 PM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 2:38 AM Jason Resch
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 5:05 AM Bruce Kellett
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 8:21 PM Jason Resch
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 5:19 PM Bruce Kellett
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If you include all events as as present moments, and say that they
>>>>>>>> all exist, then how is this different from the block-time view (which
>>>>>>>> says
>>>>>>>> only that all points in time exist and are real)?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> They differ in exactly the same was a 10^80 protons differs from one
>>>>>>> proton. The block-time view claims that all moments exist timelessly and
>>>>>>> simultaneously.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think your addition of the word "simultaneously" is invalid and
>>>>>> incorrect. It is enough to say timelessly.  Simultaneously is an
>>>>>> observer's
>>>>>> reference-frame dependent phenomenon.  It has no objective meaning.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  The trouble is that the very concept of "timeless" involves some
>>>>> "super time" dimension. The only possible interpretation is that the
>>>>> unchanging block endures for ever in some other temporal dimension. Any
>>>>> slice of that temporal dimension across the block is a moment of
>>>>> simultaneity. The very notion of "timeless" is a temporal concept.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> As I see block time, there is no need to add any super time dimension.
>>>> It is only to say other points in time are real, just as other points in
>>>> space are real.  And that "here" is as much a property of me as is "now".
>>>> That is, there is spacetime (that's it).  I happen to be in one point in
>>>> space time (here and now), but other people and events are in other theres
>>>> and thens.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I don't think you understand my objection to the very notion of
>>> "timeless" in connection with the universe. The universe is not timeless,
>>> and arbitrary imaginary constructions involving the universe always are
>>> built with a concept of time. You have no evidence that other points in
>>> time are "real", whatever that might mean. It is just a notion, without any
>>> basis.
>>>
>>
>> Do you believe other locations in space exist?
>>
>
> They exist, but there is no sense in which they are simultaneous with my
> existence.
>

There are certain senses in which you could, but I mostly agree (as they
are not objective).

> They exist because events at other locations in my past light cone can
> affect me, and I can affect events at other locations in my future light
> cone.
>

Okay, no problem with this.

>
> Do you believe other locations in time exist?
>>
>
> I believe that I have a past, and will have a future, but I do not believe
> that these exist in my present. Such an idea is clearly a linguistic
> confusion.
>

I agree.

>
> (I answer yes to both questions, that is all I mean by block time -- that
>> there is no privileged part of space time blessed with the property of
>> existence).
>>
>
> The present is all that you can know exists. All else is idle speculation.
>

But you just said there is no such thing as the present (since there is no
objective notion of simultaneity)

> Of course, you can construct imaginary theories in which unicorns,
> fairies, and Hogwarts Castle exist, but you would not have any evidence for
> any of these.
>
>
You just said you have evidence for the existence of objects in your past
light cone.  Why presume that they would disappear from existence?  What is
the motivation/justification for such an idea?

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 7:05 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 11:45 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 3:26 PM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 2:35 AM Jason Resch
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 5:01 AM Bruce Kellett
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 8:18 PM Jason Resch
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:34 PM Bruce Kellett
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 4:21 AM Bruno Marchal
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 19 Dec 2018, at 12:59, Bruce Kellett
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Dynamics is the study of matter in motion. There are no clocks in
>>>>>>>> arithmetic.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Of course there is clock. The successor function implements it out
>>>>>>>> of time and space.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The fact that you can use one ordered sequence to index another
>>>>>>> ordered sequence does not constitute a clock.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Nothing exists out of time and space, not even time and space
>>>>>>> themselves.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Accordingly, you must reject:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>- Membranes
>>>>>>- String theory landscape
>>>>>>- Eternal inflation
>>>>>>- The inside of black holes (yet another observer-dependent
>>>>>>phenomenon)
>>>>>>- Other universes with different physics (it's amazing that our
>>>>>>universe allows for life, assuming it's the only universe that exists)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> All of these ideas have at least some motivation/support. Why reject
>>>>>> them out of hand?
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This is a very mixed list! Some of these have no evidential support,
>>>>> some are mere speculation, and other universes with different physics is a
>>>>> long stretch, not at all in accordance with present knowledge.  I do not
>>>>> reject all these possibilities, but we do need more data on some of them.
>>>>> None of them exist outside of space-time, however.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  What do you think about the apparent fine-tuning of the universe? e.g.
>>>> https://www.amazon.com/Just-Six-Numbers-Forces-Universe-ebook/dp/B00CW0H6JY
>>>>
>>>> Isn't this a very strong statistical argument that other universes with
>>>> different physical laws must exist?
>>>>
>>>
>>> No. there is no evidence for that at all. Why should the constants of
>>> nature be a random selection from some distribution?
>>>
>>>
>> 1. It is a prediction of eternal inflation and string theory.
>>
>
> String theory and its "landscape" are very speculative, and unlikely to
> have any relation to the real world -- there is no evidence that string
> theory is even a coherent theory! Eternal inflation, although popular, is
> only one possibility for inflation, and even inflationary theory itself is
> not well-established science.
>
>

I agree they are speculative, but they are on the side many many universes.
Meanwhile there is no evidence for "the only universe that exists is the
one I can see".

> 2. There is no known principal that prohibits other systems ruled by
>> different laws.
>>
>
> The idea that everything that is not forbidden must exist is a silly
> metaphysical notion.
>
>
That's not the position I was advocating, though I think that notion is
less silly than the idea that we should expect to be in a position to see
everything that exists.

> 3. The digits of the dimensionless constants at significance levels not
>> important to life appear to be randomly distributed
>>
>
> Appearances can be deceptive -- vide flat earth.
>
>

What do you think determines the dimensionless constants?

> 4. It is highly surprising that the dimensionless constants hold the
>> values they do as if they were even slightly different, the universe would
>> be too simple for any life to exist
>>
```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 3:30 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 2:38 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 5:05 AM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 8:21 PM Jason Resch
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 5:19 PM Bruce Kellett
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> If you include all events as as present moments, and say that they
>>>>>> all exist, then how is this different from the block-time view (which
>>>>>> says
>>>>>> only that all points in time exist and are real)?
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> They differ in exactly the same was a 10^80 protons differs from one
>>>>> proton. The block-time view claims that all moments exist timelessly and
>>>>> simultaneously.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I think your addition of the word "simultaneously" is invalid and
>>>> incorrect. It is enough to say timelessly.  Simultaneously is an observer's
>>>> reference-frame dependent phenomenon.  It has no objective meaning.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  The trouble is that the very concept of "timeless" involves some "super
>>> time" dimension. The only possible interpretation is that the unchanging
>>> block endures for ever in some other temporal dimension. Any slice of that
>>> temporal dimension across the block is a moment of simultaneity. The very
>>> notion of "timeless" is a temporal concept.
>>>
>>>
>> As I see block time, there is no need to add any super time dimension.
>> It is only to say other points in time are real, just as other points in
>> space are real.  And that "here" is as much a property of me as is "now".
>> That is, there is spacetime (that's it).  I happen to be in one point in
>> space time (here and now), but other people and events are in other theres
>> and thens.
>>
>
> I don't think you understand my objection to the very notion of "timeless"
> in connection with the universe. The universe is not timeless, and
> arbitrary imaginary constructions involving the universe always are built
> with a concept of time. You have no evidence that other points in time are
> "real", whatever that might mean. It is just a notion, without any basis.
>
>
Do you believe other locations in space exist?

Do you believe other locations in time exist?

(I answer yes to both questions, that is all I mean by block time -- that
there is no privileged part of space time blessed with the property of
existence).

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 3:26 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 2:35 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 5:01 AM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 8:18 PM Jason Resch
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:34 PM Bruce Kellett
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 4:21 AM Bruno Marchal
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 19 Dec 2018, at 12:59, Bruce Kellett
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Dynamics is the study of matter in motion. There are no clocks in
>>>>>> arithmetic.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Of course there is clock. The successor function implements it out of
>>>>>> time and space.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The fact that you can use one ordered sequence to index another
>>>>> ordered sequence does not constitute a clock.
>>>>>
>>>>> Nothing exists out of time and space, not even time and space
>>>>> themselves.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> Accordingly, you must reject:
>>>>
>>>>- Membranes
>>>>- String theory landscape
>>>>- Eternal inflation
>>>>- The inside of black holes (yet another observer-dependent
>>>>phenomenon)
>>>>- Other universes with different physics (it's amazing that our
>>>>universe allows for life, assuming it's the only universe that exists)
>>>>
>>>> All of these ideas have at least some motivation/support. Why reject
>>>> them out of hand?
>>>>
>>>
>>> This is a very mixed list! Some of these have no evidential support,
>>> some are mere speculation, and other universes with different physics is a
>>> long stretch, not at all in accordance with present knowledge.  I do not
>>> reject all these possibilities, but we do need more data on some of them.
>>> None of them exist outside of space-time, however.
>>>
>>
>>  What do you think about the apparent fine-tuning of the universe? e.g.
>> https://www.amazon.com/Just-Six-Numbers-Forces-Universe-ebook/dp/B00CW0H6JY
>>
>> Isn't this a very strong statistical argument that other universes with
>> different physical laws must exist?
>>
>
> No. there is no evidence for that at all. Why should the constants of
> nature be a random selection from some distribution?
>
>
1. It is a prediction of eternal inflation and string theory.
2. There is no known principal that prohibits other systems ruled by
different laws.
3. The digits of the dimensionless constants at significance levels not
important to life appear to be randomly distributed
4. It is highly surprising that the dimensionless constants hold the values
they do as if they were even slightly different, the universe would be too
simple for any life to exist

Why do you believe there is only one inevitable possibility for the laws of
physics? I've never heard any justification for that idea.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 1:37 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/20/2018 2:09 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
> >
> > How is it imaginary if they later confirm it?  i.e., they wait 1 year,
> > and compare their readings from telescopes of things 1 ly away from
> > them, and when they compare notes each one confirms that indeed their
> > presents contained a different set of objects on that day 1 year ago
> > when they crossed paths.
>
> If there was an event one light year away in one of their's "present" at
> the time they passed, the other will not agree that it was in his
> "present" at that moment.  But they will agree on the event and it's
> causal relation to other events...which is why physicsts don't assign
> any significance to these subjective "presents".
>
>
I agree, there is no physical significance to any "present", which is I
prefer the block-time view.  It is the simplest theory consistent with
observations. It is simply a belief in "spacetime" without the added
assumption that "things come into existence and then cease existing".

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 1:27 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/20/2018 1:49 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 8:05 PM John Clark  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:16 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>> *> The Shrodinger equation is deterministic.*
>>
>>
>> Yes.
>>
>>  > *Quantum Randomness, like a moving present, is a subjective
>>> phenomenon.*
>>
>>
>> The Schrodinger equation describes the quantum wave function using
>> complex numbers, and that is not observable so it's subjective in the same
>> way that lines of latitude and longitude are. However the square of the
>> absolute value of the wave function is observable because that produces a
>> probability that we can measure in the physical world that is objective,
>> provided  anything deserves that word; but it also yields something that is
>> not deterministic.
>>
>>
> It is still deterministic.  If you say otherwise you are introducing
> "collapse", and saying the other unobserved outcomes have stopped existing
> and are no long part of the system.  Schrodinger's equation does not say
> this is what happened, it just says that you have ended up with a system
> with many sets of observers, each of which observed different outcomes.
>
>
> You seem to think Schroedinger's equation was handed down to him on stone
> tablets from God.
>

QM is the most accurate and successful theory in science. I will believe it
until something better comes along.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 1:25 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/20/2018 1:38 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 5:51 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/19/2018 4:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:00 AM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 10:40 PM Jason Resch
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 11:14 PM Bruce Kellett <
>>>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> From: Jason Resch
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 7:27 PM Bruce Kellett
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 12:19 PM Jason Resch
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:45 PM Bruce Kellett
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:27 AM Jason Resch
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:05 PM Bruce Kellett <
>>>>>>>>> bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:02 AM Jason Resch <
>>>>>>>>>> jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:23 PM John Clark
>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Arithmetical computations don't change so there can't be a
>>>>>>>>>>>> correspondence between them and the evolution of spacetime or
>>>>>>>>>>>> with anything else that can change.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> "y = 2x+1" defines the arithmetical relation of "oddness".
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Solutions to this equation yield (compute) for *y* all possible
>>>>>>>>>>> odd numbers.  *y* changes with respect to increasing values of
>>>>>>>>>>> *x*, just as John Clark's brain changes with respect to
>>>>>>>>>>> increasing values of *t*.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> How does 'x' change?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> With respect to y, and vice versa (like your brain state and your
>>>>>>>>> location in spacetime).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Poor analogy. Change in the physical world is governed by dynamics,
>>>>>>>> described by equations with a veritable 't', called time. Time is
>>>>>>>> probably
>>>>>>>> only a local phenomenon, but I do not see any 'time' variable in
>>>>>>>> arithmetic.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It depends on the equation.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What equation? There are no dynamics in arithmetic.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> There are computations.
>>>>>
>>>>> But no dynamics.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I'm not sure what this means.  Not dynamic in what sense?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Dynamics is the study of matter in motion. There are no clocks in
>>> arithmetic.
>>>
>>
>> Matter only moves with respect to different times, likewise the state of
>> a computer's registers and memory only change between steps of a CPU.  You
>> could study the dynamics of state changes in a computer.
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> The analogy with the block universe idea is useless, because the block
>>>>>>>> universe idea is only a picture, not a reality. Special relativity
>>>>>>>> merely
>>>>>>>> abolishes any notion of Newtonian absolute time, it does not prove
>>>>>>>> that all
>>>>>>>> instants o```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 1:16 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/20/2018 1:11 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 5:39 PM Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 9:47 AM Brent Meeker
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On 12/18/2018 6:34 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>> That wasn't my question.  Do you believe your experience rules out the
>>> block universe?
>>>
>>> If you mean a pre-determined universe, I think that is ruled out by
>>> quantum randomness.  But I don't think our experience rules out there being
>>> a 4-dimensional map of all events.
>>>
>>
>> Sure. General relativity gives us the idea of a 4-dimensional Lorentzian
>> manifold, over which one can lay a coordinate chart.
>> But that is not an ontology.
>>
>>
> But my point is it could be (and that it is a simpler theory if it is).
>
>
> But the inference often drawn from this picture is hyper-determinism.
> Hyper-determinism isn't impossible, but it's not implied by the fact that
> there can be 4-space map for labeling events.
>

What is hyper determinism and how does it different from plain old
determinism?

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 12:11 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 4:50 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> >> The Schrodinger equation describes the quantum wave function using
>>> complex numbers, and that is not observable so it's subjective in the same
>>> way that lines of latitude and longitude are. However the square of the
>>> absolute value of the wave function is observable because that produces a
>>> probability that we can measure in the physical world that is objective,
>>> provided  anything deserves that word; but it also yields something that is
>>> not deterministic.
>>>
>>
>> > *It is still deterministic. *
>>
>
> That depends on what "it" refers to. The quantum wave function is
> deterministic but the physical system associated with it is not.
>

This is incorrect.

>
> > *If you say otherwise you are introducing "collapse", *
>>
>
> Well you sure as hell are going to have to introduce something because
> after a observation is made there is no  longer a probability as  there is
> always a 100% chance you saw what you just saw. If I won the lottery
> yesterday then the day before yesterday there was one chance in ten million
> I would win but today there is 1 chance in 1 that I did win.
>
> > *and saying the other unobserved outcomes have stopped existing*
>>
>
>
>
>> > *Schrodinger's equation does not say this is what happened, it just
>> says that you have ended up with a system with many sets of observers, each
>> of which observed different outcomes.*
>>
>
> That's what Many World's claims it means but that claim is controversial,
> but what is not controversial is the wave function the Schrodinger equation
> describes mathematically.  Consider the wave functions of these 2 systems:
>
> 1) An  electron of velocity V starts at X  and after one second it is
> observed at point Y and then goes on for  another second.
>
> 2) An electron of the same velocity V starts at the same point X and then
> goes on for 2 seconds.
>
> The wave functions of these 2 systems are NOT the same and after you've
> taken the square of the absolute value of both you will find radically
> different probabilities about where you're likely to find the electron
> after 2 seconds. And as I said this is not controversial, people disagree
> over quantum interpretations but nobody disagrees over the mathematics, and
> the mathematical objects that the Schrodinger equation describes in those
> two systems are NOT the same.
>
>
If you model the system to be measured, and the experimenter making the
measurement, the Schrodinger wave equation tells you unambiguously the
system evolves into a form holding the measured system in all of its
possible results, together with many experimenters, each of whom observed
one of the possible results.

If you don't believe me, consider what would happen if you simulated an
experimenter's mind on a quantum computer, and then fed in as sensory input
one of the qubits registers prepared to be in a superposed state (0 and 1).

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 5:05 AM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 8:21 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 5:19 PM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>> If you include all events as as present moments, and say that they all
>>>> exist, then how is this different from the block-time view (which says only
>>>> that all points in time exist and are real)?
>>>>
>>>
>>> They differ in exactly the same was a 10^80 protons differs from one
>>> proton. The block-time view claims that all moments exist timelessly and
>>> simultaneously.
>>>
>>
>> I think your addition of the word "simultaneously" is invalid and
>> incorrect. It is enough to say timelessly.  Simultaneously is an observer's
>> reference-frame dependent phenomenon.  It has no objective meaning.
>>
>
>  The trouble is that the very concept of "timeless" involves some "super
> time" dimension. The only possible interpretation is that the unchanging
> block endures for ever in some other temporal dimension. Any slice of that
> temporal dimension across the block is a moment of simultaneity. The very
> notion of "timeless" is a temporal concept.
>
>
As I see block time, there is no need to add any super time dimension.  It
is only to say other points in time are real, just as other points in space
are real.  And that "here" is as much a property of me as is "now".  That
is, there is spacetime (that's it).  I happen to be in one point in space
time (here and now), but other people and events are in other theres and
thens.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 5:01 AM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 8:18 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:34 PM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 4:21 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 19 Dec 2018, at 12:59, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Dynamics is the study of matter in motion. There are no clocks in
>>>> arithmetic.
>>>>
>>>> Of course there is clock. The successor function implements it out of
>>>> time and space.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The fact that you can use one ordered sequence to index another ordered
>>> sequence does not constitute a clock.
>>>
>>> Nothing exists out of time and space, not even time and space themselves.
>>>
>>>
>> Accordingly, you must reject:
>>
>>- Membranes
>>- String theory landscape
>>- Eternal inflation
>>- The inside of black holes (yet another observer-dependent
>>phenomenon)
>>- Other universes with different physics (it's amazing that our
>>universe allows for life, assuming it's the only universe that exists)
>>
>> All of these ideas have at least some motivation/support. Why reject them
>> out of hand?
>>
>
> This is a very mixed list! Some of these have no evidential support, some
> are mere speculation, and other universes with different physics is a long
> stretch, not at all in accordance with present knowledge.  I do not reject
> all these possibilities, but we do need more data on some of them. None of
> them exist outside of space-time, however.
>

What do you think about the apparent fine-tuning of the universe? e.g.
https://www.amazon.com/Just-Six-Numbers-Forces-Universe-ebook/dp/B00CW0H6JY

Isn't this a very strong statistical argument that other universes with
different physical laws must exist?

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:42 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/19/2018 3:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:47 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/18/2018 6:34 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 7:27 PM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 12:19 PM Jason Resch
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:45 PM Bruce Kellett
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:27 AM Jason Resch
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:05 PM Bruce Kellett
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:02 AM Jason Resch
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:23 PM John Clark
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Arithmetical computations don't change so there can't be a
>>>>>>>>> correspondence between them and the evolution of spacetime or
>>>>>>>>> with anything else that can change.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "y = 2x+1" defines the arithmetical relation of "oddness".
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Solutions to this equation yield (compute) for *y* all possible
>>>>>>>> odd numbers.  *y* changes with respect to increasing values of *x*,
>>>>>>>> just as John Clark's brain changes with respect to increasing values of
>>>>>>>> *t*.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> How does 'x' change?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> With respect to y, and vice versa (like your brain state and your
>>>>>> location in spacetime).
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Poor analogy. Change in the physical world is governed by dynamics,
>>>>> described by equations with a veritable 't', called time. Time is probably
>>>>> only a local phenomenon, but I do not see any 'time' variable in
>>>>> arithmetic.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It depends on the equation.
>>>>
>>>
>>> What equation? There are no dynamics in arithmetic.
>>>
>>
>> There are computations.
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> The analogy with the block universe idea is useless, because the block
>>>>> universe idea is only a picture, not a reality. Special relativity merely
>>>>> abolishes any notion of Newtonian absolute time, it does not prove that
>>>>> all
>>>>> instants of time are equally and simultaneously existent. The whole notion
>>>>> of simultaneity is abolished in relativity. Minkowski's block universe was
>>>>> a response to this, but not a very good picture in the final analysis,
>>>>> because it completely fails to capture the local dynamical aspect of the
>>>>> time variable.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> No. Why should I?
>>>
>>
>> Because you believe relativity cannot be used to justify the block
>> universe concept.
>>
>>
>> You still won't believe it after reading the paper.  It's full of
>> falacious reasoning drawing conclusions about simultaneous events at
>> different places instead of noting that simultaneity is meaningless for
>> spatially separated events.
>>
>>
>>
> Simultaneity is only meaningless between different reference frames.
>
>
> You mean an imaginary rigid frame that extends across the universe, which
> assigns four coordinates to each event with values that cannot be
> operationally determined in any way?
>
>
Conventionally speaking, an observer's view of the present is the 3-d
surface of a slice through spacetime perpendicular to their velocity
through spacetime (at least it is using Euclidean coordinates, in which
one's velocity through spacetime is always c).

> There is no spacial limit on how distant the present moment can be
> defined, once you assume a reference frame.
>
>
> "Defined"?  How is the defined value to be arrived at?  How can```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 8:05 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:16 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> *> The Shrodinger equation is deterministic.*
>
>
> Yes.
>
>  > *Quantum Randomness, like a moving present, is a subjective
>> phenomenon.*
>
>
> The Schrodinger equation describes the quantum wave function using
> complex numbers, and that is not observable so it's subjective in the same
> way that lines of latitude and longitude are. However the square of the
> absolute value of the wave function is observable because that produces a
> probability that we can measure in the physical world that is objective,
> provided  anything deserves that word; but it also yields something that is
> not deterministic.
>
>
It is still deterministic.  If you say otherwise you are introducing
"collapse", and saying the other unobserved outcomes have stopped existing
and are no long part of the system.  Schrodinger's equation does not say
this is what happened, it just says that you have ended up with a system
with many sets of observers, each of which observed different outcomes.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:25 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 10:57 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 5:19 PM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 10:09 AM Jason Resch
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> If you include all events as as present moments, and say that they all
>>>> exist, then how is this different from the block-time view (which says only
>>>> that all points in time exist and are real)?
>>>>
>>>
>>> They differ in exactly the same was a 10^80 protons differs from one
>>> proton. The block-time view claims that all moments exist timelessly and
>>> simultaneously. As well as being inconsistent with the relativity of
>>> simultaneity, the notion is incoherent.
>>>
>>
>> Why is it incoherent?  What does moments popping out of existence do to
>> make the conception more coherent?
>>
>
> The notion of present moments "popping into and out of existence" makes
> sense only in terms of some external concept of time. If the present moment
> is all that exists at the moment, then it can't be said to "pop" from
> anywhere because it doesn't exist in any external timeless sense. If time
> is simply what you read on your local clock, the idea of a block universe
> becomes incoherent, because it requires time to be something other than
>

I would say that if time is simply what you read on your local clock, then
the idea of a block universe becomes the only coherent view.  I don't know
why you think block-time somehow redefines what time is.  It merely says
events in space time don't pop into or out of existence, they simply exist.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 5:51 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/19/2018 4:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:00 AM Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 10:40 PM Jason Resch
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 11:14 PM Bruce Kellett <
>>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>
>>>> From: Jason Resch
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 7:27 PM Bruce Kellett
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 12:19 PM Jason Resch
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:45 PM Bruce Kellett
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:27 AM Jason Resch
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:05 PM Bruce Kellett <
>>>>>>>> bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:02 AM Jason Resch
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:23 PM John Clark
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Arithmetical computations don't change so there can't be a
>>>>>>>>>>> correspondence between them and the evolution of spacetime or
>>>>>>>>>>> with anything else that can change.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "y = 2x+1" defines the arithmetical relation of "oddness".
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Solutions to this equation yield (compute) for *y* all possible
>>>>>>>>>> odd numbers.  *y* changes with respect to increasing values of
>>>>>>>>>> *x*, just as John Clark's brain changes with respect to
>>>>>>>>>> increasing values of *t*.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> How does 'x' change?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> With respect to y, and vice versa (like your brain state and your
>>>>>>>> location in spacetime).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Poor analogy. Change in the physical world is governed by dynamics,
>>>>>>> described by equations with a veritable 't', called time. Time is
>>>>>>> probably
>>>>>>> only a local phenomenon, but I do not see any 'time' variable in
>>>>>>> arithmetic.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It depends on the equation.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> What equation? There are no dynamics in arithmetic.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> There are computations.
>>>>
>>>> But no dynamics.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I'm not sure what this means.  Not dynamic in what sense?
>>>
>>
>> Dynamics is the study of matter in motion. There are no clocks in
>> arithmetic.
>>
>
> Matter only moves with respect to different times, likewise the state of a
> computer's registers and memory only change between steps of a CPU.  You
> could study the dynamics of state changes in a computer.
>
>
>>
>>
>>> The analogy with the block universe idea is useless, because the block
>>>>>>> universe idea is only a picture, not a reality. Special relativity
>>>>>>> merely
>>>>>>> abolishes any notion of Newtonian absolute time, it does not prove that
>>>>>>> all
>>>>>>> instants of time are equally and simultaneously existent. The whole
>>>>>>> notion
>>>>>>> of simultaneity is abolished in relativity. Minkowski's block universe
>>>>>>> was
>>>>>>> a response to this, but not a very good picture in the final analysis,
>>>>>>> because it completely fails to capture the local dynamical aspect of the
>>>>>>> time variable.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 5:19 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 10:09 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:53 PM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 9:38 AM Jason Resch
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:36 PM Bruce Kellett
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 9:33 AM Jason Resch
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:18 PM Bruce Kellett <
>>>>>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> From: Jason Resch
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:00 AM Bruce Kellett
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Of course they differ: in one case you have a purely local concept
>>>>>>>> of the present; in the other case you require some global notion of a
>>>>>>>> "present", which cannot even be uniquely defined.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> What exists?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A: *naive presentism*: only a 3-dimensional space evolving in time
>>>>>>> (some particular "slice" of spacetime exists, which constantly changes)
>>>>>>> B: *local-presents*: Events, each in their position in space time,
>>>>>>> each in their own present time
>>>>>>> C: *block-time*: Events, each in their position in space time
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We both agree relativity rules out A.  But I struggle to see the
>>>>>>> difference between B and C (ontologically speaking), unless you are
>>>>>>> proposing the view that the only thing that exists is a single event (I
>>>>>>> don't think you are though).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There are of the order of 10^80 protons in the visible universe. One
>>>>>>> does not confuse this fact by imagining that there is only one
>>>>>>> proton..
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I think your problem with the ontology of the strictly local
>>>>>>> "present" is that you still have in you mind some notion of an absolute,
>>>>>>> external time, in which all these "presents" exist. Your description of
>>>>>>> "block time" in C above makes precisely this mistake.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I am only asking what exists in your theory, given you reject the
>>>>>> notion of the present as a global space-like hyperplane.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The universe exists -- an infinity of present moments. Nothing exists
>>>>> timelessly because that is incoherent.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> So what defines this the set of present moments?  Does it include all
>>>> events in spacetime?  Or only some of them?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Why would you leave any out?
>>>
>>>
>> If you include all events as as present moments, and say that they all
>> exist, then how is this different from the block-time view (which says only
>> that all points in time exist and are real)?
>>
>
> They differ in exactly the same was a 10^80 protons differs from one
> proton. The block-time view claims that all moments exist timelessly and
> simultaneously.
>

incorrect. It is enough to say timelessly.  Simultaneously is an observer's
reference-frame dependent phenomenon.  It has no objective meaning.

Jason

> As well as being inconsistent with the relativity of simultaneity, the
> notion is incoherent.
>
>

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:34 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 4:21 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>> On 19 Dec 2018, at 12:59, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>> Dynamics is the study of matter in motion. There are no clocks in
>> arithmetic.
>>
>> Of course there is clock. The successor function implements it out of
>> time and space.
>>
>
> The fact that you can use one ordered sequence to index another ordered
> sequence does not constitute a clock.
>
> Nothing exists out of time and space, not even time and space themselves.
>
>
Accordingly, you must reject:

- Membranes
- String theory landscape
- Eternal inflation
- The inside of black holes (yet another observer-dependent phenomenon)
- Other universes with different physics (it's amazing that our universe
allows for life, assuming it's the only universe that exists)

All of these ideas have at least some motivation/support. Why reject them
out of hand?

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 5:39 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 9:47 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>> On 12/18/2018 6:34 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> That wasn't my question.  Do you believe your experience rules out the
>> block universe?
>>
>> If you mean a pre-determined universe, I think that is ruled out by
>> quantum randomness.  But I don't think our experience rules out there being
>> a 4-dimensional map of all events.
>>
>
> Sure. General relativity gives us the idea of a 4-dimensional Lorentzian
> manifold, over which one can lay a coordinate chart.
> But that is not an ontology.
>
>
But my point is it could be (and that it is a simpler theory if it is).

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 5:19 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 10:09 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:53 PM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 9:38 AM Jason Resch
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:36 PM Bruce Kellett
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 9:33 AM Jason Resch
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:18 PM Bruce Kellett <
>>>>>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> From: Jason Resch
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:00 AM Bruce Kellett
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Of course they differ: in one case you have a purely local concept
>>>>>>>> of the present; in the other case you require some global notion of a
>>>>>>>> "present", which cannot even be uniquely defined.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> What exists?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A: *naive presentism*: only a 3-dimensional space evolving in time
>>>>>>> (some particular "slice" of spacetime exists, which constantly changes)
>>>>>>> B: *local-presents*: Events, each in their position in space time,
>>>>>>> each in their own present time
>>>>>>> C: *block-time*: Events, each in their position in space time
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We both agree relativity rules out A.  But I struggle to see the
>>>>>>> difference between B and C (ontologically speaking), unless you are
>>>>>>> proposing the view that the only thing that exists is a single event (I
>>>>>>> don't think you are though).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There are of the order of 10^80 protons in the visible universe. One
>>>>>>> does not confuse this fact by imagining that there is only one
>>>>>>> proton..
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I think your problem with the ontology of the strictly local
>>>>>>> "present" is that you still have in you mind some notion of an absolute,
>>>>>>> external time, in which all these "presents" exist. Your description of
>>>>>>> "block time" in C above makes precisely this mistake.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I am only asking what exists in your theory, given you reject the
>>>>>> notion of the present as a global space-like hyperplane.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The universe exists -- an infinity of present moments. Nothing exists
>>>>> timelessly because that is incoherent.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> So what defines this the set of present moments?  Does it include all
>>>> events in spacetime?  Or only some of them?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Why would you leave any out?
>>>
>>>
>> If you include all events as as present moments, and say that they all
>> exist, then how is this different from the block-time view (which says only
>> that all points in time exist and are real)?
>>
>
> They differ in exactly the same was a 10^80 protons differs from one
> proton. The block-time view claims that all moments exist timelessly and
> simultaneously. As well as being inconsistent with the relativity of
> simultaneity, the notion is incoherent.
>
>
Why is it incoherent?  What does moments popping out of existence do to
make the conception more coherent?

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:47 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/18/2018 6:34 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 7:27 PM Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 12:19 PM Jason Resch
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:45 PM Bruce Kellett
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:27 AM Jason Resch
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:05 PM Bruce Kellett
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:02 AM Jason Resch
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:23 PM John Clark
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Arithmetical computations don't change so there can't be a
>>>>>>>> correspondence between them and the evolution of spacetime or with
>>>>>>>> anything else that can change.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "y = 2x+1" defines the arithmetical relation of "oddness".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Solutions to this equation yield (compute) for *y* all possible odd
>>>>>>> numbers.  *y* changes with respect to increasing values of *x*,
>>>>>>> just as John Clark's brain changes with respect to increasing values of
>>>>>>> *t*.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> How does 'x' change?
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> With respect to y, and vice versa (like your brain state and your
>>>>> location in spacetime).
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Poor analogy. Change in the physical world is governed by dynamics,
>>>> described by equations with a veritable 't', called time. Time is probably
>>>> only a local phenomenon, but I do not see any 'time' variable in
>>>> arithmetic.
>>>>
>>>
>>> It depends on the equation.
>>>
>>
>> What equation? There are no dynamics in arithmetic.
>>
>
> There are computations.
>
>
>>
>>
>>> The analogy with the block universe idea is useless, because the block
>>>> universe idea is only a picture, not a reality. Special relativity merely
>>>> abolishes any notion of Newtonian absolute time, it does not prove that all
>>>> instants of time are equally and simultaneously existent. The whole notion
>>>> of simultaneity is abolished in relativity. Minkowski's block universe was
>>>> a response to this, but not a very good picture in the final analysis,
>>>> because it completely fails to capture the local dynamical aspect of the
>>>> time variable.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> No. Why should I?
>>
>
> Because you believe relativity cannot be used to justify the block
> universe concept.
>
>
> You still won't believe it after reading the paper.  It's full of
> falacious reasoning drawing conclusions about simultaneous events at
> different places instead of noting that simultaneity is meaningless for
> spatially separated events.
>
>
>
Simultaneity is only meaningless between different reference frames. There
is no spacial limit on how distant the present moment can be defined, once
you assume a reference frame.  That two adjacent observers, in different
reference frames, can have a completely different (yet fully valid from
their own POV) conception of the present suggests that the naive view of an
objective present is fallacious.

>
>
>
>>
>>
>>> What is your interpretation of the
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rietdijk%E2%80%93Putnam_argument ?
>>>
>>
>> The "present" is a local concept which cannot be extended to global
>> hyperplanes.
>>
>
> Which would means there is no such thing as a present point in time.
>
>
> I don't know what you mean by "in time".  Every event can be labeled by
> four coordinate values one of which is "time", but the coordinate label is
> not the same as the clock reading of an observer at that event, and which
> defines that "present" for that observer.
>

The present is everything an observer can conclude to exist at any
particular clock time.  If he receives light from the sun at time (t+8
minutes), he can conclude the sun existed ```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:53 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 9:38 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:36 PM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 9:33 AM Jason Resch
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:18 PM Bruce Kellett <
>>>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> From: Jason Resch
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:00 AM Bruce Kellett
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Of course they differ: in one case you have a purely local concept of
>>>>>> the present; in the other case you require some global notion of a
>>>>>> "present", which cannot even be uniquely defined.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> What exists?
>>>>>
>>>>> A: *naive presentism*: only a 3-dimensional space evolving in time
>>>>> (some particular "slice" of spacetime exists, which constantly changes)
>>>>> B: *local-presents*: Events, each in their position in space time,
>>>>> each in their own present time
>>>>> C: *block-time*: Events, each in their position in space time
>>>>>
>>>>> We both agree relativity rules out A.  But I struggle to see the
>>>>> difference between B and C (ontologically speaking), unless you are
>>>>> proposing the view that the only thing that exists is a single event (I
>>>>> don't think you are though).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> There are of the order of 10^80 protons in the visible universe. One
>>>>> does not confuse this fact by imagining that there is only one
>>>>> proton..
>>>>>
>>>>> I think your problem with the ontology of the strictly local "present"
>>>>> is that you still have in you mind some notion of an absolute, external
>>>>> time, in which all these "presents" exist. Your description of "block
>>>>> time"
>>>>> in C above makes precisely this mistake.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I am only asking what exists in your theory, given you reject the
>>>> notion of the present as a global space-like hyperplane.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The universe exists -- an infinity of present moments. Nothing exists
>>> timelessly because that is incoherent.
>>>
>>>
>> So what defines this the set of present moments?  Does it include all
>> events in spacetime?  Or only some of them?
>>
>
> Why would you leave any out?
>
>
If you include all events as as present moments, and say that they all
exist, then how is this different from the block-time view (which says only
that all points in time exist and are real)?

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:36 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 9:33 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:18 PM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> From: Jason Resch
>>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:00 AM Bruce Kellett
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Of course they differ: in one case you have a purely local concept of
>>>> the present; in the other case you require some global notion of a
>>>> "present", which cannot even be uniquely defined.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> What exists?
>>>
>>> A: *naive presentism*: only a 3-dimensional space evolving in time
>>> (some particular "slice" of spacetime exists, which constantly changes)
>>> B: *local-presents*: Events, each in their position in space time, each
>>> in their own present time
>>> C: *block-time*: Events, each in their position in space time
>>>
>>> We both agree relativity rules out A.  But I struggle to see the
>>> difference between B and C (ontologically speaking), unless you are
>>> proposing the view that the only thing that exists is a single event (I
>>> don't think you are though).
>>>
>>>
>>> There are of the order of 10^80 protons in the visible universe. One
>>> does not confuse this fact by imagining that there is only one proton..
>>>
>>> I think your problem with the ontology of the strictly local "present"
>>> is that you still have in you mind some notion of an absolute, external
>>> time, in which all these "presents" exist. Your description of "block time"
>>> in C above makes precisely this mistake.
>>>
>>
>> I am only asking what exists in your theory, given you reject the notion
>> of the present as a global space-like hyperplane.
>>
>
> The universe exists -- an infinity of present moments. Nothing exists
> timelessly because that is incoherent.
>
>
So what defines this the set of present moments?  Does it include all
events in spacetime?  Or only some of them?

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:18 PM Bruce Kellett
wrote:

> From: Jason Resch
>
> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:00 AM Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>>
>> Of course they differ: in one case you have a purely local concept of the
>> present; in the other case you require some global notion of a "present",
>> which cannot even be uniquely defined.
>>
>>
> What exists?
>
> A: *naive presentism*: only a 3-dimensional space evolving in time (some
> particular "slice" of spacetime exists, which constantly changes)
> B: *local-presents*: Events, each in their position in space time, each
> in their own present time
> C: *block-time*: Events, each in their position in space time
>
> We both agree relativity rules out A.  But I struggle to see the
> difference between B and C (ontologically speaking), unless you are
> proposing the view that the only thing that exists is a single event (I
> don't think you are though).
>
>
> There are of the order of 10^80 protons in the visible universe. One does
> not confuse this fact by imagining that there is only one proton..
>
> I think your problem with the ontology of the strictly local "present" is
> that you still have in you mind some notion of an absolute, external time,
> in which all these "presents" exist. Your description of "block time" in C
> above makes precisely this mistake.
>

I am only asking what exists in your theory, given you reject the notion of
the present as a global space-like hyperplane.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 8:16 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 7:02 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> >> Arithmetical computations don't change so there can't be a
>>> correspondence between them and the evolution of spacetime or with
>>> anything else that can change.
>>>
>>
>
> > *"y = 2x+1" defines the arithmetical relation of "oddness".*
>>
>
> Definitions can't compute anymore than the English word "cow" can produce
> milk.
>
> > *Solutions to this equation yield (compute) for y all possible odd
>> numbers. *
>>
>
> Correct computations can do that, incorrect computations can not, and no
> computation can happen without matter/energy and the laws of physics.  So
> equations can't even compute incorrect solutions to themselves let alone
> correct ones.
>
> > *y* changes with respect to increasing values of *x*,
>>
>
> In this context x and y are words in the language of mathematics that
> represent the physical process a Turing Machine would undergo if it were
> running the  y = 2x+1 program. Mathematics is a excellent language but x
> and y are still just words and they don't change anymore than the English
> word "calf" changes to "cow" as time passes.
>
> > *Similar equations (arithmetical relations) exist in arithmetic which
>> can compute, the Fibonacci numbers, the primes, the moves made by Deep
>> Blue, the outputs of LISP programs, and the time evolution of the
>> Schrodinger Equation for the Hubble Volume we find ourselves in.*
>>
>
> Equations are sentences in the language of mathematics and no sentence in
> any language can compute, because like words sentences don't change, but
> fortunately physical turing machines do.
>

What is special about the equations of the physical universe?

>
> >> A functioning Turing Machine does not take its marching orders from
>>> the Peano Postulates or from the numbers they define, a functioning Turing
>>> Machine only does what its program orders it to do and even then only if
>>> that order does not violate physical law. Depending on the program you
>>> could have the functioning Turing Machine output that 2+3 is 4,5,6,-17,
>>> 6.02*10^23. or an infinity of other things, but only one of those programs
>>> treats numbers the way Peano said they should be treated, and thus out of
>>> an infinite of  possible programs only one will produce an output
>>> consistent with arithmetic.
>>>
>>
>> *> I think I see the problem with our failure to communicate or reach
>> agreement on this. You appear to be equating "all computations" with "all
>> descriptions of all computations" or "all outputs of any computation
>> interpreted as true statements". *
>>
>
> A computation is the output of a Turing Machine after it has worked on
> data X with program Y and halted. Programers never want their programs to
> make arithmetical errors but this isn't always easy because there are an
> infinite number of programs that halt and contain no grammatical errors in
> the very very simple Turing Machine language but are nevertheless not
> compatible with the Peano Postulates and so do make arithmetical errors.
>
>
>> > *When I say all computations, I am referring to the executions of each
>> Turing machine initiated with each possible starting program, allowed to
>> run forever or halt, whichever that may be.*
>>
>
> If it goes on forever then it's not a computation it's just a Turing
> Machine moving around, but there is still a infinite number of programs
> that will halt and of those almost all of them will not be compatible with
> the Peano Postulates which dictates how numbers should behave. And only
> the Peano Postulates are harmonious with physical law; if the hand
> calculator you use to design a bridge is running a typical program it will
> not be based on Peano and so will make arithmetic errors and thus the bridge
> you're designing will fall down. That's why calculator manufactures make
> sure the program is not typical and is one of the very rare programs that
> is Peano friendly and will tell you that 2+2 is 4 and not 5.
>
>
The output of a computation is not the computation, and we make use of
non-halting programs all the time.  For example, Operating Systems, Web
Servers, Virtual Machines, etc.  Ideally, these programs never halt, and
usually they never output anything, unless they crash.

Would a program that simulates John Clock's brain need to halt in order for
that simulation to realize John Clock's consciousness?

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:00 AM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 10:40 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 11:14 PM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> From: Jason Resch
>>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 7:27 PM Bruce Kellett
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 12:19 PM Jason Resch
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:45 PM Bruce Kellett
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:27 AM Jason Resch
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:05 PM Bruce Kellett
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:02 AM Jason Resch
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:23 PM John Clark
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Arithmetical computations don't change so there can't be a
>>>>>>>>>> correspondence between them and the evolution of spacetime or
>>>>>>>>>> with anything else that can change.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> "y = 2x+1" defines the arithmetical relation of "oddness".
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Solutions to this equation yield (compute) for *y* all possible
>>>>>>>>> odd numbers.  *y* changes with respect to increasing values of *x*,
>>>>>>>>> just as John Clark's brain changes with respect to increasing values
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> *t*.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> How does 'x' change?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> With respect to y, and vice versa (like your brain state and your
>>>>>>> location in spacetime).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Poor analogy. Change in the physical world is governed by dynamics,
>>>>>> described by equations with a veritable 't', called time. Time is
>>>>>> probably
>>>>>> only a local phenomenon, but I do not see any 'time' variable in
>>>>>> arithmetic.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It depends on the equation.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> What equation? There are no dynamics in arithmetic.
>>>>
>>>
>>> There are computations.
>>>
>>> But no dynamics.
>>>
>>
>> I'm not sure what this means.  Not dynamic in what sense?
>>
>
> Dynamics is the study of matter in motion. There are no clocks in
> arithmetic.
>

Matter only moves with respect to different times, likewise the state of a
computer's registers and memory only change between steps of a CPU.  You
could study the dynamics of state changes in a computer.

>
>
>> The analogy with the block universe idea is useless, because the block
>>>>>> universe idea is only a picture, not a reality. Special relativity merely
>>>>>> abolishes any notion of Newtonian absolute time, it does not prove that
>>>>>> all
>>>>>> instants of time are equally and simultaneously existent. The whole
>>>>>> notion
>>>>>> of simultaneity is abolished in relativity. Minkowski's block universe
>>>>>> was
>>>>>> a response to this, but not a very good picture in the final analysis,
>>>>>> because it completely fails to capture the local dynamical aspect of the
>>>>>> time variable.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> No. Why should I?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Because you believe relativity cannot be used to justify the block
>>> universe concept.
>>>
>>>
>>> I do not have the time or inclination to rebut every argument that is
>>> presented in arbitrary papers. But if you abandon the idea of
>>> 'simultaneity' as used in this paper, the objections to the idea of "the
>>> present" as a ```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 11:14 PM Bruce Kellett
wrote:

> From: Jason Resch
>
> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 7:27 PM Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 12:19 PM Jason Resch
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:45 PM Bruce Kellett
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:27 AM Jason Resch
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:05 PM Bruce Kellett
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:02 AM Jason Resch
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:23 PM John Clark
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Arithmetical computations don't change so there can't be a
>>>>>>>> correspondence between them and the evolution of spacetime or with
>>>>>>>> anything else that can change.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "y = 2x+1" defines the arithmetical relation of "oddness".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Solutions to this equation yield (compute) for *y* all possible odd
>>>>>>> numbers.  *y* changes with respect to increasing values of *x*,
>>>>>>> just as John Clark's brain changes with respect to increasing values of
>>>>>>> *t*.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> How does 'x' change?
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> With respect to y, and vice versa (like your brain state and your
>>>>> location in spacetime).
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Poor analogy. Change in the physical world is governed by dynamics,
>>>> described by equations with a veritable 't', called time. Time is probably
>>>> only a local phenomenon, but I do not see any 'time' variable in
>>>> arithmetic.
>>>>
>>>
>>> It depends on the equation.
>>>
>>
>> What equation? There are no dynamics in arithmetic.
>>
>
> There are computations.
>
> But no dynamics.
>

I'm not sure what this means.  Not dynamic in what sense?

>
> The analogy with the block universe idea is useless, because the block
>>>> universe idea is only a picture, not a reality. Special relativity merely
>>>> abolishes any notion of Newtonian absolute time, it does not prove that all
>>>> instants of time are equally and simultaneously existent. The whole notion
>>>> of simultaneity is abolished in relativity. Minkowski's block universe was
>>>> a response to this, but not a very good picture in the final analysis,
>>>> because it completely fails to capture the local dynamical aspect of the
>>>> time variable.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> No. Why should I?
>>
>
> Because you believe relativity cannot be used to justify the block
> universe concept.
>
>
> I do not have the time or inclination to rebut every argument that is
> presented in arbitrary papers. But if you abandon the idea of
> 'simultaneity' as used in this paper, the objections to the idea of "the
> present" as a ourely local concept collapse.
>
>
Then you have already abandoned the idea of a 3-dimensional space evolving
in time.  How does this not leave "block time" as the only view that
preserves an objective global spacetime?  Why give up an objective realist
view that captures all of spacetime when you do't have to?

This reminds me quite a bit of the break down of the naive conception of
personal identity.  The normal view is each person's experiences are
bounded by either psychological or biological continuity.  Thought
experiments such as duplicating or permuting minds show neither of these
can work.  The only consistent choices that remain are:
1. "universalism" -- all experiences belong to one universal experiencer
2. "no-self" -- there are only single individual thought moments

The thought experiments of relativity, such as the Rietdijk-Putnam
experiment, lead to a similar break down. You either reduce what exists
"presently" to a collection of independent events (points) in space time,
or you expand it to include all of space time.  But in both cases, you are
saying what exists in the present is the same (all points in space time vs.
all of space time).  I'm not sure you there is really a conceptual
difference.

> What is ```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 7:27 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 12:19 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:45 PM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:27 AM Jason Resch
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:05 PM Bruce Kellett
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:02 AM Jason Resch
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:23 PM John Clark
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Arithmetical computations don't change so there can't be a
>>>>>>> correspondence between them and the evolution of spacetime or with
>>>>>>> anything else that can change.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "y = 2x+1" defines the arithmetical relation of "oddness".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Solutions to this equation yield (compute) for *y* all possible odd
>>>>>> numbers.  *y* changes with respect to increasing values of *x*, just
>>>>>> as John Clark's brain changes with respect to increasing values of
>>>>>> *t*.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> How does 'x' change?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> With respect to y, and vice versa (like your brain state and your
>>>> location in spacetime).
>>>>
>>>
>>> Poor analogy. Change in the physical world is governed by dynamics,
>>> described by equations with a veritable 't', called time. Time is probably
>>> only a local phenomenon, but I do not see any 'time' variable in arithmetic.
>>>
>>
>> It depends on the equation.
>>
>
> What equation? There are no dynamics in arithmetic.
>

There are computations.

>
>
>> The analogy with the block universe idea is useless, because the block
>>> universe idea is only a picture, not a reality. Special relativity merely
>>> abolishes any notion of Newtonian absolute time, it does not prove that all
>>> instants of time are equally and simultaneously existent. The whole notion
>>> of simultaneity is abolished in relativity. Minkowski's block universe was
>>> a response to this, but not a very good picture in the final analysis,
>>> because it completely fails to capture the local dynamical aspect of the
>>> time variable.
>>>
>>
>>
>
> No. Why should I?
>

Because you believe relativity cannot be used to justify the block universe
concept.

>
>
>> What is your interpretation of the
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rietdijk%E2%80%93Putnam_argument ?
>>
>
> The "present" is a local concept which cannot be extended to global
> hyperplanes.
>

Which would means there is no such thing as a present point in time.

> Remember, the only sensible definition of "time" is an operational
> definition -- "time is what is measured on a clock". This is a purely local
> concept.
>

So then you have reduced the present to a point in spacetime, a single
event.

>
>
>> Do you agree in principal, that human experience of a dynamically
>> evolving universe cannot be used to decide between block time and
>> presentism?
>>
>
> Special relativity certainly cannot be used to justify the block universe
> concept.
>
>
That wasn't my question.  Do you believe your experience rules out the
block universe?

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:45 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:27 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:05 PM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:02 AM Jason Resch
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:23 PM John Clark
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Arithmetical computations don't change so there can't be a
>>>>> correspondence between them and the evolution of spacetime or with
>>>>> anything else that can change.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> "y = 2x+1" defines the arithmetical relation of "oddness".
>>>>
>>>> Solutions to this equation yield (compute) for *y* all possible odd
>>>> numbers.  *y* changes with respect to increasing values of *x*, just
>>>> as John Clark's brain changes with respect to increasing values of *t*.
>>>>
>>>
>>> How does 'x' change?
>>>
>>
>> With respect to y, and vice versa (like your brain state and your
>> location in spacetime).
>>
>
> Poor analogy. Change in the physical world is governed by dynamics,
> described by equations with a veritable 't', called time. Time is probably
> only a local phenomenon, but I do not see any 'time' variable in arithmetic.
>

It depends on the equation.

> The analogy with the block universe idea is useless, because the block
> universe idea is only a picture, not a reality. Special relativity merely
> abolishes any notion of Newtonian absolute time, it does not prove that all
> instants of time are equally and simultaneously existent. The whole notion
> of simultaneity is abolished in relativity. Minkowski's block universe was
> a response to this, but not a very good picture in the final analysis,
> because it completely fails to capture the local dynamical aspect of the
> time variable.
>

What is your interpretation of the
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rietdijk%E2%80%93Putnam_argument ?

Do you agree in principal, that human experience of a dynamically evolving
universe cannot be used to decide between block time and presentism?

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:05 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:02 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:23 PM John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Arithmetical computations don't change so there can't be a
>>> correspondence between them and the evolution of spacetime or with
>>> anything else that can change.
>>>
>>
>> "y = 2x+1" defines the arithmetical relation of "oddness".
>>
>> Solutions to this equation yield (compute) for *y* all possible odd
>> numbers.  *y* changes with respect to increasing values of *x*, just as
>> John Clark's brain changes with respect to increasing values of *t*.
>>
>
> How does 'x' change?
>
>
With respect to y, and vice versa (like your brain state and your location
in spacetime).

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:23 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018  Jason Resch  wrote
>
> > * I was explaining that pure numbers are changeless, but their
>> relationships yield computations which like spacetime, ** have manifest
>> change*
>
>
> 2+3=5, that relationship between the pure numbers 2,3 and 5 doesn't
> change, manifestly or otherwise.
>
> *> I was not saying you would find an arithmetical relation in spacetime,*
>
>
> True, you were saying the exact opposite, you were saying you could find
> spacetime in the relationship between pure numbers and so everything comes
> from pure numbers, but I'll be damned if I can see how you reached that
> conclusion.
>
> *> I was saying there is a correspondence between arithmetical
>> computations, and the subjective time evolution of spacetime *
>
>
> Arithmetical computations don't change so there can't be a correspondence
> between
> them and the evolution of spacetime or with anything else that can change.
>

"y = 2x+1" defines the arithmetical relation of "oddness".

Solutions to this equation yield (compute) for *y* all possible odd
numbers.  *y* changes with respect to increasing values of *x*, just as
John Clark's brain changes with respect to increasing values of *t*.

Similar equations (arithmetical relations) exist in arithmetic which can
compute, the Fibonacci numbers, the primes, the moves made by Deep Blue,
the outputs of LISP programs, and the time evolution of the Schrodinger
Equation for the Hubble Volume we find ourselves in.

>
> >> OK, in platonic heaven all computations exist, and I mean all of them,
>>> the incorrect ones as well as the correct ones, and only a physical Turing
>>> Machine can seperate the correct from the incorrect computations. In the
>>> same way when Michelangelo carved his huge statue of David he started with
>>> a single colossal block of marble and used his chisel to seperate the parts
>>> of the block that were correctly part of David from the parts of the block
>>> that were incorrectly part of David. There were an infinite number of
>>> incorrect Davids inside that block of marble and only one correct one, and
>>> Michelangelo used his brain and his chisel to get to the correct one, and
>>> both are made of matter that obeys the laws of physics.
>>
>>
>> *> I have no idea what you mean by "an incorrect computation".*
>
>
> I believe you are being disingenuous with me, I believe you do have some
> idea of what "a incorrect calculation" might mean and in fact I believe at
> various times in your life you have had first hand experience with such a
> thing,
>
> > in the set of all computations, all computations exist.
>
>
> Obviously, but in such an infinite set nearly all the computations in it
> would be self contradictory, I believe the technical term for that is
> "wrong", although some prefer the word "stupid".
>
> > * What is an incorrect computation? Incorrect with respect to what?  *
>
>
> Incorrect with respect to the laws of logic and the Peano Postulates, the
> very thing used to give formal definitions to numbers, the very thing that
> you and Bruno claim sits at the foundation of reality.
>
> *> So long as the computation is the result of a functioning Turing
>> machine nothing it does can be called an "incorrect computation".*
>
>
> A functioning Turing Machine does not take its marching orders from the
> Peano Postulates or from the numbers they define, a functioning Turing
> Machine only does what its program orders it to do and even then only if
> that order does not violate physical law. Depending on the program you
> could have the functioning Turing Machine output that 2+3 is 4,5,6,-17,
> 6.02*10^23. or an infinity of other things, but only one of those programs
> treats numbers the way Peano said they should be treated, and thus out of
> an infinite of  possible programs only one will produce an output
> consistent with arithmetic.
>
>

I think I see the problem with our failure to communicate or reach
agreement on this. You appear to be equating "all computations" with "all
descriptions of all computations" or "all outputs of any computation
interpreted as true statements".  This is not what I mean by all
computations. When I say all computations, I am referring to the executions
of each Turing machine initiated with each possible starting program,
allowed to run forever or halt, whichever that may be.

Jason

> >* Note the context is we're talking about arithmetical computations, not
>> physical machines *
>
>
> And speaking of self in```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:00 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
>
> That will give all computations, including the one responsible for you
> consciousness state here and now. But that is only a tiny part of the
> explanation, as physics as o be retrieved from the first person
> indeterminacy on all computations going through your state in the universal
> dovetailing (aka the sigma_2 arithmetical true sentences).
>
>
>
Hi Bruno,

Could you tell me (or point me to a definition of) what "sigma_2"
arithmetical true sentences are? What is their relation to sigma_1
sentences?

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 8:02 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 18 Dec 2018, at 06:01, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 10:46 PM Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:32 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> I have no idea what you mean by "an incorrect computation".
>>>
>>
>> Have you never made an arithmetical error?
>>
>>
> This posits some expectation of a particular result. But in the set of all
> computations, all computations exist.  What is an incorrect computation?
> Incorrect with respect to what?  So long as the computation is the result
> of a functioning Turing machine nothing it does can be called an "incorrect
> computation".
>
> (Note the context is we're talking about arithmetical computations, not
> physical machines that can be faulty, or ill-designed, or crash, etc. And
> the concept of a buggy program or a program that loops infinitely is only a
> relevant when some person expects some different behavior out of the
> program.  In the set of call computations, there is no concept of an
> incorrect vs. a correct computation, there are just computations.)
>
>
>
> That is well illustrated by Ehud Shapiro’s debugging algorithm(*) in
> PROLOG.
>
> It works well on simple programs. You let it compute, and when he gives a
> “wrong answer”, you just tell him, or tell it. Eventually (on simple
> sequences of corrections) it debugs the program.
>
> Now, if you give the empty program, you can do the same and debug it, from
> any sequence of input-output you have in mind, and eventually it converges
> on the program you were thinking about. He synthesised the usual factorial
> function from the debugging of the empty program.
>
> This illustrates well that a “bug” is a goal oriented notion.
>
> In some sense, the universal dovetailer emulates all programs, with all
> possible bugs, (including the grammatical error (if we want), as those can
> be mechanically skipped, unlike the possible unwanted loop), which are of
> course correct looping programs, if the goal was to do some loop.
>
> A program is correct with respect to some specification, but in the space
> of all computations, the notion of correctness does not make sense.
>
> Bruno
>
> (*) Algorithmic Program Debugging, Ehud Shapiro, MIT Press, 1983.
>

That's fascinating. Thanks for the reference.  On the topic of "teaching
programs", this made the news today:

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 11:31 PM Bruce Kellett
wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 4:12 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 10:54 PM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:38 PM Jason Resch
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 12:26 PM Brent Meeker
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But mathematical objects are completely defined by their axioms.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Are they?
>>>>
>>>> Two is a mathematical object.
>>>> One of the properties of two is the number of primes it separates.  For
>>>> example "3 and 5", "5 and 7", etc.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Definitions do not necessarily specify all the relationships into which
>>> things can enter -- if that was necessary for a definition, no definition
>>> would be possible. Clearly, common ostensive definitions do not have to
>>> specify all the properties of an object, or even what it is made of: "That
>>> is a rock" is a useful ostensive definition, but it does not commit one to
>>> a full geological understanding of rocks, their formation and properties.
>>>
>>
>> But shouldn't the system that "completely defines" some mathematical
>> object, allow one to learn and discover those properties?  Would you be
>> satisfied with a physical theory that billed itself as completely defining
>> all any physical phenomena, but couldn't tell us what the mass of the
>> electron was?
>>
>
> Definitions may be the starting point for a theory, but they are not the
> complete theory.
>
>
> If mathematical objects are completely defined by their axioms, then
>>>> shouldn't this property be defined and known for two?  Yet we don't even
>>>> know the answer to this question, we don't know if it is infinite or
>>>> finite.  It might even be that no proof exists under the axioms we
>>>> currently use.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Mathematical objects may be completely defined by their definitions, in
>>> that the definition corresponds to that unique object. But that does not
>>> commit one to knowledge of all the relationships that might be true about
>>> that object. You are requiring too much from a definition.
>>>
>>
>> Let me update my example:
>> Instead of considering "2", consider "Object T" which is "The number of
>> primes separated by 2".
>> Wouldn't this be a mathematical object that might be undefined by the
>> axioms?
>>
>
> The concept of twin primes has a simple definition. And the definition
> uniquely specifies the object -- one would know one whenever one met one,
> and that without ambiguity or error. But that does not mean that the
> definition, of itself, should tell you whether the number of primes that
> satisfy this definition of twin primes is finite or infinite, or even if
> there are any such pairs of primes.
>
> But we are talking about definitions of objects, not axioms of a theory.
> We know that any axiomatic theory will necessarily be incomplete -- there
> will be formulae in the theory that are neither theorems nor the negation
> of theorems.
>
>
>
>
>> There is no possibility of ostensive or empirical definition.  That's the
>>>>> strength of mathematics; it's "truths" are independent of reality, they
>>>>> are
>>>>> part of language.
>>>>>
>>>>> But in any case, the axioms don't define arithmetical truth, which is
>>>>> my only point.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> No, but they define arithmetic, without which "arithmetical truth"
>>>>> would be meaningless.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Was the physical universe meaningless before Newton?
>>>>
>>>
>>> The physical universe is defined ostensively -- neither Newton not
>>> Einstein brought it into  existence.
>>>
>>
>> I think that of the Integers.  I'm open to any arguments you have that
>> could change my mind.
>>
>
> What is an ostensive definition of an integer?
>
>
I mean that neither Peano nor Robinson brought integers into existence, not
that integers are defined ostensibly.

But regarding ostensibility of mathematical objects, I would say our
knowledge of them comes from simulation (interacting and playing with
objects of the mathematical world in our heads).  Brains of mathematicians,
via experience (empiricism) and simulation via their own brains gain a
sense and intuition for these properties.  It can be a sense not unlike
sight or hearing. Which is why one mathematician can point out mathematical
facts to another and others can see and appreciate that fact.

If I tell you 28 is a perfect number
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfect_number>, and you accept that fact
and agree, how is it you come to agree?  Is it through some human "math
sense"?

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 10:54 PM Bruce Kellett
wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:38 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 12:26 PM Brent Meeker
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> But mathematical objects are completely defined by their axioms.
>>>
>>
>> Are they?
>>
>> Two is a mathematical object.
>> One of the properties of two is the number of primes it separates.  For
>> example "3 and 5", "5 and 7", etc.
>>
>
> Definitions do not necessarily specify all the relationships into which
> things can enter -- if that was necessary for a definition, no definition
> would be possible. Clearly, common ostensive definitions do not have to
> specify all the properties of an object, or even what it is made of: "That
> is a rock" is a useful ostensive definition, but it does not commit one to
> a full geological understanding of rocks, their formation and properties.
>

But shouldn't the system that "completely defines" some mathematical
object, allow one to learn and discover those properties?  Would you be
satisfied with a physical theory that billed itself as completely defining
all any physical phenomena, but couldn't tell us what the mass of the
electron was?

>
>
> If mathematical objects are completely defined by their axioms, then
>> shouldn't this property be defined and known for two?  Yet we don't even
>> know the answer to this question, we don't know if it is infinite or
>> finite.  It might even be that no proof exists under the axioms we
>> currently use.
>>
>
> Mathematical objects may be completely defined by their definitions, in
> that the definition corresponds to that unique object. But that does not
> commit one to knowledge of all the relationships that might be true about
> that object. You are requiring too much from a definition.
>

Let me update my example:
Instead of considering "2", consider "Object T" which is "The number of
primes separated by 2".
Wouldn't this be a mathematical object that might be undefined by the
axioms?

>
>
>
>> There is no possibility of ostensive or empirical definition.  That's the
>>> strength of mathematics; it's "truths" are independent of reality, they are
>>> part of language.
>>>
>>> But in any case, the axioms don't define arithmetical truth, which is my
>>> only point.
>>>
>>>
>>> No, but they define arithmetic, without which "arithmetical truth" would
>>> be meaningless.
>>>
>>
>> Was the physical universe meaningless before Newton?
>>
>
> The physical universe is defined ostensively -- neither Newton not
> Einstein brought it into  existence.
>
>
I think that of the Integers.  I'm open to any arguments you have that
could change my mind.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 10:46 PM Bruce Kellett
wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:32 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>>
>> I have no idea what you mean by "an incorrect computation".
>>
>
> Have you never made an arithmetical error?
>
>
This posits some expectation of a particular result. But in the set of all
computations, all computations exist.  What is an incorrect computation?
Incorrect with respect to what?  So long as the computation is the result
of a functioning Turing machine nothing it does can be called an "incorrect
computation".

(Note the context is we're talking about arithmetical computations, not
physical machines that can be faulty, or ill-designed, or crash, etc. And
the concept of a buggy program or a program that loops infinitely is only a
relevant when some person expects some different behavior out of the
program.  In the set of call computations, there is no concept of an
incorrect vs. a correct computation, there are just computations.)

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 12:26 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/16/2018 10:46 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 12:00 AM Brent Meeker
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/16/2018 9:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 9:39 PM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 1:50 PM Jason Resch
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 7:21 PM Bruce Kellett
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Are you claiming that there is an objective arithmetical realm that is
>>>>> independent of any set of axioms?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yes. This is partly why Gödel's result was so shocking, and so
>>>> important.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> And our axiomatisations are attempts to provide a theory of this
>>>>> realm? In which case any particular set of axioms might not be true of
>>>>> "real" mathematics?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It will be either incomplete or inconsistent.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Sorry, but that is silly. The realm of integers is completely defined
>>>>> by a set of simple axioms -- there is no arithmetic "reality" beyond this.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> The integers can be defined, but no axiomatic system can prove
>>>> everything that happens to be true about them.  This fact is not commonly
>>>> known and appreciated outside of some esoteric branches of mathematics, but
>>>> it is the case.
>>>>
>>>
>>> All that this means is that theorems do not encapsulate all "truth".
>>>
>>
>> Where does truth come from, if not the formalism of the axioms?  Do you
>> agree that arithmetical truth has an existence independent of the axiomatic
>> system?
>>
>>
>> No.  You are assuming that arithmetic exists apart from axioms that
>> define it.
>>
>
> I am saying truth about the integers exists independently of any system of
> axioms that are capable of defining the integers.
>
>
>> There are true things about arithmetic that are not provable *within
>> arithmetic*.
>>
>
> It's unclear what you mean by "within arithmetic".
>
>
>> But that is not the same as being independent of the axioms.  Some axioms
>> are necessary to define what is meant by arithmetic.
>>
>
> You need to define what you're talking about before you can talk about
> it.
>
>
> But mathematical objects are completely defined by their axioms.
>

Are they?

Two is a mathematical object.
One of the properties of two is the number of primes it separates.  For
example "3 and 5", "5 and 7", etc.

If mathematical objects are completely defined by their axioms, then
shouldn't this property be defined and known for two?  Yet we don't even
know the answer to this question, we don't know if it is infinite or
finite.  It might even be that no proof exists under the axioms we
currently use.

> There is no possibility of ostensive or empirical definition.  That's the
> strength of mathematics; it's "truths" are independent of reality, they are
> part of language.
>
> But in any case, the axioms don't define arithmetical truth, which is my
> only point.
>
>
> No, but they define arithmetic, without which "arithmetical truth" would
> be meaningless.
>

Was the physical universe meaningless before Newton?

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 10:03 AM John Clark  wrote:

>
> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 8:30 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 11:44 AM Jason Resch
>> wrote:
>>
>> >>> *Pure numbers may not correspond to point in time and space, but
>>>> their relationships do. *
>>>
>>>
>>> >> Where and when did 2+2=4 happen?
>>
>> > *That is a category mistake.*
>>
>
> I agree, but I didn't say it, Jason is the one who said  "*Pure numbers
> may not correspond to point in time and space, but their relationships
> do". *
>
>
That is out of context. I was explaining that pure numbers are changeless,
but their relationships yield computations which like spacetime, have
manifest change (indexically). Here is the original exchange:

Relativity says space and time are intimately related but it does not say
>> that all points in the time dimension are equal because they correspond
>> to different points in the spatial dimensions. The trouble with pure
>> numbers is they don't correspond to any points in time or space and there
>> is nothing more fundamentalto our subjective experience than time and
>> space.
>>
>> Pure numbers may not correspond to point in time and space, but their
>> relationships do.  Relationships between pure numbers yield
>> computations, and those computations correspond to anything that is
>> computable.
>
>
I was not saying you would find an arithmetical relation in spacetime, I
was saying there is a correspondence between arithmetical computations, and
the subjective time evolution of spacetime as we experience it (because we
are part of it), just as any conscious mind might experience mind because
it is part of an evolving computation.

>
>
>> > *then it follows that all computations exists independently of you.*
>>
>
> OK, in platonic heaven all computations exist, and I mean all of them, the
> incorrect ones as well as the correct ones, and only a physical Turing
> Machine can seperate the correct from the incorrect computations. In the
> same way when Michelangelo carved his huge statue of David he started with
> a single colossal block of marble and used his chisel to seperate the parts
> of the block that were correctly part of David from the parts of the block
> that were incorrectly part of David. There were an infinite number of
> incorrect Davids inside that block of marble and only one correct one, and
> Michelangelo used his brain and his chisel to get to the correct one, and
> both are made of matter that obeys the laws of physics.
>

I have no idea what you mean by "an incorrect computation".

>
> > *Today we know that not only all computations are emulated in
>> arithmetic, but we know that they are already emulated by just one degree 4
>> diophantine polynomial.*
>>
>
> Degree 4 diophantine polynomials aren't going to be DOING any emulating
> or DOING anything else either until something changes, and numbers can't
> change and neither can their relationships, so they can't DO anything. But
> matter/energy can change and its the only thing that can, so it's the only
> thing that can DO stuff.
>

I thought you "weren't religious". This looks like blind faith to me.

Don't worry, I'll say it for you:

> Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never heard
> that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12.
>
>
>
Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Monday, December 17, 2018, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 7:06 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 1:50 AM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 5:59 PM Jason Resch
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> What I am curious to know is how how many of these statements you agree
>>>> with:
>>>>
>>>> "2+2 = 4" was true:
>>>> 1. Before I was born
>>>> 2. Before humans formalized axioms and found a proof of it
>>>> 3. Before there were humans
>>>> 4. Before there was any conscious life in this universe
>>>> 5. As soon as there were 4 physical things to count
>>>> 6. Before the big bang / before there were 4 physical things
>>>>
>>>
>>> "2+2=4" is a tautology, true because of the meanings of the terms
>>> involved. So its truth is not independent of the formulation of the
>>> question and the definition of the terms involved.
>>>
>>
>> So would you say it was false before it was asked and the terms defined?
>>
>
> The true/false dichotomy is not applicable to undefined terms. As in QM,
>
>
>> Was the 10^100th bit of Pi set only at such time that Pi was defined, or
>> did it have a set value before humans defined Pi?
>>
>
> Before pi was defined, the question had no meaning.
>
>
But was it not in a certain sense inevitable that we would get "3" as the
first digit?

Jason

> Bruce
>
> --
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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 1:50 AM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 5:59 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 12:03 AM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 4:30 PM Jason Resch
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 9:39 PM Bruce Kellett
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 1:50 PM Jason Resch
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 7:21 PM Bruce Kellett
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Are you claiming that there is an objective arithmetical realm that
>>>>>>> is independent of any set of axioms?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yes. This is partly why Gödel's result was so shocking, and so
>>>>>> important.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> And our axiomatisations are attempts to provide a theory of this
>>>>>>> realm? In which case any particular set of axioms might not be true of
>>>>>>> "real" mathematics?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It will be either incomplete or inconsistent.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Sorry, but that is silly. The realm of integers is completely
>>>>>>> defined by a set of simple axioms -- there is no arithmetic "reality"
>>>>>>> beyond this.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> The integers can be defined, but no axiomatic system can prove
>>>>>> everything that happens to be true about them.  This fact is not commonly
>>>>>> known and appreciated outside of some esoteric branches of mathematics,
>>>>>> but
>>>>>> it is the case.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> All that this means is that theorems do not encapsulate all "truth".
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Where does truth come from, if not the formalism of the axioms?
>>>>
>>>
>>> You are equivocating on the notion of "truth". You seem to be claiming
>>> that "truth" is encapsulated in the axioms, and yet the axioms and the
>>> given rules of inference do not encapsulate all "truth".
>>>
>>> I think I worded that badly.  What I mean is given that truth does not
>> come from axioms (since they cannot encapsulate all of it), then where does
>> it come from?  Does it have an independent, uncaused, transcendent
>> existence?
>>
>
> I don't know what that would mean. I don't think the truth of arithmetical
> statements comes from some underlying consistent model in which the axioms
> are "true". How do you determine the truth of the Godel sentence in some
> axiomatic system? Only by going to some more general system, not by
> reference to some underlying model.
>

Whether or not we can or determine it is irrelevant. The point is it is out
there, waiting to be determined, like the 10^100th bit of Pi is either
definitely "0" or definitely "1"; we just don't know which yet.

>
>
> Do you agree that arithmetical truth has an existence independent of the
>>>> axiomatic system?
>>>>
>>>
> Since truth does not equal 'theorem of the system', there is a sense in
> which this is true. But it does not mean that the truth of any
> syntactically correct statement is independent of any axiom set.
>
>

So where does that put arithmetical truth in relation to the axiom set?

>
>>> I agree that there are true statements in arithmetic that are not
>>> theorems in any particular axiomatic system. This does not mean that
>>> arithmetic has an existence beyond its definition in terms of some set of
>>> axioms. You cannot go from "true" to "exists", where "exists" means
>>> something more than the existential quantifier over some set. Confusing the
>>> existential quantifier with an ontology is a common mistake among some
>>> classes of mathematicians.
>>>
>>
>> I agree, let us ignore "exists" for now as I think it is distracting from
>> the current question of whether "true statements are true" (independent of
>> thinking about them, defining them, uttering them, etc.).
>>
>
> True statements are true by definition!
>
>
But```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 12:05 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/16/2018 9:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 10:22 PM Brent Meeker
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/16/2018 4:39 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 5:53 PM Brent Meeker
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/16/2018 1:56 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 3:28 PM Brent Meeker
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 12/15/2018 10:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 11:35 PM Brent Meeker
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 12/15/2018 6:07 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 7:57 PM Brent Meeker
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 12/15/2018 5:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> hh, but diophantine equations only need integers, addition, and
>>>>>>> multiplication, and can define any computable function. Therefore the
>>>>>>> question of whether or not some diophantine equation has a solution can
>>>>>>> be
>>>>>>> made equivalent to the question of whether some Turing machine halts.
>>>>>>> So
>>>>>>> you face this problem of getting at all the truth once you can define
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There's no surprise that you can't get at all true statements about
>>>>>>> a system  that is defined to be infinite.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But you can always prove more true statements with a better system of
>>>>>> axioms.  So clearly the axioms are not the driving force behind truth.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And you can prove more false statements with a "better" system of
>>>>>> axioms...which was my original point.  So axioms are not a "force behind
>>>>>> truth"; they are a force behind what is provable.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> There are objectively better systems which prove nothing false, but
>>>>> allow you to prove more things than weaker systems of axioms.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> By that criterion an inconsistent system is the objectively best of
>>>>> all.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> The problem with an inconsistent system is that it does prove things
>>>> that are false i.e. "not true".
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> However we can never prove that the system doesn't prove anything
>>>>> false (within the theory itself).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> You're confusing mathematically consistency with not proving something
>>>>> false.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  They're related. A system that is inconsistent can prove a statement
>>>> as well as its converse. Therefore it is proving things that are false.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But a system that is consistent can also prove a statement that is
>>>> false:
>>>>
>>>> axiom 1: Trump is a genius.
>>>> axiom 2: Trump is stable.
>>>>
>>>> theorem: Trump is a stable genius.
>>>>
>>>
>>> So how is this different from flawed physical theories?
>>>
>>>
>>> The difference is that mathematicians can't test their theories.
>>>
>>
>> Sure they can:  A set of axioms predicts a Diophantine equation has no
>> solutions.  We happen to find it does have a solution.  We can reject that
>> set of axioms.
>>
>>
>> Then the axioms must have also included enough to include Diophantine
>> equations (e.g. PA) so you have added axioms making the system inconsistent
>> and every proposition is a theorem.  The only test of the theory was that
>> it is inconsistent.
>>
>
> There is also soundness <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soundness> which I
> think more accurately reflects my example above.
>
>
> "...a system is sound when all of its theorems are tautologies."  Which is
> to say it is true that the theorem follows from the axioms.  Not that it is
> true simpliciter.
>

Arithmetic soundness[edit
<https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Soundness=edit=5>
]
If *T* is a theory whose objects of discourse can be interpreted as natural
numbers <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_numbers>, we say *T* is
*arithmetically
sound* if all theorems of *T* are actually true about the standard
mathematical integers. For further information, see ω-consistent theory
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%A9-consistent_theory>.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 12:03 AM Bruce Kellett
wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 4:30 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 9:39 PM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 1:50 PM Jason Resch
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 7:21 PM Bruce Kellett
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Are you claiming that there is an objective arithmetical realm that is
>>>>> independent of any set of axioms?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yes. This is partly why Gödel's result was so shocking, and so
>>>> important.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> And our axiomatisations are attempts to provide a theory of this
>>>>> realm? In which case any particular set of axioms might not be true of
>>>>> "real" mathematics?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It will be either incomplete or inconsistent.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Sorry, but that is silly. The realm of integers is completely defined
>>>>> by a set of simple axioms -- there is no arithmetic "reality" beyond this.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> The integers can be defined, but no axiomatic system can prove
>>>> everything that happens to be true about them.  This fact is not commonly
>>>> known and appreciated outside of some esoteric branches of mathematics, but
>>>> it is the case.
>>>>
>>>
>>> All that this means is that theorems do not encapsulate all "truth".
>>>
>>
>> Where does truth come from, if not the formalism of the axioms?
>>
>
> You are equivocating on the notion of "truth". You seem to be claiming
> that "truth" is encapsulated in the axioms, and yet the axioms and the
> given rules of inference do not encapsulate all "truth".
>
> I think I worded that badly.  What I mean is given that truth does not
come from axioms (since they cannot encapsulate all of it), then where does
it come from?  Does it have an independent, uncaused, transcendent
existence?

> Do you agree that arithmetical truth has an existence independent of the
>> axiomatic system?
>>
>
> I agree that there are true statements in arithmetic that are not theorems
> in any particular axiomatic system. This does not mean that arithmetic has
> an existence beyond its definition in terms of some set of axioms. You
> cannot go from "true" to "exists", where "exists" means something more than
> the existential quantifier over some set. Confusing the existential
> quantifier with an ontology is a common mistake among some classes of
> mathematicians.
>

I agree, let us ignore "exists" for now as I think it is distracting from
the current question of whether "true statements are true" (independent of
thinking about them, defining them, uttering them, etc.).

What I am curious to know is how how many of these statements you agree
with:

"2+2 = 4" was true:
1. Before I was born
2. Before humans formalized axioms and found a proof of it
3. Before there were humans
4. Before there was any conscious life in this universe
5. As soon as there were 4 physical things to count
6. Before the big bang / before there were 4 physical things

>
> There are syntactically correct statements in the system that are not
>>> theorems, and neither are their negation theorems.
>>>
>>
>> Yes.
>>
>>
>>> Godel's theorem merely shows that some of these statements may be true
>>> in a more general system.
>>>
>>
>> So isn't this like scientific theories attempting to better describe the
>> physical world, with ever more general and more powerful theories?
>>
>
> Except that physics is not an axiomatic system, and does not confuse
> theorems with truth. It is not useful to classify physical theories as
> 'true' or 'false',
>

Isn't this what professors do with physics tests? Ask there students to
prove something or determine what some physical law says should happen?
Then they grade an item as wrong if the answer given was "false" under the
working theory.

> even though this is often done in mistaken homage to Popper. The
> descriptions of the phenomena that physical theories give are either
> consistent with the data or not -- even adequate descriptions are not
> necessarily "true" in any sense.
>
>
Would you liken consistency with the data to soundness in a system of
axioms?

>
>
>> That does not mean that the integers are not completely defined by some
>>> simple axioms. It means no more than that 'truth' and 'theorem' are not
>>> synonyms.
>>>
>>>
>> I agree with this.
>>
>
> Good.
>
>
Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 12:00 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/16/2018 9:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 9:39 PM Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 1:50 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 7:21 PM Bruce Kellett
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>> Are you claiming that there is an objective arithmetical realm that is
>>>> independent of any set of axioms?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Yes. This is partly why Gödel's result was so shocking, and so important.
>>>
>>>
>>>> And our axiomatisations are attempts to provide a theory of this realm?
>>>> In which case any particular set of axioms might not be true of "real"
>>>> mathematics?
>>>>
>>>
>>> It will be either incomplete or inconsistent.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> Sorry, but that is silly. The realm of integers is completely defined
>>>> by a set of simple axioms -- there is no arithmetic "reality" beyond this.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> The integers can be defined, but no axiomatic system can prove
>>> everything that happens to be true about them.  This fact is not commonly
>>> known and appreciated outside of some esoteric branches of mathematics, but
>>> it is the case.
>>>
>>
>> All that this means is that theorems do not encapsulate all "truth".
>>
>
> Where does truth come from, if not the formalism of the axioms?  Do you
> agree that arithmetical truth has an existence independent of the axiomatic
> system?
>
>
> No.  You are assuming that arithmetic exists apart from axioms that define
> it.
>

I am saying truth about the integers exists independently of any system of
axioms that are capable of defining the integers.

> There are true things about arithmetic that are not provable *within
> arithmetic*.
>

It's unclear what you mean by "within arithmetic".

> But that is not the same as being independent of the axioms.  Some axioms
> are necessary to define what is meant by arithmetic.
>

You need to define what you're talking about before you can talk about it.
But in any case, the axioms don't define arithmetical truth, which is my
only point.

If they don't, then formalism, nominalism, fictionalism, etc. all fall, and
what is left is platonism.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 10:27 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/16/2018 4:43 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 6:02 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/16/2018 2:04 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 4:01 PM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 8:56 AM Jason Resch
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 3:28 PM Brent Meeker
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But a system that is consistent can also prove a statement that is
>>>>> false:
>>>>>
>>>>> axiom 1: Trump is a genius.
>>>>> axiom 2: Trump is stable.
>>>>>
>>>>> theorem: Trump is a stable genius.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So how is this different from flawed physical theories?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Physical theories do not claim to prove theorems - they are not systems
>>> of axioms and theorems. Attempts to recast physics in this form have always
>>> failed.
>>>
>>>
>> Physical theories claim to describe models of reality.  You can have a
>> fully consistent physical theory that nevertheless fails to accurately
>> describe the physical world, or is an incomplete description of the
>> physical world.  Likewise, you can have an axiomatic system that is
>> consistent, but fails to accurately describe the integers, or is less
>> complete than we would like.
>>
>>
>> But it still has theorems.  And no matter what the theory is, even if it
>> describes the integers (another mathematical abstraction), it will fail to
>> describe other things.
>>
>> ISTM that the usefulness of mathematics is that it's identical with its
>> theories...it's not intended to describe something else.
>>
>
> A useful set of axioms (a mathematical theory, if you will) will
> accurately describe arithmetical truth.  E.g., it will provide us the means
> to determine the behavior of a large number of Turing machines, or whether
> or not a given equation has a solution.  The world of mathematical truth is
> what we are trying to describe.  We want to know whether there is a biggest
> twin prime or not, for example.  There either is or isn't a biggest twin
> prime.  Our theories will either succeed or fail to include such truths as
> theorems.
>
>
> This is begging the question. You taking one piece of mathematics,
> arithmetic, and using it as a theory describing another piece of
> mathematics, Turing machines.  And then you're calling a successful
> description "true". But all you're showing is that one contains the
> other.
>

I'm not following here.

> Theorems are not "truths" except in the conditional sense that it is true
> that they follow from the axioms and the rules of inference.
>

I agree a theorem is not the same as a truth. Truth is independent of some
statement being provable in some system. Truth is objective.  If a system
of axioms is sound and consistent, then a theorem in that system is a
truth. But we can never be sure that system is sound and consistent (just
like we can never know if our physical theories reflect the physical
reality they attempt to capture).

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 10:22 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/16/2018 4:39 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 5:53 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/16/2018 1:56 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 3:28 PM Brent Meeker
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/15/2018 10:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 11:35 PM Brent Meeker
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 12/15/2018 6:07 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 7:57 PM Brent Meeker
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 12/15/2018 5:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> hh, but diophantine equations only need integers, addition, and
>>>>>> multiplication, and can define any computable function. Therefore the
>>>>>> question of whether or not some diophantine equation has a solution can
>>>>>> be
>>>>>> made equivalent to the question of whether some Turing machine halts.  So
>>>>>> you face this problem of getting at all the truth once you can define
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There's no surprise that you can't get at all true statements about a
>>>>>> system  that is defined to be infinite.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But you can always prove more true statements with a better system of
>>>>> axioms.  So clearly the axioms are not the driving force behind truth.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> And you can prove more false statements with a "better" system of
>>>>> axioms...which was my original point.  So axioms are not a "force behind
>>>>> truth"; they are a force behind what is provable.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> There are objectively better systems which prove nothing false, but
>>>> allow you to prove more things than weaker systems of axioms.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> By that criterion an inconsistent system is the objectively best of all.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> The problem with an inconsistent system is that it does prove things
>>> that are false i.e. "not true".
>>>
>>>
>>>> However we can never prove that the system doesn't prove anything false
>>>> (within the theory itself).
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You're confusing mathematically consistency with not proving something
>>>> false.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  They're related. A system that is inconsistent can prove a statement as
>>> well as its converse. Therefore it is proving things that are false.
>>>
>>>
>>> But a system that is consistent can also prove a statement that is false:
>>>
>>> axiom 1: Trump is a genius.
>>> axiom 2: Trump is stable.
>>>
>>> theorem: Trump is a stable genius.
>>>
>>
>> So how is this different from flawed physical theories?
>>
>>
>> The difference is that mathematicians can't test their theories.
>>
>
> Sure they can:  A set of axioms predicts a Diophantine equation has no
> solutions.  We happen to find it does have a solution.  We can reject that
> set of axioms.
>
>
> Then the axioms must have also included enough to include Diophantine
> equations (e.g. PA) so you have added axioms making the system inconsistent
> and every proposition is a theorem.  The only test of the theory was that
> it is inconsistent.
>

There is also soundness <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soundness> which I
think more accurately reflects my example above.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 9:39 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 1:50 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 7:21 PM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>> Are you claiming that there is an objective arithmetical realm that is
>>> independent of any set of axioms?
>>>
>>
>> Yes. This is partly why Gödel's result was so shocking, and so important.
>>
>>
>>> And our axiomatisations are attempts to provide a theory of this realm?
>>> In which case any particular set of axioms might not be true of "real"
>>> mathematics?
>>>
>>
>> It will be either incomplete or inconsistent.
>>
>>
>>
>>> Sorry, but that is silly. The realm of integers is completely defined by
>>> a set of simple axioms -- there is no arithmetic "reality" beyond this.
>>>
>>>
>> The integers can be defined, but no axiomatic system can prove everything
>> that happens to be true about them.  This fact is not commonly known and
>> appreciated outside of some esoteric branches of mathematics, but it is the
>> case.
>>
>
> All that this means is that theorems do not encapsulate all "truth".
>

Where does truth come from, if not the formalism of the axioms?  Do you
agree that arithmetical truth has an existence independent of the axiomatic
system?

> There are syntactically correct statements in the system that are not
> theorems, and neither are their negation theorems.
>

Yes.

> Godel's theorem merely shows that some of these statements may be true in
> a more general system.
>

So isn't this like scientific theories attempting to better describe the
physical world, with ever more general and more powerful theories?

> That does not mean that the integers are not completely defined by some
> simple axioms. It means no more than that 'truth' and 'theorem' are not
> synonyms.
>
>
I agree with this.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 7:21 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 11:36 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 4:14 PM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 9:04 AM Jason Resch
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 4:01 PM Bruce Kellett
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 8:56 AM Jason Resch
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 3:28 PM Brent Meeker
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But a system that is consistent can also prove a statement that is
>>>>>>> false:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> axiom 1: Trump is a genius.
>>>>>>> axiom 2: Trump is stable.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> theorem: Trump is a stable genius.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So how is this different from flawed physical theories?
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Physical theories do not claim to prove theorems - they are not
>>>>> systems of axioms and theorems. Attempts to recast physics in this form
>>>>> have always failed.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> Physical theories claim to describe models of reality.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Physical theories are models of reality -- using the word "model" in the
>>> physicists sense.
>>>
>>>
>>>> You can have a fully consistent physical theory that nevertheless fails
>>>> to accurately describe the physical world,
>>>>
>>>
>>> Like Brent's example of an axiomatic description of Trump..
>>>
>>>
>>>> or is an incomplete description of the physical world.  Likewise, you
>>>> can have an axiomatic system that is consistent, but fails to accurately
>>>> describe the integers, or is less complete than we would like.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Axiomatic system are always going to fail to capture everything we would
>>> like to capture about any domain. That is why attempted axiomatisation of
>>> physics have been rather unsuccessful.
>>>
>>>
>>>> It is a completely analogous situation. If you hold the physical
>>>> reality is real because we can study it objectively and refine our
>>>> understanding of it through observations,
>>>>
>>>
>>> That is not "why" I hold the physical world to be real. I take the
>>> physical world to be real because that is the definition of reality.
>>>
>>
>> There is no evidence that physics reality marks the end of our ability to
>> explain anything deeper.
>>
>
> And there is no evidence that any deeper explanation is possible. Let's
> face it, you could make such a claim about any theory -- there is no
> evidence that there is not some deeper explanation -- unless, that is, your
> theory does not account for all the facts. Physics itself is not a theory.
> We have theories about physical phenomena that are more or less successful,
> but the theories are not the physical reality.
>

more fundamental is a quasi religious belief--it's held without any
evidence for or against (in your view).

On the other hand, there is evidence that physics is derived from more
fundamental structures.  But you reject them. Why?

>
>
>>
>>
>>> then the same would hold for the mathematical reality.
>>>>
>>>
>>> No, mathematical "reality" (note the scare quotes) is a derived realm,
>>> entirely dependent on the set of axioms chosen in any instance. So it is
>>> not in any way analogous to physics.
>>>
>>>
>> Did you miss my earlier posts to Brent on this?  The integers and their
>> relations are not modeled by any axiomatic system, they transcend the
>> axioms and therefore we must conclude have a reality independent from our
>> attempts to model them.
>>
>
> It is interesting, then, that Bruno is very proud of the fact that
> arithmetic depends only on a small set of axioms, or even just on the
> properties of a pair of combinators.
>

A simple set of axioms allows us to define the Integers as well as
computation, but those axioms can only scratch the surface regarding all
the truth about the integers and their relations.

> Are you claiming that there is an objectiv```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 6:02 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/16/2018 2:04 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 4:01 PM Bruce Kellett
> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 8:56 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 3:28 PM Brent Meeker
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> But a system that is consistent can also prove a statement that is
>>>> false:
>>>>
>>>> axiom 1: Trump is a genius.
>>>> axiom 2: Trump is stable.
>>>>
>>>> theorem: Trump is a stable genius.
>>>>
>>>
>>> So how is this different from flawed physical theories?
>>>
>>
>> Physical theories do not claim to prove theorems - they are not systems
>> of axioms and theorems. Attempts to recast physics in this form have always
>> failed.
>>
>>
> Physical theories claim to describe models of reality.  You can have a
> fully consistent physical theory that nevertheless fails to accurately
> describe the physical world, or is an incomplete description of the
> physical world.  Likewise, you can have an axiomatic system that is
> consistent, but fails to accurately describe the integers, or is less
> complete than we would like.
>
>
> But it still has theorems.  And no matter what the theory is, even if it
> describes the integers (another mathematical abstraction), it will fail to
> describe other things.
>
> ISTM that the usefulness of mathematics is that it's identical with its
> theories...it's not intended to describe something else.
>

A useful set of axioms (a mathematical theory, if you will) will accurately
describe arithmetical truth.  E.g., it will provide us the means to
determine the behavior of a large number of Turing machines, or whether or
not a given equation has a solution.  The world of mathematical truth is
what we are trying to describe.  We want to know whether there is a biggest
twin prime or not, for example.  There either is or isn't a biggest twin
prime.  Our theories will either succeed or fail to include such truths as
theorems.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 5:53 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/16/2018 1:56 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 3:28 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/15/2018 10:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 11:35 PM Brent Meeker
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/15/2018 6:07 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 7:57 PM Brent Meeker
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 12/15/2018 5:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>
>>>> hh, but diophantine equations only need integers, addition, and
>>>>> multiplication, and can define any computable function. Therefore the
>>>>> question of whether or not some diophantine equation has a solution can be
>>>>> made equivalent to the question of whether some Turing machine halts.  So
>>>>> you face this problem of getting at all the truth once you can define
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> There's no surprise that you can't get at all true statements about a
>>>>> system  that is defined to be infinite.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But you can always prove more true statements with a better system of
>>>> axioms.  So clearly the axioms are not the driving force behind truth.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> And you can prove more false statements with a "better" system of
>>>> axioms...which was my original point.  So axioms are not a "force behind
>>>> truth"; they are a force behind what is provable.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> There are objectively better systems which prove nothing false, but
>>> allow you to prove more things than weaker systems of axioms.
>>>
>>>
>>> By that criterion an inconsistent system is the objectively best of all.
>>>
>>>
>> The problem with an inconsistent system is that it does prove things that
>> are false i.e. "not true".
>>
>>
>>> However we can never prove that the system doesn't prove anything false
>>> (within the theory itself).
>>>
>>>
>>> You're confusing mathematically consistency with not proving something
>>> false.
>>>
>>
>>  They're related. A system that is inconsistent can prove a statement as
>> well as its converse. Therefore it is proving things that are false.
>>
>>
>> But a system that is consistent can also prove a statement that is false:
>>
>> axiom 1: Trump is a genius.
>> axiom 2: Trump is stable.
>>
>> theorem: Trump is a stable genius.
>>
>
> So how is this different from flawed physical theories?
>
>
> The difference is that mathematicians can't test their theories.
>

Sure they can:  A set of axioms predicts a Diophantine equation has no
solutions.  We happen to find it does have a solution.  We can reject that
set of axioms.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 4:14 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 9:04 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 4:01 PM Bruce Kellett
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 8:56 AM Jason Resch
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 3:28 PM Brent Meeker
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But a system that is consistent can also prove a statement that is
>>>>> false:
>>>>>
>>>>> axiom 1: Trump is a genius.
>>>>> axiom 2: Trump is stable.
>>>>>
>>>>> theorem: Trump is a stable genius.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So how is this different from flawed physical theories?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Physical theories do not claim to prove theorems - they are not systems
>>> of axioms and theorems. Attempts to recast physics in this form have always
>>> failed.
>>>
>>>
>> Physical theories claim to describe models of reality.
>>
>
> Physical theories are models of reality -- using the word "model" in the
> physicists sense.
>
>
>> You can have a fully consistent physical theory that nevertheless fails
>> to accurately describe the physical world,
>>
>
> Like Brent's example of an axiomatic description of Trump..
>
>
>> or is an incomplete description of the physical world.  Likewise, you can
>> have an axiomatic system that is consistent, but fails to accurately
>> describe the integers, or is less complete than we would like.
>>
>
> Axiomatic system are always going to fail to capture everything we would
> like to capture about any domain. That is why attempted axiomatisation of
> physics have been rather unsuccessful.
>
>
>> It is a completely analogous situation. If you hold the physical reality
>> is real because we can study it objectively and refine our understanding of
>> it through observations,
>>
>
> That is not "why" I hold the physical world to be real. I take the
> physical world to be real because that is the definition of reality.
>

There is no evidence that physics reality marks the end of our ability to
explain anything deeper.

>
>
>> then the same would hold for the mathematical reality.
>>
>
> No, mathematical "reality" (note the scare quotes) is a derived realm,
> entirely dependent on the set of axioms chosen in any instance. So it is
> not in any way analogous to physics.
>
>
Did you miss my earlier posts to Brent on this?  The integers and their
relations are not modeled by any axiomatic system, they transcend the
axioms and therefore we must conclude have a reality independent from our
attempts to model them.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 4:01 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 8:56 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 3:28 PM Brent Meeker
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> But a system that is consistent can also prove a statement that is false:
>>>
>>> axiom 1: Trump is a genius.
>>> axiom 2: Trump is stable.
>>>
>>> theorem: Trump is a stable genius.
>>>
>>
>> So how is this different from flawed physical theories?
>>
>
> Physical theories do not claim to prove theorems - they are not systems of
> axioms and theorems. Attempts to recast physics in this form have always
> failed.
>
>
Physical theories claim to describe models of reality.  You can have a
fully consistent physical theory that nevertheless fails to accurately
describe the physical world, or is an incomplete description of the
physical world.  Likewise, you can have an axiomatic system that is
consistent, but fails to accurately describe the integers, or is less
complete than we would like.

It is a completely analogous situation. If you hold the physical reality is
real because we can study it objectively and refine our understanding of it
through observations, then the same would hold for the mathematical reality.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 3:39 PM  wrote:

>
>
> On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 8:58:33 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 2:14 PM  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 2:11:06 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 8:06 PM  wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 1:41:08 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 7:28 PM  wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 11:04:55 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Saturday, December 15, 2018,  wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 9:28:32 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 12/15/2018 7:43 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 1:09 AM Brent Meeker
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On 12/14/2018 7:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 8:43 PM Brent Meeker <
>>>>>>>>>>> meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Yes, you create a whole theology around not all truths are
>>>>>>>>>>>> provable.  But you ignore that what is false is also provable.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Provable is
>>>>>>>>>>>> only relative to axioms.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> 1. Do you agree a Turing machine will either halt or not?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> 2. Do you agree that no finite set of axioms has the power to
>>>>>>>>>>> prove whether or not any given Turing machine will halt or not?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> 3. What does this tell us about the relationship between truth,
>>>>>>>>>>> proofs, and axioms?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> What do you think it tells us.  Does it tell us that a false
>>>>>>>>>>> axiom will not allow proof of a false proposition?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It tells us mathematical truth is objective and doesn't come from
>>>>>>>>>> axioms. Axioms are like physical theories, we can test them and
>>>>>>>>>> refute them
>>>>>>>>>> if they lead to predictions that are demonstrably false. E.g., if
>>>>>>>>>> they
>>>>>>>>>> predict a Turing machine will not halt, but it does, then we can
>>>>>>>>>> reject
>>>>>>>>>> that axiom as an incorrect theory of mathematical truth.  Similarly,
>>>>>>>>>> we
>>>>>>>>>> might find axioms that allow us to prove more things than some
>>>>>>>>>> weaker set
>>>>>>>>>> of axioms, thereby building a better theory, but we have no
>>>>>>>>>> mechanical way
>>>>>>>>>> of doing this. In that way it is like doing science, and requires
>>>>>>>>>> trial and
>>>>>>>>>> error, comparing our theories with our observations, etc.
>>>>>>>>>>
>```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 3:28 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/15/2018 10:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 11:35 PM Brent Meeker
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/15/2018 6:07 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 7:57 PM Brent Meeker
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/15/2018 5:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>> hh, but diophantine equations only need integers, addition, and
>>>> multiplication, and can define any computable function. Therefore the
>>>> question of whether or not some diophantine equation has a solution can be
>>>> made equivalent to the question of whether some Turing machine halts.  So
>>>> you face this problem of getting at all the truth once you can define
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> There's no surprise that you can't get at all true statements about a
>>>> system  that is defined to be infinite.
>>>>
>>>
>>> But you can always prove more true statements with a better system of
>>> axioms.  So clearly the axioms are not the driving force behind truth.
>>>
>>>
>>> And you can prove more false statements with a "better" system of
>>> axioms...which was my original point.  So axioms are not a "force behind
>>> truth"; they are a force behind what is provable.
>>>
>>>
>> There are objectively better systems which prove nothing false, but allow
>> you to prove more things than weaker systems of axioms.
>>
>>
>> By that criterion an inconsistent system is the objectively best of all.
>>
>>
> The problem with an inconsistent system is that it does prove things that
> are false i.e. "not true".
>
>
>> However we can never prove that the system doesn't prove anything false
>> (within the theory itself).
>>
>>
>> You're confusing mathematically consistency with not proving something
>> false.
>>
>
>  They're related. A system that is inconsistent can prove a statement as
> well as its converse. Therefore it is proving things that are false.
>
>
> But a system that is consistent can also prove a statement that is false:
>
> axiom 1: Trump is a genius.
> axiom 2: Trump is stable.
>
> theorem: Trump is a stable genius.
>

So how is this different from flawed physical theories?

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 2:14 PM  wrote:

>
>
> On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 2:11:06 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 8:06 PM  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 1:41:08 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 7:28 PM  wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 11:04:55 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Saturday, December 15, 2018,  wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 9:28:32 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 12/15/2018 7:43 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 1:09 AM Brent Meeker
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 12/14/2018 7:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 8:43 PM Brent Meeker
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Yes, you create a whole theology around not all truths are
>>>>>>>>>> provable.  But you ignore that what is false is also provable.
>>>>>>>>>> Provable is
>>>>>>>>>> only relative to axioms.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> 1. Do you agree a Turing machine will either halt or not?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> 2. Do you agree that no finite set of axioms has the power to
>>>>>>>>> prove whether or not any given Turing machine will halt or not?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> 3. What does this tell us about the relationship between truth,
>>>>>>>>> proofs, and axioms?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> What do you think it tells us.  Does it tell us that a false axiom
>>>>>>>>> will not allow proof of a false proposition?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It tells us mathematical truth is objective and doesn't come from
>>>>>>>> axioms. Axioms are like physical theories, we can test them and refute
>>>>>>>> them
>>>>>>>> if they lead to predictions that are demonstrably false. E.g., if they
>>>>>>>> predict a Turing machine will not halt, but it does, then we can reject
>>>>>>>> that axiom as an incorrect theory of mathematical truth.  Similarly, we
>>>>>>>> might find axioms that allow us to prove more things than some weaker
>>>>>>>> set
>>>>>>>> of axioms, thereby building a better theory, but we have no mechanical
>>>>>>>> way
>>>>>>>> of doing this. In that way it is like doing science, and requires
>>>>>>>> trial and
>>>>>>>> error, comparing our theories with our observations, etc.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Fine, except you've had to quailfy it as "mathematical truth",
>>>>>>>> meaning that it is relative to the axioms defining the Turning machine.
>>>>>>>> Remember a Turing machine isn't a real device.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This seems to be the core problem with Bruno's proposal or model of
>>>>>>> reality; how does an imaginary device produce the illusion of matter
>>>>>>> (and
>>>>>>> space and time)? AG
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Brent
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The solution us easy. Don't assum```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sunday, December 16, 2018, Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 7:41:08 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 7:28 PM  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 11:04:55 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Saturday, December 15, 2018,  wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 9:28:32 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 12/15/2018 7:43 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 1:09 AM Brent Meeker
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 12/14/2018 7:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 8:43 PM Brent Meeker
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Yes, you create a whole theology around not all truths are
>>>>>>>> provable.  But you ignore that what is false is also provable.
>>>>>>>> Provable is
>>>>>>>> only relative to axioms.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 1. Do you agree a Turing machine will either halt or not?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 2. Do you agree that no finite set of axioms has the power to prove
>>>>>>> whether or not any given Turing machine will halt or not?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 3. What does this tell us about the relationship between truth,
>>>>>>> proofs, and axioms?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> What do you think it tells us.  Does it tell us that a false axiom
>>>>>>> will not allow proof of a false proposition?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It tells us mathematical truth is objective and doesn't come from
>>>>>> axioms. Axioms are like physical theories, we can test them and refute
>>>>>> them
>>>>>> if they lead to predictions that are demonstrably false. E.g., if they
>>>>>> predict a Turing machine will not halt, but it does, then we can reject
>>>>>> that axiom as an incorrect theory of mathematical truth.  Similarly, we
>>>>>> might find axioms that allow us to prove more things than some weaker set
>>>>>> of axioms, thereby building a better theory, but we have no mechanical
>>>>>> way
>>>>>> of doing this. In that way it is like doing science, and requires trial
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> error, comparing our theories with our observations, etc.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Fine, except you've had to quailfy it as "mathematical truth",
>>>>>> meaning that it is relative to the axioms defining the Turning machine.
>>>>>> Remember a Turing machine isn't a real device.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This seems to be the core problem with Bruno's proposal or model of
>>>>> reality; how does an imaginary device produce the illusion of matter (and
>>>>> space and time)? AG
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Brent
>>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The solution us easy. Don't assume they're only imaginary.
>>>>
>>>
>>> *If they're responsible for the existence of the matter and spacetime
>>> illusion, then they aren't composed of matter and don't exist in spacetime.
>>> So, the only alternative is that they exist in our imagination; hence,
>>> they're imaginary. QED. AG *
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>> Imaginary mean exists only in imagination.
>>
>> Simple counter example to your proof: If this universe is a simulation
>> run on a computer by an advanced alien species, you would conclude that
>> computer and alien species is imaginary on the basis that it can't be
>> located in spacetime.  But clearly this computer and alien civilization
>> does not exist only in our heads, for if they didn't we wouldn't have heads
>> with w```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 11:35 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/15/2018 6:07 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 7:57 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/15/2018 5:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> hh, but diophantine equations only need integers, addition, and
>>> multiplication, and can define any computable function. Therefore the
>>> question of whether or not some diophantine equation has a solution can be
>>> made equivalent to the question of whether some Turing machine halts.  So
>>> you face this problem of getting at all the truth once you can define
>>>
>>>
>>> There's no surprise that you can't get at all true statements about a
>>> system  that is defined to be infinite.
>>>
>>
>> But you can always prove more true statements with a better system of
>> axioms.  So clearly the axioms are not the driving force behind truth.
>>
>>
>> And you can prove more false statements with a "better" system of
>> axioms...which was my original point.  So axioms are not a "force behind
>> truth"; they are a force behind what is provable.
>>
>>
> There are objectively better systems which prove nothing false, but allow
> you to prove more things than weaker systems of axioms.
>
>
> By that criterion an inconsistent system is the objectively best of all.
>
>
The problem with an inconsistent system is that it does prove things that
are false i.e. "not true".

> However we can never prove that the system doesn't prove anything false
> (within the theory itself).
>
>
> You're confusing mathematically consistency with not proving something
> false.
>

They're related. A system that is inconsistent can prove a statement as
well as its converse. Therefore it is proving things that are false.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 8:06 PM  wrote:

>
>
> On Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 1:41:08 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 7:28 PM  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 11:04:55 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Saturday, December 15, 2018,  wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 9:28:32 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 12/15/2018 7:43 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 1:09 AM Brent Meeker
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 12/14/2018 7:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 8:43 PM Brent Meeker
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Yes, you create a whole theology around not all truths are
>>>>>>>> provable.  But you ignore that what is false is also provable.
>>>>>>>> Provable is
>>>>>>>> only relative to axioms.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 1. Do you agree a Turing machine will either halt or not?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 2. Do you agree that no finite set of axioms has the power to prove
>>>>>>> whether or not any given Turing machine will halt or not?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 3. What does this tell us about the relationship between truth,
>>>>>>> proofs, and axioms?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> What do you think it tells us.  Does it tell us that a false axiom
>>>>>>> will not allow proof of a false proposition?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It tells us mathematical truth is objective and doesn't come from
>>>>>> axioms. Axioms are like physical theories, we can test them and refute
>>>>>> them
>>>>>> if they lead to predictions that are demonstrably false. E.g., if they
>>>>>> predict a Turing machine will not halt, but it does, then we can reject
>>>>>> that axiom as an incorrect theory of mathematical truth.  Similarly, we
>>>>>> might find axioms that allow us to prove more things than some weaker set
>>>>>> of axioms, thereby building a better theory, but we have no mechanical
>>>>>> way
>>>>>> of doing this. In that way it is like doing science, and requires trial
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> error, comparing our theories with our observations, etc.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Fine, except you've had to quailfy it as "mathematical truth",
>>>>>> meaning that it is relative to the axioms defining the Turning machine.
>>>>>> Remember a Turing machine isn't a real device.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This seems to be the core problem with Bruno's proposal or model of
>>>>> reality; how does an imaginary device produce the illusion of matter (and
>>>>> space and time)? AG
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Brent
>>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The solution us easy. Don't assume they're only imaginary.
>>>>
>>>
>>> *If they're responsible for the existence of the matter and spacetime
>>> illusion, then they aren't composed of matter and don't exist in spacetime.
>>> So, the only alternative is that they exist in our imagination; hence,
>>> they're imaginary. QED. AG *
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>> Imaginary mean exists only in imagination.
>>
>> Simple counter example to your proof: If this universe is a simulation
>> run on a computer by an advanced alien species, you would conclude that
>> computer and alien species is imaginary on the basis that it can't be
>> located in spacetime.  But clearly this computer and alien civilization
>> does not exist only in our heads, for if they didn't we wouldn't have heads
>> with which to imagine them.
>>
>
> *If you insist on asserting something, anything, exists, but not in
> spacetime, you have a huge burden of proof since it's impossible to prove
> your assertion by any empirical test. So, you're not dealing with a
> scientific hypothesis, since it can't be falsified. AG *
>
>>
>>
It can be falsified. I think you missed the posts I wrote in response to
John.  The basic idea is this:

Theories predict certain observations.  We can check for those
observations.  If we find them, the theory has passed a test. If we don't
find them we keep looking. If we find observations that contradict the
predictions of the theory, then we reject that theory and look for
something better.

Jason

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```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 7:57 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/15/2018 5:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> hh, but diophantine equations only need integers, addition, and
>> multiplication, and can define any computable function. Therefore the
>> question of whether or not some diophantine equation has a solution can be
>> made equivalent to the question of whether some Turing machine halts.  So
>> you face this problem of getting at all the truth once you can define
>>
>>
>> There's no surprise that you can't get at all true statements about a
>> system  that is defined to be infinite.
>>
>
> But you can always prove more true statements with a better system of
> axioms.  So clearly the axioms are not the driving force behind truth.
>
>
> And you can prove more false statements with a "better" system of
> axioms...which was my original point.  So axioms are not a "force behind
> truth"; they are a force behind what is provable.
>
>
There are objectively better systems which prove nothing false, but allow
you to prove more things than weaker systems of axioms.  However we can
never prove that the system doesn't prove anything false (within the theory
itself).

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 7:39 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/15/2018 2:58 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, December 15, 2018, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/15/2018 7:43 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 1:09 AM Brent Meeker
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/14/2018 7:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>> On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 8:43 PM Brent Meeker
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Yes, you create a whole theology around not all truths are provable.
>>>> But you ignore that what is false is also provable.  Provable is only
>>>> relative to axioms.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> 1. Do you agree a Turing machine will either halt or not?
>>>
>>> 2. Do you agree that no finite set of axioms has the power to prove
>>> whether or not any given Turing machine will halt or not?
>>>
>>>
>>> 3. What does this tell us about the relationship between truth, proofs,
>>> and axioms?
>>>
>>>
>>> What do you think it tells us.  Does it tell us that a false axiom will
>>> not allow proof of a false proposition?
>>>
>>
>> It tells us mathematical truth is objective and doesn't come from axioms.
>> Axioms are like physical theories, we can test them and refute them if they
>> lead to predictions that are demonstrably false. E.g., if they predict a
>> Turing machine will not halt, but it does, then we can reject that axiom as
>> an incorrect theory of mathematical truth.  Similarly, we might find axioms
>> that allow us to prove more things than some weaker set of axioms, thereby
>> building a better theory, but we have no mechanical way of doing this. In
>> that way it is like doing science, and requires trial and error, comparing
>> our theories with our observations, etc.
>>
>>
>> Fine, except you've had to quailfy it as "mathematical truth", meaning
>> that it is relative to the axioms defining the Turning machine.  Remember a
>> Turing machine isn't a real device.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
> Ahh, but diophantine equations only need integers, addition, and
> multiplication, and can define any computable function. Therefore the
> question of whether or not some diophantine equation has a solution can be
> made equivalent to the question of whether some Turing machine halts.  So
> you face this problem of getting at all the truth once you can define
>
>
> There's no surprise that you can't get at all true statements about a
> system  that is defined to be infinite.
>

But you can always prove more true statements with a better system of
axioms.  So clearly the axioms are not the driving force behind truth.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 7:28 PM  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 11:04:55 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, December 15, 2018,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 9:28:32 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 12/15/2018 7:43 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 1:09 AM Brent Meeker
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 12/14/2018 7:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 8:43 PM Brent Meeker
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Yes, you create a whole theology around not all truths are provable.
>>>>>> But you ignore that what is false is also provable.  Provable is only
>>>>>> relative to axioms.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> 1. Do you agree a Turing machine will either halt or not?
>>>>>
>>>>> 2. Do you agree that no finite set of axioms has the power to prove
>>>>> whether or not any given Turing machine will halt or not?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 3. What does this tell us about the relationship between truth,
>>>>> proofs, and axioms?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> What do you think it tells us.  Does it tell us that a false axiom
>>>>> will not allow proof of a false proposition?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It tells us mathematical truth is objective and doesn't come from
>>>> axioms. Axioms are like physical theories, we can test them and refute them
>>>> if they lead to predictions that are demonstrably false. E.g., if they
>>>> predict a Turing machine will not halt, but it does, then we can reject
>>>> that axiom as an incorrect theory of mathematical truth.  Similarly, we
>>>> might find axioms that allow us to prove more things than some weaker set
>>>> of axioms, thereby building a better theory, but we have no mechanical way
>>>> of doing this. In that way it is like doing science, and requires trial and
>>>> error, comparing our theories with our observations, etc.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Fine, except you've had to quailfy it as "mathematical truth", meaning
>>>> that it is relative to the axioms defining the Turning machine.  Remember a
>>>> Turing machine isn't a real device.
>>>>
>>>
>>> This seems to be the core problem with Bruno's proposal or model of
>>> reality; how does an imaginary device produce the illusion of matter (and
>>> space and time)? AG
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Brent
>>>>
>>> --
>>
>>
>> The solution us easy. Don't assume they're only imaginary.
>>
>
> *If they're responsible for the existence of the matter and spacetime
> illusion, then they aren't composed of matter and don't exist in spacetime.
> So, the only alternative is that they exist in our imagination; hence,
> they're imaginary. QED. AG *
>
>>
>>
Imaginary mean exists only in imagination.

Simple counter example to your proof: If this universe is a simulation run
on a computer by an advanced alien species, you would conclude that
computer and alien species is imaginary on the basis that it can't be
located in spacetime.  But clearly this computer and alien civilization
does not exist only in our heads, for if they didn't we wouldn't have heads
with which to imagine them.

Jason

--
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```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Saturday, December 15, 2018,  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, December 15, 2018 at 9:28:32 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 12/15/2018 7:43 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 1:09 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/14/2018 7:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>> On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 8:43 PM Brent Meeker
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Yes, you create a whole theology around not all truths are provable.
>>>> But you ignore that what is false is also provable.  Provable is only
>>>> relative to axioms.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> 1. Do you agree a Turing machine will either halt or not?
>>>
>>> 2. Do you agree that no finite set of axioms has the power to prove
>>> whether or not any given Turing machine will halt or not?
>>>
>>>
>>> 3. What does this tell us about the relationship between truth, proofs,
>>> and axioms?
>>>
>>>
>>> What do you think it tells us.  Does it tell us that a false axiom will
>>> not allow proof of a false proposition?
>>>
>>
>> It tells us mathematical truth is objective and doesn't come from axioms.
>> Axioms are like physical theories, we can test them and refute them if they
>> lead to predictions that are demonstrably false. E.g., if they predict a
>> Turing machine will not halt, but it does, then we can reject that axiom as
>> an incorrect theory of mathematical truth.  Similarly, we might find axioms
>> that allow us to prove more things than some weaker set of axioms, thereby
>> building a better theory, but we have no mechanical way of doing this. In
>> that way it is like doing science, and requires trial and error, comparing
>> our theories with our observations, etc.
>>
>>
>> Fine, except you've had to quailfy it as "mathematical truth", meaning
>> that it is relative to the axioms defining the Turning machine.  Remember a
>> Turing machine isn't a real device.
>>
>
> This seems to be the core problem with Bruno's proposal or model of
> reality; how does an imaginary device produce the illusion of matter (and
> space and time)? AG
>
>>
>> Brent
>>
> --

The solution us easy. Don't assume they're only imaginary.

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Saturday, December 15, 2018, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/15/2018 7:43 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 1:09 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/14/2018 7:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 8:43 PM Brent Meeker
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Yes, you create a whole theology around not all truths are provable.
>>> But you ignore that what is false is also provable.  Provable is only
>>> relative to axioms.
>>>
>>>
>> 1. Do you agree a Turing machine will either halt or not?
>>
>> 2. Do you agree that no finite set of axioms has the power to prove
>> whether or not any given Turing machine will halt or not?
>>
>>
>> 3. What does this tell us about the relationship between truth, proofs,
>> and axioms?
>>
>>
>> What do you think it tells us.  Does it tell us that a false axiom will
>> not allow proof of a false proposition?
>>
>
> It tells us mathematical truth is objective and doesn't come from axioms.
> Axioms are like physical theories, we can test them and refute them if they
> lead to predictions that are demonstrably false. E.g., if they predict a
> Turing machine will not halt, but it does, then we can reject that axiom as
> an incorrect theory of mathematical truth.  Similarly, we might find axioms
> that allow us to prove more things than some weaker set of axioms, thereby
> building a better theory, but we have no mechanical way of doing this. In
> that way it is like doing science, and requires trial and error, comparing
> our theories with our observations, etc.
>
>
> Fine, except you've had to quailfy it as "mathematical truth", meaning
> that it is relative to the axioms defining the Turning machine.  Remember a
> Turing machine isn't a real device.
>
> Brent
>

Ahh, but diophantine equations only need integers, addition, and
multiplication, and can define any computable function. Therefore the
question of whether or not some diophantine equation has a solution can be
made equivalent to the question of whether some Turing machine halts.  So
you face this problem of getting at all the truth once you can define

Jason

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### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 7:53 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 2:32 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>  >> Static with respect to what dimension? The block universe is a
>>> mathematical 4D object  constructed in 1 dimension of time and 3 dimensions
>>> of space that follows Non-Euclidean geometry, and it changes in time and it
>>> changes in space, if it didn't there would be no details in the universe
>>> and everything would be a even unchanging fog.
>>>
>>
>> > Special Relativity implies all points in time are equally real,
>>
>
> Relativity says space and time are intimately related but it does not say
> that all points in the time dimension are equal because they correspond
> to different points in the spatial dimensions. The trouble with pure
> numbers is they don't correspond to any points in time or space and there
> is nothing more fundamental to our subjective experience than time and
> space.
>
>

Pure numbers may not correspond to point in time and space, but their
relationships do.  Relationships between pure numbers yield computations,
and those computations correspond to anything that is computable.

> > *If all points in time exist then the universe doesn't change. *
>>
>
> If we're standing outside of time then obviously nothing can change in time
> , but we are most certainly not standing outside of time and there is no
> visible evidence anything is, but it's super easy to find lots of
> invisible evidence to support that idea or to support any other idea.
>

So if there is another universe out there, causally disconnected from us
(as you presume there probably is), doesn't that blow a hole in your theory?
Doesn't the fact that "John Clark is conscious of every point of time in
his life, and none of those John Clark view points ceases to exist",

>
>
> > I never said numbers see time.
>>
>
> Fine, but we can see time, so there must be more to us than numbers
> because we can do something numbers can't.
>
>
This is predicted and explained in both Bruno's and Markus's papers.  The
mathematical reality, as seen from the inside, appears much richer.

> > *But programs can.*
>>
>
> Not unless it's running on a computer they can't! I think programmers
> sometimes get so involved with their craft that they forget software is
> only half of what you need to make a calculation.
>

telescopes."

>
>
>> >> The difference is with a platonic computer you can NOT view the state
>>> of the machine at individual steps or view anything else about it either,
>>> and the scientific method can not provide a single scrap of evidence that
>>> the machine even exists.
>>>
>>
>> *> It can.  You are using an overly constrained method of science which
>> depends on your vision.  *
>>
>
> It is in the nature of science to be constrained, Feynman describe it as
> speculation in a straitjacket, and the first and most obvious restraint is
> that invisible evidence is not acceptable.  Would you be OK with convicting
> someone of a crime and sending him to prison if it was all based on
> invisible evidence?
>
>
People are convicted without there being any eye witnesses or direct
evidence all the time.  In those cases it requires indirect evidence and
deduction to build the case.

> > *We can't see beyond the Hubble volume, *
>>
>
> And it's easy to understand why we can't see beyond the Hubble volume, but
> it's very hard to understand why we can't detect non-material Turing
> machines if they exist,
>

Why is that hard to understand?

> and if they are responsible for our consciousness it's even harder to
> understand why a change in the matter in our brain changes our
> consciousness and a change in our consciousness changes the matter in our
> brain.
>

This is explained well in Markus Muller's paper:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.01826.pdf
Among the predictions he reached assuming only the existence of
computations:

- *The Big Bang:*
- In both cases, Abby will identify a singular state in the past,
where the universe was particularly “small” and “simple” in the
algorithmic
sense. If Abby reconstructs the previous history of her universe (the
computational process giving rise to her asymptotic measure µ), she will
see that complexity unfolded after this stage in a way that resembles an
abstract computation according to simple probabilistic laws.
Thus, she may
call this initial state the “Big Bang”, and hypothesize that time had its
beginning in this moment. This is a striking consistenc```

### Re: What is more primary than numbers?

```On Sat, Dec 15, 2018 at 1:09 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/14/2018 7:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 8:43 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>> Yes, you create a whole theology around not all truths are provable.  But
>> you ignore that what is false is also provable.  Provable is only relative
>> to axioms.
>>
>>
> 1. Do you agree a Turing machine will either halt or not?
>
> 2. Do you agree that no finite set of axioms has the power to prove
> whether or not any given Turing machine will halt or not?
>
>
> 3. What does this tell us about the relationship between truth, proofs,
> and axioms?
>
>
> What do you think it tells us.  Does it tell us that a false axiom will
> not allow proof of a false proposition?
>

It tells us mathematical truth is objective and doesn't come from axioms.
Axioms are like physical theories, we can test them and refute them if they
lead to predictions that are demonstrably false. E.g., if they predict a
Turing machine will not halt, but it does, then we can reject that axiom as
an incorrect theory of mathematical truth.  Similarly, we might find axioms
that allow us to prove more things than some weaker set of axioms, thereby
building a better theory, but we have no mechanical way of doing this. In
that way it is like doing science, and requires trial and error, comparing
our theories with our observations, etc.

Jason

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