Re: Hitch
On 07/10/2013 11:18 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I use atheists in the (Google) sense of B~g. ~Bg is agnosticism (in the mundane common sense). Some atheists seem to oscillate between the two definitions, opportunistically. The issue is that both of those require some specific 'g' to be claimed, before either of them may apply. But first 'g' has to be well-defined, coherent, and logically possible, before either of the above can even make sense. My experience is that few religious claims make it past this hurdle; there is therefore not really anything to believe or not believe in. So we're left with the state of our belief system unchanged, and optimization of our finite resources means we just don't think about these sorts of things. I suppose that's neither 'atheism' or 'agnosticism'. Johnathan Corgan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Hitch
On Wed, Jul 10, 2013 at 8:50 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: My point is that if one takes atheism to be the rejection of all conceptions of god, then because those ideas are conceptions of god from various religions, then someone who remains atheist after exposure to those ideas (rather than agnostic) has rejected them, and worse, has done so without any justification. This is anti-scientific because there is some evidence for these propositions. Even if that evidence does not convince you, there is no reason to reject them until evidence comes out against the theories on which they are based. This thread has devolved somewhat into arguing definitions, but I'll bite anyway. Anyone can posit theories or claims; it is up to those persons to present credible evidence supporting those claims. If the claims themselves are incoherent or not logically possible, no evidence can be presented. If the evidence presented in support of those claims is not actually supportive, or is not possible to evaluate, then no further action need be taken. If the evidence presented is simply that a proposition is possible, well, many things that are possible are still not true; this is not evidence. If the evidence presented is I would like/feel happier/be less scared in a world where this is true, this is of course not evidence. If the evidence presented is If this were true, it would be consistent with these other things that I believe are true, it is not evidence. If the evidence presented is I can't make sense of the world unless this is true, it is not evidence. If the evidence presented is Everyone believes this, you should too, it is not evidence. If the evidence presented is Believe this or we will kill you, it is not evidence. In all these cases, there is no burden on anyone else to reject these assertions, as no evidence has been presented in support of them. In the realm of theistic beliefs, we were all born lacking any; we were all born atheists. Some people have come to believe various religious claims as true, and thus have become theists of different varieties. For some of us, these claims have never risen beyond any of the categories above, and hence we remain atheists, without the need to reject anything, having not taken any action whatsoever. We simply remain in our state of lacking any theistic beliefs. We do not need to encounter specific evidence against these sorts of claims. So if you have a specific claim to make, and actual evidence to support it, we'll listen. But we don't start out as rejecting all conceptions of God; we're just happily living our lives and not spending much time worrying about these matters, except perhaps recently on this mailing list. Johnathan Corgan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Which one result in maths has surprised you the most?
On 07/08/2013 02:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote: This one is very interesting, but the fact that Pi was a poor choice for the constant makes the equation considerably more ugly than it should be. There is a growing movement to usurp the number Pi with the much more important constant 2*Pi (see: http://www.math.utah.edu/~palais/pi.html ). If we call that new number tau (t). Then Euler's identity becomes: e^(t * i) = 1 I think part of the appeal of the original formulation is realizing that the result of an exponentiation of a positive number can be a negative number. While this is unremarkable with complex exponents, many people are only used to seeing real (or even just integer) exponents. Johnathan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The Leibniz-Taoist solution: Matter is mind, mind is matter
On Sun, May 19, 2013 at 11:33 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: More to the point of my original comment, though, you frequently make statements about how it follows from this an explanation of quantum, qualia, matter, etc., using references to modal logic, Plotinus' theory of matter, the eight hypostases, and other very high-level concepts. I guess I'm just having trouble connecting the dots in between. It took me 30 years of math to get that. But I am giving the dots right now on the FOAR list (as I have done already on this list). The difficulty is in the work already done by Gödel, Löb, Solovay, relating provability to the G logic, the relation between provability and computability, etc. I suggest you look at the FOAR list, for not psuhing me to duplicate the informations, thanks. Of course. I'll go get myself subscribed to that list, thanks. Johnathan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The Leibniz-Taoist solution: Matter is mind, mind is matter
On Sun, May 19, 2013 at 7:31 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Feel free to ask more from this post, though. If you understand the FPI, the rest follows from logic and some passive theoretical computer science, I think. Yes, I understand UDA 1-7 and the concept that first-person indeterminacy arises from the one's current state being the possible future state of an infinity of prior computational states (give the assumptions of the argument.) It's less clear to me how this would translate to an expectation value or measure on the space of possible future states from this one. More to the point of my original comment, though, you frequently make statements about how it follows from this an explanation of quantum, qualia, matter, etc., using references to modal logic, Plotinus' theory of matter, the eight hypostases, and other very high-level concepts. I guess I'm just having trouble connecting the dots in between. Johnathan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: That the mind works even after the brain ceases to function suggests its independence
On Sat, May 18, 2013 at 4:23 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 17 May 2013, at 22:52, Johnathan Corgan wrote: A common occurrence reported by users of Salvia Divinorum is that of having lived an entire alternate life in the few minutes of intoxication, and even being surprised and confused for a moment while the drug wears off that this is their real life and the one they remember was the drug induced one. Yes, that's quite a Maury effect, indeed. Utterly amazing and sometimes extremely confusing. This reminds me of the the Star Trek TNG episode The Inner Light, where Picard lives a third of a lifetime in 25 minutes under the control of a space artifact they encounter. The artifact was created by a doomed race as a way of preserving/propagating their culture, and implants the memory of having lived as a resident of their planet into Picard. (One of the few ST episodes to get away from the technobabble and explore some real science fiction themes.) Salvia might be the Hubble of introspection. Just reading through the written experience reports on Erowid, it's amazing how completely different the subjective effects of Salvia are vs. more traditional psychedelic drugs. It's no wonder many of them end with I will never do this again. I wonder what could be learned about how the mind works by studying these in a scientific, experimental setting. Dissociative in general are quite interesting. And salvia is highly selective in the dissociation, and seems to be very healthy and helpful, so such studies are needed, that's for sure. Unfortunately, at least in the United States, the legal standards for public scientific studies of drugs require them to be conducted in the context of assessing their efficacy as therapeutic agents. It's unlikely that any protocol would be approved that was simply designed to study the effects described above. It's also pretty unlikely to ever be able to do a double-blind experiment with Salvia. :) Johnathan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: The Leibniz-Taoist solution: Matter is mind, mind is matter
On Sat, May 18, 2013 at 3:37 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Matter is a first person plural sharable border by collections of machines which multiplied collectively on the set of all computations. It sure would nice if you could unpack this sentence, word by word, to help make its meaning more clear. Johnathan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: That the mind works even after the brain ceases to function suggests its independence
On Fri, May 17, 2013 at 7:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Salvia and DMT seem to have NDE like effects A common occurrence reported by users of Salvia Divinorum is that of having lived an entire alternate life in the few minutes of intoxication, and even being surprised and confused for a moment while the drug wears off that this is their real life and the one they remember was the drug induced one. Perhaps something akin the Maury Effect is happening, where the *memory* of having lived an entire alternate life is somehow created within the mind as result of the drug effect, which would then be 1p indistinguishable from actually having happened. Salvia seems to have an uniquely dramatic effect on the mind's subjective experience of episodic and semantic memory, identity, body image, time duration, and consciousness. I wonder what could be learned about how the mind works by studying these in a scientific, experimental setting. Johnathan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: 1p-indeterminacy and brains
On Fri, Jun 22, 2012 at 2:37 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Hameroff is a crackpot. If microtubles were the source of consciousness my finger would be conscious; microtubles are in almost all cells. This does not follow. The ion channels which support the propagation of event potentials down the length of an axon in the central nervous system also exist in a variety of forms outside the brain. Yet it is only in the brain these ion channels have become organized by evolution to sustain complex patterns of firing. Likewise, it is logically possible that microtubules could have one function in the brain and yet another in the rest of the body. That said, I find Hameroff's argument for entangled microtubules very unconvincing. Crackpot? Perhaps--there does indeed seem to be an element of consciousness is weird, quantum entanglement is weird, therefore brains must work by quantum entanglement. Johnathan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Help with mailing list configuration
On Wed, Feb 1, 2012 at 1:07 PM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: I am not the one helping you: I am a computer illitterate and use the Internet (since 1988) on a trial and error basis. Thanks John, I appreciate your willingness to help. However, my email was a mild (and perhaps altogether ineffective) attempt at humor poking fun at the amount list traffic devoted to unproductive arguing on certain topics. No worries. Johnathan Corgan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Help with mailing list configuration
I have a filter set in my mail software such that any Everything List thread that has more than 20% of the comments by Craig Weinberg gets put into a special folder. I find this helps me to prioritize my reading. It's really working well! But something must be wrong, as I haven't seen any other threads come through in a long time. Someone please help me debug my settings. Johnathan Corgan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA reducing physics to number theory
On Mon, Nov 21, 2011 at 7:19 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I will answer Johnathan's question asap, but I have three busy days and I want to take some time to do that. The answer is, imo, contained in the conclusion of UDA, and made clearer (technically) with AUDA, but I guess I shopuld explain this more clearly. Bruno--thank you for your consideration, and of course please take as much time as you like in composing an answer to my (admittedly demanding) questions. My hope is to spur further work in this area by participants of this list; unfortunately, much of the maths are beyond my current training. And perhaps I am asking you to restate things you already demonstrate in your thesis that I'm just not aware of. If so, it is not my intent to have you belabor the points on my behalf. I very much look forward to your answers, whenever you have the opportunity to write them down. Thank you, Johnathan Corgan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: bruno list
On Sun, Sep 4, 2011 at 6:25 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: You know, I was raised in the USSR where the official religion was atheism and materialism. The results were disastrous. Um, I rather suspect the disaster was from having an official religion, enforced by men with guns, regardless of whichever form it took. That would also include, of course, enforcing the lack of religion, or atheism. Johnathan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The Brain on Trial
Congressmen Barney Frank and Ron Paul have introduced a bill in the U.S. House of Representatives that would allow states to legalize or otherwise liberalize marijuana laws without interference from the federal government. Brent Purely symbolic--it will never make it out of committee. Still, how many House bills are co-authored by Frank and Paul? Strange bedfellows indeed. Johnathan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is QTI false?
On Thu, Mar 31, 2011 at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Or something like that. Quantum logic (and also its arithmetical form) has many notion of implication. The one above is the closer to the Sazaki Hook which Hardegree used to show that orthomodularity in quantum ortholattice is related to the notion of counterfactual. You will find the reference in my papers. Unfortunately orthomodularity is still an open problem in the arithmetical 'quantum logic'. Eric Vandenbusche is currently trying to optimize the G* theorem prover to get an answer. And here I thought I was making progress in understanding Bruno's thesis. I clearly have a *long* way further to go in my studies :-) Johnathan Corgan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: UDA query
On Fri, Jan 8, 2010 at 10:03 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Isn't it? Bruno presents comp as equivalent to betting that replacing your brain with a digitial device at the appropriate level of substitution will leave your stream of consciousness unaffected. From this people are inferring that the discrete states of this digital brain instantiate observer moments. But suppose (which I consider likely) the digital brain would have to have a cycle time of a billionth of a second or less. I don't think you believe you have a different conscious thought every billionth of a second. What it means is that a state of your consciousness corresponds to a million or so successive states of the digitial computation. These sets of a million states can then of course overlap. So the idea of discrete observer moments doesn't follow from yes doctor. It's plausible that observer moments correspond to what are called chaotic attractors in complex systems theory. The brain passes through a complex, dynamic trajectory of states. A stable attractor is a cycle of discrete states that repeats exactly, in the case of a limit cycle, or more often, retraces a similar but not exact trajectory, in the case of a chaotic attractor. Chaotic attractors are robust to perturbation, up to a point, and many complex systems can be characterized by a succession of chaotic attractors separated by rapid transitions driven by external perturbations exceeding some threshold. I use the term meta-state as a synonym for chaotic attractor in this context. My working hypothesis is that nervous systems developed into complex systems capable of generating quasi-stable meta-states which were evolutionarily advantageous, and over (evolutionary) time, were able to reach a level of organization which eventually produced consciousness. In this model, brains are continuously cycling through patterns of firing, which, absent external stimuli, are self-sustaining in some sort quasi-stable chaotic fashion, or meta-state. Sensory input of various types may be ignored if it doesn't reach a threshold of activation which tips the brain into a new meta-state. Or, novel sensations may drive the system into a new meta-state (dynamic cycle) that corresponds to some classification of that input in the context of whatever the current meta-state is. Observer moments, then, correspond to some subset of meta-states in the brain. They aren't discrete states of zero duration, but trajectories of states in a chaotic cycle. A succession of these meta-states would then make up a stream-of-consciousness. As an aside, I strongly suspect that in practice, our sensory input serves to constrain the brain into a (relatively) small set of meta-states that has allowed us to survive in a harsh evolutionary context, and produces what may be called consensus reality (I think Bruno calls this 1st-person plural.) Other chaotic systems do spend most of their time in a small subset of possible states. Yet there is evidence that perturbing the brain in a variety of ways (fasting, breathing exercises, meditation, religious contemplation, drugs, disease, injury, etc.) can allow it to wander off into meta-states that are quite subjectively different from the typical states associated with normal functioning. All of the above speculation could still hold true in a non-physicalist, computationalism-based view of consciousness, where one would replace brain with computational substrate at appropriate level of substitution. Johnathan Corgan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why I am I?
On Sat, Dec 5, 2009 at 2:27 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: All of this indicates that salvinorin A has potent but short-lived effects on the brain systems involved in memory, identity, body image and perception of time and space (along with a host of other effects not discussed here). Regardless of one's view on the use of these substances to alter one's cognition, it seems there is a great opportunity to study these effects to zero in on how these brain systems are related to our subjective experience of reality. Very difficult task, but very interesting, and probably parts of the experience/experiments needed to build an artificial brain. A double-blind study protocol to test for particular effects would be difficult to design, no doubt. I don't understand your reference to the need for an artificial brain. However, it would still be possible to carry out experimentation to correlate subjective reports of these altered 1-pov percepts with 3-pov data obtained by FMRI, EEG, etc. Unfortunately, current laws in the U.S. restrict experimentation of this type to therapeutic applications. It is possible to test to see whether MDMA is a successful treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder, but not, say only to find out the dose/response curve for its psychedelic properties. Absent those types of studies, it would still be enormously educational for someone to conduct a meta-analysis of the many thousands of first-hand written and recorded reports of Salvia Divinorum use. While far from being a random sample, at least one would have a better map of the territory to guide further research. Well, if we define a drug by something harmful and addictive, then salvia is not known to be a drug today, because there are no evidence it is harmful nor evidence it is addictive. Indeed, animal studies to date have shown that salvinorin A administration reduces the levels of dopamine in the portions of the brain associated with addiction and craving, which is exactly opposite the effects of strongly addictive and euphoriant drugs like cocaine and methamphetamine. Whether this is true in human brains remains to be seen (and difficult to study due to reasons above). In any case, this discussion is probably more relevant in other forums. I brought it up only because we frequently discuss consciousness, memory and identity, and lo and behold there is a drug which has radical effects on the subjective experience of all three, and a body of written reports to examine. Johnathan Corgan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why I am I?
On Fri, Dec 4, 2009 at 10:15 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: I thought it was impossible to live that and to be able to come back from such an experience, but it happens that with salvia divinorum, some subject can live the experience of quasi-total amnesia, where not only you forget which human you are, but you can forget what a human is, what time is, what space is, and yet, retrospectively, after coming back, you realize that despite having forgot everything, you were still conscious, and you were still considering you as a living entity of some sort. I've not had that experience, but I might try it. I think though that even in such a state one must have some short-term (~second) memory to have a human kind of consciousness. Obviously you now have memories of what it was like. I have known people with severe Alzheimer's disease who seemed merely reactive and apparently had no memory, even short term. I don't think they were as conscious as my dog or the fish in my pond. Experience reports of Salvia Divinorum (or salvinorin A, it's chief psychoactive compound) use in the literature contain many common themes related to memory deficits, and represent a fascinating uncontrolled study in the phenomenology of consciousness. There are of course many concurrent effects (visual and auditory hallucinations, somatic sensations, distortions of body image, etc.) shared with other hallucinogens, but the impact on memory seems unique. At typical dose levels resulting from smoking the plant leaves or fortified extracts of the plant leaves, many users later report that they had forgotten they had taken a drug, and were confused (and often terrified) about why they were experiencing what they were. This is reported as a sudden onset phenomena, not a gradual one, and is often compared to the feeling of waking up in a strange place with no memory of how one got there. This suggests that one action of the drug is to disrupt the last few minutes of episodic memory formation. However, these same reports also state that as the effect of the drug began to peak and then wear off, usually in a matter of a few minutes, the users suddenly recalled the events leading up to their intoxicated state. This then suggests that, at these doses, the drug only disrupts access to recent episodic memory, but the memory is still formed for later recall. This is different from the form of permanent memory loss that occurs in head injury cases where the victim cannot ever recall the moments leading up to, say, a vehicle collision. At higher doses, a common theme is that (along with the prior episodic amnestic effects) the user reports having forgotten key fundamental concepts like what being human is or what space is. This sort of semantic memory loss is difficult to imagine, but it is fascinating that even under such extreme conditions, the user is experiencing a stream-of-consciousness that can later be recalled. Less frequently, reports at higher doses describe feeling like all of my prior reality was a joke being played on me, and I was experiencing the REAL reality, and everything that happened before was just a construction or movie set. Some users go on to report even more bizarre cases where they report having lived another lifetime somewhere else, and are shocked and dismayed when the drug begins to wear off that it was all a dream, and that this reality is the real one. This sounds like a more extreme version of our normal REM sleep, where when dreaming, one doesn't usually realize one is dreaming, but sorts things out upon awakening. Compounding these impacts on memory are reports of changes in body image and identity. One recurring theme (that is shared with other hallucinogens) is the feeling of merging with objects in one's visual field. This is reported as both incorporating the physical object into one's body image and changing one's perspective to be that of the object. In one case, a user reported that I actually KNEW what it was like to be a swing set, to live every day in the playground and be happy when children were using me, and sad when the park was closed. Another unique aspect of the effects of salvinorin A is its extremely short-lived activity. Most reports seem to indicate that the smoked form of the drug wears off in as little as 10-15 minutes, completely returning the user to baseline in less than a half-hour. All of this indicates that salvinorin A has potent but short-lived effects on the brain systems involved in memory, identity, body image and perception of time and space (along with a host of other effects not discussed here). Regardless of one's view on the use of these substances to alter one's cognition, it seems there is a great opportunity to study these effects to zero in on how these brain systems are related to our subjective experience of reality. Johnathan Corgan -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Re: no-go for the penrose-hameroff proposal
On Tue, 2009-08-18 at 11:09 -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: It has long been noted that microtubles are ubiquitous in the cells of other organs, not just in the brain. While I find the Penrose/Hameroff proposal very unconvincing for other reasons, this is not one of them. There are many shared organelles that are in both neuronal and non-neuronal cell bodies. It is a matter of organizing them for use one way or another. The voltage-gated sodium ion channel pore used for propagating an event potential down an axon is also present in cells outside the nervous system, yet the brain is able to use them to effect (dare I say?) computation. So it is at least plausible that microtubules, though ubiquitous throughout the body, have been recruited and honed by evolution to operate in the fashion proposed by Penrose/Hameroff in the nervous system. Personally, I think their whole agenda is misguided, an example of brains are mysterious, quantum mechanics is mysterious, therefore, brains operate using quantum mechanics. The mystery of quantum mechanics largely disappears with no-collapse and decoherence anyway. Johnathan Corgan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
On Fri, 2009-08-07 at 11:35 -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: But as Bertrand Russell, David Hume and many mystics have pointed out you can wake up and realize there is consciousness but the I that possesses it is a fiction. There are also many common reports of what is colloquially called ego loss in the hallucinogenic literature. Users report the experience of being conscious in that they are awake, perceiving sensory data, and performing motor functions, but they have no sense of self or I. Johnathan Corgan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The seven step series
On Fri, 2009-07-10 at 22:24 +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: I suddenly feel sorry putting too much burden on just one correspondent in the list, and I would appreciate if someone else could propose answers or any remarks to the exercises. Bruno--you're doing great. I think it is the case where silence means I understand, continue, rather than disinterest. There is also some sort of burden onto me, because it is hard to explain the real thing concerning the seventh step, without explaining or just illustrating at least some relevant portion of the mathematical reality: mainly the unexpected mathematical discovery of the universal functions, sets, numbers, systems, language, machine ... I don't mention the absence of drawing ability which does not help. The derivation of your thesis from first principles is a very compelling idea. The somewhat startling and unorthodox conclusions you espouse are bound to cause confusion unless all their underpinnings are well understood. The arguments from others then can have a much more specific target than the top-level conclusions; instead they will come out earlier in the derivation process and at the time of introduction of the controversial subject. The knowledge of most people participating to the discussion is very varied, due to the extreme transdiciplinarity of the subject, and the interest it can evidently have for the layman (and indeed, for any universal machine). While I do have training in math and physics, I still benefit from your targeting the motivated layman. Personally, I'm not interested in doing the exercises on the list, but they are still useful to check my understanding. Best regards to all of you, and thanks for letting me know your interests, By all means, proceed. Personally, if I don't understand something or have an objection, you'll hear about it on the list, but I think you should take silence as assent. Johnathan Corgan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
The seven step series
Bruno, I think you were off to a good start with your planned series of posts about the seven step argument. I believe your first installment was a discussion of set theory as one of the mathematical preliminaries to the actual argument. I am looking forward to your next installment. Regards, Johnathan Corgan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Consciousness is information?
On Wed, 2009-04-29 at 10:28 -0500, Jason Resch wrote: It would seem the way the brain is organized it doesn't accept perception of pure randomness (at least not for long, I have not yet tried the experiment myself). If it can't find patterns from the senses it looks like it gives up and invents patterns of its own. It is perhaps the other way around. The portion(s) of the brain responsible for qualia perception appear to operate as a complex, dynamical system with a variety of chaotic attractors, and sensory information only serves to nudge this system from one set of attractor cycles to another. In the absence of sensory input, these then operate in open loop mode, and the person may experience all variety of interesting qualia uncorrelated with the real world. The overall mechanism of dissociative anaesthetic agents such as Ketamine or nitrous oxide is poorly understood, but one notable property they have is that in sub-clinical dosages they suppress sensory input while retaining consciousness. This results in similar, open loop qualia. Johnathan Corgan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]
On Wed, 2009-03-04 at 12:25 +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: The no-cul-de-sac hypothesis is false if you allow that there is some means of destroying all copies in the multiverse. But there is probably no such means, no matter how advanced the aliens. Indeed, that would be like if a number could make disappear another number. Even a God cannot do that! We are a collection of particles, though the exact arrangement and constitution of such is constantly changing. Yet, under most circumstances, from moment to moment our instantaneous state follows a trajectory such that this state continues to be a member of the larger class that is me, being conscious. It is again the situation of many microstates mapping to one higher level, emergent macrostate according to some membership function, the exact nature of which depends on your specific theory of identity. The no cul-de-sac conjecture, more precisely, states that as the wavefunction of our present collection of particles unitarily evolves there will always be at least one decoherent branch of it that continues to satisfy the macrostate membership function that is me, being conscious, delays and copies notwithstanding. It is at least conceivable that the collection of particles that is me could undergo some environmental interaction such that *all* the following entangled branches decohere into states that do *not* map to the emergent class of me, being conscious. Then I would be dead. There are many questions/assumptions in the above line of reasoning. What is the macrostate membership function that defines a set of particles as me? As the set becomes entangled with its environment, how and when does one decoherent branch then decohere into one or more new branches (that are still me)? Presumably, our digital level of substitution is much higher than the exact quantum state of this collection of particles. What microstate changes don't make a difference, which do? Johnathan Corgan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Copying?
On Sat, 2009-02-21 at 15:25 -0500, Stephen Paul King wrote: Does this allow us to recover our method X? No, because unless the copy is identical, not just approximate, we can not conclude that any notion of continuance of consciousness might obtain. It is possible (I think likely) that there is a many-to-one relationship between exact quantum states and one conscious state, or observer moment. To put into Bruno's terminology, the your digital substitution level would then be at a higher level than the exact quantum state. If this is the case, then the method X of copying only needs to ensure that the resultant quantum state stays within the common higher level state to ensure continuity. To use a thermodynamic analogy, which I find increasingly useful to visualize these sorts of things, if the above many-to-one hypothesis holds true, then multiple microstates map to a single macrostate. Continuity of personal identity would allow a change in microstates (i.e., quantum states) during copying, as long as the resultant microstate still belonged to the same macrostate (observer moment). Of course, what the defining function of membership of quantum states within an observer moment that would preserve personal identity is unknown. Still, as long as there is a many-to-one relationship, then the no-cloning theorem does not rule out transfer of identity through your method X. Johnathan Corgan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
ASSA vs. RSSA and the no cul-de-sac conjecture was (AB continuity)
While I wasn't around for the original ASSA vs. RSSA arguments on the list here, and I'm sure I'm risking a rehash of things back then, the recent traffic over adult vs. child and AB continuity seems to revolve around this anyway. It seems intuitively obvious to me that from a 1st-person perspective, I have to treat successor observer moments with a /conditional/ probability. My next observer moment I face would be selected from among only those where a), I am conscious, and b) those with memories of this one, or more generally, with a causal thread of continuity with this one (unitary evolution of SW). So my subjective expectation would then be the absolute probability of those occurring conditioned on, or given, that the one I'm in now has already occurred. It is an open question (to me at least) whether there are any observer moments without successors, i.e., where the amplitude of the SW goes to zero. If it does not, then this implies that the always branching tree of observer moments has no leaf nodes--rather, it becomes an ever finer filigree of lines, but any particular point will always have a downstream set of forks. This is the essence of the no cul-de-sac conjecture, and the crux of the quantum theory of immortality. If the above is true, then the absolute measure of an observer moment becomes irrelevant; it's clear that as one traces through a particular branch it would always be dramatically decreasing anyway. But the relative measure of my next observer moment to this one becomes the thing that drives my expectations of what I am likely to experience. Indeed, some version of me experiences all of them, but each split copy of me can only say to himself, what I am experiencing now was likely (or unlikely) given where I was a moment ago. Johnathan Corgan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
On Fri, 2008-11-14 at 10:46 -0800, Brent Meeker wrote: That was my point. The SWE indicates that every microscopic event that happens or doesn't happen stochastically splits the wave function. But these events don't generally cause a split of Kory or other classical objects. Those objects are not in some pure state anyway. They are already fuzzy and their interaction with the environment keeps the fuzzy bundle along the classical path. There are microscopic splittings that are 'within' the fuzz, but I think these are far below the substitution level envisioned for your teleporter thought experiment. I think you've hit on an area that is sufficiently ill-understood by a layman like me to warrant further elaboration. It seems to me there is a strong similarity here with statistical mechanics. If I might speak loosely, there are a large number of quantum states that correspond to microstates of the system, while being Kory is a macrostate. Most microstate trajectories stay within the boundaries of a single macrostate trajectory. But sometimes the microstate trajectories can diverge enough, due to an amplification process, to cause the macrostate trajectory to divide into two. (This of course leaves out definitions of all the above, but I hope you get the gist of it.) To me this makes much more intuitive sense than using words like universes splitting into copies, or even many worlds. Part of my difficulty in grasping some of the discussion here is that we tend to speak of aggregrate objects consisting of many particles, yet refer to quantum properties of individual particles when discussing superposition, etc. I get the single particle stuff fairly well, but it's the transition to large systems of particles that have an aggregate identity of me that I think is sometimes glossed over. In statistical mechanics, aggregates have properties and behavior (like temperature, pressure, and density) that don't exist in single particle systems. Likewise, macroscopic objects have independent identities (macrostates) that persist even when their component particles go through many changes at the atomic level. I'm almost to the point where I understand how decoherence causes the above to be true... -Johnathan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
Brent Meeker wrote: The top level goal implied by evolution would be to have as many children as you can raise through puberty. Avoiding death should only be a subgoal. It should go a little further than puberty--the accumulated wisdom of grandparents may significantly enhance the survival chances of their grandchildren, more so than the decrease in available resources in the environment they might consume. So I agree that once you have sired all the children you ever will, it makes sense from an evolutionary perspective to get out of the way--that is, stop competing with them for resources. But the timing of your exit is probably more optimal somewhat after they have their own children, if you can help them to get a good start. I do wonder if evolutionary fitness is more accurately measured by the number of grandchildren one has than by the number of children. Aside from the assistance line of reasoning above, in order to propagate, one must be able to have children that are capable of having children themselves. Johnathan Corgan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ASSA and Many-Worlds
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: If some multiverse theory happens to be true then by your way of argument we should all be extremely anxious all the time, because every moment terrible things are definitely happening to some copy of us. For example, we should be constantly be worrying that we will be struck by lightning, because we *will* be struck by lightning. If MWI is true, *and* there isn't a lowest quantum of probability/measure as Brent Meeker speculates, there is an interesting corollary to the quantum theory of immortality. While one branch always exists which continues our consciousness forward, indeed we are constantly shedding branches where the most brutal and horrific things happen to us and result in our death. Their measure is extremely small, so from a subjectively probability perspective, we don't worry about them. I'd speculate that there are far more logically possible ways to experience an agonizing, lingering death than to live. Some have a relatively high measure, like getting hit by a car, or getting lung cancer (if you're a smoker), so we take steps to avoid these (though they still happen in some branch.) Others, like having all our particles spontaneously quantum tunnel into the heart of a burning furnace, are so low in measure, we can blissfully ignore the possibility. Yet if MWI is true, there is some branch where this has just happened to us. (modulo Brent's probability quantum.) If there are many more ways to die than to live, even of low individual measure, I wonder how the integral of the measure across all of them comes out. -Johnathan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
On Fri, 2006-12-29 at 00:37 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Sure, it's a defect in the brain chemistry, but the delusional person will give you his reasons for his belief: [...] This is very similar to the arguments of people with religious convictions, who will cite evidence in support of their beliefs up to a point, but it soon becomes clear that no matter how paltry this evidence is shown to be, they will still maintain their belief. I do wonder how many non-religious beliefs are the same way, i.e., incorrigible in spite of the absence of evidence, or even contrary to evidence, simply because they are convenient or permeate one's surrounding culture. The difference is that these people do not change their way of thinking in response to antipsychotic medication. Which is fascinating to behold, as I have witnessed this very same, in both directions, on many occasions, as patients have gone on and off their medication. They will also go to great lengths to justify their change in belief structure when it's obvious it's the effect of the chemical on their disease process. There is a subtlety to the religious qualification you make above, however. There are indeed religious-oriented delusions which go away on medication, but they tend to be ones that were only acquired through the course of the patient's illness. Those acquired through detailed indoctrination in youth tend to be unaffected, as you mention. -Johnathan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
On Sat, 2006-11-11 at 00:30 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: http://whywontgodhealamputees.com/god5.htm Great article! I initially thought that it was written by some poor, honest Christian genuinely struggling with the logical consequences of his beliefs. But then such a person would quickly either fall back on blind faith or reject his beliefs as false, so there can't be many around. One thing that stands out about this author is his even-handed, non-strident walk through of his argument, taking claims regarding prayer and statements in the Christian bible at face value. There is no politicizing, sarcasm, or innuendo. It's almost as if he very strongly wants these claims to be true but is forced to conclude they are not through irrefutable logic. We certainly could use more people this eloquent in their presentation! -Johnathan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
On Wed, 2006-11-08 at 09:39 -0800, Brent Meeker wrote: Good old-fashioned miracles are not lawlike, which is what makes them subject to empirical verification. If God is a Protestant, then an examination of a list of lottery ticket winners or people with serious illnesses should show that Protestants are statistically more likely to have their prayers answered than Catholics, Muslims or atheists (who wish for things, even if they don't actually pray). If not, then either God is not a Protestant or there is no point in praying for anything even if you and he are both Protestants. And yet I doubt that there are any Protestants, Catholics or Muslims who be at all perturbed by the findings of such a study, or countless other possible studies or experiments. That's because for hundreds, if not thousands, of years their theologians have had to explain why their God is invisible, unnoticable, incompehensible, and undetectable. So a null experimental outcome, like the recent studies of the efficacy of healing prayer, is ho-hum. For a rather lengthy, straight-faced treatment of intercessory prayer and victims of amputation: http://whywontgodhealamputees.com/god5.htm -Johnathan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical concept' ;)
On Thu, October 5, 2006 11:49, markpeaty wrote: That said, I read with interest a year or two ago about certain kinds of insects [I think they are in North America somewhere] which lie dormant in the earth in some pre-adult stage for a PRIME number of years, 11, 13, were chosen by different species. Apparently the payoff for this strategy is that few predator species can match this length of time, and repeating cycles of shorter periods cannot 'resonate' so as to launch a large cohort of predators when the prey species produces its glut after waiting for the prime number of years. An alternative hypothesis put forth, equally plausible to me, is that different species co-evolved to be dormant different prime numbers of years. This would create the minimum competition for environmental resources as they came out of their dormant period; prime numbers having the largest least common multiple. Of course they didn't do this with any intention or awareness; natural selection on random variations in dormancy period length would favor this kind of outcome. -Johnathan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
David Nyman wrote: [re: QTI] This has obvious implications for retirement planning in general and avoidance of the more egregious cul-de-sac situations. On the other hand, short of outright lunacy vis-a-vis personal safety, it also seems to imply that from the 1st-person pov we are likely to come through (albeit possibly in less-than-perfect shape) even apparently minimally survivable situations. This struck me particularly forcibly while watching the 9/11 re-runs on TV last night. It's the cul-de-sac situations that interest me. Are there truly any? Are there moments of consciousness which have no logically possible continuation (while remaining conscious?) It seems the canonical example is surviving a nearby nuclear detonation. One logical possibility is that all your constituent particles quantum-tunnel away from the blast in time. This would be of extremely low measure in absolute terms, but what about the proportion of continuations that contain you as a conscious entity? This also touches on a recent thread about how being of low measure feels. If QTI is true, and I'm subject to a nuclear detonation, does it matter if my possible continuations are of such a low relative measure? Once I'm in them, would I feel any different and should I care? These questions may reduce to something like, Is there a lower limit to the amplitude of the SWE? If measure is infinitely divisible, then is there any natural scale to its absolute value? I raised a similar question on the list a few months ago when Tookie Wiliams was in the headlines and was eventually executed by the State of California. What possible continuations exist in this situation? In effect, we are being presented with a kind of 'yes doctor' in everyday life. Do you find that these considerations affect your own behaviour in any way? A very interesting question. If my expectation is that QTI is true and I'll be living for a very long time, I may adjust my financial planning accordingly. But QTI only applies to my own first-person view; I'll be constantly shedding branches where I did indeed die. If I have any financial dependents, do I provide for their welfare, even if they'll only exist forever outside my ability to interact with? -Johnathan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
David Nyman wrote: Is this in fact your expectation? And do you so plan? Forgive me if this seems overly personal, but I'm fascinated to discover if anyone actually acts on these beliefs. It's not overly personal; I brought it up in fact. But personally, no, I don't act on these beliefs because they are not mine. That is, I've not established to my satisfaction that QTI is correct. However, I do have an intense interest and must admit I want it to be true. Alas, I may only find out when I look around and wonder why I'm the only 150 year old person :-) It does seem to me the theory hinges on whether cul-de-sac's exist or not, hence my earlier questioning. I've already accepted the essential underlying MWI explanation. -Johnathan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Russell's book
Brent Meeker wrote: Everett who originated the MWI thought about QTI. Although he never explicitly said he believed it, he led a very unhealthy life style smoking, drinking, eating to excees, never exercising and he died young, of a heart attack IIRC. So some of his acquaintences have speculated that he did really believe in QTI. Well, that's not quite rational--what is the quality of life (utility) that succeeds surviving a heart attack? If QTI is true, and I'm going to live a very long time, it would not only motivate me to plan for the long term, but also to be much more careful about my health--I'll be living in this body for much longer than ~73 years! -Johnathan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Technical paper on 3-dimensional time
Marc Geddes wrote: This is very recent (late 2005): http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0510010 I've read this and the author's prior two papers on multi-dimensional time. It appears that his mathematical formulation is able describe a variety of quantum-mechanical properties by adding one or more additional time dimensions to the classical derivations of motion, momentum, energy, etc. As a result he ends up with a 3-space, 3-time dimension theory that is simple and elegant. (The additional two time dimensions are closed loops on the scale of the Plank length.) I'm not nearly knowledgeable enough on the subject to pick out any logical errors. However, the papers are somewhat disorganized so it's hard to see what assumptions are being made or what contradictions with established theories or experiment there might be. This also may be a language issue as it's clear English is not the author's native tongue. But--the papers do not make any testable predictions that I can see, which is a big red flag. In addition, the author is a wave function collapse kind of guy. I'm curious how his derivation would hold up from the MWI perspective. -Johnathan
Re: Technical paper on 3-dimensional time
Norman Samish wrote: I realize that there are unsolved problems in quantum mechanics that can be solved by adding dimensions, whether spatial or time. I also know that added dimensions are describable mathematically, and that some (Tegmark) hold that this makes them real. However, as Jonathan points out with respect to Geddes's speculation, extra dimensions are not yet testable. Until they are, we can just as well invoke fairy dust - or God - or whatever - to explain the QM problems. If a theory makes predictions that are not testable, even in principle, then it is not a scientific theory and we ignore it. If a theory makes predictions that are testable in principle but not yet in practical terms, one can still falsify it by demonstrating that it fails retrodiction of experimentally demonstrated facts. This latter was one concern I had about the referenced papers. Barring logical errors, his equations resulting from treating 3-space 3-time in a classical way are able to explain particle spin, charge quantization, the exclusion principle, wave function probabilities, and a host of other things related to electromagnetism and gravity. But do they also imply things we have already experimentally demonstrated to be false? (I personally don't have the training or skills to answer this question.) Even if a theory survives these two criteria--it makes predictions that are testable in principle (even if not yet in practical terms), and it is consistent with all known experimental facts--we can still rank it vs. competing theories using Ockham's Razor. I don't think we can equate Chen's Three Dimensional Time Theory with God or fairy dust, as the God theory is not scientific and the fairy dust theory lacks the explanatory power seen in Chen's papers. So I'm back to my original questions. On it's own merits, does Chen's theory make predictions testable in principle, even if not yet feasible? Does is retrodict known experimental facts? Is it simpler in the Ockham sense than prevailing theories? The papers themselves do not address these questions. I'm looking for others on the list to comment. -Johnathan
Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: There are many ways to escape from this scenario. If you are Tookie, you will find yourself shunted into increasingly less likely situations: not being caught in the first place; being caught but not being found guilty; being sentenced to death but getting off on appeal; being pardoned by the Governer at the last moment; finding that you are one of the 1/billion people who have a natural resistance to the lethal agent. Only your last scenario is causally connected to having received a lethal injection. What does shunted mean in the above? Once I experience having had the injection, how would I get shunted to any of the preceding outcomes? If that all falls through, you might find that your arrest and execution was all part of a dream, or that you were actually executed but your head was preserved and you were resurrected as a computer upload in the future, or you were resurrected as a result of brute force emulation of every possible human mind in the very far future. These latter possibilities may be more likely than quantum tunneling to a tropical island, but in the final analysis, however unlikely the escape route may be, if its probability is non-zero, then it *has* to happen, doesn't it? These scenarios are all causally connected to having been lethally injected. But your final question goes to the heart of the issue I raised. What is the likeliest scenario which includes the memory of being lethally injected? Are there always non-zero probability outcomes, which, according to MWI, must be realized somewhere? -Johnathan
Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
Saibal Mitra wrote: To me it seems that the notion of ''successor'' has to break down at cases where the observer can die. The Tookies that are the most similar to the Tookie who got executed are the ones who got clemency. There is no objective reason why these Tookies should be excluded as ''successors''. They miss the part of their memories about things that happened after clemency was denied. Instead of those memories they have other memories. We forget things all the time. Sometimes we remember things that didn't really happen. So, we allow for information loss anyway. My point is then that we should forget about all of the information contained in the OM and just sample from the entire set of OMs. (After being away for a couple weeks, I'd like to follow up with yours and others replies.) I find this line of argument hard to follow. I think where we differ is that I assume there must be some physical causality connecting observer moments. That is, if a person is in physical state A and is experiencing state E(A), then their next subjective moment E(B) must have some connected, causal path between physical state A and physical state B. This reasoning makes the materialist assumption that subjective experience E is entirely defined by the physical state of the observer. According to MWI, physical state A actually evolves into a superposition of discrete physical states B, each with a different density or measure. So, by the logic of the previous paragraph, subjective experience E(A) must evolve into a superposition of discrete Es, each a function of the particular discrete physical state B it arises from, and each with a particular measure. Some subset of this superposition of physical states B, however, do not support the creation of subjective experience (say, where the person has died.) So some proportion of E(B)'s are null. So my original question about what is happening to Tookie now can be rephrased as the following thought experiment: Physical state A is Tookie lying on a gurney, experiencing E(A), which is getting injected with lethal toxin by the State of California. Clearly, the vast majority of the elements of superposition of states B which follow the execution are with him being dead, and do not give rise to any subjective experience at all. What are the possibilities for causally connected physical states which don't involve his death? Which B's exist which continue to give rise to new E(B)'s? In other words, which observer moments for Tookie exist which include the memories of his having received the lethal injection, but not of dying as a result? Does there have to be any at all? QTI says yes, there must be, and no matter how unlikely--there is always escape in some form. What was Tookie's? -Johnathan
Re: ROSS MODEL OF THE UNIVERSE - The Simplest Yet Theory of Everything
John Ross wrote: My April 18, 2005 version of my Theory of Everything has recently been published as a patent application. You can view it at the United States Patent Office web site by going to www.uspto.gov . Click search then click Published Number Search under Published Applications. Then type in my Patent Application Number: 20050182607. Is it April 1st yet? No? How unfortunate--I wonder how often the USPTO has to deal with sort of thing.
Is 'Measure' infinitely divisible?
When considering possible continuations of observer-moments, one speaks of dividing one's measure among them such that any succeeding observer-moment has a relative proportion consistent with the quantum amplitude of its wave function. (Or something like that.) My first question is: Can this go on indefinitely? Based on my understanding of MWI, the answer is yes, but I haven't seen this addressed before. I think another way to ask this is, can the amplitude of a wave function ever go to zero for all values of it's dependent variable? (Forgive me if this is an ill-formed question, I'm still sorting out in my own mind what I'm trying to figure out.) Secondly, there are value-judgment arguments made here on the list about the desirability of taking certain actions based on the anticipated observer-measure that would result from them, such as implied by Lee Corbin's recent comment: Not sure I entirely understand, but it seems to me that we survive in Harry potter like universes, but only get very little runtime there (i.e. have very low measure in those). I can understand the argument that one's present expectation value of an possible outcome is related to the proportion of one's measure that would continue in that branch of the wave function. But here is where my first question has implications--if measure has some finite lower bound, then eventually, all roads lead to zero at some point. An observer would have a strong motivation to take actions which maximize one's future measure integral, to stave off this impending non-existence as long as possible. If, on the other hand, measure is infinitely divisible, then there will always be a branch that will continue. Finally, here's my second question: Does being in a low measure branch somehow feel different from being in a high measure branch? To take the canonical example, let's say one is next to that 20 megaton H-Bomb when it detonates. In one branch, with a very very tiny fraction of one's current measure, one will find himself magically tunneled and reformed somewhere away from the danger. The expectation value of this happening, of course is tiny, but is non-zero, so it does happen somewhere in the multiverse. Now, finding oneself, after the fact, having survived the blast by quantum tunneling, one realizes one is in a low measure branch of his wave function. But does it really matter? If measure is infinitely divisible, I don't think it does. But if measure can run out, then I've just brought that point in time much closer. (Of course, one could then also argue that the quantum amplitude of surviving the blast would likely fall below this threshold, so there would be no continuer at all.) I've seen references to something called the no cul-de-sac theorem, which sounds like what I'm talking about, but I can't seem to find out more about it in Google or Wikipedia. I also think what I've been discussing is related to the RSSA and ASSA concepts, but I don't understand those well enough. I think I've been assuming RSSA here in my argument though. Thoughts? -Johnathan signature.asc Description: PGP signature signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature
Re: where do copies come from?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: It is likely that multiple error correction and negative feedback systems are in place to ensure that small changes are not chaotically amplified to cause gross mental changes after a few seconds, On the other hand, the above may be precisely how consciousness operates! Picture a system that traverses through many different states as chaotic attractor cycles, and outside stimuli act to nudge the system between grossly different chaotic attractors. You have a system that needs to be exquisitely tuned to subtle input changes, yet also robust in the face of other types of changes (damage, etc.) In the brain, these state trajectories would be neuronal firing patterns and synaptic chemical gradients. Determining the chaotic attractors themselves would be neuronal morphology and ion channel types and locations. The short-term information about a brain might not need to be stored in order to reconstruct a brain. That is, individual neuron on-off states and synaptic chemical gradients may be how you feel and what you are thinking this moment--but discarding (or not measuring) this info might only mean the reconstructed brain would start from some blank state. Chaotic attractor dynamics would pull the system into one of the aforementioned chaotic cycles and the system as a whole would eventually recreate the short-term firing patterns and chemical gradients needed for normal functioning. (The above might be wrong in particulars, but I strongly suspect the concept of small changes perturbing a chaotic system to shift between chaotic attractors will play a role in the ultimate explanation of how neuronal processes give rise to conscious experience.) -Johnathan
Re: More is Better (was RE: another puzzle)
Jonathan Colvin wrote: I've sometimes wondered whether some anaesthetics might work this way: put you into a state of paralysis, and affect your short term memory. So you actually experience the doctor cutting you open, with all the concommitant pain, but you can't report it at the time and forget about it afterwards. If you knew an anaesthetic worked that way, would you agree to have it used on you for surgery? Here is a similar situation. I had a medical procedure performed using something called conscious sedation. In this technique, a drug was administered (Versed in my case) which allowed me to retain consciousness and even engage my doctor in conversation. Yet no long term memories were laid down. This temporary anterograde amnesia is the same experience as above, except I wasn't paralyzed and was free to report any experienced pain to my doctor. In my case, this was a (supposedly) mildly painful procedure, yet I in fact have a puzzling gap in my continuity of memory and have no recollection of any pain (or of anything else) during that time period. For all I know, I was in agony and had to be in full restraints to allow things to proceed--without anyone telling me what happened, I have no way to know. Today I'd do this again without hesitation. I wish my dentist were licensed to do this so the next time I have to have a root canal I can have no memory of it afterwards. (As an aside, Versed is quick to act but slow to recover. It's very difficult to describe the 1st person experience here but I have memories of something I can only call gradual awareness that got better over a period of a couple hours, yet the nursing staff said I was talking to them on and off during this whole period. Weird.) -Johnathan
Re: More is Better (was RE: another puzzle)
Lee Corbin wrote: When I was in high school, I read that dentists were considering use of a new anasthetic with this property. I was revolted, and even more revolted when none of my friends could see anything wrong with it. Experiences are real, whether you remember them or not. It's interesting how different people react to things. I've actually been through this (see previous post); it's not theoretical for me. And I would do it again, and wish my dentist could use this technique. (Of course, in my case, is was for a semi-surgical procedure that I could probably have withstood with conscious sedation; I don't think I'd choose this for open heart surgery!) Here is a case where I voluntarily chose to undergo a mildly painful experience with the foreknowledge that I would have no recall of it. I am none the worse for it. Did I experience pain? Yes, so I am told. Was that experience real? Sure. Can I relive that experience in my memory? Not a chance. And that's how I wanted it. What is so revolting about it? What's behind the strong emotion here? (You seem to have had a similar reaction to the events depicted in Brin's Kiln People.) -Johnathan
Re: More is Better (was RE: another puzzle)
Johnathan Corgan wrote: (Of course, in my case, is was for a semi-surgical procedure that I could probably have withstood with conscious sedation; I don't think I'd ^^ without -Johnathan
Re: More is Better (was RE: another puzzle)
Russell Standish wrote: This leads to a speculation that memories are an essential requirement for consciousness... I agree. Had I known then what I know now, I would have asked the nursing staff and doctor to question me in detail about my first person experience *while it was happening*, since all I can think about now is how I felt before and after. Was I oriented to time, place, who I was, and what was happening to me? Did my first person experience of consciousness seem any different? (Aside from the obvious mellowness that any sedative induces.) While I was undergoing the procedure, and feeling the pain, did I regret the decision to be awake but not remember later? Knowing that I would forget this, is there anything about what I was experiencing that I'd want to be noted so I could read about it afterward? etc. So I do wonder, if I was awake and responding accurately to verbal cues, but not laying down memories, was I really conscious? Of course, it *seems* to me now that I was unconscious the whole time, with some odd emergent effects as the Versed wore off. But as I've gathered from reading folks like Dennett, what things seem like and what actually is happening can be very different things. Performing the question answer session described above is at least part of my willingness to undergo conscious sedation again. -Johnathan
Questions about MWI and mathematical formalism
I'm a layperson fascinated with quantum mechanics and the MWI, and have reached a point where to obtain a better understanding of the qualitative descriptions (universes splitting, measure of a universe, etc.) I must learn the mathematical formalism. It appears that the popular descriptions of MWI use very loose terminology, and I suspect much has been lost in translation. Digging through online sources such as MathWorld, Wikipedia, and CiteSeer, as well as reviving painful memories of matrix algebra from university (CS), I think I've learned enough to be dangerous. Below is a set of (possibly incorrect) statements and questions I have. -=-=-=- Let |phi represent the quantum mechanical state of a system S as a vector in Hilbert space. The state is determined by the angle of the vector, not it's length. So any state multiplied by a constant is the same physical state of the system. (Correct? Is this by decree or does it fall out of something more fundamental?) Let A represent a Hermitian operator corresponding to some observable of the system S Let {l} represent the set of eigenvalues for operator A such that A|phi = l|phi And finally: {|An} is the set of eigenvectors for operator A corresponding to {l} This set of eigenvectors (if I understand correctly) form an orthonormal basis for the possible states of S, such that if S is in a state phi which is not an eigenvector of observable A, it may be represented as a linear combination of such eigenvectors: (1) |phi = c1|A1 + c2|A2 + ... + cn|An In the case where |phi is indeed an eigenvector of A, then one of the constants cn is 1 while the remainder are 0. So far so good (I hope.) Here are my questions: A) What is the physical meaning of equation (1) above? Is this what is meant when a system is described as being in a superposition of states that are measured by A? Is superposition the accepted term in the MWI or is there another? B) In the Copenhagen Interpretation (CI), the collapse postulate states that (somehow) as a result of a measurement, |phi actually changes to one of {|An} with a probability related to {cn}, though I'm not sure of the particulars. How do you describe the probability (within the CI) of obtaining measurement l from state |phi based on equation (1) ? This is the Born rule, I think, but I haven't quite grasped the math. C) In MWI, there is no collapse postulate. When a measurement occurs, the quantum mechanical state of the measuring device (and ultimately the observer) becomes a superposition as well, with each observer becoming a linear combination of states corresponding the effect the measured outcome has on the observer. Is this the technical meaning of splitting universes? D) Even in the case where the spectrum of A is discrete, the set of constants {cn} in (1) can take on continuous values. When an observer splits as a result of measuring A on S, how many splits occur? Is there an infinity of them, each corresponding to a different set of constants {cn}? Or, is there a split only into the number of eigenvectors of A, since cn|An represents the same physical state regardless of the numerical value of cn? E) What is the measure associated with each of the observer states resulting from D? How is this mathematically related to the probability values from B)? F) What happens when you use a different observable B? How do the answers to C), D), and E) change when observables A and B have different sets of eigenvectors? Is this the preferred basis problem? Struggling but determined to figure this out, -Johnathan