Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-24 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le sam. 24 nov. 2018 17:28, John Clark  a écrit :

> On Fri, Nov 23, 2018 at 8:31 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>
>> > *in a precise context, when doing science/mathematics, it is useful to
>> have precise mathematical definition.*
>>
>
> Sure definitions can be useful but they never cause things to pop into
> existence or can tell you anything about the nature of science or
> mathematics, all they tell you is what the sound some human beings make
> with their mouth or the squiggles they draw with their hands represent,
> something that may or may not be part of reality.
>
> *> You define computation through an ontological commitment.*
>>
>
> My commitment is with the scientific method, so when you make outlandish
> claims (*matter is not needed to make calculations Robison arithmetic
> alone can do so,  Kleene’s predicate T(x, y, z) can encode information*)
> I ask you to actually do so.
>

Strangely you're not as hard with yourself when you advertise manyworld...
Just show us a parallel universe then... Until you apply to your own
beliefs your own methods, It will just be dismissive BS.

I don't ask you to tell me about it, anybody can spin a tale in the English
> language or the Mathematical language, I ask you to actually make a
> calculation or encode some information without using matter that obeys the
> laws of physics. I don't want more squiggles made of ink I want you to
> perform a experiment that can be repeated.  I'm not being unreasonable in
> my request, I'm just asking you to be scientific.  If you can successfully
> do all that I'll do a 180, my opinion of your work will change radically
> because I have no loyalty or sentimentality, if a idea doesn't work I
> reject it if it does work I embrace it until I find something that works
> even better.
>
>
>> > *That is not the standard way to proceed in this field,*
>>
>
> True, that's not the way things are done in the Junk Science field, Voodoo
> priests would not approve at all.
>
> >>Definitions do not change reality and you're never going to discover
>>> anything new just by making definitions.
>>
>>
>> > *Any formal or mathematical definition will do,*
>>
>
> Will do what? Change reality?
>
> *>That all computations are executed in arithmetic is just a standard fact
>> knows since 1931-1936. *
>>
>
> And it has also been know that arithmetic can only be performed by matter
> that obeys the laws of physics.
>
>
>> > *That simply cannot work, unless you are right about the non existence
>> of the first person indeterminacy, *
>>
>
> First person indeterminacy? Oh yes, the idea that you can't always be
> certain what will happen next. I believe that monumental discovery was made
> by the great thinker and philosopher Og The Caveman.
>
>
>> >>We've observed experimentally that a change in matter changes
>>> consciousness and a change in consciousness changes matter, I don't see how
>>> you could get better evidence than that indicating matter and consciousness
>>> are related.
>>
>>
>> *> In a video games, you can also have such relations,*
>>
>
> Yes, so what?
>
> *> them being processed in the physical reality, or in a brain in a vat,
>> or in arithmetic, the same effect can take place,*
>
>
> A brain in a vat is part of physical reality and so is a brain in a bone
> box atop your shoulders. And forget video games, arithmetic can't even
> calculate 2+2 anymore the English word "cat" can have kittens because a
> language by itself can't do anything.
>
> >>Turing showed that matter can make any computation that can be
>>> composted, what more do you need.
>>
>>
>
> *> Sure,*
>>
>
> I'm glad we agree on something.
>
> *> but we talk on primary matter, and it is this one that you have to
>> explain the role in consciousness,*
>>
>
> To hell with consciousness! Turing explained how matter can behave
> intelligently, and Darwin explained how  natural selection and random
> mutation can produce an animal that behaves intelligently, and I know that
> I am conscious, and I know I am the product of Evolution. If consciousness
> is a brute fact, if consciousness is the inevitable byproduct of
> intelligence, as I think it must be, then there is nothing more of interest
> to be said about it, certainly nobody on this list has said anything of
> more significance about consciousness since I joined the list.
>
> >> You've got it backwards. Again. Turing proved that matter can do
>>> mathematics he did NOT prove that mathematics can do matter,
>>
>>
>> *> Yes, that is my result,*
>>
>
> If you agree with Turing that matter can do mathematics but mathematics
> can NOT do matter then you must also agree that physics is more fundamental
> than mathematics.
>
>
>> > in arithmetic there are infinitely any processes that we cannot
>> predict in advance.
>>
>
> True, but how in the world does that weakness support your claim that
> mathematics tells physics what to do and thus is at the foundation of
> reality when mathematics doesn't know what matter is going to 

Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

2018-11-05 Thread Quentin Anciaux
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oracle_machine

Le lun. 5 nov. 2018 19:28, Quentin Anciaux  a écrit :

>
>
> Le lun. 5 nov. 2018 19:17, John Clark  a écrit :
>
>> On Mon, Nov 5, 2018 at 8:51 AM Quentin Anciaux 
>> wrote:
>>
>> >>There is no evidence fire breathing dragons exist in nature but if one
>>>> did it would not produce a logical contradiction, however Turing proved
>>>> over 80 years ago that a oracle that could solve the Halting Problem would.
>>>>
>>>
>>> *> It does not, it "solves" it for turing machines... it does not for
>>> turing machine + oracle...  there is no contradiction.*
>>>
>>
>> In a way that's true but the price paid is one of ambiguity. You say the
>> oracle can predict if any Turing Machine will halt, OK but the oracle is
>> not a Turing Machine so can the oracle predict if it itself will halt?
>> Nobody known how the oracle works so nobody can say but if it can then it
>> can't and I can prove it.
>>
>
>
> It can't... Again, the oracle solves it for TM... Not for TMO.. But
> another oracle... Call it O2... Can solve it for TMO... But not for TMO2...
> Etc
>
>>
>> Let's give the turing machine + oracle you mentioned a name, I'll call
>> it a TMO. If the TMO can solve the Halting problem then if I feed in any
>> Turing Machine it can tell me if it halts or not. Any computer that is not
>> a oracle can be reduced to a Turing Machine regardless of it circuit
>> design, so let's say the TMO has 2 slots for input and one slot for
>> output, if I feed in the circuit logic design blueprints of any computer
>> into one slot the TMO can simulate that computer, and if I feed in  program
>> data into the other slot that TMO will output either "Halt" meaning the
>> simulated machine operating on that data will eventually stop or the TMO
>> will output "not halt" meaning  the simulated machine operating on that
>> data will never stop.
>>
>> I will now make a new machine called X, it has 3 parts to it. The first
>> part of X  is just a Xerox copy machine, feed in one program and it outputs
>> 2 identical programs. The second part of X is the TMO and it receives the 2
>> programs as input from the Xerox machine's outputs, and the TMO then
>> outputs either "halt" or "not halt". The third and last part of X is a very
>> simple machine called the negator, it receives as input the output of
>> the TMO and if the input to the negator is "Halt" the negator will go
>> into a infinite loop and if the input is "not halt" the negator will
>> print "halt" and then stop.
>>
>> Now let's draw the blueprint circuit design of the entire X machine that
>> fully defines it, then make 2 copies of it and feed it into the TMO; so
>> the TMO is now trying to figure out if the X machine will halt if it is
>> fed its own blueprint as data. If the TMO says "halt" the X machine will
>> not halt and the TMO was wrong.  If the TMO says "not halt" the X
>> machine will halt and the TMO was wrong again. Therefore the TMO that
>> can tell if any Turing Machine will halt or not can not logically exist.
>>
>> I suppose you could argue that the oracle operates according to some sort
>> of magic so you couldn't have the blueprints of it and therefore you
>> couldn't have the blueprints of the entire X machine, but then the very
>> question of whether the X machine halts is not a well defined question
>> because the X machine itself is not well defined and the properties of the
>> oracle are ambiguous. So oracle or no oracle, anything that can always tell
>> if any well defined program will halt or not halt when run on a well
>> defined computer will  lead to a logical contradiction.
>>
>>  John K Clark
>>
>> --
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>

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

2018-11-05 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le lun. 5 nov. 2018 19:17, John Clark  a écrit :

> On Mon, Nov 5, 2018 at 8:51 AM Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
> >>There is no evidence fire breathing dragons exist in nature but if one
>>> did it would not produce a logical contradiction, however Turing proved
>>> over 80 years ago that a oracle that could solve the Halting Problem would.
>>>
>>
>> *> It does not, it "solves" it for turing machines... it does not for
>> turing machine + oracle...  there is no contradiction.*
>>
>
> In a way that's true but the price paid is one of ambiguity. You say the
> oracle can predict if any Turing Machine will halt, OK but the oracle is
> not a Turing Machine so can the oracle predict if it itself will halt?
> Nobody known how the oracle works so nobody can say but if it can then it
> can't and I can prove it.
>


It can't... Again, the oracle solves it for TM... Not for TMO.. But another
oracle... Call it O2... Can solve it for TMO... But not for TMO2... Etc

>
> Let's give the turing machine + oracle you mentioned a name, I'll call it
> a TMO. If the TMO can solve the Halting problem then if I feed in any
> Turing Machine it can tell me if it halts or not. Any computer that is not
> a oracle can be reduced to a Turing Machine regardless of it circuit
> design, so let's say the TMO has 2 slots for input and one slot for
> output, if I feed in the circuit logic design blueprints of any computer
> into one slot the TMO can simulate that computer, and if I feed in  program
> data into the other slot that TMO will output either "Halt" meaning the
> simulated machine operating on that data will eventually stop or the TMO
> will output "not halt" meaning  the simulated machine operating on that
> data will never stop.
>
> I will now make a new machine called X, it has 3 parts to it. The first
> part of X  is just a Xerox copy machine, feed in one program and it outputs
> 2 identical programs. The second part of X is the TMO and it receives the 2
> programs as input from the Xerox machine's outputs, and the TMO then
> outputs either "halt" or "not halt". The third and last part of X is a very
> simple machine called the negator, it receives as input the output of the
> TMO and if the input to the negator is "Halt" the negator will go into a
> infinite loop and if the input is "not halt" the negator will print
> "halt" and then stop.
>
> Now let's draw the blueprint circuit design of the entire X machine that
> fully defines it, then make 2 copies of it and feed it into the TMO; so
> the TMO is now trying to figure out if the X machine will halt if it is
> fed its own blueprint as data. If the TMO says "halt" the X machine will
> not halt and the TMO was wrong.  If the TMO says "not halt" the X machine
> will halt and the TMO was wrong again. Therefore the TMO that can tell if
> any Turing Machine will halt or not can not logically exist.
>
> I suppose you could argue that the oracle operates according to some sort
> of magic so you couldn't have the blueprints of it and therefore you
> couldn't have the blueprints of the entire X machine, but then the very
> question of whether the X machine halts is not a well defined question
> because the X machine itself is not well defined and the properties of the
> oracle are ambiguous. So oracle or no oracle, anything that can always tell
> if any well defined program will halt or not halt when run on a well
> defined computer will  lead to a logical contradiction.
>
>  John K Clark
>
> --
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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

2018-11-05 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le lun. 5 nov. 2018 à 14:48, John Clark  a écrit :

> On Mon, Nov 5, 2018 at 4:39 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> *>>> No Turing machine can solve the halting problem. You are right on
 this. But an oracle can, or a machine with infinite speed can.*
>>>
>>>
>
> >>If such a oracle could exist
>>
>>
>
> > *In what sense?*
>>
>
> Whoever said there is no such thing as a stupid question was wrong.
>
> >>then logical contradictions could too
>>
>>
>> > *That does not follow. I don’t think that there are any evidence for
>> such oracle in nature, but such existence would not introduce any
>> contradiction.*
>>
>
> For god's sake! There is no evidence fire breathing dragons exist in
> nature but if one did it would not produce a logical contradiction, however
> Turing proved over 80 years ago that a oracle that could solve the Halting
> Problem would.
>

It does not, it "solves" it for turing machines... it does not for turing
machine + oracle...  there is no contradiction.


>  John K Clark
>
>
>
> --
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-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: The Ilusion of Branching and the MWI

2018-08-04 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Do you really think that using your words, insults and so on will convince
anyone?

How old are you? C'est ridicule.

Le sam. 4 août 2018 à 23:32,  a écrit :

> AFAIK, no one has ever observed a probability wave, from which I conclude
> the wave function has only epistemic content. So I have embraced the "shut
> up and calculate" interpretation of the wave function. I also see a
> connection between the True Believers of the MWI, and Trump sycophants;
> they seem immune to simple facts, such as the foolishness of thinking
> copies of observers can occur, or be created, willy-nilly. AG
>
> --
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Re: My final word on the MWI --

2018-07-27 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le sam. 28 juil. 2018 à 00:12, Brent Meeker  a écrit :

>
>
> On 7/27/2018 1:58 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> Le ven. 27 juil. 2018 à 22:48, Brent Meeker  a
> écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On 7/27/2018 11:21 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le ven. 27 juil. 2018 à 20:18, Brent Meeker  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 7/26/2018 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Le ven. 27 juil. 2018 à 00:10,  a écrit :
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thursday, July 26, 2018 at 9:59:49 PM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, 27 Jul 2018 at 2:08 am,  wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thursday, July 26, 2018 at 11:30:11 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Thursday, July 26, 2018 at 11:24:42 AM UTC, Quentin Anciaux
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I still don't get it why some people prefer insulting other people
>>>>>>>> and their ideas instead of discussing or just stay with their own 
>>>>>>>> thoughts
>>>>>>>> and just say they disagree... What do you gain by saying they are 
>>>>>>>> insane,
>>>>>>>> stupid or whatever?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It just looks to me childish. So stop doing this, stop writing in
>>>>>>>> 70pt size red fonts... It's a disfavor to your arguments.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Quentin
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In fact, I DO think it's a mental illness. AG
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It's not just wrong, but a gross dysfunction of judgment. Joe the
>>>>>> Plumber goes into a lab or his closet, shoots a single electron at a 
>>>>>> slit,
>>>>>> and by so doing creates uncountable universes, all with copies of 
>>>>>> himself,
>>>>>> replete with his memories. Sure. AG
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> You may as well protest on the same basis that the universe can’t be
>>>>> so wastefully large.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I don't see how that follows. Unfortunately, one cannot PROVE that the
>>>> many worlds allegedly implied by the MWI interpretation don't exist, which
>>>> is why I insist the True Believers are judgment impaired. Do you really
>>>> believe that trivial actions by mere humans, accidents of evolution, can
>>>> create entire universes? AG.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> No, because that's not what happens, at every interactions, universes
>>> split/differentiate... Humans or not.
>>>
>>>
>>> I think that's a misleading way to look at it.  First, the vector in
>>> Hilbert space representing the state of the universe just rotates around.
>>> It never "splits".  What we refer to as "splitting" is the projection onto
>>> a plane in the Hilbert space that corresponds to a certain "classical"
>>> world.  Second, this "classical" world plane is not sharply defined.
>>> Almost all interactions do not make any difference to it, i.e. they only
>>> make Planck sized changes to the action and correspondingly tiny tilts to
>>> the projective plane.  The myriad atomic interactions in your body don't
>>> make any classical difference.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Yet if QM is the theory of reality, there is no classical world that
>> exists ontologicaly... So makes no difference to who, what?
>>
>>
>> That the ontology of the world is quantum is a theory.  The theory is
>> derived from and supported by evidence which is stuff experienced by you
>> and me.  Our experience of the world is "classical" (notice I used scare
>> quotes, as I did above).  Bohr was right when he observed that science and
>> knowledge are only possible in a "classical" world; a world in which
>> records exist and observers can agree on them and we do not observe
>> macroscopic superpositions.
>>
>
>
> If QM is reality, microscopic change are parallel realities even if your
&

Re: My final word on the MWI --

2018-07-27 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le ven. 27 juil. 2018 à 22:48, Brent Meeker  a écrit :

>
>
> On 7/27/2018 11:21 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> Le ven. 27 juil. 2018 à 20:18, Brent Meeker  a
> écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On 7/26/2018 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le ven. 27 juil. 2018 à 00:10,  a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, July 26, 2018 at 9:59:49 PM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, 27 Jul 2018 at 2:08 am,  wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thursday, July 26, 2018 at 11:30:11 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thursday, July 26, 2018 at 11:24:42 AM UTC, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I still don't get it why some people prefer insulting other people
>>>>>>> and their ideas instead of discussing or just stay with their own 
>>>>>>> thoughts
>>>>>>> and just say they disagree... What do you gain by saying they are 
>>>>>>> insane,
>>>>>>> stupid or whatever?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It just looks to me childish. So stop doing this, stop writing in
>>>>>>> 70pt size red fonts... It's a disfavor to your arguments.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Quentin
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In fact, I DO think it's a mental illness. AG
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It's not just wrong, but a gross dysfunction of judgment. Joe the
>>>>> Plumber goes into a lab or his closet, shoots a single electron at a slit,
>>>>> and by so doing creates uncountable universes, all with copies of himself,
>>>>> replete with his memories. Sure. AG
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You may as well protest on the same basis that the universe can’t be so
>>>> wastefully large.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I don't see how that follows. Unfortunately, one cannot PROVE that the
>>> many worlds allegedly implied by the MWI interpretation don't exist, which
>>> is why I insist the True Believers are judgment impaired. Do you really
>>> believe that trivial actions by mere humans, accidents of evolution, can
>>> create entire universes? AG.
>>>
>>
>>
>> No, because that's not what happens, at every interactions, universes
>> split/differentiate... Humans or not.
>>
>>
>> I think that's a misleading way to look at it.  First, the vector in
>> Hilbert space representing the state of the universe just rotates around.
>> It never "splits".  What we refer to as "splitting" is the projection onto
>> a plane in the Hilbert space that corresponds to a certain "classical"
>> world.  Second, this "classical" world plane is not sharply defined.
>> Almost all interactions do not make any difference to it, i.e. they only
>> make Planck sized changes to the action and correspondingly tiny tilts to
>> the projective plane.  The myriad atomic interactions in your body don't
>> make any classical difference.
>>
>
>
> Yet if QM is the theory of reality, there is no classical world that
> exists ontologicaly... So makes no difference to who, what?
>
>
> That the ontology of the world is quantum is a theory.  The theory is
> derived from and supported by evidence which is stuff experienced by you
> and me.  Our experience of the world is "classical" (notice I used scare
> quotes, as I did above).  Bohr was right when he observed that science and
> knowledge are only possible in a "classical" world; a world in which
> records exist and observers can agree on them and we do not observe
> macroscopic superpositions.
>


If QM is reality, microscopic change are parallel realities even if your
conscious state is compatible, span over them...Hence computationalism.

>
> Brent
> "Epistemology precedes ontology."
> --- terry savage
>
>
>   Only the few that cause you to take action at the classical level.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Humans have nothing to do in the process.
>>
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
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>> email to everything-l

Re: My final word on the MWI --

2018-07-27 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le ven. 27 juil. 2018 à 20:18, Brent Meeker  a écrit :

>
>
> On 7/26/2018 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> Le ven. 27 juil. 2018 à 00:10,  a écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, July 26, 2018 at 9:59:49 PM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, 27 Jul 2018 at 2:08 am,  wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thursday, July 26, 2018 at 11:30:11 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thursday, July 26, 2018 at 11:24:42 AM UTC, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I still don't get it why some people prefer insulting other people
>>>>>> and their ideas instead of discussing or just stay with their own 
>>>>>> thoughts
>>>>>> and just say they disagree... What do you gain by saying they are insane,
>>>>>> stupid or whatever?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It just looks to me childish. So stop doing this, stop writing in
>>>>>> 70pt size red fonts... It's a disfavor to your arguments.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Quentin
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In fact, I DO think it's a mental illness. AG
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It's not just wrong, but a gross dysfunction of judgment. Joe the
>>>> Plumber goes into a lab or his closet, shoots a single electron at a slit,
>>>> and by so doing creates uncountable universes, all with copies of himself,
>>>> replete with his memories. Sure. AG
>>>>
>>>
>>> You may as well protest on the same basis that the universe can’t be so
>>> wastefully large.
>>>
>>
>> I don't see how that follows. Unfortunately, one cannot PROVE that the
>> many worlds allegedly implied by the MWI interpretation don't exist, which
>> is why I insist the True Believers are judgment impaired. Do you really
>> believe that trivial actions by mere humans, accidents of evolution, can
>> create entire universes? AG.
>>
>
>
> No, because that's not what happens, at every interactions, universes
> split/differentiate... Humans or not.
>
>
> I think that's a misleading way to look at it.  First, the vector in
> Hilbert space representing the state of the universe just rotates around.
> It never "splits".  What we refer to as "splitting" is the projection onto
> a plane in the Hilbert space that corresponds to a certain "classical"
> world.  Second, this "classical" world plane is not sharply defined.
> Almost all interactions do not make any difference to it, i.e. they only
> make Planck sized changes to the action and correspondingly tiny tilts to
> the projective plane.  The myriad atomic interactions in your body don't
> make any classical difference.
>


Yet if QM is the theory of reality, there is no classical world that exists
ontologicaly... So makes no difference to who, what?

>   Only the few that cause you to take action at the classical level.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
>
> Humans have nothing to do in the process.
>
>
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Re: My final word on the MWI --

2018-07-27 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le ven. 27 juil. 2018 à 19:55,  a écrit :

>
>
> On Friday, July 27, 2018 at 9:58:47 AM UTC, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le ven. 27 juil. 2018 à 09:26,  a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, July 27, 2018 at 6:31:26 AM UTC, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Le ven. 27 juil. 2018 à 00:10,  a écrit :
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thursday, July 26, 2018 at 9:59:49 PM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, 27 Jul 2018 at 2:08 am,  wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Thursday, July 26, 2018 at 11:30:11 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Thursday, July 26, 2018 at 11:24:42 AM UTC, Quentin Anciaux
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I still don't get it why some people prefer insulting other people
>>>>>>>>> and their ideas instead of discussing or just stay with their own 
>>>>>>>>> thoughts
>>>>>>>>> and just say they disagree... What do you gain by saying they are 
>>>>>>>>> insane,
>>>>>>>>> stupid or whatever?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It just looks to me childish. So stop doing this, stop writing in
>>>>>>>>> 70pt size red fonts... It's a disfavor to your arguments.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Quentin
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In fact, I DO think it's a mental illness. AG
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It's not just wrong, but a gross dysfunction of judgment. Joe the
>>>>>>> Plumber goes into a lab or his closet, shoots a single electron at a 
>>>>>>> slit,
>>>>>>> and by so doing creates uncountable universes, all with copies of 
>>>>>>> himself,
>>>>>>> replete with his memories. Sure. AG
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You may as well protest on the same basis that the universe can’t be
>>>>>> so wastefully large.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I don't see how that follows. Unfortunately, one cannot PROVE that the
>>>>> many worlds allegedly implied by the MWI interpretation don't exist, which
>>>>> is why I insist the True Believers are judgment impaired. Do you really
>>>>> believe that trivial actions by mere humans, accidents of evolution, can
>>>>> create entire universes? AG.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> No, because that's not what happens, at every interactions, universes
>>>> split/differentiate... Humans or not.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Humans have nothing to do in the process.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Like I said, the True Believers are judgement impaired. The splitting
>>> occurs BECAUSE Joe the Plumber DECIDES to perform a single event slit
>>> experiment. AG
>>>
>>
>>
>> Your judgment is impaired because that 's not what happens, splitting
>> happens continuously, Joe the plumber is part of the universe so as his
>> thoughts and whatever he does... His decisions are not something that
>> exists independently outside of that, Joe the plumber does not create
>> universe, any qm interactions split the universe, since the beginning of
>> the universe, no humans needed at all.
>>
>
> *I misspoke. I just meant that by doing a single event slit experiment, it
> is alleged by the MWI that the universe splits uncountably. I didn't mean
> that the alleged physical splitting is caused by human consciousness, in
> this case the decision to do the experiment. It's like a man deciding to
> jump off a roof and gets killed; his death is directly caused by gravity,
> not that the man caused the gravity to exist. The alleged splitting is not
> disprovable, just plausible for those whose judgement is impaired due to an
> over reliance on mathematics. As I pointed out several times, without any
> reasoned responses, in E we have plane wave solutions to Maxwell's
> Equations, but plane wa

Re: My final word on the MWI --

2018-07-27 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le ven. 27 juil. 2018 à 09:26,  a écrit :

>
>
> On Friday, July 27, 2018 at 6:31:26 AM UTC, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le ven. 27 juil. 2018 à 00:10,  a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, July 26, 2018 at 9:59:49 PM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, 27 Jul 2018 at 2:08 am,  wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thursday, July 26, 2018 at 11:30:11 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thursday, July 26, 2018 at 11:24:42 AM UTC, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I still don't get it why some people prefer insulting other people
>>>>>>> and their ideas instead of discussing or just stay with their own 
>>>>>>> thoughts
>>>>>>> and just say they disagree... What do you gain by saying they are 
>>>>>>> insane,
>>>>>>> stupid or whatever?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It just looks to me childish. So stop doing this, stop writing in
>>>>>>> 70pt size red fonts... It's a disfavor to your arguments.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Quentin
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In fact, I DO think it's a mental illness. AG
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It's not just wrong, but a gross dysfunction of judgment. Joe the
>>>>> Plumber goes into a lab or his closet, shoots a single electron at a slit,
>>>>> and by so doing creates uncountable universes, all with copies of himself,
>>>>> replete with his memories. Sure. AG
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You may as well protest on the same basis that the universe can’t be so
>>>> wastefully large.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I don't see how that follows. Unfortunately, one cannot PROVE that the
>>> many worlds allegedly implied by the MWI interpretation don't exist, which
>>> is why I insist the True Believers are judgment impaired. Do you really
>>> believe that trivial actions by mere humans, accidents of evolution, can
>>> create entire universes? AG.
>>>
>>
>>
>> No, because that's not what happens, at every interactions, universes
>> split/differentiate... Humans or not.
>>
>>
>> Humans have nothing to do in the process.
>>
>
> Like I said, the True Believers are judgement impaired. The splitting
> occurs BECAUSE Joe the Plumber DECIDES to perform a single event slit
> experiment. AG
>


Your judgment is impaired because that 's not what happens, splitting
happens continuously, Joe the plumber is part of the universe so as his
thoughts and whatever he does... His decisions are not something that
exists independently outside of that, Joe the plumber does not create
universe, any qm interactions split the universe, since the beginning of
the universe, no humans needed at all.

> --
>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>>
>>> --
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Re: My final word on the MWI --

2018-07-27 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le ven. 27 juil. 2018 à 00:10,  a écrit :

>
>
> On Thursday, July 26, 2018 at 9:59:49 PM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Fri, 27 Jul 2018 at 2:08 am,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, July 26, 2018 at 11:30:11 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thursday, July 26, 2018 at 11:24:42 AM UTC, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> I still don't get it why some people prefer insulting other people and
>>>>> their ideas instead of discussing or just stay with their own thoughts and
>>>>> just say they disagree... What do you gain by saying they are insane,
>>>>> stupid or whatever?
>>>>>
>>>>> It just looks to me childish. So stop doing this, stop writing in 70pt
>>>>> size red fonts... It's a disfavor to your arguments.
>>>>>
>>>>> Quentin
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> In fact, I DO think it's a mental illness. AG
>>>>
>>>
>>> It's not just wrong, but a gross dysfunction of judgment. Joe the
>>> Plumber goes into a lab or his closet, shoots a single electron at a slit,
>>> and by so doing creates uncountable universes, all with copies of himself,
>>> replete with his memories. Sure. AG
>>>
>>
>> You may as well protest on the same basis that the universe can’t be so
>> wastefully large.
>>
>
> I don't see how that follows. Unfortunately, one cannot PROVE that the
> many worlds allegedly implied by the MWI interpretation don't exist, which
> is why I insist the True Believers are judgment impaired. Do you really
> believe that trivial actions by mere humans, accidents of evolution, can
> create entire universes? AG.
>


No, because that's not what happens, at every interactions, universes
split/differentiate... Humans or not.


Humans have nothing to do in the process.

> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
> --
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Re: My final word on the MWI --

2018-07-26 Thread Quentin Anciaux
I still don't get it why some people prefer insulting other people and
their ideas instead of discussing or just stay with their own thoughts and
just say they disagree... What do you gain by saying they are insane,
stupid or whatever?

It just looks to me childish. So stop doing this, stop writing in 70pt size
red fonts... It's a disfavor to your arguments.

Quentin

Le jeu. 26 juil. 2018 à 13:06,  a écrit :

> --  a mental illness, verging on, but not quite a form of insanity. AG
>
> --
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Re: Radioactive Decay States

2018-07-24 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le mar. 24 juil. 2018 à 20:30,  a écrit :

>
>
> On Tuesday, July 24, 2018 at 12:58:43 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 24 Jul 2018, at 09:19, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, July 23, 2018 at 4:27:03 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 20 Jul 2018, at 23:12, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, July 20, 2018 at 10:17:04 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 20 Jul 2018, at 04:40, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

 


 *Nevertheless, I still stand with Schroedinger that in any quantum
 superposition, other than for slit experiments, the system cannot be in all
 eigenstates simultaneously before measurement.*


 Then you can no more explain the working of an interferometer, or
 polariser, or even the structure of the hydrogen atoms, molecules, etc. You
 are just saying that QM works for the double slit, but not for anything
 else. That is contrary to the fact that QM has just never been shown wrong,
 at any scale and level.

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *Sorry, but I see you have no clue what I have been claiming in this
>>> thread. Although I infer that English isn't your native language, you know
>>> it well enough to understand my claim; yet you do NOT. How can you expect
>>> to posit new theories about reality, such as based on arithmetic, if you
>>> are unable to understand simple English?  OK, let me start again. I am NOT
>>> questioning the CALCULATED results of QM.*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That is ambiguous. Is it SWE + COLLAPSE, or just SWE (+ Mechanism) ?
>>>
>>
>>
>> *That you ask this question, shows you still have no clue what I am
>> arguing about. Thanks for your time. AG *
>>
>>
>>
>> What are you arguing about? I’m afraid you are unclear in many of your
>> replies, including to others. But you seem to believe that there is no
>> superposition,
>>
>
> *I never claimed that, never. You have no clue what I am arguing. NONE! AG*
>

Could you use a bigger font and a redder color? Because it's too small for
us to read... Also please stop taking time to explain yourself it is as we
all know useless, instead I propose for you to directly insult people in
blinking red 66pt sized font... It will be at last interesting.

Thank you.

>
>
>
>> makes me doubt you have study QM,
>>
>
> which is all about superposition. I do miss something, you might perhaps
>> try to clarify.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>> Personally by QM I mean the SWE or its Dirac Version, or DeWitt-Wheeler,
>>> etc. Once I understood that Bohr’s perturbation act needs FTL influence, I
>>> have ceased to judge the collapse plausible.
>>>
>>>
>>>
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Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

2018-07-19 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Awaiting the dodge... The oblivion... And round and round we go.. 15 years
of fun.

Quentin

Le jeu. 19 juil. 2018 à 15:18, Jason Resch  a écrit :

>
>
> On Wed, Jul 18, 2018 at 9:15 PM, John Clark  wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Jul 17, 2018 at 6:25 PM, Jason Resch 
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>> ​>>​
 We're right back to Bruno's definition problem. I can't answer your
 question until you make clear what you mean by "Abby".   I can tell you
 exactly precisely what I mean by "Abby", its whoever remembers being Abby
 before the duplication. Yes its odd that there are 2 people that meet that
 criteria, but odd is not the same thing as paradoxical. I've given you mine
 so what is your precise definition of "Abby"?


>>>
>>> *​>​Given the "will" my assumption is the author is referring to Earth
>>> Abby, the Abby before the teleportation.  Let us work with that assumption
>>> for now.*
>>>
>>
>> OK but that sure doesn't leave us much to work with! If "Abbey" is the
>> being before the teleportation then obviously by definition "Abbey" will
>> not exist after the teleportation. Are you sure you really want to go with
>> that definition?
>>
>
> Okay we can go with your definition as anyone who remembers being Abby,
> what is important is that our language and definitions are consistent. So
> we have:
>
> "Earth Abby" - The Abby at time 0 on Earth
> "Abby-1" - The Abby who ends up at her intended destination on Mars, at
> time 1
> "Abby-2" - The Abby who ends up at her admirer's destination on Mars, at
> time 1
> "Abby" - Anyone who remembers being Earth Abby (includes Earth Abby,
> Abby-1, Abby-2)
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>> ​>>​
 If you're interested in consciousness and subjectivity you will get
 nowhere pondering on the nature of successor states, it would be like
 pushing on a string. If you don't want to get tied up in logical knots and
 self contradictions you've got to define personal identity based on
 previous states not successor states; otherwise you wouldn't even know who
 you are because you don't know what your successor state will be. But you
 do know what your previous state was. We don't live in the future because
 we never know what the future will be, we live in the present and the past
 through memory because we know what the past was.

>>>
>>> ​>*​*
>>> *But we can have more than one precursor state too (e.g., the quantum
>>> erasure experiment).*
>>>
>>
>> There is only one one precursor state I am conscious of, and as
>> consciousness is pretty much the only thing anybody on this list wants to
>> talk about your objection is not relevant.
>>
>
> Okay, I don't see this tangent as particularly important to the thought
> experiment. We can drop it.
>
>
>>
>> ​> ​
>>> Do you believe persons are duplicated ala many-worlds?
>>>
>>
>> ​I believe people will be duplicated when​
>>
>> ​technology becomes advanced enough and if many worlds is true they
>> already are.​
>>
>> ​>* ​*
>>> *They identify themselves with Earth Abby.*
>>>
>>
>> I define "Abby" as anyone who remembers being Abbey as anyone who
>> remembers being Abby before the duplication. Do you disagree?
>>
>>
>
> No, we can go with that.
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>> ​>>​
 Forget teleportation and people duplicating machines, we can guess but
 we can never know what the future will bring and that's why we don't define
 ourselves by what will happen to us in the future.

>>>
>>> ​>​
>>> Do you not save money in the bank account for the future?
>>> ​
>>>
>>
>> If the future doesn't unfold as I expected and my retirement investments
>> go bad then I will have lost some money, but if I develop Alzheimer's
>> disease in retirement and lost my past then I will have lost far more than
>> money, I will have lost my identity. The past and the future are not
>> symmetrical, we can remember the past but not the future.
>>
>
> But the important point is we have expectations about the future, and
> physical theories attempt to predict likelihoods of various future outcomes
> which we (at time now) have no memory of, but nonetheless expect to
> experience in the future.
> Do you agree on this point?
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>> *​> ​the only point in having a brain is to predict and prepare for the
>>> future.*
>>
>>
>> Yes but even so the future often turns out to be very different from what
>> we expected, when that happens we are surprised but we don't feel that our
>> identity has been lost; but Alzheimer's patients do feel their identity
>> slipping away because they can no longer remember the past.
>>
>> ​>>​
 But we do remember what has happened in the past. I can say with
 complete confidence that I am John Clark because I remember being John
 Clark yesterday, but I don't remember being John Clark tomorrow.

>>>
>>> ​>​
>>> Which John Clark were you before I ran the quantum erasure experiment?
>>> Or before your memories were wiped and you were placed in a sensory
>>> deprivation chamber?
>>>

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

2018-06-21 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le ven. 22 juin 2018 à 01:33,  a écrit :

>
>
> On Thursday, June 21, 2018 at 11:07:16 PM UTC, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le ven. 22 juin 2018 à 00:54,  a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, June 21, 2018 at 5:35:52 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 9:04 PM,  wrote:
>>>>
>>>> *​>​Send a check for $5000 payable to Brent Meeker. When it clears, I
>>>>> will send my check for the same amount*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>> Wow, I just figured out what your real name is! You are Abacha
>>>> Tunde, the rich Nigerian Prince of scam fame.
>>>>
>>>> ​John K Clark​
>>>>
>>>>
>>> *You're a confirmed coward and liar. If you were half as smart as you
>>> think you are, you would have figured it out long ago. Not sending check?
>>> AG *
>>>
>>
>>
>> You are just polluting this list with such things... If what you say is
>> true, state your name and give a clear reference to what you claim for
>> free, if you're unwilling to do so, you're clearly not what you claim... So
>> either do that, it's simple and will take you far less time than to
>> continue polluting the list with sterile wager.
>>
>
> *You need not read my posts. I guess you don't get it. I don't like being
> accused of being a liar. AG*
>


I don't care, either prove it (that would have taken you the same amount of
time as your answer) or stop it.

>
>>> --
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

2018-06-21 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le ven. 22 juin 2018 à 00:54,  a écrit :

>
>
> On Thursday, June 21, 2018 at 5:35:52 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 9:04 PM,  wrote:
>>
>> *​>​Send a check for $5000 payable to Brent Meeker. When it clears, I
>>> will send my check for the same amount*
>>
>>
>
>> Wow, I just figured out what your real name is! You are Abacha Tunde, the
>> rich Nigerian Prince of scam fame.
>>
>> ​John K Clark​
>>
>>
> *You're a confirmed coward and liar. If you were half as smart as you
> think you are, you would have figured it out long ago. Not sending check?
> AG *
>


You are just polluting this list with such things... If what you say is
true, state your name and give a clear reference to what you claim for
free, if you're unwilling to do so, you're clearly not what you claim... So
either do that, it's simple and will take you far less time than to
continue polluting the list with sterile wager.

>
> --
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

2018-06-16 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le sam. 16 juin 2018 à 10:46,  a écrit :

>
>
> On Saturday, June 16, 2018 at 7:43:14 AM UTC, telmo_menezes wrote:
>>
>> On 15 June 2018 at 23:57,   wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > On Friday, June 15, 2018 at 11:45:43 AM UTC, telmo_menezes wrote:
>> >>
>> >> On 15 June 2018 at 13:27,   wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > On Friday, June 15, 2018 at 10:33:53 AM UTC, telmo_menezes wrote:
>> >> >>
>> >> >> On 15 June 2018 at 02:55,   wrote:
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > On Thursday, June 14, 2018 at 8:15:59 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>> >> >> > wrote:
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> On Wednesday, June 13, 2018 at 11:30:27 PM UTC, Jason wrote:
>> >> >> >>>
>> >> >> >>>
>> >> >> >>> Physical Theories, Eternal Inflation, and Quantum Universe,
>> >> >> >>> Yasunori
>> >> >> >>> Nomura
>> >> >> >>>
>> >> >> >>> We conclude that the eternally inflating multiverse and many
>> worlds
>> >> >> >>> in
>> >> >> >>> quantum mechanics are the same. Other important implications
>> >> >> >>> include:
>> >> >> >>> global spacetime
>> >> >> >>> can be viewed as a derived concept; the multiverse is a
>> transient
>> >> >> >>> phenomenon during the
>> >> >> >>> world relaxing into a supersymmetric Minkowski state. We also
>> >> >> >>> present
>> >> >> >>> a
>> >> >> >>> theory of “initial
>> >> >> >>> conditions” for the multiverse. By extrapolating our framework
>> to
>> >> >> >>> the
>> >> >> >>> extreme, we arrive at a
>> >> >> >>> picture that the entire multiverse is a fluctuation in the
>> >> >> >>> stationary,
>> >> >> >>> fractal “mega-multiverse,”
>> >> >> >>> in which an infinite sequence of multiverse productions occurs.
>> >> >> >>>
>> >> >> >>> "Therefore, we conclude that the multiverse is the same as (or
>> a
>> >> >> >>> specific
>> >> >> >>> manifestation
>> >> >> >>> of ) many worlds in quantum mechanics."
>> >> >> >>>
>> >> >> >>> "In eternal inflation, however, one first picks a causal patch;
>> >> >> >>> then
>> >> >> >>> one
>> >> >> >>> looks for observers in it.” Our framework does not follow this
>> >> >> >>> approach. We
>> >> >> >>> instead pick an observer first, and then construct the relevant
>> >> >> >>> spacetime
>> >> >> >>> regions associated with it.
>> >> >> >>>
>> >> >> >>> Instead of admitting the existence of the “beginning,” we may
>> >> >> >>> require
>> >> >> >>> that the quantum observer principle is respected for the whole
>> >> >> >>> history
>> >> >> >>> of
>> >> >> >>> spacetime. In this case, the beginning of our multiverse is a
>> >> >> >>> fluctuation of
>> >> >> >>> a larger structure, whose beginning is also a fluctuation of an
>> >> >> >>> even
>> >> >> >>> larger
>> >> >> >>> structure, and this series goes on forever. This leads to the
>> >> >> >>> picture
>> >> >> >>> that
>> >> >> >>> our multiverse arises as a fluctuation in a huge, stationary
>> >> >> >>> “megamultiverse,” which has a fractal structure."
>> >> >> >>>
>> >> >> >>>
>> >> >> >>> The Multiverse Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, Raphael
>> Bousso
>> >> >> >>> and
>> >> >> >>> Leonard Susskind
>> >> >> >>>
>> >> >> >>> In both the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics and
>> the
>> >> >> >>> multiverse
>> >> >> >>> of eternal inflation the world is viewed as an unbounded
>> collection
>> >> >> >>> of
>> >> >> >>> parallel universes.
>> >> >> >>> A view that has been expressed in the past by both of us is
>> that
>> >> >> >>> there
>> >> >> >>> is
>> >> >> >>> no need to
>> >> >> >>> add an additional layer of parallelism to the multiverse in
>> order
>> >> >> >>> to
>> >> >> >>> interpret quantum
>> >> >> >>> mechanics. To put it succinctly, the many-worlds and the
>> multiverse
>> >> >> >>> are
>> >> >> >>> the same
>> >> >> >>> thing [1].
>> >> >> >>>
>> >> >> >>>
>> >> >> >>> Jason
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> Not right. Not even wrong. AG.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > Eternal inflation and string theory imply universes created by
>> >> >> > natural
>> >> >> > processes. The jury is out on those. OTOH, the MWI has human
>> beings
>> >> >> > creating
>> >> >> > universes by going into a lab and doing trivial quantum
>> experiments.
>> >> >> > Of
>> >> >> > course they're they same (for idiots). AG
>> >> >>
>> >> >> The MWI does not propose that new universes are created
>> specifically
>> >> >> by certain experiences in the lab. It proposes that this universe
>> >> >> branching is a fundamental natural mechanism -- that it happens for
>> >> >> every quantum-level event that we perceive as random from our
>> branch.
>> >> >> It's an attempt to describe nature by making sense of experimental
>> >> >> results, the same way as string theory and other theories.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > Call it what you want, it comes to the same thing; universes created
>> by
>> >> > trivial quantum experiments by Joe the Plumber.
>> >>
>> >> You are using emotionally-charged language to convince yourself that
>> >> it is absurd: "universes created" and "Joe the Plumber".
>> >>
>> >> The MWI only 

Re: Primary matter

2018-06-01 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2018-06-01 14:35 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :

> From: Bruno Marchal 
>
> On 1 Jun 2018, at 11:46, Bruce Kellett < 
> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
> From: Bruno Marchal 
>
> On 1 Jun 2018, at 03:25, Bruce Kellett < 
> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
> From: Bruno Marchal < marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>
>
> > On 31 May 2018, at 02:33, Brent Meeker < 
> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> >
> > Of course something can make some computations unreal, namely their
> non-existence in the world.
>
> Which World?
>
>
> Rhetorical flourish!
>
>
> Not at all.
>
> You know, God was a nickname for “the ultimate truth we are searching when
> doing fundamental science”, and the “blasphemy” was for any invocation and
> special use of of concept like “true”, “reality”, “world” … the use of this
> is invalid. You could as well invoke miracle.
>
> So you lack some background in metaphysics and/or what is the scientific
> attitude.
>
>
> I think the intellectual battles of the classical era are well behind us.
>
>
> ?
>
> It was realized a long time ago that these idea are ultimately sterile,
>
>
> Which ideas? The metaphysical question? Yes, the answer to them have been
> imposed by terror since 1500 years. That has not solved them.
>
>
> The problems were sterile, and it was realized that there was no useful
> question to answer.
>
>
> and the scientific approach has gradually achieved dominance.
>
>
> In the natural science, thanks to the Enlightenment period, made possible
> by the jews and muslim metaphysicians who were able to continue the
> research in the Middle east for six more centuries.
>
> But in theology, the least we can say is that the scientific approach has
> not yet taken dominance. The choice is still between an inconsistent
> materialism or the pope-ayatollah (the boss is right) kind of theories.
>
> You are not helping science by abandoning the field to the professional
> con men.
>
>
> I am certainly not abandoning the field to you!
>
>
> I think you should abandon this outmoded framework for your thinking and
> join the rest of the world in the 21st century.
>
>
> You are the one abandoning the scientific attitude here.
>
>
> You cannot appeal to an ontological commitment in science.
>
>
> There is no ontological commitment in phenomenology -- unless you want to
> deny the existence of consciousness….
>
>
> Ah, so you think that the notion of world used by Brent was
> phenomenological?
>
> That makes my point in that case, as physics must becomes
> phenomenological, which was all I needed to justify.
>
>
> Physics is, as is all science, based on observation and experiment. The
> phenomena are the subject matter of science.
>
>
> Not the fundamental science, which try to infer some simple relations
> accounting for the origin and phenomena.
>
>
> The "fundamental science" as you call it is an illusion. There quite
> possibly are no simple relations accounting for the origin and the
> phenomena. The phenomena have to be described and understood on their own
> terms.
>
>
>
> But the phenomena are matters of sensory experience, not of abstract
> axiomatic reasoning. That, too, was realized a long time ago when Kant's
> attempt to make 3-dimensional Euclidean space a necessity of thought failed.
>
>
> Kant failed? Show me the paper.
>
>
> Any textbook on non-Euclidean geometry would suffice.
>
> Only his premise based on some naive interpretation of the physics of his
> time was false. Its main idea is implied and generalised  by Mechanism. And
> the opposite idea requires a non Turing emulable machine in the body, which
> is usually considered as speculative (no evidence at all, and a lot of
> strong counterevidences, like the failure of physicalism to link mind and
> matter since very long).
>
>
> Physical theories of the brain, based on extensive empirical research,
> have linked the mind and consciousness to physical brain activity in
> irrefutable ways.
>
> By saying this you do show that you identify science with Aristotelian
> Materialism. That is bad science, and bad philosophy.
>
>
> Sez you. But then, you are no authority..
>
> Here is you god, selecting an histories, or a class of histories. How?
> Magical power? Then I can no more say yes to the doctor without praying or
> something.
>
>
> More empty rhetorical flourishes. We know that when you resort to your
> store of empty rhetorical flourishes that you have no answer to the
> substantive points that have been made.
>
>
>
> *That* is pure rhetorical flourishes. You avoid the reasoning.
>
>
> What reasoning? You did not offer any reasoning. Merely assertions and
> rhetorical flourishes.
>
>
> That is simply a lie.
>
>
> You do not offer any argument in the above. It is mere assertion. What you
> say elsewhere is irrelevant to the present discussion.
>
> All what I say has been verified multiple times by independent people in
> different countries, and I have given an informal version, accessible to
> kids, in this list. The reasoning is 

Re: Primary matter

2018-05-31 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le jeu. 31 mai 2018 à 19:57, Brent Meeker  a écrit :

>
>
> On 5/31/2018 2:06 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
> >
> > You're a bit naughty Brent. You sometimes use this maneuver of
> > nonchalantly listing something that is being discussed -- but that you
> > don't like -- along with something else that is obviously outdated or
> > silly.
>
> It's not that I "don't like" primary matter, it's that I think it's an
> invented term that nobody actually postulates.


Si materialism and physicalism are an invention of Bruno... Or maybe not.

I'd like to see Bruno
> actually quote some well known philosophers or scientist using the
> term.  I think he reads people like Dennett or Churchland who defend the
> possibility of a physical explanation of consciousness and, since he
> thinks consciousness is more fundamental than physics, he wants to
> accuse them of believing in "primary matter".
>
> >
> > "Oh you think that quantum mechanics and consciousness might be
> > connected? How are those Deepak Chopra teachings working for you?"
> > etc...
> >
> > So, forgetting the elan vitale, I would like you to make you position
> > more precise. Do you think that tax money should only be applied to
> > research that is obviously and immediately useful?
>
> Of course not.
>
> > Or are you ok with
> > trusting tenured academics and peer-review to decide what gets funded?
> > In the second case, I guess we must all have some tolerance for ideas
> > that we don't agree with, right?
>
> Right.
>
> Brent
>
> --
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Re: Primary matter

2018-05-30 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le jeu. 31 mai 2018 à 03:38, Brent Meeker  a écrit :

>
>
> On 5/30/2018 11:38 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> Le mer. 30 mai 2018 à 20:29, Brent Meeker  a écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On 5/30/2018 3:18 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> 2018-05-30 11:27 GMT+02:00 Lawrence Crowell <
>> goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com>:
>>
>>> On Tuesday, May 29, 2018 at 1:25:19 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You miss my point that no one, no physicists, no philosopher, starts
>>>> out by defining "primary matter".  It is your invention as a straw man to
>>>> be defeated by computationalism.  Some physicists and some philosophers may
>>>> suppose that the stuff described by physics is enough to explain the world
>>>> we observe; but most also suppose that it is not "primary".  They look for
>>>> a deeper more unified ur-stuff and many physicists have followed Wheeler
>>>> and Tegmark in thinking of the equations of mathematical physics as simply
>>>> defining the ur-stuff.
>>>>
>>>> Brent
>>>>
>>>
>>> This and other old philosophical ideas are of no utility in physics.
>>> There is no physical meaning to terms such as primary matter.
>>>
>>
>> Primary matter is a metaphysical idea about the reality... so of course
>> it is of no utility in physics... but physics don't tell us anything about
>> what is reality.
>>
>>
>> Yet it tells us about how the world works and what we can and can't do.
>> So what exactly would it add know "what is reality".  This is exactly like
>> my point about consciousness.  When we can predict, construct, manipulate,
>> consciousness the way we do the physical world, then the "hard problem" of
>> consciousness will be as irrelevant as elan vitale is to biology and
>> "primary matter" is to physics.
>>
>>
>> Everythingism are metaphysical idea about what is reality... so if your
>> concern is only in utility, philosophy doesn't concern you...
>>
>> Materialism, physicalim, computationalism, deism etc are metaphysical,
>> philosophical and about what reality is... physics is about prediction on
>> the reality, not about what ultimately reality is... it answers how, not
>> what and why...
>>
>> The problem is with people equating physics whith physicalism... they're
>> not the same, one is a metaphysical idea about the nature of reality.
>>
>>
>> But I'm suggesting to you that this metaphysical idea is empty if it has
>> no consequences,  but if it does have consequences then it's physics and
>> not metaphysics.
>>
>
>
> That is your point of view which I do not share... You're like people who
> don't like arts and find that empty... As long as you're not imposing your
> view, I'm fine with it.
>
>
> As I am fine with those seeking the elan vitale and primary matter.  Just
> so they don't use my tax money.
>

Well, it's a beautiful straw man... Keep your money.

>
> Brent
>
> --
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Re: Primary matter

2018-05-30 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le mer. 30 mai 2018 à 20:29, Brent Meeker  a écrit :

>
>
> On 5/30/2018 3:18 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> 2018-05-30 11:27 GMT+02:00 Lawrence Crowell <
> goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com>:
>
>> On Tuesday, May 29, 2018 at 1:25:19 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> You miss my point that no one, no physicists, no philosopher, starts out
>>> by defining "primary matter".  It is your invention as a straw man to be
>>> defeated by computationalism.  Some physicists and some philosophers may
>>> suppose that the stuff described by physics is enough to explain the world
>>> we observe; but most also suppose that it is not "primary".  They look for
>>> a deeper more unified ur-stuff and many physicists have followed Wheeler
>>> and Tegmark in thinking of the equations of mathematical physics as simply
>>> defining the ur-stuff.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> This and other old philosophical ideas are of no utility in physics.
>> There is no physical meaning to terms such as primary matter.
>>
>
> Primary matter is a metaphysical idea about the reality... so of course it
> is of no utility in physics... but physics don't tell us anything about
> what is reality.
>
>
> Yet it tells us about how the world works and what we can and can't do.
> So what exactly would it add know "what is reality".  This is exactly like
> my point about consciousness.  When we can predict, construct, manipulate,
> consciousness the way we do the physical world, then the "hard problem" of
> consciousness will be as irrelevant as elan vitale is to biology and
> "primary matter" is to physics.
>
>
> Everythingism are metaphysical idea about what is reality... so if your
> concern is only in utility, philosophy doesn't concern you...
>
> Materialism, physicalim, computationalism, deism etc are metaphysical,
> philosophical and about what reality is... physics is about prediction on
> the reality, not about what ultimately reality is... it answers how, not
> what and why...
>
> The problem is with people equating physics whith physicalism... they're
> not the same, one is a metaphysical idea about the nature of reality.
>
>
> But I'm suggesting to you that this metaphysical idea is empty if it has
> no consequences,  but if it does have consequences then it's physics and
> not metaphysics.
>


That is your point of view which I do not share... You're like people who
don't like arts and find that empty... As long as you're not imposing your
view, I'm fine with it.

Quentin



> Brent
>
> --
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Re: Primary matter

2018-05-30 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2018-05-30 11:27 GMT+02:00 Lawrence Crowell <
goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com>:

> On Tuesday, May 29, 2018 at 1:25:19 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> You miss my point that no one, no physicists, no philosopher, starts out
>> by defining "primary matter".  It is your invention as a straw man to be
>> defeated by computationalism.  Some physicists and some philosophers may
>> suppose that the stuff described by physics is enough to explain the world
>> we observe; but most also suppose that it is not "primary".  They look for
>> a deeper more unified ur-stuff and many physicists have followed Wheeler
>> and Tegmark in thinking of the equations of mathematical physics as simply
>> defining the ur-stuff.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> This and other old philosophical ideas are of no utility in physics. There
> is no physical meaning to terms such as primary matter.
>

Primary matter is a metaphysical idea about the reality... so of course it
is of no utility in physics... but physics don't tell us anything about
what is reality.

Everythingism are metaphysical idea about what is reality... so if your
concern is only in utility, philosophy doesn't concern you...

Materialism, physicalim, computationalism, deism etc are metaphysical,
philosophical and about what reality is... physics is about prediction on
the reality, not about what ultimately reality is... it answers how, not
what and why...

The problem is with people equating physics whith physicalism... they're
not the same, one is a metaphysical idea about the nature of reality.

Quentin


>
>  LC
>
> --
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Re: Primary matter

2018-05-28 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2018-05-28 14:54 GMT+02:00 :

>
>
> On Monday, May 28, 2018 at 11:49:49 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 26 May 2018, at 22:56, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, May 26, 2018 at 9:56:39 AM UTC, scerir wrote:
>>>
>>> Aristotle distinguishes two aspects of ordinary things: form and matter.
>>>
>>> Form only exists when it enforms matter. Matter is just potential to be
>>> enformed.
>>>
>>> Aristotle identifies matter with potentiality, form with actuality.
>>>
>>> "For, as we said, word substance has three meanings, form, matter, and
>>> the complex of both and of these three, what is called matter is
>>> potentiality, what is called form actuality." (De Anima, II)
>>>
>>> (According to Heisenberg wavefunctions are "potentialities", at least
>>> before measurements).
>>>
>>
>> Bruno exudes extreme aversion to "primary matter”,
>>
>>
>>
>> Not at all.
>>
>> I just show that the assumption of primary matter contradicts the
>> assumption of mechanism (that is not obvious and requires some work).
>> Mechanism is incompatible with (weak) Materailsm (the belief that there is
>> some ontologically primitive/irreducible matter).
>>
>
> What is "primary matter"? AG
>

Simply matter as an ontological primitive...

ie: irreducible to something else, which is the base of reality.

Quentin

>
>> Then I show how to test it, and how I have tested it, and the evidences
>> available up to now sides with Mechanism, against (weak) materialism.
>>
>> I only have aversion with contradiction.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> and Aristotle, the presumed creator of the concept. But it's hard to see
>> what exactly he objects to.
>>
>>
>> I object to nothing. I prove that mechanism (Yes-doctor + Church’s
>> thesis) are logically incompatible, or epistemologically impossible. (The
>> phrasing can depend on some other metaphysical assumptions).
>>
>> Then I explain why today evidences strongly suggests mechanism.
>>
>> I certainly object to the idea that “materialism” has been proved, or
>> that physicalism is the only modern option, and common misuse of physics in
>> metaphysics.
>>
>> You will need to understand how the notion of computation has been
>> discovered by mathematicians, in arithmetic. Gödel 1931 made the hard work,
>> and Gödel missed it, but then people like Church, Turing and Kleene will
>> make all this transparent, as Gödel explained himself.
>>
>> Ask any question. I worked hard to make the main argument available to
>> anyone having a small amount of passive understanding of how a (physical if
>> you want) computer is functioning. There nothing hard to understand, except
>> for having some ability to doubt metaphysical prejudices.
>>
>> If you understand what is a computation, you will, with some small amount
>> of work understand that all computation are executed in arithmetic, which
>> is enough to doubt *primary* matter (for which there has never been any
>> evidence as the antic dream argument already showed). But the reasoning I
>> shared here run deeper, and eventually, in the mathematical part, get
>> constructive, so that we can make the test, and thanks to
>> QM-without-collapse, it fits rather well.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> You seem quite erudite on a variety of subjects. Is this a general
>> characteristic of farmers in Italy today? Inquiring minds want to know. AG
>>
>>>
>>> Il 26 maggio 2018 alle 10.13 agrays...@gmail.com ha scritto:
>>>
>>> What is it according to Aristotle (or whoever is responsible for the
>>> concept), and what is the basis for refuting its existence? -- in 25 words
>>> or less. AG
>>>
>>>
>>> --
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>>>
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Re: What is a Löbian machine/number/combinator

2018-05-03 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Again the perfect example of I lost so I dodge...

Le jeu. 3 mai 2018 21:36, John Clark  a écrit :

>
> On Thu, May 3, 2018 at 2:01 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> ​>> ​
>>> You say the diary solves the referent issue because its clear the man in
>>> Helsinki wrote it and he wrote it yesterday, but in one variation of the
>>> thought experiment there is nobody in Helsinki today, there are people in
>>> Moscow and Washington who vividly remember writing that diary but what one
>>> and only one really did?
>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> We assume Mechanism, so the answer is simply both, from the third person
>> point of view, and only one, for each of the first person point of view
>> obtained.
>>
>
> ​Counter argument #11​42
>
> ​>>​
>>> What did the correct answer to the question turn out to be?
>>
>>
>> ​>​
>> The question was the prediction of the next experience. The correct
>> answer, remaining correc,t through the experience was the prediction “I
>> will feel either W or M”, written “W v M”, keeping in mind that the
>> question concerned the experience at the first person.
>>
>> So it is “W v M”.
>>
>
> ​Counter argument #926​
>
>
> ​>>​
>>> Who wrote the diary?
>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> The candidate of the experience.
>>
>
> ​And who is the ​
>  candidate of the experience
> ​? The guy who wrote the diary of course.​
>
>
>> ​>> ​
>>> Is the one and only one referent to the personal pronoun “I” in the
>>> question the Moscow man or the Washington man?
>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> Anyone. We keep only the prediction assessed by all of them. In the big
>> number iteration of that experience, the correct prediction is “white
>> noise”.
>>
>
> ​Yes that's what I thought, hot air and a big noise.​
>
>>
> ​>> ​
>>> It can’t be the Helsinki man because today there is no Helsinki man.
>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> That contradicts the local personal identity definition that you have
>> agreed very often upon,
>>
>
> ​An oldie but a goodie, counter agreement #22​
>
> ​John K Clark​
>
>
>
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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?

2018-01-06 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le 6 janv. 2018 7:29 AM, "Bruce Kellett"  a
écrit :

On 6/01/2018 4:59 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 1/5/2018 9:30 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 6/01/2018 4:15 pm, Russell Standish wrote:

Other things seem possible, such as the
extraordinary unlikelihood that all animals can be conscious.


That is an extraordinary claim, and sufficient in itself to falsify your
theory. I know as a fact that my cat is conscious, and that my various dogs
over the years have also been conscious. You refer to the "mirror test" in
your book -- an animal is conscious (is self-aware) if it recognizes itself
in a mirror. I agree that my cat does not recognize itself in the mirror --
but that only goes to show that this is a stupid test for consciousness.


But it's still unlikely that ALL animals can be conscious, e.g. jellyfish
(which recently found to sleep...perchance to dream?).


Well, it depends on how you gauge consciousness in another living being --
how do you know that your wife is conscious? or the person you meet in the
street? It seems that there must be a third person (intersubjective)
element to consciousness whereby we can know that other people are
conscious.

I used the example of the fact that I did not see my abacus as talking to
me to judge that its computations were not supporting consciousness.


Again that's a flawed example, so certainly not a good starting point. I
thought you understood that.

Quentin

That is a good starting point. Cats and dogs can certainly "talk" to us: in
fact they can be very eloquent in making their wishes known! At a different
level, I was sitting on the verandah of our bush house over the Christmas
break, and a king parrot came in with his mate. They are long-lived birds,
and relatively territorial, so we know this pair of king parrots quite
well. The male sat on the roof above me and peered round to look at where I
was sitting. He then started to vocalize -- talk to me -- in response to my
quiet welcome and conversation. Sure, no English words were used, but the
recognition and communication was clear. So I put out some seeds on the
table, and he was happy. This same bird has, on another occasion, sat on
the arm of my wife's chair, a few feet away, while we talked.

There is also a family of blue fairy wrens living by the house. Being the
late breeding season, the male is jealous of his territory and spends time
fighting his reflection in our windows, and in the bonnet of the car! He
fails the mirror test for consciousness, but he is clearly an able and
successful breeder. It is harder to establish direct communication with
wrens, but I have no doubt that they are intelligent birds, conscious and
knowledgeable of their surroundings.

So there are probably grades of consciousness, just as there are grades of
ability to communicate. Cats, dogs, and some birds, are quite high on this
scale, but jellyfish are probably quite low. But can you rule out the
possibility that some environmental awareness does not constitute low level
consciousness?



I'm still not clear on whether it is "machines" (axiom systems) which *are*
conscious, or *can be* conscious?  Or is it computations which *are*
consciousness, or *"support"* consciousness?  ISTM that my consciousness is
only a part of my thinking (and not always the best part).


I think the notion of supervenience is the best way to approach it. But one
must be careful to distinguish models of supervenience for the reality of
actual consciousness.

Bruce

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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?

2018-01-04 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2018-01-04 12:36 GMT+01:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:

> On 4/01/2018 6:41 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> 2018-01-04 6:57 GMT+01:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:
>
>> My abacus does not talk to me.
>>
>>
> That would mean no computation are conscious at all...
>
>
> No, that does not follow. Even if consciousness is a computation, it does
> not follow that all computations are conscious: A is a B does not imply
> that all Bs are As.
>

You say that as your abacus does not talk to you that means not all
computations are conscious... but that does not follows, it just means your
abacus as not way to convey you it is conscious as it lacks a correct I/O
system with you... the fact it does not talk to you is not evidence
computations performed on it are not conscious even the simplest one.

Also if it was true *some* computations are conscious, as your abacus is
turing complete, you could in principle run them on it... but your abacus
still wouldn't talk to you, and it would be wrong to say that the
computation is not conscious in this case...


>
>
> technically your abacus is turing complete (well it has to be large
> enough), so it could run a conscious computation... but that doesn't mean
> that computation could talk to you, for that it would also need an I/O
> system with our reality.
>
>
> No, it does not have the necessary I/O equipment. But, as above, even
> Turing completeness does not mean that every computation such a Turing
> machine makes is conscious.
>
> The real point of my original comment was that the only way you can
> distinguish a conscious computation from a non-conscious one is if it is
> conscious. In other words, the suggestion that consciousness is a
> computation tells you absolutely nothing interesting about consciousness.
>
> Bruce
>
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Re: What falsifiability tests has computationalism passed?

2018-01-03 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2018-01-04 6:57 GMT+01:00 Bruce Kellett :

> My abacus does not talk to me.
>
>
That would mean no computation are conscious at all... technically your
abacus is turing complete (well it has to be large enough), so it could run
a conscious computation... but that doesn't mean that computation could
talk to you, for that it would also need an I/O system with our reality.

Regards,
Quentin


> Bruce
>
>
>
> On 29/12/2017 3:49 pm, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 28, 2017 at 7:29 PM, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> ​ > ​
>> not all computations are conscious.
>
>
> ​ How do you know?​
>
> ​
>
> John K Clark​
>
>
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Re: US vs North Korea

2017-12-01 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le 1 déc. 2017 23:02,  a écrit :



On Friday, December 1, 2017 at 8:58:13 PM UTC, Kim Jones wrote:
>
> This is completely off-topic for this list. There are gazillions of
> discussions going on about this elswhere
>
> Kim Jones
>

What does "everything" mean? AG


Theory of everything... Not that you can discuss whatever comes to your
mind... There are other lists if you want to talk about politics...

Quentin


>
>
> On 1 Dec 2017, at 10:05 pm, Lawrence Crowell 
> wrote:
>
> Everything is easy to predict except the future. The one thing I hope is
> this science and physics list does not become laden with politics. I will
> say though that with the sociopathic presidents or leaders of the United
> States and N. Korea the outcome is likely to range from bad to disastrous.
>
> LC
>
> On Thursday, November 30, 2017 at 7:51:22 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com
> wrote:
>>
>> Insights welcome as to how this situation will evolve in the next 12
>> months. TIA, AG
>>
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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

2017-11-30 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2017-11-30 12:08 GMT+01:00 Bruce Kellett :

> On 30/11/2017 9:53 pm, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 10:40:36 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On 30/11/2017 5:31 am, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 10:59 PM, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>> ​ >​
>> ​I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,
>>
>>
>> ​ > ​
>> Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger equation
>> applies everywhere without exception, so that all physical evolution is
>> unitary. A change in the underlying physics -- such as a change in the
>> value of fundamental constants, Planck's constant or Newton's constant for
>> example -- would not be unitary, so cannot occur in MWI.
>>
>>
>> ​
>> Why can't it be unitary?? Show me why if
>> ​ ​
>> Newton's constant had any value other than
>> ​ ​
>> 6.754* 10^-11 m3 kg^−1 s^−2
>> ​  ​
>> the sum of all quantum probabilities would no longer add up to exactly 1.
>> If you can really do that then you've just derived Newton's constant
>> directly from first principles and you should but a ticket to Stockholm
>> right now because you're absolutely certain to win the next nobel Prize.
>>
>>
>> Although unitarity does mean that probabilities always sum to unity, that
>> is a consequence of unitary evolution, not a definition of it. A unitary
>> transformation is one that can be reversed: so the unitary operator U can
>> be written as exp(-iH), for example, and the complex conjugate (or the
>> adjoint for hermitian operators) is the inverse transformation.
>>
>
> * Considering the evolution of the wf, if there exists a DE that describes
> the collapse process, would it necessarily be nonlinear? Is nonlinear a
> problem; that is, what is the downside to nonlinear? How would it effect
> the issue of hidden variables? TIA, AG *
>
>
> Collapse would be non-linear and non-unitary -- intrinsically
> non-reversible. This is not necessarily a problem since there are plenty of
> non-linearities in physics. It has nothing to do with hidden variables.
>

How could that be compatible with delayed choice experiment ?

Quentin

>
>
> Bruce
>
>
>
>> So for changes in constants to be unitary, there needs to be a hermitian
>> operator that brings about these changes. But changes in constants only
>> make sense for dimensionless constants such as the fine structure constant,
>> and there is currently no theory as to how this would change in a unitary
>> manner.
>>
>
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Re: An AI program that teaches itself

2017-10-30 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2017-10-30 14:58 GMT+01:00 PGC :

> On Sunday, October 29, 2017 at 6:40:53 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> Right.
>>
>>
>>
>> In acute, severe pain they are often the only thing that works, and
>> denying them to a suffering patient is inhumane. In chronic pain, their use
>> is more controversial. Perhaps not widely known is that in a way they are
>> very safe drugs in that they do not cause end organ damage, unlike, say,
>> alcohol or tobacco.
>>
>>
>> Note that tobacco would be much less dangerous if people were informed,
>> and could have more choice. Since tobacco exists, it has been used orally
>> by many people, and today, studies shows that this mode of consumption is
>> far less dangerous than smoking it.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Elephant-killing doses of fentanyl are used in cardiac surgery, and as
>> long as respiration is supported, the patient wakes up fine. The problem is
>> that some people (not all) enjoy the euphoric effect so much that they
>> misuse them, leading to tolerance, dose escalation and risk of overdose.
>>
>>
>> That is right, but seems to be an effect of its prohibition.
>>
>
> Then next time a person requires that kind of surgery, they can thus
> inform the doctor that a small salvia infusion and some chewing tobacco
> suffices for their analgesic needs before a scalpel is reached for? The
> efficacy of opiates is not merely an effect of prohibition.
>
> Assuming something severe like heart surgery, a work related accident, a
> soldier being exposed to an IED and losing a limb in a war zone... anywhere
> where high levels of pain are a clear matter, I know why most humane
> doctors today turn to opiates. Efficacy at pain management. Stathis is
> correct.
>
> In addition to their utility in surgery, it is a fact that said soldier
> with a lost limb, supplied with an appropriate dose of morphine, fentanyl,
> or one of its equivalents may not have their mortifying/traumatic level of
> pain disappear completely; i.e. the pain is still there but somehow, from a
> subjective point of view, *it matters much less than before the opiate
> was administered*. If pain is assumed to be nature's "argument of
> authority", then opiates are the best local god atm. This property is
> remarkable, useful, and well established. You could argue that some of the
> dynamics of prohibition are due to opiates' efficacy: they are so effective
> at relieving pain that people have waged war over their control/use.
>
>
>> In the city of Liege, in Belgium, they have made (two times) a three year
>> experience of legalizing heroin. You need a medical prescription. This has
>> confirmed that the best medication to quit heroin is ... heroin itself,
>> when cheap and medically prescribed. heroin then loose completely its
>> appeal for "beginners", and old consummers, not only get fine, got the time
>> to search a job, diminish by themselves the consumption, and eventually
>> most have stopped. Obviously, this is helpful for getting clean needles and
>> preventing AIDS. Despite this success, heroin is still illegal in Belgium,
>> for pure insane political reason.
>>
>
> What's so insane about the usual social dynamics of loosing face or being
> in office? Assuming you had a sizable bit of political reputation to
> uphold, would you risk it by switching sides on something that is clearly
> not decidable in public? Betting on your aesthetic preference for
> everything minimalism, you'd choose the path of minimal risk and uphold the
> very prohibition you flatter yourself denouncing.
>
> Because it's much easier to yodel conspiracy from the outside than to face
> the practicalities and admit the tension of two opposing facts:
>
> 1) Opiates are the most effective tools for pain management known, and
> their usefulness in surgery is well established, so we need them for now.
> 2) With chronic pain, it is often impossible to distinguish between those
> that are "truly suffering from consistent and/or worsening pain" and those
> that want access to the drug for whatever reason (which the Christians
> demonize because they loose subscribers). All copies state that they are in
> severe pain for true reasons in their history. Unfortunately, interviewing
> them in a thought experiment sheds no light on the matter. Some of them
> will die of overdose and respiratory failure.
>
>
>>
>> Note that heroin was first sold in Germany to cure young infant cough.
>>
> Its illegality is one of the most source of finance of terrorism, and in
>> this case there are proof that the CIA have organized traffic. It seems
>> also that it is part of the reason the american have gone to Afghanistan
>> (to protect the field of Opiate-plant (Pavot, in french). I have verified
>> this, but it does not obvious to interpret all data; need to pursue the
>> research.
>>
>
> By all means do so with a bit more rigor. This list is a place where
> wishful thinking is shared most liberally, but I do know that some folks
> read 

Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

2017-09-30 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2017-09-30 11:40 GMT+02:00 Bruno Marchal :

>
> On 29 Sep 2017, at 19:39, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Thu, Sep 28, 2017 at 11:48 PM, Terren Suydam 
> wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> This thought experiment must be analyzed from the first person perspective
>>
>
> ​There is no *THE* ​
> first person perspective
> ​ if ​
> first person perspective
> ​ duplicating machines exist! It's the same blunder over and over and
> over again.
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> (and by that I'm referring to the grammatical person
>> ).
>>
>
> ​
> I
> ​would bet money that ​
>  the third grade English teacher
> ​that ​
> wrote that article did not have first person perspective
> ​ ​
> duplicating machines
> ​ ​
> in mind.
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> There is only one stream of consciousness, ever,
>>
>
> ​Then why can't anybody *ever* tell me if that ​
>  one stream of consciousness
> ​ is in Moscow or Washington?​
>
>
>
> Because that is non determinable from the first person point of you. Here
> Terren won the point. (Like if this could change anything in your attitude
> alas).
>
> Bruno
>

just ask him to describe from a 1st pov what happens... like this:

I'm in helsinki, I'm in front of a button, I close my eyes, I push on the
button, and I open my eyes, and I am ...

I see only one valid continuation of the text if written before pushing the
button:

-> in washington or in moscow.

I see two valid continuations of the text given by the two copies if
written after pushing the button:

-> in washingtom
-> in moscow

What will never be valid if written before or after is this;

-> in washington and in moscow.

Because being in washington *and* moscow is not something that can be lived
from the 1st pov.

But JC will still blurry anything by either pretending it's 1st POV vanish
from existense or that the answer is santa claus or obiwan kenobi...

So the only real valid continuation here is to *stop* talking with him and
about this. The last 10 years of this list is a circle dumb discussion
between you and JC... JC has clearly destroyed the goal of this list, and
you engaging him on this is just the way to perpetuate that troll
forever... *he will never acknowledge anything*, he is a troll... that's
his purpose, he doesn't *care* of what you're saying, he is just taking
pride of destroying this place of discussion about everything theories (not
only yours).

As I see it, this list died 10 years ago, nothing interresting as come out
of it since unfortunately... only infinite useless step 3 discussion with a
troll.

 Quentin


>
>
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> despite the possibility of its bifurcation (no different from many-worlds)
>>
>
> ​In ​
> many-worlds
> ​ the meaning of personal pronouns are always clear, in Bruno's thought
> experiment ​they never are.
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> The only reality a person experiences is the one inside their head.
>> Thanks to this, we never have to get into pronouns
>
>
> Then why is ​
> Terren Suydam
> ​ unable to state ​
> Terren Suydam
> ​'s ideas without the constant use of personal pronouns and the misuse of
> articles like "the" and "a"?
>
>
> ​> ​
>> You seem to have a hang-up that prevents you from adopting that
>> perspective
>>
>
> ​My ​
> hang-up
> ​ is I don't know what ​
> perspective
> ​ you're talking about and neither do you.​
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> you compulsively return to questions about the objective reality,
>>
>
> ​Objective reality is important but subjective reality is even more
> important. There is only one objective reality but there are billions of
> subjective realities, so a question about subjective reality needs to
> specify which one it's referring to, and the way English grammar uses
> personal pronouns just can't do that if people duplicating machines are in
> the mix.
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> talking in terms of multiple consciousnesses,
>>
>
> ​How can I not talk about ​
> multiple consciousnesses
> ​ if you're talking about people duplicating machines?  ​
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> and getting confused about the referents of grammatical conventions.
>>
>
> ​I plead guilty to that charge, I am VERY confused ​
>
> ​about what you're talking about because you're using ​
> grammatical conventions
> ​ just as people have been using for centuries, but for centuries there
> has been no people duplicating machines. A century ago "What one and only
> one city will I see tomorrow?"  was a real question with a real answer
> because the meaning of the personal pronoun "I" was clear,
>  but a century from now "Tomorrow
> I
> ​will see
> ​ one and only one city after I have become two, what is the name of that
> one city I will see?" would just be ridiculous. ​
>
> Is it really your position that the English language will need
> no modification on how it uses personal pronouns even
> after people duplicating machines become common?
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> And you blame that gibberish on the thought experiment itself,
>>
>
> ​If it's not gibberish then what in the world 

Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

2017-09-29 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2017-09-29 19:51 GMT+02:00 Terren Suydam :

> ​Then why can't anybody *ever* tell me if that ​
>>  one stream of consciousness
>> ​ is in Moscow or Washington?​
>>
>
> Congratulations, you just discovered the first-person indeterminacy. I'll
> get the champagne.
>

 Don't be too quick... we'll still be exactly at the same step in 10
years...



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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

2017-09-29 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2017-09-29 19:43 GMT+02:00 John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com>:

> On Fri, Sep 29, 2017 at 2:30 AM, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> maybe half peepee half bad faith...
>
>
>
> ​Hey ​
> Quentin
> ​ I just had a great idea, go fuck yourself.
>

Yeah I'm aware of the peepee idea "you" have... But I shouldn't use "you"
as "you" don't know what it means, as "you" seems to say that "I" is
confusing in a world where there exist approximatilly 7.5 billions minus
one "I" who have no problem pointing to themselves when using it.

Quentin


>
> Sincerely
>
>  John K Clark ​
>
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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

2017-09-29 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2017-09-29 1:33 GMT+02:00 John Clark :

> On Thu, Sep 28, 2017 at 4:26 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> The question is “what city will I see tomorrow”.
>>
>
> ​I know, and​
>
> ​it's gibberish because if tomorrow "I" doesn't mean a person who
> remembers being asked that question today then even Mr. I doesn't know what
> "I" will refer to tomorrow.
>
>
>> ​>​
>> You know what a city is,
>>
>
> ​Yes.​
>
>
> ​> ​
>> you know what seeing is
>>
>
> ​Yes.​
>
>
> ​> ​
>> you agree that I will survive
>>
>
> ​There is no agreement on that. ​
> Stathis Papaioannou
> ​will survive,  but unfortunately John Clark doesn't know who Mr. I is so
> has no opinion on what the fate of that gentleman will be.
>
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> But “I” is singular,
>>
>
> ​Exactly, and "I" has been duplicated ​so that personal pronoun can no
> longer be used by anyone who isn't a great fan of gibberish.
>
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> a single person cannot see both cities,
>>
>
> ​How is that relevant? The question concerns the future and remembering
> asking the question in the past, and a
>  single person
> ​ doesn't meet those specifications, ​two people do.
>
>
> ​>​
>> Imagination is limited by logic - I can’t imagine a square circle because
>> it is meaningless.
>>
>
> ​So is asking what *one *and only *one* city *"I"* will see after *"I" *have
> become *two*!
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> But I can imagine seeing one or other city with 1/2 probability;
>>
>
> ​I can't. After it's all over I can ​
> imagine
> ​having ​
> see
> ​n​
>  Moscow or having not seen it, but I can not imagine ​half seeing Moscow
> and half not seeing it.
>


Must be difficult to ask you to play coin flip... Can't imagine seeing you
wandering how you could see half head, half tail... bad faith always. or
peepee ? not sure now, maybe half peepee half bad faith...


> And
> probability
> ​ has no meaning if you can't specify what the probability is about, and
> if it's what Mr. You will or will not see then you can't because even Mr.
> You doesn't know what Mr. You means with all those Mr. You duplicating
> machines around. ​
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> it is meaningful, it is what I anticipate will happen,
>>
>
> ​I expect to see Santa Clauses workshop. Unlike questions all statements
> about expectations are meaningful, ​
>
> ​but not all of ​them turn out to be true.
>
>  John K Clark
>
>
>
>
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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

2017-09-08 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2017-09-07 14:32 GMT+02:00 John Clark :

>
> On Wed, Sep 6, 2017 at 3:23 PM, Terren Suydam 
> wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> You admitted earlier that the question is not gibberish when you don't
>> know you're being duplicated elsewhere.
>>
>
> ​I admitted nothing of the sort! The question is always 100% pure
> gibberish but I did not know it was gibberish because I was deceived and
> given false information.​
>
> ​If you give me incorrect data I will form incorrect conclusions.​
>
>  John K Clark
>
>
According to John Clark, John Clark believe in MWI (or find it plausible),
so according to John Clark where from it's own POV he will be tomorrow (or
in the next second) is gibberish... as tomorrow there will be an infinity
of John Clark (well, even in the next nanosecond... so scary...). So we
have to conclude John Clark is gibberish. Won't say that I knew it


>
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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

2017-09-06 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2017-09-05 21:49 GMT+02:00 Terren Suydam :

>
>
> On Mon, Sep 4, 2017 at 1:25 PM, John Clark  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Sep 3, 2017 at 5:05 PM, Terren Suydam 
>> wrote:
>>
>> ​> ​
>>> Right now I'm only concerned with the present, the ongoing flow of
>>> experience. It doesn't sound like you have any issue with the idea that
>>> someone who gets physically reconstituted would experience consciousness
>>> normally, save for discontinuities like the room changing color from red to
>>> blue.
>>> ​ ​
>>> If this seems obvious, that's good, it means we are starting from a
>>> place of agreement.
>>>
>>
>> ​Of course I agree, there is nothing special about the atoms in my
>> brain, only the way that the atoms are arranged is unique, and that
>> uniqueness signifies nothing fundamental or philosophical, it's just the
>> result of the present day limitations of engineering technology. I am quite
>> literally not the man I once was, new atoms are constantly coming into my
>> body and old atoms going out. I am made of last years mashed potatoes, and
>> yet subjectively I remain the same person, or at least I think I do and
>> that's good enough for me.
>>
>>
> Good. Now let's add a twist. In Helsinki, you're told that you'll be
> merely teleported to Barcelona, as before. However, unbeknownst to you, a
> duplicate of you will also be created in Paris.
>
> This creates a situation where depending on your perspective -
> first-person or third-person - the question of where you expect to be
> duplicated is either straightforward or gibberish. From the first-person
> perspective, it's the same answer as before - Barcelona. From the
> third-person, I think you have to say it's gibberish to be consistent.
>
> Agree?
>

Do you think if we reveal to JC that since he was born he has been
duplicated everyday unbeknown to him and his doppelgangers have been killed
everytime that it would change JC behavior and he would be less trolling ?
It would be fun to see him not ever again use the indexical "I" pronouns
which he seems to have the most difficulties to grasp to whom it refers...

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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

2017-09-06 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2017-09-06 0:13 GMT+02:00 John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com>:

> On Tue, Sep 5, 2017 at 12:30 PM, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> You can insist with all the bad faith you have (and you have more than
>> plenty),
>
>
> ​Hey Quentin I have a great idea, go fuck yourself.
>

I cannot, the futur """"I"""" which clearly does not exists is the one who
should... but as """"he"""" does not exist... But bad faith, insults and
peepee is the john clark way... I'm eager for the starting point.


>
> John K Clark ​
>
>
>
>
>
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Re: A profound lack of profundity (and soon "the starting point")

2017-09-05 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2017-09-05 18:14 GMT+02:00 John Clark :

> On Tue, Sep 5, 2017 at 4:22 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
> > > Of course they couldn't have figured out which one before the
>>> duplication, they couldn't figure out ANYTHING before the duplication
>>> because they didn't exist before the duplication!
>>
>>
>
> ​> ​
>> This contradicts our agreement that the H-person do survive
>>
>
> ​
> It contradicts nothing. We're not talking about the H-person, you're
> complaining that neither the Moscow Man nor the Washington Man could
> ​ ​
> have made a prediction, and they couldn't because *they didn't exist
> before the duplication*
> *​*.​
>
> ​T​
> he very definition of "the Moscow Man" is the man who saw Moscow, so if
> nobody has see Moscow yet then there is no Moscow Man and so the poor
> ​fellow​
>  can't be expected to be making predictions or doing anything else.
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> (indeed, in both cities).
>>
>
> ​Yes, in *BOTH *cities!!​
>
> ​So will the Helsinki ​Man see* both* cities? I say yes, Bruno says no.
> Go figure.
>

You can insist with all the bad faith you have (and you have more than
plenty), there will never be a first person experience which is 'seeing
both cities', that simply does not exist.

Go peepee elsewhere.


>
> ​> ​
>> If the person cannot figure out anything before the duplication, it
>> becomes equivalent with dying,
>>
>
> ​What on Earth are you talking about? The future is always uncertain,
> with or without people duplicating machines.​
>
>
> ​ John K Clark​
>
>
>
>
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Re: infinite computations

2017-09-04 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Because there are an infinity of implementations for a given computation
state so if consciousness supervene on a computation, it supervenes on all
the possible implementations going through it's current state.

Quentin


Virus-free.
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<#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2>

2017-09-04 14:47 GMT+02:00 Telmo Menezes :

> A question for Bruno (and anyone who wants to chime in, of course):
>
> I believe you state that, under comp, consciousness necessarily
> supervenes on infinite computations. Why?
>
> Best,
> Telmo.
>
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Re: A profound lack of profundity

2017-08-10 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le 10 août 2017 20:49, "John Clark" <johnkcl...@gmail.com> a écrit :



On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 11:30 AM, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com>
wrote:

​> ​
> You (the one A*E trolling constantly on this list)


​Go to hell Quentin.


Likewise, hope it'll happen soon, you deserve it.


John K Clark​





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Re: A profound lack of profundity

2017-08-10 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2017-08-10 16:35 GMT+02:00 John Clark :

> On Wed, Aug 9, 2017 at 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> ​>> ​
>>> That does not compute. If ​BOTH answer are correct
>>> ​ then the Helsinki man will see Moscow AND Washington not ​
>>> Moscow
>>> ​OR​
>>>  Washington
>>> ​. Come on Bruno, this isn't rocket science.​
>>>
>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> Let us ask all the copies if any of them saw M and W.
>>
>
> ​Why ask them that? The bet isn't about what any one copy will see
> because we already know what that will be with 100% certainty, Mr. W will
> see W and Mr. M will see M. The bet, at least as I see it,  is "Tomorrow
> how many cities will beings who remember asking the question today be in?".
> If that's not the bet then I have no idea what the bet is and I very
> strongly suspect you don't know either.
>

You're the only one who don't know... or more correctly put *who don't want
to know and will do anything to fake understanding*... because if you did,
you would have to admit and assume your 10 years+ trolling. The bet *is*:

You (the only you existing right now) are in front of a button that when
you push it, will instantly make two copy of you (the one in front of the
button) and put one in Moscow and one in Washington and destroy the you
(the one in front of the button) at the same moment. It is asked to the you
in front of the button what city he will expect to see after pushing the
button... You (the one in front of the button) have a paper where it is
asked for to write the name of a city, or a composition (like with a OR or
an AND), that paper is duplicated at the same time as you (the one in front
of the button) and sent in alongside the copy. The bet is then verified
after pushing the button and checking with each copy if what was written on
the paper correspond to what they live... you could have write 4 things on
that paper:

1- Moscow
2- Washington
3- Moscow AND Washington
4- Moscow OR Washington

At the verification step, it is easy to see the following:

If you (the one in front of the button) have bet option 1:
   - The one in Moscow confirms he is seeing moscow and wins.
   - The one in Washington denies he is seeing moscow and loses.
If you (the one in front of the button) have bet option 2:
   - The one in Moscow denies he is seeing Washington and loses.
   - The one in Washington confirms he is seeing Washington and wins.
If you (the one in front of the button) have bet option 3:
   - The one in Moscow denies he is seeing Washington AND Moscow and loses.
 (indeed he is currently seeing Moscow and only Moscow)
   - The one in Washington denies he is seeing Washington AND Moscow and
loses. (indeed he is currently seeing Moscow and only Moscow)
If you (the one in front of the button) have bet option 4:
   - The one in Moscow confirms he is seeing Washington OR Moscow and wins.
(indeed he is currently seeing Moscow)
   - The one in Washington confirms he is seeing Washington OR Moscow and
wins. (indeed he is currently seeing Washington)

You (the one A*E trolling constantly on this list) bet 3... *you
lose* being to stupid to understand the bet and saying others don't
either does not change help you... clearly the problem is with you, and
it's understandable that you can't acknowledge 10 years of shit talk from
you.

So now, please go do your peepee elsewhere, thank you.


> ​> ​
>> Oops, none of them saw two cities
>
>
> ​
> One can't be in 2 cities at the same time, but 2 can be
> ​,​
> and so can Bruno Marchal because Bruno Marchal
> ​ ​
> has been duplicated. That's what "duplicated" means and duplication has
> consequences
> ​,​
> and some of them are odd, not paradoxical just odd.
>
> I've asked the following question 4 times and you've refused to answer 4
> times but I'm going to ask for a fifth time because it gets to the very
> heart of the topic:
>
> *Are the following 2 questions equivalent?*
>
> 1) What will I see tomorrow?
> 2) Tomorrow what will the person who remembers being me right now see?
>
> I can answer that question and the answer is YES. You should be able to
> answer it too with a simple YES or NO, and I don't want to hear any pee
> dodges of the question because the same level of pee and iterations of pee
> and any other convolutions of pee applies equally to both questions. So are
> they equivalent or are they not? If you can't provide a simple one word
> answer to that question then you quite literally don't know what you're
> arguing in favor of and you're wasting your time and ours.
>
> John K Clark
>
>
>
>>
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Re: A profound lack of profundity

2017-07-27 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le 27 juil. 2017 16:14, "John Clark"  a écrit :

On Wed, Jul 26, 2017 at 10:44 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

​> ​
> Your beliefs about your future are demonstrated by your decisions and
> behaviour,
>

​
Absolutely true.
​ ​
By the way, the short sentence quoted above contains just 12 words, but 3
of them are personal pronouns. That's 25%. People just use them
unconsciously without thinking about what they really mean, and that causes
few problems in everyday life but fails utterly if personal pronoun
duplicating machines are involved.

​> ​
> despite what you may say about pronouns.
>

​Also true, and what John Clark says is that John Clark doesn't
 ​give a damn about what happens to words like "me" or "I" or any other
personal pronoun, however John Clark cares very much about what happens to
the conscious being that is typing these words right now.



That's why the word 'I' is used for... It's an indexical... Waiting the
peepee.



> ​> ​
> If you go through a 1->1 duplication would you make provisions for the
> copy?
>

​Explain what the difference is between a future "you" and a future "copy"
and John Clark will provide a answer to that question, in the future of
course. ​

​

 John K Clark​





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Re: A profound lack of profundity

2017-07-26 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Are you that stupid not to see Stathis was trying to summarize what
*you're* saying ?

Le 26 juil. 2017 23:26, "John Clark"  a écrit :

> On Wed, Jul 26, 2017  Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> The point is you seem to be saying that with 1->1 duplication you would
>> be satisfied that you survive,
>>
>
> ​Yes.​
>
>
> ​>​
>>  but if an additional copy is made you would not.
>
>
> ​I see, so if tomorrow 2 people remember being me today then nobody
> tomorrow will remember being me today, so tomorrow I will be dead.
> Waite...that does not compute. . ​
>
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> You probably feel that you have survived as the same person from
>> yesterday, but if you (the version reading this) discover that you were
>> surreptitiously duplicated, it would mean that yesterday's version of you
>> had in fact died.
>>
>
> ​So I'll be dead, I'll  think and feel like I'm​
>
> ​alive but "really" I'll be dead. That sounds good enough​ for me! If true
> that would be wonderful news because that would mean death was not all it's
> cracked up to be, in fact death would be a big nothing. But it all sounds a
> little too good to be true.
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> So you can't really be sure today that you have survived from yesterday,
>>
>
> *​Then who the hell cares if you've "survived ' or not?! What does the
> word even mean?*
>
>  John K Clark
>
>
>
>>
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Re: A profound lack of profundity

2017-07-25 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le 25 juil. 2017 19:26, "John Clark"  a écrit :


On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 at 11:19 AM, Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

​>> ​
>> both had a equal continuous feeling of self *after* they walked out of
>> the teleporter, so to ask the ONE* before* he walked into the teleporter
>> and became TWO "Which ONE will become I ? "  has no answer, and it has no
>> answer not for any deep philosophical reason, it has no answer because it
>> is not a question, it is gibberish. And that us why I think the title of
>> this thread is very well named.
>>
>
> ​> ​
> It seems that I become one if the copies after the duplication because
> that is my memory of how things turned out.
>

​If after "you" walk into the duplicator at A "you" remain one when "you"
walk out at B and also remain one when "you" walk out at C, and then ask if
"you" are in B or C then things are just nuts. Either the word "you" or the
word "one" has lost its meaning.


> ​> ​
> If this is an illusion
>

​
Illusions are fine, an illusion is a perfectly respectable subjective
​ ​
phenomena, but gibberish is not
​ fine.​



> ​> ​
> "which city should I (being any of the copies) expect to find myself in".
>

​If the question is being asked of the copies then it must have been asked
after the duplication because the copies did not exist before the
duplication, therefore in this case the question is not gibberish and
actually has a answer. Mr. Copy you can expect to find yourself in B if you
open your eyes and see B because the sight of that city is the one and only
thing that will change you from being Mr. A to Mr. B.

​> ​
> To change the experiment, if I were told I would be copied 1000 times in A
> and once in B, and prior to the duplication I had to bet on whether I would
> end up in
> ​ [...]​
>

Stop right there!
​!​
​ ​
Stathis Papaioannou
​ is being told that IN THE FUTURE ​
Stathis Papaioannou
​
​will be duplicated ​
1000 times in A and once in B
​ , but the bet is not about that, it's about something or another called
"I". ​How on earth could anybody determine which of the 1001 people is the
one true "I" in order to determine who won the bet? How could anybody even
figure out exactly what the bet was supposed to be about? And I wish I knew
why we keep talking about predictions when good or bad they have nothing to
do with our feeling of continuity or of self.

​> ​
> the copy would get a payout if he bet correctly,
>

​There are 1001 copies, which ONE is *THE* copy? Even in a world with
people duplicating machines its easy to trace a continuos path of identity
from the present into the past and say that fellow was me but that other
fellow was not me, but its impossible to do the same thing for the future.
And the reason its impossible is that we can remember the past but not the
future.


> ​> ​
> it would be foolish not to bet on A.
>

​Mr. B remembers being you just as strongly as the other 1000 and is
absolutely positively convinced he is you. Why is Mr. B wrong?  ​Why didn't
Mr. B win the bet?

​If Mr. B isn't you who is he, a zombie? ​

> ​> ​
> It would also be foolish for the copies to try to argue (perhaps after
> losing the bet) that the bet is incoherent, since most ordinary English
> speakers would say they understood what it means and under what
> circumstances a copy would be a winner or loser.
>

​Then as a English speaker please tell this English speaker which ONE of
the 1001 won the bet, or at least tell me what the bet was supposed to be
about.​

​



The 999 who bet A won, the one in B who bet A lost.. If you had bet B, 999
in A lost and the only one in B win... So it's foolish not to bet A... But
again, the loop, the peepee, etc


 John K Clark​



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Re: A profound lack of profundity

2017-07-23 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le 24 juil. 2017 05:45, "Stathis Papaioannou"  a écrit :

Yes, AFTER the duplication
​ it would make perfect sense for ONE of the copies to say that, but we
were talking about what the original could say BEFORE the duplication. If
the original said "I will come in at city A and come out at city B and
nowhere else" that prediction would turn out to be incorrect. Not that
predictions, correct or incorrect, have anything to do with the sense of
self.



> On 24 July 2017 at 12:05, John Clark  wrote:
>
On Sun, Jul 23, 2017 at 7:42 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
>
> ​> ​
>>  Each copy that comes out of the transporter would continue to say "I
>> went into the transporter in city A and came out in city B",
>
>
> Yes, AFTER the duplication
> ​ it would make perfect sense for ONE of the copies to say that, but we
> were talking about what the original could say BEFORE the duplication. If
> the original said "I will come in at city A and come out at city B and
> nowhere else" that prediction would turn out to be incorrect. Not that
> predictions, correct or incorrect, have anything to do with the sense of
> self.
>

The original would argue as follows: I have gone through the teleporter
multiple times, and about half the time I have come out in city A and half
the time in city B, with no way for me to predict which it would be, even
given all the information. So if I go through again, I should expect I will
arrive in either A or B with about a 1/2 probability. I know that in actual
fact the original version of me will be destroyed, and there will be two
new versions, one in each city, but that's not what it feels like, and what
I care about is what it feels like. Furthermore, in the days before
teleporters when I travelled by train, the version of me that arrived was
different to the version of me that left - different atoms in different
configurations - and that never bothered me.



Don't bother, now the loop will restart, wait for the peepee...

Quentin



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Re: rgument.

2017-07-20 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le 20 juil. 2017 20:42, "John Clark"  a écrit :

On Thu, Jul 20, 2017 at 9:37 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​>> ​
>> If it
>> ​'s​
>> useful and can be used to distinguish between the two then you can easily
>> tell me which one has "*THE* 1p view", the Washington man or the
>> ​Moscow man. ​
>> I'm all ears.
>
>
> ​> ​
> I have answered this a billion times.
> ​ ​
> I will answer it a billion + 1 times.
>

​I've told you a million times don't exaggerate. ​


​> ​
> The guy has been duplicated. So in the 3-1 view, there are two 1-views,
>

​That's real nice but that's not what I asked. I want to know which one has
"*THE* 1p view​".



​>> ​
>> ​What the hell are you talking about? You just correctly predicted
>> exactly what will happen, and it was easy! I repeat, what more is there to
>> predict?​
>
>
> ​> ​
> Read carefully: what is asked to preedict is the current experience,
>

​
There is no such thing as *THE*
*​* ​
current experience
​ ​
there is only *A*
*​ *​
current experience
​ ​
because there are two, and you correctly predicted there will be one in W
and one in M.
​So ​
I repeat my question, what more is there to predict?


> ​> ​
> You missed "current experience after the duplication".
>

And you missed specifying whose current experience after the duplication
​ you want information about, the W man or the M man. The question "what
one and only one city will *YOU* see after​ *YOU* have been duplicated and
there are two of *YOU*?" is just as profound as the question "what one and
only one integer is larger than 2 but smaller than 5?"; deep philosophical
conclusions can not be derived from the fact that neither question has a
answer.

​> ​
> You older answer "W and M" is directly refuted by BOTH individuals.
>

​But it is not refuted by H and H was the man the prediction was about;
when the prediction was made neither W nor M even existed so nobody could
tell them a prediction, nor tell them anything else for that matter.

​
>> ​>> ​
>> I will provide such a prediction algorithm just as soon as you tell me
>> exactly WHAT THE HELL YOU WANT ME TO PREDICT!
>
>
> ​> ​
> Whay you, or any person doing the experience can expect to live,
>

​The W man can expect to live in W and the​

​M man can expect to live in M and the H man can expect to live in both.​
What more is there to predict?


> ​> ​
> from the FIRST PERSON pov.
>

​THERE IS NO *THE* ​
 FIRST PERSON pov
​!​

​> ​
> The 3-you, or the 3-1-you becomes two, by definition of the protocol.
>

​Protocol my ass! I know bafflegab when I see it. ​


​> ​
> It looks like you consider yourself as a zombie when getting an digital
> brain, which means you are abandoning computationalism.
>

​This is really getting silly.​



> ​>> ​
>> I can't answer the question "will this atom of uranium decay in the next
>> hour?" but after one hour I could say what the correct answer to the
>> question would have been, so it was a legitimate question I just had no way
>> of knowing what the answer was at the time. But long after your thought
>> experiment is over I* STILL* couldn't say what the correct answer to the
>> question "what one and only one city will you end up seeing?".
>
>
> ​> ​
> Your copies know, and that is what count,
>

No they do not know! If you think I'm wrong then interview them both and
tell me what the one and
​ ​
only
​ ​
one correct answer would have been back in Helsinki to the question "Will I
see W only or will I see M only?". If you can't answer that question even
retroactively, not even after the experiment is long over and all the data
is in and has been analyzed (and you can't) then it is not a question at
all it is just a sequence of letters with a question mark at the end.


> ​> ​
> unless you eliminate the first person experience,
>

​If there are 2 of *YOU* there is no *THE* ​
first person experience
​.​


> ​> i
> n which case you have become a p-zombie.
>

​Are ​p-zombies related to what Trump did in that Moscow hotel room?

​>> ​
>> ​I predict that the perfect answer to a gibberish question is a gibberish
>> answer.
>
>
> ​> ​
> You are eliminating the first person,
>


​If there are 2 of *YOU* there is no *THE* ​
first person experience
​.


> ​> ​
> confirming that materialist needs to eliminate consciousness
>

​That would be unnecessary, eliminating gibberish would be quite
sufficient.   ​


> ​> ​
> and all first person notions.
>

​No need to get rid of all ​
first person notions
​, just *THE *​
first person notion
​.​


> ​> ​
> you do eliminate the first person,
>

If there are 2 of *YOU* there is no *THE* ​
first person experience
​.


> ​> ​
> and you never do the thought experience: you never go to the point of
> listening both copies
>

​I presume you listened to both copies so now you know what the correct
answer to the Helsinki Man's question "what one and only one city will I
end up seeing, W or M?".  So after conferring with ​
both W and M what is the consensus, did it 

Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

2017-06-08 Thread Quentin Anciaux
http://mccabism.blogspot.be/2010/10/many-worlds-and-quantum-fungibility.html

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2017-06-08 12:57 GMT+02:00 Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com>:

>
>
> 2017-06-08 12:40 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:
>
>> On 8/06/2017 7:52 pm, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> On 8 Jun 2017 1:05 a.m., "Bruce Kellett" < <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>
>> The question then, is whether many worlds can provide a fully local
>> account of this situation. I claim, with most present day physicists, that
>> MWI does not provide any such local account.
>>
>>
>> I suspect I'm being obtuse in some way here but, rereading the quote
>> attributed to Bell himself by Wikipedia about superdeterminism, it strikes
>> me that MWI seems to describe a species of this sort of thing. IOW when
>> Alice and Bob make their measurements, the consequence in terms of branches
>> is a spectrum of all the possible outcomes. Indeed one could say that this
>> is what has been propagating from one to the other, rather than a
>> 'particle'. Let's say then that the various versions of Alice and Bob that
>> consequently coexist in MWI terms, however far apart they may have been,
>> eventually meet to compare notes. Again, the spectrum of possible outcomes
>> implicit in the global MWI perspective travels with them, as it were.
>> However, of all the possible pairings of the two, it appears to be
>> 'superdetermined' that each observed encounter must be consistent with the
>> predictions of QM. And so it would appear that the paired results of their
>> joint measurements are somehow inseparable, in Wallace's language, without
>> there having been any action at a distance. If this depiction were to make
>> any sense, one might then enquire what common cause, or other explanatory
>> device, could account for this apparent superdetermination of observed
>> outcomes?
>>
>>
>> I don't think that superdeterminism and MWI have very much in common.
>> Although Bell did acknowledge that superdeterminism provides a possible
>> local loophole to his theorem, Bell always thought that superdeterminism
>> was sufficiently implausible to be disregarded as a serious contender as an
>> explanation.
>>
>> I tend to agree with the comment from Zeilinger on the same Wiki page, to
>> the effect that such absolute superdeterminism would render the whole
>> scientific enterprise otiose. I think that non-locality is a better
>> approach -- at least then  science can still make sense.
>>
>> The problem with attempts to find local accounts of the correlations
>> between Alice and Bob is that their measurements are taken to be
>> independent. If they are independent, then they cannot be correlated --
>> that is in the definition of independence. Superdeterminism circumvents
>> this, simply by denying that Alice and Bob can freely choose their
>> measurements, and are consequently not independent.
>>
>> As I understand the better attempts to give an account in MWI, it is
>> accepted that Alice and Bob are independent, so their results are
>> uncorrelated *when they are made*, but the necessary correlation is built
>> later when they meet to compare results. I find this unconvincing, and no
>> satisfactory account of any mechanism whereby this could be achieved has
>> been given. Accounts along this line seem to depend on multiple worlds
>> containing all possible results that somehow, miraculously, pair up,
>> without any outside intervention, in such a way to give the necessary
>> correlations. This is rendered less plausible if one considers timelike
>> separations, where Bob, say, is always in Alice's forward light cone, so
>> any splitting of either observer is communicated to the other by normal
>> decoherence, long before the other measurement is made, and before they
>> meet up to compare lab books.
>>
>>
> If I remember David Deutsch explained that the worlds were not "splitting"
> but differentiating, and thus are all preexisting... so even if their
> measures are independent, this gives only a self localisation... and so
> nothing non-local happens ?
>
> Quentin
>
>
>
>
>
>> Bruce
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Googl

Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

2017-06-08 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2017-06-08 12:40 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :

> On 8/06/2017 7:52 pm, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 8 Jun 2017 1:05 a.m., "Bruce Kellett" < 
> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
>
> The question then, is whether many worlds can provide a fully local
> account of this situation. I claim, with most present day physicists, that
> MWI does not provide any such local account.
>
>
> I suspect I'm being obtuse in some way here but, rereading the quote
> attributed to Bell himself by Wikipedia about superdeterminism, it strikes
> me that MWI seems to describe a species of this sort of thing. IOW when
> Alice and Bob make their measurements, the consequence in terms of branches
> is a spectrum of all the possible outcomes. Indeed one could say that this
> is what has been propagating from one to the other, rather than a
> 'particle'. Let's say then that the various versions of Alice and Bob that
> consequently coexist in MWI terms, however far apart they may have been,
> eventually meet to compare notes. Again, the spectrum of possible outcomes
> implicit in the global MWI perspective travels with them, as it were.
> However, of all the possible pairings of the two, it appears to be
> 'superdetermined' that each observed encounter must be consistent with the
> predictions of QM. And so it would appear that the paired results of their
> joint measurements are somehow inseparable, in Wallace's language, without
> there having been any action at a distance. If this depiction were to make
> any sense, one might then enquire what common cause, or other explanatory
> device, could account for this apparent superdetermination of observed
> outcomes?
>
>
> I don't think that superdeterminism and MWI have very much in common.
> Although Bell did acknowledge that superdeterminism provides a possible
> local loophole to his theorem, Bell always thought that superdeterminism
> was sufficiently implausible to be disregarded as a serious contender as an
> explanation.
>
> I tend to agree with the comment from Zeilinger on the same Wiki page, to
> the effect that such absolute superdeterminism would render the whole
> scientific enterprise otiose. I think that non-locality is a better
> approach -- at least then  science can still make sense.
>
> The problem with attempts to find local accounts of the correlations
> between Alice and Bob is that their measurements are taken to be
> independent. If they are independent, then they cannot be correlated --
> that is in the definition of independence. Superdeterminism circumvents
> this, simply by denying that Alice and Bob can freely choose their
> measurements, and are consequently not independent.
>
> As I understand the better attempts to give an account in MWI, it is
> accepted that Alice and Bob are independent, so their results are
> uncorrelated *when they are made*, but the necessary correlation is built
> later when they meet to compare results. I find this unconvincing, and no
> satisfactory account of any mechanism whereby this could be achieved has
> been given. Accounts along this line seem to depend on multiple worlds
> containing all possible results that somehow, miraculously, pair up,
> without any outside intervention, in such a way to give the necessary
> correlations. This is rendered less plausible if one considers timelike
> separations, where Bob, say, is always in Alice's forward light cone, so
> any splitting of either observer is communicated to the other by normal
> decoherence, long before the other measurement is made, and before they
> meet up to compare lab books.
>
>
If I remember David Deutsch explained that the worlds were not "splitting"
but differentiating, and thus are all preexisting... so even if their
measures are independent, this gives only a self localisation... and so
nothing non-local happens ?

Quentin





> Bruce
>
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Re: What are atheists for?

2017-05-08 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le 9 mai 2017 01:17, "Bruce Kellett" <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> a écrit :

On 9/05/2017 12:22 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2017-05-08 15:18 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:

> On 8/05/2017 5:25 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> 2017-05-08 9:14 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett < <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:
>
>> On 8/05/2017 5:01 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>> Something lie the speed prior... yes the UD has all of them, but the
>> measure function (which we don't have) must render the consistency, thing
>> like complexity and size could be a way to explain why consciousness->white
>> noise have low measure.
>>
>>
>> Those are just arbitrary assumptions, designed to give you some handle on
>> what you want. For consistency, the definition of 'consistent
>> continuations' for the measure must come from logic and/or arithmetic alone.
>>
>
> A measure function would come from arithmetic alone, complexity/size/...
> are arithmetical notion... so I don't see your point,
>
>
> If one insists on 'consistent continuations' of conscious states, it does
> not seem that 'size (of what, program length, or what?) can really do the
> job.
>
> it's not because there are everything that everything is equally
> probable... the problem is exactly the same with MWI... you have to have a
> measure function, I understand you reject even the idea, so it seems
> pointless to discuss
>
>
> What gives you the idea that I reject a measure function for QM in the MWI
> interpretation -- the Born rule applied to the wave function is precisely
> the measure function one needs, for any interpretation of QM to accord with
> experience.
>
> If physics is to come from the UD (computationalism) you need a measure
> over conscious states. From what Bruno says, it is not clear that these
> conscious states need consistent continuations -- your next conscious
> moment might be a computation is some entirely different program of the UD.
> However, that notion runs into the Occam catastrophe that Russell mentions
> -- the overwhelming majority of programs that instantiate our conscious
> moments run from white noise in the past, to white noise in the future --
> Boltzmann brains, in effect.
>
> ... remember, I'm not here to be convinced in any way that your
> ontological stance is true  or not (or the ones of someone else) but to
> discuss the everything ideas and theories.
>
>
> Presumably you are interested in tests of these ideas? And the possibility
> that there may be conceptual problems with their implementation? I am not
> making any ontological claims here. I am simply asking how one can get
> physics out of computationalist notions.
>
>
To have that we have to extract a measure function... which we don't have.
But things like complexity,size, minimum change between computation steps,
... may give a clue to it. The fact that we don't have one does not mean
there isn't any and that measure function must exists for computationalism
to have any meaning. Assuming it is true, there is such a function...


That is just the usual non-argument -- "If our theory is correct, then it
must work"



It's not a non argument, and it's not my theory. Assuming it, that measure
function must exist and be in accordance with observation. Finding it or
proving there is no such function would be a result, again you're no more
discussing the idea but trying to convince other that you know there is no
such function and that idea is a waste... But you don't. No need to repeat
your bias, we know it.

Quentin


All that remains is for you to prove that your theory is correct, and
without making contact with some facts and making some verifiable
predictions, you can't do that.

Bruce

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Re: What are atheists for?

2017-05-08 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2017-05-08 15:18 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:

> On 8/05/2017 5:25 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> 2017-05-08 9:14 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:
>
>> On 8/05/2017 5:01 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>> Something lie the speed prior... yes the UD has all of them, but the
>> measure function (which we don't have) must render the consistency, thing
>> like complexity and size could be a way to explain why consciousness->white
>> noise have low measure.
>>
>>
>> Those are just arbitrary assumptions, designed to give you some handle on
>> what you want. For consistency, the definition of 'consistent
>> continuations' for the measure must come from logic and/or arithmetic alone.
>>
>
> A measure function would come from arithmetic alone, complexity/size/...
> are arithmetical notion... so I don't see your point,
>
>
> If one insists on 'consistent continuations' of conscious states, it does
> not seem that 'size (of what, program length, or what?) can really do the
> job.
>
> it's not because there are everything that everything is equally
> probable... the problem is exactly the same with MWI... you have to have a
> measure function, I understand you reject even the idea, so it seems
> pointless to discuss
>
>
> What gives you the idea that I reject a measure function for QM in the MWI
> interpretation -- the Born rule applied to the wave function is precisely
> the measure function one needs, for any interpretation of QM to accord with
> experience.
>
> If physics is to come from the UD (computationalism) you need a measure
> over conscious states. From what Bruno says, it is not clear that these
> conscious states need consistent continuations -- your next conscious
> moment might be a computation is some entirely different program of the UD.
> However, that notion runs into the Occam catastrophe that Russell mentions
> -- the overwhelming majority of programs that instantiate our conscious
> moments run from white noise in the past, to white noise in the future --
> Boltzmann brains, in effect.
>
> ... remember, I'm not here to be convinced in any way that your
> ontological stance is true  or not (or the ones of someone else) but to
> discuss the everything ideas and theories.
>
>
> Presumably you are interested in tests of these ideas? And the possibility
> that there may be conceptual problems with their implementation? I am not
> making any ontological claims here. I am simply asking how one can get
> physics out of computationalist notions.
>
>
To have that we have to extract a measure function... which we don't have.
But things like complexity,size, minimum change between computation steps,
... may give a clue to it. The fact that we don't have one does not mean
there isn't any and that measure function must exists for computationalism
to have any meaning. Assuming it is true, there is such a function...

Quentin



> Bruce
>
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-- 
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Re: What are atheists for?

2017-05-08 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2017-05-08 9:14 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:

> On 8/05/2017 5:01 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> 2017-05-08 8:58 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:
>
>> On 8/05/2017 4:41 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> 2017-05-08 8:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett < <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:
>>
>>> On 8/05/2017 3:59 pm, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
>>> On 8 May 2017 4:53 a.m., "Bruce Kellett" < <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
>>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>
>>> On 8/05/2017 3:14 am, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> I've been thinking a bit more about this and I'd like to set out some
>>> further tentative remarks about the above. Your professional expertise in
>>> these matters is orders of magnitude greater than mine and consequently any
>>> comments you might make would be very helpful. By the way, it would also be
>>> helpful if you would read beyond the next paragraph before commenting
>>> because I hope I will come by myself to the fly in the ointment.
>>>
>>> Firstly, and "assuming computationalism" on the basis of CT + YD, we are
>>> led to the view that UD* must include all possible "physical" computational
>>> continuations (actually infinitely reiterated). This of course is also to
>>> assume that all such continuations are finitely computable (i.e. halting).
>>> Now, again on the same assumptions, it might seem reasonable that our
>>> observing such a physics in concrete substantial form is evidence of its
>>> emergence (i.e. epistemologically) as the predominant computational
>>> mechanism underlying those very perceptions. Hence it might seem equally
>>> reasonable to conclude that this is the reason that these latter
>>> correspondingly appear to supervene on concrete physical manifestations in
>>> their effective environment.
>>>
>>> Now wait a minute. We cannot escape the question of measure. Why would
>>> it be reasonable to assume that a physics of this sort should predominate
>>> in the manner outlined above? Well, firstly, it would seem that the
>>> generator of the set of possible physical computations is infinitely
>>> reiterative​ and hence very robust (both in the sense of computational
>>> inclusiveness a la step 7, and that of internal self-consistency). But who
>>> is to say that the generators of "magical" or simply inconsistent
>>> continuations aren't equally or even more prevalent? After all we're
>>> dealing with a Library of Babel here and the Vast majority of any such
>>> library is bound to be gibberish. Well, I'm wondering​ about an analogy
>>> with Feynman's path integral idea (comments particularly appreciated here).
>>> Might a kind of least action principle be applicable here, such that
>>> internally consistent computations self-reinforce, whereas inconsistent
>>> ones in effect self-cancel?
>>>
>>> Also, absence of evidence isn't evidence of absence. I'm thinking here
>>> about the evaluation of what we typically remember having experienced. I
>>> can't help invoking Hoyle here again (sorry). Subjectively speaking,
>>> there's a kind of struggle always in process between remembering and
>>> forgetting. So on the basis suggested above, and from the abstract point of
>>> view of Hoyle's singular agent (or equally Bruno's virgin machine),
>>> inconsistent paths might plausibly tend to result, in effect, in a net
>>> (unintelligible) forgetting and contrariwise, self-consistent paths might
>>> equally plausibly result in a net (intelligible) remembering. I'm speaking
>>> of consistent and hence intelligible "personal histories" here. But perhaps
>>> you would substitute "implausibly" above. Anyway, your comments as ever
>>> particularly appreciated.
>>>
>>>
>>> I think the problem here is the use of the word "consistent". You refer
>>> to "internally consistent computations" and "consistent and hence
>>> intelligible 'personal histories'." But what is the measure of such
>>> consistency? You cannot use the idea of 'consistent according to some
>>> physical laws', because it is those laws that you are supposedly deriving
>>> -- they cannot form part of the derivation. I don't think any notion of
>>> logical consistency can fill the bill here. It is logically consistent that
>>> my present

Re: What are atheists for?

2017-05-08 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2017-05-08 9:14 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:

> On 8/05/2017 5:01 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> 2017-05-08 8:58 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:
>
>> On 8/05/2017 4:41 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> 2017-05-08 8:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett < <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:
>>
>>> On 8/05/2017 3:59 pm, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
>>> On 8 May 2017 4:53 a.m., "Bruce Kellett" < <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
>>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>
>>> On 8/05/2017 3:14 am, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> I've been thinking a bit more about this and I'd like to set out some
>>> further tentative remarks about the above. Your professional expertise in
>>> these matters is orders of magnitude greater than mine and consequently any
>>> comments you might make would be very helpful. By the way, it would also be
>>> helpful if you would read beyond the next paragraph before commenting
>>> because I hope I will come by myself to the fly in the ointment.
>>>
>>> Firstly, and "assuming computationalism" on the basis of CT + YD, we are
>>> led to the view that UD* must include all possible "physical" computational
>>> continuations (actually infinitely reiterated). This of course is also to
>>> assume that all such continuations are finitely computable (i.e. halting).
>>> Now, again on the same assumptions, it might seem reasonable that our
>>> observing such a physics in concrete substantial form is evidence of its
>>> emergence (i.e. epistemologically) as the predominant computational
>>> mechanism underlying those very perceptions. Hence it might seem equally
>>> reasonable to conclude that this is the reason that these latter
>>> correspondingly appear to supervene on concrete physical manifestations in
>>> their effective environment.
>>>
>>> Now wait a minute. We cannot escape the question of measure. Why would
>>> it be reasonable to assume that a physics of this sort should predominate
>>> in the manner outlined above? Well, firstly, it would seem that the
>>> generator of the set of possible physical computations is infinitely
>>> reiterative​ and hence very robust (both in the sense of computational
>>> inclusiveness a la step 7, and that of internal self-consistency). But who
>>> is to say that the generators of "magical" or simply inconsistent
>>> continuations aren't equally or even more prevalent? After all we're
>>> dealing with a Library of Babel here and the Vast majority of any such
>>> library is bound to be gibberish. Well, I'm wondering​ about an analogy
>>> with Feynman's path integral idea (comments particularly appreciated here).
>>> Might a kind of least action principle be applicable here, such that
>>> internally consistent computations self-reinforce, whereas inconsistent
>>> ones in effect self-cancel?
>>>
>>> Also, absence of evidence isn't evidence of absence. I'm thinking here
>>> about the evaluation of what we typically remember having experienced. I
>>> can't help invoking Hoyle here again (sorry). Subjectively speaking,
>>> there's a kind of struggle always in process between remembering and
>>> forgetting. So on the basis suggested above, and from the abstract point of
>>> view of Hoyle's singular agent (or equally Bruno's virgin machine),
>>> inconsistent paths might plausibly tend to result, in effect, in a net
>>> (unintelligible) forgetting and contrariwise, self-consistent paths might
>>> equally plausibly result in a net (intelligible) remembering. I'm speaking
>>> of consistent and hence intelligible "personal histories" here. But perhaps
>>> you would substitute "implausibly" above. Anyway, your comments as ever
>>> particularly appreciated.
>>>
>>>
>>> I think the problem here is the use of the word "consistent". You refer
>>> to "internally consistent computations" and "consistent and hence
>>> intelligible 'personal histories'." But what is the measure of such
>>> consistency? You cannot use the idea of 'consistent according to some
>>> physical laws', because it is those laws that you are supposedly deriving
>>> -- they cannot form part of the derivation. I don't think any notion of
>>> logical consistency can fill the bill here. It is logically consistent that
>>> my present

Re: What are atheists for?

2017-05-08 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2017-05-08 8:58 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:

> On 8/05/2017 4:41 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> 2017-05-08 8:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:
>
>> On 8/05/2017 3:59 pm, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> On 8 May 2017 4:53 a.m., "Bruce Kellett" < <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>
>> On 8/05/2017 3:14 am, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>
>> I've been thinking a bit more about this and I'd like to set out some
>> further tentative remarks about the above. Your professional expertise in
>> these matters is orders of magnitude greater than mine and consequently any
>> comments you might make would be very helpful. By the way, it would also be
>> helpful if you would read beyond the next paragraph before commenting
>> because I hope I will come by myself to the fly in the ointment.
>>
>> Firstly, and "assuming computationalism" on the basis of CT + YD, we are
>> led to the view that UD* must include all possible "physical" computational
>> continuations (actually infinitely reiterated). This of course is also to
>> assume that all such continuations are finitely computable (i.e. halting).
>> Now, again on the same assumptions, it might seem reasonable that our
>> observing such a physics in concrete substantial form is evidence of its
>> emergence (i.e. epistemologically) as the predominant computational
>> mechanism underlying those very perceptions. Hence it might seem equally
>> reasonable to conclude that this is the reason that these latter
>> correspondingly appear to supervene on concrete physical manifestations in
>> their effective environment.
>>
>> Now wait a minute. We cannot escape the question of measure. Why would it
>> be reasonable to assume that a physics of this sort should predominate in
>> the manner outlined above? Well, firstly, it would seem that the generator
>> of the set of possible physical computations is infinitely reiterative​ and
>> hence very robust (both in the sense of computational inclusiveness a la
>> step 7, and that of internal self-consistency). But who is to say that the
>> generators of "magical" or simply inconsistent continuations aren't equally
>> or even more prevalent? After all we're dealing with a Library of Babel
>> here and the Vast majority of any such library is bound to be gibberish.
>> Well, I'm wondering​ about an analogy with Feynman's path integral idea
>> (comments particularly appreciated here). Might a kind of least action
>> principle be applicable here, such that internally consistent computations
>> self-reinforce, whereas inconsistent ones in effect self-cancel?
>>
>> Also, absence of evidence isn't evidence of absence. I'm thinking here
>> about the evaluation of what we typically remember having experienced. I
>> can't help invoking Hoyle here again (sorry). Subjectively speaking,
>> there's a kind of struggle always in process between remembering and
>> forgetting. So on the basis suggested above, and from the abstract point of
>> view of Hoyle's singular agent (or equally Bruno's virgin machine),
>> inconsistent paths might plausibly tend to result, in effect, in a net
>> (unintelligible) forgetting and contrariwise, self-consistent paths might
>> equally plausibly result in a net (intelligible) remembering. I'm speaking
>> of consistent and hence intelligible "personal histories" here. But perhaps
>> you would substitute "implausibly" above. Anyway, your comments as ever
>> particularly appreciated.
>>
>>
>> I think the problem here is the use of the word "consistent". You refer
>> to "internally consistent computations" and "consistent and hence
>> intelligible 'personal histories'." But what is the measure of such
>> consistency? You cannot use the idea of 'consistent according to some
>> physical laws', because it is those laws that you are supposedly deriving
>> -- they cannot form part of the derivation. I don't think any notion of
>> logical consistency can fill the bill here. It is logically consistent that
>> my present conscious moment, with its rich record of memories of a physical
>> world, stretching back to childhood, is all an illusion of the momentary
>> point in a computational history: the continuation of this computation back
>> into the past, and forward into the future, could be just white noise! That
>> is not logically inconsistent, or comutationally inconsistent. It is
>> inconsistent only with the physical laws of conservati

Re: What are atheists for?

2017-05-08 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2017-05-08 8:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :

> On 8/05/2017 3:59 pm, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 8 May 2017 4:53 a.m., "Bruce Kellett" < 
> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
> On 8/05/2017 3:14 am, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 6 May 2017 11:04 p.m., "Brent Meeker" < 
> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>
> On 5/6/2017 2:45 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 6 May 2017 10:16 p.m., "Brent Meeker" < 
> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>
>
> But that's what I mean when I say Bruno's theory has no predictive
> success.  QM (and Everett) would correctly predict that alcohol molecules
> in the blood will interfere with neuronal function and THEN invoking the
> physicalist theory of mind, i.e. that mind supervenes on material events,
> it predicts that your ability to do arithmetic will be impaired by drinking
> tequila.  It will NOT predict the contrary with more than infinitesimal
> probability.  So it's misdirection to say that it's just a measure
> problem.  Without having the right measure a probabilistic theory is just
> fantasy...or magic as Bruno would say.
>
>
> I have no idea why you say that. I thought it was clear that if
> computationalism doesn't (ultimately) predict that its predominating
> computational mechanism (i.e. the one effectively self-selected by complex
> subjects, in this case, like ourselves) is the physics those selfsame
> subjects observe,
>
>
> That would certainly be an accomplishment - which in another post Bruno
> says is trivially accomplished even in RA (I don't see it).  But to succeed
> in prediction it is not enough to show that some world exists in which mind
> and physics are consistent (that the physics that mind infers is also the
> real physics that predicts effects on the mind).  You need also to show
> this has large measure relative to contrary worlds.  One can make a logic
> chopping argument that it must be that way for otherwise minds would not be
> making sense of the physics they perceived - but that makes the whole
> computational argument otiose.
>
>
> I've been thinking a bit more about this and I'd like to set out some
> further tentative remarks about the above. Your professional expertise in
> these matters is orders of magnitude greater than mine and consequently any
> comments you might make would be very helpful. By the way, it would also be
> helpful if you would read beyond the next paragraph before commenting
> because I hope I will come by myself to the fly in the ointment.
>
> Firstly, and "assuming computationalism" on the basis of CT + YD, we are
> led to the view that UD* must include all possible "physical" computational
> continuations (actually infinitely reiterated). This of course is also to
> assume that all such continuations are finitely computable (i.e. halting).
> Now, again on the same assumptions, it might seem reasonable that our
> observing such a physics in concrete substantial form is evidence of its
> emergence (i.e. epistemologically) as the predominant computational
> mechanism underlying those very perceptions. Hence it might seem equally
> reasonable to conclude that this is the reason that these latter
> correspondingly appear to supervene on concrete physical manifestations in
> their effective environment.
>
> Now wait a minute. We cannot escape the question of measure. Why would it
> be reasonable to assume that a physics of this sort should predominate in
> the manner outlined above? Well, firstly, it would seem that the generator
> of the set of possible physical computations is infinitely reiterative​ and
> hence very robust (both in the sense of computational inclusiveness a la
> step 7, and that of internal self-consistency). But who is to say that the
> generators of "magical" or simply inconsistent continuations aren't equally
> or even more prevalent? After all we're dealing with a Library of Babel
> here and the Vast majority of any such library is bound to be gibberish.
> Well, I'm wondering​ about an analogy with Feynman's path integral idea
> (comments particularly appreciated here). Might a kind of least action
> principle be applicable here, such that internally consistent computations
> self-reinforce, whereas inconsistent ones in effect self-cancel?
>
> Also, absence of evidence isn't evidence of absence. I'm thinking here
> about the evaluation of what we typically remember having experienced. I
> can't help invoking Hoyle here again (sorry). Subjectively speaking,
> there's a kind of struggle always in process between remembering and
> forgetting. So on the basis suggested above, and from the abstract point of
> view of Hoyle's singular agent (or equally Bruno's virgin machine),
> inconsistent paths might plausibly tend to result, in effect, in a net
> (unintelligible) forgetting and contrariwise, self-consistent paths might
> equally plausibly result in a net (intelligible) remembering. I'm speaking
> of consistent and 

Re: What are atheists for?

2017-05-03 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le 3 mai 2017 11:23 PM, "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> a écrit :



On 5/3/2017 1:32 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

This an extreme reductionist view, i.e. if X is the fundamental ontology
then only X exists.  But that leads to nonsense: "If the standard model is
fundamental ontology then football doesn't exist."


But it's true, football does not exist in any ontological sense, and we are
talking about ontology.


So neither Sherlock Holmes nor Donald Trump exist.  That's certainly a
relief.



What about ontology don't you understand?

Quentin



Brent

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Re: What are atheists for?

2017-05-03 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le 3 mai 2017 22:27, "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> a écrit :



On 5/3/2017 12:54 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2017-05-03 21:46 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>:

>
>
> On 5/3/2017 9:47 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2 May 2017 11:18 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/2/2017 2:29 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2 May 2017 9:57 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/2/2017 1:09 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2 May 2017 7:21 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/2/2017 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Your answer seems to be that physics can be an illusion of digital
> thought, therefore primary physics is otiose.  But thought can't be a
> consequence of physics becausewell you just don't see how it could be.
>
>
> Not at all. It cannot be because you need to give a role to the primary
> matter which is not emulable by the UD, nor FPI-recoverable.
>
>
> The obvious "role" is that some things exist and some don't.  I don't know
> anyone who calls this "primary matter", but it's what is not UD emulable.
>
>
> But what are your grounds for discriminating which things exist and which
> don't?
>
>
> Empiricism.
>
>
> That's a slogan not an explanation.
>
>
> That's right - you asked for grounds.
>
>
> I think you could be more helpful than this.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> If anything, it strikes me that the history of human enquiry is rather
> conducive to the view that whatever limits we try to impose on "what
> exists" are in all likelihood destined soon to be surpassed.
>
>
> Actually it has been the reverse.  Relativity places a limit on speed,
> quantum mechanics places a limit on measurements, Goedel found a limit on
> proofs.  Laplace was the last physicist who thought we could predict
> everything.  We haven't been the center of the universe for a long time.
>
>
> Very selective. What about the string landscape, eternal inflation or for
> that matter the CUH? Maybe you'll say that these are as yet unproven
> hypotheses, but are you willing to say in principle​ they're barking up the
> wrong tree?
>
>
> Except for eternal inflation, they aren't even developed enough to be
> hypotheses.  I'm willing to bet that they will imply limits on what
> exists.  Even CUH does that, it implies real numbers and theories that
> assume them don't exist.
>
>
> Sure, but my point is that all these ideas lead to a broader ontology than
> you seemed to be suggesting: i.e the theoretical recipe for what exists and
> what doesn't extends beyond the physics we observe locally. But even comp
> doesn't claim that *everything* exists. In fact its ontology is extremely
> restrictive.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> In any case, I still don't see that you've made a convincing argument for
> your "groundless" circular explanations.
>
>
> It's not an argument - it's an observation that that's the way
> explanations work.
>
>
> Not all explanations. And in particular not ontological ones.
>
>
> You mean the fundamental elements of a theory - whose existence doesn't
> have an explanation.  My idea of an explanation is one that brings
> understanding - not just stops explaining.
>
>
> So is mine. So is Bruno's. What's your point?
>
>
> An explanation that reaches understanding must end with an ontology that
> is already understood.  Bruno accepts this.  He thinks we understand Peano
> arithmetic.  I think we only understand it because we refer it to
> experience with objects.  But the broader point is that you can't just pick
> some theory with an ontology and say this theory explains things.  The
> explanation is no good unless you already understand the theory's
> ontology.  So explanations of different things bottom out on different
> ontologies for different people.  This is why supernatural agents were
> popular explanations up until a few hundred years ago; agents are
> intuitively understood by people because, as social animals, evolution
> provided us with intuitions about other people.  So it was satisfying to
> explain a storm as the cloud-god was angry.  Now, some physicists would say
> it is explained by the Navier-Stokes equation - but that wouldn't really be
> right either.  In fact NOAA explains it with some simplified N-S plus some
> heuristics.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> For example, based on your remarks above, you implicitly exclude "non
> physical" computations from your ontology (not forgetting what you said
> abo

Re: What are atheists for?

2017-05-03 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2017-05-03 21:46 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker :

>
>
> On 5/3/2017 9:47 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2 May 2017 11:18 p.m., "Brent Meeker"  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/2/2017 2:29 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2 May 2017 9:57 p.m., "Brent Meeker"  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/2/2017 1:09 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2 May 2017 7:21 p.m., "Brent Meeker"  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/2/2017 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Your answer seems to be that physics can be an illusion of digital
> thought, therefore primary physics is otiose.  But thought can't be a
> consequence of physics becausewell you just don't see how it could be.
>
>
> Not at all. It cannot be because you need to give a role to the primary
> matter which is not emulable by the UD, nor FPI-recoverable.
>
>
> The obvious "role" is that some things exist and some don't.  I don't know
> anyone who calls this "primary matter", but it's what is not UD emulable.
>
>
> But what are your grounds for discriminating which things exist and which
> don't?
>
>
> Empiricism.
>
>
> That's a slogan not an explanation.
>
>
> That's right - you asked for grounds.
>
>
> I think you could be more helpful than this.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> If anything, it strikes me that the history of human enquiry is rather
> conducive to the view that whatever limits we try to impose on "what
> exists" are in all likelihood destined soon to be surpassed.
>
>
> Actually it has been the reverse.  Relativity places a limit on speed,
> quantum mechanics places a limit on measurements, Goedel found a limit on
> proofs.  Laplace was the last physicist who thought we could predict
> everything.  We haven't been the center of the universe for a long time.
>
>
> Very selective. What about the string landscape, eternal inflation or for
> that matter the CUH? Maybe you'll say that these are as yet unproven
> hypotheses, but are you willing to say in principle​ they're barking up the
> wrong tree?
>
>
> Except for eternal inflation, they aren't even developed enough to be
> hypotheses.  I'm willing to bet that they will imply limits on what
> exists.  Even CUH does that, it implies real numbers and theories that
> assume them don't exist.
>
>
> Sure, but my point is that all these ideas lead to a broader ontology than
> you seemed to be suggesting: i.e the theoretical recipe for what exists and
> what doesn't extends beyond the physics we observe locally. But even comp
> doesn't claim that *everything* exists. In fact its ontology is extremely
> restrictive.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> In any case, I still don't see that you've made a convincing argument for
> your "groundless" circular explanations.
>
>
> It's not an argument - it's an observation that that's the way
> explanations work.
>
>
> Not all explanations. And in particular not ontological ones.
>
>
> You mean the fundamental elements of a theory - whose existence doesn't
> have an explanation.  My idea of an explanation is one that brings
> understanding - not just stops explaining.
>
>
> So is mine. So is Bruno's. What's your point?
>
>
> An explanation that reaches understanding must end with an ontology that
> is already understood.  Bruno accepts this.  He thinks we understand Peano
> arithmetic.  I think we only understand it because we refer it to
> experience with objects.  But the broader point is that you can't just pick
> some theory with an ontology and say this theory explains things.  The
> explanation is no good unless you already understand the theory's
> ontology.  So explanations of different things bottom out on different
> ontologies for different people.  This is why supernatural agents were
> popular explanations up until a few hundred years ago; agents are
> intuitively understood by people because, as social animals, evolution
> provided us with intuitions about other people.  So it was satisfying to
> explain a storm as the cloud-god was angry.  Now, some physicists would say
> it is explained by the Navier-Stokes equation - but that wouldn't really be
> right either.  In fact NOAA explains it with some simplified N-S plus some
> heuristics.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> For example, based on your remarks above, you implicitly exclude "non
> physical" computations from your ontology (not forgetting what you said
> about ontology being theory dependent).
>
>
> Not at all.  I've never tried to make my "virtuous circle of explanation"
> exhaustive.  I generally include "mathematics" in it, but just as indicator
> for all kinds of abstract, symbolic based systems.
>
>
> A theory explicitly based on a computational ontology includes both
> physical and non physical. Of course you could go on to say that a physical
> computer could compute anything computable; but in that case we find
> ourselves at step 7 of the UDA and the putative physical machine then takes
> on the aspect of Bruno's invisible horses. Unless you want to say that the
> comp derivation of physics is 

Re: What are atheists for?

2017-05-03 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2017-05-03 17:44 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker :

>
>
> On 5/3/2017 2:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 02 May 2017, at 20:21, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/2/2017 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Your answer seems to be that physics can be an illusion of digital
> thought, therefore primary physics is otiose.  But thought can't be a
> consequence of physics becausewell you just don't see how it could be.
>
>
> Not at all. It cannot be because you need to give a role to the primary
> matter which is not emulable by the UD, nor FPI-recoverable.
>
>
> The obvious "role" is that some things exist and some don't.  I don't know
> anyone who calls this "primary matter", but it's what is not UD emulable.
>
>
> To reify something for which we have no evidence, just to avoid a problem,
>
>
> You mean something like other worlds, just to make your theory simpler.  I
> would never accuse you of religious dogma for that.
>
> is a bit like a pseudo-religious move, like invoking a miracle or a god.
> You have to explain more on how that primary matter succeeds in linking the
> computational histories with consciousness. If it is non Turing emulable, I
> don't see why we could remain confident in a digital brain transplant.
>
>
> You're the one that says physics is non-Turing emulable - a consequence of
> assuming an infinite number of worlds.
>

You're playing with words here, indeed if mind is computational, not-mind
aka physics is not...

Quentin

>
>
> Brent
>
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Brent
>
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>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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Re: What are atheists for?

2017-04-27 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le 28 avr. 2017 12:01 AM, "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> a écrit :



On 4/27/2017 9:21 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



2017-04-27 18:17 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>:

>
>
> On 4/27/2017 12:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> If there is a primary physical reality, you have to explain how it drives
>> the arithmetical consciousness flux. But how could it do that? If it does
>> it in a digitally simulable way, it cannot work (because that is done in
>> arithmetic too)
>>
>
> We've just been through (again) finding there is no contradiction between
> physics and arithmetic.  Your answer seems to be that physics can be an
> illusion of digital thought, therefore primary physics is otiose.  But
> thought can't be a consequence of physics becausewell you just don't
> see how it could be.
>
>
Thought *can be* a consequence of physics *but not* in a computationalist
setting, as in computationalism, though are the result of computations
which  are not physical object.

I don't see any problem with computationalism being false... but if it is
true, then to predict correctly your next state, you should have to take
into account the infinity of computations computing your current state to
have a measure on your next states...


In QM you take the current state into account by a finite description.  The
idea that there are an infinity of computations is of no use since that
doesn't tell you anything about what it would mean to "take account of
them".


Because if all these infinity of computations exists, at every steps they
diverge, so to make predictions you have to have a measure functions.



If you restrict computations by "physically instantiated in this
universe"... well it's not computationalism...


But it's a lot more useful - and testable.


I don't care, because the only thing I said is that's not computationalism.

Quentin



Brent

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Re: What are atheists for?

2017-04-27 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2017-04-27 18:23 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker :

>
>
> On 4/27/2017 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> If I say "yes" to the doctor, I am simply accepting that if the brain is
>>> replaced by a completely equivalent device, then I will survive. This is a
>>> matter of understanding the physics -- not a theological matter.
>>>
>>
>> The problem is that we can show that IF I am a machine, THEN I cannot
>> know which machine I am. So, incompleteness will justify that saying "yes"
>> to the doctor asks for a genuine leap of faith. It is a theology in that
>> sense.
>>
>
> To say "yes" to the doctor only requires that the doctor know the physics
> of your construction ("at the right substitution level" as you say).  He
> doesn't need to know what algorithms that physics can compute.  So the
> "leap of faith" is just in the substitution level.


And being sure reproducing it is sufficient for you staying you... Only you
would know (or not) if it's the case... it's like quantum suicide.. if it's
true, only you would know (and even then, you can't be sure)


> And from an engineering viewpoint, one may not be very concerned with
> whether one's Godel sentence is changed from one to another by the doctor.
>
> Brent
>
>
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Re: What are atheists for?

2017-04-27 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2017-04-27 18:17 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker :

>
>
> On 4/27/2017 12:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> If there is a primary physical reality, you have to explain how it drives
>> the arithmetical consciousness flux. But how could it do that? If it does
>> it in a digitally simulable way, it cannot work (because that is done in
>> arithmetic too)
>>
>
> We've just been through (again) finding there is no contradiction between
> physics and arithmetic.  Your answer seems to be that physics can be an
> illusion of digital thought, therefore primary physics is otiose.  But
> thought can't be a consequence of physics becausewell you just don't
> see how it could be.
>
>
Thought *can be* a consequence of physics *but not* in a computationalist
setting, as in computationalism, though are the result of computations
which  are not physical object.

I don't see any problem with computationalism being false... but if it is
true, then to predict correctly your next state, you should have to take
into account the infinity of computations computing your current state to
have a measure on your next states...

If you restrict computations by "physically instantiated in this
universe"... well it's not computationalism...

Quentin

>
> Brent
>
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Re: What are atheists for?

2017-04-26 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le 26 avr. 2017 11:21 PM, "Brent Meeker"  a écrit :



On 4/26/2017 9:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

> You can't invalidate an argument by invoking your own theory (which seems
> to assume that there is some world). Like Quentin said, when a world is
> assumed, it is only to get a reductio ad absurdum, in the computationalist
> theoretical frame.
>

I appreciate that.  But as I see it we have two theories: One supposes
there is a physical world and we observe it.  Within this theory there are
an enormous number of detailed, precise, surprising, accurate predictions.
The other makes only a few very general, qualitative predictions
(uncertainty, linearity,...).  It purportedly explains some things about
consciousness (e.g. limitations of self-knowledge) although this is
qualitative and is generally untestable.  But it supposedly makes the first
theory otiose.

Of course in science we don't need to choose between these theories - we
can wait and see what develops.  But claims that the second has proven the
first one wrong seem premature.

Brent


That 's not what is claimed... What is claimed is that *if* the second is
true, then the first is otiose.

Also, in *physicalist* frame saying mind supervenes on computations is
meaningless, in physicalist frame, mind supervene on matter, computation is
at most a description of what is.

Regards, Quentin


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Re: What are atheists for?

2017-04-26 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2017-04-26 9:37 GMT+02:00 David Nyman :

>
>
> On 26 Apr 2017 1:04 a.m., "Brent Meeker"  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 4/25/2017 10:19 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 25 Apr 2017 5:15 a.m., "Brent Meeker"  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 4/24/2017 10:02 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 24 Apr 2017 7:32 a.m., "Brent Meeker"  wrote:
>
> I don't think there's any question that non-physical things exist, like
> chess and insurance and computations.  The question was whether the
> assumption that computations can instantiate a mind, i.e. the possibility
> of a conscious robot, entails a contradiction of something.  The
> "something" having to do with physics, is part of what I would like
> eulicidated.  Bruno says it reverses the relationship of physics and
> psychology...but that's more of a polemic slogan than entailment of a
> contradiction.
>
>
> I don't think so. Here's the way I see it. Let's say we accept as a
> hypothesis a computational ontology. Since this requires no more than the
> natural numbers with +  and * this amounts to an ontology of arithmetic.
> Platonism be damned, our interest at this point is merely in seeing where
> the hypothesis can take us. So, computationalism leads us to the extension
> of the UD, which in turn gives us the digital machine, aka the fully
> fungible universal computational device. The reversal then is between role
> of the "psychology" of that universal machine and the subset of the trace
> of the UD assumed to implement physics.
>
>
> The UD doesn't have a "psychology".  Bruno talks about the "beliefs" of a
> universal theorem prover in arithmetic...but that's not a UD.   And was is
> "the trace of the UD".  To talk of taking a "subset of the trace" sounds to
> me like handing waving: We'll make a machine that writes all possible
> sentences and then there's a subset that describes the world.
>
>
> The former is now required to play the role of filter or selector on
> behalf of the latter; it's what distinguishes​ it from the much more
> general computational background. Of course that "filtration", by
> assumption, essentially equates to the extremely high probability of that
> very subset being required to support its own self-selection.
>
>
> Are you saying this "subset of the trace" must have a high probability of
> existing, or it has, by some measure, a high probability relative to other
> stuff not in the trace.  If the latter, and if the measure can be defined,
> that would be an interesting result; but when I've asked about this in the
> past Bruno has just said it's a hoped for result.
>
> I understand that Bruno wants to take thoughts as fundamental and the
> wants to identify thoughts with provable or computable propositions in
> arithmetic.  He thinks that the modality of "provable" is somehow a good
> model of "believes" or "thinks".  But even if that were true (I don't think
> it is) it fails to account for the physical world which one thinks about
> and acts in.
>
>
> IOW it's selection by observation, with the part of "universal point of
> view" falling to the suitably programmed digital machine. It from bit
> really, but without the prior commitment to physics as the unexplained (aka
> primitive) assumption. OK?
>
>
> You don't seem to have even mentioned a contradiction.
>
>
> As far as the contradiction is concerned, I think you've found it for
> yourself. You've said many times that the number 2 has no independent
> existence but must depend on there being 2 things. IOW, you take the view
> that numbers are inferred only secondarily from objects which, broadly, is
> the intuitionist position on mathematics. Fine, if so for numbers, then
> equally so for computation. If computation is at root an inference from the
> relations between objects, and at the same time one holds that
> consciousness supervenes on those inferred relations, then one has reasoned
> oneself around in a circle, and not a virtuous one at that. Is it really
> intelligible to say that your mind supervenes on a set of secondary
> relations that are themselves nothing other than a product of its own
> powers of inference?
>
>
> But on that account they are not "nothing other than" - the are
> *instantiated* computational relations.
>
>
> Sorry, Brent, that doesn't help. AFAICT you're just dodging my point.
> Could you respond in a way that isn't merely a verbal flourish?
>

As I said earlier, if you assume physicalism, computationalism is just a
cute story... not what is... because mind in this case does not supervene
on computation but on matter, and in that case you still have to prove the
equivalence of implementations, as it's not "abstract" computation that
enact mind but matter. Would the same program which has been shown to
support a mind on a super speedy computer, would also on a very very very
slow computer ? Normally this if computation are abstract, this shouldn't
change anything...

Quentin


>
> 

Re: What are atheists for?

2017-04-24 Thread Quentin Anciaux
I think the concept of computationalism in a physicalist frame is
meaningless, or only can be viewed as a cute story about the real thing...
computation is not a physical notion, so either the mind is a computation,
in which case physicalism is in that setting is not the ontology, or the
mind is a physical thing, which could be approximated by the notion of
computation... but this is not computationalism...

Quentin

2017-04-24 8:31 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>:

> I don't think there's any question that non-physical things exist, like
> chess and insurance and computations.  The question was whether the
> assumption that computations can instantiate a mind, i.e. the possibility
> of a conscious robot, entails a contradiction of something.  The
> "something" having to do with physics, is part of what I would like
> eulicidated.  Bruno says it reverses the relationship of physics and
> psychology...but that's more of a polemic slogan than entailment of a
> contradiction.  He also says it entails the non-existence of "primary
> matter"but what is "primary matter".  I've studied physics for many
> years and primary matter was never mentioned.  But it is said to be
> logically contrary to the assumption that computations can instantiate a
> mind...whatever that means.
>
> Brent
>
> On 4/23/2017 3:52 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> It's you who's begging the question, first define what is a computation
> with physics first, without relying on abstract mathematical notion.
>
> Le 23 avr. 2017 12:45 PM, "Bruce Kellett" <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> a
> écrit :
>
>> On 23/04/2017 6:53 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> Le 23 avr. 2017 10:32, "Bruce Kellett" <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> a
>> écrit :
>>
>> But that does not prove that the computation does not run on a physical
>> computer. I take JC's point to be that your assumption of the primacy of
>> the abstract computation is unprovable. We at least have experience of
>> physical computers, and not of non-physical computers. (Whatever you say to
>> the contrary,
>>
>>
>> You're making an ontological commitment and closing any discussion on
>> it...
>>
>>
>> All I am asking for is a demonstration of the contradiction that you all
>> claim exists between computationalism and physicalism -- a contradiction
>> that does not simply depend on a definition of computationalism that
>> explicitly states "physicalism is false". In other words, where is the
>> contradiction?  A demonstration that does not just beg the question.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
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Re: What are atheists for?

2017-04-23 Thread Quentin Anciaux
It's you who's begging the question, first define what is a computation
with physics first, without relying on abstract mathematical notion.

Le 23 avr. 2017 12:45 PM, "Bruce Kellett" <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> a
écrit :

> On 23/04/2017 6:53 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> Le 23 avr. 2017 10:32, "Bruce Kellett" <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> a
> écrit :
>
> But that does not prove that the computation does not run on a physical
> computer. I take JC's point to be that your assumption of the primacy of
> the abstract computation is unprovable. We at least have experience of
> physical computers, and not of non-physical computers. (Whatever you say to
> the contrary,
>
>
> You're making an ontological commitment and closing any discussion on
> it...
>
>
> All I am asking for is a demonstration of the contradiction that you all
> claim exists between computationalism and physicalism -- a contradiction
> that does not simply depend on a definition of computationalism that
> explicitly states "physicalism is false". In other words, where is the
> contradiction?  A demonstration that does not just beg the question.
>
> Bruce
>
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Re: What are atheists for?

2017-04-23 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le 23 avr. 2017 10:32, "Bruce Kellett"  a écrit :

On 23/04/2017 6:18 pm, Telmo Menezes wrote:

> On Sun, Apr 23, 2017 at 12:42 AM, Bruce Kellett
>  wrote:
>
>> On 23/04/2017 12:52 am, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>>> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 6:12 AM, Brent Meeker 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On 4/21/2017 3:42 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

> John is accusing you of naive dualism. He says that you claim that
> there is some mysterious substance (he finally called it a "soul")
> that is not copied in your thought experiment. What I claim is this:
> under physicalist assumptions, everything was copied. The problem is
> that physicalism leads to a contradiction,
>

 I don't agree that it leads to a contradiction.  Can spell out what that
 contradiction is?

>>> Shortly (sorry for any lack of rigour):
>>> If you assume computationalism, the computation that is currently
>>> supporting your mind state can be repeated in time and space. Maybe
>>> your current computation happens in the original planet Earth but also
>>> in a Universal Dovetailer running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a
>>> far-away galaxy. Given a multiverse, it seems reasonable to assume
>>> that these repetitions are bound to happen (also with the simulation
>>> argument, etc.). And yet our mind states are experienced as unique. It
>>> follows that, given computationalism, mind cannot be spatially or
>>> temporally situated, thus cannot be physical.
>>>
>>
>> This does not demonstrate any contradiction with physicalism. In fact, you
>> examples are all completely consistent with the requirement that any
>> computation requires a physical substrate -- "a Universal Dovetailer
>> running
>> on a Jupiter-sized computer in a far-away galaxy" is a completely physical
>> concept.
>>
> Sure, how could I show a contradiction without assuming both
> computationalism and physicalism?
>
> Do you disagree that my argument shows that a computationalist mind
> cannot be spatially or temporally situated?
>
Of course I disagree. Your argument requires that all the computations be
physically instantiated. SO even if there are many instantiations, each and
every one is spatially and temporally situated.


If you don't, do you disagree that something that is not spatially or
> temporally situated is incompatible with physicalism?
>

I certainly disagree because you have confused "having many locations" with
"having no location". Many things are not physical, but are properties of,
or manifested by, physical objects or beings. Values such as justice and
mercy are not physical, but are exhibited, or not, by physical beings.



Even given computationalism -- the idea that you consciousness is a
>> computation -- there is no contradiction with physicalism. You have to add
>> something else -- namely, hard mathematical platonism, the idea that all
>> computations exist in the abstract, in platonia, and do not require
>> physical
>> implementation. But that is merely the assumption that physicalism is
>> false.
>> So it may be the case that mathematical platonism does not require a
>> physical universe, but it does not contradict physicalism: it is perfectly
>> possible that your consciousness is a computation, and that mathematical
>> platonism is true, but that there is still a primitive physical universe
>> and
>> that any actual computations require a physical substrate -- as JC keeps
>> insisting.
>>
> The scenario you propose would require the following:
>
> - my mind supervenes on computation C;
> - my mind exists if computation C is performed by at least one
> physical substrate P;
> - if the computation C is performed by several physical substrates P1,
> P2, P3, nothing changes, my mind still exists as unique;
>
> Suppose one of the physical realities, say P1, is what you call
> primitive and C is running on P1. You would say I am experiencing the
> primitive universe. But then P2 (the giant Jupiter computer) also
> starts running the computation. In fact, at some point, the real earth
> is destroyed but P2 continues.
>
> So, if the physical substrate you propose exists, there is no way of
> knowing if that is the physical reality that my mind perceives. There
> is no way that I can access it or verify it's existence.
>

This seems to be nothing more than the universality of Turing computation
-- it is the same computation whatever computer it is run on. But that does
not prove that there is no computer. Your simulation ideas are just the
hypothesis that the program is more complicated than you first thought, it
does not change the fact that your consciousness is a computation running
on a physical computer.

We never have access to "ultimate truth". The best we can ever achieve is a
model or theort=y that accords with every aspect of the reality we
experience. That is known as science.


In my view,
> what you are proposing is not different than positing that 

Re: What are atheists for?

2017-04-23 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Did not see the rest of the post.

Le 23 avr. 2017 09:57, "Bruce Kellett" <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> a écrit :

On 23/04/2017 5:44 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Le 23 avr. 2017 09:16, "Bruce Kellett" < <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> a écrit :

On 23/04/2017 5:05 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

The only direct experience I have is me, not physics.


That is solipsism.


No that would be if i'd say only me is real... That's not what I said. It's
a fact that the only *direct* experience I have is me.


And you are a physical being If you thereby deny the existence of the
external objective world, that is most certainly solipsism.


Physics is an explanation of my experiences, not reality.


So your experiences are not real? If physics explains your experiences,
then physics is primary --


No, physics as such use mathematics to explain, and rely on rules of
mathematics to ascertain its explanations, as such it is dubious to make it
primary. For it to be primary, physics should not rely on inference rules.
You can't use an higher level to explain the lower feature, because if in
the lower is primary, everything should reduce to it.


What basis do you have for claiming that the rules of inference are of a
higher level? They are perfectly easily understood as deriving from
experience -- i.e., from our experience of an objective external world.


No because it uses induction to establish truth, the explanation relies on
logic for consistency, and unless you have an explanation of logic without
logic, you have a problem, as per physicalism logic must reduce to *matter*
explanation, and you can't use logic to justify itself, unless it is
primary on physics itself.

In fact, where else could they come from? Do you have direct intuitive
access to the higher realms of Platonia? What facility do you use for this
direct intuition? And how do you verify its reliability? Inference rules,
and mathematics, derive fundamentally from experience, and that is our
experience of the physical world.

You are doing nothing more than making assertions here -- there is no
argument, no evidence, no substantiation for your claims.

Bruce

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Re: What are atheists for?

2017-04-23 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le 23 avr. 2017 09:57, "Bruce Kellett" <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> a écrit :

On 23/04/2017 5:44 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Le 23 avr. 2017 09:16, "Bruce Kellett" < <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> a écrit :

On 23/04/2017 5:05 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

The only direct experience I have is me, not physics.


That is solipsism.


No that would be if i'd say only me is real... That's not what I said. It's
a fact that the only *direct* experience I have is me.


And you are a physical being If you thereby deny the existence of the
external objective world, that is most certainly solipsism.


Again, I do not... I was answering to the claim I have direct experience of
physics, which is clearly and plainly false.


Physics is an explanation of my experiences, not reality.


So your experiences are not real? If physics explains your experiences,
then physics is primary --


No, physics as such use mathematics to explain, and rely on rules of
mathematics to ascertain its explanations, as such it is dubious to make it
primary. For it to be primary, physics should not rely on inference rules.
You can't use an higher level to explain the lower feature, because if in
the lower is primary, everything should reduce to it.


What basis do you have for claiming that the rules of inference are of a
higher level? They are perfectly easily understood as deriving from
experience -- i.e., from our experience of an objective external world. In
fact, where else could they come from? Do you have direct intuitive access
to the higher realms of Platonia? What facility do you use for this direct
intuition? And how do you verify its reliability? Inference rules, and
mathematics, derive fundamentally from experience, and that is our
experience of the physical world.

You are doing nothing more than making assertions here -- there is no
argument, no evidence, no substantiation for your claims.

Bruce

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Re: What are atheists for?

2017-04-23 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le 23 avr. 2017 09:16, "Bruce Kellett" <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> a écrit :

On 23/04/2017 5:05 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

The only direct experience I have is me, not physics.


That is solipsism.


No that would be if i'd say only me is real... That's not what I said. It's
a fact that the only *direct* experience I have is me.



Physics is an explanation of my experiences, not reality.


So your experiences are not real? If physics explains your experiences,
then physics is primary --


No, physics as such use mathematics to explain, and rely on rules of
mathematics to ascertain its explanations, as such it is dubious to make it
primary. For it to be primary, physics should not rely on inference rules.
You can't use an higher level to explain the lower feature, because if in
the lower is primary, everything should reduce to it.

Quentin

it is the reality underlying your experiences.

You said it -- I am not putting words into your mouth. I think you may be
finding that your solipsism leads to nothing but confusion.

Bruce


Quentin

Le 23 avr. 2017 4:08 AM, "John Clark" <johnkcl...@gmail.com> a écrit :

> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 9:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux < <allco...@gmail.com>
> allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> ​ > ​
>> How can you justify logic from physics if logic is primary to prove
>> anything?
>>
>
> ​
> Physics does not need logic or mathematics or anything else to prove it's
> existence to us because we all have the ability to detect physics by direct
> experience
> ​ ,​
> ​ and that far outranks proof.​
> Humans originally
> ​ ​
> invented mathematics to better understand and manipulate the physical
> world
> ​, and logic is the stuff that produces no inconsistencies with our
> observation of that physical world. ​
>
>
>  ​John ​K Clark
>

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Re: What are atheists for?

2017-04-23 Thread Quentin Anciaux
The only direct experience I have is me, not physics. Physics is an
explanation of my experiences, not reality.

Quentin

Le 23 avr. 2017 4:08 AM, "John Clark" <johnkcl...@gmail.com> a écrit :

> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 9:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> How can you justify logic from physics if logic is primary to prove
>> anything?
>>
>
> ​
> Physics does not need logic or mathematics or anything else to prove it's
> existence to us because we all have the ability to detect physics by direct
> experience
> ​,​
> ​ and that far outranks proof.​
> Humans originally
> ​ ​
> invented mathematics to better understand and manipulate the physical world
> ​, and logic is the stuff that produces no inconsistencies with our
> observation of that physical world. ​
>
>
>  ​John ​K Clark
>
>
>
> --
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Re: What are atheists for?

2017-04-23 Thread Quentin Anciaux
If you take them as tools  to explain physics, then yes. But you, don't. So
no.

Le 23 avr. 2017 8:52 AM, "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> a écrit :

So you're defining computationalism as "not everything reduces to
matter...and it's processes and relations?"  That's quite different from
the idea that consciousness would survive substititution of different
substrates for brains provided certain computations were preserved.

Does the existence of insurance, or chess, also contradict physicalism?

Brent


On 4/22/2017 4:03 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

> The contradiction is in requiring computation which is a mathematical
> notion, if physicalism is true, so everything reduce to matter,
> computationalism is false by definition, as computation as such is not a
> physical notion.
>
> Regards,
> Quentin
>

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Re: What are atheists for?

2017-04-22 Thread Quentin Anciaux
How can you justify logic from physics if logic is primary to prove
anything? You're building your lower layer upon an higher layer... It's
contradictory.


Le 23 avr. 2017 02:21, "Bruce Kellett" <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> a écrit :

On 23/04/2017 10:01 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

If everything reduce to matter then the tools you use to prove and
demonstrate are *false*... The truth of them are inconsistent if only real
is physically realised computations... Even the notion of realised
computation proved by definition that computation is not a physical notion.


Existence is not a matter of definition. Rules of inference are abstract,
not concrete, but abstractions do not contradict the concrete.

Bruce



Quentin

Le 23 avr. 2017 01:34, "Bruce Kellett" <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> a écrit :

> On 23/04/2017 9:03 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> The contradiction is in requiring computation which is a mathematical
> notion, if physicalism is true, so everything reduce to matter,
> computationalism is false by definition, as computation as such is not a
> physical notion.
>
>
> That is just word salad. A description of a physical process is not, in
> itself, physical (unless it is written down or stored physically).
> Similarly, computation is not physical in so far as it is an abstract
> description of what a computer does. But the computer is physical, and the
> computation does not exist absent the computer.
>
> It seems that you have merely defined computationalism as the thesis that
> physicalism is false, and then claimed that the assumption of
> computationalism contradicts physicalism. But that is logic chopping of the
> basest kind.
>
> Bruno, at least, starts from the "Yes, doctor" idea, which is not, of
> itself, inconsistent with physicalism, and then attempts to argue that the
> notion of abstract computations (platonia) renders the physical otiose.
> There is still no contradiction. The best that Bruno can achieve is
> something that seems absurd to him. But that is merely a contradiction with
> his instinctive notions of what is reasonable -- it is not a demonstrated
> logical contradiction.
>
> Bruce
>

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Re: What are atheists for?

2017-04-22 Thread Quentin Anciaux
If everything reduce to matter then the tools you use to prove and
demonstrate are *false*... The truth of them are inconsistent if only real
is physically realised computations... Even the notion of realised
computation proved by definition that computation is not a physical notion.
Quentin

Le 23 avr. 2017 01:34, "Bruce Kellett" <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> a écrit :

> On 23/04/2017 9:03 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> The contradiction is in requiring computation which is a mathematical
> notion, if physicalism is true, so everything reduce to matter,
> computationalism is false by definition, as computation as such is not a
> physical notion.
>
>
> That is just word salad. A description of a physical process is not, in
> itself, physical (unless it is written down or stored physically).
> Similarly, computation is not physical in so far as it is an abstract
> description of what a computer does. But the computer is physical, and the
> computation does not exist absent the computer.
>
> It seems that you have merely defined computationalism as the thesis that
> physicalism is false, and then claimed that the assumption of
> computationalism contradicts physicalism. But that is logic chopping of the
> basest kind.
>
> Bruno, at least, starts from the "Yes, doctor" idea, which is not, of
> itself, inconsistent with physicalism, and then attempts to argue that the
> notion of abstract computations (platonia) renders the physical otiose.
> There is still no contradiction. The best that Bruno can achieve is
> something that seems absurd to him. But that is merely a contradiction with
> his instinctive notions of what is reasonable -- it is not a demonstrated
> logical contradiction.
>
> Bruce
>
>
>
> Regards,
> Quentin
>
> Le 23 avr. 2017 00:42, "Bruce Kellett" <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> a
> écrit :
>
>> On 23/04/2017 12:52 am, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>>> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 6:12 AM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 4/21/2017 3:42 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> John is accusing you of naive dualism. He says that you claim that
>>>>> there is some mysterious substance (he finally called it a "soul")
>>>>> that is not copied in your thought experiment. What I claim is this:
>>>>> under physicalist assumptions, everything was copied. The problem is
>>>>> that physicalism leads to a contradiction,
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I don't agree that it leads to a contradiction.  Can spell out what that
>>>> contradiction is?
>>>>
>>> Shortly (sorry for any lack of rigour):
>>> If you assume computationalism, the computation that is currently
>>> supporting your mind state can be repeated in time and space. Maybe
>>> your current computation happens in the original planet Earth but also
>>> in a Universal Dovetailer running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a
>>> far-away galaxy. Given a multiverse, it seems reasonable to assume
>>> that these repetitions are bound to happen (also with the simulation
>>> argument, etc.). And yet our mind states are experienced as unique. It
>>> follows that, given computationalism, mind cannot be spatially or
>>> temporally situated, thus cannot be physical.
>>>
>>
>> This does not demonstrate any contradiction with physicalism. In fact,
>> you examples are all completely consistent with the requirement that any
>> computation requires a physical substrate -- "a Universal Dovetailer
>> running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a far-away galaxy" is a completely
>> physical concept.
>>
>> Even given computationalism -- the idea that you consciousness is a
>> computation -- there is no contradiction with physicalism. You have to add
>> something else -- namely, hard mathematical platonism, the idea that all
>> computations exist in the abstract, in platonia, and do not require
>> physical implementation. But that is merely the assumption that physicalism
>> is false. So it may be the case that mathematical platonism does not
>> require a physical universe, but it does not contradict physicalism: it is
>> perfectly possible that your consciousness is a computation, and that
>> mathematical platonism is true, but that there is still a primitive
>> physical universe and that any actual computations require a physical
>> substrate -- as JC keeps insisting.
>>
>> No contradiction has been demonstrated.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
> --
> You received this message bec

Re: What are atheists for?

2017-04-22 Thread Quentin Anciaux
The contradiction is in requiring computation which is a mathematical
notion, if physicalism is true, so everything reduce to matter,
computationalism is false by definition, as computation as such is not a
physical notion.

Regards,
Quentin

Le 23 avr. 2017 00:42, "Bruce Kellett"  a écrit :

> On 23/04/2017 12:52 am, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 6:12 AM, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On 4/21/2017 3:42 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
 John is accusing you of naive dualism. He says that you claim that
 there is some mysterious substance (he finally called it a "soul")
 that is not copied in your thought experiment. What I claim is this:
 under physicalist assumptions, everything was copied. The problem is
 that physicalism leads to a contradiction,

>>>
>>> I don't agree that it leads to a contradiction.  Can spell out what that
>>> contradiction is?
>>>
>> Shortly (sorry for any lack of rigour):
>> If you assume computationalism, the computation that is currently
>> supporting your mind state can be repeated in time and space. Maybe
>> your current computation happens in the original planet Earth but also
>> in a Universal Dovetailer running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a
>> far-away galaxy. Given a multiverse, it seems reasonable to assume
>> that these repetitions are bound to happen (also with the simulation
>> argument, etc.). And yet our mind states are experienced as unique. It
>> follows that, given computationalism, mind cannot be spatially or
>> temporally situated, thus cannot be physical.
>>
>
> This does not demonstrate any contradiction with physicalism. In fact, you
> examples are all completely consistent with the requirement that any
> computation requires a physical substrate -- "a Universal Dovetailer
> running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a far-away galaxy" is a completely
> physical concept.
>
> Even given computationalism -- the idea that you consciousness is a
> computation -- there is no contradiction with physicalism. You have to add
> something else -- namely, hard mathematical platonism, the idea that all
> computations exist in the abstract, in platonia, and do not require
> physical implementation. But that is merely the assumption that physicalism
> is false. So it may be the case that mathematical platonism does not
> require a physical universe, but it does not contradict physicalism: it is
> perfectly possible that your consciousness is a computation, and that
> mathematical platonism is true, but that there is still a primitive
> physical universe and that any actual computations require a physical
> substrate -- as JC keeps insisting.
>
> No contradiction has been demonstrated.
>
> Bruce
>
> --
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Re: What are atheists for?

2017-04-19 Thread Quentin Anciaux
I think you're overthinking it... The motivation of John is clear, plain
and simple, he is a troll... He likes to contradict, if his contradiction
is plainly false the better... He has no other motivation than being a
troll... he must enjoy it that much for doing it since so long.

So don't feed the troll, stop answering him... as he likes it, that can
continue till death of one of you, you won't make him acknowledge anything
you say or change his mind... that would presuppose he has one, which is
very unlikely.

2017-04-19 9:24 GMT+02:00 Bruno Marchal :

>
> On 18 Apr 2017, at 18:10, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 5:48 PM, John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 4:27 AM, Bruno Marchal 
>>> wrote:
>>>

>
>>> John Clark has no need to precisely define the word "you" because
> John
> Clark has no need to use that or any other personal pronoun to explain
> John
> Clark's ideas but instead can simply
> use a proper noun. By contrast Bruno Marchal can not do that because
> the
> inherent ambiguity the word "you" will always have if a "you"
> duplicating
> machine is going to be used
> on "you"
> in the future is the only thing that disguises the underlying
> silliness of Bruno Marchal's ideas.
>
>

> I can do that, I did do that, and you did not answer. I let you find
 the
 post.

>>>
>>>
>>> Ah yes that mythical magical post that you've been talking about for
>>> years,
>>> the wonderful post where you logically refute all my points and make your
>>> theory crystal clear with no circularity or ambiguity, the post that is,
>>> unfortunately, as hard to find
>>> as
>>> the Loch Ness Monster, unicorns,
>>> or
>>> the
>>> pot of gold at the end of
>>> a
>>> rainbow.
>>>
>>
>> You know why it's hard to find? Because every time that post shows up you:
>>
>> go silent;
>> wait a certain amount of time;
>> come back to the beginning of the loop.
>>
>> That's why. It doesn't take an oracle to figure out that this
>> computation doesn't terminate.
>>
>> In any case, the post will never work with you. Natural language is (I
>> think necessarily) ambiguous, so it is only possible to discuss ideas
>> if all interlocutors are acting in good faith. The opportunities to
>> misinterpret anything on purpose are infinite, and you are a master at
>> taking advantage of them.
>>
>> How to talk about first-person experience vs. third-person theory with
>> someone who is fixated on pronoun legalese? Forget about it -- with no
>> offense to Bruno -- it's a fool's errand.
>>
>
>
> John was doing a rhetorical maneuver again. The "mythical post" was just
> the sane04 paper. I was only alluding to the hundreds of post where he did
> what you describe above, where he introduces an ambiguity in the proper
> name or pronouns by abstracting from the 1p-3p distinction in the
> duplication experiences, and when someone explained this to him, he
> answered with "peepee" or thing at that level. I was alluding to hundreds
> of posts. John has never write one clear post refuting the step-3 which
> would make it possible to answer by one post. There is no need for this, as
> the answer is in the publications, which makes clear the 1-3 distinction,
> so the ambiguity that John dreams for cannot occur.
>
> It is not innocuous, as John is not the only one doing that. he is the
> only one doing it in front of me, so to speak. But the refusal of my thesis
> in 1998 in Brussels was based on similar maneuver (behind my back though),
> and the disappearance of the Le Monde prize too, and this by the director
> of the thesis in France, which was rather enthusiast at the defense of the
> thesis. That is why I try to understand their motivation. I know the
> motivation in Brussels, but elsewhere it is still a mystery.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>> Telmo.
>>
>> John K Clark
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>
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>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> --
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Re: What are atheists for?

2017-04-13 Thread Quentin Anciaux
After ten years of peepee talk, you should have left this list... nothing
interesting came from you and nothing will... when you're wrong, you simply
ignore it and go back in a loop.

On the other side, I'm still confuse after that much time of dumb talk,
Bruno still wants to try to argue with you, it's pointless.

If I had to bet between the mythical friend of Bruno and you having any
friends... I'd bet on the realness of Bruno's friend.

Please leave and don't come back.

2017-04-13 19:07 GMT+02:00 John Clark :

> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 10:04 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> I did just bet to a friend that your answer would contain the word
>> "peepee". I win!
>>
>
> ​And I bet the same mythical friend that every post of yours would either
> contain a peepee personal pronoun, accuse me of being religious, refer to
> some fossilized ancient Greek, or contain the phrase "you confuse". I win.
>  ​
>
>
> ​ John K Clark​
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
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Re: Non-Evolutionary Superintelligences Do Nothing, Eventually

2016-09-17 Thread Quentin Anciaux
I think what he meant is 'Je marie ma nièce',  I'm going to my niece
wedding...

Le 17 sept. 2016 9:59 PM, "Brent Meeker"  a écrit :

>
>
> On 9/17/2016 12:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> I will look at it next week, as I am marry my niece today, and it is a
>> busy week-end and beginning of week.
>>
>
> Is that legal in Belgium?
>
> Brent
>
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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

2016-08-04 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2016-08-04 19:20 GMT+02:00 smitra :

> On 04-08-2016 03:05, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> On 8/3/2016 4:30 PM, smitra wrote:
>>
>>> On 04-08-2016 01:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>>
 On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:

 On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a
>> mistake,
>> which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one
>> of
>> the many copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those
>> copies are not continuations of the you who won the lottery.
>>
>
> I'm imagining waking up after a night of heavy drinking with
> memories gradually returning. Now, you can, of course, condition
> everything on the person who will find that he won the lottery. But
> making that a hard part of my identity doesn't make sense to me,
> otherwise you could not be the same person and forget about it, or
> consider being the same person who participated in the lottery who
> then went on to win it.
>
> Now,while this boils down to an arbitrary definition of personal
> identity, we should be consistent about this; you can be the same
> person as the won who had not yet won it, and you could imagine
> being a person who did not win it, then you'll likely end up waking
> up as a copy in another branch who did not win it.
>

  That seems to invoke a dualism, such that there's only one real "you"
 who may be in different branches at different times.  I'd say that if
 "you" wake up as a copy in another branch where "you" didn't win, it's
 because "you" didn't win.  It's the same as saying the man who sees
 Moscow didn't "wake up" as the man who sees Washington.

  Brent

>>>
>>> We can turn this into a reverse Bruno-like problem. If your memory is
>>> temporarily cleared then copies of different branches merge.
>>>
>>
>> You mean there are branches of the world in which your memory of
>> yesterday, when the lottery was drawn, is erased (and we're supposing
>> there is no physics, so there is no physical evidence of yesterday?).
>> Then the threads of consciousness constituting Saibal before yesterday
>> AND suffering amnesia about yesterday will merge with each other, but
>> NOT with the threads of Saibal that do remember yesterday.
>>
>> The branches will of course be different, but you without a memory of
>>> having won in the branch where you did win is the same you as the you in
>>> another branch were you did not win where you also have forgotten about not
>>> winning.
>>>
>>> The question is then if it is advisable to go through this procedure if
>>> you have won.
>>>
>>
>> You're supposing there's a "procedure" for erasing memory of
>> yesterday?  How could there be, there's no physics?  So there are some
>> Saibals that forgot yesterday, and whether or not "they" won, but the
>> forgetting wasn't a "procedure" because that would imply a physical
>> world context in which whether on not Saibal won would be evident in
>> the physical world and beyond mere "forgetting".  The forgetting would
>> just have to be a result of the computation.
>>
>
>
> I've written in the past about an elaborate procedure involving an AI that
> resets its memory, but I now think that this is not necessary.  It seems to
> me that every moment we experience is a new measurement of our state that
> is equivalent to forgetting everything and then just reloading all the
> information. Predictions of outcomes of experiments should not depend on
> making this assumption. Put differently, at any one time you could imagine
> yourself as being sampled randomly from the set of all observer moments.
>
>
This is basically ASSA... and it has all the problems ASSA has


> Saibal
>
>
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Re: Intelligent design - maybe?

2015-11-03 Thread Quentin Anciaux
PA = https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peano_axioms
RA = https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robinson_arithmetic

2015-11-03 21:17 GMT+01:00 John Mikes :

> I read it all, did not find what PA and RA are standing for.
> Can you explain in brief?
> Thanks
> John M
>
> On Tue, Nov 3, 2015 at 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 02 Nov 2015, at 18:30, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 11/1/2015 11:09 PM, Pierz wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, November 1, 2015 at 6:25:57 PM UTC+11, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/31/2015 11:47 PM, Pierz wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, November 1, 2015 at 4:18:05 PM UTC+11, Brent wrote:



 On 10/31/2015 8:55 PM, Pierz wrote:

 OK, a subject title designed to provoke, but here's a thought that has
 intrigued me. Computationalism (and let's not worry for the time being
 about whether one buys Bruno's UDA) states that consciousness supervenes on
 computation. This necesssarily implies (by Church thesis)  that the
 hardware doesn't matter. This commits us to some unintuitive scenarios in
 which thought is instantiated by means of carrier pigeons delivering
 letters with symbols written on them, or dominoes falling or whatever. It's
 assumed that such a computation must reach a certain level of complexity in
 order to become conscious, though what level of complexity is not
 specified. According to some views (Brent has expressed this position), it
 is necessary that the computations reference a "world", though I'll admit I
 don"t understand the rationale for that exactly. Important though is that
 it is neither necessary that the computations are carried out in some
 localised "device"/brain nor that they are carried out by "wetware".

 So my thinking is this: isn't *evolution* precisely such a
 computation?


 I take it you mean life is doing a computation which consists of
 finding ways to live and reproduce.  Life on Earth is executing  THE
 paradigmatic genetic algorithm.

 Exactly.
>>>
 It is undoubtedly an extremely complex calculation (more so than any
 human thought has ever been), and it undoubtedly "references a world".
 Bruno mentions "Loebianity" in this context as well, or the capacity for
 self-reference. I'm not so sure about this in relation to an evolutionary
 computation. Certainly it is a highly recursive procedure with a continual
 self-environment feedback loop. I don't understand Loebianity sufficiently
 to say whether genes , or the gene-environment system, might possess it.
 However I'm also not sure if it's required for consciousness, or merely
 *self*- consciousness. I don't see that the possession of qualia
 demands the possession of self-awareness, though I can also see that it is
 at least conceivable that an evolutionary feedback system might possess  a
 kind of self-reference.

 Anyway it seems that if we're committed to computationalism plus Church
 thesis, then we have to consider the possibility that evolution may be a
 conscious process - indeed the onus should be on us to say why it
 *wouldn't* be conscious. Which does not mean I am suggesting some
 mystical additional ingredient. Evolution would still be described
 objectively in terms of random mutation plus environmental selection, but
 this process may have an interior component, its own "1P".


 Yes, I think that's right in a sense.  Life in a sense forms a
 representation of the world.   If a alien scientist were told just about
 the living organisms on Earth he could infer a great deal about the
 inorganic aspects of the planet.   I don't know if you could say it's
 self-aware, except by inclusion of ourselves.  The problem is that it may
 be conscious in such a different way from humans or animals that it doesn't
 really add anything to our understanding of it to say it is conscious.
 I've sometimes had a similar idea about the atmosphere and weather.  Isn't
 weather a kind of computation performed by the atmosphere and isn't it
 aware of things in its environment like solar heating, ocean currents and
 temperatures, human activities like jet liners and burning fossil fuel,...

 Yes. But then isn't an orbiting planet carrying out a computation?
>>> Isn't a river? Isn't an atom doing quantum computing? It almost becomes a
>>> matter of perspective whether any given physical process is a computation
>>> or not, e.g., if someone wanted to compute the route that water would take
>>> down a given slope, they could "compute" it analogically with actual water
>>> on an actual slope. Which, combined with computationalism, seems like the
>>> (ahem) slippery slope to panpsychism, which *I* am happy enough with,
>>> but which I suspect to be too mystical for *your* metabolism...
>>>
>>>
>>> I don't see anything 

Re: Carroll's Paradox

2015-10-30 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2015-10-30 17:01 GMT+01:00 John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com>:

> On Thu, Oct 29, 2015 at 11:55 AM, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> ​>>​
>>> And I repeat, ​If the microprocessor made of matter that obeys the laws
>>> of physics can't sense **any** information in the AI program then the AI
>>> program is not running, it's​ not intelligent it's just a inert list of
>>> instructions DOING nothing.
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> Re-read what is written above...
>>
> ​
> ​OK​
>
> ​:​
>
> ​"​
> And I repeat, ​If the microprocessor made of matter that obeys the laws of
> physics can't sense **any** information in the AI program then the AI
> program is not running, it's​ not intelligent it's just a inert list of
> instructions DOING nothing.
> ​"​
>
>
>
>> ​> ​
>>>> how can that affect if ? how can it knows that external world ?*
>>>>
>>>
>>> ​
>>> ​>> ​
>>> It could have memories of that external world before the sensors were
>>> ​detached, if they were never attached then it could have no knowledge of
>>> that world
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> That's the point... as no information of that "external" world is fed to
>> it.
>>
>
> ​Not true. The AI's physical memory banks are in that external world and
> the information in it is sure as hell fed into it, as are the results of
> calculations made by the physical microprocessors that are also in that
> external physical world.
>

That's *not* information *about the physical world*... you are confusing
level as usual.

Bye


>
>
>> ​>> ​
>>> but it would still have knowledge of some virtual world in its memory
>>> banks.
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> Who cares ?
>>
>
> ​Well I care, and you should too it you ever want to remember anything or
> calculate anything. ​
>
>
>
>> ​>
>> he question was about the "external" world.
>>
>
> ​I know, and the external world is exactly where every single bit of the
> hardware that the AI needs
>
> ​to function is located. ​
>
>   John K Clark
>
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Re: Carroll's Paradox

2015-10-30 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2015-10-30 17:13 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com>:

>
>
> 2015-10-30 17:01 GMT+01:00 John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com>:
>
>> On Thu, Oct 29, 2015 at 11:55 AM, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> ​>>​
>>>> And I repeat, ​If the microprocessor made of matter that obeys the laws
>>>> of physics can't sense **any** information in the AI program then the AI
>>>> program is not running, it's​ not intelligent it's just a inert list of
>>>> instructions DOING nothing.
>>>>
>>>
>>> ​> ​
>>> Re-read what is written above...
>>>
>> ​
>> ​OK​
>>
>> ​:​
>>
>> ​"​
>> And I repeat, ​If the microprocessor made of matter that obeys the laws
>> of physics can't sense **any** information in the AI program then the AI
>> program is not running, it's​ not intelligent it's just a inert list of
>> instructions DOING nothing.
>> ​"​
>>
>>
>>
>>> ​> ​
>>>>> how can that affect if ? how can it knows that external world ?*
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ​
>>>> ​>> ​
>>>> It could have memories of that external world before the sensors were
>>>> ​detached, if they were never attached then it could have no knowledge of
>>>> that world
>>>>
>>>
>>> ​> ​
>>> That's the point... as no information of that "external" world is fed to
>>> it.
>>>
>>
>> ​Not true. The AI's physical memory banks are in that external world and
>> the information in it is sure as hell fed into it, as are the results of
>> calculations made by the physical microprocessors that are also in that
>> external physical world.
>>
>
> That's *not* information *about the physical world*... you are confusing
> level as usual.
>

I'll try again... fooling myself again in believing you're honest here...
with a simple real life example.

So let's pretend our "AI" is in fact a Nintendo Entertainment System
game... that game, can be run on a physical NES, or can be run in an
emulator running on a physical computer... or on an emulator running on an
emulator running on a physical computer...

>From the POV of the game, it is unable to distinguish those cases because
all informations it has from the substrate(machine running it) is the same,
the NES game cannot know it is not really running on a physical NES...

Same thing with the AI, the information it has access to, it cannot tell
the ontological status of what that information represent... those
informations could come from a really real ontological physical world... or
an emulation of the  really real ontological physical world or an emulation
of an emulation of the  really real ontological physical world it has
no way to decide the ontological status of that "external world".

Quentin




>
> Bye
>
>
>>
>>
>>> ​>> ​
>>>> but it would still have knowledge of some virtual world in its memory
>>>> banks.
>>>>
>>>
>>> ​> ​
>>> Who cares ?
>>>
>>
>> ​Well I care, and you should too it you ever want to remember anything
>> or calculate anything. ​
>>
>>
>>
>>> ​>
>>> he question was about the "external" world.
>>>
>>
>> ​I know, and the external world is exactly where every single bit of the
>> hardware that the AI needs
>>
>> ​to function is located. ​
>>
>>   John K Clark
>>
>> --
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>>
>
>
>
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
> Batty/Rutger Hauer)
>



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Re: Carroll's Paradox

2015-10-30 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2015-10-30 19:20 GMT+01:00 Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>:

>
>
> On 10/30/2015 9:30 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> 2015-10-30 17:13 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com>:
>
>>
>>
>> 2015-10-30 17:01 GMT+01:00 John Clark < <johnkcl...@gmail.com>
>> johnkcl...@gmail.com>:
>>
>>> On Thu, Oct 29, 2015 at 11:55 AM, Quentin Anciaux < <allco...@gmail.com>
>>> allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> ​ >>​
>>>>> And I repeat, ​If the microprocessor made of matter that obeys the
>>>>> laws of physics can't sense **any** information in the AI program then the
>>>>> AI program is not running, it's​ not intelligent it's just a inert list of
>>>>> instructions DOING nothing.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ​ > ​
>>>> Re-read what is written above...
>>>>
>>> ​
>>> ​OK​
>>>
>>> ​ :​
>>>
>>> ​ "​
>>> And I repeat, ​If the microprocessor made of matter that obeys the laws
>>> of physics can't sense **any** information in the AI program then the AI
>>> program is not running, it's​ not intelligent it's just a inert list of
>>> instructions DOING nothing.
>>> ​ "​
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> ​ > ​
>>>>>> how can that affect if ? how can it knows that external world ?*
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ​
>>>>> ​ >> ​
>>>>> It could have memories of that external world before the sensors were
>>>>> ​detached, if they were never attached then it could have no knowledge of
>>>>> that world
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ​ > ​
>>>> That's the point... as no information of that "external" world is fed
>>>> to it.
>>>>
>>>
>>> ​Not true. The AI's physical memory banks are in that external world and
>>> the information in it is sure as hell fed into it, as are the results of
>>> calculations made by the physical microprocessors that are also in that
>>> external physical world.
>>>
>>
>> That's *not* information *about the physical world*... you are confusing
>> level as usual.
>>
>
> I'll try again... fooling myself again in believing you're honest here...
> with a simple real life example.
>
> So let's pretend our "AI" is in fact a Nintendo Entertainment System
> game... that game, can be run on a physical NES, or can be run in an
> emulator running on a physical computer... or on an emulator running on an
> emulator running on a physical computer...
>
> From the POV of the game, it is unable to distinguish those cases because
> all informations it has from the substrate(machine running it) is the same,
> the NES game cannot know it is not really running on a physical NES...
>
> Same thing with the AI, the information it has access to, it cannot tell
> the ontological status of what that information represent... those
> informations could come from a really real ontological physical world... or
> an emulation of the  really real ontological physical world or an emulation
> of an emulation of the  really real ontological physical world it has
> no way to decide the ontological status of that "external world".
>
>
> I think you are confusing a virtual world with an AI.
>

No I'm not.


> An AI must be embedded in a world, a context, which it interacts with.
>

where this "must" come from ? an AI has to have a context sure... a world
"as in our everyday world"... why would it ?



> It can only be intelligent in the sense of interacting intelligently.
>

Either it is conscious or it is not... if it is conscious, it knows it, it
doesn't care if you see it behaving "intelligently" or not.


> A virtual world can't be intelligent.
>

What are you talking about ? I'm talking about the ability for an AI to
give an ontological status about the information it has on something
external to it... it has simply no way of doing it, as my example with the
game program illustrate it, the program cannot know if it is run directly
on the "metal" or on an emulation of it... which means from it's POV, the
direct "metal" or a virtual "metal" has the same "realness"... which makes
the "metal" from it's POV an hypothetical (it can or not be ontological,
the AI as simply no way to tell).

Quentin


> An AI will have some internal model of the world within which it interacts
> and that model has an ontology.
&g

Re: Carroll's Paradox

2015-10-29 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2015-10-29 16:33 GMT+01:00 John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com>:

> On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 12:40 PM, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> ​>> ​
>>> Matter always matters.
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> I repeat if there is *absolutely no sensors writing **any** information
>> in a *memory location* readable by the AI program
>>
>
> And I repeat, ​If the microprocessor made of matter that obeys the laws of
> physics can't sense **any** information in the AI program then the AI
> program is not running, it's​ not intelligent it's just a inert list of
> instructions DOING nothing.
>

Re-read what is written above...

>
>
>> ​> ​
>> how can that affect if ? how can it knows that external world ?*
>>
>
> ​It could have memories of that external world before the sensors were
> ​detached, if they were never attached then it could have no knowledge of
> that world
>

That's the point... as no information of that "external" world is fed to it.


> but it would still have knowledge of some virtual world in its memory
> banks.
>

Who cares ? the question was about the "external" world.


> If the stuff in its memory bank is not rich enough to be called a world
> then it wouldn't be a AI program, it would just be a program.
>
> ​> ​
>> yes the AI program runs on a physical computer if you want,
>>
>
> ​It's not what I want that's important, it's the universe that insists
>

You're the one insisting... didn't heard the universe complaining.


> that the AI program be running on a computer made of matter that obeys the
> laws of physics; nobody has ever made a calculation without physical
> matter.
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> and stopping it, stops the program
>>
>
> ​Agreed. ​
>
>
>> >
>> ​
>> from the POV of the AI program, that physical world has no bearing on it
>> nor even existence, as *nothing from it* absolutely *no information about
>> that external world* is passed to it,
>>
>
> ​Regardless of how abstract the AI's thoughts may be you can bet money
> that the physical state of its memory banks and the physical state of its
> microprocessors ​WILL have a bearing on it!
>

The point is not there, it's the fact that that hypothetical AI *could have
no knowledge about an hypothetical external world*, and as such from its
POV, it has only an hypothetical existense... and it's existence (of that
external world) is as real as any hypothetical.

Quentin


>
>  John K Clark
>
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Re: Carroll's Paradox

2015-10-27 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2015-10-27 7:44 GMT+01:00 Brent Meeker :

>
>
> On 10/26/2015 3:37 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 10:44:28AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>>> On 10/26/2015 2:43 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
>>>
>>> Assuming computationalism, our everyday experience _is_ internal to the
 system. That doesn't make it any less meaningful.

>>> I think that's a confusion.  The system is the universe with it's
>>> physics.   So in a sense everything is internal to it.  But
>>> experience is individual and it's meaningful because the individual
>>> has values and memory and so incorporates experiences into decisions
>>> about future actions...that's what constitutes giving them
>>> semantics.
>>>
>>> Hi Brent, I appreciate your point of view very much, but I fail to see
>> how what you say is incompatible with my claim. Where is the
>> confusion?
>>
>
> I think our everyday experience is given meaning as referring to things
> outside ourselves.  So it's not internal to "the system" that is the
> experiencer.  It is only because the observer is distinct from the rest of
> the world that he can form meaningful symbolic representations of it.
>
>
>> The only clarification I would make is that (with computationalism)
>> the system is formal, but the observer (individual in your
>> terminology) and environment (universe with its physics in your
>> terminology) are a non formal partition of the system.
>>
>
> I'm not sure what you mean by non-formal partition.  If your brain is
> replaced by a I/O functionally equivalent digital computer it will still be
> in an environment and will have internal representations that refer to the
> environment.


In a computer... an io, is just a memory location... as anything else is...
that the value of that memory location reflect or not an external world...
doesn't change anything from the POV of the program  reading it... so as
the meaning must somehow be internal to the program as to what that value
at that memory location means for it.

Quentin

>
>
> Brent
>
>
>>
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Re: Carroll's Paradox

2015-10-27 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2015-10-27 17:29 GMT+01:00 John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com>:

> On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 11:17 AM, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> ​
>>> ​>> ​
>>> If it is *FULLY*
>>>  disconnected from the physical world
>>> ​ then what sort of computer is the AI running on, and what is
>>> generating the virtual reality environment?​
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> If no sensor of the real world write anything  at all in the memory
>> available to the AI program... then how on earth does the fact it runs on a
>> physical computer matter ?
>>
>
> ​
> Matter always matters.
>

I repeat if there is *absolutely no sensors writing **any** information in
a *memory location* readable by the AI program how can that affect if ? how
can it knows that external world ?*


> ​ ​
> If it is FULLY
> ​ ​
> disconnected from the physical world
> ​ so
>
> there is no processor
> ​ made of matter that obeys the laws of physics​
>  and
> ​no ​
> memory
> ​ made of matter to write the outcome of a calculation
> ​
> ​to ​
> then how on earth can
> ​a​
>  AI
> ​
> program *DO* anything?
>

That's not what I'm talking about, yes the AI program runs on a physical
computer if you want, and stopping it, stops the program... but from the
POV of the AI program, that physical world has no bearing on it nor even
existence, as *nothing from it* absolutely *no information about that
external world* is passed to it, so *how on earth could it knows it, be
influenced by it* ?


>
> ​  John K Clark​
>
>>
>>
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Re: Carroll's Paradox

2015-10-27 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2015-10-27 15:39 GMT+01:00 John Clark :

>
> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 9:05 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> So what do you think would happen if an AI, or uploaded mind were
>> uploaded into a virtual reality that was fully disconnected from the
>> physical world? Would that mind no longer be conscious?
>>
>
> ​If it is *FULLY*
>  disconnected from the physical world
> ​ then what sort of computer is the AI running on, and what is generating
> the virtual reality environment?​
>
>
>
If no sensor of the real world write anything  at all in the memory
available to the AI program... then how on earth does the fact it runs on a
physical computer matter ? The AI has no way to have access to that
world...

Quentin


>   John K Clark
>
>
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Re: Carroll's Paradox

2015-10-27 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2015-10-27 19:16 GMT+01:00 Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>:

>
>
> On 10/26/2015 11:57 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> 2015-10-27 7:44 GMT+01:00 Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>:
>
>>
>>
>> On 10/26/2015 3:37 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Oct 26, 2015 at 10:44:28AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 10/26/2015 2:43 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Assuming computationalism, our everyday experience _is_ internal to the
>>>>> system. That doesn't make it any less meaningful.
>>>>>
>>>> I think that's a confusion.  The system is the universe with it's
>>>> physics.   So in a sense everything is internal to it.  But
>>>> experience is individual and it's meaningful because the individual
>>>> has values and memory and so incorporates experiences into decisions
>>>> about future actions...that's what constitutes giving them
>>>> semantics.
>>>>
>>>> Hi Brent, I appreciate your point of view very much, but I fail to see
>>> how what you say is incompatible with my claim. Where is the
>>> confusion?
>>>
>>
>> I think our everyday experience is given meaning as referring to things
>> outside ourselves.  So it's not internal to "the system" that is the
>> experiencer.  It is only because the observer is distinct from the rest of
>> the world that he can form meaningful symbolic representations of it.
>>
>>
>>> The only clarification I would make is that (with computationalism)
>>> the system is formal, but the observer (individual in your
>>> terminology) and environment (universe with its physics in your
>>> terminology) are a non formal partition of the system.
>>>
>>
>> I'm not sure what you mean by non-formal partition.  If your brain is
>> replaced by a I/O functionally equivalent digital computer it will still be
>> in an environment and will have internal representations that refer to the
>> environment.
>
>
> In a computer... an io, is just a memory location... as anything else
> is... that the value of that memory location reflect or not an external
> world... doesn't change anything from the POV of the program  reading it...
> so as the meaning must somehow be internal to the program as to what that
> value at that memory location means for it.
>
>
> That's like saying a neuron in your brain doesn't know anything.
>

I don't know about neurons and interactions with the environment... but as
far as a program is concerned, a program has only access to memory
locations... so if meaning must arise from the POV of the program (ie: what
we could call a conscious program), it must be internal to itself... What
you could say I could agree, is that IO of our "real" world do provide
regularity pattern to those memory locations when fed with the sensor
data... what random value would not... so one can say that meaning arise
from stable pattern... where they come from and the fact they represent
something ontologically real is unknown to the program...


> In a sense it's true, but it obfuscates the source of meaning.  What your
> neurons, as a brain, know are things about the external world (external to
> the brain) with which they interact.  The "meaning" is internal in the
> sense that it is represented by a pattern in the brain - but it is only
> meaning because it has referents outside the brain.  A brain that had never
> had an environment with which to interact would not have anything to
> represent and would contain no "meaning".  It would be like the computer
> running a random or unknowable program, or the rock that computes
> everything.
>
> Brent
>
>
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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-13 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2015-10-13 12:43 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :

> On 13/10/2015 7:57 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 13 October 2015 at 11:48, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On 13/10/2015 9:46 am, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>> The double-slit experiment is evidence of platonic computation being
>>> responsible for our consciousness, along with many other properties seen in
>>> physics.
>>>
>> Come again? How on earth do you make that out? The double slit experiment
>> is evidence for quantum superpositions of waves and/or particles. Nothing
>> to do with consciousness. As for the rest of physics??
>>
>> The theory has survived numerous tests, without being disproven, which is
>>> all we can hope for as evidence for any theory.
>>>
>>
>> Quantum mechanics is a well-tested theory. Computationalism is not.
>> Computationalism can't even get the basic physics right, much less explain
>> how the universe came to exist long before consciousness emerged.
>
>
> Computationalism is the theory that a computer could simulate not only the
> brain's behaviour, but also consciousness. It is possible that the brain
> utilises non-computable physics, in which case computationalism would be
> false. Is that what you believe?
>
>
> You present a false dichotomy. The brain might well be Turing emulable,
> and computationalism false. That would be the case if matter is primary and
> arithmetic merely a formal game.
>
>
Then it's not computationalism... but materialism, as computation is not a
material notion...

You have to say then that computation is just an abstract representation of
the real thing (aka matter doing thing looking at if it was a
computation)... then you is not "just" a computation... "you" is matter
which behaves like a computation.

Matter as primary entity is thus needed... and the brain would not be
turing emulable per se.

Also I wonder how you could justify with such theory the equivalence
between two computations... if not by using abstract computation theory to
justify it...

Quentin


> Bruce
>
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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-13 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2015-10-13 14:26 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:

> On 13/10/2015 11:00 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> 2015-10-13 13:44 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:
>
>> A computer made of silicon can emulate a Turing machine. A brain made of
>> wetware can be emulated by a silicon computer, or a Turing machine. The
>> fact that a Turing machine can be define mathematically is entirely
>> secondary.
>>
>
> The fact that a computer made of matter can  emulate a Turing machine is
> because we have a definition of a turing machine which is a mathematical
> concept... but if you reject the mathematical definition, I wonder how you
> can say that a "computer" emulate a turing machine... You should first
> define computation in terms of matter, and shows that the "mathematical"
> game is coincidentally like it.
>
>
> Who said I reject the mathematical definition of a Turing machine?
>

If you don't reject it, your explanation of computation is circular if you
don't have a *definition* of what is a physical computation without using
the mathematical definition.


> A computer emulates a Turing machine in the sense that the silicon based
> computer can do everything that an ideal Turing machine can do -- in fact,
> the modern computer on your desk is a perfect universal Turing machine. I
> don't have to *define* computation in terms of matter --
>

You do have to, for not to be circular.


> I simply have to compute the output from the given input.
>
> Also I wonder how you could justify with such theory the equivalence
> between two computations... if not by using abstract computation theory to
> justify it...
>
> Two computations are equivalent if they give the same answers.
>
> How do you justify it ? I can easily write an emulator of another machine
> and justify the correct functionning by logic alone, no matter involve...
> so if logic is just a game, and matter is the end point, algorithm *can't*
> be used as justification of the correct working.
>
>
> Who said matter was the end point?
>
> You... why do you insist on matter, if it is not primary and can be made
> of something else ?
>
>
> Who said matter was not primary?
>

Who said it was ? If it is not, then reality can be explained in terms of
computations alone, and matter could be a product of computations... You
dislike that idea, that somehow must mean matter is primary in your view...
so IMO, you're saying matter is primary, don't you ?


>
>
> I can justify the equivalence of two computations by pointing to the fact
>> that they give the same numerical output.
>>
>
> Then you say it only if you have achieved all possible outputs ? because
> you can't use mathematical induction to justify they will on the same
> domain.
>
>
>  A computation has one input and one output -- it is a mapping between the
> input and the output.
>

Yes so to prove them equivalent, you have to prove the mapping between
input and output for all input... how do you achieve that without
mathematical induction ?


> Different inputs may give different outputs, but then they are different
> calculations.
>
>
> Computations might be definable in terms of algorithms, but more than one
>> algorithm can give the same computation -- give the same result for the
>> given input.
>>
>
> Yes, an infinity of them... but that's a mathematical result... no matter
> is used in the reasoning .
>
>
> That mathematical result can be instantiated by actually doing the same
> calculation -- same output for the given input -- in a number of different
> ways. I can do this without recourse to any mathematics at all. The
> material world can be considered as a model instantiating the mathematical
> result. This does not diminish either the physical or the mathematical --
> they ride on this together.
>
> Bruce
>
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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-13 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2015-10-13 13:08 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:

> On 13/10/2015 9:54 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> 2015-10-13 12:43 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:
>
>> On 13/10/2015 7:57 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 13 October 2015 at 11:48, Bruce Kellett < <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>> On 13/10/2015 9:46 am, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>> The double-slit experiment is evidence of platonic computation being
>>>> responsible for our consciousness, along with many other properties seen in
>>>> physics.
>>>>
>>> Come again? How on earth do you make that out? The double slit
>>> experiment is evidence for quantum superpositions of waves and/or
>>> particles. Nothing to do with consciousness. As for the rest of
>>> physics??
>>>
>>> The theory has survived numerous tests, without being disproven, which
>>>> is all we can hope for as evidence for any theory.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Quantum mechanics is a well-tested theory. Computationalism is not.
>>> Computationalism can't even get the basic physics right, much less explain
>>> how the universe came to exist long before consciousness emerged.
>>
>>
>> Computationalism is the theory that a computer could simulate not only
>> the brain's behaviour, but also consciousness. It is possible that the
>> brain utilises non-computable physics, in which case computationalism would
>> be false. Is that what you believe?
>>
>>
>> You present a false dichotomy. The brain might well be Turing emulable,
>> and computationalism false. That would be the case if matter is primary and
>> arithmetic merely a formal game.
>>
>>
> Then it's not computationalism... but materialism, as computation is not a
> material notion...
>
>
> I did say that computationalism could be false
>
> You have to say then that computation is just an abstract representation
> of the real thing (aka matter doing thing looking at if it was a
> computation)... then you is not "just" a computation... "you" is matter
> which behaves like a computation.
>
>
> Sounds reasonable to me.
>
> Matter as primary entity is thus needed... and the brain would not be
> turing emulable per se.
>
>
> That does not follow.
>

It does as turing emulability is a mathematical notion, it does not involve
matter, so if matter is needed, then you have something more than turing
emulability alone, you need matter.


>
>
> Also I wonder how you could justify with such theory the equivalence
> between two computations... if not by using abstract computation theory to
> justify it...
>
> Two computations are equivalent if they give the same answers.
>

How do you justify it ? I can easily write an emulator of another machine
and justify the correct functionning by logic alone, no matter involve...
so if logic is just a game, and matter is the end point, algorithm *can't*
be used as justification of the correct working.

>
>
> Bruce
>
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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-13 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2015-10-13 13:44 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:

> On 13/10/2015 10:14 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> 2015-10-13 13:08 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:
>
>> On 13/10/2015 9:54 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> 2015-10-13 12:43 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett < <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:
>>
>>> On 13/10/2015 7:57 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>> On 13 October 2015 at 11:48, Bruce Kellett < <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
>>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 13/10/2015 9:46 am, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> The double-slit experiment is evidence of platonic computation being
>>>>> responsible for our consciousness, along with many other properties seen 
>>>>> in
>>>>> physics.
>>>>>
>>>> Come again? How on earth do you make that out? The double slit
>>>> experiment is evidence for quantum superpositions of waves and/or
>>>> particles. Nothing to do with consciousness. As for the rest of
>>>> physics??
>>>>
>>>> The theory has survived numerous tests, without being disproven, which
>>>>> is all we can hope for as evidence for any theory.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Quantum mechanics is a well-tested theory. Computationalism is not.
>>>> Computationalism can't even get the basic physics right, much less explain
>>>> how the universe came to exist long before consciousness emerged.
>>>
>>>
>>> Computationalism is the theory that a computer could simulate not only
>>> the brain's behaviour, but also consciousness. It is possible that the
>>> brain utilises non-computable physics, in which case computationalism would
>>> be false. Is that what you believe?
>>>
>>>
>>> You present a false dichotomy. The brain might well be Turing emulable,
>>> and computationalism false. That would be the case if matter is primary and
>>> arithmetic merely a formal game.
>>>
>>>
>> Then it's not computationalism... but materialism, as computation is not
>> a material notion...
>>
>>
>> I did say that computationalism could be false
>>
>> You have to say then that computation is just an abstract representation
>> of the real thing (aka matter doing thing looking at if it was a
>> computation)... then you is not "just" a computation... "you" is matter
>> which behaves like a computation.
>>
>>
>> Sounds reasonable to me.
>>
>> Matter as primary entity is thus needed... and the brain would not be
>> turing emulable per se.
>>
>>
>> That does not follow.
>>
>
> It does as turing emulability is a mathematical notion, it does not
> involve matter, so if matter is needed, then you have something more than
> turing emulability alone, you need matter.
>
> A computer made of silicon can emulate a Turing machine. A brain made of
> wetware can be emulated by a silicon computer, or a Turing machine. The
> fact that a Turing machine can be define mathematically is entirely
> secondary.
>

The fact that a computer made of matter can  emulate a Turing machine is
because we have a definition of a turing machine which is a mathematical
concept... but if you reject the mathematical definition, I wonder how you
can say that a "computer" emulate a turing machine... You should first
define computation in terms of matter, and shows that the "mathematical"
game is coincidentally like it.


>
> Also I wonder how you could justify with such theory the equivalence
> between two computations... if not by using abstract computation theory to
> justify it...
>
> Two computations are equivalent if they give the same answers.
>
> How do you justify it ? I can easily write an emulator of another machine
> and justify the correct functionning by logic alone, no matter involve...
> so if logic is just a game, and matter is the end point, algorithm *can't*
> be used as justification of the correct working.
>
>
> Who said matter was the end point?
>

You... why do you insist on matter, if it is not primary and can be made of
something else ?


> I can justify the equivalence of two computations by pointing to the fact
> that they give the same numerical output.
>

Then you say it only if you have achieved all possible outputs ? because
you can't use mathematical induction to justify they will on the same
domain.


> Computations might be definable in terms of algorith

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-07 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2015-10-07 7:49 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett :

> On 7/10/2015 3:58 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 10:37 PM, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> They do affect you, because identical conscious states are, (by
>> definition), indistinguishable from that point of view. So when you are
>> experiencing a particular conscious state, and there are different paths,
>> or future extensions of that conscious state, you can never be certain of
>> which one will follow. Consider these various sequences of conscious states:
>>
>> H->N->J
>> W->N->Q
>> X->N->Y
>>
>> If each letter represents a conscious state, then anyone experiencing
>> conscious state "N" cannot predict with any certainty whether their next
>> experience will be that of "J", that of "Q", or that of "Y". The reason
>> this is relevant is because the statistics of computations appears to share
>> many of the properties/consequences of quantum mechanics, in particular
>> with the many-worlds/many-minds interpretations: there exist an infinite
>> number of conscious minds (all minds perhaps), which differentiate/combine
>> when as they diverge or converge upon common states.
>>
>> This is an oversimplification. It is not at all clear what a "conscious
>> state" actually is.
>>
>
> Here a conscious state is that which you cannot (even in theory)
> subjectively differentiated from another identical "conscious state".
>
>
> H!  'Identical' *means* that they cannot be differentiated,
> theoretically or subjectively. How do you know that two conscious states
> are identical?
>
> For instance, how long does it last? Does it consist of one thought or
>> two? Or the space between thoughts?
>>
>
> Make it as long or as short as you'd like, it doesn't matter for the
> purposes of the above reasoning to work.
>
> There is a similar problem with the simplistic equation of brain states
> with conscious states. How many brain states make up a conscious state?
>
> This is physicalism. A physical time slice of a brain is not the same as a
> conscious state (under computationalism).
>
> OK. Since I do not accept computationalism, I am cool with that. I
> believe, in accordance with all the available evidence, that consciousness
> supervenes on the physical brain. So states of the physical brain are
> relevant to consciousness.
>
> What is a brain state? How long does it last? Is it an instantaneous
>> snapshot? Or a Planck time, Or a femtosecond? Or what?
>>
>
> Like a CPU, a complex computation and computational state may require many
> sub-computations to occur and accordingly occurs over a long period of time
> (especially for a highly serial CPU). The computation of a conscious state
> by a brain is spread out over time and space.
>
>
> Hence it is almost impossible to duplicate. Once the time scale increases,
> environmental interference becomes increasingly important. And you still
> haven't specified how you determine that two conscious states are identical.
>
> Quantum mechanics is of little relevance here. The brain is hot, and
>> quantum events decohere so rapidly that it is clear that any conscious
>> processes in the brain are entirely classical. So quantum analogies are
>> seriously misplaced. It is even more misguided to hang you theory of mind
>> on a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics.
>>
>
> I don't. This is not QM explains the mind/consciousness. It's the
> mind/consciousness explains QM.
>
>
> Bullshit. In spades.
>
> MWI is an interpretation of a theory, not a theory in its own right.
>>
>
> MWI is so far, the only theory of quantum mechanics, in so far as its the
> only well-defined, mathematical and consistent account of quantum
> mechanics. Collapse theories, say that the laws of QM are only obeyed some
> of the time, and are unclear about those times it supposedly does not. As
> such, they are incomplete half-baked ideas, not theories; they offer no
> explanations about when QM's equations are or aren't followed.
>
>
> Bullshit, in double spades. You seem to think that QM is a *final theory*.
> This is by no means clear. The best one can do is treat it as an effective
> theory: it is a calculational tool that enables one to calculate
> probabilities with remarkable precision. Beyond that, one cannot claim
> anything.
>
> And why do MWI enthusiasts think that collapse theories are the only
> alternative to many worlds? That is simply not the case -- there are many
> other possibilities. Including my favourite, which is that QM is merely an
> effective theory that is useful for calculating probabilities in the
> quantum domain. Eschew ontological commitments!
>

So again, as it seems, you dislike metaphysical discussions, yet, you do
that for months... you don't want to commit to anything, nor discuss
ontology, fine, but please stop implying this is stupid or bullshit. Here
we *don't* make ontological commitments, we discuss ontological
possibilities... what we believe (or 

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-07 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2015-10-07 11:11 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:

> On 7/10/2015 6:06 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> 2015-10-07 7:49 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>:
>
>> On 7/10/2015 3:58 pm, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 10:37 PM, Bruce Kellett <
>> <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>
>> They do affect you, because identical conscious states are, (by
>>> definition), indistinguishable from that point of view. So when you are
>>> experiencing a particular conscious state, and there are different paths,
>>> or future extensions of that conscious state, you can never be certain of
>>> which one will follow. Consider these various sequences of conscious states:
>>>
>>> H->N->J
>>> W->N->Q
>>> X->N->Y
>>>
>>> If each letter represents a conscious state, then anyone experiencing
>>> conscious state "N" cannot predict with any certainty whether their next
>>> experience will be that of "J", that of "Q", or that of "Y". The reason
>>> this is relevant is because the statistics of computations appears to share
>>> many of the properties/consequences of quantum mechanics, in particular
>>> with the many-worlds/many-minds interpretations: there exist an infinite
>>> number of conscious minds (all minds perhaps), which differentiate/combine
>>> when as they diverge or converge upon common states.
>>>
>>> This is an oversimplification. It is not at all clear what a "conscious
>>> state" actually is.
>>>
>>
>> Here a conscious state is that which you cannot (even in theory)
>> subjectively differentiated from another identical "conscious state".
>>
>>
>> H!  'Identical' *means* that they cannot be differentiated,
>> theoretically or subjectively. How do you know that two conscious states
>> are identical?
>>
>> For instance, how long does it last? Does it consist of one thought or
>>> two? Or the space between thoughts?
>>>
>>
>> Make it as long or as short as you'd like, it doesn't matter for the
>> purposes of the above reasoning to work.
>>
>> There is a similar problem with the simplistic equation of brain states
>> with conscious states. How many brain states make up a conscious state?
>>
>> This is physicalism. A physical time slice of a brain is not the same as
>> a conscious state (under computationalism).
>>
>> OK. Since I do not accept computationalism, I am cool with that. I
>> believe, in accordance with all the available evidence, that consciousness
>> supervenes on the physical brain. So states of the physical brain are
>> relevant to consciousness.
>>
>> What is a brain state? How long does it last? Is it an instantaneous
>>> snapshot? Or a Planck time, Or a femtosecond? Or what?
>>>
>>
>> Like a CPU, a complex computation and computational state may require
>> many sub-computations to occur and accordingly occurs over a long period of
>> time (especially for a highly serial CPU). The computation of a conscious
>> state by a brain is spread out over time and space.
>>
>>
>> Hence it is almost impossible to duplicate. Once the time scale
>> increases, environmental interference becomes increasingly important. And
>> you still haven't specified how you determine that two conscious states are
>> identical.
>>
>> Quantum mechanics is of little relevance here. The brain is hot, and
>>> quantum events decohere so rapidly that it is clear that any conscious
>>> processes in the brain are entirely classical. So quantum analogies are
>>> seriously misplaced. It is even more misguided to hang you theory of mind
>>> on a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics.
>>>
>>
>> I don't. This is not QM explains the mind/consciousness. It's the
>> mind/consciousness explains QM.
>>
>>
>> Bullshit. In spades.
>>
>> MWI is an interpretation of a theory, not a theory in its own right.
>>>
>>
>> MWI is so far, the only theory of quantum mechanics, in so far as its the
>> only well-defined, mathematical and consistent account of quantum
>> mechanics. Collapse theories, say that the laws of QM are only obeyed some
>> of the time, and are unclear about those times it supposedly does not. As
>> such, they are incomplete half-baked ideas, not theories; they offer no
>> explanations about when QM's equat

Re: What day is it?

2015-10-07 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2015-10-07 20:46 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker :

>
>
> On 10/7/2015 4:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> But here Clark contradicts all the textbook on the subject. In fact all
>> what John Clarks says here is that you cannot get a physical object from an
>> arithmetical computations, which is trivial, but does not prove the
>> existence of the physical object, as physical is a relative relational
>> notion in arithmetic.
>> Those type of argument are only the usual knocking on the table.
>>
>
> Which is very good evidence for the existence of a physical object.


But it is no evidence at all about the ontological status of such object...
so what is it for ? Computationalism, MWI, do not deny the existence of
physical objects... even subjective idealism does not deny you interact
with physical object, it is the reality/ontological status of those which
is questioned... so what's the point to use such argument ?

Quentin

>
>
> Brent
>
>
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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again

2015-10-06 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2015-10-06 16:23 GMT+02:00 John Clark :

>
> On Tue, Oct 6, 2015  Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> John Clark agrees implicitly with the fact that a computation is not a
>> physical notion,
>
>
> ​No, John Clark does not agree with that.​
>
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> because he defines physical computation by a computation done in physics.
>
>
> ​Because John Clark can find no evidence that ​
> computation *NOT* done in physics exists, ​and INTEL can't find any
> evidence for it either. The only reason John Clark talks about "
> physical computation
> ​"​
> ​ and not just "computation" is that unlike John Clark  ​
> Bruno Marchal
> ​thinks there is a type of computation that isn't physical.
>

Then you have to define a computation *WITHOUT* using the mathematical
definition of a computation.. which you've not done...


> ​
>  John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>> On 05 Oct 2015, at 00:52, Kim Jones wrote:
>>
>>
>>>
>>> On 1 Oct 2015, at 3:25 AM, John Clark  wrote:

 When I say "physical computation" ​ and you demand a definition of that
 and when I respond with "a computation done with physics" and you demand a
 definition of that too then I believe it is perfectly acceptable for me to
 either get off the silly definition merry-go-round or to demand a
 definition of my own, a definition of definition.

>>>
>>> You are here painting yourself with a very fine brush as what you are.
>>> An academic. A useless bloody argumentative broom handle-up-the-arse
>>> straighto from the planet Dork. You are out to win argument only, not
>>> boldly explore consequences of interesting ideas. That is beyond you; you
>>> are a mental midget; the equivalent of someone who thinks its really smart
>>> to shoot a giraffe or a lion and then pose for a photo against the carcass.
>>> You just love it when people engage with you at all over anything at all
>>> because this allows you to indulge in this very sporting activity
>>> favourite. You are sick. This list might have moved on from this ridiculous
>>> bottleneck years ago but for you. There used to be a lively exchange of
>>> ideas going on here.
>>>
>>
>> Academic? No need to insult people. The only thing which matters is that
>> his argument are invalid. Not all academic are invalid when thinking on
>> this subject, and very often non-academic can be invalid, which is normal
>> as the TOE has to be highly counter-intuitive if it can manage both mind
>> and matter, as the platonist understood well when creating theology, math
>> and physics.
>>
>> Note that here John Clark agrees implicitly with the fact that a
>> computation is not a physical notion, because he defines physical
>> computation by a computation done in physics. So he lost the point.
>> Unfortunately we can expect the usual self-deny and the handwaving.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> Kim
>>>
>>> --
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>>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
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Re: Mandela effect?

2015-10-04 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2015-10-04 15:26 GMT+02:00 Telmo Menezes :

>
>
> On Sun, Oct 4, 2015 at 1:26 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> As the simulation runs at the speed of light, we'd have to drive very
>> fast and randomly, indeed.
>
>
> Ok, but suppose that the simulation has limited resources and only
> computes some sphere around the current part of the universe you're
> observing. Then it might do some predictive analysis to pre-compute likely
> future states. Driving randomly would be an attempt to fuck with that
> algorithm.
>

That presupose you're not part yourself of the algorithm... so where is
your consciousness computed ? If you're computed along everything else...
you can't escape it, as from the pov of what is computing, you don't do
something unpredicted, because that would mean you're doing something the
algorithm has not computed... but it's a plain contradiction with the
premises which is you're computed by it.

Quentin


> Of course this would have to be a scenario where our perception channels
> are hijacked but our cognition is performed in the real world. If Our
> cognition is part of the simulation, it can just take more
> outside-the-simulation time to compute the next simulation moment and the
> inhabitants of the simulation won't notice.
>
>
>> It is a simulation, or rather, a computation, such as a statistical
>> mechanics analysis. The boot up and power on and self test, was the Big
>> Bang.
>
>
> My view is that the big bang is the simplest possible state, so it's the
> common ancestor of all possible states, so if you look far enough in time
> your are bound to observe it. My crazy hypothesis is that the instant of
> the big bang is shared by all universes and belongs to all histories.
>
>
>> here's another completely, off the wall, point of view. The challenge is
>> not merely, to discover what is true, but to discover what is true, and
>> then use this against despair.
>
>
> I agree.
>
>
>> Consider this a super-goal, perhaps one that is best resolved by
>> hypercomputing. This utilizes both the cerebrum and the amygdala, to
>> achieve this goal. We use the cerebrum to discover, we use the amygdala to
>> decide when we are pleased with the result.
>>
>>
>>
>> -Original Message-
>> From: Telmo Menezes 
>> To: everything-list 
>> Sent: Sun, Oct 4, 2015 6:28 am
>> Subject: Re: Mandela effect?
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 23, 2015 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Never heard of it before.
>>>
>>> http://www.skeptic.com/insight/the-mandela-effect/
>>>
>>
>>
>> I have heard about it, and found it silly (I agree with the link and with
>> what Bruno said).
>>
>> It is fun to see how the Internet enables kids to explore weird ideas
>> though:
>> https://www.reddit.com/r/mandelaeffect
>>
>> I remember when me and a friend, after failing to impress some girls at a
>> bar, started philosophizing about the nature of reality. We came up with
>> the sort of ideas that later became popular in the Matrix (and were popular
>> before in smaller circles, of course), and decided to test the simulation.
>> Our hypothesis was that, if we started driving fast and always choosing a
>> random path, we would eventually break the simulation's ability to "keep
>> up". It didn't work, but these days we could have started an Internet
>> movement.
>>
>> Best,
>> Telmo.
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
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>>
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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-01 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2015-10-01 21:17 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker :

>
>
> On 10/1/2015 9:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 01 Oct 2015, at 17:54, John Clark wrote:
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> Many worlds is nothing more than a hypothetical construct.
>
>
> ​True.​
>
>
> Nice we all agree!
>
> Note that one world is as much an hypothetical construct.
>
>
> No, you can kick it and it kicks back.
>

I'm amaze that it was so simple to be sure there was in fact only one
"world"... thanks Brent, you have saved us from years of babbling...
strange no one has thought of that before you.

Quentin

>
>
> Brent
>
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Re: What day is it?

2015-10-01 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Le 2 oct. 2015 00:52, "Bruce Kellett" <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> a écrit :
>
> On 2/10/2015 5:32 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> 2015-10-01 21:17 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/1/2015 9:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 01 Oct 2015, at 17:54, John Clark wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ​> ​
>>>>>> Many worlds is nothing more than a hypothetical construct.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ​True.​
>>>>>
>>>> Nice we all agree!
>>>>
>>>> Note that one world is as much an hypothetical construct.
>>>
>>>
>>> No, you can kick it and it kicks back.
>>
>>
>> I'm amaze that it was so simple to be sure there was in fact only one
"world"... thanks Brent, you have saved us from years of babbling...
strange no one has thought of that before you.
>
>
> I think Brent is quite happy to cede authorship of this insight to Samuel
Johnson. Johnson's 18th century response to the idealism of Bishop Berkeley
has never been bettered. The same response serves to confound Bruno's
idealism as well.

I know it was that simple... I wonder why we're discussing here... Thank
you, without you such argument would never have crossed my mind.

Quentin
>
> Bruce
>
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Re: What day is it?

2015-09-09 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2015-09-09 8:29 GMT+02:00 Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com>:

>
>
> 2015-09-09 8:20 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>:
>
>>
>>
>> On 9/8/2015 10:55 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> 2015-09-09 7:39 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 9/8/2015 8:20 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 9 September 2015 at 12:44, Bruce Kellett <
>>> <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 9/09/2015 12:26 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 9 September 2015 at 10:43, Bruce Kellett <
>>>> <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 9/09/2015 9:30 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> On 9 September 2015 at 09:23, Bruce Kellett <
>>>>> <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 9/09/2015 8:56 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 8 September 2015 at 22:11, Bruce Kellett <
>>>>>> <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 8/09/2015 9:14 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 8 September 2015 at 20:48, Bruce Kellett <
>>>>>>> <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 8/09/2015 8:40 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 8 September 2015 at 17:39, Bruce Kellett <
>>>>>>>> <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 8/09/2015 4:56 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I will ask you the same question as I did Brent: do you conclude
>>>>>>>>> from the fact that when you toss a coin it comes up either as head or 
>>>>>>>>> tails
>>>>>>>>> that the world does not split into two parallel versions of you, one 
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>> which sees heads and the other tails?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I would conclude that a coin toss does not provide any evidence
>>>>>>>>> for multiple worlds or a split. The only evidence we have from this 
>>>>>>>>> data is
>>>>>>>>> that the outcome of the toss is uncertain. There is no evidence there 
>>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>>> any split of anything.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It is not evidence FOR a split but is it evidence AGAINST a split?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It is evidence that the assumption of a split is not necessary in
>>>>>>>> order to understand everyday happenings. So, by the application of 
>>>>>>>> Occam's
>>>>>>>> Razor, no split happens.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So you agree that we would still observe the probabilities we do if
>>>>>>> we lived in a deterministic world in whaich all possibilities are 
>>>>>>> realised?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> No, because not all possibilities happen in this world. If all
>>>>>>> possibilities were realized in this world, then there would be no
>>>>>>> uncertainty, no probabilities. Possibility and actuality would be the 
>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>> thing. All the horses would win the Melbourne cup; and we don't live in
>>>>>>> such a world.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Obviously, not all possibilities happen in this world, but they might
>>>>>> happen in parallel worlds that don't interact with each other. The 
>>>>>> argument
>>>>>> is that probabilities emerge from this, since you don't know which world
>>>>>> you will find yourself in

Re: What day is it?

2015-09-09 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2015-09-09 8:20 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>:

>
>
> On 9/8/2015 10:55 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> 2015-09-09 7:39 GMT+02:00 Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>:
>
>>
>>
>> On 9/8/2015 8:20 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 9 September 2015 at 12:44, Bruce Kellett < <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>> On 9/09/2015 12:26 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>> On 9 September 2015 at 10:43, Bruce Kellett <
>>> <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 9/09/2015 9:30 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 9 September 2015 at 09:23, Bruce Kellett <
>>>> <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 9/09/2015 8:56 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> On 8 September 2015 at 22:11, Bruce Kellett <
>>>>> <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 8/09/2015 9:14 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 8 September 2015 at 20:48, Bruce Kellett <
>>>>>> <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 8/09/2015 8:40 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 8 September 2015 at 17:39, Bruce Kellett <
>>>>>>> <bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 8/09/2015 4:56 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I will ask you the same question as I did Brent: do you conclude
>>>>>>>> from the fact that when you toss a coin it comes up either as head or 
>>>>>>>> tails
>>>>>>>> that the world does not split into two parallel versions of you, one of
>>>>>>>> which sees heads and the other tails?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I would conclude that a coin toss does not provide any evidence for
>>>>>>>> multiple worlds or a split. The only evidence we have from this data is
>>>>>>>> that the outcome of the toss is uncertain. There is no evidence there 
>>>>>>>> for
>>>>>>>> any split of anything.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It is not evidence FOR a split but is it evidence AGAINST a split?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It is evidence that the assumption of a split is not necessary in
>>>>>>> order to understand everyday happenings. So, by the application of 
>>>>>>> Occam's
>>>>>>> Razor, no split happens.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So you agree that we would still observe the probabilities we do if
>>>>>> we lived in a deterministic world in whaich all possibilities are 
>>>>>> realised?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No, because not all possibilities happen in this world. If all
>>>>>> possibilities were realized in this world, then there would be no
>>>>>> uncertainty, no probabilities. Possibility and actuality would be the 
>>>>>> same
>>>>>> thing. All the horses would win the Melbourne cup; and we don't live in
>>>>>> such a world.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Obviously, not all possibilities happen in this world, but they might
>>>>> happen in parallel worlds that don't interact with each other. The 
>>>>> argument
>>>>> is that probabilities emerge from this, since you don't know which world
>>>>> you will find yourself in. You bet on the favourite in the race because 
>>>>> you
>>>>> think you are more likely to end up in a world in which the favourite 
>>>>> wins.
>>>>>
>>>>> In other words, probabilities can make perfect sense in a single
>>>>> deterministic world. This was understood a long time ago with the
>>>>> development of statistical mechanics. The idea that "all possibilities
>>>>> hap

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