JamesTauber wrote:
1) the problem is theirs not ours
vs
2) it is their problem not our problem
So, if I understand well, our problems are ours, and their problems are theirs.
Thanks for the teaching: I didn't dare to put a s on their, up to now,
especially after a plural (but only
Günther Greindl wrote:
Hi List,
I found this:
S. A. Terwijn, Computability and measure, PhD thesis, University of
Amsterdam, 1998.
Downloadable here:
http://www.logic.at/people/terwijn/publications/thesis.pdf
(I am currently attending his course, he is a very good teacher :-)
Maybe of
Hello Günther,
I have already presented an argument (an easy consequence of the
Universal Dovetailer Argument, which is less easy probably) showing that:
- CRH implies COMP
- COMP implies the negation of CRH
- Thus, with or without COMP (and with or without the MUH) the CRH does
not
Dear Stephen,
When you say:
[...]
We might not be able to know what it is like to be a bat
but surely we could know what it is like to be an ameoba!
It is amusing because I describe often---for exemple my thesis
or http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3651.html--- my whole
work as an attempt
Tony Hollick forwarded us an argument by Chris Tame, casting
doubt about the existence of Santa Claus (See below).
This is hard to swallow especially before Christmas.
I hardly resist the pleasure of giving you a straight proof of the
existence of Santa Claus.
Consider the following sentence S
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Yes. I strongly suspect that minds are quantum mechanical. My
arguement is at this point very hand waving, but it seems to me that if
minds are purely classical when it would not be difficult for us to imagine,
i.e. compute, what it is like to be a bat or any other
Jesse Mazer wrote
[snip]
...
Doesn't the UDA argument in some sense depend on the
idea of computing in the limit too?
Yes. This follows from the invariance lemma, i.e. from
the fact that the first persons cannot be aware of delays
of reconstitution in UD* (the complete work of the UD).
The
Russell Standish wrote:
Hal Finney wrote:
That would be true IF you include descriptions that are infinitely long.
Then the set of all descriptions would be of cardinality c. If your
definition of a description implies that each one must be finite, then the
set of all of them would have
Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Tim May wrote:
As I hope I had made clear in some of my earlier posts on this, mostly
this past summer, I'm not making any grandiose claims for category
theory and topos theory as being the sine qua non for understanding the
nature of reality. Rather,
Stephen Paul King wrote:
I am asking this to try to understand how Bruno has a problem with BOTH
comp AND the existence of a stuffy substancial universe. It seems to me
that the term machine very much requires some kind of stuffy substancial
universe to exist in, even one that is in
Colin Hales wrote
...
Not really TOE stuff, so I?ll desist for now. I remain ever hopeful that one
day I?ll be able to understand Bruno?. :-)
Ah! Thanks for that optimistic proposition :-)
Let us forget the AUDA which needs indeed some familiarity with
mathematical logic.
But the UDA? It
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
There is no problem is saying that all computations exist in
platonia (or the plenitude). This is a zero information set, and
requires no further explanation.
Stricly speaking I disagree. The expression all computations needs
Church thesis
Stephen Paul King wrote:
I found these statements:
http://www.imaph.tu-bs.de/qi/concepts.html#TP
Teleportation with purely classical means is impossible, which is precisely
the observation making the theory of Quantum Information a new branch of
Information Theory.
This is correct. What
Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
BG: You seem to be making points about the limitations
of the folk-psychology notion of identity, rather than about the actual
nature of the universe...
BM: Then you should disagree at some point of the reasoning, for the
reasoning is intended, at
Hal Finney wrote:
Bruno Marchal writes:
Methodologically your ON theory suffers (at first sight)the same
problem as Wolfram, or Schmidhuber's approaches. The problem consists in
failing to realise the fact that if we are turing-emulable, then
the association between mind-dynamics and
Ben Goertzel writes:
I read your argument for the UDA, and there's nothing there that
particularly worries me.
Good. I don't like to worry people. (Only those attached
dogmatically to BOTH comp AND the existence of a stuffy
substancial universe should perhaps be worried).
You seem to be
Ben Goertzel wrote:
Regarding octonions, sedenions and physics
Tony Smith has a huge amount of pertinent ideas on his website, e.g.
http://www.innerx.net/personal/tsmith/QOphys.html
http://www.innerx.net/personal/tsmith/d4d5e6hist.html
His ideas are colorful and speculative, but also deep and
Tim May wrote
(I was struck by the point that the sequence 1, 2, 4, 8 is the only
sequence satisfying certain properties--the only scalars, vectors,
quaternions, octonions there can be--and that the sequence 3, 4, 6,
10, just 2 higher than the first sequence, is closely related to
allowable
Hi Plamen,
Thanks for the info. Actually we knew about your site
since your friend Joel Dobrzelewski pointed us to it.
You can search the everything-list archives with the
keyword cellular automata to see
what some among us think about the use of CA for
developping a TOE. See my web page
Hi,
I hope you have not missed Ian Steward's paper on the number
8, considered as a TOE in the last new scientist.
It mentions a paper by John Baez on the octonions. The
octonions seems to be a key ingredient for the quantization
of general relativity.
http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/Octonions/
I agree with Hal.
CA models doesn't explain quantum non-locality.
More deeply perhaps is the fact that from Kochen
Specker theorem there is no boolean map on quantum
reality, but a CA model always has a boolean map.
When Hal says:
As far as the claim that we already know the algorithm that runs
I do no more believe that Freedman P/NP paper shows that some
Quantum Universal machine can compute more than Deutsch QUM,
or, consequently, more than any Turing Universal Machine.
(Nor do Freedman himself, see
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/?0001071
)
About Calude attempts to go beyond the
Saibal Mitra wrote:
Bruno wrote:
At 16:25 +0200 11/10/1996, Saibal Mitra wrote:
You can still have realism, but it must be the case that at least some
of
the things we think of as ``real physical objects´´ like e.g. electrons
are
not real.
What would that mean? What would be real? Even in my
Gordon wrote:
But you have an inconsistent idea in that on the one hand a theory which
say that they are physical object that becoame no physical and then just
comp pure comp.Now although I dont thing it that narrow just like the
old Clock work view, I do think that your theory can be simpler in
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