### Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

```
> On 26 Feb 2019, at 23:45, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 4:39:25 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
> On 2/26/2019 2:02 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 2:51:39 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 2/26/2019 11:00 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 12:43:49 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Right.  Truth and existence are quite different things.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> For those from the type theory, programming language theory, constructive
>>> mathematics (whatever that clumping of schools is called):
>>>
>>> Truth and existence are the same things.
>>
>> So do those infer the existence of 2 and 4 from truth of 2+2=4?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>> Formulate arithmetic as a logic program and enter the query:
>>
>>∃(X,Y):(X+X=Y)
>>
>> Then via backtracking it prints out:
>>
>> (X,Y) =
>>
>> (0,0)
>> (1,2)
>> (2,4)
>> ...
>>
>>
> Formulate theology as a logic program and enter the query:
>
>   E(x)[If P is a prefection, then Px]
>
> Then it prints out:
>
> x = Anslem's God.
>
> That's the great thing about logic. You can prove anything if you just the
> right axioms and rules of inference.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
> Automating Godel’s Ontological Proof of God’s Existence with Higher-order
> Automated Theorem Provers
> http://page.mi.fu-berlin.de/cbenzmueller/papers/C40.pdf

This illustrates only that we can “brainwash” machine, even machine which
reason in a valid way, by using absurd definitions or premise. That will not
convince Brent, I’m afraid. It is logically interesting though, and not
completely trivial, but hardly convincing as an argument of metaphysics. You
could as well say that infinity exists because ZF say so. It is not valid
argument. It is an argument per-authority, unless you make clear that you
assume the axioms of ZF.

Bruno

>
> - pt
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> .
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
> .
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
> .
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout
> .

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

```

### Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

```

> On 26 Feb 2019, at 19:43, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/26/2019 2:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 26 Feb 2019, at 01:04, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 2/25/2019 8:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Fictionalism does not apply to the arithmetical reality, nor to physics,
but to the naïve idea of a “physical universe” as being the fundamental
reality. The theology of the universal machine is a priori quite non
Aristotelian: there is no Creator, and there is no Creation. Just a
universal dreamer which lost itself in an infinitely surprising structure
and wake up from time to time, or from numbers to numbers.
>>> There is according to St Anselm, who also thought that definitions bring
>>> things into existence.
>>
>> Yes, but God is defined by being perfect, and existence is considered as
>> being good, and better than non existence. So, of course, God has to exists.
>> Then Gödel made St-Anselmes more rigorous, by making that proof in the modal
>> logic S5, which unfortunately presuppose a metaphysics incompatible with
>> Mechanism.
>> Such notions of God are quite away from Plato, and makes sense with
>> physicalism, and not much sense with Mechanism, where the notion of
>> “fundamental truth" is the closer notion to the God of Plato. There is an
>> understanding that such a notion of “fundamental truth”, at the origin of
>> all types of truth, is transcendant, and this fits very well with the
>> theology (G*) of the sound machines.
>
> Right.  Truth and existence are quite different things.

Absolutely. And there are many sort of existence, even if we postulate only one
“universal truth”.

With mechanism, it is absolutely undecidable if there is anything more than the
sigma_1 truth (which gives already the universal dovetailing on all
computations, and thus of all dreaming digital machines.

Then many sort of phenomenological existence are imposed by incompleteness. The
absolute existence can be defined by the absolute truth of existential (not
necessarily sigma_1) formula, like Ex(x is a prime number), or Ex(x is a
halting computation), etc.

Most interesting notion of existence, like the psychological existence (or pain
and suffering for example), or the material existence are explained in therm of
the modal nuances enforced by incompleteness. Physical existence becomes
something like []<>(Ex([]<>P(x)), with the box [] being the one of Z1*, X1*, or
S4Grz1*.

It is the advantage of the Digital Mechanist hypothesis. It might be wrong, but
it is mathematically precise, and physically testable.

Bruno

>
> Brent
>
>>
>> Only strong-atheists believe in the God of the (Roman) Christians. Educated
>> christians usually does not, although they fake it since 529 (due to
>> violence and authoritative argument only).
>>
>> Of course, no argument at all can prove any existence, but all experiences
>> makes some existence true, although not in a rationally justified way.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> Brent
>>>
I need no more than a partial applicative algebra, and each choice of the
phi_i makes N into one, simply by defining an operation “*” in N such that
n * m = phi_n(m). There exist numbers k and s such that

((k * n) * m) = n
(((s * n) * m) * r) = (n * r) * (m * r),

for all m, n, r in N.

And, the key point, the operation “*” can be defined in the arithmetical
language, and those statements are, for each n, m, r, provable in RA. I
have shown that the converse is true. It is a very elegant Turing complete
theory. With Indexical Digital Mechanism, it is absolutely undecidable if
the Universe is bigger than the sigma_1 reality. (But here I do a
blasphemy: that can only be entirely justified by G* *only*!, It is where
I have to insist that this is presented as a consequence of YD + CT (“yes
doctor” + Church-Turing thesis).

Such theories are essentially undecidable. It means that not only they are
arithmetically incomplete, but all their effective consistent extensions
are too. They are creative, you cannot capture the semantic in the way it
could become complete, even in some imaginary domain concevable by the
machine/theory/number. The universal machine are never entirely satisfied
and a computation is always an escape forward, but their self-reflection
create a mess, and illusions.

The sigma_1 arithmetical reality, as seen by the universal numbers which
lives there, in the first person undetermined sense, is something *very
big*. It generates infinitely many surprises. There are consistent
histories.

>>> --
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>>> "Everything List" group.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
```

### Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

```

On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 4:39:25 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/26/2019 2:02 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 2:51:39 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 2/26/2019 11:00 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 12:43:49 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Right.  Truth and existence are quite different things.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> For those from the type theory, programming language theory, constructive
>> mathematics (whatever that clumping of schools is called):
>>
>> Truth and existence are the same things.
>>
>>
>> So do those infer the existence of 2 and 4 from truth of 2+2=4?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> Formulate arithmetic as a logic program and enter the query:
>
>∃(X,Y):(X+X=Y)
>
> Then via backtracking it prints out:
>
> (X,Y) =
>
> (0,0)
> (1,2)
> (2,4)
> ...
>
>
> Formulate theology as a logic program and enter the query:
>
>   E(x)[If P is a prefection, then Px]
>
> Then it prints out:
>
> x = Anslem's God.
>
> That's the great thing about logic. You can prove anything if you just the
> right axioms and rules of inference.
>
> Brent
>

*Automating Godel’s Ontological Proof of God’s Existence with Higher-order
Automated Theorem Provers*
http://page.mi.fu-berlin.de/cbenzmueller/papers/C40.pdf

- pt

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

```

### Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

```

On 2/26/2019 2:02 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 2:51:39 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

On 2/26/2019 11:00 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 12:43:49 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

Right.  Truth and existence are quite different things.

Brent

For those from the type theory, programming language theory,
constructive mathematics (whatever that clumping of schools is
called):

Truth and existence are the same things.

So do those infer the existence of 2 and 4 from truth of 2+2=4?

Brent

Formulate arithmetic as a logic program and enter the query:

∃(X,Y):(X+X=Y)

Then via backtracking it prints out:

(X,Y) =

(0,0)
(1,2)
(2,4)
...

Formulate theology as a logic program and enter the query:

E(x)[If P is a prefection, then Px]

Then it prints out:

x = Anslem's God.

That's the great thing about logic. You can prove anything if you just
the right axioms and rules of inference.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

```

### Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

```

On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 2:51:39 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/26/2019 11:00 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 12:43:49 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Right.  Truth and existence are quite different things.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
> For those from the type theory, programming language theory, constructive
> mathematics (whatever that clumping of schools is called):
>
> Truth and existence are the same things.
>
>
> So do those infer the existence of 2 and 4 from truth of 2+2=4?
>
> Brent
>

Formulate arithmetic as a logic program and enter the query:

∃(X,Y):(X+X=Y)

Then via backtracking it prints out:

(X,Y) =

(0,0)
(1,2)
(2,4)
...

- pt

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

```

### Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

```

On 2/26/2019 11:00 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 12:43:49 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

Right.  Truth and existence are quite different things.

Brent

For those from the type theory, programming language theory,
constructive mathematics (whatever that clumping of schools is called):

Truth and existence are the same things.

So do those infer the existence of 2 and 4 from truth of 2+2=4?

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

```

### Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

```

On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 12:43:49 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> Right.  Truth and existence are quite different things.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
For those from the type theory, programming language theory, constructive
mathematics (whatever that clumping of schools is called):

Truth and existence are the same things.

- pt

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

```

### Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

```

On 2/26/2019 2:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Feb 2019, at 01:04, Brent Meeker  wrote:

On 2/25/2019 8:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Fictionalism does not apply to the arithmetical reality, nor to physics, but to
the naïve idea of a “physical universe” as being the fundamental reality. The
theology of the universal machine is a priori quite non Aristotelian: there is
no Creator, and there is no Creation. Just a universal dreamer which lost
itself in an infinitely surprising structure and wake up from time to time, or
from numbers to numbers.

There is according to St Anselm, who also thought that definitions bring things
into existence.

Yes, but God is defined by being perfect, and existence is considered as being
good, and better than non existence. So, of course, God has to exists. Then
Gödel made St-Anselmes more rigorous, by making that proof in the modal logic
S5, which unfortunately presuppose a metaphysics incompatible with Mechanism.
Such notions of God are quite away from Plato, and makes sense with physicalism, and
not much sense with Mechanism, where the notion of “fundamental truth" is the
closer notion to the God of Plato. There is an understanding that such a notion of
“fundamental truth”, at the origin of all types of truth, is transcendant, and this
fits very well with the theology (G*) of the sound machines.

Right.  Truth and existence are quite different things.

Brent

Only strong-atheists believe in the God of the (Roman) Christians. Educated
christians usually does not, although they fake it since 529 (due to violence
and authoritative argument only).

Of course, no argument at all can prove any existence, but all experiences
makes some existence true, although not in a rationally justified way.

Bruno

Brent

I need no more than a partial applicative algebra, and each choice of the phi_i
makes N into one, simply by defining an operation “*” in N such that n * m =
phi_n(m). There exist numbers k and s such that

((k * n) * m) = n
(((s * n) * m) * r) = (n * r) * (m * r),

for all m, n, r in N.

And, the key point, the operation “*” can be defined in the arithmetical
language, and those statements are, for each n, m, r, provable in RA. I have
shown that the converse is true. It is a very elegant Turing complete theory.
With Indexical Digital Mechanism, it is absolutely undecidable if the Universe
is bigger than the sigma_1 reality. (But here I do a blasphemy: that can only
be entirely justified by G* *only*!, It is where I have to insist that this is
presented as a consequence of YD + CT (“yes doctor” + Church-Turing thesis).

Such theories are essentially undecidable. It means that not only they are
arithmetically incomplete, but all their effective consistent extensions are
too. They are creative, you cannot capture the semantic in the way it could
become complete, even in some imaginary domain concevable by the
machine/theory/number. The universal machine are never entirely satisfied and a
computation is always an escape forward, but their self-reflection create a
mess, and illusions.

The sigma_1 arithmetical reality, as seen by the universal numbers which lives
there, in the first person undetermined sense, is something *very big*. It
generates infinitely many surprises. There are consistent histories.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

```

### Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

```

> On 26 Feb 2019, at 01:04, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/25/2019 8:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Fictionalism does not apply to the arithmetical reality, nor to physics, but
>> to the naïve idea of a “physical universe” as being the fundamental reality.
>> The theology of the universal machine is a priori quite non Aristotelian:
>> there is no Creator, and there is no Creation. Just a universal dreamer
>> which lost itself in an infinitely surprising structure and wake up from
>> time to time, or from numbers to numbers.
>
> There is according to St Anselm, who also thought that definitions bring
> things into existence.

Yes, but God is defined by being perfect, and existence is considered as being
good, and better than non existence. So, of course, God has to exists. Then
Gödel made St-Anselmes more rigorous, by making that proof in the modal logic
S5, which unfortunately presuppose a metaphysics incompatible with Mechanism.
Such notions of God are quite away from Plato, and makes sense with
physicalism, and not much sense with Mechanism, where the notion of
“fundamental truth" is the closer notion to the God of Plato. There is an
understanding that such a notion of “fundamental truth”, at the origin of all
types of truth, is transcendant, and this fits very well with the theology (G*)
of the sound machines.

Only strong-atheists believe in the God of the (Roman) Christians. Educated
christians usually does not, although they fake it since 529 (due to violence
and authoritative argument only).

Of course, no argument at all can prove any existence, but all experiences
makes some existence true, although not in a rationally justified way.

Bruno

>
> Brent
>
>>
>> I need no more than a partial applicative algebra, and each choice of the
>> phi_i makes N into one, simply by defining an operation “*” in N such that n
>> * m = phi_n(m). There exist numbers k and s such that
>>
>> ((k * n) * m) = n
>> (((s * n) * m) * r) = (n * r) * (m * r),
>>
>> for all m, n, r in N.
>>
>> And, the key point, the operation “*” can be defined in the arithmetical
>> language, and those statements are, for each n, m, r, provable in RA. I have
>> shown that the converse is true. It is a very elegant Turing complete
>> theory. With Indexical Digital Mechanism, it is absolutely undecidable if
>> the Universe is bigger than the sigma_1 reality. (But here I do a blasphemy:
>> that can only be entirely justified by G* *only*!, It is where I have to
>> insist that this is presented as a consequence of YD + CT (“yes doctor” +
>> Church-Turing thesis).
>>
>> Such theories are essentially undecidable. It means that not only they are
>> arithmetically incomplete, but all their effective consistent extensions are
>> too. They are creative, you cannot capture the semantic in the way it could
>> become complete, even in some imaginary domain concevable by the
>> machine/theory/number. The universal machine are never entirely satisfied
>> and a computation is always an escape forward, but their self-reflection
>> create a mess, and illusions.
>>
>> The sigma_1 arithmetical reality, as seen by the universal numbers which
>> lives there, in the first person undetermined sense, is something *very
>> big*. It generates infinitely many surprises. There are consistent histories.
>>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

```

### Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

```

On Monday, February 25, 2019 at 6:04:28 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/25/2019 8:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > Fictionalism does not apply to the arithmetical reality, nor to
> > physics, but to the naïve idea of a “physical universe” as being the
> > fundamental reality. The theology of the universal machine is a priori
> > quite non Aristotelian: there is no Creator, and there is no Creation.
> > Just a universal dreamer which lost itself in an infinitely surprising
> > structure and wake up from time to time, or from numbers to numbers.
>
> There is according to St Anselm, who also thought that definitions bring
> things into existence.
>
> Brent
>

Anselm would work for DC Films or Marvel Studios today.

- pt

> >
> > I need no more than a partial applicative algebra, and each choice of
> > the phi_i makes N into one, simply by defining an operation “*” in N
> > such that n * m = phi_n(m). There exist numbers k and s such that
> >
> > ((k * n) * m) = n
> > (((s * n) * m) * r) = (n * r) * (m * r),
> >
> > for all m, n, r in N.
> >
> > And, the key point, the operation “*” can be defined in the
> > arithmetical language, and those statements are, for each n, m, r,
> > provable in RA. I have shown that the converse is true. It is a very
> > elegant Turing complete theory. With Indexical Digital Mechanism, it
> > is absolutely undecidable if the Universe is bigger than the sigma_1
> > reality. (But here I do a blasphemy: that can only be entirely
> > justified by G* *only*!, It is where I have to insist that this is
> > presented as a consequence of YD + CT (“yes doctor” + Church-Turing
> > thesis).
> >
> > Such theories are essentially undecidable. It means that not only they
> > are arithmetically incomplete, but all their effective consistent
> > extensions are too. They are creative, you cannot capture the semantic
> > in the way it could become complete, even in some imaginary domain
> > concevable by the machine/theory/number. The universal machine are
> > never entirely satisfied and a computation is always an escape
> > forward, but their self-reflection create a mess, and illusions.
> >
> > The sigma_1 arithmetical reality, as seen by the universal numbers
> > which lives there, in the first person undetermined sense, is
> > something *very big*. It generates infinitely many surprises. There
> > are consistent histories.
> >
>
>

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

```

### Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

```

On 2/25/2019 8:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Fictionalism does not apply to the arithmetical reality, nor to
physics, but to the naïve idea of a “physical universe” as being the
fundamental reality. The theology of the universal machine is a priori
quite non Aristotelian: there is no Creator, and there is no Creation.
Just a universal dreamer which lost itself in an infinitely surprising
structure and wake up from time to time, or from numbers to numbers.

There is according to St Anselm, who also thought that definitions bring
things into existence.

Brent

I need no more than a partial applicative algebra, and each choice of
the phi_i makes N into one, simply by defining an operation “*” in N
such that n * m = phi_n(m). There exist numbers k and s such that

((k * n) * m) = n
(((s * n) * m) * r) = (n * r) * (m * r),

for all m, n, r in N.

And, the key point, the operation “*” can be defined in the
arithmetical language, and those statements are, for each n, m, r,
provable in RA. I have shown that the converse is true. It is a very
elegant Turing complete theory. With Indexical Digital Mechanism, it
is absolutely undecidable if the Universe is bigger than the sigma_1
reality. (But here I do a blasphemy: that can only be entirely
justified by G* *only*!, It is where I have to insist that this is
presented as a consequence of YD + CT (“yes doctor” + Church-Turing
thesis).

Such theories are essentially undecidable. It means that not only they
are arithmetically incomplete, but all their effective consistent
extensions are too. They are creative, you cannot capture the semantic
in the way it could become complete, even in some imaginary domain
concevable by the machine/theory/number. The universal machine are
never entirely satisfied and a computation is always an escape
forward, but their self-reflection create a mess, and illusions.

The sigma_1 arithmetical reality, as seen by the universal numbers
which lives there, in the first person undetermined sense, is
something *very big*. It generates infinitely many surprises. There
are consistent histories.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

```

### Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

```
> On 25 Feb 2019, at 11:52, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 25, 2019 at 3:34:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 22 Feb 2019, at 18:44, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>> Some accept the possibility that there can be something that is immaterial.
>
> Yes. We call them “mathematician”.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> This recent thesis I came across
>
> Application and ontology in mathematics: a defence [defense] of fictionalism
> http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/18636/
>
>
> pure mathematicians may be immaterialists,
> but applied mathematicians are materialists.
>
>
>
> Abstract
>
> The aim of this thesis is to defend fictionalism as a response to the
> mathematical placement problem. As we will see, against the backdrop of
> philosophical naturalism, it is difficult to see how to fit mathematical
> objects into our best total scientific theory.
>
Which “best total scientific theory”? Theology is still taboo, and there is no
coherent physical theory of the universe, nor clear argument why that would
exist.

Assuming mechanism, assuming more than the natural numbers, or than the
combinators, or the programs, is just speculation on undecidable metaphysical
ontologies. No doubt is put on physics as an art to put relevant order on the
observable and predictable, but it can’t be the fundamental science. It has to
be derived from the theology, that is from G* (actually from qZ1*, the
observable-mode of self-reference, motivated through thought experience and/or
Theaetetus/Parmenides/Moderatus/Plotinus. (It is an old alternative viewing of
reality).

> On the other hand, the indispensability argument seems to suggest that
> science itself mandates ontological commitment to mathematical entities.
>

Not really. It needs we agree on some basic starting simple relation.

As I have demonstrate recently here, the relation

Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)

Are enough. But classical logic + Robinson arithmetic is enough.

No need of ontological commitment other that not denying what we found almost
obvious in primary school. You can remain formal, but it is simpler to do a bit
of math and get the intuition that indeed it kick back and, well, 2+2 is not
equal to 5.

> My goal is to undermine the indispensability argument by presenting an
> account of applied mathematics as a kind of revolutionary prop-oriented
> make-believe, the content of which is given by a mapping account of
> mathematical applications. This kind of fictionalism faces a number of
> challenges from various quarters. To begin with, we will have to face the
> challenge of a different kind of indispensability argument, one that draws
> ontological conclusions from the role of mathematical objects in scientific
> explanations. We will then examine one recent theory of mathematical
> scientific representation, and discover that the resulting position is
> Platonistic. At this point we will introduce our fictionalist account, and
> see that it defuses the Platonist consequences of mathematical
> representation. The closing chapters of the thesis then take a
> metaphilosophical turn. The legitmacy of a fictionalist response to the
> mathematical placement problem is open to challenge from a metaphilosophical
> perspective in two different ways: on the one hand, some modern pragmatists
> have argued that this kind of metaphysics relies on questionable assumptions
> about how langauge works. On the other, some modern philosophers have
> developed forms of metaontological anti-realism that they believe undermine
> the legitimacy of philosophical work in metaphysics. In the final two
> chapters I defend the fictionalist account developed here against these
> sceptical claims. I conclude that the fictionalist account of applied
> mathematics offered here is our best hope for coping with the mathematical
> placement problem.
>
>

It illustrates the kind of difficulties you can meet when you take for granted
the idea that the fundamental reality is physical.

There is only a placement problem for mathematics because people commit
themselves into some *place* which does not seem to be an hypothesis making
thing simpler.

Fictionalism does not apply to the arithmetical reality, nor to physics, but to
the naïve idea of a “physical universe” as being the fundamental reality. The
theology of the universal machine is a priori quite non Aristotelian: there is
no Creator, and there is no Creation. Just a universal dreamer which lost
itself in an infinitely surprising structure and wake up from time to time, or
from numbers to numbers.

I need no more than a partial applicative algebra, and each choice of the phi_i
makes N into one, simply by defining an operation “*” in N such that n * m =
phi_n(m). There exist numbers k and s such that

((k * n) * m) = n
(((s * n) * m) * r) = (n * r) * (m * r),

for all m, n, r in N.

And, the key point, the operation “*” can be defined in the ```

### Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

```

On Monday, February 25, 2019 at 3:34:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Feb 2019, at 18:44, Philip Thrift >
> wrote:
>
>
> Some accept the possibility that there can be something that is immaterial.
>
>
> Yes. We call them “mathematician”.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
This recent thesis I came across

*Application and ontology in mathematics: a defence [defense] of
fictionalism*
http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/18636/

pure mathematicians may be immaterialists,
but applied mathematicians are materialists.

Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to defend fictionalism as a response to the
mathematical placement problem. As we will see, against the backdrop of
philosophical naturalism, it is difficult to see how to fit mathematical
objects into our best total scientific theory. On the other hand, the
indispensability argument seems to suggest that science itself mandates
ontological commitment to mathematical entities. My goal is to undermine
the indispensability argument by presenting an account of applied
mathematics as a kind of revolutionary prop-oriented make-believe, the
content of which is given by a mapping account of mathematical
applications. This kind of fictionalism faces a number of challenges from
various quarters. To begin with, we will have to face the challenge of a
different kind of indispensability argument, one that draws ontological
conclusions from the role of mathematical objects in scientific
explanations. We will then examine one recent theory of mathematical
scientific representation, and discover that the resulting position is
Platonistic. At this point we will introduce our fictionalist account, and
see that it defuses the Platonist consequences of mathematical
representation. The closing chapters of the thesis then take a
metaphilosophical turn. The legitmacy of a fictionalist response to the
mathematical placement problem is open to challenge from a
metaphilosophical perspective in two different ways: on the one hand, some
modern pragmatists have argued that this kind of metaphysics relies on
questionable assumptions about how langauge works. On the other, some
modern philosophers have developed forms of metaontological anti-realism
that they believe undermine the legitimacy of philosophical work in
metaphysics. In the final two chapters I defend the fictionalist account
developed here against these sceptical claims. I conclude that the
fictionalist account of applied mathematics offered here is our best hope
for coping with the mathematical placement problem.

- pt

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

```

### Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

```
> On 22 Feb 2019, at 18:44, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, February 22, 2019 at 3:57:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 21 Feb 2019, at 20:26, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, February 21, 2019 at 8:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 18 Feb 2019, at 20:18, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>
>>> On Monday, February 18, 2019 at 9:14:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> >
>>> This is the link to the reply in the topic "When Did Consciousness Begin?"
>>> As I have said before, the modal logic and numerical semantics written
>>> there is one way to approach the science of experience. But I think
>>> ultimately this is a logical semantics (not a material semantics), but of
>>> course belief in an actual numerical reality makes a difference.
>>>
>>> Here is something more along those lines:
>>>
>>> On modal logic and consciousness:
>>>
>>> A Modal Logic for Gödelian Intuition
>>> Hasen Khudairi
>>> https://philarchive.org/archive/KHUAML
>>>
>>>
>>> Towards an Axiomatic Theory of Consciousness
>>> Jim Cunningham [ https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/
>>>  ]
>>> https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/Cunningham.pdf
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> However I think that there is ultimately a material semantics.
>>
>> I can imagine a semantic for some theory of matter, but matter itself cannot
>> be semantical. What would that mean? Even without mechanism, I have no idea
>> what that could mean.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I define material semantics here:
>>
>> Material Semantics for Unconventional Programming
>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>material semantics =
>>
>>  physical (incl. chemical+biological)
>>  +
>>  psychical (or experiential) semantics
>>
>>
>
> That does not assume the existence of an ontological matter.
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> As for the ancient Greeks, forget Aristotle and look to Epicurus.
>>
>> I assume mechanism, and I just listen to the universal machine, with machine
>> taken in the sense of Church and Turing. The notion of matter is not assumed
>> in such definition, and we know, basically since Gödel, that they exist in
>> arithmetic (semantically, of course).
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Some "offbeat" materialism I just came across that my be of interest:
>>>
>>> Terry Eagleton
>>> Materialism, Yale University Press
>>>
>>> excerpt 2:
>>> http://blog.yalebooks.com/2017/02/09/material-theology-and-christian-religion/
>>>
>>>
>> Very nice. I would not have dare to suggest that christianism is so much
>> materialist. I am not sure this was true during the five first hundreds
>> years, but it is dogmatically so after 529 (closure of Plato’s academy).
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Matter is an aggregation of cuisines whose recipes arise and combine to
>>> form the cookbook of nature.
>>
>> No problem with this, on the contrary. A recipe is another name for an
>> algorithm, which is typically not made of matter, but exist in arithmetic.
>>
>> And for the cooking, there is no need distinguish primary matter, which
>> cannot exist with Mechanism, and matter, which obviously exist
>> phenomenologically.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Of course all algorithms (technically) are made of matter:
>
> I disagree. An algorithm is an immaterial recipe to compute a function, or to
> implement a process, and you can do that in any universal machinery,
> implemented in the physical reality or not. The physical reality itself is
> not produced by an algorithm, but emerges from the first person indeterminacy
> on all consistent computational histories, structure by the observable mode.
> That explains quanta and qualia, in a testable (and tested) way.
>
> (I'don't know what this test is.)

It consists, roughly, in comparing the quantum logic extrapolated from
observation, with the quantum logics "in the head of the machine”.  We get
three quantum logics “in the head of the machine”: the one given (all the time
with p for a sigma_1 (computable) sentences by []p & p, []p & <>t, and []p &
<>t & p.
([]p is an abbreviation of Gödel’s beweisbar, <>p is ~[]~p).

Each modal nuance (with “ & <>p”, or “& p” and p sigma_1) give modal logics
mimicking quantum logic (like S4Grz gives logics mimicking ```

### Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

```

On Friday, February 22, 2019 at 3:57:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Feb 2019, at 20:26, Philip Thrift >
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, February 21, 2019 at 8:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 18 Feb 2019, at 20:18, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>> On Monday, February 18, 2019 at 9:14:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> >
>> This is the link to the reply in the topic "When Did Consciousness
>> Begin?" As I have said before, the modal logic and numerical semantics
>> written there is one way to approach the science of experience. But I think
>> ultimately this is a logical semantics (not a material semantics), but of
>> course belief in an actual numerical reality makes a difference.
>>
>> Here is something more along those lines:
>>
>> On modal logic and consciousness:
>>
>> *A Modal Logic for Gödelian Intuition*
>> Hasen Khudairi
>> https://philarchive.org/archive/KHUAML
>>
>> *Towards an Axiomatic Theory of Consciousness*
>> Jim Cunningham [ https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/ ]
>> https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/Cunningham.pdf
>>
>>
>> However I think that there is ultimately a material semantics.
>>
>>
>> I can imagine a semantic for some theory of matter, but matter itself
>> cannot be semantical. What would that mean? Even without mechanism, I have
>> no idea what that could mean.
>>
>>
>>
>>
> I define material semantics here:
>
> *Material Semantics for Unconventional Programming*
>
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/
>
>
>
>
>material semantics =
>
>  physical (*incl.* chemical+biological)
>  +
>  psychical (or experiential) semantics
>
>
> That does not assume the existence of an ontological matter.
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> As for the ancient Greeks, forget Aristotle and look to Epicurus.
>>
>>
>> I assume mechanism, and I just listen to the universal machine, with
>> machine taken in the sense of Church and Turing. The notion of matter is
>> not assumed in such definition, and we know, basically since Gödel, that
>> they exist in arithmetic (semantically, of course).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Some "offbeat" materialism I just came across that my be of interest:
>>
>> Terry Eagleton
>> *Materialism*, Yale University Press
>> excerpt 2:
>> http://blog.yalebooks.com/2017/02/09/material-theology-and-christian-religion/
>>
>>
>> Very nice. I would not have dare to suggest that christianism is so much
>> materialist. I am not sure this was true during the five first hundreds
>> years, but it is dogmatically so after 529 (closure of Plato’s academy).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *Matter is an aggregation of cuisines whose recipes arise and combine to
>> form the cookbook of nature.*
>>
>>
>> No problem with this, on the contrary. A recipe is another name for an
>> algorithm, which is typically not made of matter, but exist in arithmetic.
>>
>> And for the cooking, there is no need distinguish primary matter, which
>> cannot exist with Mechanism, and matter, which obviously exist
>> phenomenologically.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>
>
> Of course all algorithms (technically) are made of matter:
>
>
> I disagree. An algorithm is an immaterial recipe to compute a function, or
> to implement a process, and you can do that in any universal machinery,
> implemented in the physical reality or not. The physical reality itself is
> not produced by an algorithm, but emerges from the first person
> indeterminacy on all consistent computational histories, structure by the
> observable mode. That explains quanta and qualia, in a testable (and
> tested) way.
>

(I'don't know what this test is.)

Some accept the possibility that there can be something that is immaterial.

In philosophy, *antimaterialism* can mean one of several metaphysical or
religious beliefs that are specifically opposed to materialism
, the notion that *only matter
exists*. These beliefs include:

- • Immaterialism , a
philosophy branching from George Berkeley of which his idealism is a type
- •  Dualism (philosophy of
mind) , a
philosophy which includes the claim that mental phenomena are, in some
respects, non-physical
- •  Gnosticism
, a general class of religious
movements which hold that human beings have divine souls trapped in a
material world
- •  Idealism
, which holds that the ultimate
nature of reality is based on ```

### Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

```
> On 21 Feb 2019, at 20:26, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, February 21, 2019 at 8:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 18 Feb 2019, at 20:18, Philip Thrift >
>> wrote:
>>
>> On Monday, February 18, 2019 at 9:14:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> >
>> This is the link to the reply in the topic "When Did Consciousness Begin?"
>> As I have said before, the modal logic and numerical semantics written there
>> is one way to approach the science of experience. But I think ultimately
>> this is a logical semantics (not a material semantics), but of course belief
>> in an actual numerical reality makes a difference.
>>
>> Here is something more along those lines:
>>
>> On modal logic and consciousness:
>>
>> A Modal Logic for Gödelian Intuition
>> Hasen Khudairi
>> https://philarchive.org/archive/KHUAML
>>
>>
>> Towards an Axiomatic Theory of Consciousness
>> Jim Cunningham [ https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/
>>  ]
>> https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/Cunningham.pdf
>>
>>
>>
>> However I think that there is ultimately a material semantics.
>
> I can imagine a semantic for some theory of matter, but matter itself cannot
> be semantical. What would that mean? Even without mechanism, I have no idea
> what that could mean.
>
>
>
>
> I define material semantics here:
>
> Material Semantics for Unconventional Programming
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/
>
>
>
>material semantics =
>
>  physical (incl. chemical+biological)
>  +
>  psychical (or experiential) semantics
>
>

That does not assume the existence of an ontological matter.

>
>
>
>>
>> As for the ancient Greeks, forget Aristotle and look to Epicurus.
>
> I assume mechanism, and I just listen to the universal machine, with machine
> taken in the sense of Church and Turing. The notion of matter is not assumed
> in such definition, and we know, basically since Gödel, that they exist in
> arithmetic (semantically, of course).
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> Some "offbeat" materialism I just came across that my be of interest:
>>
>> Terry Eagleton
>> Materialism, Yale University Press
>>
>> excerpt 2:
>> http://blog.yalebooks.com/2017/02/09/material-theology-and-christian-religion/
>>
>>
> Very nice. I would not have dare to suggest that christianism is so much
> materialist. I am not sure this was true during the five first hundreds
> years, but it is dogmatically so after 529 (closure of Plato’s academy).
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>> Matter is an aggregation of cuisines whose recipes arise and combine to form
>> the cookbook of nature.
>
> No problem with this, on the contrary. A recipe is another name for an
> algorithm, which is typically not made of matter, but exist in arithmetic.
>
> And for the cooking, there is no need distinguish primary matter, which
> cannot exist with Mechanism, and matter, which obviously exist
> phenomenologically.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Of course all algorithms (technically) are made of matter:

I disagree. An algorithm is an immaterial recipe to compute a function, or to
implement a process, and you can do that in any universal machinery,
implemented in the physical reality or not. The physical reality itself is not
produced by an algorithm, but emerges from the first person indeterminacy on
all consistent computational histories, structure by the observable mode. That
explains quanta and qualia, in a testable (and tested) way.

>
> They are arrangements of glyphs of ink on paper  (like in a book), or are
> electronic dots on a screen (like you are looking at right now) or are
> magnetic polarities stored on a hard drive, etc.

This confuses a bit the truth of “2+2=4” and “”2+2=4””.

>
> That matter "has" recipes (or algorithms) is the dialectics of Codicalism.

Matter can implement algorithm, with mechanism that is a (non obvious) theorem.
But that does not make matter primary. It belongs to the sharable dreams of the
universal machine.

Bruno

>
> - pt
>
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> .
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
> ```

### Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

```

On Thursday, February 21, 2019 at 8:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 Feb 2019, at 20:18, Philip Thrift >
> wrote:
>
> On Monday, February 18, 2019 at 9:14:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> This is the link to the reply in the topic "When Did Consciousness Begin?"
> As I have said before, the modal logic and numerical semantics written
> there is one way to approach the science of experience. But I think
> ultimately this is a logical semantics (not a material semantics), but of
> course belief in an actual numerical reality makes a difference.
>
> Here is something more along those lines:
>
> On modal logic and consciousness:
>
> *A Modal Logic for Gödelian Intuition*
> Hasen Khudairi
> https://philarchive.org/archive/KHUAML
>
> *Towards an Axiomatic Theory of Consciousness*
> Jim Cunningham [ https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/ ]
> https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/Cunningham.pdf
>
>
> However I think that there is ultimately a material semantics.
>
>
> I can imagine a semantic for some theory of matter, but matter itself
> cannot be semantical. What would that mean? Even without mechanism, I have
> no idea what that could mean.
>
>
>
>
I define material semantics here:

*Material Semantics for Unconventional Programming*
https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/

material semantics =

physical (*incl.* chemical+biological)
+
psychical (or experiential) semantics

>
>
>
> As for the ancient Greeks, forget Aristotle and look to Epicurus.
>
>
> I assume mechanism, and I just listen to the universal machine, with
> machine taken in the sense of Church and Turing. The notion of matter is
> not assumed in such definition, and we know, basically since Gödel, that
> they exist in arithmetic (semantically, of course).
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Some "offbeat" materialism I just came across that my be of interest:
>
> Terry Eagleton
> *Materialism*, Yale University Press
> excerpt 2:
> http://blog.yalebooks.com/2017/02/09/material-theology-and-christian-religion/
>
>
> Very nice. I would not have dare to suggest that christianism is so much
> materialist. I am not sure this was true during the five first hundreds
> years, but it is dogmatically so after 529 (closure of Plato’s academy).
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *Matter is an aggregation of cuisines whose recipes arise and combine to
> form the cookbook of nature.*
>
>
> No problem with this, on the contrary. A recipe is another name for an
> algorithm, which is typically not made of matter, but exist in arithmetic.
>
> And for the cooking, there is no need distinguish primary matter, which
> cannot exist with Mechanism, and matter, which obviously exist
> phenomenologically.
>
> Bruno
>
>

Of course all algorithms (technically) are made of matter:

They are arrangements of glyphs of ink on paper  (like in a book), or are
electronic dots on a screen (like you are looking at right now) or are
magnetic polarities stored on a hard drive, etc.

That matter "has" recipes (or algorithms) is the dialectics of Codicalism.

- pt

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

```

### Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

```
> On 18 Feb 2019, at 20:18, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
> On Monday, February 18, 2019 at 9:14:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> This is the link to the reply in the topic "When Did Consciousness Begin?" As
> I have said before, the modal logic and numerical semantics written there is
> one way to approach the science of experience. But I think ultimately this is
> a logical semantics (not a material semantics), but of course belief in an
> actual numerical reality makes a difference.
>
> Here is something more along those lines:
>
> On modal logic and consciousness:
>
> A Modal Logic for Gödelian Intuition
> Hasen Khudairi
> https://philarchive.org/archive/KHUAML
>
> Towards an Axiomatic Theory of Consciousness
> Jim Cunningham [ https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/ ]
> https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/Cunningham.pdf
>
>
> However I think that there is ultimately a material semantics.

I can imagine a semantic for some theory of matter, but matter itself cannot be
semantical. What would that mean? Even without mechanism, I have no idea what
that could mean.

>
> As for the ancient Greeks, forget Aristotle and look to Epicurus.

I assume mechanism, and I just listen to the universal machine, with machine
taken in the sense of Church and Turing. The notion of matter is not assumed in
such definition, and we know, basically since Gödel, that they exist in
arithmetic (semantically, of course).

>
>
>
> Some "offbeat" materialism I just came across that my be of interest:
>
> Terry Eagleton
> Materialism, Yale University Press
> excerpt 2:
> http://blog.yalebooks.com/2017/02/09/material-theology-and-christian-religion/

Very nice. I would not have dare to suggest that christianism is so much
materialist. I am not sure this was true during the five first hundreds years,
but it is dogmatically so after 529 (closure of Plato’s academy).

>
>
>
> Matter is an aggregation of cuisines whose recipes arise and combine to form
> the cookbook of nature.

No problem with this, on the contrary. A recipe is another name for an
algorithm, which is typically not made of matter, but exist in arithmetic.

And for the cooking, there is no need distinguish primary matter, which cannot
exist with Mechanism, and matter, which obviously exist phenomenologically.

Bruno

>
> - pt
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> .
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
> .
> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
> .
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout
> .

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.

```

### Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

```On Monday, February 18, 2019 at 9:14:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

This is the link to the reply in the topic "When Did Consciousness Begin?"
As I have said before, the modal logic and numerical semantics written
there is one way to approach the science of experience. But I think
ultimately this is a logical semantics (not a material semantics), but of
course belief in an actual numerical reality makes a difference.

Here is something more along those lines:

On modal logic and consciousness:

*A Modal Logic for Gödelian Intuition*
Hasen Khudairi
https://philarchive.org/archive/KHUAML

*Towards an Axiomatic Theory of Consciousness*
Jim Cunningham [ https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/ ]
https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/Cunningham.pdf

However I think that there is ultimately a material semantics.

As for the ancient Greeks, forget Aristotle and look to Epicurus.

Some "offbeat" materialism I just came across that my be of interest:

Terry Eagleton
*Materialism*, Yale University Press
excerpt 2:
http://blog.yalebooks.com/2017/02/09/material-theology-and-christian-religion/

*Matter is an aggregation of cuisines whose recipes arise and combine to
form the cookbook of nature.*

- pt

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email