On 01 Sep 2014, at 14:58, Pierz wrote:
What is bizarre about John's objections is that it, if he really
can't accept FPI, then he can't accept MWI either,
Yes, that points has been made clear, many times, by Quentin and others.
yet that theory is perfectly straightforward and clear,
On 01 Sep 2014, at 18:58, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Sep 1, 2014 at 8:58 AM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
What is bizarre about John's objections is that it, if he really
can't accept FPI,[...]
Despite what Bruno says I would maintain there is not one single
person on planet Earth
On 2 September 2014 04:58, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Mon, Sep 1, 2014 at 8:58 AM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
What is bizarre about John's objections is that it, if he really can't
accept FPI,[...]
Despite what Bruno says I would maintain there is not one single person
What is bizarre about John's objections is that it, if he really can't
accept FPI, then he can't accept MWI either, yet that theory is perfectly
straightforward and clear, and, at least if the informal straw poll cited
in Tegmark's recent book is anything to be believed, possibly the dominant
On Mon, Sep 1, 2014 at 8:58 AM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
What is bizarre about John's objections is that it, if he really can't
accept FPI,[...]
Despite what Bruno says I would maintain there is not one single person on
planet Earth that is confused by the difference between the first
On Mon, Sep 1, 2014 at 6:58 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Mon, Sep 1, 2014 at 8:58 AM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
No, but John is going to contend that comp is scientific baby talk.
You really should get out of the habit of using it because if you say it
anywhere else
On Tuesday, September 2, 2014 2:58:53 AM UTC+10, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Sep 1, 2014 at 8:58 AM, Pierz pie...@gmail.com javascript:
wrote:
What is bizarre about John's objections is that it, if he really can't
accept FPI,[...]
Despite what Bruno says I would maintain there is not
On 24 Aug 2014, at 03:59, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Aug 23, 2014 at 1:29 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
By definition you accept computationalism, as you accept yes
doctor + Church thesis.
Yes, although I can't prove it I think the chances that
computationalism is true is
On 22 Aug 2014, at 19:42, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/22/2014 4:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Aug 2014, at 04:18, Pierz wrote:
On Wednesday, August 20, 2014 6:04:44 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
Sorry for being again a bit out of phase.
On 18 Aug 2014, at 15:15, Pierz wrote:
What
On 22 Aug 2014, at 19:49, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 6:07 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Who cares, I don't give a hoot in hell about comp.
By definition you believe in comp,
If you say so, I guess you should know as you invented the word, so
I guess the
On 22 Aug 2014, at 21:35, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/22/2014 11:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Aug 2014, at 18:43, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/22/2014 2:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Aug 2014, at 18:33, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/21/2014 12:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
They could be the ur-stuff of
On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 3:47 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But entropy is relative constraints, in this case coarse graining.
Yes, entropy is the logarithm of the number of microstates that produce the
same macrostate times a constant; so the entropy of a square foot of steam
is
On 8/23/2014 4:58 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 3:47 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But entropy is relative constraints, in this case coarse graining.
Yes, entropy is the logarithm of the number of microstates that produce the same
On Sat, Aug 23, 2014 at 1:29 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
By definition you accept computationalism, as you accept yes doctor +
Church thesis.
Yes, although I can't prove it I think the chances that computationalism is
true is about the same as the probability that I am not the
On 21 Aug 2014, at 18:33, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/21/2014 12:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
They could be the ur-stuff of a TOE. Bruno says they're not stuff
- but then I don't think stuff is any better defined that
primitive physical.
Primitive means assumed necessarily in the TOE. With comp
On 21 Aug 2014, at 21:38, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Aug 21, 2014 at 3:44 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
intelligence and consciousness would need to be unrelated for a
smart zombie to exist, but if that were the case then Evolution
could never have produced a conscious
On 22 Aug 2014, at 04:18, Pierz wrote:
On Wednesday, August 20, 2014 6:04:44 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Sorry for being again a bit out of phase.
On 18 Aug 2014, at 15:15, Pierz wrote:
What I mean is, your formulation, the words you use, add a certain
numinous quality to the
On Thu, Aug 21, 2014 at 7:19 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
Yes but it's not always obvious what is physically possible and what is
not. Is it physically possible that Germany could have won the second world
war? Yes. Is it physically possible that 2+2=5 ? No. Is it physically
possible
On 8/22/2014 2:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Aug 2014, at 18:33, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/21/2014 12:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
They could be the ur-stuff of a TOE. Bruno says they're not stuff - but then I don't
think stuff is any better defined that primitive physical.
Primitive means
On 8/22/2014 7:17 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Aug 21, 2014 at 7:19 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com
mailto:lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
Yes but it's not always obvious what is physically possible and what
is not.
Is it physically possible that Germany could have won the second world
On 8/22/2014 4:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Aug 2014, at 04:18, Pierz wrote:
On Wednesday, August 20, 2014 6:04:44 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Sorry for being again a bit out of phase.
On 18 Aug 2014, at 15:15, Pierz wrote:
What I mean is, your formulation,
On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 6:07 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Who cares, I don't give a hoot in hell about comp.
By definition you believe in comp,
If you say so, I guess you should know as you invented the word, so I guess
the definition of comp is the stuff that John Clark
On 22 Aug 2014, at 18:43, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/22/2014 2:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Aug 2014, at 18:33, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/21/2014 12:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
They could be the ur-stuff of a TOE. Bruno says they're not
stuff - but then I don't think stuff is any better
On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 1:27 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
The second law is only approximately true for finite systems (in either
time or space). Globally it's a tautology: the arrow-of-physical-time
points in the direction of increasing entropy, whichever way you chose
On 8/22/2014 11:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Aug 2014, at 18:43, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/22/2014 2:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Aug 2014, at 18:33, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/21/2014 12:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
They could be the ur-stuff of a TOE. Bruno says they're not stuff - but
On 8/22/2014 11:48 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 1:27 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
The second law is only approximately true for finite systems (in either
time or
space). Globally it's a tautology: the arrow-of-physical-time
On 20 Aug 2014, at 15:42, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno,
Could you explain again why a measure is needed in Everettian Many
World Theories?
To justify the probability used with the Born Rule (asssuming the SWE,
QM)
In comp, we don't assume QM, but we need a measure to justify the
On 20 Aug 2014, at 17:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/20/2014 5:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Aug 2014, at 20:11, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/18/2014 1:49 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Monday, August 18, 2014 5:33:19 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 8/17/2014 5:43 AM, Pierz wrote:
Thank you Bruno for your
On 20 Aug 2014, at 17:42, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/20/2014 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Aug 2014, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The laws will always assured the existence of computations in
which you survive, and have that quantum MW aspects, but
On 20 Aug 2014, at 18:55, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Aug 8, 2014 at 11:34 PM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
In The Conscious Mind, Chalmers bases his claim that materialism
has failed to provide an explanation for consciousness
It's not just materialism, a philosopher like Chambers would
On 21 Aug 2014, at 01:57, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/20/2014 4:00 PM, LizR wrote:
On 21 August 2014 04:55, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
There is nothing logically inconsistent about a fire breathing
dragon powered by a nuclear reactor in its belly, but that doesn't
prove that such an
On 21 Aug 2014, at 02:50, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 08:30:56AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/20/2014 5:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
2) invariant for all choice of TOE rich enough to define a
universal machine
I'm not sure what is meant by choice of TOE. Who is doing
Bruno: We assume comp, which requires consciousness by definition.
Richard: I sure did miss that part. I presumed that consciousness required
life. Could you explain a bit why comp requires consciousness with or
without life? I do not even understand how something can be required by
definition.
Surely, it's because computationalism is a theory of the mind... Don't you
think?
Le 21 août 2014 11:52, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com a écrit :
Bruno: We assume comp, which requires consciousness by definition.
Richard: I sure did miss that part. I presumed that consciousness required
On 21 Aug 2014, at 11:52, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno: We assume comp, which requires consciousness by definition.
Richard: I sure did miss that part. I presumed that consciousness
required life. Could you explain a bit why comp requires
consciousness with or without life? I do not even
On 8/21/2014 12:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
They could be the ur-stuff of a TOE. Bruno says they're not stuff - but then I don't
think stuff is any better defined that primitive physical.
Primitive means assumed necessarily in the TOE. With comp we don't assume particles, or
space, or time,
On Thu, Aug 21, 2014 at 3:44 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
intelligence and consciousness would need to be unrelated for a smart
zombie to exist, but if that were the case then Evolution could never have
produced a conscious being and yet I know for a fact that it did as least
On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 7:00 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
There is nothing logically inconsistent about a fire breathing dragon
powered by a nuclear reactor in its belly, but that doesn't prove that such
an animal actually exists.
Unless you believe that QM necessarily entails a
On 22 August 2014 08:00, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 7:00 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
There is nothing logically inconsistent about a fire breathing dragon
powered by a nuclear reactor in its belly, but that doesn't prove that such
an animal actually
On Thursday, August 21, 2014 9:00:39 AM UTC+10, Liz R wrote:
On 21 August 2014 04:55, John Clark johnk...@gmail.com javascript:
wrote:
There is nothing logically inconsistent about a fire breathing dragon
powered by a nuclear reactor in its belly, but that doesn't prove that such
an
On Wednesday, August 20, 2014 6:04:44 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Sorry for being again a bit out of phase.
On 18 Aug 2014, at 15:15, Pierz wrote:
On Monday, August 18, 2014 9:19:32 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Aug 2014, at 14:43, Pierz wrote:
Thank you Bruno for your
On 18 Aug 2014, at 20:11, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/18/2014 1:49 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Monday, August 18, 2014 5:33:19 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 8/17/2014 5:43 AM, Pierz wrote:
Thank you Bruno for your response. Honestly I don't know if I'd
say yes to the doctor.
It's cowardly of me, but I
On 18 Aug 2014, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The laws will always assured the existence of computations in which
you survive, and have that quantum MW aspects, but in some
consciousness state we might live some phase transition between
different
On 19 Aug 2014, at 03:37, John Mikes wrote:
On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The laws will always assured the existence of computations in which
you survive, and have that quantum MW aspects, but in some
consciousness state we might live some phase transition between
different
On 18 Aug 2014, at 20:11, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/18/2014 1:49 AM, Pierz wrote:
Ah no, I'm not mistaking the map for the territory. I don't know
why you say that. I'm saying the territory is infinite in all
directions (according to my guess), but our maps are finite and so
have to have
Bruno,
Could you explain again why a measure is needed in Everettian Many World
Theories?
Your 1p observer requirement for measure suggests that the physical came
from life.
I have asked you this before and your response is that the universe would
still evolve
but weakly, whatever that means, in
On 20 Aug 2014, at 02:53, David Nyman wrote:
On 19 August 2014 21:35, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I can agree. But it is not entirely, as I suspect you might prefer,
a reversal between 3p reality and 1p reality, as we continue to have
a big 3p reality: the arithmetical reality
On 20 Aug 2014, at 07:08, Kim Jones wrote:
On 18 Aug 2014, at 5:33 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Is there a kind of soul that is independent of memory but is a
person?
Well, you'd want to hope so by now, surely. After all, if there
isn't, then What's It All (been)
On 8/20/2014 5:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Aug 2014, at 20:11, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/18/2014 1:49 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Monday, August 18, 2014 5:33:19 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 8/17/2014 5:43 AM, Pierz wrote:
Thank you Bruno for your response. Honestly I don't know if I'd
On 8/20/2014 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Aug 2014, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The laws will always assured the existence of computations in which you survive, and
have that quantum MW aspects, but in some consciousness state we might live
On Fri, Aug 8, 2014 at 11:34 PM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
In The Conscious Mind, Chalmers bases his claim that materialism has
failed to provide an explanation for consciousness
It's not just materialism, a philosopher like Chambers would not be
satisfied with any explanation of the
On 21 August 2014 04:55, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
Chambers believes that if philosophers can conceive of something then it
must be logically possible, and Chambers can conceive of a smart zombie,
but young children can conceive that 2+2 = 5.
And that objects cease to exist when
On 21 August 2014 04:55, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
There is nothing logically inconsistent about a fire breathing dragon
powered by a nuclear reactor in its belly, but that doesn't prove that such
an animal actually exists.
Unless you believe that QM necessarily entails a
On 8/20/2014 3:49 PM, LizR wrote:
On 21 August 2014 04:55, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com
wrote:
Chambers believes that if philosophers can conceive of something then it
must be
logically possible, and Chambers can conceive of a smart zombie, but young
On 8/20/2014 4:00 PM, LizR wrote:
On 21 August 2014 04:55, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com
wrote:
There is nothing logically inconsistent about a fire breathing dragon
powered by a
nuclear reactor in its belly, but that doesn't prove that such an animal
On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 08:30:56AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/20/2014 5:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
2) invariant for all choice of TOE rich enough to define a universal
machine
I'm not sure what is meant by choice of TOE. Who is doing the
choosing? Under comp we've already assumed a
On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 09:42:22AM -0400, Richard Ruquist wrote:
The requirement for observers in my mind makes comp equivalent to the
Copenhagen Interpretation CI
in the need for conscious observers and is falsified along with CI for that
reason.
Richard
I don't see this. 1p
Is IIUC If I Understand Correctly ? (IIUC?)
On 21 August 2014 13:06, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 09:42:22AM -0400, Richard Ruquist wrote:
The requirement for observers in my mind makes comp equivalent to the
Copenhagen Interpretation CI
in the
(I don't see why comp is equivalent to the CI, mind you. Or what the
requirement for observers in my mind means...)
On 21 August 2014 13:16, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
Is IIUC If I Understand Correctly ? (IIUC?)
On 21 August 2014 13:06, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
On
On 21 August 2014 11:57, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 8/20/2014 4:00 PM, LizR wrote:
On 21 August 2014 04:55, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
There is nothing logically inconsistent about a fire breathing dragon
powered by a nuclear reactor in its belly, but that
PS Fire breathing dragoons http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dragoon indeed!
Tres amusant.
On 21 August 2014 13:24, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 21 August 2014 11:57, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 8/20/2014 4:00 PM, LizR wrote:
On 21 August 2014 04:55, John Clark
On Tuesday, August 19, 2014 5:00:10 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 8/18/2014 4:38 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Saturday, August 9, 2014 2:48:48 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 8/8/2014 8:34 PM, Pierz wrote:
In The Conscious Mind, Chalmers bases his claim that materialism has
failed to provide
On Tuesday, August 19, 2014 4:12:17 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 8/18/2014 1:49 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Monday, August 18, 2014 5:33:19 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 8/17/2014 5:43 AM, Pierz wrote:
Thank you Bruno for your response. Honestly I don't know if I'd say yes
to the doctor.
On 8/19/2014 2:53 AM, Pierz wrote:
If you're going to stick with this argument you need to be more rigorous
about it
and not just lazily rely on your intuition. How specifically does the
computer
distinguish computation about something from computation about ... what?
nothing?
On 18 Aug 2014, at 10:49, Pierz wrote:
On Monday, August 18, 2014 5:33:19 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 8/17/2014 5:43 AM, Pierz wrote:
Thank you Bruno for your response. Honestly I don't know if I'd
say yes to the doctor.
It's cowardly of me, but I think I'd like to see the device work
Sorry for being again a bit out of phase.
On 18 Aug 2014, at 15:15, Pierz wrote:
On Monday, August 18, 2014 9:19:32 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Aug 2014, at 14:43, Pierz wrote:
Thank you Bruno for your response. Honestly I don't know if I'd say
yes to the doctor.
Nor do I.
On 18 Aug 2014, at 15:17, David Nyman wrote:
On 18 August 2014 12:19, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Then the arithmetical realism suggests the existence of
approximation of physical realities, without observers. The falling
leaf will make a sound (a 3p wave), but of course,
On 19 August 2014 21:35, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I can agree. But it is not entirely, as I suspect you might prefer, a
reversal between 3p reality and 1p reality, as we continue to have a big 3p
reality: the arithmetical reality which contains computer science and the
machine's
On 20 August 2014 12:53, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
In this vein I offer the well-known limerick of Ronald Knox:
There was a young man who said God
Must find it exceedingly odd
To think that the tree
Should continue to be
When there's no one about in the quad.
Reply:
Dear
On 8/19/2014 5:53 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 19 August 2014 21:35, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I can agree. But it is not entirely, as I suspect you might prefer, a
reversal
between 3p reality and 1p reality, as we continue to have a big 3p reality:
On 18 Aug 2014, at 5:33 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Is there a kind of soul that is independent of memory but is a person?
Well, you'd want to hope so by now, surely. After all, if there isn't, then
What's It All (been) About, Alfie?
No cul-de-sacs. Consciousness sails on
On Monday, August 18, 2014 5:33:19 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 8/17/2014 5:43 AM, Pierz wrote:
Thank you Bruno for your response. Honestly I don't know if I'd say yes
to the doctor.
It's cowardly of me, but I think I'd like to see the device work on
someone else first.
If they
On 17 Aug 2014, at 14:43, Pierz wrote:
Thank you Bruno for your response. Honestly I don't know if I'd say
yes to the doctor.
Nor do I.
Actually, even if comp is true, I might say no, because I might not
trust the doctor's skill, or the choice of the level.
It's cowardly of me, but I
On Saturday, August 9, 2014 2:48:48 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 8/8/2014 8:34 PM, Pierz wrote:
In The Conscious Mind, Chalmers bases his claim that materialism has
failed to provide an explanation for consciousness on a distinction between
'logical' and 'natural' supervenience, where
On Monday, August 18, 2014 9:19:32 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Aug 2014, at 14:43, Pierz wrote:
Thank you Bruno for your response. Honestly I don't know if I'd say yes to
the doctor.
Nor do I.
Actually, even if comp is true, I might say no, because I might not
trust the
On 18 August 2014 12:19, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Then the arithmetical realism suggests the existence of approximation of
physical realities, without observers. The falling leaf will make a sound
(a 3p wave), but of course, without observers, there will be no perception
or
On 18 August 2014 14:15, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
OK that may be true, but without an observer, nothing will exist to select
out that computation from the chaotic infinities. I don't know how you can
say that the leaf meaningfully exists, because other computational threads
will destroy
On 8/18/2014 1:49 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Monday, August 18, 2014 5:33:19 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 8/17/2014 5:43 AM, Pierz wrote:
Thank you Bruno for your response. Honestly I don't know if I'd say yes
to the
doctor.
It's cowardly of me, but I think I'd like to see the
On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The laws will always assured the existence of computations in which you survive, and
have that quantum MW aspects, but in some consciousness state we might live some phase
transition between different physical realms. Obviously, we cannot get a
On 8/18/2014 4:38 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Saturday, August 9, 2014 2:48:48 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 8/8/2014 8:34 PM, Pierz wrote:
In The Conscious Mind, Chalmers bases his claim that materialism has
failed to
provide an explanation for consciousness on a distinction between
On 19 August 2014 06:59, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
You're trying to isolate the consciousness from it's context so that it's
just data and patterns and 1s and 0s and neuron pulses. I'm saying
consciousness requires a context, in fact I think it requires a physics.
This is, I
On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The laws will always assured the existence of computations in which you
survive, and have that quantum MW aspects, but in some consciousness state
we might live some phase transition between different physical realms.
Obviously, we cannot get a physical
Thank you Bruno for your response. Honestly I don't know if I'd say yes to
the doctor. It's cowardly of me, but I think I'd like to see the device
work on someone else first. If they appear to be fine after the operation
then I guess I'll go under the knife - and have to swallow the logical
On 8/17/2014 5:43 AM, Pierz wrote:
Thank you Bruno for your response. Honestly I don't know if I'd say yes to the doctor.
It's cowardly of me, but I think I'd like to see the device work on someone else first.
If they appear to be fine after the operation then I guess I'll go under the knife -
On Saturday, August 9, 2014, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
In The Conscious Mind, Chalmers bases his claim that materialism has
failed to provide an explanation for consciousness on a distinction between
'logical' and 'natural' supervenience, where logical supervenience simply
means that if
On 09 Aug 2014, at 05:34, Pierz wrote:
In The Conscious Mind, Chalmers bases his claim that materialism
has failed to provide an explanation for consciousness on a
distinction between 'logical' and 'natural' supervenience, where
logical supervenience simply means that if A supervenes on
On 09 Aug 2014, at 06:48, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/8/2014 8:34 PM, Pierz wrote:
In The Conscious Mind, Chalmers bases his claim that materialism
has failed to provide an explanation for consciousness on a
distinction between 'logical' and 'natural' supervenience, where
logical supervenience
In The Conscious Mind, Chalmers bases his claim that materialism has
failed to provide an explanation for consciousness on a distinction between
'logical' and 'natural' supervenience, where logical supervenience simply
means that if A supervenes on B, then B logically and necessarily entails
On 8/8/2014 8:34 PM, Pierz wrote:
In The Conscious Mind, Chalmers bases his claim that materialism has failed to provide
an explanation for consciousness on a distinction between 'logical' and 'natural'
supervenience, where logical supervenience simply means that if A supervenes on B, then
B
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