Re: The Nature of Time

2011-04-06 Thread Saibal Mitra
Hi Stephen,

My point is that time as a pointer that points to what exists and what not
(anymore or yet), cannot exist. You can indeed map the set of all such
pointers to the real line. I agree that relativity is inconsistent with
such an idea of time.

Saibal

 Hi Saibal

 Are you defining time as isomorphic to the Real number line? Could it
 be
 that all of these proofs of the nonexistence of time are really just
 proofs that time is *not* that but something else entirely? It seems to me
 that we are thinking of the way that we can chronometrize events in our
 past
 with real number values and concluding that this labeling scheme extends
 into the future in a unique way, the problem is that if we take General
 Relativity seriously this is a non-started of an idea. The relativity of
 simultaneity coupled with general covariance does not permit any form of
 unique labeling events. We really need to stop assuming a Newtonian
 Absolute
 chronometrization of events. Time is a local measure of change, nothing
 more.

 Onward!

 Stephen

 ***

 -Original Message-
 From: smi...@zonnet.nl
 Sent: Saturday, April 02, 2011 8:27 PM
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Subject: Re: QTI is trivially false

 I think we are now making hidden assumptions about the nature of time,
 namely that it really exists, and then we are trying to argue that
 you can still have immortality (in different senses). However, it is
 far more natural to assume that time does not exist and then you get
 immortality (in the sense of my conscious states that have a finite
 memory always existing) in a far more straightforward way.

 That time does not exist is a quite natural assumption. To see this,
 assume that it does exist. But then, since time evolution is given by a
 unitary transform, the past still exists in a scrambled way in the
 present (when taking into account parallel universes). E.g. your past
 brain state of ten years ago can still be described in terms of the
 physical variables as they exist today. Of course such a description is
 extremely complicated involving the physical state of today's
 multiverse within a sphere of ten lightyears.

 Then assuming that the details of implementation does not affect
 consciousness (as long as the right program is being run), one has to
 conclude that your past state of coinsciousess exists also today. You
 could therefore just as well assume that time does not exist, as the
 two possibilities are operationally equivalent.


 Saibal


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Re: Changing the past by forgetting

2009-04-21 Thread Saibal Mitra

Yes, I agree, and that's then why we cannot do this in practice. The
verification of the MWI would have to wait untilk we have artificially
intelligent observers implemented by quantum computers.

However, ass uming that the MWI is indeed correct, it doesn't matter if you
undo the measurement. If you just dump your memory in the nvironment in an
irreversible way, you end up in a superposition like:

|you[ |universe_1| + |universe_2 ]

As far as |you are concerned, it doesn't matter if |universe_1 and
|universe_2 differ by one electron state or the state of 10^23 particles:
the result of a new measurement is not pre-determined in either case.


- Original Message - 
From: Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sunday, March 15, 2009 08:06 PM
Subject: Re: Changing the past by forgetting



 Saibal Mitra wrote:
  If we consider measuring the spin of a particle, you could also say that
the
  two possible outcomes just exist and thatthere are two possible future
  versions of me. There is no meaningful way to associate myself with
either
  of the two outcomes.
 
  But then, precisely this implies that after a measurement and forgetting
  about the result will yield a version of me who is in a similar position
as
  that earlier version of me who had yet to make the measurement. If one
could
  perform measurements in a reversible way, this would be possible to
  experimentally confirm, as David Deutsch pointed out. You can start with
a
  spin polarized in the x direction. Then you measure the z-component.
There
  then exists a unitary transformation which leads to the observer
forgetting
  about the outcome of the measurement and to the spin to be restored in
the
  original state. The observer does remember having measured the
z-component
  of the spin.
 
  Then, measuring the x-component again will yield spin-up with 100%
  probability, confirming that both branches in which the observer
measured
  spin up and spin down have coherently recombined. This then proves that
had
  the observer measured the z-component, the outcome would not be a priori
  determined, despite the observer having measured it earlier. So, both
  branches are real. But then this is true in general, also if the quantum
  state is of the form:
 
  |You[|spin up|rest of the world knows the spin is up + |spin
down|rest
  of the world knows spin is down]

 You're contemplating reversing three different things:

 1) Your knowledge, by forgetting a measurement result.  Something that's
easy to do.

 2) The spin state of a particle.

 3) The state of what the rest of the world knows.

 Because of the entanglement, I don't think you can, in general, reverse
the spin
 state of the  particle without reversing what is known about it by the
rest of
 the world.
 If it was a known state (to someone) the particle can easily be put back
in that
 state.  But to do so for a general, unknown state, after a measurement
would
 require invoking time-reversal invariance of the state of whole universe
(or at
 least all of it entangled with the particle spin via the measuring
apparatus).

 Brent Meeker

 
  although you cannot directly verify it here. But that means that you
cannot
  rule out an alternative theory in which only one of the branches is real
  when performing a measurement in this case. But if the reality of both
  branches is accepted, then each time you make a measurement and you
don't
  know the outcome, the outcome is not fixed (proovided, of course, there
is
  indeed more than one branch).
 
 
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
  Sent: Thursday, March 12, 2009 03:47 AM
  Subject: Re: Changing the past by forgetting
 
 
 
 
  --- On Tue, 3/10/09, Saibal Mitra smi...@zeelandnet.nl wrote:
  http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825
 
  I've written up a small article about the idea that you could end up in
a
  different sector of the multiverse by selective memory erasure. I had
  written about that possibility a long time ago on this list, but now
I've
  made the argument more rigorous.
 
  Saibal, I have to say that I disagree.  As you acknowledge, erasing
memory
  doesn't recohere the branches.  There is no meaningful sense in which
you
  could end up in a different branch due to memory erasure.
 
  You admit the 'effect' has no observable consequences.  But it has no
  unobservable meaning either.
 
  In fact, other than what I call 'causal differentiation', which clearly
will
  track the already-decohered branches (so you don't get to reshuffle the
  deck), there is no meaningful sense in which you will end up in one
  particular future branch at all.  Other than causal differentiation
  tracking, either 'you' are all of your future branches, or 'you' are
just
  here for the moment and are none of them.

 


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Extra explanation

2009-04-21 Thread Saibal Mitra

I just send a posting to the FOR list about my article. I did not have the
time to reply to everyone on this list previously. Reading the old
discussion again, I think that it was suggested that the exact quantum
states matter, but they don't. It was only used to illustrate the thought
experiment by Deutsch which would allow one to prove that the MWI is
correct.

This is what I sent to the FOR list:


Some time ago I wrote a small article:


http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825


This was recently featured in New Scientist:


http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20227044.200-avoid-a-future-cataclysm-forget-the-past.html


The idea is that an observer can undo things that have already happened by
resetting its memory, because when you reset your memory to a previous
state, that previous state you are evolving into will be the same in a
sector of the multiverse which evolved from that previous state and then was
reset for any reason. So, if the reseting is triggered for reason A or
reason B, it would lead to the observer ending up in the same state. The
outcome of a new measuremnt to find out why the mempory was reset is then
not pre-determined.

Some details:

The word state here refers to the classically describable state of an
observer. In the article, I focus on machine observers. The subjective state
of the observer is then exactly specified by specifying the ones and zeroes
of the bits of the memory. So, I assume that whatever the observer can be
aware of is encoded by the classical state of the bits of the computer and
not the exact quantum state of the computer. The exact state of the computer
has to be specified using a wavefunction of the computer (in fact, the state
of the computer will be entangled with the rest of the universe).


Then, one can write down any generic quantum state of the universe
containing the observer by supplementing the (classical) information stored
in the bits by the extra information you need to fully specify the
wavefunction of the computer and everything else in the universe. One can
then consider the unitary transformations that would represent a memory
backup, memory resetting etc.


After the memory resetting, you are notified why the memory was reset. Since
the relevant things happen in the realm where classical physics applies, the
probabilities are the same as what you would find using purely classical
reasoning. The interpretation of these probablilites is, however, different
from classical physics. When the memory is reset, you evolve to some state
while the rest of the inverse will be in some superposition of states in
which the memory was reset for various reasons. Then, before finding out why
the memory was reset, the outcome of that observation is not pre-determined


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Re: Changing the past by forgetting

2009-04-21 Thread Saibal Mitra

That's correct. It is not really irreversible. The point is that it doesn't
matter as you end up in a state where the outcome of finding out what
happened is not pre-determined.

Saibal

- Original Message - 
From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, April 21, 2009 07:27 PM
Subject: Re: Changing the past by forgetting



 Accepting QM without collapse, I am not sure you can dump your memory
 in the environment in any truly irreversible way.

 Bruno


 On 21 Apr 2009, at 15:22, Saibal Mitra wrote:

 
  Yes, I agree, and that's then why we cannot do this in practice. The
  verification of the MWI would have to wait untilk we have artificially
  intelligent observers implemented by quantum computers.
 
  However, ass uming that the MWI is indeed correct, it doesn't matter
  if you
  undo the measurement. If you just dump your memory in the nvironment
  in an
  irreversible way, you end up in a superposition like:
 
  |you[ |universe_1| + |universe_2 ]
 
  As far as |you are concerned, it doesn't matter if |universe_1 and
  |universe_2 differ by one electron state or the state of 10^23
  particles:
  the result of a new measurement is not pre-determined in either case.
 
 
  - Original Message -
  From: Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
  Sent: Sunday, March 15, 2009 08:06 PM
  Subject: Re: Changing the past by forgetting
 
 
 
  Saibal Mitra wrote:
  If we consider measuring the spin of a particle, you could also
  say that
  the
  two possible outcomes just exist and thatthere are two possible
  future
  versions of me. There is no meaningful way to associate myself with
  either
  of the two outcomes.
 
  But then, precisely this implies that after a measurement and
  forgetting
  about the result will yield a version of me who is in a similar
  position
  as
  that earlier version of me who had yet to make the measurement. If
  one
  could
  perform measurements in a reversible way, this would be possible to
  experimentally confirm, as David Deutsch pointed out. You can
  start with
  a
  spin polarized in the x direction. Then you measure the z-component.
  There
  then exists a unitary transformation which leads to the observer
  forgetting
  about the outcome of the measurement and to the spin to be
  restored in
  the
  original state. The observer does remember having measured the
  z-component
  of the spin.
 
  Then, measuring the x-component again will yield spin-up with 100%
  probability, confirming that both branches in which the observer
  measured
  spin up and spin down have coherently recombined. This then proves
  that
  had
  the observer measured the z-component, the outcome would not be a
  priori
  determined, despite the observer having measured it earlier. So,
  both
  branches are real. But then this is true in general, also if the
  quantum
  state is of the form:
 
  |You[|spin up|rest of the world knows the spin is up + |spin
  down|rest
  of the world knows spin is down]
 
  You're contemplating reversing three different things:
 
  1) Your knowledge, by forgetting a measurement result.  Something
  that's
  easy to do.
 
  2) The spin state of a particle.
 
  3) The state of what the rest of the world knows.
 
  Because of the entanglement, I don't think you can, in general,
  reverse
  the spin
  state of the  particle without reversing what is known about it by
  the
  rest of
  the world.
  If it was a known state (to someone) the particle can easily be put
  back
  in that
  state.  But to do so for a general, unknown state, after a
  measurement
  would
  require invoking time-reversal invariance of the state of whole
  universe
  (or at
  least all of it entangled with the particle spin via the measuring
  apparatus).
 
  Brent Meeker
 
 
  although you cannot directly verify it here. But that means that you
  cannot
  rule out an alternative theory in which only one of the branches
  is real
  when performing a measurement in this case. But if the reality of
  both
  branches is accepted, then each time you make a measurement and you
  don't
  know the outcome, the outcome is not fixed (proovided, of course,
  there
  is
  indeed more than one branch).
 
 
  - Original Message -
  From: Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
  Sent: Thursday, March 12, 2009 03:47 AM
  Subject: Re: Changing the past by forgetting
 
 
 
 
  --- On Tue, 3/10/09, Saibal Mitra smi...@zeelandnet.nl wrote:
  http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825
 
  I've written up a small article about the idea that you could end
  up in
  a
  different sector of the multiverse by selective memory erasure. I
  had
  written about that possibility a long time ago on this list, but now
  I've
  made the argument more rigorous.
 
  Saibal, I have to say that I disagree.  As you acknowledge, erasing
  memory
  doesn't recohere the branches.  There is no meaningful sense

Re: Changing the past by forgetting

2009-03-15 Thread Saibal Mitra

Thanks!  This is like undoing historical events. If you forget about the
fact that dinosaurs ever lived on Earth and there is an alternative history
that led to your existence in the multiverse, and you do the memory erasure
also in sectors were dinosaurs never lived, you have some nonzero
probability of finding yourself on an Earth were the dinosaurs never lived.

- Original Message - 
From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-l...@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2009 06:54 PM
Subject: Re: Changing the past by forgetting



 Nice! I did refer often to the Saibal Mitra backtracking procedure (in
 immortality discussions). I will take a further look on your paper.
 If valid, it should work in the comp frame. Amnesia could lead you to
 the original singularity, which could be a kind of blind spot of
 universal consciousness, except that with comp such a singularity
 should looks like a little Mandelbrot set, at first sight, I mean
 something like a compact view of a universal dovetailing.

 Bruno

 On 10 Mar 2009, at 19:55, Saibal Mitra wrote:

 
  http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825
 
  I've written up a small article about the idea that you could end up
  in a
  different sector of the multiverse by selective memory erasure. I had
  written about that possibility a long time ago on this list, but now
  I've
  made the argument more rigorous.
 
 
  

 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




 


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Re: Changing the past by forgetting

2009-03-15 Thread Saibal Mitra

If we consider measuring the spin of a particle, you could also say that the
two possible outcomes just exist and thatthere are two possible future
versions of me. There is no meaningful way to associate myself with either
of the two outcomes.

But then, precisely this implies that after a measurement and forgetting
about the result will yield a version of me who is in a similar position as
that earlier version of me who had yet to make the measurement. If one could
perform measurements in a reversible way, this would be possible to
experimentally confirm, as David Deutsch pointed out. You can start with a
spin polarized in the x direction. Then you measure the z-component. There
then exists a unitary transformation which leads to the observer forgetting
about the outcome of the measurement and to the spin to be restored in the
original state. The observer does remember having measured the z-component
of the spin.

Then, measuring the x-component again will yield spin-up with 100%
probability, confirming that both branches in which the observer measured
spin up and spin down have coherently recombined. This then proves that had
the observer measured the z-component, the outcome would not be a priori
determined, despite the observer having measured it earlier. So, both
branches are real. But then this is true in general, also if the quantum
state is of the form:

|You[|spin up|rest of the world knows the spin is up + |spin down|rest
of the world knows spin is down]

although you cannot directly verify it here. But that means that you cannot
rule out an alternative theory in which only one of the branches is real
when performing a measurement in this case. But if the reality of both
branches is accepted, then each time you make a measurement and you don't
know the outcome, the outcome is not fixed (proovided, of course, there is
indeed more than one branch).


- Original Message - 
From: Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com
To: everything-l...@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, March 12, 2009 03:47 AM
Subject: Re: Changing the past by forgetting




--- On Tue, 3/10/09, Saibal Mitra smi...@zeelandnet.nl wrote:
 http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825

 I've written up a small article about the idea that you could end up in a
different sector of the multiverse by selective memory erasure. I had
written about that possibility a long time ago on this list, but now I've
made the argument more rigorous.

Saibal, I have to say that I disagree.  As you acknowledge, erasing memory
doesn't recohere the branches.  There is no meaningful sense in which you
could end up in a different branch due to memory erasure.

You admit the 'effect' has no observable consequences.  But it has no
unobservable meaning either.

In fact, other than what I call 'causal differentiation', which clearly will
track the already-decohered branches (so you don't get to reshuffle the
deck), there is no meaningful sense in which you will end up in one
particular future branch at all.  Other than causal differentiation
tracking, either 'you' are all of your future branches, or 'you' are just
here for the moment and are none of them.









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Changing the past by forgetting

2009-03-10 Thread Saibal Mitra

http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825

I've written up a small article about the idea that you could end up in a
different sector of the multiverse by selective memory erasure. I had
written about that possibility a long time ago on this list, but now I've
made the argument more rigorous.


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Dreams and measure

2009-02-11 Thread Saibal Mitra

Welcome back Jack Mallah!

I have a different argument against QTI.

I had a nice dream last night, but unfortunately it suddenly ended. 
Now, this is empirical evidence against QTI because, according to the 
QTI, the life expectancy of the version of me simulated in that dream 
should have been be infinite.

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QTI --- Expanding brains

2008-04-19 Thread Saibal Mitra

Yes, I should have mentioned ASSA and RSSA as discussed on this list in the
dark ages.

I don't buy QTI for quite a few reasons. A model independent objection I
have is the following. If you accept QTI, then the information you have
about your history will have to grow without limit (if not, then effectively
you have a finite lifetime as you can only store a finite amount of
information in a finite volume).

Your identity must be preserved as your brain continues to expand to make
room for all that informaton that must be stored. Now, I find it hard to
believe that a superlarge brain the size of the galaxy would still be me.
:)



- Original Message - 
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, April 16, 2008 03:24 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality = no second law



 On Wed, Apr 16, 2008 at 02:22:23AM +0200, Saibal Mitra wrote:
 
   First off, how is it that the MWI does not imply
  quantum immortality?
 
  MWI is just quantum mechanics without the wavefunction collapse
postulate.
  This then implies that after a measurement your wavefuntion will be in a
  superposition of the states corresponding to definite outcomes. But we
  cannot just consider suicide experiments and then say that just because
  branches of the wavefuntion exist in which I survive, I'll find myself
there
  with 100% probability. The fact that probabilities are conserved follows
  from unitary time evolution. If a state evolves into a linear
combination of
  states in which I'm dead and alive then the probabilities of all these
  states add up to 1. The probability of finding myself to be alive at all
  after the experiment is then less than the probability of me finding
myself
  about to perform the suicide experiment.
 
  The probability of me finding myself to be alive after n suicide
experiments
  decays exponentially with n. Therefore I should not expect to find
myself
  having survived many suicide experiments. Note that contrary to what you
  often read in the popular accounts of the multiverse, the multiverse
does
  not split when we make observations. The most natural state for the
entire
  multiverse is just an eigenstate of the Hamiltonian. The energy can be
taken
  to be zero, therefore the wavefunction of the multiverse satisfies the
  equation:
 

 One should also note that this is the ASSA position. The ASSA was
 introduced by Jacques Mallah in his argument against quantum
 immortality, and a number of participants in this list adhere to the
 ASSA position. Its counterpart if the RSSA, which does imply quantum
 immortality (provided that the no cul-de-sac conjecture holds), and
 other list participants adhere to the RSSA. To date, no argument has
 convincingly demonstrated which of the ASSA or RSSA should be
 preferred, so it has become somewhat a matter of taste. There is some
 discussion of this in my book Theory of Nothing.

 Cheers

 -- 

 --
--
 A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
 Mathematics
 UNSW SYDNEY 2052  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au
 --
--

 


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Re: Quantum Immortality = no second law

2008-04-14 Thread Saibal Mitra

Citeren nichomachus [EMAIL PROTECTED]:


 In the description of the quantum immortality gedanken experiment, a
 physicist rigs an automatic rifle to a geiger counter to fire into him
 upon the detection of an atomic decay event from a bit of radioactive
 material. If the many worlds hypothesis is true, the self-awareness of
 the physicist will continue to find himself alive after any length of
 time in front of his gun, since there exist parallel worlds where the
 decay does not occur.

This has never been rigorously proven. I can give you some argumetns 
why the MWI does not imply Quantum Immortality.


 On a microscopic scale this is analogous to the observing a reality in
 which the second law of thermodynamics does not hold. for example,
 since there is a non-zero probability that molecular interactions will
 result in a decrease in entropy in a particular sealed volume under
 observation, there exist histories in which this must be observed.

 This is never observed. Therefore the MWI is shown to be false.

This is also not a correct conclusion (if you replace MWI by quantum 
immortality).


 




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Re: Quantum Immortality = no second law

2008-04-14 Thread Saibal Mitra

Citeren nichomachus [EMAIL PROTECTED]:


 In the description of the quantum immortality gedanken experiment, a
 physicist rigs an automatic rifle to a geiger counter to fire into him
 upon the detection of an atomic decay event from a bit of radioactive
 material. If the many worlds hypothesis is true, the self-awareness of
 the physicist will continue to find himself alive after any length of
 time in front of his gun, since there exist parallel worlds where the
 decay does not occur.

This has never been rigorously proven. I can give you some argumetns 
why the MWI does not imply Quantum Immortality.


 On a microscopic scale this is analogous to the observing a reality in
 which the second law of thermodynamics does not hold. for example,
 since there is a non-zero probability that molecular interactions will
 result in a decrease in entropy in a particular sealed volume under
 observation, there exist histories in which this must be observed.

 This is never observed. Therefore the MWI is shown to be false.

This is also not a correct conclusion (if you replace MWI by quantum 
immortality).


 




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Re: Request to form 'Social Contract' with SAI

2007-10-15 Thread Saibal Mitra

The best thing you could do is to freeze your brain. I think that will
preserve the connections between the neurons, although the cells will be
destroyed.

This will make it easier for a future civilization to regenerate you
digitally


- Original Message - 
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Everything List [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Monday, October 15, 2007 07:17 AM
Subject: Re: Request to form 'Social Contract' with SAI





 On Oct 14, 3:39 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 
  Take care, trust yourself and kill all the SAI on the road, to
  paraphrase a well known Buddhist idea. Either you are sufficiently
  clever to understand the SAI arguments, showing you are already an SAI
  yourself, and your message is without purpose, or you are not, in which
  case, to keep soundness (by lobianity), you better be skeptical, (and
  not to abide so quick imo).
 
  Unless you want to loose your universality, and be a slave, a tool.
 
  Bruno
 
  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

 Heh.  Bruno, I continue to analyse my current (human) condition to try
 to find a way out of this mess (I'm not a happy bloke).  Still
 considering many possibilities.  Given the possibility that super-
 intelligences do already (or will in the future) exist,  there's a
 chance that a non-interference policy is being/will be pursued, but
 that there's a way to get their attention - it could be a simple
 matter of indicating that you are aware of the possibility and
 requesting to 'sign' a 'social contract'.  Get in early now! ;)


 


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Re: how to define ASSA (was: The ASSA leads to a unique utilitarism)

2007-10-05 Thread Saibal Mitra

1) looks better because there is no unambiguous definition of next. 
However, I don't understand the shared by everyone part. Different 
persons are different programs who cannot exactly represent the 
observer moment of me.

As I see it, an observer moment is a snapshot of the universe taken by 
my brain. The brain simulates a virtual world based on information from 
the real world. We don't really experience the real world, we just 
experience this simulated world. Observer moments for observers should 
refer to the physical states of the virtual world they live in. Since 
different observers live in different universes which have different 
laws of physics, these physical states (= qualia) cannot be compared to 
each other.

We can only talk about an absolute measure for programs (simulated by 
other programs or not)...



Citeren Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED]:


 Russell Standish wrote:
 This is actually the SSSA, as originally defined by Bostrom. The ASSA
 is the SSSA applied to next observer moments.

 I guess there is a bit of confusing on these terms. I did some searching in
 the mailing list archives to find out how they were originally defined.
 First of all SSSA was clearly coined by Hal Finney, not Bostrom. Here's Hal
 Finney on May 18, 1999:

 Perhaps we need to distinguish a Strong Self-Sampling Assumption,
 which is like the SSA but instead of discussing observers, it refers to
 observer-instants.

 Followed by Bruno Marchal's reply defining RSSA/ASSA:

 Perhaps we need to distinguish a Strong Self-Sampling Assumption,
 which is like the SSA but instead of discussing observers, it refers to
 observer-instants.

 Useful distinction, indeed.

 Nevertheless I do think we should also distinguish between
 a relative strong SSA and a absolute strong SSA.
 The idea is that we can only quantify the first-person
 indeterminism on the set of consistent observer-instants
 extensions. I mean : consistent with the observers memory of its own
 (first person) past.

 Actually now I'm not sure what Bruno really meant. I had assumed that ASSA
 was the same thing as SSSA, only with the clarification that it's not
 relative. But if Bruno had really meant to define ASSA as SSSA applied to
 the next observer moment then I have been using the term ASSA
 incorrectly.

 So to sum up, there are two possible meanings for ASSA currently. Does
 anyone else have an opinion on the matter? Here are the competing
 definitions:

 1. You should reason as if your current observer-moment was randomly
 selected from a distribution that is shared by everyone and independent of
 your current observations (hence absolute).

 2. You should expect your next observer-moment to be randomly selected from
 a distribution that is shared by everyone and independent of your current
 observations.




 




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Re: how to define ASSA

2007-10-05 Thread Saibal Mitra

Of course, we all live in the same universe in the sense that we are 
all simulated by brains that exist in this universe (described 
approximately by the Standard Model and General Relativity). The 
problem is how to define the observer moments rigorously at least in 
principle. It is undeniable that we experience a the world that our 
brains are simulating and not the real world. We experience the real 
world only indirectly.

If you touch a hot object and burn your finger then you experiencing 
the pain is really an event that happens in the virtual world simulated 
by your brain. Your brain simply uses the results of the simulation to 
compute what action to take in the real world (and the simulation will 
then be updated accordingly). The burning sensation exists only in the 
simulated world, not in the real world. Of course, you can infer that 
the object must have been hot.

So, it seems to be more sensible to me to say that an observer moment 
is itself an entire universe (= program) in some state. This looks 
equivalent to specifying the exact state a brain is in, but the brain 
contains more information than is accessible to the observer. We really 
have to extract the program the brain is running from the brain and use 
that to define OMs, otherwise an OM becomes an inherently ambiguous 
concept (e.g. where does the brain end, do the nerves in my feet also 
count? etc. etc.).

One can simply define an observer as some program and look at the 
entire multiverse to seek out these programs that are in such and such 
state. Then one adds up all the absolute measures to obtain the total 
probability that the program is experiencing that state.

One would then expect that it is likely that a program defining a human 
observer is simulated by a brain in a universe described by the 
Standard Model.

citeren Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:


 Saibal Mitra wrote:
 1) looks better because there is no unambiguous definition of next.
 However, I don't understand the shared by everyone part. Different
 persons are different programs who cannot exactly represent the
 observer moment of me.

 As I see it, an observer moment is a snapshot of the universe taken by
 my brain. The brain simulates a virtual world based on information from
 the real world. We don't really experience the real world, we just
 experience this simulated world. Observer moments for observers should
 refer to the physical states of the virtual world they live in. Since
 different observers live in different universes which have different
 laws of physics, these physical states (= qualia) cannot be compared to
 each other.

 How do you know they live in different universes?  The great 
 agreement among observers is what leads us to believe in an objective 
 world.  It appears that it is more economical (both ontologically and 
 algorithmically) to explain the agreement by supposing there is an 
 objective world as described by physics.  In which case the observer 
 moments are derivative from the objective world - that's what makes 
 it a more efficient hypothesis.

 Brent Meeker


 




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Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?

2007-06-03 Thread Saibal Mitra

If it feels bafflement and confusion, then surely it is conscious :)

An AI that takes information from books might experience similar qualia we
can experience. The AI will be programmed to do certain tasks and it must
thus have a notion of what it is doing is ok., not ok, or completely wrong.

If things are going wrong and it has to revert what it has just done, it may
feel some sort of pain. Just like what happens to us if we pick up something
that is very hot.

So, I think that there will be a mismatch between the qualia the AI
experiences and what it reads about that we experience. The AI won't read
the information like we read it. I think it will directly experience it as
some qualia, just like we experience information coming in via our senses
into our brain.

The meaning we associate with the text would not be accessible to the AI,
because ultimately that is linked to the qualia we experience.

Perhaps what the AI experiences when it is processing information is similar
to an animal that is moving in some landscape. Maybe when it reads something
then that manifests itself like some object it sees. If  it processes
information then that could be like picking up that object putting it next
to a similar looking object.

But if  that object represents a text about consciousness then there is no
way for the AI to know that.

Saibal


- Original Message - 
From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Sunday, June 03, 2007 09:52 PM
Subject: Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?



 Part of what I wanted to get at in my thought experiment is the
 bafflement and confusion an AI should feel when exposed to human ideas
 about consciousness.  Various people here have proffered their own
 ideas, and we might assume that the AI would read these suggestions,
 along with many other ideas that contradict the ones offered here.
 It seems hard to escape the conclusion that the only logical response
 is for the AI to figuratively throw up its hands and say that it is
 impossible to know if it is conscious, because even humans cannot agree
 on what consciousness is.

 In particular I don't think an AI could be expected to claim that it
 knows that it is conscious, that consciousness is a deep and intrinsic
 part of itself, that whatever else it might be mistaken about it could
 not be mistaken about being conscious.  I don't see any logical way it
 could reach this conclusion by studying the corpus of writings on the
 topic.  If anyone disagrees, I'd like to hear how it could happen.

 And the corollary to this is that perhaps humans also cannot legitimately
 make such claims, since logically their position is not so different
 from that of the AI.  In that case the seemingly axiomatic question of
 whether we are conscious may after all be something that we could be
 mistaken about.

 Hal

 


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Re: Believing in Divine Destiny

2007-02-28 Thread Saibal Mitra

The only connection I can think of is as follows. For any given religious
text there should exist a universe which best fits those text.


Saibal


- Original Message - 
From: Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, February 27, 2007 11:55 PM
Subject: Re: Believing in Divine Destiny



  A year ago or so Wei Dai put an end to religious discussions on the
list.

 I don't remember if I did that a year ago or not, but I certainly think
the
 current discussion is off-topic. This mailing list is based on the premise
 that all possible universes exist. Unless someone can think of a
connection
 to this idea, can we please drop this thread?

 I have also noticed that all of [EMAIL PROTECTED]'s posts are
 copy-and-pastes from online sources:

 http://www.islamanswers.net/destiny/recorded.htm
 http://www.islamanswers.net/unity/understand.htm
 http://sg.answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20070226110342AAy6SG5
 http://www.themodernreligion.com/basic/quran/quran_proof_preservation.htm

 Copying other people's writings without attribution is plagiarism, which I
 certainly do not approve of.

 And aside from that, if anyone wants to reference large amounts of online
 material, please post a link instead of copying the text.

 P.S., I find that I am not always able to keep up with all of the
 discussions on the list. Putting my name in a post is a good way to get my
 attention, and please always feel free to email me directly with any
 administrative issues related to the list.



 


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Re: testing

2006-12-20 Thread Saibal Mitra


The listserver was experiencing a lot of computer pain recently and 
that prevented it from function normally :)


John Mikes [EMAIL PROTECTED]:


This is the 3rd time I send a 'test' to myself. I receive list-post on this
gmail address, but my mail does not show up, neither here nor on the
YAHOO-mail address I unsubscribed from.
Am I still on the No e-mail exclusion?
Or does the listserve not recognise my mailing?

John Mikes





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Re: Zuse Symposium: Is the universe a computer? Berlin Nov 6-7

2006-11-03 Thread Saibal Mitra

uncompoutable numbers, non countable sets etc. don't exist in first 
order logic, see here:

http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/courses/logsys/low-skol.htm


[EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]:


 Ah the famous Juergen Schmidhuber! :)

 Is the universe a computer.  Well, if you define 'universe' to mean
 'everything which exists' and you're a mathematical platonist and grant
 reality to infinite sets and uncomputables, the answer must be NO,
 since if uncomputable numbers are objectively real (strong platonism)
 they are 'things' and therefore 'part of the universe' which are by
 definition not computable.

 But if by 'universe' you just mean 'physical reality' or 'discrete
 mathematics' or you refuse to grant platonic reality to uncomputables
 or infinite sets (anti-platonism or weaker platonism) then the answer
 could be YES, the universe is a computer.

 Cheers!


 




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Re: Proof that QTI is false

2006-09-14 Thread Saibal Mitra


- Original Message - 
From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2006 5:47 AM
Subject: Re: Proof that QTI is false



 Saibal Mitra wrote:
  QTI in the way defined in this list contradicts quantum mechanics. The
  observable part of the universe can only be in a finite number of
quantum
  states. So, it can only harbor a finite number of observer moments or
  experiences a  person can have, see here for details:
 
  http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0102010
 
  If there can only be a finite number of observer moments you can only
  experience a finite amount of time.
 
  QED.

 So that would imply that when predicting states at some fixed finite time
in the
 future there is a smallest, non-zero probability that is realizable.  So
if our
 prediction, using continuum variables as an approximation, indicates a
probability
 lower than this value we should set it to zero??

 Brent Meeker

Yes, but you don't have to set anything to zero by hand. What happens is
that if there are only a finite number of quantum states there is one which
has the smallest non zero probability.

Saibal


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Re: Proof that QTI is false

2006-09-14 Thread Saibal Mitra

Yes, I agree that you could still have some form of QTI if there are only a
finite number of states. I just don't believe in it, because I don't think
the use of the relative measure is justified in case the observer isn't
conserved. In all other case the absolute measure and the relative measure
lead to the same predictions.




 Actually, in standard quantum mechanics, there is an infinity of
 observer moments, 2^{\aleph_0} of them in fact.

 What you are talking about are various quantum gravity theories, such
 as string theory, which appear to have a finite number of observer
 moments.

 However, even if as observers we are locked into a Nietschian cycle at
 some point in time due to finiteness of the number of possible states,
 the number will be so large that the practical effects of QTI will
 still need to be considered.

 Cheers


- Original Message - 
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2006 4:31 AM
Subject: Re: Proof that QTI is false

 On Tue, Sep 12, 2006 at 11:58:14PM +0200, Saibal Mitra wrote:
 
  QTI in the way defined in this list contradicts quantum mechanics. The
  observable part of the universe can only be in a finite number of
quantum
  states. So, it can only harbor a finite number of observer moments or
  experiences a  person can have, see here for details:
 
  http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0102010
 
  If there can only be a finite number of observer moments you can only
  experience a finite amount of time.
 
  QED.
 
 
 
 -- 
 *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
 is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a
 virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this
 email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you
 may safely ignore this attachment.

 --
--
 A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
 Mathematics
 UNSW SYDNEY 2052  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Australia
http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
 International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02
 --
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Saibal


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Re: Russell's book

2006-09-12 Thread Saibal Mitra

I think I can prove that QTI as intepreted in this list is false, I'll post
the proof in a new thread.

The only version of QTI that makes sense to me is this:
All possible states exist out there in the multiverse. The observer
moments are timeless objects so, in a certain sense, QTI is true. But then
you must consider surviving with memory loss.

E.g., if I'm diagnosed with a terminal illness, then there is still a branch
in which I haven't  been diagnosed with that illness. If I'm 100 years old,
then I still have copies that are only 20 years old etc. etc.

Saibal

- Original Message - 
From: Johnathan Corgan [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, September 12, 2006 7:43 PM
Subject: Re: Russell's book



 David Nyman wrote:

 [re: QTI]
  This has obvious
  implications for retirement planning in general and avoidance of the
  more egregious cul-de-sac situations. On the other hand, short of
  outright lunacy vis-a-vis personal safety, it also seems to imply that
  from the 1st-person pov we are likely to come through (albeit possibly
  in less-than-perfect shape) even apparently minimally survivable
  situations. This struck me particularly forcibly while watching the
  9/11 re-runs on TV last night.

 It's the cul-de-sac situations that interest me.  Are there truly any?
 Are there moments of consciousness which have no logically possible
 continuation (while remaining conscious?)

 It seems the canonical example is surviving a nearby nuclear detonation.
  One logical possibility is that all your constituent particles
 quantum-tunnel away from the blast in time.

 This would be of extremely low measure in absolute terms, but what about
 the proportion of continuations that contain you as a conscious entity?

 This also touches on a recent thread about how being of low measure
 feels. If QTI is true, and I'm subject to a nuclear detonation, does it
 matter if my possible continuations are of such a low relative measure?
 Once I'm in them, would I feel any different and should I care?

 These questions may reduce to something like, Is there a lower limit to
 the amplitude of the SWE?

 If measure is infinitely divisible, then is there any natural scale to
 its absolute value?

 I raised a similar question on the list a few months ago when Tookie
 Wiliams was in the headlines and was eventually executed by the State of
 California.  What possible continuations exist in this situation?

  In effect, we are being presented with a kind of 'yes doctor' in
  everyday life. Do you find that these considerations affect your own
  behaviour in any way?

 A very interesting question.

 If my expectation is that QTI is true and I'll be living for a very long
 time, I may adjust my financial planning accordingly.  But QTI only
 applies to my own first-person view; I'll be constantly shedding
 branches where I did indeed die.  If I have any financial dependents, do
 I provide for their welfare, even if they'll only exist forever outside
 my ability to interact with?

 -Johnathan

 


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Proof that QTI is false

2006-09-12 Thread Saibal Mitra

QTI in the way defined in this list contradicts quantum mechanics. The
observable part of the universe can only be in a finite number of quantum
states. So, it can only harbor a finite number of observer moments or
experiences a  person can have, see here for details:

http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0102010

If there can only be a finite number of observer moments you can only
experience a finite amount of time.

QED.


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Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees

2006-07-26 Thread Saibal Mitra


- Original Message - 
From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, July 26, 2006 08:28 AM
Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees



 The real problem is not just that it is a philosophical speculation,
 it is that it does not lead to any testable physical predictions.
 The string theory landscape, even if finite, is far too large for
 systematic exploration.  Our ideas, with an infinite number of possible
 universes, are even worse.  Physicists see acceptance of anthropic
 explanations as the end of physics because there is no way to make
 quantitative predictions when there are so many degrees of freedom.


I'm not so sure that our ideas are worse. If you read some recent articles,
e.g.:

http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0607227

you see that they haven't really formulated rigorous theories about measure,
probabilities etc. of the multiverse. It's still very much in the
handwaving stage.

Saibal


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Re: A calculus of personal identity

2006-06-30 Thread Saibal Mitra


- Original Message - 
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, June 30, 2006 09:23 AM
Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity


Brent Meeker writes:

  I think it is one of the most profound things about consciousness  
that observer moments don't *need* anything to connect them other than  
their content. They are linked like the novels in a series, not like the  
carriages of a train. It is not necessary that the individual novels be  
lined up specially on a shelf: as long as they have each been written  
and exist somewhere in the world, the series exists.   But the series
exists, as a series, by virtue of the information in them.  They are like
Barbour's  time-capsules; each contains enough references and characters
from the others to allow them to be  put into order.  It's not clear to me
what duration obserever moments have - but I don't think  they are novel
length.  I imagine them more like sentences (a complete thought as my
English teacher  used to say), and sentences *don't* have enough
information to allow them to be reconstructed into  the novel they came
from.
A book is the analogy that came to mind, but there is an important
difference between this and conscious experience. Books, sentences, words
may not need to be physically collected together to make a coherent larger
structure, but they do need to be somehow sorted in the mind of an observer;
otherwise, we could say that a dictionary contains every book ever written
or yet to be written. Moments of consciousness, on the other hand, by their
nature contain their own observer.
 That's why I suggest that OMs are not an adequate ontological basis for a
world model.  On the other  hand, if we include brain processes, or more
abstractly, subconscious thoughts, then we would have  enough information
to string them together.
I know some people on this list have attempted world-building with OMs, but
my starting point is the less ambitious idea that consciousness can in
principle extend across time and space without being specially linked. If a
person's stream of consciousness were chopped up into seconds, minutes, days
or whatever, using whatever vehicle it takes to run a human mind, and these
moments of consciousness randomly dispersed throughout the multiverse, they
would all connect up by virtue of their information content. Do you disagree
that it would in principle be possible?


You can take time evolution as an example. In both classical physics and
quantum mechanics, information is preserved. All the information about us
was already present in the early universe


Saibal







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Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA

2006-06-27 Thread Saibal Mitra

Hal, thanks for explaining!

I think that your approach makes a lot of sense. Applying this to copying
experiments, the probability of finding yourself to be the digital copy is:

m1/[m1 + m2]

where m1 is the measure of the mental experience corresponding to knowing
that you are the digital copy and m2 the measure of the mental experience
corresponding to knowing that you are still in biological form. I think that
for practical implementations m1 = m2 because the digital implementation
will just simulate the brain, so the complexity of the translation program
would be practically the same.

Saibal



- Original Message - 
From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 08:49 AM
Subject: Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA



 Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
  I don't understand why you consider the measures of the programs that do
the
  simulations. The ''real'' measure should be derived from the algorithmic
  complexity of the laws of physics that describe how the computers/brains
  work. If you know for certain that a computation will be performed in
this
  universe, then it doesn't matter how it is performed.

 I think what you're saying here is that if a mental state is instantiated
 by a given universe, the contribution to its measure should just be
 the measure of the universe that instantiates it.  And that universe's
 measure is based on the complexity of its laws of physics.

 I used to hold this view, but I eventually abandoned it because of a
 number of problems.  I need to go back and collect the old messages
 and discussions that we have had and put them into some kind of order.
 But I can mention a couple of issues.

 One problem is the one I just wrote about in my reply to Russell, the
 fuzziness of the concept of implementation.  In at least some universes
 we may face a gray area in deciding whether a particular computation,
 or more specifically a particular mental state, is being instantiated.
 Philosophers like Hans Moravec apparently really believe that every
 system instantiates virtually every mental state!  If you look at the
 right subset of the atomic vibrations inside a chunk of rock, you can
 come up with a pattern that is identical to the pattern of firing of
 neurons in your own brain.  Now, most philosophers reject this, they come
 up with various technical criteria that implementations have to satisfy,
 but as I wrote to Russell I don't think any of these work.

 The other problem arises from fuzziness in what counts as a universe.
 The problem is that you can write very simple programs which will
 create your mental state.  For example, the Universal Dovetailer does
 just that.  But the UD program is much smaller than what our universe's
 physical laws probably would be.  Does the measure of the UD count as a
 contribution to every mind it creates?  If so, then it will dominate over
 the contributions from more conventional universes; and further, since
 the UD generates all minds, it means that all minds have equal measure.
 To reject the UD as a cheating non-universe means that we will need a
 bunch of ad hoc rules about what counts as a universe and what does not,
 which are fundamentally arbitrary and unconvincing.

 Then there are all those bothersome disputes which arise in this model,
 such as whether multiple instantiations should add more measure than
 just one; or whether a given brain in a small universe should get more
 measure than the same brain in a big universe (since it uses a higher
 proportion of the universe's resources in the first case).  All these
 issues, as well as the ones above, are addressed and answered in my
 current framework, which is far simpler (the measure of a mental state
 is just its Kolmogorov measure - end of story).


  The algorithmic complexity of the program needed to simulate a brain
refers
  to a ''personal universe''. You can think of the brain as a machine that
is
  simulating a virtual world in which the qualia we experience exist. That
  world also exists independent of our brain in a universe of its own.
This
  world has a very small measure defined by the very large algorithmic
  complexity of the program needed to specify the brain.

 I agree with this, I think.  The program needed to specify a mental state
 a priori would be far larger than the program needed to specify the laws
 of physics which could cause that mental state to evolve naturally.
 Both programs make a contribution to the measure of the mental state,
 but the second one's contribution is enormously greater.

 The key point, due to Wei Dai, is that you can mathematically treat the
 two on an equal footing.  As you have described it, we have a virtual
 world with qualia being created by a brain; and you have that same
 world existing independently as a universe of its own.  Those are pretty
 different in a Schmidhuber type model.  The second case is the output of
 one

Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA

2006-06-20 Thread Saibal Mitra

I don't understand why you consider the measures of the programs that do the
simulations. The ''real'' measure should be derived from the algorithmic
complexity of the laws of physics that describe how the computers/brains
work. If you know for certain that a computation will be performed in this
universe, then it doesn't matter how it is performed.

The algorithmic complexity of the program needed to simulate a brain refers
to a ''personal universe''. You can think of the brain as a machine that is
simulating a virtual world in which the qualia we experience exist. That
world also exists independent of our brain in a universe of its own. This
world has a very small measure defined by the very large algorithmic
complexity of the program needed to specify the brain.


Saibal



From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, June 20, 2006 06:35 PM
Subject: Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA



 Bruno writes:
  Hal,
 
  It seems to me that you are introducing a notion of physical
universe,=20
  and then use it to reintroduce a notion of first person death, so
that=20
  you can bet you will be the one annihilated in Brussels.

 I should first mention that I did not anticipate the conclusion that
 I reached when I did that analysis.  I did not expect to conclude that
 teleportation like this would probably not work (speaking figurately).
 This was not the starting point of the analysis, but the conclusion.

 The starting point was the framework I have described previously, which
 can be stated very simply as that the measure of an information pattern
 comes from the universal distribution of Kolmogorov.  I then applied this
 analysis to specific information patterns which represent subjective,
 first person lifetime experiences.  I concluded that the truncated version
 which ends when the teleportation occurs would probably have higher
 measure than the ones which proceed through and beyond the teleportation.

 Although I worked in terms of a specific physical universe, that is
 a short-cut for simplicity of exposition.  The general case is to simply
 ask for the K measure of each possible first-person subjective life
 experience - what is the shortest program that produces each one.  I
 assume that the shortest program will in fact have two parts, one which
 creates a universe and the second which takes that universe as input
 and produces the first-person experience record as output.

 This leads to a Schmidhuber-like ensemble where we would consider
 all possible universes and estimate the contribution of each one to
 the measure of a particular first-person experience.  It is important
 though to keep in mind that in practice the only universe which adds
 non-negligible measure would be the one we are discussing.  In other
 words, consider the first person experience of being born, living your
 life, travelling to Brussels and stepping into a teleportation machine.
 A random, chaotic universe would add negligibly to the measure of this
 first-person life experience.  Likewise for a universe which only evolves
 six-legged aliens on some other planet.  So in practice it makes sense
 to restrict our attention to the (approximately) one universe which has
 third-person objective events that do add significant measure to the
 instantiation of these abstract first-person experiences.


  You agree that this is just equivalent of negating the comp
hypothesis.=20
  You would not use (classical) teleportation, nor accept a digital=20
  artificial brain, all right? Do I miss something?

 It is perhaps best to say that I would not do these things
 *axiomatically*.  Whether a particular teleportation technology would
 be acceptable would depend on considerations such as I described in my
 previous message.  It's possible that the theoretical loss of measure for
 some teleportation technology would be small enough that I would do it.

 As far as using an artificial brain, again I would look to this kind of
 analysis.  I have argued previously that a brain which is much smaller
 or faster than the biological one should have much smaller measure, so
 that would not be an appealing transformation.  OTOH an artificial brain
 could be designed to have larger measure, such as by being physically
 larger or perhaps by having more accurate and complete memory storage.
 Then that would be appealing.

 I think that one of the fundamental principles of your COMP hypothesis
 is the functionalist notion, that it does not matter what kind of system
 instantiates a computation.  However I think this founders on the familiar
 paradoxes over what counts as an instantiation.  In principle we can
 come up with a continuous range of devices which span the alternatives
 from non-instantiation to full instantiation of a given computation.
 Without some way to distinguish these, there is no meaning to the question
 of when a computation is instantiated; hence functionalism fails.

 My 

Re: Reasons and Persons

2006-06-01 Thread Saibal Mitra

John, actually I don't want to do that per se. I think that ultimately we live 
in a 
universe described by the very complex ''laws of physics'' that describe the 
qualia we 
experience. Perhaps it is better to say that we are such complex universes. We 
are 
simulated in a universe described by simple laws of physics. Our brains are 
simulating 
us. We shouldn't confuse the hardware with the software


Saibal


Quoting [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]:

 
 And why do you want to restrict a 'person' to a cut view of its neurons
 only?
 Isn't a person (as anything) part of his ambience - in a wider view: of
 the
 totality, with interction back and forth with all the changes that go on?
 Are you really interested only in the dance of those silly neurons?
 
 John M
 - Original Message -
 From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
 Sent: Monday, May 29, 2000 9:07 PM
 Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons
 
 
 
  There must exist a ''high level'' program that specifies a person in
 terms
  of qualia. These qualia are ultimately defined by the way neurons are
  connected, but you could also think of persons in terms of the
 high-level
  algorithm, instead of the ''machine language'' level algorithm specified
 by
  the neural network.
 
  The interpolation between two persons is more easily done in the high
 level
  language. Then you do obtain a continuous path from one person to the
 other.
  For each intermediary person, you can then try to ''compile'' the
 program
 to
  the corresponding neural network.
 
  - Original Message -
  From: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
  Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2006 02:29 AM
  Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons
 
 
  
   Russell Standish wrote:
   
   
   On Mon, May 29, 2006 at 07:15:33PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 I don't see why you are so sure about the necessity of passing
 through
 non-functional brain structures going from you to Napoleon. After
 all,
 there is a continuous sequence of intermediates between you and a
 fertilized ovum, and on the face of it you have much more in
 common
 mentally and physically with Napoleon than with a fertilized ovum.
 However, technical feasibility is not the point. The point is that
  *if*
 (let's say magically) your mind were gradually transformed, so
 that
  your
   
   We need to be a bit more precise than magically. In Parfit's book
 he
   talks about swapping out my neurons for the equivalent neurons in
   Napoleon's brain. Sure this is not exactly technically feasible at
   present, but for thought experiment purposes it is adequate, and
   suffices for doing the teleporting experiment.
   
   The trouble I have is that Napoleon's brain will be wired completely
   differently to my own. Substituting enough of his neurons and
   connections will eventually just disrupt the functioning of my brain.
  
   I agree that Parfit's simple method would probably create a
 nonfunctional
   state in between, or at least the intermediate phase would involve a
 sort
  of
   split personality disorder with two entirely separate minds coexisting
 in
   the same brain, without access to each other's thoughts and feelings.
 But
   this is probably not a fatal flaw in whatever larger argument he was
  making,
   because you could modify the thought experiment to say something like
  let's
   assume that in the phase space of all possibe arrangements of neurons
 and
   synapses, there is some continuous path between my brain and
 Napoleon's
   brain such that every intermediate state would have a single
 integrated
   consciousness. There's no way of knowing whether such a path exists
 (and
  of
   course I don't have a precise definition of 'single integrated
   consciousness'), but it seems at least somewhat plausible.
  
   Jesse
  
  
  
   
 
 
  
 
 
  --
  No virus found in this incoming message.
  Checked by AVG Free Edition.
  Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.8.0/353 - Release Date: 05/31/06
 
 
 
 
  
 




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Re: Reasons and Persons

2006-05-29 Thread Saibal Mitra

There must exist a ''high level'' program that specifies a person in terms
of qualia. These qualia are ultimately defined by the way neurons are
connected, but you could also think of persons in terms of the high-level
algorithm, instead of the ''machine language'' level algorithm specified by
the neural network.

The interpolation between two persons is more easily done in the high level
language. Then you do obtain a continuous path from one person to the other.
For each intermediary person, you can then try to ''compile'' the program to
the corresponding neural network.

- Original Message - 
From: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2006 02:29 AM
Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons



 Russell Standish wrote:
 
 
 On Mon, May 29, 2006 at 07:15:33PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
  
   I don't see why you are so sure about the necessity of passing through
   non-functional brain structures going from you to Napoleon. After all,
   there is a continuous sequence of intermediates between you and a
   fertilized ovum, and on the face of it you have much more in common
   mentally and physically with Napoleon than with a fertilized ovum.
   However, technical feasibility is not the point. The point is that
*if*
   (let's say magically) your mind were gradually transformed, so that
your
 
 We need to be a bit more precise than magically. In Parfit's book he
 talks about swapping out my neurons for the equivalent neurons in
 Napoleon's brain. Sure this is not exactly technically feasible at
 present, but for thought experiment purposes it is adequate, and
 suffices for doing the teleporting experiment.
 
 The trouble I have is that Napoleon's brain will be wired completely
 differently to my own. Substituting enough of his neurons and
 connections will eventually just disrupt the functioning of my brain.

 I agree that Parfit's simple method would probably create a nonfunctional
 state in between, or at least the intermediate phase would involve a sort
of
 split personality disorder with two entirely separate minds coexisting in
 the same brain, without access to each other's thoughts and feelings. But
 this is probably not a fatal flaw in whatever larger argument he was
making,
 because you could modify the thought experiment to say something like
let's
 assume that in the phase space of all possibe arrangements of neurons and
 synapses, there is some continuous path between my brain and Napoleon's
 brain such that every intermediate state would have a single integrated
 consciousness. There's no way of knowing whether such a path exists (and
of
 course I don't have a precise definition of 'single integrated
 consciousness'), but it seems at least somewhat plausible.

 Jesse



 


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Re: Smullyan Shmullyan, give me a real example

2006-05-12 Thread Saibal Mitra

From: Patrick Leahy [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, May 12, 2006 12:56 PM
Subject: Re: Smullyan Shmullyan, give me a real example




 On Fri, 12 May 2006, Saibal Mitra wrote:

 
  Einstein seems to have believed in ''immortal observer moments''.
 
  In a BBC documentary about time it was mentioned that Einstein consoled
a
  friend whose son had died in a tragic accident by saying that relativity
  suggests that the past and the future are as real as the present.
 

 I'm sure Einstein would turn in his grave at your quoted expression. An
 immortal moment is a contradiction in terms, unless it implies a second
 time which passes as we contemplate first time embedded in 4-D
 space-time.  Unfortunately a lot of popular discussion of space-time
 implicitly invokes this spurious second time, because it is hard to
 decouple the language of existence from the language of existence *in
 time*. To believe, with Einstein, that all points in space-time are
 equally real (because the relativity of simultaneity means that there is
 no unique now) is quite the opposite of the nutty idea that all events
 exist now --- not even wrong, from Einstein's point of view.

 Einstein actually expressed this view in a letter of condolence to the
 widow of his old friend Michele Besso. His words are worth quoting
 accurately:

 In quitting this strange world he has once again preceded me by just a
 little. That doesn't mean anything. For we convinced physicists the
 distinction between past, present, and future is only an illusion, however
 persistent.

 Later physicists, in particular John Bell, have pointed out that
 relativity doesn't *prove* that now is an illusion, it just makes it
 impossible to identify any objective now.

 Not that any of this has anything to do with the sort of immortality
 contemplated by Everett, which is not at all enticing: like the Sibyl in
 classical myth, his immortality would not be accompanied by eternal
 youth... a rather horrible fate.


Thanks for the correction and the exact quote. I only vaguely remembered
what was said in the program. Of course, ''immortal observer moment'' is
indeed contradictory. The point is, of course, that ''now'' implies a
localization in time just like ''here'' implies localization in space. Just
like things that don't exist here but do exist elsewhere are ''real'' so
should things that don't exist now anymore but did exist at some time in the
past.

Saibal


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Re: Smullyan Shmullyan, give me a real example

2006-05-11 Thread Saibal Mitra

Einstein seems to have believed in ''immortal observer moments''.

In a BBC documentary about time it was mentioned that Einstein consoled a
friend whose son had died in a tragic accident by saying that relativity
suggests that the past and the future are as real as the present.

Saibal





From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, May 11, 2006 01:07 AM
Subject: Re: Smullyan Shmullyan, give me a real example



 On Wed, May 10, 2006 at 11:13:27PM +0100, Patrick Leahy wrote:
 
 
  On who invented quantum suicide, the following is from the biography of
  Hugh Everett by Eugene B. Shikhovtsev and Kenneth W. Ford, at
  http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/everett/
 
  Atheist or not, Everett firmly believed that his many-worlds theory
  guaranteed him immortality: His consciousness, he argued, is bound at
each
  branching to follow whatever path does not lead to death --- and so on
ad
  infinitum. (Sadly, Everett's daughter Liz, in her later suicide note,
said
  she was going to a parallel universe to be with her father...)

 Sadly, because this is based on a total misunderstanding of QTI, I guess.

 
  The reference is to Everett's views in 1979-80, but there is no reason
to
  suppose that Everett had only just thought of it at the time. On a
  personal note, some time in the '80s I met one of Everett's co-workers
who
  told me that Everett used to justify his very unhealthy lifestyle on
  exactly these grounds. In our world, Everett died of a heart attack aged
  52.
 
  I have always assumed that John Bell was thinking along these lines when
  he commented on Everett's theory:
 
  But if such a theory was taken seriously it would hardly be possible to
  take anything else seriously. (1981, reprinted in _Speakable 
  Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics).
 

 These dates all mesh with Don Page's anecdote about Ed Teller :
 immortality consequences widely known, but rarely talked about by the
 early '80s.

  For that matter, this idea is implicit in Borges' story The Garden of
  Forking Paths (written before 1941), which provides the epigraph to the
  DeWitt  Graham anthology on The Many Worlds Interpretation.
 
  ==
  Dr J. P. Leahy, University of Manchester,
  Jodrell Bank Observatory, School of Physics  Astronomy,
  Macclesfield, Cheshire SK11 9DL, UK
  Tel - +44 1477 572636, Fax - +44 1477 571618

 Very interesting. Its a shame my manuscript is already at the
 printers, I would have loved this for my background info on QTI.

 -- 
 --
--
 A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
 Mathematics0425 253119 ()
 UNSW SYDNEY 2052  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Australia
http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
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Re: why can't we erase information?

2006-05-06 Thread Saibal Mitra

This thread is still alive! It seems that information can't be erased in
this thread either :)

I think that information can't be erased because of the way time is (or
should be) defined. If you take the observer moment approach to the
multiverse, then you have to define a notion of time. That definition will
then imply conservation of information.




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Re: why can't we erase information?

2006-04-11 Thread Saibal Mitra

Yes, I agree. But it could be that information loss is a bit ambiguous. E.g.
't Hooft has shown that you can start with a deterministic model exhibiting
information loss and end up with quantum mechanics.

Saibal

- Original Message - 
From: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Monday, April 10, 2006 03:22 AM
Subject: Re: why can't we erase information?



 Saibal Mitra wrote:

 
 
 How would an observer know he is living in a universe in which
information
 is lost? Information loss means that time evolution can map two different
 initial states to the same final state. The observer in the final state
 thus
 cannot know that information really has been lost.

 If he is able to figure out the fundamental laws of physics of his
universe,
 then he could see whether or not they have this property of it being
 possible to deduce past states from present ones (I think the name for
this
 property might be 'reversible', although I can't remember the difference
 between 'reversible' and 'invertible' laws). For example, the rules of
 Conway's Game of Life cellular automaton are not reversible, but if it
 were possible for such a world to support intelligent beings I don't see
why
 it wouldn't be in principle possible for them to deduce the underlying
 rules.

 As for the question of why we live in a universe that apparently has this
 property, I don't think there's an anthropic explanation for it, I'd see
it
 as part of the larger question of why we live in a universe whose
 fundamental laws seem to be so elegant and posess so many symmetries, one
of
 which is time-symmetry (or to be more accurate, CPT-symmetry, which means
 the laws of physics are unchanged if you switch particles with
antiparticles
 and flip the 'parity' along with reversing which direction of time is
 labeled 'the future' and which is labeled 'the past'). Some TOEs that have
 been bandied about here say that we should expect to live in a universe
 whose laws are very compressible, so maybe this would be one possible way
of
 answering the question.

 Jesse



 

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Re: why can't we erase information?

2006-04-11 Thread Saibal Mitra


- Original Message - 
From: Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, April 11, 2006 01:46 AM
Subject: Re: why can't we erase information?



 Saibal Mitra wrote:
  How would an observer know he is living in a universe in which
information
  is lost? Information loss means that time evolution can map two
different
  initial states to the same final state. The observer in the final state
  thus
  cannot know that information really has been lost.

 If the universe allows two different states to evolve into the same final
 state, the second law of thermodynamics wouldn't hold, and we would be
able
 to (in principle) contruct perpetual motion machines.

 I don't know why you say this can't be detected by an observer. In theory
 all we have to do is prepare two systems in two different states, and then
 observe that they have evolved into the same final state. Of course in
 practice the problem is which two different states? And as I suggest
 earlier, it may be that for anthropic reasons one or both of these states
is
 very difficult to access.


Yes, in principle you could observe such a thing. But it may be that generic
models exhibiting information loss look like model that don't have
information loss to internal observers. 't Hooft's deterministic models are
an example of this.

I'm also skeptical about observers being able to make more efficient
machines. The problem with that, as I see it (I haven't read Lloyd's book
yet) is as follows.

Consider first a model without information loss, like our own universe. What
is preventing us from converting heat into work with 100% efficiency is lack
of information. If we had access to all the information that is present then
you could make an effective Maxwell's Daemon.

Lacking such information, Maxwell's Deamon has to make measurements, which
it has to act on. But eventually it has to clear it's memory, and that makes
it ineffective.

To get rid of this problem Maxwell's Daemon would have to be able to reset
its memory without changing the state of the rest of the universe. This
could possibly be done in an universe with information loss, but that could
only work if the Daemon has control over the information loss process. If
information loss interferes with the actions of the Daemon, then it isn't
much use.

You could also think of the possiblity of some ''physical process'' which
would be sort of a ''passive Maxwell's Deamon'' that could reduce the
entropy in such universe. Using that you could create a temperature
difference between two objects. To extract work you now need to let heat
flow between the two objects. So, at that stage you need an entropy to
increase again.

So, to me this doesn't seem to be a generic world in which you have
information loss, rather a world in which it is preserved but where it can
be overruled at will. The benefits come from that magical power.


Saibal


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Re: why can't we erase information?

2006-04-09 Thread Saibal Mitra

How would an observer know he is living in a universe in which information
is lost? Information loss means that time evolution can map two different
initial states to the same final state. The observer in the final state thus
cannot know that information really has been lost.



- Original Message - 
From: Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sunday, April 09, 2006 09:11 AM
Subject: why can't we erase information?



 If we consider our observable universe as a computation, it's rather
 atypical in that it doesn't seem to make use of the erase operation (or
 other any operation that irreversibly erases information). The second law
of
 thermodynamics is a consequence of this. In order to forget anything
 (decrease entropy), we have to put the information somewhere else
(increase
 entropy of the environment), instead of just making it disappear. If this
 doesn't make sense to you, see Seth Lloyd's new book Programming the
 Universe : A Quantum Computer Scientist Takes On the Cosmos for a good
 explanation of the relationship between entropy, computation, and
 information.

 Has anyone thought about why this is the case? One possible answer is that
 if it were possible to erase information, life organisms would be able to
 construct internal perpetual motion machines to power their metabolism,
 instead of competing with each other for sources of negentropy, and
perhaps
 intelligence would not be able to evolve in this kind of environment. If
 this is the case, perhaps there is reason to hope that our universe does
 contain mechanisms to erase information, but they are not easily
accessible
 to life before the evolution of intelligence. It may be a good idea to
look
 out for such mechanisms, for example in high energy particle reactions.

 However I'm not sure this answer is correct because there would still be
 competition for raw material (matter and energy) where intelligence can
 still be an advantage. Anyone have other ideas?



 


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Re: Multiverse concepts in string theory

2006-02-15 Thread Saibal Mitra



Hi Stephen,

Yes I agree. But once you have many scientists 
believing in a certain paradigm, it takes radical new discoveries to overturn 
it. The lack of confirmation is usually not enough.

Saibal




- Original Message - 

  From: 
  Stephen 
  Paul King 
  To: everything-list@eskimo.com 
  Sent: Wednesday, February 15, 2006 1:45 
  AM
  Subject: Re: Multiverse concepts in 
  string theory
  
  Hi Saibal,
  
   Does this not lead one to suspect that 
  they secretly believe SUSY to be "not even wrong" and yet seek to save face? 
  My problem is that any scientific theory must be highly falsifiable, otherwise 
  we are just going back to the days of Scholastic debates...
  
  http://clublet.com/why?AngelsOnTheHeadsOfPins
  
  Onward!
  
  Stephen
  
  
- Original Message - 
From: 
    Saibal Mitra 

To: Stephen Paul King ; everything-list@eskimo.com 

Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2006 6:20 
PM
Subject: Re: Multiverse concepts in 
string theory

Stephen,

Theorists are always a bit ahead and they have 
already foundways to save SUSY from negative results from the LHC. 


Saibal


- Original Message - 

  From: 
  Stephen 
  Paul King 
  To: everything-list@eskimo.com 
  
  Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2006 1:04 
  PM
  Subject: Re: Multiverse concepts in 
  string theory
  
  Hi Norman,
  
   It will be a wonderful thing to get a 
  confirmation by next year but I am afraid that the usual behavior of 
  theorist will occur: the theory will be re-tinkered so that the particle 
  masses are too massive to be created by humans. It has been happening 
  already in astrophysics...
  
   Btw, have you any familiarity with 
  modeling the dynamics of scalar fields in relativistic situations? I need 
  some help. ;-)
  
  Onward!
  
  Stephen
  
  
  - Original Message - 
  
From: 
Norman 
Samish 
To: Everything-list 
Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2006 
1:36 AM
Subject: Re: Multiverse concepts in 
string theory

Stephen,

As you say, the version of string theorywith an 
infinity of universes isan elegant concept. However, when 
you say". . . its most fundamental assumption,the existence 
of a supersymmerty relation between bosons and fermions, has never even 
come close to matching experimental observation,"one could infer 
that there is little likelihood that SUSY will ever be shown to 
bea good theory.

Thismay change soon.Wikipedia says 
"Experimentalists have not yet found any superpartners for known 
particles, either because they are too massive to be created in our 
current particle accelerators, or because they may not exist at 
all. By the year 2007, the Large Hadron Collider at CERN 
should be ready for use, producing collisions at sufficiently high 
energies to detect the superpartners many theorists hope to 
see."

So maybe, in a couple of years, there WILL be 
experimental observation supporting SUSY.

I agree that the posts by Hal Finney and Wei Dai are 
well said and inspirational. Thanks,

Norman


Re: Multiverse concepts in string theory

2006-02-14 Thread Saibal Mitra



Stephen,

Theorists are always a bit ahead and they have 
already foundways to save SUSY from negative results from the LHC. 


Saibal


- Original Message - 

  From: 
  Stephen 
  Paul King 
  To: everything-list@eskimo.com 
  Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2006 1:04 
  PM
  Subject: Re: Multiverse concepts in 
  string theory
  
  Hi Norman,
  
   It will be a wonderful thing to get a 
  confirmation by next year but I am afraid that the usual behavior of theorist 
  will occur: the theory will be re-tinkered so that the particle masses are too 
  massive to be created by humans. It has been happening already in 
  astrophysics...
  
   Btw, have you any familiarity with 
  modeling the dynamics of scalar fields in relativistic situations? I need some 
  help. ;-)
  
  Onward!
  
  Stephen
  
  
  - Original Message - 
  
From: 
Norman 
Samish 
To: Everything-list 
Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2006 1:36 
AM
Subject: Re: Multiverse concepts in 
string theory

Stephen,

As you say, the version of string theorywith an 
infinity of universes isan elegant concept. However, when you 
say". . . its most fundamental assumption,the existence of a 
supersymmerty relation between bosons and fermions, has never even come 
close to matching experimental observation,"one could infer that there 
is little likelihood that SUSY will ever be shown to bea good 
theory.

Thismay change soon.Wikipedia says 
"Experimentalists have not yet found any superpartners for known particles, 
either because they are too massive to be created in our current particle 
accelerators, or because they may not exist at all. By the year 
2007, the Large Hadron Collider at CERN should be ready for use, producing 
collisions at sufficiently high energies to detect the superpartners many 
theorists hope to see."

So maybe, in a couple of years, there WILL be experimental 
observation supporting SUSY.

I agree that the posts by Hal Finney and Wei Dai are well 
said and inspirational. Thanks,

Norman


Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

2005-12-16 Thread Saibal Mitra
Hi Bruno,

Well, even if you can derive the laws of physics as we know them (in some
approximation), you still can't do an experiment to prove that quantum
suicide works. It can only be proven to the experimentor himself. This means
that the absolute measure cannot be ruled out experimentally.


- Original Message - 
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Thursday, December 15, 2005 01:25 PM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow



 Le 15-déc.-05, à 03:04, Saibal Mitra a écrit :


 
  To me it seems that the notion of ''successor'' has to break down at
  cases
  where the observer can die. The Tookies that are the most similar to
  the
  Tookie who got executed are the ones who got clemency. There is no
  objective
  reason why these Tookies should be excluded as ''successors''. They
  miss the
  part of their memories about things that happened after clemency was
  denied.
  Instead of those memories they have other memories. We forget things
  all the
  time. Sometimes we remember things that didn't really happen. So, we
  allow
  for information loss anyway. My point is then that we should forget
  about
  all of the information contained in the OM and just sample from the
  entire
  set of OMs.
 
  The notion of a ''successor'' is not a fundamental notion at all. You
  can
  define it any way you like.


 ?



  It will not lead to any conflict with any
  experiments you can think of.
 
 


 ?

 Counterexamples will appear if I succeed to explain more of the
 conversation with the lobian machines.

 But just with the Kripke semantics we have a base to doubt what you are
 saying here. Indeed, it is the relation of accessibility between OMs
 which determine completely the invariant laws pertaining in all OMs.
 For example, if the multiverse is reflexive the Bp - p is true in all
 OMs (that is, Bp - p is invariant for any walk in the multiverse). If
 the mutliverse is terminal of papaioannou-like) then Dt - ~BDt  is
 a law. In Kripke structure the accessibility relation determined the
 invariant laws.
 later, the modal logic is given by the machine interview, and from
 that, we will determine the structure of the multiverse, including the
 observable one.

 Bruno




 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





A New Kind of Science Conference

2005-12-14 Thread Saibal Mitra
http://www.wolframscience.com/conference/2006/outline.html






Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

2005-12-14 Thread Saibal Mitra

- Original Message - 
From: Johnathan Corgan [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wednesday, December 14, 2005 10:39 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow


 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

  In the multiverse, only other people end up in dead ends.

 Kind of makes you wonder what Tookie is doing right now.  To us, he died
 as a result of lethal injection.

 What sort of successor observer-moments can follow a thing like that?

 Better question--what is the most likely type of 1st-person
 observer-moment that would follow experiencing lethal injection?

 Sure, there is an infinitesimal probability that all his constituent
 particles quantum-tunneled to a Pacific island paradise and right now
 somewhere in the multiverse he's enjoying a drink with an umbrella in
 it, thanking the fine State of California for his new life.

 More likely, but still infinitesimally small, is the probability that
 only the molecules of toxin in the injection syringe quantum-tunneled
 away and right now there are execution officials puzzling over whether
 to pardon him after this act-of-God miraculous reprieve from death.

 But seriously, when the overwhelmingly vast majority of successor
 moments to an instant in time are all 3rd-person dead-ends, what would
 would be an example of a high-expectation 1st-person successor
 observer-moment from the tiny sliver of physically possible (but
 extremely unlikely) ones left?

 Is there in fact always one left, no matter how unlikely?



To me it seems that the notion of ''successor'' has to break down at cases
where the observer can die. The Tookies that are the most similar to the
Tookie who got executed are the ones who got clemency. There is no objective
reason why these Tookies should be excluded as ''successors''. They miss the
part of their memories about things that happened after clemency was denied.
Instead of those memories they have other memories. We forget things all the
time. Sometimes we remember things that didn't really happen. So, we allow
for information loss anyway. My point is then that we should forget about
all of the information contained in the OM and just sample from the entire
set of OMs.

The notion of a ''successor'' is not a fundamental notion at all. You can
define it any way you like. It will not lead to any conflict with any
experiments you can think of.



Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

2005-12-04 Thread Saibal Mitra
I still think that if you double everything and then annihilate only the
doubled person, the probability will be 1. This is simply a consequence of
using the absolute measure. The idea is that the future is ''already out
there''. So, the correct picture is not that suddenly the plenitude is made
larger because a copy of the person plus (part of) his universe is appended
to the plenitude. The plenitude itself is a timeless entity, containing all
possible states. If someone wants to carry out a duplication experiment then
the results of that are ''already'' present in the plenitude.

When death can be ignored then the apparent time evolution can be described
by a relative measure which is given as the ratio of absolute measures taken
before and after an experiment (as pointed out by George Levy in a previous
reply). Note that the locality of the laws of physics imply that you can
never directly experience the past. So, if you measure the z-component of a
spin polarized in the x-direction, you will find yourself in a state where
you have measured, say, spin up, while you have a memory of how you
prepaired the spin of the particle, some time before you made the
measurement. One thus has to distinguish between the three states:

S1: the experimenter prepaires the spin of the particle

S2: the experimenter finds spin up while having the memory of being in S1

S3: the experimenter finds spin down while having the memory of being in S1

These three states are ''timeless'' elements of the plenitude. They have
their own intrinsic measures. I challenge people on this list to explain why
this is not the case. If you have a plenitude you have everything. So, S1,
S2 and S3 are just ''out there''. The measure of S2  and S3 are half that of
S1. The probability of being in either S2 or S3 is thus the same as being in
S1. But if measuring spin down leads to instant death, then the probability
of being alive after the experiment is half that of being alive before the
experiment.




- Original Message - 
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Sunday, December 04, 2005 05:32 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow



 There is, of course, a difference between being duplicated so that there
are
 multiple copies of you in the one Universe, as in teleportation, and being
 duplicated along with the rest of the Universe as a result of MWI
branching.
 In the former case your relative measure increases and problems will arise
 when it comes to deciding who will get the spouse, house, bank account
etc.
 In the latter case your relative measure stays the same because everything
 else is duplicated along with you and nothing will seem to have changed.
You
 agree that in the teleportation example if your duplicate is
instantaneously
 annihilated the moment he comes into being, you will continue living with
 probability 1, as if the duplication had not taken place. On the other
hand,
 in the MWI branching example, you would argue that if your duplicate in
one
 of the branches is annihilated, then your subjective probability of
survival
 is 1/2.

 Now, suppose that instead of just you the entire Earth, or Galaxy, or
 Universe is duplicated along with you, while as before your duplicate (and
 only he) is annihilated the moment he comes into being on the new Earth
(or
 Galaxy, or Universe). It could be argued that your measure relative to the
 rest of the Universe (or that part of it which is duplicated) has now
 decreased. Is your expectation of survival in this case more like the
 original teleportation example, or more like the MWI branching example?

 Stathis Papaioannou



 Saibal Mitra writes:

 This doubling of the absolute measure is important. In another posting
you
 wrote about being teleported to many places and then being annihilated
 everywhere except at the original place. This won't affect the
probability
 of being alive at the original place. But in a QC experiment where you
have
 many outcomes, all leading to death except one, the probability of
 experiencing that branch is very small.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - Original Message -
 From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
 Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2005 11:38 AM
 Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
 
 
   Well, I did actually intend my example to be analogous to the Tegmark
QS
   experiment. Are you saying that if there is only one world and
magically
 an
   identical, separate world comes into being this is fundamentally
 different
   to what happens in quantum branch splitting? It seems to me that in
both
   cases the relative measure of everything in the world stays the same,
 even
   though in absolute terms there is double of everything.
  
   Stathis Papaioannou
  
  
   Saibal Mitra writes:
  
   Correction, I seem to have misunderstood Statis'  set up. If you
really

Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

2005-12-03 Thread Saibal Mitra
This doubling of the absolute measure is important. In another posting you
wrote about being teleported to many places and then being annihilated
everywhere except at the original place. This won't affect the probability
of being alive at the original place. But in a QC experiment where you have
many outcomes, all leading to death except one, the probability of
experiencing that branch is very small.






- Original Message - 
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2005 11:38 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow


 Well, I did actually intend my example to be analogous to the Tegmark QS
 experiment. Are you saying that if there is only one world and magically
an
 identical, separate world comes into being this is fundamentally different
 to what happens in quantum branch splitting? It seems to me that in both
 cases the relative measure of everything in the world stays the same, even
 though in absolute terms there is double of everything.

 Stathis Papaioannou


 Saibal Mitra writes:

 Correction, I seem to have misunderstood Statis'  set up. If you really
 create a new world and then create and kill the person there then the
 probability of survival is 1. This is different from quantum mechanical
 branch splitting.
 
 To see this, consider first what would have happened had the person not
 been
 killed. Then his measure would have doubled. But because he is killed in
 one
 of the two copies of Earth, his measure stays the same. In a quantum
 suicide
 experiment his measure would be reduced by a factor two.

   If on the basis of a coin toss the world splits, and in one branch I
am
   instantaneously killed while in the other I continue living, there are
   several possible ways this might be interpreted from the 1st person
   viewpoint:
  
   (a) Pr(I live) = Pr(I die) = 0.5
  
   (b) Pr(I live) = 1, Pr(I die) = 0
  
   (c) Pr(I live) = 0, Pr(I die) = 1

 _
 Buy now @ Tradingpost.com.au

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Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

2005-12-03 Thread Saibal Mitra
- Original Message - 
From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2005 03:06 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow


 Saibal Mitra wrote:
  - Original Message - 
  From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  To: everything-list@eskimo.com
  Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
  Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 07:41 PM
  Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
 
 
 
 Saibal Mitra wrote:
 
 - Original Message - 
 From: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: everything-list@eskimo.com
 Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 05:49 AM
 Subject: RE: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
 
 
 
 
 Saibal wrote:
 
 
 The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with
 Jesse), all that exists is an ensemble of isolated observer
 moments. The future, the past, alternative histories, etc.
 they all exist in a symmetrical way. It don't see how some
 states can be more ''real'' than other states. Of course, the
 universe we experience seems to be real to us while
 alternative universes, or past or future states of this
 universe are not being experienced by us.
 
 
 So, you must think of yourself at any time as being  randomly
 sampled from the set of all possible observer moments.
 
 delurk
 
 I'm not sure how this works. Suppose I consider my state now at time
N
 
 as
 
 
 a random sample of all observer moments. Now, after having typed this
 sentence, I consider my state at time N + 4 seconds. Is this also a
 
 random
 
 
 sample on all observer moments?  I can do the same at now N+10, and
 
 so-on.
 
 
 It seems very unlikely that 3 random samples would coincide so
closely.
 
  So
 
 in what sense are these states randomly sampled?
 
 
 It's a bit like symmetry breaking. You have an ensemble of all possible
 observer moment, but each observer moment can only experience its own
 
  state.
 
 So, the OM samples itself.
 
 There exists an observer moment representing you at N seconds, at N + 4
 seconds and at all possible other states. They all ''just exist'' in
the
 plenitude, as Stathis wrote. The OM  representing you at N + 4 has the
 memory of being the OM at N.
 
 This I find confusing.  How is there memory associated with an obserever
 
  moment?
 
   Is it equivocation on memory?  As an experience, remembering
something
 
  takes
 
 much longer than what I would call a moment.  It may involve a
sequence
 images, words, and emotions.  Of course in a materialist model of the
 
  world the
 
 memories are coded in the physical configuration of your brain, even
when
 
  not
 
 being experienced; but an analysis that takes OM's as fundamental can't
 
  refer to
 
 that kind of memories.
 
 
 
  Well, what really matters is that the laws of physics define a
probability
  distribution over OMs. So, there is no problem thinking of yourself as
being
  sampled randomly from that probability distribution. The length of an OM
  can be taken to be zero. Even if recalling something takes time, at any
time
  you are at a certain point in that process. There exists an OM that
recalls
  going through that sequence, but that is also at a specific moment in
time.

 But you're assuming laws of physics and a physical basis for
consciousness.  I
 thought the idea was to take conscious moments as basic.  I'm fine with
taking
 physics as basic - but then what's the point of talking about observer
moments;
 conscious observations are then some kind of emergent phenomena and
they're
 connected by physical causation.



Yes, but it's a fact that there exists laws of physics. I am of the opinion
that what really exists is an ensemble of algorithms and that the laws of
physics is a consequence of this. Whatever your starting point, you'll end
up with an absolute measure over the set of all OMs.



Does God play dice?

2005-12-03 Thread Saibal Mitra
http://physicsweb.org/articles/world/18/12/2/1



Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

2005-12-02 Thread Saibal Mitra

- Original Message - 
From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 07:41 PM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow


 Saibal Mitra wrote:
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  To: everything-list@eskimo.com
  Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 05:49 AM
  Subject: RE: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow
 
 
 
 Saibal wrote:
 
 The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with
 Jesse), all that exists is an ensemble of isolated observer
 moments. The future, the past, alternative histories, etc.
 they all exist in a symmetrical way. It don't see how some
 states can be more ''real'' than other states. Of course, the
 universe we experience seems to be real to us while
 alternative universes, or past or future states of this
 universe are not being experienced by us.
 
 
 So, you must think of yourself at any time as being  randomly
 sampled from the set of all possible observer moments.
 
 delurk
 
 I'm not sure how this works. Suppose I consider my state now at time N
 
  as
 
 a random sample of all observer moments. Now, after having typed this
 sentence, I consider my state at time N + 4 seconds. Is this also a
 
  random
 
 sample on all observer moments?  I can do the same at now N+10, and
 
  so-on.
 
 It seems very unlikely that 3 random samples would coincide so closely.
So
 in what sense are these states randomly sampled?
 
 
  It's a bit like symmetry breaking. You have an ensemble of all possible
  observer moment, but each observer moment can only experience its own
state.
  So, the OM samples itself.
 
  There exists an observer moment representing you at N seconds, at N + 4
  seconds and at all possible other states. They all ''just exist'' in the
  plenitude, as Stathis wrote. The OM  representing you at N + 4 has the
  memory of being the OM at N.

 This I find confusing.  How is there memory associated with an obserever
moment?
   Is it equivocation on memory?  As an experience, remembering something
takes
 much longer than what I would call a moment.  It may involve a sequence
 images, words, and emotions.  Of course in a materialist model of the
world the
 memories are coded in the physical configuration of your brain, even when
not
 being experienced; but an analysis that takes OM's as fundamental can't
refer to
 that kind of memories.


Well, what really matters is that the laws of physics define a probability
distribution over OMs. So, there is no problem thinking of yourself as being
sampled randomly from that probability distribution. The length of an OM
can be taken to be zero. Even if recalling something takes time, at any time
you are at a certain point in that process. There exists an OM that recalls
going through that sequence, but that is also at a specific moment in time.



Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

2005-12-02 Thread Saibal Mitra
- Original Message - 
From: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 10:02 PM
Subject: RE: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow



 Saibal wrote:
The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with
Jesse), all that exists is an ensemble of isolated observer
moments. The future, the past, alternative histories, etc.
they all exist in a symmetrical way. It don't see how some
states can be more ''real'' than other states. Of course, the
universe we experience seems to be real to us while
alternative universes, or past or future states of this
universe are not being experienced by us.
   
   
So, you must think of yourself at any time as being  randomly
sampled from the set of all possible observer moments.
  
   delurk
  
   I'm not sure how this works. Suppose I consider my state
  now at time N
  as
   a random sample of all observer moments. Now, after having
  typed this
   sentence, I consider my state at time N + 4 seconds. Is
  this also a
  random
   sample on all observer moments?  I can do the same at now
  N+10, and
  so-on.
   It seems very unlikely that 3 random samples would coincide
  so closely. So
   in what sense are these states randomly sampled?
 
  It's a bit like symmetry breaking. You have an ensemble of
  all possible
  observer moment, but each observer moment can only experience
  its own state.
  So, the OM samples itself.
 
  There exists an observer moment representing you at N
  seconds, at N + 4
  seconds and at all possible other states. They all ''just
  exist'' in the
  plenitude, as Stathis wrote. The OM  representing you at N + 4 has the
  memory of being the OM at N. Subjectively the OMs experience
  time evolution,
  even though the plenitude itself doesn't have a time evolution at the
  fundamental level.

 I understand all that, but I still don't see in what sense these OM's are
 randomly sampled.

 Here's a related question. The DDA insists that we must all consider
 ourselves random observers on our reference class, whatever it is (class
of
 all observers is standard). Now, if I am a random observer, and you
(Saibal)
 are a random observer, what are the odds that two observers selected
 randomly from the class of all observers would be discoursing on the same
 mailing list? We can only conclude that one of us can not be random, but
 must have been selected by the other. But did I select you, or did you
 select me? If we select each other, the randomness issue is not resolved.

 Another possibility is, I suppose, to simply *define* randomness as
observer
 self-selection. Perhaps observer self-selection is the only truly random
 phenomenon in the universe (everything else appearing random is merely
 unpredictable). But it is then a purely a first-person phenomenon, and I
can
 not consider anything else in the universe (including *your* observer
 moments) as random.



Yes, I meant ''random'' in the sense of observer self selection. But note
that the laws of physics define, in principle, a probability distribution
over the set over all possible states you can be in. One element of that set
corresponds to you reading this sentence. The probability of this is given
by an integral of the probability of states of the universe that are
consistent with you experiencing this OM. So, you ''integrate out''
everything that is not part of the OM and you are left with the probability
of the OM.



Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

2005-12-02 Thread Saibal Mitra

- Original Message - 
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Stathis Papaioannou
[EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, November 28, 2005 04:47 PM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow



 Le 27-nov.-05, à 02:25, Saibal Mitra a écrit :

  The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with Jesse), all
  that
  exists is an ensemble of isolated observer moments. The future, the
  past,
  alternative histories, etc.  they all exist in a symmetrical way. It
  don't
  see how some states can be more ''real'' than other states.

 But then how could we ever explain why some states seem to be more
 *near*, or more probable than others from our point of view?

Well, even if you assume ''ordinary'' laws of physics, you can have this
view. Einstein tried to console a friend whose son had died, by saying that
although he isn't alive now, he is ''still'' alive in the past. Relativity
theory threats space and time in more or less symmetrical ways.It doesn't
make any difference if you assume that you are sampled from a probability
distribution (to be calculated from physics) over your experiences.



 Is the choice between Papaioannou's  a, b reflecting(*) the ASSA
 and RSSA difference?

 Recall: ASSA = absolute self-sampling assumption. RSSA = relative
 self-sampling assumption.

 (*) Stathis Papaioannou writes:
  If on the basis of a coin toss the world splits, and in one branch I am
  instantaneously killed while in the other I continue living, there are
  several possible ways this might be interpreted from the 1st person
  viewpoint:
 
  (a) Pr(I live) = Pr(I die) = 0.5
 
  (b) Pr(I live) = 1, Pr(I die) = 0
 
  (c) Pr(I live) = 0, Pr(I die) = 1
 
  Even on this list, there are people who might say (a) above is the case
  rather than (b) or (c).


 Saibal:

  So, you must think of yourself at any time as being  randomly sampled
  from
  the set of all possible observer moments.


 This could make sense in a pure third person perspective, but then it
 is no more a perspective. And, indeed, to predict the result of
 anything I decide to test, I need to take into account relations
 between observer-moments. Let me throw a dice. Are you saying to us
 that to predict the result I need to take into account all
 observer-moments and sample on them in some uniform way. Why should
 people buy lotto-tickets? They could make the big win by their OM being
 sampled on all OMs.
 I'm not saying you are false, but your absolute sample does not
 correspond tour first person experience (including physics) which we
 want to explain. It seems to me.

Well, the probability distribution has to be consistent with physics. In
case of throwing a dice, one should consider the set of OMs that are
experiencing the outcome of the throw.



  To get to answer b) you have to
  redefine your identity so that experiencing having done the experiment
  becomes a necessary part of your identity.

 Not some absolute identity, but memories are part of our relative,
 mundane, identity.



  But this is cheating because you
  wouldn't say that if ''death'' were replaced by a partial memory
  erasure
  such that the experience of having done the experiment were wiped out
  form
  your memory.

 OK, but that is why the experiment is proposed with (absolute) death
 (if that exists) and not with memory erasure. This could change the
 probabilities a lot, and this can admit many different protocol for
 verifying the probability distributions. It is another experiment.
 Perhaps I miss your point.


Yes, that was my point. The probabilities become sensitive to the details of
the set up in a way that I find unphysical. If we just do conventional
quantum measurement of z-component of a spin polarized in the x-direction.
Then, in the MWI, you would say that there exists a world in which an
observer sees spin up and a world in which spin down is experienced.
Strictly speaking the two observers are not identical. Let's now modify the
experiment so that in case of spin down the observer is annihilated and
replaced by some arbitrary person. Then if we choose this person to be
''close'' to the original person then the probabilities are 1/2, but if I
move sufficiently ''far away'' from the person then it should somehow jump
to 1 for the original person.



Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

2005-12-02 Thread Saibal Mitra
Correction, I seem to have misunderstood Statis'  set up. If you really
create a new world and then create and kill the person there then the
probability of survival is 1. This is different from quantum mechanical
branch splitting.

To see this, consider first what would have happened had the person not been
killed. Then his measure would have doubled. But because he is killed in one
of the two copies of Earth, his measure stays the same. In a quantum suicide
experiment his measure would be reduced by a factor two.


- Original Message - 
From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED];
[EMAIL PROTECTED]; Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 02:25 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow


 The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with Jesse), all that
 exists is an ensemble of isolated observer moments. The future, the past,
 alternative histories, etc.  they all exist in a symmetrical way. It don't
 see how some states can be more ''real'' than other states. Of course, the
 universe we experience seems to be real to us while alternative universes,
 or past or future states of this universe are not being experienced by us.


 So, you must think of yourself at any time as being  randomly sampled from
 the set of all possible observer moments. To get to answer b) you have to
 redefine your identity so that experiencing having done the experiment
 becomes a necessary part of your identity. But this is cheating because
you
 wouldn't say that if ''death'' were replaced by a partial memory erasure
 such that the experience of having done the experiment were wiped out form
 your memory.





 - Original Message - 
 From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
 Sent: Saturday, November 26, 2005 11:51 AM
 Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow


 
  Stathis Papaioannou writes:
  If on the basis of a coin toss the world splits, and in one branch I am
  instantaneously killed while in the other I continue living, there are
  several possible ways this might be interpreted from the 1st person
  viewpoint:
 
  (a) Pr(I live) = Pr(I die) = 0.5
 
  (b) Pr(I live) = 1, Pr(I die) = 0
 
  (c) Pr(I live) = 0, Pr(I die) = 1
 
  Even on this list, there are people who might say (a) above is the case
  rather than (b) or (c).
 
  Bruno Marchal replies:
  Are you sure?
 
  I was thinking of people who accept some ensemble theory such as MWI,
but
  don't believe in QTI. I must admit, I find it difficult to understand
how
  even a dualist might justify (a) as being correct. Would anyone care to
  help?
 
  Stathis
 
  _
  Start something musical - 15 free ninemsn Music downloads!
 

http://ninemsn.com.au/share/redir/adTrack.asp?mode=clickclientID=667referral=HotmailTaglineNovURL=http://www.ninemsn.com.au/startsomething
 




Re: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow

2005-11-27 Thread Saibal Mitra

- Original Message - 
From: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 05:49 AM
Subject: RE: Quantum Immortality and Information Flow


 Saibal wrote:
  The answer must be a) because (and here I disagree with
  Jesse), all that exists is an ensemble of isolated observer
  moments. The future, the past, alternative histories, etc.
  they all exist in a symmetrical way. It don't see how some
  states can be more ''real'' than other states. Of course, the
  universe we experience seems to be real to us while
  alternative universes, or past or future states of this
  universe are not being experienced by us.
 
 
  So, you must think of yourself at any time as being  randomly
  sampled from the set of all possible observer moments.

 delurk

 I'm not sure how this works. Suppose I consider my state now at time N
as
 a random sample of all observer moments. Now, after having typed this
 sentence, I consider my state at time N + 4 seconds. Is this also a
random
 sample on all observer moments?  I can do the same at now N+10, and
so-on.
 It seems very unlikely that 3 random samples would coincide so closely. So
 in what sense are these states randomly sampled?

It's a bit like symmetry breaking. You have an ensemble of all possible
observer moment, but each observer moment can only experience its own state.
So, the OM samples itself.

There exists an observer moment representing you at N seconds, at N + 4
seconds and at all possible other states. They all ''just exist'' in the
plenitude, as Stathis wrote. The OM  representing you at N + 4 has the
memory of being the OM at N. Subjectively the OMs experience time evolution,
even though the plenitude itself doesn't have a time evolution at the
fundamental level.


Although it is a bit strange to think about time evolution in this way, it
is necessary to resolve paradoxes you get when contemplating doubling and
suicide experiments. It is precisely in these cases that our naive notion of
time evolution breaks down.


Saibal



Re: Quantum theory of measurement

2005-10-13 Thread Saibal Mitra
Well, as you can see here:

http://cabtep5.cnea.gov.ar/particulas/daniel/curri/curreng.html

He isn't very experienced yet. I know of some experienced  professors of
have made worse mistakes :)

So, what goes wrong? Well, you don't get an interference pattern at one end
even if you don't detect the photon at the other end. To see this, just
write down the two particle state and add the phase shifts. If the detectors
on the other sides are off, then the two contributions corresponding to the
photon being detected at some position z consist of two orthogonal terms;
one term correpsonds to the other photon in pipe 1 and the other for that
photon in pipe 2

 Suppose that you add a plate to detect the photon on that side as well.
Then the probability that the photon at one end is detected at position z1
and the other is detected at z2 does contain an interference term of the
form:

Cos[delta1(z1) + delta2(z2)]

If you don't detect where photon 2 is absorbed you have to integrate over z2
and the interference term vanishes. To see an interference term you must
keep  z2 fixed. This means that you must consider only those photons for
which the entangled partners were detected at at some fixed z2. But this
means that this value must be communicated by the observer there.

- Original Message - 
From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2005 03:59 AM
Subject: RE: Quantum theory of measurement


 Now that you are experts on this, try your hand on this FTL
 signalling device, http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph?0204108.
 The author, Daniel Badagnani, is apparently a genuine physicist,
 http://cabtep5.cnea.gov.ar/particulas/daniel/pag-db.html.

 Hal Finney




Re: Quantum theory of measurement

2005-10-12 Thread Saibal Mitra
Hal gives the correct explanation of what's going on. In general,  all you
have to do to analyze the problem is to consider all contributions to a
particular state and add up the amplitudes. The absolute value squared of
the amplitude gives the probability, which may or may not contain an
interference term.

A simple minded formal description can be given as follows:

If you pass a photon through two slits then close to the screen its state
would be of the form:

Integral over z of [1 + Exp(i delta(z))] |s,z

Here z denotes the postion on the screen, s is just a label for the photon
and Exp(i delta(z)) is the phase shift between the two paths which gives
rise to the interference term. Delta(z) will be zero exactly inbetween the
two slits and will be nonzero elsewhere. The probability of having the
photon at z is obtained (up to normalization) by taking the absolute value
squared of the prefactor of |s,z, which is 2 + 2 cos(delta(z)).

Let's do the same for the two entagled photons. The entangled photon pair
can be denoted as:

 |p_x,s_y + |p_y,s_x

here x and y denote the polarization states.

If you pass s through the two slits then the state becomes:

 [1 + Exp(i delta(z))] |p_x,s_y,z +  [1 + Exp(i delta(z))] ||p_y,s_x,z

This has to be integrated over z, but let's focus only at the contribution
at some fixed position z. The prefactors of both state vectors |p_x,s_y,z
and |p_y,s_x,z are of the same form as in the single photon case and thus
you get an interference term Cos(delta(z) as above. If you put the quarter
wave plate in then instead of

 [1 + Exp(i delta(z))] |p_x,s_y,z you get:

 |p_x,s_r,z +  Exp(i delta(z))  |p_x,s_l,z

And the complete state vector becomes:

|p_x,s_r,z +  Exp(i delta(z))  |p_x,s_l,z+

|p_y,s_l,z +  Exp(i delta(z))  |p_y,s_r,z


All the four state vectors are orthogonal. The probability that you detect
the photon s at z is just the sum of the absolute value squared of the four
terms, which is constant and doesn't contain an interference term.

Now let's pass photon p through the polarizer (45 degrees w.r.t. x). This
amounts to measuring the polarization state of photon p in the basis |p_x +
p_y and |p_x - p_y. If you don't discard one of these two states and keep
them both then, as Hal rightly points out, nothing changes. If you
substitute:

|p_x = |a + |b;

|p_y = |a - |b

in the state vector above you get:



|a,s_r,z +  Exp(i delta(z))  |a,s_l,z+

|a,s_l,z +  Exp(i delta(z))  |a,s_r,z+


|b,s_r,z +  Exp(i delta(z))  |b,s_l,z+

- |b,s_l,z -  Exp(i delta(z))  |b,s_r,z = (collecting the prefactors of
like state vectors)

=

[1 + Exp(i delta(z))]|a,s_r,z + [1 + Exp(i delta(z))]|a,s_l,z +

[1 - Exp(i delta(z))]|b,s_r,z - [1 -  Exp(i delta(z))] |b,s_l,z

The absolute value squared of the terms with the p photons in the |a state
contains the term 2 Cos (delta(z)), but for the b terms this is - 2
Cos(delta(z). If you don't observe the polarization of the p photon, the
interference terms would thus cancel. This is obvious since all we have done
is to write down the same state in a different basis. But if you do observe
the polarization of the p photon, then can measure the probability of
detecting s at position z and p in polarization state |a then you have to
add up the absolute value squared of |a,s_r,z and |a,s_l,z. Then you do
get the Cos(delta(z) interference term.




- Original Message - 
From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wednesday, October 12, 2005 08:16 PM
Subject: Re: Quantum theory of measurement


 Ben Goertzel writes about:
  http://grad.physics.sunysb.edu/~amarch/
 
  The questions I have regard the replacement of the Coincidence Counter
(from
  here on: CC) in the  above experiment with a more complicated apparatus.
 
  What if we replace the CC with one of the following:
 
  1) a carefully sealed, exquisitely well insulated box with a printer
inside
  it.  The printer is  hooked up so that it prints, on paper, an exact
record
  of everything that comes into the CC.  Then,  to erase the printed
record,
  the whole box is melted, or annihilated using nuclear explosives, or
  whatever.

 The CC is not what is erased.  Rather, the so-called erasure happens
 to the photons while they are flying through the apparatus.  Nothing in
 the experiment proposes erasing data in the CC.  So I don't really see
 what you are getting at.

  What will the outcome be in these experiments?

 It won't make any difference, because the CC is not used in the way you
 imagine.  It doesn't have to produce a record and it doesn't have to erase
 any records.

 Let me tell you what really happens in the experiment above.  It is
 actually not so mystical as people try to make it sound.

 We start off with the s photon going through a 2 slit experiment and
 getting interference.  That is standard.

 Now we put two different polarization rotations in front of the two slits
 and interference goes away.  The web page author professes 

Re: Neutrino shield idea

2005-10-10 Thread Saibal Mitra
There are a lot of experiments that have detected neutrinos and verified
their properties (which are completely different from photons).



- Original Message - 
From: John Ross [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: 'Saibal Mitra' [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, October 10, 2005 10:49 PM
Subject: RE: Neutrino shield idea


 I think the beta decay model is wrong where it predicts neutrinos are
 basically different from photons.  I understand neutrinos travel at the
 speed of light.  Only photons travel at the speed of light.

 -Original Message-
 From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Sent: Friday, October 07, 2005 4:30 PM
 To: John Ross; everything-list@eskimo.com
 Subject: Re: Neutrino shield idea


 This means that beta decay proves your model wrong.

 - Original Message - 
 From: John Ross [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: 'Stephen Paul King' [EMAIL PROTECTED];
 everything-list@eskimo.com
 Sent: Saturday, October 08, 2005 12:35 AM
 Subject: RE: Neutrino shield idea


  Thanks for the paper relating to detection of low energy neutrinos.
  However, according to my model, neutrinos are very, very high energy
  photons (off everybody's chart, except mine).
 
  Therefore, if my model is correct, then low energy neutrinos would
  merely be the photons we are familiar with and would be very easy to
  detect.
 
  -Original Message-
  From: Stephen Paul King [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Sent: Friday, October 07, 2005 12:54 PM
  To: everything-list@eskimo.com
  Subject: Neutrino shield idea
 
 
  Howdy!
 
  I friend of mine has worked on a related idea that might help this

  inverstigation. Please see:
 
  http://davidwoolsey.com/physics/ideas/neutrinoscope/index.html
 
  Kindest regards,
 
  Stephen
 
  - Original Message -
  From: John Ross [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
  Sent: Friday, October 07, 2005 11:57 AM
  Subject: RE: ROSS MODEL OF THE UNIVERSE - The Simplest Yet Theory of
  Everything
 
 
   Yes.  But building a neutrino shield would be difficult.
 




Re: Neutrino shield idea

2005-10-10 Thread Saibal Mitra
I'm sure you saw something else :-)

- Original Message - 
From: John Ross [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: 'Russell Standish' [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: 'Hal Ruhl' [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Tuesday, October 11, 2005 01:40 AM
Subject: RE: Neutrino shield idea


 I say a neutrino does not have a rest mass.  It is a photon, like a very
 high energy gamma ray photon.  I have seen photos of a neutrino
 collision in a neutrino trap.  From the look of all the resulting
 ionization tracks, it must have had a lot more energy than 40 ev.  I say
 the energy of neutrinos is in the range of 300 mev!
 
 -Original Message-
 From: Russell Standish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 Sent: Monday, October 10, 2005 3:00 PM
 To: John Ross
 Cc: 'Hal Ruhl'; everything-list@eskimo.com
 Subject: Re: Neutrino shield idea
 
 
 According to special relativity, anything with a positive rest mass
 travels slower than the speed of light. Neutrinos have been measured
 with a positive rest mass, of around 40ev for the electron neutrino
 IIRC, and higher values for the muon and tauon neutrinos.
 
 I have never heard of either tardyon or luxon before either, but have
 heard of tachyon, or faster than light particle. Clearly tardyon is
 therefore slower than light, and luxon is at light speed.
 
 Luxons therefore have zero rest mass, and tachyons have imaginary (ie
 proportional to sqrt(-1)) rest mass.
 
 Cheers
 
 On Mon, Oct 10, 2005 at 03:06:55PM -0700, John Ross wrote:
  Where is the proof that a neutrino is not a photon.  I believe people 
  are only guessing that a neutrino is a tardyon, whatever in the hell a
 
  tardyon is.  Tardyons are not in my dictionary.
  
  -Original Message-
  From: Hal Ruhl [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Sent: Monday, October 10, 2005 2:50 PM
  To: everything-list@eskimo.com
  Subject: RE: Neutrino shield idea
  
  
  As I understand it a photon is a luxon as is a gluon and a neutrino
  is a tardyon.
  
  Hal Ruhl
  
  
  At 04:49 PM 10/10/2005, you wrote:
  I think the beta decay model is wrong where it predicts neutrinos are
  basically different from photons.  I understand neutrinos travel at
 the
  
  speed of light.  Only photons travel at the speed of light.
  
  -Original Message-
  From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Sent: Friday, October 07, 2005 4:30 PM
  To: John Ross; everything-list@eskimo.com
  Subject: Re: Neutrino shield idea
  
  
  This means that beta decay proves your model wrong.
  
  - Original Message -
  From: John Ross [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  To: 'Stephen Paul King' [EMAIL PROTECTED];
  everything-list@eskimo.com
  Sent: Saturday, October 08, 2005 12:35 AM
  Subject: RE: Neutrino shield idea
  
  
Thanks for the paper relating to detection of low energy
neutrinos. However, according to my model, neutrinos are very,
 very 
high energy photons (off everybody's chart, except mine).
   
Therefore, if my model is correct, then low energy neutrinos would
merely be the photons we are familiar with and would be very easy
 to
  
detect.
   
-Original Message-
From: Stephen Paul King [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, October 07, 2005 12:54 PM
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Neutrino shield idea
   
   
Howdy!
   
I friend of mine has worked on a related idea that might help
this
  
inverstigation. Please see:
   
http://davidwoolsey.com/physics/ideas/neutrinoscope/index.html
   
Kindest regards,
   
Stephen
   
- Original Message -
From: John Ross [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Friday, October 07, 2005 11:57 AM
Subject: RE: ROSS MODEL OF THE UNIVERSE - The Simplest Yet Theory 
of
  
Everything
   
   
 Yes.  But building a neutrino shield would be difficult.
   
 
 -- 
 *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
 is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus.
 It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email
 came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely
 ignore this attachment.
 
 
 
 A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
 Mathematics0425 253119 ()
 UNSW SYDNEY 2052  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 
 Australia
 http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
 International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02
 
 
 



Re: Neutrino shield idea

2005-10-10 Thread Saibal Mitra
Faster than light effects lead to violations of causality. There are very
stringent experimental constraints against such effects.

- Original Message - 
From: John Ross [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: 'Russell Standish' [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: 'Stephen Paul King' [EMAIL PROTECTED];
everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Tuesday, October 11, 2005 01:43 AM
Subject: RE: Neutrino shield idea


 I say any massless particle that has a charge supporting a Coulomb force
 must travel at the speed of light or faster because the Coulomb force
 travels at the speed of light and a charged massless particle will be
 repelled by its own Coulomb force.

 -Original Message-
 From: Russell Standish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Sent: Monday, October 10, 2005 3:04 PM
 To: John Ross
 Cc: 'Stephen Paul King'; everything-list@eskimo.com
 Subject: Re: Neutrino shield idea


 On Mon, Oct 10, 2005 at 09:11:04AM -0700, John Ross wrote:
  * Only photons travel at the speed of light.  (Except my tronnies that

  usually go faster than the speed of light.)

 Who says? Any massless particle will travel at the speed of light.

 -- 
 *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which
 is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus.
 It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email
 came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely
 ignore this attachment.

 
 
 A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
 Mathematics0425 253119 ()
 UNSW SYDNEY 2052  [EMAIL PROTECTED]

 Australia
 http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
 International prefix  +612, Interstate prefix 02
 
 




Tegmark's prediction of neutrino masses

2005-10-10 Thread Saibal Mitra
Since we are discussing neutrinos, I thought it is fun to mention antropic
constraints on neutrino masses derived by Tegmark, see here:

http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0304536


Anthropic predictions for neutrino masses
Authors: Max Tegmark (MIT), Alexander Vilenkin (Tufts), Levon Pogosian
(Tufts)
Categories: astro-ph
Comments: Revised to match accepted PRD version. Added references,
discussion of very heavy neutrinos, analytic growth factor fit. 9 pages, 4
figs. Color figs and links at this http URL
Journal-ref: Phys.Rev. D71 (2005) 103523

It is argued that small values of the neutrino masses may be due to
anthropic selection effects. If this is the case, then the combined mass of
the three neutrino species is expected to be ~1eV, neutrinos causing a
non-negligible suppression of galaxy formation.


http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0404497

Anthropic predictions for vacuum energy and neutrino masses
Authors: Levon Pogosian, Alexander Vilenkin, Max Tegmark
Categories: astro-ph gr-qc hep-th
Comments: 9 pages, 4 figures
Journal-ref: JCAP 0407 (2004) 005

It is argued that the observed vacuum energy density and the small values of
the neutrino masses could be due to anthropic selection effects. Until now,
these two quantities have been treated separately from each other and, in
particular, anthropic predictions for the vacuum energy were made under the
assumption of zero neutrino masses. Here we consider two cases. In the
first, we calculate predictions for the vacuum energy for a fixed (generally
non-zero) value of the neutrino mass. In the second we allow both quantities
to vary from one part of the universe to another. We find that the anthropic
predictions for the vacuum energy density are in a better agreement with
observations when one allows for non-zero neutrino masses. We also find that
the individual distributions for the vacuum energy and the neutrino masses
are reasonably robust and do not change drastically when one adds the other
variable.



-
Defeat Spammers by launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites:
http://www.hillscapital.com/antispam/



Re: Neutrino shield idea

2005-10-07 Thread Saibal Mitra
This means that beta decay proves your model wrong.

- Original Message - 
From: John Ross [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: 'Stephen Paul King' [EMAIL PROTECTED];
everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Saturday, October 08, 2005 12:35 AM
Subject: RE: Neutrino shield idea


 Thanks for the paper relating to detection of low energy neutrinos.
 However, according to my model, neutrinos are very, very high energy
 photons (off everybody's chart, except mine).

 Therefore, if my model is correct, then low energy neutrinos would
 merely be the photons we are familiar with and would be very easy to
 detect.

 -Original Message-
 From: Stephen Paul King [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Sent: Friday, October 07, 2005 12:54 PM
 To: everything-list@eskimo.com
 Subject: Neutrino shield idea


 Howdy!

 I friend of mine has worked on a related idea that might help this
 inverstigation. Please see:

 http://davidwoolsey.com/physics/ideas/neutrinoscope/index.html

 Kindest regards,

 Stephen

 - Original Message - 
 From: John Ross [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
 Sent: Friday, October 07, 2005 11:57 AM
 Subject: RE: ROSS MODEL OF THE UNIVERSE - The Simplest Yet Theory of
 Everything


  Yes.  But building a neutrino shield would be difficult.




Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

2005-09-08 Thread Saibal Mitra
Hi Norman,

Only when you demand that the computations be done in real time there is a
problem. My point is that this problem is not relevant.

Any TM that you can build will have limitations because of the laws of
physics. Suppose that  simulating the time evolution of 1 isolated cubic
meter of space containing matter for 1 second takes at least 1 billion years
for a computer the size of our solar system.

Then I would say that I can simulate a few seconds of your consciousness
because you only experience simulated time. You may say that because your
simulated brain can't interact with the rest of the (real) universe this
doesn't qualify as a ''bona fide'' simulation.

Saibal



- Original Message - 
From: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2005 05:48 AM
Subject: Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*


 Hi Saibal,

 Thanks for your reply.  But semantics once again rears its ugly head!
 Norman

 - Original Message - 
 From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
 Sent: Monday, September 05, 2005 3:08 PM
 Subject: Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*


 Hi Norman,

 (SM) A TM in our universe can simulate you living in a virtual universe.
If
 your universe is described by the same laws of physics as ours, then most
 physicists believe that the TM would have to work in a nonlocal way from
 your perspective.

 (NS) What do you mean by nonlocal?  Wikipedia says Nonlocality in
quantum
 mechanics, refers to the property of entangled quantum states in which
both
 the entangled states collapse simultaneously upon measurement of one of
 their entangled components, regardless of the spatial separation of the
two
 states.   I don't understand what that has to do with the TM.

 (SM) Is this a problem? I don't think so, because the TM doesn't exist in
 your universe, it exists in our universe and it doesn't violate locality
 here.  The TM generates your universe in which locality cannot be
violated.
 So, I don't see the problem.

 (NS) Are you saying that the universe that the Turing Machine simulates is
 different from the one that I'm in, and in this simulated universe the
speed
 limits on the speed of the TM don't apply?  No - that can't be it.  I'm
 sorry - I guess I don't know what you mean.  The problem that I posed is
 that I don't understand how a finite-speed Turing Machine can simulate a
 universe, contrary to the assertions of the Church Thesis.  Whether or not
 I'm in the universe to be simulated seem irrelevant.  The computation in
 such a simulation is so immense that it must take a faster-than-light TM,
 which is not possible.  Therefore, it seems to me, computationalism must
be
 false.


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Re: subjective reality

2005-09-05 Thread Saibal Mitra
Hi Norman,

I agree that you can assume that one multiverse exists and that that implies
that everything describable exists. But If physical existence is not the
same as mathematical existence then there is nothing we can do to verify
this. So, this like postulating that a powerless God exists.

Saibal



- Original Message - 
From: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Saturday, September 03, 2005 09:33 PM
Subject: Re: subjective reality


 Hi Saibal,
 While my simple mind believes that mathematical existence = physical
 existence, I do not assume that we owe our existence to the mere
existence
 of the algorithm, not a machine that executes it.
 To me, the reason that mathematical existence means physical existence
 is that in infinite space and time, everything that can exist must
exist.
 If it's describable mathematically, then it can exist, somewhere in the
 multiverse - therefore it must exist.  Tegmark claims, for example, that
 in his Level I multiverse, there is an identical copy of (me) about
 10^10^29 meters away.   (arXiv:astro-ph/0302131 v1  7 Feb 2003)

 Norman
 ~~

 - Original Message - 
 From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
 Sent: Saturday, September 03, 2005 7:10 AM
 Subject: Re: subjective reality


 Hi Godfrey,

 It is not clear to me why one would impose constraints such as locality
etc.
 here. Ignoring the exact details of what Bruno (and others) are doing, it
 all all boils down to this:

 Does there exists an algorithm that when run on some computer would
generate
 an observer who would subjectively perceive his virtual world to be
similar
 to the world we live in (which is well described by the standard model and
 GR).

 The quantum fields are represented in some way by the states of the
 transistors of the computer. The way the computer evolves from one state
to
 the next, of course, doesn't violate ''our laws of physics''. It may be
the
 case that the way the transistors are manipulated by the computer when
 interpreted in terms of the quantum fields in the ''virtual world'' would
 violate the laws of physics of that world. But this is irrelevant, because
 the observer cannot violate the laws of physics in his world. Also, if you
 believe that ''mathematical existence= physical existence'', then you
assume
 that we owe our existence to the mere existence of the algorithm, not a
 machine that executes it.


 Saibal


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Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*

2005-09-05 Thread Saibal Mitra
Hi Norman,

A TM in our universe can simulate you living in a virtual universe. If your
universe is described by the same laws of physics as ours, then most
physicists believe that the TM would have to work in a nonlocal way from
your perspective.

Is this a problem? I don't think so, because the TM doesn't exist in your
universe, it exists in our universe and it doesn't violate locality here.
The TM generates your universe in which locality cannot be violated. So, I
don't see the problem.

Saibal

- Original Message - 
From: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, September 05, 2005 08:44 PM
Subject: Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*


 Hal Finney,

 You say, . . . the Church Thesis, which I would paraphrase as saying that
 there are no physical processes more computationally powerful than a
Turing
 machine, or in other words that the universe could in principle be
simulated
 on a TM.  I wouldn't be surprised if most people who believe that minds
can
 be simulated on TMs also believe that everything can be simulated on a
TM.

 I'm out of my depth here, but this doesn't make sense to me.  My
 understanding is that the Turing Machine is a hypothetical device.  If one
 could be built that operated at faster-than-light or infinite speed, maybe
 it could, in principle, simulate the universe.  However, this isn't
 possible.  Does this mean that the Church Thesis, hence computationalism,
 is, in reality, false?

 Norman Samish


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Re: How did it all begin?

2005-09-01 Thread Saibal Mitra
Hi Norman,

I have no idea why it received a dishonorable mention. It could be because
some physicists/cosmologists don't like anthropic reasoning.




- Original Message - 
From: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 12:57 AM
Subject: Re: How did it all begin?


 This is a teaser.  Why did Tegmark's paper receive Dishonorable Mention?
 Who is Godfrey?

 - Original Message - 
 From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: everything everything-list@eskimo.com
 Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2005 6:14 AM
 Subject: How did it all begin?


 http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0508429


 Tegmark's essay was not well received (perhaps Godfrey didn't like it?
:-) )


 How did it all begin?
 Authors: Max Tegmark
 Comments: 6 pages, 6 figs, essay for 2005 Young Scholars Competition in
 honor of Charles Townes; received Dishonorable Mention

 How did it all begin? Although this question has undoubtedly lingered for
as
 long as humans have walked the Earth, the answer still eludes us. Yet
since
 my grandparents were born, scientists have been able to refine this
question
 to a degree I find truly remarkable. In this brief essay, I describe some
of
 my own past and ongoing work on this topic, centering on cosmological
 inflation. I focus on
 (1) observationally testing whether this picture is correct and
 (2) working out implications for the nature of physical reality (e.g., the
 global structure of spacetime, dark energy and our cosmic future, parallel
 universes and fundamental versus environmental physical laws).
 (2) clearly requires (1) to determine whether to believe the conclusions.
I
 argue that (1) also requires (2), since it affects the probability
 calculations for inflation's observational predictions.




How did it all begin?

2005-08-30 Thread Saibal Mitra
http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0508429


Tegmark's essay was not well received (perhaps Godfrey didn't like it? :-) )


How did it all begin?
Authors: Max Tegmark
Comments: 6 pages, 6 figs, essay for 2005 Young Scholars Competition in
honor of Charles Townes; received Dishonorable Mention

How did it all begin? Although this question has undoubtedly lingered for as
long as humans have walked the Earth, the answer still eludes us. Yet since
my grandparents were born, scientists have been able to refine this question
to a degree I find truly remarkable. In this brief essay, I describe some of
my own past and ongoing work on this topic, centering on cosmological
inflation. I focus on
(1) observationally testing whether this picture is correct and
(2) working out implications for the nature of physical reality (e.g., the
global structure of spacetime, dark energy and our cosmic future, parallel
universes and fundamental versus environmental physical laws).
(2) clearly requires (1) to determine whether to believe the conclusions. I
argue that (1) also requires (2), since it affects the probability
calculations for inflation's observational predictions.



Re: subjective reality

2005-08-19 Thread Saibal Mitra
Hi Godfrey,

As you wrote in reply to others, local deterministic models seem to be ruled
out. The class of all formally describable models is much larger than that
of only the local deterministic models. So, although 't Hooft may  be proved
wrong (if loopholes like pre-determinism don't save him), non-local models
can reproduce QM.


Saibal




- Original Message - 
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Sunday, August 14, 2005 06:07 PM
Subject: Re: subjective reality


 Hi Saibal,

   Yes, trans-Plankian physics is likely to be quite different from our
 cis-plankian
   one. However I think the main reason 't Hooft claims the no-go
 theorems of
   quantum physics are in small print is because his reading glasses
 are no
   longer current :-), I am afraid. His arguments for the prevalence of
 simple
   deterministic models at this scaled have varied over the years (as his
 little
  examples) and some of these are quite clever, I'll agree.

   However, as you very well point out, any transplankian theory worth
 looking
   into has to reproduce a recognizable picture of the cisplankian world
 we know
  and that means: quantum mechanics (non-locality and all) in some
   discernible limit (and General Relativity too in some other limit) and
 all
   indications is that this cannot be done from deterministic models
 alone.
  't Hooft has been working around this for the last 10 years or so and
  he doesn't have much to show for it. Considering that it took him less
   than 2 years to come up with a renormalization prescription for
 non-abelian gauge
   theories in his youth I suspect god's dice are loaded against him
 this time.

  However he is always fascinating to read and hear. I saw him at Harvard
   this winter for the Colemanfest and he had the most fabulous
 animations...

  Godfrey Kurtz
  (New Brunswick, NJ)

  -Original Message-
  From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
  Sent: Sat, 13 Aug 2005 01:34:19 +0200
  Subject: Re: subjective reality

  Hi Godfrey,

  't Hooft's work is motivated by problems one encounters in Planck scale
  physics. 't Hooft has argued that the no go theorems precluding
   deterministic models come with some ''small print''. Physicists
 working on
   ''conventional ways'' to unite gravity with QM are forced to make such
 bold
  assumptions that one should now also question this ''small print''.

   As you wrote, 't Hooft has only looked at some limited type of models.
 It
   seems to me that much more is possible. I have never tried to do any
 serious
   work in this area myself (I'm too busy with other things). I would say
 that
   anything goes as long as you can explain the macroscopic world. One
 could
   imagine that a stochastic treatment of some deterministic theory could
 yield
  the standard model, but now with the status of the quantum fields as
   fictitional ghosts. If photons and electrons etc. don't really exists,
 then
  you can say that this is consistent with ''no local hidden variables''.

  Saibal



   Hi Saibal,
  
   You are correct that Gerard 't Hooft is one of the world exponents in
   QFTh.
But Quantum Field Theory is but one small piece of QM and one in
 which
non-local effects do not play a direct role (as of yet).
 Understandably
   't Hooft's forays into Quantum Mechanics have not, however, been
   very insightful as he himself confesses (you can check his humorous
   slides in the Kavli Institute symposium of last year on the Future of
   Physics).
  
   So far he has supplied mostly some interesting simple CA models from
   which one
can indeed extract something akin to superpositions but that in no
 way
   bypasses
   the basic facts of entanglement and non-local correlations.
  
He may very well be the very last hold out for a deterministic (an
 thus
   classically mechanistic) point-of-view but I would not count him out
   just yet. If any one around has the brain to deal with this its him!
   That much I will grant you...
  
   (Now I have met 't Hooft! 't Hooft was a neighbor of mine and I tell
   you: Bruno is no 't Hooft! ;- )
  
   Best regards
  
   Godfrey Kurtz
   (New Brunswick, NJ)
  
   -Original Message-
   From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
   To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
   Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
   Sent: Fri, 12 Aug 2005 21:11:30 +0200
   Subject: Re: subjective reality
  
   Godfrey Kurtz wrote
  
More specifically: I believe QM puts a big kabosh into any
   non-quantum
mechanistic view of the physical world. If you
don't get that, than maybe you don't get a lot of other things,
   Bruno.
Sorry if this sounds contemptuous. It is meant
to be.
  
  
   There aren't many people with a better understanding of QFT than 't
   Hooft.
  
  
  
   http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0409021
  
  
   http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc

Re: subjective reality

2005-08-12 Thread Saibal Mitra
Godfrey Kurtz wrote

   More specifically: I believe QM puts a big kabosh into any non-quantum 
 mechanistic view of the physical world. If you
   don't get that, than maybe you don't get a lot of other things, Bruno. 
 Sorry if this sounds contemptuous. It is meant
  to be.


There aren't many people with a better understanding of QFT than 't Hooft.



http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0409021


http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9903084


http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0212095


http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0105105


http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0104219


http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0104080




Saibal




Re: subjective reality

2005-08-12 Thread Saibal Mitra
Hi Godfrey,

't Hooft's work is motivated by problems one encounters in Planck scale
physics. 't Hooft has argued that the no go theorems precluding
deterministic models come with some ''small print''. Physicists working on
''conventional ways'' to unite gravity with QM are forced to make such bold
assumptions that one should now also question this ''small print''.

As you wrote, 't Hooft has only looked at some limited type of models. It
seems to me that much more is possible. I have never tried to do any serious
work in this area myself (I'm too busy with other things). I would say that
anything goes as long as you can explain the macroscopic world. One could
imagine that a stochastic treatment of some deterministic theory could yield
the standard model, but now with the status of the quantum fields as
fictitional ghosts. If photons and electrons etc. don't really exists, then
you can say that this is consistent with ''no local hidden variables''.

Saibal



 Hi Saibal,

   You are correct that Gerard 't Hooft is one of the world exponents in
 QFTh.
  But Quantum Field Theory is but one small piece of QM and one in which
  non-local effects do not play a direct role (as of yet). Understandably
  't Hooft's forays into Quantum Mechanics have not, however, been
  very insightful as he himself confesses (you can check his humorous
   slides in the Kavli Institute symposium of last year on the Future of
 Physics).

   So far he has supplied mostly some interesting simple CA models from
 which one
   can indeed extract something akin to superpositions but that in no way
 bypasses
  the basic facts of entanglement and non-local correlations.

  He may very well be the very last hold out for a deterministic (an thus
  classically mechanistic) point-of-view but I would not count him out
  just yet. If any one around has the brain to deal with this its him!
  That much I will grant you...

  (Now I have met 't Hooft! 't Hooft was a neighbor of mine and I tell
  you: Bruno is no 't Hooft! ;- )

  Best regards

  Godfrey Kurtz
  (New Brunswick, NJ)

  -Original Message-
  From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
  Sent: Fri, 12 Aug 2005 21:11:30 +0200
  Subject: Re: subjective reality

  Godfrey Kurtz wrote

More specifically: I believe QM puts a big kabosh into any
 non-quantum
   mechanistic view of the physical world. If you
don't get that, than maybe you don't get a lot of other things,
 Bruno.
   Sorry if this sounds contemptuous. It is meant
   to be.


   There aren't many people with a better understanding of QFT than 't
 Hooft.



  http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0409021


  http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9903084


  http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0212095


  http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0105105


  http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0104219


  http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/0104080




  Saibal




 
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 industry-leading spam and email virus protection.




OMs are events

2005-07-31 Thread Saibal Mitra
I agree with the notion of OMs as events in some suitably chosen space.
Observers are defined by the programs that generate them. If we identify
universes with programs then observers are just embedded universes. An
observer moment is just a qualia experienced by the observer, which is just
an event in the observer's universe.


I don't think that Hal's idea of identifying brain patterns with OMs will be
successful. The brain is just the hardware that runs a program (the
observer). If I run a simulation of our solar system on a computer, then the
relevant events are e.g. that Jupiter is in such and such a position. This
is associated with the state of the transistors of the computer running the
program. But that same pattern could arise in a completely different
calculation. You would have to extract exactly what program is running on
the machine to be able to define OMs like that. To do that you need to feed
the program with different kinds of input and study the output, otherwise
you'll fall prey to the famous ''clock paradox'' (you can map the time
evolution of a clock to that of any object, including brains).


Saibal


- Original Message - 
From: Aditya Varun Chadha [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2005 08:46 AM
Subject: Re: What We Can Know About the World


 [RS]
 On 7/31/05, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  On Sat, Jul 30, 2005 at 12:25:48PM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote:
  
   This is not to say that progress is impossible. Consider an idea
   like Aditya has:  what is the real difference between an event
   and an observer-moment?  In trying to answer that question, many
   of us may learn something (at least for our own purposes).
  
 
  Err, an event is a particular set of coordinates (t,x,y,z) in 4D
  spacetime. This is how it is used in GR, anyway.
 
  An observer moment is a set of constraints, or equivalently
  information known about the world (obviously at a moment of time). It
  corresponds the the state vector \psi of quantum mechanics.
 
  Perhaps you have different definitions of these terms, but it seems
  like chalk and cheese to me.
 

 Lets not constrain an event to mean something only in 4-space. Take
 any N-Space and you can define it in terms of a set of N-dim. events.
 Ofcourse I agree with your definition, am just making it scale over
 dimensions.

 Now consider an observer moment to be exactly what you are defining
 it to be: information KNOWN about the world at a moment of time. The
 coming to know of any information corresponds to an event. Thus an
 observer moment is well-defined if and only if event is defined.
 In other words, an Observer-Moment exists iff it's corresponding
 coming to know event exists for some observer. In terms of light
 cones, OMs are the Events at and after the crossing over of light
 cones.

 I think the distinction is not a qualitative one between the two, only
 those events which interfere with the set of events observable by
 us (who are also just sets of events) correspond to
 observer-moments in our universe. So the set of OMs is simply a
 subset of the set of all events.

 refer to my previous mail about the multiverse as a partition with
 equivalence classes which are maximal sets of connected observer
 moments, in other words, maximal sets of mutually interfering
 events. visualize this as connected components of a graph.

 Defining entities in more than one different sets of words does not
 rule out their qualitative identity. Every Observer-Moment is an
 event. Every event is an Observer-Moment in some universe.

 -- 
 Aditya Varun Chadha
 adichad AT gmail.com
 http://www.adichad.com




Re: Reference class (was dualism and the DA)

2005-06-20 Thread Saibal Mitra

- Original Message - 
From: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: 'Russell Standish' [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: 'EverythingList' everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, June 20, 2005 09:52 PM
Subject: Reference class (was dualism and the DA)


 Russell Standish wrote:
(JC) If you want to insist that What would it be like
  to be a bat
is  equivalent to the question What would the universe be like
if I had
 been a bat rather than me?, it is very hard to see what the
 answer could be. Suppose you
 *had* been a bat rather than you (Russell Standish).
  How would the
 universe be any different than it is now? If you can
  answer that
 question, (which is the key question, to my mind), then
  I'll grant
 that the question is meaningful.
  
   
No different in the 3rd person, very obviously different
  in the 1st
person
  
   I don't really know what that means. The only way I can
  make sense of
   the question is something like, If I was a bat instead of me
   (Jonathan Colvin), then the universe would consist of a bat
  asking the
   question I'm asking now. That's a counterfactual, a way in
  which the
   universe would be objectively different.
 
  It wouldn't be counterfactual, because by assumption bats ask
  this question of themselves anyway. Hence there is no
  difference in the 3rd person. The 1st person experience is
  very different though. There are only 1st person counterfactuals.

 That's quite an assumption. *Do* all conscious things ask this question of
 themselves? Babies don't. Senile old people don't. I'm not sure that
 medieval peasants ever thought to ask this question, or pre-literate
 cavemen.


 
  I definitely acknowledge the distinction between 1st and 3rd
  person. This is not the same as duality, which posits a 3rd
  person entity (the immaterial soul).
 
  
   This is, I think, the crux of the reference class issue
  with the DA.
   My (and
   your) reference class can not be merely conscious
  observers or all
   humans, but must be something much closer to someone (or thing)
   discussing or aware of the DA).
 
  I don't think this is a meaningful reference class. I can
  still ask the question why am I me, and not someone else
  without being aware of the DA. All it takes is self-awareness IMHO.

 You *could* certainly. Perhaps it is important as to whether you actually
 *do* ask that question (and perhaps it should be in the context of the
DA).


   I note that this reference class is certainly appropriate
  for you and
   me, and likely for anyone else reading this. This reference class
   certainly also invalidates the DA (although immaterial souls would
   rescue it).
  
   But at this point, I am, like Nick Bostrom, tempted to
  throw my hands
   up and declare the reference class issue pretty much intractable.
  
   Jonathan Colvin
 
  Incidently, I think I may have an answer to my Why am I not Chinese
  criticism, and the corresponding correction to Why am I not an ant
  seems to give the same answer as I originally proposed.

 I'd be interested to hear it. Here's something else you could look
 at...calculate the median annual income for all humans alive today (I
 believe it is around $4,000 /year), compare it to your own, and see if you
 are anyway near the median. I predict that the answer for you (and for
 anyone else reading this), is far from the median. This result is
obviously
 related to the why you are not Chinese criticism, and is, I believe, the
 reason the DA goes astray.

 Jonathan Colvin


I don't think so, because most people on Earth are not Chinese. The correct
refutation of the Doomsday Paradox was given by D. Dieks and involves the
Self Indicating Axiom. The definition of the reference class defines the set
of observers that you consider to be you. The DA involves applying Bayes's
theorem and to do that correctly you have then to use the correct a priori
probability which is also fixed by the choice of the reference class. The
two effects cancel and there is no Doomsday Problem. This is all explained
here:


http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0009081



Saibal


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Re: Measure, Doomsday argument

2005-06-20 Thread Saibal Mitra

- Original Message - 
From: Quentin Anciaux [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, June 20, 2005 11:37 PM
Subject: Measure, Doomsday argument


 Hi everyone,

 I have some questions about measure...

 As I understand the DA, it is based on conditionnal probabilities. To
somehow
 calculate the chance on doom soon or doom late. An observer should
reason
 as if he is a random observer from the class of observer.

 The conditionnal probabilities come from the fact, that the observer find
that
 he is the sixty billions and something observer to be born. Discover
this
 fact, this increase the probability of doom soon. The probability is
 increased because if doom late is the case, the probability to find myself
in
 a universe where billions of billions of observer are present is greater
but
 I know that I'm the sixty billions and something observer.


This is a false argument see here:

http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0009081


To calculate the conditional probability given the birthrank you have you
must use Bayes' theorem. You then have to take into account the a priori
probability for a given birthrank. If you could have been anyone of all the
people that will ever live, then you must include this informaton in the
a-priori probability, and as a result of that the Doomsday Paradox is
canceled.




 Now I come to the measure of observer moment :
 It has been said on this list, to justify we are living in this reality
and
 not in an Harry Potter like world that somehow our reality is simpler,
has
 higher measure than Whitte rabbit universe. But if I correlate this
 assumption with the DA, I also should assume that it is more probable to
be
 in a universe with billions of billions of observer instead of this one.

 How are these two cases different ?


Olum also stumbles on this point in his article. I also agree with Hall's
earlier reply that (artificially) increasing the number of universes will
lead to a decrease in intrinsic measure. One way to see this is as follows
(this argument was also given by Hall a few years ago, if I remember
correctly):

According to the Self Sampling Asumption you have to include an
''anthropic'' factor in the measure. The more observers there are the more
likely the universe is, but you do have to multiply the number of observers
by the intrinsic measure. For any given universe U you can consider an
universe U(n) that runs U n times, So, the anthropic factor of U(n) is n
times that of U. This means that the intrinsic measure of U(n)  should go to
zero faster than 1/n, or else you wouldn't be able to normalize
probabilities for observers. U(n) contains
 Log(n)/Log(2) bits more than U (you need to specify the number n). So,
assuming that the intrinsic measure only depends on program size, it should
decay faster than 2^(-program length).


Saibal



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Re: copy method important?

2005-06-18 Thread Saibal Mitra
You ca still create two identical systems starting from another system. E.g.
in stimulated emission two photons are created in the same state. Another
example is a Bose Einstein condensate, in which all the atoms are in the
same state.


Note that you can still teleport an unknown quantum state despite
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle (you do this without measuring the
state). It can be shown that you can't copy an unknown quantum state,
because that would violate the Schrodinger equation.


Saibal
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- Original Message - 
From: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Saturday, June 18, 2005 08:36 PM
Subject: Re: copy method important?


 I'm no physicist, but doesn't Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle forbid
 making exact quantum-level measurements, hence exact copies?  If so, then
 all this talk of making exact copies is fantasy.
 Norman Samish
 ~
 - Original Message - 
 From: rmiller [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED];
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
 Sent: Saturday, June 18, 2005 10:05 AM
 Subject: copy method important?


 All,
 Though we're not discussing entanglement per se, some of these examples
 surely meet the criteria.  So, my thought question for the day: is the
 method of copying important?
  Example #1: we start with a single marble, A.  Then, we magically
 create a copy, marble B--perfectly like marble B in every way. . .that is,
 the atoms are configured similarly, the interaction environment is the
 same--and they are indistinguishable from one another.
  Example #2: we start with a single marble A.  Then, instead of
 magically creating a copy, we search the universe, Tegmarkian-style, and
 locate a second marble, B that is perfectly equivalent to our original
 marble A.  All tests both magically avoid QM decoherence problems and show
 that our newfound marble is, in fact, indistinguishable in every way from
 our original.
  Here's the question:  Are the properties of the *relationship*
 between Marbles A and B in Example #1 perfectly equivalent to those in
 Example #2?
  If the criteria involves simply analysis of configurations at a
 precise point in time, it would seem the answer must be yes.  On the
 other hand, if the method by which the marbles were created is crucial to
 the present configuration, then the answer would be no.

 R. Miller








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Re: more torture

2005-06-15 Thread Saibal Mitra

- Original Message - 
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Tuesday, June 14, 2005 05:26 PM
Subject: Re: more torture



   Saibal Mitra writes:
  
   Because no such thing as free will exists one has to consider three
   different universes in which the three different choices are made.
The
   three
   universes will have comparable measures. The antropic factor of
10^100
 will
   then dominate and will cause the observer to find himself having made
   choice
   b) as one of the 10^100 copies in the minute without torture.
  
   But what will happen to the observer when the minute is up?
  
   --Stathis
 
 
 Pretending that these three universes are all that exists, what will
happen
 is that the OM will find himself being another one of the 10^100 copies.
 The
 copy survives with memory loss.
 
 
 Saibal

 In what sense can the copy (or anything) become another copy with memory
 loss? It is almost as if you are postulating a soul, which flies from one
 body to another, and somehow contains the original person's identity so
that
 it survives memory loss. What is required for an observer moment OM_1 at
 time t1 to become the next observer moment at time t2 is that at least
one
 successor OM exist with time stamp t2, a belief that he is the same person
 as OM_1, and memories of OM_1 up to time t2. If several such OM's exist
 {OM_2.1, OM_2.2, OM_2.3...} then either one may be the successor, with
 probability determined by the measure of OM_2.n relative to the measure of
 the whole set. Amazingly, being completely swamped with other OM's of
 various types and vintages, more or less closely related to OM_1, makes
 absolutely no difference to the process, because the OM's don't need to
 find each other and lock arms, all they need to do is *exist*, anywhere
in
 the multiverse, related in the way I have described. This is somewhat
 analogous to the fact that the integer 56 is always followed by the
integer
 57, even though there are lots and lots of other integers everywhere
amongst
 which these two could get lost.

 --Stathsi Papaioannou


I'm certainly not postulating a soul. All I'm saying is that all OMs are
real and there is no preference for one over another. Each OM will feel that
he is the successor of a previous one. If an OM checks if he is a typical
creature in the universe, he will find with large probability that this is
indeed the case.

Your proposal about time evolution ignores memory loss. How to assign
probabilities to OM_2.1, OM_2.2, etc. if they don't remember everything
about OM_1? Real people's memories are not perfect. So, you would have to
admit memory loss to make your proposal work in practice. And unless you
believe that QTI makes you immune from Alzheimer's you would have to admit
an arbitrary large amount of memory loss.


So, to me the notion of a successor doesn't make sense in general. You can
always define a set of successors of OM_1 irrespective of measure by saying
that members of that set remember being OM_1. But then there also exists
successors of me with perfect memory but with very small measures. I could
e.g. arise accidentally in a simulation performed by aliens and that
simulation could be a more perfect continuation (memory wise) of my present
OM.



These considerations have led me to believe that one should abandon any
fundamental idea of successors altogether. OMs just exist and each OM has a
memory of ''previous'' experiences. So, each OM remembers being another OM.
There exists a probability distribution over the set of all OMs which is
fixed by the laws of physics. OMs thus ''always'' exist and this is a form
of immortality. In your example of 10^100 copies almost all OMs are one of
these copies. What happens to such an OM when the minute is up? Nothing
really happens. All the OMs are ''static'' mathematical entities.


Saibal







Re: more torture

2005-06-14 Thread Saibal Mitra

- Original Message - 
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Tuesday, June 14, 2005 08:06 AM
Subject: Re: more torture


 Saibal Mitra writes:

 Because no such thing as free will exists one has to consider three
 different universes in which the three different choices are made. The
 three
 universes will have comparable measures. The antropic factor of 10^100
will
 then dominate and will cause the observer to find himself having made
 choice
 b) as one of the 10^100 copies in the minute without torture.

 But what will happen to the observer when the minute is up?

 --Stathis


Pretending that these three universes are all that exists, what will happen
is that the OM will find himself being another one of the 10^100 copies. The
copy survives with memory loss.


Saibal



Re: more torture

2005-06-13 Thread Saibal Mitra
Because no such thing as free will exists one has to consider three
different universes in which the three different choices are made. The three
universes will have comparable measures. The antropic factor of 10^100 will
then dominate and will cause the observer to find himself having made choice
b) as one of the 10^100 copies in the minute without torture.


Saibal








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- Original Message - 
From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, June 13, 2005 01:00 PM
Subject: more torture


 I have been arguing in recent posts that the absolute measure of an
observer
 moment (or observer, if you prefer) makes no possible difference at the
 first person level. A counterargument has been that, even if an observer
 cannot know how many instantiations of him are being run, it is still
 important in principle to take the absolute measure into account, for
 example when considering the total amount of suffering in the world. The
 following thought experiment shows how, counterintuitively, sticking to
this
 principle may actually be doing the victims a disservice:

 You are one of 10 copies who are being tortured. The copies are all being
 run in lockstep with each other, as would occur if 10 identical computers
 were running 10 identical sentient programs. Assume that the torture is so
 bad that death is preferable, and so bad that escaping it with your life
is
 only marginally preferable to escaping it by dying (eg., given the option
of
 a 50% chance of dying or a 49% chance of escaping the torture and living,
 you would take the 50%). The torture will continue for a year, but you are
 allowed one of 3 choices as to how things will proceed:

 (a) 9 of the 10 copies will be chosen at random and painlessly killed,
while
 the remaining copy will continue to be tortured.

 (b) For one minute, the torture will cease and the number of copies will
 increase to 10^100. Once the minute is up, the number of copies will be
 reduced to 10 again and the torture will resume as before.

 (c) the torture will be stopped for 8 randomly chosen copies, and continue
 for the other 2.

 Which would you choose? To me, it seems clear that there is an 80% chance
of
 escaping the torture if you pick (c), while with (a) it is certain that
the
 torture will continue, and with (b) it is certain that the torture will
 continue with only one minute of respite.

 Are there other ways to look at the choices? It might be argued that in
(a)
 there is a 90% chance that you will be one of the copies who is killed,
and
 thus a 90% chance that you will escape the torture, better than your
chances
 in (c). However, even if you are one of the ones killed, this does not
help
 you at all. If there is a successor observer moment at the moment of
death,
 subjectively, your consciousness will continue. The successor OM in this
 case comes from the one remaining copy who is being tortured, hence
 guaranteeing that you will continue to suffer.

 What about looking at it from an altruistic rather than selfish viewpoint:
 isn't it is better to decrease the total suffering in the world by 90% as
in
 (a) rather than by 80% as in (c)? Before making plans to decrease
suffering,
 ask the victims. All 10 copies will plead with you to choose (c).

 What about (b)? ASSA enthusiasts might argue that with this choice, an OM
 sampled randomly from the set of all possible OM's will almost certainly
be
 from the one minute torture-free interval. What would this mean for the
 victims? If you interview each of the 10 copies before the minute starts,
 they will tell you that they are currently being tortured and they expect
 that they will get one minute respite, then start suffering again, so they
 wish the choice had been (c). Next, if you interview each of the 10^100
 copies they will tell you that the torture has stopped for exactly one
 minute by the torture chambre's clock, but they know that it is going to
 start again and they wish you had chosen (c). Finally, if you interview
each
 of the 10 copies for whom the torture has recommenced, they will report
that
 they remember the minute of respite, but that's no good to them now, and
 they wish you had chosen (c).

 --Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure

2005-06-12 Thread Saibal Mitra

- Original Message - 
From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Sunday, June 12, 2005 02:43 AM
Subject: RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure




 -Original Message-
 From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Sent: Sunday, June 11, 2000 4:01 PM
 To: Brent Meeker; :everything-list@eskimo.com
 Subject: Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
 
 
 
 - Original Message -
 From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Sent: Friday, June 10, 2005 06:41 PM
 Subject: RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
 
 
 
 
  -Original Message-
  From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Sent: Friday, June 10, 2005 11:39 PM
  To: Brent Meeker; everything
  Subject: Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
  
  
  
  - Original Message -
  From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  To: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 02:23 PM
  Subject: RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
  
  
  
  
   -Original Message-
   From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
   Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 1:16 PM
   To: Patrick Leahy; Hal Finney; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
   Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
   Subject: Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
   
   
   I think one should define an observer moment as the instantaneous
   description of the human brain. I.e. the minimum amount of
information
  you
   need to simulate the brain of a observer. This description changes
 over
  time
   due to interactions with the environment. Even if there were no
  interactions
   with the environment the description would change, but this change
is
  fixed
   by the original description.
  
   That means that, supposing the brain is a classical, the moment
 cannot
  be
   defined by a description of values, omitting rates; just as the path
of
 a
   ballistic projectile cannot be specified by it location, omitting
its
  velocity.
   But to include rates means an implicit introduction of time and
 continuity
  of
   OMs.  This implies that OMs form causal chains and it makes no sense
to
  talk
   about the same OM being in two different chains.
  
  
  That's true in an isolated personal universe that is not interacting
with
 an
  'outside world'. I could, e.g. take your brain and simulate that on a
  computer. The evolution equations for your brain are deterministic, so
 the
  simulation will describe a unique chain of causal links provided you
fix
 the
  boundary conditions.
  
  If the personal universe is embedded in another universe (like in our
 case),
  then the evolution equations will be constantly perturbed.
  
  
  
  
  
   But a lot of the motivation for OMs comes from the brain *not* being
  classical;
   from the idea that the brain gets copied into Everett's multiple
  relative
   states or MWIs.  Decoherence in the brain is very much faster than
the
   neurochemical processes - that's why it's approximately classical.
So
  what is
   going on when QM predicts different OMs?  From Everett's point of
view
 the
   brain must be treated as part of the QM system and it gets
copied -
 but
  not
   by itself.  Its description must include its entanglement with the
 quantum
   systems observed.  So it seems that in either case, classical or
 quantum,
  an OM
   as a description of a brain state, has links outside itself.  In the
  classical
   case it has casual links in time.  In the QM case it has Hilbert
space
  links to
   what has been observed.
  
  
  I agree. But the entangled state of a brain with the rest of the
universe
 in
  the MWI corresponds to an ensemble of different worlds such that in
each
  member of the ensemble the brain is in some definite state.
  
  
  
   So, I see no problem with Hal's way of thinking about OMs
   
   
   Observers are can be thought of as their own descriptions and thus
  universes
   in their own right. Observer moments are observers in particular
 states
  i.e.
   their ''personal'' universe being in a certain state. The causal
 relation
   between successive states is already defined when we specify which
  observer
   we are talking about. i.e., we have already specified the laws of
 physics
   for the personal universe of an observer which defines the
observer.
   Specifying the initial state of the personal universes thus
suffices.
  
   That would hold for a classical brain in a classical universe.  But
 does
  it in
   a QM universe?  I see a tension between the idea of personal
universe
  and
   quantum entanglement.
  
  I don't see problems here. If you assume that our universe is
described
 by
  some fundamental laws of physics then those laws of physics also
describe
  our brains. The way a particular brain works is thus fixed. This then
  defines the personal universe.
 
  There seems to be a big jump between those last two sentences.
Defining
 the
  laws

RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure

2005-06-12 Thread Saibal Mitra
- Original Message - 
From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, June 10, 2005 06:41 PM
Subject: RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure




 -Original Message-
 From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Sent: Friday, June 10, 2005 11:39 PM
 To: Brent Meeker; everything
 Subject: Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
 
 
 
 - Original Message -
 From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 To: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 02:23 PM
 Subject: RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
 
 
 
 
  -Original Message-
  From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 1:16 PM
  To: Patrick Leahy; Hal Finney; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
  Subject: Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
  
  
  I think one should define an observer moment as the instantaneous
  description of the human brain. I.e. the minimum amount of information
 you
  need to simulate the brain of a observer. This description changes
over
 time
  due to interactions with the environment. Even if there were no
 interactions
  with the environment the description would change, but this change is
 fixed
  by the original description.
 
  That means that, supposing the brain is a classical, the moment
cannot
 be
  defined by a description of values, omitting rates; just as the path of
a
  ballistic projectile cannot be specified by it location, omitting its
 velocity.
  But to include rates means an implicit introduction of time and
continuity
 of
  OMs.  This implies that OMs form causal chains and it makes no sense to
 talk
  about the same OM being in two different chains.
 
 
 That's true in an isolated personal universe that is not interacting with
an
 'outside world'. I could, e.g. take your brain and simulate that on a
 computer. The evolution equations for your brain are deterministic, so
the
 simulation will describe a unique chain of causal links provided you fix
the
 boundary conditions.
 
 If the personal universe is embedded in another universe (like in our
case),
 then the evolution equations will be constantly perturbed.
 
 
 
 
 
  But a lot of the motivation for OMs comes from the brain *not* being
 classical;
  from the idea that the brain gets copied into Everett's multiple
 relative
  states or MWIs.  Decoherence in the brain is very much faster than the
  neurochemical processes - that's why it's approximately classical.  So
 what is
  going on when QM predicts different OMs?  From Everett's point of view
the
  brain must be treated as part of the QM system and it gets copied -
but
 not
  by itself.  Its description must include its entanglement with the
quantum
  systems observed.  So it seems that in either case, classical or
quantum,
 an OM
  as a description of a brain state, has links outside itself.  In the
 classical
  case it has casual links in time.  In the QM case it has Hilbert space
 links to
  what has been observed.
 
 
 I agree. But the entangled state of a brain with the rest of the universe
in
 the MWI corresponds to an ensemble of different worlds such that in each
 member of the ensemble the brain is in some definite state.
 
 
 
  So, I see no problem with Hal's way of thinking about OMs
  
  
  Observers are can be thought of as their own descriptions and thus
 universes
  in their own right. Observer moments are observers in particular
states
 i.e.
  their ''personal'' universe being in a certain state. The causal
relation
  between successive states is already defined when we specify which
 observer
  we are talking about. i.e., we have already specified the laws of
physics
  for the personal universe of an observer which defines the observer.
  Specifying the initial state of the personal universes thus suffices.
 
  That would hold for a classical brain in a classical universe.  But
does
 it in
  a QM universe?  I see a tension between the idea of personal universe
 and
  quantum entanglement.
 
 I don't see problems here. If you assume that our universe is described
by
 some fundamental laws of physics then those laws of physics also describe
 our brains. The way a particular brain works is thus fixed. This then
 defines the personal universe.

 There seems to be a big jump between those last two sentences.  Defining
the
 laws of physics may define the *way* a brain works - but not its content,
not
 the specifics of its processes - and the same for a universe.

 Entanglement of the brain with another system
 can only happen if there are interactions with the outside.

 Sure, and there must be such interactions according to what we know of
physics.

 Even in the
 classic case these intercations make the evolution of the personal
universe
 nondeterministic.

 Right.  But in that case on observer moment, defined as: ...one should
 define an observer moment as the instantaneous

RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure

2005-06-11 Thread Saibal Mitra
- Original Message - 
From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 02:23 PM
Subject: RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure




 -Original Message-
 From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 1:16 PM
 To: Patrick Leahy; Hal Finney; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
 Subject: Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
 
 
 I think one should define an observer moment as the instantaneous
 description of the human brain. I.e. the minimum amount of information
you
 need to simulate the brain of a observer. This description changes over
time
 due to interactions with the environment. Even if there were no
interactions
 with the environment the description would change, but this change is
fixed
 by the original description.

 That means that, supposing the brain is a classical, the moment cannot
be
 defined by a description of values, omitting rates; just as the path of a
 ballistic projectile cannot be specified by it location, omitting its
velocity.
 But to include rates means an implicit introduction of time and continuity
of
 OMs.  This implies that OMs form causal chains and it makes no sense to
talk
 about the same OM being in two different chains.


That's true in an isolated personal universe that is not interacting with an
'outside world'. I could, e.g. take your brain and simulate that on a
computer. The evolution equations for your brain are deterministic, so the
simulation will describe a unique chain of causal links provided you fix the
boundary conditions.

If the personal universe is embedded in another universe (like in our case),
then the evolution equations will be constantly perturbed.





 But a lot of the motivation for OMs comes from the brain *not* being
classical;
 from the idea that the brain gets copied into Everett's multiple
relative
 states or MWIs.  Decoherence in the brain is very much faster than the
 neurochemical processes - that's why it's approximately classical.  So
what is
 going on when QM predicts different OMs?  From Everett's point of view the
 brain must be treated as part of the QM system and it gets copied - but
not
 by itself.  Its description must include its entanglement with the quantum
 systems observed.  So it seems that in either case, classical or quantum,
an OM
 as a description of a brain state, has links outside itself.  In the
classical
 case it has casual links in time.  In the QM case it has Hilbert space
links to
 what has been observed.


I agree. But the entangled state of a brain with the rest of the universe in
the MWI corresponds to an ensemble of different worlds such that in each
member of the ensemble the brain is in some definite state.



 So, I see no problem with Hal's way of thinking about OMs
 
 
 Observers are can be thought of as their own descriptions and thus
universes
 in their own right. Observer moments are observers in particular states
i.e.
 their ''personal'' universe being in a certain state. The causal relation
 between successive states is already defined when we specify which
observer
 we are talking about. i.e., we have already specified the laws of physics
 for the personal universe of an observer which defines the observer.
 Specifying the initial state of the personal universes thus suffices.

 That would hold for a classical brain in a classical universe.  But does
it in
 a QM universe?  I see a tension between the idea of personal universe
and
 quantum entanglement.

I don't see problems here. If you assume that our universe is described by
some fundamental laws of physics then those laws of physics also describe
our brains. The way a particular brain works is thus fixed. This then
defines the personal universe. Entanglement of the brain with another system
can only happen if there are interactions with the outside. Even in the
classic case these intercations make the evolution of the personal universe
nondeterministic.



Saibal

-
Defeat Spammers by launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites:
http://www.hillscapital.com/antispam/



Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure

2005-06-10 Thread Saibal Mitra

- Original Message - 
From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 02:23 PM
Subject: RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure




 -Original Message-
 From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 1:16 PM
 To: Patrick Leahy; Hal Finney; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
 Subject: Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure
 
 
 I think one should define an observer moment as the instantaneous
 description of the human brain. I.e. the minimum amount of information
you
 need to simulate the brain of a observer. This description changes over
time
 due to interactions with the environment. Even if there were no
interactions
 with the environment the description would change, but this change is
fixed
 by the original description.

 That means that, supposing the brain is a classical, the moment cannot
be
 defined by a description of values, omitting rates; just as the path of a
 ballistic projectile cannot be specified by it location, omitting its
velocity.
 But to include rates means an implicit introduction of time and continuity
of
 OMs.  This implies that OMs form causal chains and it makes no sense to
talk
 about the same OM being in two different chains.


That's true in an isolated personal universe that is not interacting with an
'outside world'. I could, e.g. take your brain and simulate that on a
computer. The evolution equations for your brain are deterministic, so the
simulation will describe a unique chain of causal links provided you fix the
boundary conditions.

If the personal universe is embedded in another universe (like in our case),
then the evolution equations will be constantly perturbed.





 But a lot of the motivation for OMs comes from the brain *not* being
classical;
 from the idea that the brain gets copied into Everett's multiple
relative
 states or MWIs.  Decoherence in the brain is very much faster than the
 neurochemical processes - that's why it's approximately classical.  So
what is
 going on when QM predicts different OMs?  From Everett's point of view the
 brain must be treated as part of the QM system and it gets copied - but
not
 by itself.  Its description must include its entanglement with the quantum
 systems observed.  So it seems that in either case, classical or quantum,
an OM
 as a description of a brain state, has links outside itself.  In the
classical
 case it has casual links in time.  In the QM case it has Hilbert space
links to
 what has been observed.


I agree. But the entangled state of a brain with the rest of the universe in
the MWI corresponds to an ensemble of different worlds such that in each
member of the ensemble the brain is in some definite state.



 So, I see no problem with Hal's way of thinking about OMs
 
 
 Observers are can be thought of as their own descriptions and thus
universes
 in their own right. Observer moments are observers in particular states
i.e.
 their ''personal'' universe being in a certain state. The causal relation
 between successive states is already defined when we specify which
observer
 we are talking about. i.e., we have already specified the laws of physics
 for the personal universe of an observer which defines the observer.
 Specifying the initial state of the personal universes thus suffices.

 That would hold for a classical brain in a classical universe.  But does
it in
 a QM universe?  I see a tension between the idea of personal universe
and
 quantum entanglement.

I don't see problems here. If you assume that our universe is described by
some fundamental laws of physics then those laws of physics also describe
our brains. The way a particular brain works is thus fixed. This then
defines the personal universe. Entanglement of the brain with another system
can only happen if there are interactions with the outside. Even in the
classic case these intercations make the evolution of the personal universe
nondeterministic.



Saibal



Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure

2005-06-08 Thread Saibal Mitra
I think one should define an observer moment as the instantaneous
description of the human brain. I.e. the minimum amount of information you
need to simulate the brain of a observer. This description changes over time
due to interactions with the environment. Even if there were no interactions
with the environment the description would change, but this change is fixed
by the original description.



So, I see no problem with Hal's way of thinking about OMs


Observers are can be thought of as their own descriptions and thus universes
in their own right. Observer moments are observers in particular states i.e.
their ''personal'' universe being in a certain state. The causal relation
between successive states is already defined when we specify which observer
we are talking about. i.e., we have already specified the laws of physics
for the personal universe of an observer which defines the observer.
Specifying the initial state of the personal universes thus suffices.



Saibal


- Original Message - 
From: Patrick Leahy [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wednesday, June 08, 2005 01:04 PM
Subject: RE: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure



 On Tue, 7 Jun 2005, Hal Finney wrote:

  Jonathan Colvin writes:
  There's a question begging to be asked, which is (predictably I
suppose, for
  a qualia-denyer such as myself), what makes you think there is such a
thing
  as an essence of an experience? I'd suggest there is no such thing
as an
  observer-moment. I'm happy with using the concept as a tag of sorts
when
  discussing observer selection issues, but I think reifying it is likely
a
  mistake, and goes considerably beyond Strong AI into a full Cartesian
  dualism. Is it generally accepted here on this list that a
  substrate-independent thing called an observer moment exists?
 
  Here's how I attempted to define observer moment a few years ago:
 
  Observer - A subsystem of the multiverse with qualities sufficiently
  similar to those which are common among human beings that we consider
  it meaningful that we might have been or might be that subsystem.
  These qualities include consciousness, perception of a flow of time,
  and continuity of identity.
 
  Observer-moment - An instant of perception by an observer.  An
observer's
  sense of the flow of time allows its experience to be divided into
  units so small that no perceptible change in consciousness is possible
  in those intervals.  Each such unit of time for a particular observer
  is an observer-moment.
 
 
  So if you don't believe in observer-moments, do you also not believe
  in observers?  Or is it the -moment that causes problems?
 

 Obviously, its the -moment. I'm pleased to see that Jonathan and Brent
 have the same problem with the concept that I do.

 Being an observer is a process. Slicing it into moments is OK
 mathematically, where a moment corresponds to a calculus dt (and hence
 is neither a particular length of time nor an instant). But to regard the
 observer-state at a particular moment as an isolated entity which is
 self-aware makes as much sense as regarding individual horizontal slices
 through a brain as being self-aware. It is the causal relation between
 successive brain states (incorporating incoming sense data) which
 constitutes intelligence, and self-awareness is just an epiphenomenon on
 top of intelligence, i.e. I would not agree that anything can be
 self-aware but have no intelligence.

 Paddy Leahy




Re: where did the Big Bang come from?

2005-06-06 Thread Saibal Mitra

- Original Message - 
From: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, June 06, 2005 07:53 PM
Subject: RE: where did the Big Bang come from?


 Norman Samish wrote:
 
 
   Norman Samish wrote:
   And where did this mysterious Big Bang come from?  A quantum
   fluctuation of virtual particles I'm told.
  
 On Mon, 6 Jun 2005, Jesse Mazer wrote:
   Whoever told you that was passing off speculation as fact--in fact
there
   is no agreed-upon answer to the question of what, if anything, came
 before
   the Big Bang or caused it.
  
 
 Patrick Leahy wrote:
 Maybe Norman is confusing the rather more legit idea that the
 fluctuations
 in the Big Bang, that explain why the universe is not completely uniform,
 come from quantum fluctuations amplified by inflation.  This is currently
 the leading theory for the origin of structure, in that it has quite a
lot
 of successful predictions to its credit.
 
 Norman Samish writes:
 Perhaps I didn't express myself well.  What I was referring to is at
 http://www.astronomycafe.net/cosm/planck.html, where Sten Odenwald
 hypothesizes that random fluctuations in nothing at all led to the Big
 Bang.  This process has been described by the physicist Frank Wilczyk at
 the University of California, Santa Barbara by saying, 'The reason that
 there is something instead of nothing is that nothing is unstable.'  . .
.
 Physicist Edward Tryon expresses this best by saying that 'Our universe
is
 simply one of those things that happens from time to time.' 
 

 But as I said, this idea is pure speculation, there isn't any evidence for
 it and we'd probably need a fully worked-out theory of quantum gravity to
 see if the idea even makes sense.

 Jesse

This is one of the motivations for believing in a purely mathematical
universe. A physical universe can never arise from 'nothing'. If you believe
in mathematical reality then there is no mystery. The mathematical model
that describes the big bang is eternal.


Saibal



Re: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure

2005-06-05 Thread Saibal Mitra

- Original Message - 
From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Friday, June 03, 2005 08:10 PM
Subject: Observer-Moment Measure from Universe Measure


 To apply Wei's method, first we need to get serious about what is an OM.
 We need a formal model and description of a particular OM.  Consider, for
 example, someone's brain when he is having a particular experience.  He is
 eating chocolate ice cream while listening to Beethoven's 5th symphony,
 on his 30th birthday.  Imagine that we could scan his brain with advanced
 technology and record his neural activity.  Imagine further that with the
 aid of an advanced brain model we are able to prune out the unnecessary
 information and distill this to the essence of the experience.  We come
 up with a pattern that represents that observer moment.  Any system which
 instantiates that pattern genuinely creates an experience of that observer
 moment.  This pattern is something that can be specified, recorded and
 written down in some form.  It probably involves a huge volume of data.

 So, now that we have a handle on what a particular OM is, we can more
 reasonably ask whether a universe instantiates it.


Wouldn't it be better to think of OMs as programs just like we think of
universes? If you only look at patterns then you get the problem which you
later mention like crystals that can represent an OM of a person etc. The
patterns one is looking for should be capable of doing computations


If I define OMs as a programs (in a particular computational state), then
that is the same as saying that OMs are universes in particular states. One
can then argue that these universes are very complex and have high measures
and are thus likely to be found embedded in simple, low measure, universes.
Then one can also address the problem of what qualia actually are. They are
'events' that occur in an OM's universe.


In case of persons one can think of the neural network formed by the brain.
The events that take place in the universe defined by the neural network are
the qualia we experience. So, I think that Wei's interpretation program has
to do more than just spot certain patterns localized in time.



Similarly if I simulate the solar system on a pc, then this defines a
universe in which an event could be that jupiter is at a certain position at
a certain time. To 'see' this in terms of the electrons moving through the
transistors one has to first 'see' the program. Seeing the program requires
one to study the way the object interacts with its environment which means
that you have to take it out of the universe and study how it behaves when
you expose it to alternative inputs.



Saibal



Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...

2005-06-03 Thread Saibal Mitra

- Original Message - 
From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Friday, June 03, 2005 05:00 AM
Subject: Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...


 Stephen Paul King writes:
  I really do not want to be a stick-in-the-mud here, but what do we
base
  the idea that copies could exist upon? What if I, or any one else's
1st
  person aspect, can not be copied? If the operation of copying is
impossible,
  what is the status of all of these thought experiments?
  If, and this is a HUGE if, there is some thing irreducibly quantum
  mechanical to this 1st person aspect then it follows from QM that
copying
  is not allowed. Neither a quantum state nor a qubit can be copied
without
  destroying the original.

 According to the Bekenstein bound, which is a result from quantum gravity,
 any finite sized system can only hold a finite amount of information.
 That means that it can only be in a finite number of states.  If you
 made a large enough number of systems in every possible state, you would
 be guaranteed to have one that matched the state of your target system.
 However you could not in general know which one matched it.

 Nevertheless this shows that even if consciousness is a quantum
 phenomenon, it is possible to have copies of it, at the expense of
 some waste.


This is actualy another argument against QTI. There are only a finite number
of different versions of observers. Suppose a 'subjective' time evolution on
the set of all possible observers exists that is always well defined.
Suppose we start with observer O1, and under time evolution it evolves to
O2, which then evolves to O3 etc. Eventually an On will be mapped back to O1
(if this never happened that would contradict the fact that there are only a
finite number of O's). But mapping back to the initial state doesn't
conserve memory. You can thus only subjectively experience yourself evolving
for a finite amount of time.


Saibal



Re: objections to QTI

2005-06-01 Thread Saibal Mitra
Hi Bruno,

Patric has already explained Barbour's position (I didn't read his book).
Separating space from time is not very natural...


Perhaps one can use a similar method as presented here:

http://arxiv.org/abs/math-ph/0008018

to derive the notion of space-time as a first person phenomena.


Saibal


- Original Message - 
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Wednesday, June 01, 2005 03:24 PM
Subject: Re: objections to QTI



Le 01-juin-05, à 15:00, Saibal Mitra a écrit :

 Hi Norman,

 I entirely agree with Julian Barbour. A fundamental notion of time
 would act as a pointer indicating what is real (things that are
 happening now) and what was real and what will be real. Most of us
 here on the everything list believe that in a certain sense
 'everything exists', so the notion of a fundamental time would be
 contrary to this idea. I think that that most here on the list would
 consider time as a first person phenomena


Indeed. (SGrz pour those who knows). I would like to know if Norman and
Saibal and others agree that there is nothing special with time. Why
does not Julian Barbour talk about space-time capsule?  (Or does he?)
I think space is also a first person phenomena. OK?

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



Re: objections to QTI

2005-06-01 Thread Saibal Mitra



Hi Norman,

I entirely agree with Julian Barbour. A fundamental notion of 
time would act as a pointer indicating what is real (things that are happening 
now) and what was real and what will be real. Most of us here on the everything 
list believe that in a certain sense 'everything exists', so the notion of a 
fundamental time would be contrary to this idea. I think that that most here on 
the list would consider time as a first person phenomena.


Saibal



-Defeat Spammers by 
launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites: http://www.hillscapital.com/antispam/

  - Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
  Van: 
  Norman Samish 
  
  Aan: everything-list@eskimo.com 
  Verzonden: Monday, May 30, 2005 06:04 
  PM
  Onderwerp: Re: objections to QTI
  
  Hi Saibal and Stathis,
   This scenariothat you are 
  discussing reminds me of this interview with Julian Barbour where he proposes 
  that "time" is an illusion. If you agree or disagree with 
  Barbour,I'd like to hear why.
  http://www.science-spirit.org/article_detail.php?article_id=183
  
  Norman Samish
  - Original 
  Message ----- From: "Saibal Mitra" [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: 
  "Stathis Papaioannou" [EMAIL PROTECTED]; 
  everything-list@eskimo.comSent: Monday, May 30, 2005 8:28 
  AMSubject: Re: objections to QTIHi Stathis,I think that your 
  example below was helpful to clarify the disagreement. You say that 
  randomly sampling from all the files is not 'how real life works'. 
  However, if you did randomly sample from all the files the result would not be 
  different from the selective time ordered sampling you suggest, as long as the 
  effect of dying (reducing the absolute measure) can be ignored. If I'm 
  sampled by the computer, I'll have the recollection of having been a continuum 
  of previous states, even though these states may not have been sampled for 
  quite some while. I'll subjectively experience a linear time evolution. The 
  order in which the computer chooses to generate me at various instances 
  doesn't matter. There are a few reasons why I believe in the ''random 
  sampling''. First of all, random sampling seems to be necessary to avoid the 
  Doomsday Paradox. See this article written by Ken Olum:
  http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0009081He 
  explains here why you need the Self Indicating Assumption. The self indicating 
  assumption amounts to adopting an absolute measure that is proportional to the 
  number of observers. Another reason has to do with the notion of time. I 
  don't believe that events that have happened or will happen are not real while 
  events that are happening now are real. They have to be treated in the same 
  way. The fact that I experience time evolution is a first person 
  phenomena. Finally, QTI (which more or less follows if you adopt the 
  time ordered picture), implies that for the most part of your life you should 
  find yourself in an a-typical state (e.g. very old while almost everyone else 
  is very young). 
  -Saibal-- 
  Oorspronkelijk bericht - Van: "Stathis Papaioannou" 
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]Aan: 
  everything-list@eskimo.comVerzonden: Monday, May 30, 2005 04:02 
  PMOnderwerp: objections to QTI I thought the following analogy 
  might clarify the point I was trying to makein recent posts to the "Many 
  Pasts? Not according to QM" thread, addressingone objection to 
  QTI.You are a player in the computer game called the Files of 
  Life. In this gamethe computer generates consecutively numbered 
  folders which each containmultiple text files, representing the 
  multiple potential histories of theplayer at that time point. Each 
  folder F_i contains N_i files. The firstfolder, F_0, contains N_0 
  files each describing possible events soon afteryour birth. You choose 
  one of the files in this folder at random, and fromthis the 
  computer generates the next folder, F_1, and places in it N 
  filesrepresenting N possible continuations of the story. If you die 
  going fromF_0 to F_1, that file in F_1 corresponding to this event 
  is blank, andblank files are deleted; so for the first folder 
  N_0=N, but for the nextone N_1=N, allowing for deaths. The game then 
  continues: you choose a fileat random from F_1, from this file the 
  computer generates the next folderF_2 containing N_2 files, then 
  you choose a file at random from F_2, and soon.It should be 
  obvious that if the game is realistic, N_i should decrease 
  withincreasing i, due to death from accidents (fairly constant) + 
  death fromage related disease. The earlier folders will therefore 
  on average containmany more files than the later folders. Now, it is 
  argued that QTI isimpossible because a randomly sampled observer 
  moment from your life is veryunlikely to be from a version of you 
  who is 1000 years old, wh

Re: objections to QTI

2005-05-30 Thread Saibal Mitra
Hi Stathis,

I think that your example below was helpful to clarify the disagreement.
You say that randomly sampling from all the files is not 'how real life
works'.  However, if you did randomly sample from all the files the result
would not be different from the selective time ordered sampling you suggest,
as long as the effect of dying (reducing the absolute measure) can be
ignored.


If I'm sampled by the computer, I'll have the recollection of having been a
continuum of previous states, even though these states may not have been
sampled for quite some while. I'll subjectively experience a linear time
evolution. The order in which the computer chooses to generate me at various
instances doesn't matter.


There are a few reasons why I believe in the ''random sampling''. First of
all, random sampling seems to be necessary to avoid the Doomsday Paradox.
See this article written by Ken Olum:

http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0009081


He explains here why you need the Self Indicating Assumption. The self
indicating assumption amounts to adopting an absolute measure that is
proportional to the number of observers.


Another reason has to do with the notion of time. I don't believe that
events that have happened or will happen are not real while events that are
happening now are real. They have to be treated in the same way. The fact
that I experience time evolution is a first person phenomena.


Finally, QTI (which more or less follows if you adopt the time ordered
picture), implies that for the most part of your life you should find
yourself in an a-typical state (e.g. very old while almost everyone else is
very young).



Saibal


-
Defeat Spammers by launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites:
http://www.hillscapital.com/antispam/
- Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
Van: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Aan: everything-list@eskimo.com
Verzonden: Monday, May 30, 2005 04:02 PM
Onderwerp: objections to QTI


 I thought the following analogy might clarify the point I was trying to
make
 in recent posts to the Many Pasts? Not according to QM thread,
addressing
 one objection to QTI.

 You are a player in the computer game called the Files of Life. In this
game
 the computer  generates consecutively numbered folders which each contain
 multiple text files, representing  the multiple potential histories of the
 player at that time point. Each folder F_i contains N_i files. The first
 folder, F_0,  contains N_0 files each describing possible events soon
after
 your birth. You choose one of the  files in this folder at random, and
from
 this the computer generates the next folder, F_1, and places in it N
files
 representing N possible continuations of the story. If you die going from
 F_0 to F_1, that  file in F_1 corresponding to this event is blank, and
 blank files are deleted; so for the first  folder N_0=N, but for the next
 one N_1=N, allowing for deaths. The game then continues: you  choose a
file
 at random from F_1, from this file the computer generates the next folder
 F_2  containing N_2 files, then you choose a file at random from F_2, and
so
 on.

 It should be obvious that if the game is realistic, N_i should decrease
with
 increasing i, due  to death from accidents (fairly constant) + death from
 age related disease. The earlier folders  will therefore on average
contain
 many more files than the later folders. Now, it is argued that  QTI is
 impossible because a randomly sampled observer moment from your life is
very
 unlikely to  be from a version of you who is 1000 years old, which has
very
 low measure compared with a  younger version. The equivalent argument for
 the Files of Life would be that since the earlier  files are much more
 numerous than the later files, a randomly sampled file from your life (as
 created by playing the game) is very unlikely to represent a 1000 year old
 version of you, as  compared with a younger version. This reasoning would
be
 sound if the random sampling were  done by mixing up all the files, or
all
 the OM's, and pulling one out at random. But this is not  how the game
works
 and it is not how real life works. From the first person viewpoint, it
 doesn't matter how many files are in the folder because you only choose
one
 at each step, spend  the same time at each step, and are no more likely to
 find yourself at one step rather than  another. As long as there is at
least
 *one* file in the next folder, it is guaranteed that you  will continue
 living. Similarly, as long as there is at least *one* OM in your future
 which  represents a continuation from your present OM, you will continue
 living.

 --Stathis Papaioannou

 _
 Meet 1000s of Aussie singles today at Lavalife!
 http://lavalife9.ninemsn.com.au/




Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...

2005-05-28 Thread Saibal Mitra

- Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
Van: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Aan: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
CC: everything-list@eskimo.com
Verzonden: Saturday, May 28, 2005 07:26 AM
Onderwerp: Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...


 Saibal Mitra wrote:

 You have to consider the huge number of alternative states you could be
in.
 
 1) Consider an observer moment that has experienced a lot of things.
These
 experiences are encoded by n bits. Suppose that these experiences were
more
 or less random. Then we can conclude that there are 2^n OMs that all have
a
 probability proportional to 2^(-n). The probability that you are one of
 these OMs isn't small at all!
 
 2) Considering perforing n suicide experiments, each with 50%  survival
 probability. The n bits have registered the fact that you have survived
the
 n suicide experiments. The probability of experiencing that is 2^(-n).
The
 2^(n) -1 alternate states are all unconscious.
 
 
 So, even though each of the states in 1 is as likely as the single state
in
 2, the probability that you'll find yourself alive in 1 is vastly more
 likely than in 2. This is actually similar to why you never see a mixture
 of
 two gases spontaneously unmix. Even though all states are equally likely,
 there are far fewer unmixed states than mixed ones.

 I understand your point, but I think you are making an invalid assumption
 about the relationship between a random sampling of all the OM's available
 to an individual and that individual's experience of living his life.
 Suppose a trillion trillion copies of my mind are made today on a computer
 and run in lockstep with my biologically implemented mind for the next six
 months, at which point the computer is shut down. This means that most of
my
 measure is now in the latter half of 2005, in the sense that if you pick
an
 observer moment at random out of all the observer moments which identify
 themselves as being me, it is much more likely to be one of the copies on
 the computer. But what does this mean for my experience of life? Does it
 mean that I am unlikely to experience 2006, being somehow suspended in
2005?

I would say so. You would find yoursef to be suspended in 2005, just like
you are now suspended between 1900 and 2100. But this would require the
simulations of your mind in 2005 to dominate over all other versions of you.
Now unless experiencing 2006 would require a miracle this can't be the case.
The reason is that all possible versions of you 'already' exist in the
multiverse. Your measure in 2005 is what it is. This includes the effects of
others simulating your mind experiencing 2005 (the simulation can be done at
any time, of course).

So, you can say that your measure for experiencing time t is:

m(t) =  m_{biol}(t) + m_{sim}(t)


m_{biol} being the 'biological' contribution of your measure and m_{sim} the
digital contribution. Both terms are fixed by the laws of physics. If indeed
m_{sim}(2005) is trillions of times larger than m_{biol}(2005) and zero at
other times, you would be suspended in 2005. But this cannot be the case
unless there is some reason why m_{sim}(t) is so strongly peaked around
2005. If there are branches in which someone is simulating you in 2005 for
no good reason, then that decision is taken at random. That means that in
some other branch you are simulated in some other time. So, the measure
isn't strongly peaked around 2005 at all!





 More generally, if a person has N OM's available to him at time t1 and kN
at
 time t2, does this mean he is k times as likely to find himself
experiencing
 t2 as t1? I suggest that this is not the right way to look at it. A person
 only experiences one OM at a time, so if he has passed through t1 and t2
 it will appear to him that he has spent just as much time in either
interval
 (assuming t1 and t2 are the same length). The only significance of the
fact
 that there are more OM's at t2 is that the person can expect a greater
 variety of possible experiences at t2 if the OM's are all distinct.


The same is true here. It must follow from the laws of physics (which
include the effects of simmulations) that there are indeed many more copies
of you at t2.


Saibal






Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...

2005-05-28 Thread Saibal Mitra
Hi Bruno

- Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
Van: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Aan: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
CC: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED];
everything-list@eskimo.com
Verzonden: Friday, May 27, 2005 04:08 PM
Onderwerp: Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...


 Hi Saibal,

 Le 27-mai-05, à 14:29, Saibal Mitra a écrit :

  - Oorspronkelijk bericht -
  Van: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Aan: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  CC: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
  Verzonden: Friday, May 27, 2005 01:44 AM
  Onderwerp: Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...
 
 
  Saibal Mitra wrote:
 
  Quoting Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
 
  On 25th May 2005 Saibal Mitra wrote:
 
  One of the arguments in favor of the observer moment picture is
  that
  it
  solves Tegmark's quantum suicide paradox. If you start with a set
  of
  all
  possible observer moments on which a measure is defined (which can
  be
  calculated in principle using the laws of physics), then the
  paradox
  never
  arises. At any moment you can think of yourself as being randomly
  drawn
  from
  the set of all possible observer moments. The observer moment who
  has
  survived the suicide experiment time after time after time has a
  very
  very
  very low measure.
 
  I'm not sure what you mean by the paradox never arises here. You
  have
  said
  in the past that although you initially believed in QTI, you later
  realised
 
  that it could not possibly be true (sorry if I am misquoting you,
  this
  is
  from memory). Or are you distinguishing between QTI and QS?
 
  That's correct. In both QTI and QS one assumes conditional
  probabilities.
  You just
  throw away the branches in which you don't survive and then you
  conclude
  that you
  continue to survive into the infinitely far future (or after
  performing
  an
  arbitrary
  large number of suicide experiments) with probability 1.
 
  But if you use the a priori probability distribution then you see
  that
  you
  the measure
  of versions of you that survive into the far future is almost zero.
 
  What does the measure of versions of you that survive into the far
  future
  is almost zero actually mean? The measure of this particular version
  of
  me
  typing this email is practically zero, considering all the other
  versions
  of
  me and all the other objects in the multiverse. Another way of
  looking at
  it
  is that I am dead in a lot more places and times than I am alive. And
  yet
  undeniably, here I am! Reality trumps probability every time.
 
 
  You have to consider the huge number of alternative states you could
  be in.
 
  1) Consider an observer moment that has experienced a lot of things.
  These
  experiences are encoded by n bits. Suppose that these experiences were
  more
  or less random. Then we can conclude that there are 2^n OMs that all
  have a
  probability proportional to 2^(-n). The probability that you are one of
  these OMs isn't small at all!
 
  2) Considering perforing n suicide experiments, each with 50%  survival
  probability. The n bits have registered the fact that you have
  survived the
  n suicide experiments. The probability of experiencing that is 2^(-n).
  The
  2^(n) -1 alternate states are all unconscious.
 
 
  So, even though each of the states in 1 is as likely as the single
  state in
  2, the probability that you'll find yourself alive in 1 is vastly more
  likely than in 2. This is actually similar to why you never see a
  mixture of
  two gases spontaneously unmix. Even though all states are equally
  likely,
  there are far fewer unmixed states than mixed ones.
 
  Saibal


 I agree in the case I could imagine all the observer moments in some
 complete third person way, where the notion of dying can be given
 some third person sense.
 But the compi and the qti, relies, it seems to me,  on the fact that we
 cannot experience not being there. So that in both case the first
 person probabilities are one, from first person points of view. They
 are one, *almost* by definition, the very notion of probabilitiy
 presupposes the ability to test the outcome of a (random)  *experiment*
 (this is still more plausible for an observer-moment  first person
 *experience*).

 Do you see what I try to say?

 That's why we need some no cul-de-sac hypothesis.

 [For those who knows the (Godel Lob Solovay) provability logics (G and
 G*) : you can go from a provability logic Bp (= G; with cul-de-sac
 accessible from all transitory obsever momente) to a probability logic
 (without cul-de-sac) by *imposing* consistency: Bp == Bp  -B-p. (-B-p
 = 'Consistent p' remember the dual of Bp is -B-p, and with Bp read as
 'Provable p', ('Beweisbar p',  in German), -B-p is 'Consistent p'.  And
 if you remind Kripke Semantics, Con p, means there is at least one
 observer moment (with p true) accessible from you current observer
 moment.
 Of course G* proves Bp - (Bp  -B-p), But G* proves also -B(Bp -
 (Bp  -B-p)), so

Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...

2005-05-27 Thread Saibal Mitra
- Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
Van: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Aan: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
CC: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
Verzonden: Friday, May 27, 2005 01:44 AM
Onderwerp: Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...


 Saibal Mitra wrote:

 Quoting Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
 
   On 25th May 2005 Saibal Mitra wrote:
  
   One of the arguments in favor of the observer moment picture is that
it
   solves Tegmark's quantum suicide paradox. If you start with a set of
 all
   possible observer moments on which a measure is defined (which can be
   calculated in principle using the laws of physics), then the paradox
   never
   arises. At any moment you can think of yourself as being randomly
drawn
   from
   the set of all possible observer moments. The observer moment who has
   survived the suicide experiment time after time after time has a very
   very
   very low measure.
  
   I'm not sure what you mean by the paradox never arises here. You
have
   said
   in the past that although you initially believed in QTI, you later
 realised
  
   that it could not possibly be true (sorry if I am misquoting you, this
 is
   from memory). Or are you distinguishing between QTI and QS?
  
 That's correct. In both QTI and QS one assumes conditional probabilities.
 You just
 throw away the branches in which you don't survive and then you conclude
 that you
 continue to survive into the infinitely far future (or after performing
an
 arbitrary
 large number of suicide experiments) with probability 1.
 
 But if you use the a priori probability distribution then you see that
you
 the measure
 of versions of you that survive into the far future is almost zero.

 What does the measure of versions of you that survive into the far future
 is almost zero actually mean? The measure of this particular version of
me
 typing this email is practically zero, considering all the other versions
of
 me and all the other objects in the multiverse. Another way of looking at
it
 is that I am dead in a lot more places and times than I am alive. And yet
 undeniably, here I am! Reality trumps probability every time.


You have to consider the huge number of alternative states you could be in.

1) Consider an observer moment that has experienced a lot of things. These
experiences are encoded by n bits. Suppose that these experiences were more
or less random. Then we can conclude that there are 2^n OMs that all have a
probability proportional to 2^(-n). The probability that you are one of
these OMs isn't small at all!

2) Considering perforing n suicide experiments, each with 50%  survival
probability. The n bits have registered the fact that you have survived the
n suicide experiments. The probability of experiencing that is 2^(-n). The
2^(n) -1 alternate states are all unconscious.


So, even though each of the states in 1 is as likely as the single state in
2, the probability that you'll find yourself alive in 1 is vastly more
likely than in 2. This is actually similar to why you never see a mixture of
two gases spontaneously unmix. Even though all states are equally likely,
there are far fewer unmixed states than mixed ones.

Saibal




Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...

2005-05-26 Thread Saibal Mitra
Quoting Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]:

 On 25th May 2005 Saibal Mitra wrote:
 
 One of the arguments in favor of the observer moment picture is that it
 solves Tegmark's quantum suicide paradox. If you start with a set of all
 possible observer moments on which a measure is defined (which can be
 calculated in principle using the laws of physics), then the paradox
 never
 arises. At any moment you can think of yourself as being randomly drawn 
 from
 the set of all possible observer moments. The observer moment who has
 survived the suicide experiment time after time after time has a very
 very
 very low measure.
 
 I'm not sure what you mean by the paradox never arises here. You have
 said 
 in the past that although you initially believed in QTI, you later realised
 
 that it could not possibly be true (sorry if I am misquoting you, this is 
 from memory). Or are you distinguishing between QTI and QS?
 
That's correct. In both QTI and QS one assumes conditional probabilities. You 
just 
throw away the branches in which you don't survive and then you conclude that 
you 
continue to survive into the infinitely far future (or after performing an 
arbitrary 
large number of suicide experiments) with probability 1.

But if you use the a priori probability distribution then you see that you the 
measure 
of versions of you that survive into the far future is almost zero.


Saibal

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Re: Plaga

2005-05-26 Thread Saibal Mitra
Bruno was quoting another Aet from a parallel world :)



Quoting Eugen Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED]:

 
 If you expect to be quoted correctly, stop posting HTML-only.
 
 On Thu, May 26, 2005 at 08:45:34AM -0500, aet.radal ssg wrote:
  HEY! BRUNO - I, (aet) didn't say that.nbsp;Someone elsenbsp;did. I was
 quoting them. If you're going to quote somebody, I suggest you get it
 right.BRBR- Original Message - BRFrom: Bruno Marchal
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]BRTo: aet.radal ssg
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]BRSubject: Re: Plaga BRDate: Wed, 25 May 2005
 20:40:21 +0200 BRBRgt; BRgt; BRgt; Le 25-mai-05, à 17:59,
 aet.radal ssg a écrit : BRgt; BRgt; gt; From the initial page from
 the included link to the archive: I'm BRgt; gt; no physicist so I
 don't know for sure that these implications BRgt; gt; would BRgt;
 gt; follow, but I am very doubtful that interworld communication is
 consistent BRgt; gt; with the basics of quantum mechanics.nbsp; The
 fact that this paper has not BRgt; gt; been published in peer reviewed
 journals in 7 years indicates that it BRgt; gt; probably doesn't work.
 BRgt; BRgt; Ooh... you should not make inferences like that. I
 could give BRgt; you 10,000 reasons for not publishing. But I have not
 the time BRgt; because I have a deadline today! BRgt; BRgt; I red
 Plaga's paper. It is extremely interesting. It belongs to the BRgt;
 family of Weinberg's result. Some hoped that a slight BRgt;
 delinearisation of QM would explain the collapse. Reasoning a-la BRgt;
 Weinberg Plaga shows that it is the contrary which happens. Not BRgt;
 only we keep the MW but they became more real in some sense. It BRgt;
 shows the MWI is stable for slight variation of the SWE. this BRgt;
 confirms MWI in a deeper way. It shows quantum non linearity BRgt;
 contradicts thermodynamics! This is a powerful argument in favor of
 BRgt; both pure linear QM and MWI. BRgt; BRgt; (Good for me, it
 shows nature confirms the lobian machine's BRgt; inability to observe
 kestrels and starlings when they look enough BRgt; closely to
 themselves) BRgt; BRgt; Bruno BRgt; BRgt;
 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ BRBR
  
  -- 
  p___brSign-up
 for Ads Free at Mail.combr
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 href=http://mail01.mail.com/scripts/payment/adtracking.cgi?bannercode=adsfreejump01;
 target=_blankhttp://www.mail.com/?sr=signup/a/p
  BR
 -- 
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 __
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Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...

2005-05-26 Thread Saibal Mitra
The original posting about this dates back from the beginning of this list. I 
just 
invoked this in this thread to argue why one should consider observer moments 
(identical ones considered as the same) as fundamental concepts.

The suicide paradox I was referring to is just Tegmark's thought experiment 
where the 
experimenter measures the spin of a particle. If it is down he is instantly 
killed, he 
survives if it is up. Then he argues that according to the MWI the experimenter 
should 
always measure that the spin is up, because that's the only branch in which he 
survives.

Saibal 

Quoting aet.radal ssg [EMAIL PROTECTED]:

 For some reason I didn't get the original post about the suicide paradox,
 so if someone could resend it, sans any everything computer lingo, I
 would appreciate it.
 The subject of the thread - Many Pasts? - Not according to QM  taken on
 its face seems false, at least from the standard MWI model. If you have
 parallel worlds you have parallel pasts. In fact, that's why MWI is
 supposed to be the solution to time travel paradoxes. Take an arbitrary
 moment, when a measurement, or any other trigger, causes a decoherence,
 move forward in time from that moment and look back - you have parallel
 pasts that begin from the point of decoherence. 
 
 
 - Original Message - 
 From: Saibal Mitra 
 To: everything-list@eskimo.com 
 Subject: Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM... 
 Date: Wed, 25 May 2005 01:24:23 +0200 
 
  
  
  
  
  - Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
  Van: Patrick Leahy 
  Aan: 
  Verzonden: Wednesday, May 18, 2005 05:57 PM 
  Onderwerp: Many Pasts? Not according to QM... 
  
  
   Of course, many of you (maybe all) may be defining pasts from an 
   information-theoretic point of view, i.e. by identifying all 
   observer-moments in the multiverse which are equivalent as perceived by
 
   the observer; in which case the above point is quite irrelevant. (But
 you 
   still have to distinguish the different branches to find the total
 measure 
   for each OM). 
  
  This is indeed my position. I prefer to define an observer moment as the 
  information needed to generate an observer. According to the
 ''everything'' 
  hypothesis (I've just seen that you don't subscibe this) an observer
 moment 
  defines its own universe. But this universe is very complex and therefore
 
  must have a very low measure. It is thus far more likely that the
 observer 
  finds himself embedded in a low complexity universe. 
  
  
  One of the arguments in favor of the observer moment picture is that it 
  solves Tegmark's quantum suicide paradox. If you start with a set of all 
  possible observer moments on which a measure is defined (which can be 
  calculated in principle using the laws of physics), then the paradox
 never 
  arises. At any moment you can think of yourself as being randomly drawn
 from 
  the set of all possible observer moments. The observer moment who has 
  survived the suicide experiment time after time after time has a very
 very 
  very low measure. 
  
  
  Even if one assumes only a single universe described by the MWI, one has
 to 
  consider simulations of other universes. Virtual observers living in such
 a 
  simulated universe will perceive their world as real. The measure of such
 
  embedded universes will probably decay exponentialy with complexity 
  
  
  Saibal 
 
 
 
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Re: Plaga

2005-05-25 Thread Saibal Mitra



Plaga's paper has been published:

''Proposal for an experimental test of the 
many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics''

Found.Phys. 27 (1997) 559

arXiv: quant-ph/9510007




-Defeat Spammers by 
launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites: http://www.hillscapital.com/antispam/

  - Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
  Van: 
  aet.radal 
  ssg 
  Aan: everything-list@eskimo.com 
  Verzonden: Wednesday, May 25, 2005 05:59 
  PM
  Onderwerp: Re: Plaga
  
  From the initial page from the included link to the archive: "I'm no 
  physicist so I don't know for sure that these implications wouldfollow, 
  but I am very doubtful that interworld communication is consistentwith the 
  basics of quantum mechanics. The fact that this paper has notbeen 
  published in peer reviewed journals in 7 years indicates that itprobably 
  doesn't work."
  Back when I wasn't long in the field of video production I was well aware 
  of the insistance and belief of TV engineers that a single tube industrial 
  color video camera was not broadcast quality. Working in cable, where they 
  were used for cablecast, I had plenty of opportunity to look at picture 
  quality, etc. and came to the conclusion that it shouldn't be a problem. 2 
  years later I got the chance to prove it when a local news station sent a crew 
  out to cover something that I was shooting. In the end I gave them 
  theeditied sequence I had shot (now downtwo generations), and they 
  took it and edited it into their story, which would have taken it down a 
  third. Then they broadcasted it over the air. I taped it off-air and the 
  results were conclusive - I wasright, all the nay-sayer engineers were 
  wrong.A $40,000 Ikegami vs a $1,500 Panasonic and it was a tie 
  except for one slight red bleed from a costume due to the Saticon tube bias 
  toward red in the camera I used, which could have been color corrected with a 
  time base corrector, but whoever dubbed the tape left the red level a little 
  too hot. 
  My point being that that was the first in a long line of "you can'ts" that 
  I've faced which I eventually proved, "you can". Thus I have a dim view of 
  such positions when they aren't backed up with experiments that prove so 
  *conclusively*. As long as the possibility exists, I keep an open mind. 
  Besides, if unbriddled skepticism was right all the time, we wouldn't be using 
  computers, flying, or even have phones of any kind, just to name a few 
  things.- Original Message - From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
  To: everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: Re: Plaga Date: Tue, 24 
  May 2005 17:51:13 -0700 (PDT)   We discussed Plaga's paper 
  back in June, 2002. I reported some skeptical  analysis of the paper 
  by John Baez of sci.physics fame, at  
  http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3686.html . I also gave some  
  reasons of my own why arbitrary inter-universe quantum communication  
  should be impossible.   Hal Finney -- 
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Hamel Basis

2005-05-24 Thread Saibal Mitra
A Hamel basis is a set H such that every element of the vector space is a
*unique* *finite* linear combination of  elements in H.

This can be proven using Zorn's lemma, which is a direct consequence of the
Axiom of Choice. The idea of the proof is as follows. If you start with an H
that is too small in the sense that some elements of the vector space cannot
be written as a finite linear combination of members of H, then you make H a
bit larger by including that element. Now H has to satisfy the constraint
that any finite linear combination of its elements be unique. Adding the
element that could not be written as a linear combination will not make the
larger H violate this constraint.

You can imagine adding more and more elements until you reach some maximal H
that cannot be made larger. The existence of this maximal H is guaranteed by
Zorn's lemma. If you now consider the union of H with any element of the
vector space not contained in H, then the condition that any finite linear
combination be unique must fail (otherwise the maximality of H would be
contradicted). From this you can conclude that the element you added to H
(which was arbitrary) can be written as a unique linear combination of
elements from H.


Saibal




-
Defeat Spammers by launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites:
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- Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
Van: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Aan: everything-list@eskimo.com
Verzonden: Tuesday, May 24, 2005 06:07 PM
Onderwerp: RE: White Rabbit vs. Tegmark


 Lee Corbin writes:
  Russell writes
   You've got me digging out my copy of Kreyszig Intro to Functional
   Analysis. It turns out that the set of continuous functions on an
   interval C[a,b] form a vector space. By application of Zorn's lemma
   (or equivalently the axiom of choice), every vector space has what is
   called a Hamel basis, namely a linearly independent countable set B
   such that every element in the vector space can be expressed as a
   finite linear combination of elements drawn from the Hamel basis
 
  I can't follow your math, but are you saying the following
  in effect?
 
  Any continuous function on R or C, as we know, can be
  specified by countably many reals R1, R2, R3, ... But
  by a certain mapping trick, I think that I can see how
  this could be reduced to *one* real.  It depends for its
  functioning---as I think your result above depends---
  on the fact that each real encodes infinite information.

 I don't think that is exactly how the result Russell describes works, but
 certainly Lee's construction makes his result somewhat less paradoxical.
 Indeed, a real number can include the information from any countable
 set of reals.

 Nevertheless I'd be curious to see an example of this Hamel basis
 construction.  Let's consider a simple Euclidean space.  A two dimensional
 space is just the Euclidean plane, where every point corresponds to
 a pair of real numbers (x, y).

 We can generalize this to any number of dimensions, including a countably
 infinite number of dimensions.  In that form each point can be expressed
 as (x0, x1, x2, x3, ...).  The standard orthonormal basis for this vector
 space is b0=(1,0,0,0...), b1=(0,1,0,0...), b2=(0,0,1,0...), 

 With such a basis the point I showed can be expressed as x0*b0+x1*b1+
 I gather from Russell's result that we can create a different, countable
 basis such that an arbitrary point can be expressed as only a finite
 number of terms.  That is pretty surprising.

 I have searched online for such a construction without any luck.
 The Wikipedia article, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamel_basis has an
 example of using a Fourier basis to span functions, which requires an
 infinite combination of basis vectors and is therefore not a Hamel basis.
 They then remark, Every Hamel basis of this space is much bigger than
 this merely countably infinite set of functions.  That would seem to
 imply, contrary to what Russell writes above, that the Hamel basis is
 uncountably infinite in size.

 In that case the Hamel basis for the infinite dimensional Euclidean space
 can simply be the set of all points in the space, so then each point
 can be represented as 1 * the appropriate basis vector.  That would be
 a disappointingly trivial result.  And it would not shed light on the
 original question of proving that an arbitrary continuous function can
 be represented by a countably infinite number of bits.

 Hal




Re: Hamel Basis

2005-05-24 Thread Saibal Mitra
Hi Patrick,
Welcome to the list!

When I was a student a friend told me about transfinite induction. While
ordinary induction allows you to generalize from n to n + 1 and thus to a
countable set, transfinite induction enables you to explore the continuum.

He didn't explain how it was done, though. I learned later while following a
functional analyses class.


Saibal



 I know this one!

 I had a friend who published a magazine called Zorn printed on pale
 yellow paper... ;)

 Paddy Leahy




Re: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...

2005-05-24 Thread Saibal Mitra



- Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
Van: Patrick Leahy [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Aan: everything-list@eskimo.com
Verzonden: Wednesday, May 18, 2005 05:57 PM
Onderwerp: Many Pasts? Not according to QM...


 Of course, many of you (maybe all) may be defining pasts from an
 information-theoretic point of view, i.e. by identifying all
 observer-moments in the multiverse which are equivalent as perceived by
 the observer; in which case the above point is quite irrelevant. (But you
 still have to distinguish the different branches to find the total measure
 for each OM).

This is indeed my position. I prefer to define an observer moment as the
information needed to generate an observer. According to the ''everything''
hypothesis (I've just seen that you don't subscibe this) an observer moment
defines its own universe. But this universe is very complex and therefore
must have a very low measure. It is thus far more likely that the observer
finds himself embedded in a low complexity universe.


One of the arguments in favor of the observer moment picture is that it
solves Tegmark's quantum suicide paradox. If you start with a set of all
possible observer moments on which a measure is defined (which can be
calculated in principle using the laws of physics), then the paradox never
arises. At any moment you can think of yourself as being randomly drawn from
the set of all possible observer moments. The observer moment who has
survived the suicide experiment time after time after time has a very very
very low measure.


Even if one assumes only a single universe described by the MWI, one has to
consider simulations of other universes. Virtual observers living in such a
simulated universe will perceive their world as real. The measure of such
embedded universes will probably decay exponentialy with complexity


Saibal



Re: Many worlds theory of immortality

2005-05-12 Thread Saibal Mitra



One could say that the brain of some 
schizophrenic persons simulate otherpersons. I don't know if some of you 
have seen the film 'A Beautiful mind'about the life of mathematician Nash. 
In the film Nash was closelyacquainted to persons that didn't realy exist. 
Only much later when he wastreated for his condition did he realize that 
some of his close friendsdidn't really exist.One could argue that 
the persons that Nash was seeing in fact did exist (inour universe), 
precisely because Nash's brain was simulating 
them.SaibalVan: "Stathis Papaioannou" [EMAIL PROTECTED]Aan: 
[EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]CC: everything-list@eskimo.comVerzonden: 
Thursday, May 12, 2005 03:25 PMOnderwerp: Re: Many worlds theory of 
immortality The obvious and sensible-sounding response to 
Jeanne's question whether it may be possible to access other universes 
through dreams or hallucinations is that it is not really any more 
credible than speculation that peoplecan contact the dead, or have 
been kidnapped by aliens, or any other of the millions of weird things 
that so many seem to believe despite the totallack of supporting 
evidence. However, this response is completely wrong if MWIis 
correct. If I dream tonight that a big green monster has eaten the 
Sydney Opera House, then definitely, in some branch of the MW, a big 
greenmonster will eat the Sydney Opera House. Of course, this 
unfortunate event will occur even if I *don't* dream it, but I'm not 
saying that my dream caused it, only that I saw it happening. It might 
also be argued that I didn't really "receive" this information from 
another branch, but that it wasjust a coincidence that my dream 
matched the reality in the other branch. But seers don't see things by 
putting two and two together; they just, well, *see* them. And if I 
really could, godlike, enter at random another branch of the MW and 
return to this branch to report what I saw, how would the information 
provided be any different from my dream? The only difference I can think 
of is that with the direct method I would be more likely tovisit a 
branch with greater measure, but I can probably achieve the same 
thingby trying not to think about green monsters when I go to sleep 
tonight. --Stathis Papaioannou I once read 
an article in, I believe, Time Magazine, about the relatively new 
field of "neurotheology" which investigates what goes on in the brain 
during ecstatic states, etc. One suggestion that intrigued me was 
thatit may be possible that in such a state, and I believe that 
schizophrenics were also mentioned, that the brain is 
malfunctioning in such a way as toallow it to perceive states of 
reality other than that which the normal brain would perceive. 
In other words, the "antenna" (brain) is picking-up signals 
that are usually beyond the scope of the normal brain. I wondered 
if anyone could comment on this, and if there was any 
reason to even entertain the thought that perhaps some people have 
passed through a crack in the division between our 
universe or dimension, into perhaps another? I read this 
several years ago and wish that I could recall the details of 
thearticle, but I don't have it anymore.  
Jeanne 
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Implications of MWI

2005-05-05 Thread Saibal Mitra


 - Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
 Van: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Aan: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 CC: everything everything-list@eskimo.com
 Verzonden: Tuesday, May 03, 2005 11:39 AM
 Onderwerp: Re: Implications of MWI



 
  Le 01-mai-05, à 16:51, Saibal Mitra a écrit :
 
   The MWI made me take the idea of multiple universes/multiple realities
   serious. When I joined this list I believed that quantum suicide could
   work,
   but I later found out that it cannot possibly work. I now believe that
   there
   exists an ensemble of all possible mathematical
   models/descriptions/computer
   programs. These things exist in a mathematical sense. For this idea to
   work
   (to yield predictions that are consistent with the known laws of
   physics)
   one has to assume that there exists a measure that prefers simple
   programs
   over complex programs.
 
 
  Why? You may be right, but why? How will you make abstraction of
  complex programs
  generated by the DU and getting close to your actual computational
  states?
  What about complex programs generating simple programs?
 
  I do believe simple programs play some role, but not because they would
  have
  an higher measure, just because they will handle genuine relationship
  with all
  the running of all other programs.
 

 Well, I just obseve that we live in a universe which is described by
 relatively simple laws of physics. The actual reason for that could
perhaps
 be explained by your theory.


 Saibal





Many worlds theory of immortality

2005-05-05 Thread Saibal Mitra



I would have to read about these theories, but I think that it 
doesn'tmatter if you work with complex measures.


Saibal



  - Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
  Van: 
  Ben Goertzel 
  
  Aan: Bruno Marchal ; Saibal Mitra 
  
  CC: everything-list@eskimo.com 
  Verzonden: Tuesday, May 03, 2005 02:11 
  PM
  Onderwerp: RE: Many worlds theory of 
  immortality
  
  
  Saibal,
  
  Does 
  your conclusion about conditional probability also apply to complex-valued 
  probabilities a la Youssef?
  
  http://physics.bu.edu/~youssef/quantum/quantum_refs.html
  
  http://www.goertzel.org/papers/ChaoQM.htm
  
  -- 
  Ben Goertzel
  
-Original Message-From: Bruno Marchal 
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Tuesday, May 03, 2005 4:20 
AMTo: Saibal MitraCc: 
everything-list@eskimo.comSubject: Re: Many worlds theory of 
immortalityLe 16-avr.-05, à 02:45, Saibal Mitra a 
écrit :
Both the suicide and copying thought experiments have 
  convinced me that thenotion of a conditional probability is 
  fundamentally flawed. It can bedefined under ''normal'' circumstances 
  but it will break down precisely whenconsidering copying or 
  suicide.This is a quite remarkable remark. I can 
related it to the COMBINATORS thread.In a nutshell: in the *empirical* 
FOREST there are no kestrels (no eliminators at all),nor Mockingbird, 
warblers or any duplicators. Quantum information behaveslike 
incompressible fluid. Universes differentiate, they never multiplies. 
Deutsch is right on that point. I use Hardegree (ref in my thesis(*)) He 
did show thatquantum logic can be seen as a conditional probability 
logic. We will come back on this (it's necessarily a little bit 
technical). I am finishing atechnical paper on that. The COMBINATORS can 
help to simplify considerablythe mathematical conjectures of my 
thesis.Bruno(*) Hardegree, G.M. (1976). 
The Conditional in Quantum Logic. In Suppes, P., editor, Logic and 
Probability in Quantum Mechanics, volume78 of Synthese 
Library, pages 55-72. D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland.


Fw: Many worlds theory of immortality

2005-05-05 Thread Saibal Mitra


 I think we agree on the observer moment. One should formulate questions in
 terms of observer moments and then there are no problems (in principle).


 Saibal



 - Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
 Van: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Aan: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
 Verzonden: Tuesday, May 03, 2005 03:47 PM
 Onderwerp: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality


  2 weeks ago Saibal Mitra wrote:
 
I don't think that the MW immortality is correct at all! In a certain
  sense
  we are
immortal, because the enseble of all possible worlds is a fixed
static
  entity. So,
you ''always'' find yourselve alive in one state or another. However,
 you
  won't
experience youself evolving in the infinite far future.
  
  
If you encounter a ''branching'' in which one of the possibilities is
  death, that
branch cannot be said to be nonexistent relative to you. Quantum
  mechanics
  doesn't
imply that you can never become unconscious, otherwise you could
never
  fall
  asleep!
  
  
Of course, you can never experience being unconscious. So, what to do
  with
  the branch
leading to (almost) certain death? The more information your brain
  contains, the smaller the set of branches is in which you are alive
(and
  consistent with your experiences stored in your brain). The set of all
  branches in which you could be alive doesn't contain any information at
  all.
  Since death involves complete
memory loss, the branch leading to death should be replaced by the
  complete
  set of all possibilities.
 
  ...and despite reading the last paragraph several times slowly, I'm
afraid
 I
  don't understand it. Are you saying there may never be a next moment
at
  the point where you are facing near-certain death? It seems to me that
all
  that is required is an observer moment in which (a) you believe that you
 are
  you, however this may be defined (it's problematic even in normal life
  what constitutes continuity of identity), and (b) you remember facing
the
  said episode of near-certain death (ncd), and it will seem to you that
you
  have miraculously escaped, even if there is no actual physical
connection
  between the pre-ncd and the post-ncd observer moment. Or, another way to
  escape is as you have suggested in a more recent post, that there is an
  observer moment somewhere in the multiverse in which the ncd episode has
  been somehow deleted from your memory. Perhaps the latter is more
likely,
 in
  which case you can look forward to never, or extremely rarely, facing
ncd
 in
  your life.
 
  It all gets very muddled. If we try to ruthlessly dispense with every
  derivative, ill-defined, superfluous concept and assumption in an effort
 to
  simplify the discussion, the one thing we are left with is the
individual
  observer-moments. We then try to sort these observer-moments into sets
 which
  constitute lives, identities, birth, death, amnesia, mind duplication,
 mind
  melding, multiple world branchings, and essentially every possible
 variation
  on these and other themes. No wonder it's confusing! And who is to judge
  where a particular individual's identity/life/body/memory begins and
ends
  when even the most detailed, passed by committee of philosophers set of
  rules fails, as it inevitably will?
 
  The radical solution is to accept that only the observer-moments are
real,
  and how we sort them then is seen for what it is: essentially arbitrary,
a
  matter of convention. You can dismiss the question of immortality,
quantum
  or otherwise, by observing that the only non-problematic definition of
an
  individual is identification with a single observer-moment, so that no
  individual can ever really live for longer than a moment. Certainly,
 this
  goes against intuition, because I feel that I was alive a few minutes
ago
 as
  well as ten years ago, but *of course* I feel that; this is simply
 reporting
  on my current thought processes, like saying I feel hungry or tired, and
  beyond this cannot be taken as a falsifiable statement about the state
of
  affairs in the real world unless recourse is taken to some arbitrary
  definition of personal identity, such as would satisfy a court, for
 example.
 
  Let me put it a different way. Situation (a) life as usual: I die every
  moment and a peson is reborn every moment complete with (most) memories
 and
  other attributes of the individual who has just died. Situation (b) I am
  killed instantly, painlessly, with an axe every moment, and a person is
  reconstituted the next moment complete with (most) memories and other
  attributes of the individual who has just died, such that he experiences
 no
  discontinuity. Aside from the blood and mess in (b), is there a
 difference?
  Should I worry more about (b) than (a)? This is of course a commonplace
  thought experiment on this list, but I draw from it a slightly different
  conclusion: we all die all the time; death doesn't really matter

Many worlds theory of immortality

2005-05-05 Thread Saibal Mitra



 Russell Standish 
wrote: With my TIME postulate, I say that a conscious 
observer necessarily experiences a sequence of related observer moments 
(or even a continuum of them). To argue that observer moments are 
independent of each other is to argue the negation of TIME. With TIME, 
the measure of each observer moment is relative to the predecessor 
state, or the RSSA is the appropriate principle to use. With not-TIME, 
each observer moment has an absolute measure, the 
ASSAThat's an interesting idea, although I do have 
some problems with it. Ifonecompletely specifies the state of an 
observer at a given time, then thisalready contains a notion of time 
as experienced by the observer. So, Iwould say that the notion of an 
abserver moment is more like that of atangent space in General 
Relativity than that of a single space-time 
point.Saibal
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Re: Memory erasure

2005-05-02 Thread Saibal Mitra
If you accept that you can experience having been unconscious, then you also
have to accept that you can survive with memory loss in any branch.

This means that if you are faced with almost certain death, it is more
likely that you will find yourself alive in a completely different sector of
the multiverse than experiencing a miracle that saves your life.


Saibal

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


 Hal Finney wrote:

 Arguing against this is that every night you fall asleep, a similar
 loss of consciousness (often with memory erasure of the last few
 thoughts before sleep). This theory would predict that each night you
 only experience universes where, for whatever reason, you never again
 lose consciousness.

 I don't know why this objection to QTI/QS keeps coming up. It is surely a
 truism that you cannot *experience unconsciousness*, but this is certainly
 not the same as saying that you cannot lose consciousness, or experience
 worlds where you lose consciousness. If the loss of consciousness is
 permanent (i.e., death), then yes, since it is imposssible to *experience
 unconsciousness*, you will not experience those worlds. But if the loss of
 consciousness is temporary, as in sleep, you will experience only a
 discontinuity from which you might conclude you have gone through a period
 of unconsciousness.


 You can turn this whole chain of logic around and make it an argument
 against QS. Sleep proves that loss of consciousness is possible,
 and that memory erasure is possible. Imagine memory erasure becoming
 so complete that it erases your entire life. Is that possible? If so,
 isn't it essentially the same as suicide? Or if it's not possible, where
 is the dividing line between the amount of memory erasure that is and
 is not possible?

 I agree, complete memory erasure is essentially the same as suicide.
 Therefore, you cannot experience complete memory erasure if QTI is true.
The
 dividing line between the amount of memory erasure that is and is not
 possible is a problem in the philosophy of personal identity: how much
 you can change and still be you. The MWI predicts that every possible
 variation on your mind will exist in some world, and although you can get
 into complex discussions about amnesia, delusions etc., a simple answer
 might be, those versions which think they are you, are in fact you.

 --Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Implications of MWI

2005-05-01 Thread Saibal Mitra
The MWI made me take the idea of multiple universes/multiple realities
serious. When I joined this list I believed that quantum suicide could work,
but I later found out that it cannot possibly work. I now believe that there
exists an ensemble of all possible mathematical models/descriptions/computer
programs. These things exist in a mathematical sense. For this idea to work
(to yield predictions that are consistent with the known laws of physics)
one has to assume that there exists a measure that prefers simple programs
over complex programs.


Saibal



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- Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
Van: Mark Fancey [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Aan: everything-list@eskimo.com
Verzonden: Wednesday, April 27, 2005 04:36 PM
Onderwerp: Implications of MWI


 Did accepting and understanding the MWI drastically alter your
 philosophical worldview? If so, how?

 I cannot answer this question myself because I do not truly understand
 many parts of it.

 Thanks

 -- 
 Mark Fancey
 Anti-Bushite  Bullshite




Re: Memory erasure

2005-05-01 Thread Saibal Mitra

- Oorspronkelijk bericht - 
Van: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Aan: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
CC: everything-list@eskimo.com
Verzonden: Sunday, May 01, 2005 07:30 PM
Onderwerp: Re: Memory erasure


 You can turn this whole chain of logic around and make it an argument
 against QS. Sleep proves that loss of consciousness is possible,
 and that memory erasure is possible. Imagine memory erasure becoming
 so complete that it erases your entire life. Is that possible? If so,
 isn't it essentially the same as suicide? Or if it's not possible, where
 is the dividing line between the amount of memory erasure that is and
 is not possible?

Complete memory erasure is probably the same as suicide. You can imagine
deleting almost all of your memory, storing it on some machine. Before the
procedure you leave a note to yourself explaining how to retrieve your
memory.

When you read the note, you are identical to all your versions who have
decided to do the same thing. If you then load the data back in your memory
you could thus end up in any of these branches in which you decided to do
this.


Perhaps this happens all the time to us when we forget something and then
later remember it or look it up...


Saibal



Quantum Behavior of Deterministic Systems with Information Loss. Path Integral Approach

2005-04-27 Thread Saibal Mitra



http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0504200



Quantum Behavior of Deterministic Systems with Information Loss. Path 
Integral ApproachAuthors: M. 
Blasone, P. Jizba, 
H. 
KleinertComments: 11 pages, RevTeXSubj-class: Quantum 
Physics; Mathematical Physics
't Hooft's derivation of quantum from classical physics is 
  analyzed by means of the classical path integral of Gozzi et al.. It is shown 
  how the key element of this procedure - the loss of information constraint - 
  can be implemented by means of Faddeev-Jackiw's treatment of constrained 
  systems. It is argued that the emergent quantum systems are identical with 
  systems obtained in [quant-ph/0409021] through 
  Dirac-Bergmann's analysis. We illustrate our approach with two simple examples 
  - free particle and linear harmonic oscillator. Potential Liouville anomalies 
  are shown to be absent. 

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