Roger, And you do not know the difference between a string particle
and a CYM monad particle. Let's stop with the insults. Richard
On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 5:27 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote:
Hi Richard Ruquist
You keep getting physical strings mixed up with theoretical strings.
And then you mix this up with monads.
Theoretical strings are not physical and monads are not physical.
Period. You'd do better to stick to straight materialism since
you seem to have no understranding of idealism.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/11/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Richard Ruquist
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-10, 15:52:29
Subject: Re: Re: more firewalls
Craig,
Neurons are made in accordance with physical laws.
You are confusing string theory with comp which apparently makes everything.
String theory monads are made in the big bang by having the excess
dimensions of the space of string theory curl up into 1000 planck
diameter particles that precipitate out of 3-D space. In fact they're
curling up is what allows 3-D space to inflate. As space is still
expanding, monads are apparently still being made.
The monads exist in what would be commonly called a supernatural realm.
They solve the hard problems of consciousness. Neurons do not. That is
why they are needed. But the fact is that according to string theory,
they (the monads) exist.
You can quibble with string theory if you like. In my models that
extend string theory to consciousness, string theory is assumed to be
correct, even if my modelling is incorrect.
All I claim is that my model is one possibility among many that
probably can never be proven.
Richard
On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 2:47 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 2:32:40 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
Craig,
The experiencers are the monads and the physical neurons..
I conjure experiencers because I have experiences.
But it appears that two kinds of experiencers are necessary.
The BEC just connects them. I do not care what you call that.
Names are not important.
Richard
I agree that the names aren't important, but why are there two different
unrelated kinds of experiences? Do the monads make the neurons, and if so,
why? Or do the neurons make monads, and again, why? If you have either one,
why have the other?
Craig
On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 1:45 PM, Craig Weinberg
wrote:
On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:47:47 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
Craig,
I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the
substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if
consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then
the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other.
So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism.
I understand what you are saying. Not to be a weenie, but just fyi I
think
that what you are describing would be technically categorized as
interactionism and/or parallelism, since substance dualism is supposed
to be
two unconnected substances - a brain that doesn't think and a mind that
doesn't...bleed?
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29)
Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory
monads..
For example take the binding problem where:
There are an almost infinite number of possible, different
objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single
neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each
one. (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf)
However, at a density of 10^90/cc
(from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space),
the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for
all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial
location
ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up:
http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html)
I think that you are still dealing with a mechanical model which only
tries
to account for the complexity of consciousness, not one which actually
suggests that such a model could have a reason to experience itself. The
hard problem is 'why is there any such thing as experience at all'?
So the monads and the neurons experience the same things
because of the BEC entanglement connection.
These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory
that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness
and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads
perhaps to solve the binding problem
and at least for computational support of physical consciousness.
This is more of a quantum method of closing the gap between physics and
neurophysiology, but it doesn't really suggest why that would result in
what
we experience. Like Orch-OR, I'm not opposed to the
