Bruno:
There exists one dimensional *universal* automata.
Yes, but it has many internal states and is not minimal. Also... it does
not specify something very important...
What is this one-dimensional universal automaton doing?
What program is it running?
If minimality + universality
Fred:
Without knowing these criteria, we cannot tell what is the simplest
possible universe containing consciousness.
I don't see why we should limit ourselves to the simplest possible universe
containing consciousness.
I would think that all worlds containing consciousness would be
George:
The observer's psyche then becomes the constraint of what he can
observe. No computer needed. Just an observer and the Plenitude. The
rest is first person emergent.
Yes, this is true. In fact I agree with you.
As a matter of practicality, it doesn't matter at all what is at the
Jacques:
You guys are going about it all wrong. Sure, some computers seem
simpler than others. But there's no one way to pick the simplest.
Why not?
The set of all is the simplest possibility, rather than choosing
one simple program. (Joel's 3 dimensional cellular automata
are
Bruno:
I should have been more clear. I put at the (3-) bottom
arithmetical truth. It just means I believe sentence like
2+2=4, Fermat theorem, ...
Yes, I think we agree on this point. I gave the example of the
minimal cellular automaton as another third-person verifiable
structure. We
Bruno:
Your frank aknowledgment of the necessary 1-ignorance in self-
multiplication is quite moving, Joel, but don't you see where we
are leading to?
Let me guess... Is it Moscow?
No - wait. Is it Washington?
;) Honestly, I'm trying not to think too hard about the whole
argument yet.
Bruno:
Do you realise now that not only we have a form of 1-indeterminacy
but we have also a sort of 1-nonlocality.
Yes, from the first-person point of view. Though I would try to
argue that the third-person point of view must always remain local.
Note: If you find that remark
Bruno:
See http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2793.html for a universal
dovetailer written in LISP. Among the LISP programs you have all the
simulation of Fortran programs, Joel's minimal cellular automata,
etc.
Yes, this is true. But (of course :) I would like to argue in favor of
hpm:
Races that live in space realize that it's perfectly OK to build
structures that have no foundation at all. They can be circular
and unsupported, yet if you spin them they'll have gravity just
like the ponderous planetary piles!
This is a clever argument, but I think it's just a
Bruno:
All of this may seem academic really, since we all know that any
universal computer is as good as any other. It's kindof like arguing
about the kind of wood God's stool is made out of! But there MAY be
some reasons to want to know exactly which algorithm is really being
run on the
Fred:
Perhaps you are saying all worlds have some commonality eventually?
Such as the program you mention below?
Yes, I suppose so.
If you'd like something to visualize... Imagine a huuuge Game of Life
grid. Some regions of space will contain worlds that are relatively
self-contained for
Bruno:
The mind body admit a lot of subproblem, like what is free-will
An illusion.
An illusion? That is a rather quick answer. Let us not enter into
that perenial debate. Perhaps I should ask you exemple of what is not
an illusion, what is your ontology.
Good idea. Let me just say that
Fred:
If two worlds within this everything are contradictory or not
consistent with each other, with no common ground, how exactly do
they interact?
Well I believe the universe is strictly local and completely homogeneous at
the bottommost layer. So even though two worlds/cosmoses may be
Hi Fred:
I agree that any useful TOE should be able to be implemented on a
(large enough) computer.
Yes, I agree.
This computation can then SIMULATE the relevant or important aspects
of the universe we observe, or all aspects of other possible
universes, with their APPARENT real-number
Joel:
It seems to me there is a great deal more information in PI than
just the 2 bytes it takes to convey it in an email message.
Russell:
Not much more. One could express pi by a short program - eg the
Wallis formula, that would be a few tens of bytes on most Turing
machines. Even
Joel:
What is the mind-body problem?
Bruno:
The formulations are as numerous than the philosophical systems.
For a materialist the problem is to explain what are the necessary
and sufficient conditions for having the feeling of pain in a leg.
Consider me a materialist then, I suppose.
George:
My position, is that there are no separations between worlds.
There is only one single huge world, the plenitude and we live in
it. The plenitude is choke full of white rabbits. In fact most of
it is white rabbit stuff.
I very much agree.
The reason we don't see them is that
Fred:
Your cellular automaton demos look pretty neat, but how can you
tell if they are conscious or self-aware? Do two of these interact
in a social manner?
Well, in the 3D version there must exist (if these automata are indeed
minimal) configurations that look just like you and me
Juergen:
There is the rather harmless kind: the countable one. And some say
there is another kind, a strange one, the one associated with the
uncountable continuum, the one whose very existence many deny.
Do not lump them together.
Yes, I can see how this distinction might be useful in some
Juergen:
I think we may not ignore infinities for quite pragmatic,
non-esoteric reasons. Many believe the history of our own universe
will be infinite - certainly there is no evidence against this
possibility. Also, any finite never-halting program for a virtual
reality corresponds to an
Scerir: Thanks for your thoughtful reply.
Today is commonly accepted that the QM domain is incompatible with
that local realism. That is because Bell inequalities actually
are violated. Local hidden variables do not exist.
I know this is not a popular view, but I am not convinced of the
Hi Fred:
I have not corresponded with the distribution in quite a while. Your
posting
below seems to have caused some furor.
That's good, right?!
I tend to feel that the position that our universe is a digital
cellular automaton is vulnerable, mainly because it implies that we
can create
Ok, sorry for being a smart-ass. Instead of baiting the discussion
to make my point, I'll try to simply state the position clearly.
We humans cannot deal with infinite structures, like pi. Numbers
like pi and e and Omega and all the others are the devil! :) And
we all know the devil is in
Hello again...
I'm finding these (older) discussions about flying rabbits to be quite
interesting. :)
Let me inject these thoughts...
1. The absence of flying rabbits from our (apparent) collective history does
not seem to me to be evidence that they do not exist in other worlds. Nor
does it
Hello! My name is Joel Dobrzelewski and I'm newcomer to the list.
I'm still looking through the archived messages, but so far it looks like a
very good match with what we do. I'm excited to see others working in this
area and wish I had found you sooner!
Anyway, I represent a small group
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