Saibal Mitra:
> ... a so-called mirror world could exist. Nature would then be
> symmetric under parity. Their so-called exact parity model predicts
> the existence of so-called ''mirror matter''. Each particle is
> postulated to have a mirror partner with similar properties (they
> behave exact
Joel:
... But there MAY be some reasons to want to know exactly which
algorithm is really being run on the bottom...
Bruno:
I am not sure there is any (absolute) bottom.
Joel:
Mustn't we assume there is?
If there is no bottom, what will we stand on?
How can we understand anything at all?
I wro
Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> From the dim recesses of my memory, "the set of all sets" is a
> logical contradiction, although I can't remember why. Is the
> plenitude like the "set of all sets" in some way?
I think you remember "the set of all set that are not members of
themselves"
[EMAIL PROTECTED] to hpm
> [re. the existence of non-computable real-valued observers]
> That's a bit like saying there is some truth to 1+1=3 just because we
> can argue about it
[EMAIL PROTECTED] to GLevy
> [Re. Dubito ergo cogito]
> Many things are doubtful. 2+2=4 isn&#x
[EMAIL PROTECTED]:
> Check out analytic TMs (Hotz, Vierke and Schieffer,
> 1995) and R-Machines (Blum, Shub, Smale, 1989):
> http://rapa.idsia.ch/~juergen/toesv2/node47.html The alphabet of such TMs
> is indeed real-valued instead of binary. This is beyond constructivism
> though. GTMs are at
"Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> [re: rock is a good implementation of any computation]
> It depends what you mean by "good implementation." The context of my
> comment above was, *if* you believe there is a single true set of
> psychophysical laws, are the laws likely to be defined in term
[EMAIL PROTECTED]:
> This constructive notion of formal describability is less restrictive
> than the traditional notion of computability, mainly because we do not
> insist on the existence of a halting program that computes an upper
> bound of the convergence time of p's n-th output bit. Formal
[EMAIL PROTECTED]:
> Nobody will ever be able to fully describe anything that is not
> computable in the limit by a general Turing Machine.
It hasn't been proven that Turing computability is ultimate in
computability, only its equivalence to other proposed models of
computability with finite des
George Levy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> The Humongous Table is just consciousness by proxy. I have nothing
> against tables, mind you :-) . Let's not forget that this table (or
> the interpreter that converts this table into meaning) did not occur
> by accident. Either someone programmed it or it ev
hpm:
> In this way of looking at the setup, the intelligence and
> consciousness of the AI reside soley in the counting clock. The
> Humongous table is simply a translation device that maps the clock's
> representation to your representation.
John Regehr <[EMAIL PROTECTED
"Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> There's some ambiguity in your use of the word "interpretation"
> here. In "Robot" you argue that a physical system can be seen as
> implementing any possible computation under the right mapping, so
> that an "interpretation" might be just another word for
"Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> helpfully wrote:
> ... it's useful to differentiate between 3 different positions:
>
> 1. Consciousness is not "real"--our decision to call a system
> "conscious" or not is based only on subjective aesthetic criteria,
> like "cuteness" (Daniel Dennett's example
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