:
MWI predicts the same as QM+collapse.
Only because it assumes the Born rule applies to give a probability
interpretation to the density matrix. But Everettista's either ignore
the need
for the Born rule or they suppose it can be derived from the SWE
(although all
On 2/26/2015 7:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 9:40 PM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 9:20 PM, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 9:20 PM, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Jason Resch wrote:
There's no problem defining probability. There is, however, a
big problem defining collapse.
Collapse is easily
On 2/26/2015 7:05 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
But it assumes the Born rule provides the relative measure - which is more
than just
the SWE. You can solve the problem of branch counting by assuming
infinitely many
parallel worlds - but then that raises the problem of defining
:
MWI predicts the same as QM+collapse.
Only because it assumes the Born rule applies to give a probability
interpretation to the density matrix. But Everettista's either ignore the
need for the Born rule or they suppose it can be derived from the SWE
(although all attempts have fallen short
:
On 2/26/2015 3:16 PM, LizR wrote:
On 27 February 2015 at 10:01, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
MWI predicts the same as QM+collapse.
Only because it assumes the Born rule applies to give a probability
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 9:20 PM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 3:01 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:
meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
MWI predicts the same as QM+collapse.
Only because it assumes the Born rule
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 9:40 PM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 9:20 PM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Jason Resch wrote:
There's no problem defining probability. There
that one of the probable states happens. MWI fails to add that.
Isn't it enough when one considers the FPI (which tells us you will only
experience one of the probable states)?
FPI has been around a long time. In the earlier literature on the
Anthropic Principle it was known as self-selection
On 25 Feb 2015, at 12:28, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Feb 2015, at 22:52, Bruce Kellett wrote:
MWI simply formalizes the fact that such data are in-principle
unknowable.
Well, usually we say that the SWE formalizes that fact, and that
the MWI interpret this in term
On Wed, Feb 25, 2015 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You've got to think what random means, nothing made it happen, it
is a brute fact..
How can you know that. This is equivalent with saying we will not try
to understand.
If there is something to understand about why X happened,
Bell's theorem, as Bell made clear, allows realism and locality if the laws
of physics operate in a time symmetric manner. All the known laws of
physics do, apart from the mechanism underlying neutral kaon decay. Hence
it is likely that Bell's theorem doesn't require quantum mystical nonlocal
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Feb 2015, at 12:28, Bruce Kellett wrote:
In particular one has to solve the basis problem
I disagree. It seems to me that Everett already solved it. The relative
subjective state does not depend on the base.
That is precisely the problem. There are an infinite
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 09:31:53AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
An eigenfunction in one basis is a superposition (potentially an
infinite superposition) in any other basis. Why do we not see
superpositions of positions?
Bruce
But we do! Whenever the two slit experiment is performed, for
will
experience next.
That seems to me to be a very good case of something being in-principle
unknowable. If it is not in-principle unknowable, the onus is on you to
spell out the principles and circumstances in which the time of the
radioactive decay of a particular atom is knowable in advance.
MWI
On Wed, Feb 25, 2015 at 5:28 AM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Feb 2015, at 22:52, Bruce Kellett wrote:
MWI simply formalizes the fact that such data are in-principle
unknowable.
Well, usually we say that the SWE formalizes that fact
On 2/25/2015 1:02 PM, LizR wrote:
Bell's theorem, as Bell made clear, allows realism and locality if the laws of physics
operate in a time symmetric manner. All the known laws of physics do, apart from the
mechanism underlying neutral kaon decay. Hence it is likely that Bell's theorem doesn't
On Wed, Feb 25, 2015 , meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Bell's theorem, as Bell made clear, allows realism and locality if the
laws of physics operate in a time symmetric manner. All the known laws of
physics do, apart from the mechanism underlying neutral kaon decay. Hence
it is likely
On 2/25/2015 7:11 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wed, Feb 25, 2015 at 5:28 AM, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Feb 2015, at 22:52, Bruce Kellett wrote:
MWI simply formalizes the fact
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 04:44:25PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 09:31:53AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
An eigenfunction in one basis is a superposition (potentially an
infinite superposition) in any other basis. Why do we not see
superpositions
Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 09:31:53AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
An eigenfunction in one basis is a superposition (potentially an
infinite superposition) in any other basis. Why do we not see
superpositions of positions?
Bruce
But we do! Whenever the two slit experiment
particular decay, and whatever it might be
that caused that nucleus to decay now rather than at some other
time, is in-principle unknowable.
MWI simply formalizes the fact that such data are in-principle
unknowable.
Well, usually we say that the SWE formalizes that fact, and that the
MWI
of something being in-
principle unknowable. If it is not in-principle unknowable, the
onus is on you to spell out the principles and circumstances in
which the time of the radioactive decay of a particular atom is
knowable in advance.
MWI means, I know it when I see it. :-)
But more seriously
to be a very good case of something being in-
principle unknowable. If it is not in-principle unknowable, the
onus is on you to spell out the principles and circumstances in
which the time of the radioactive decay of a particular atom is
knowable in advance.
MWI means, I know it when I see
On 24 Feb 2015, at 23:00, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Feb 24, 2015 at 08:10:35PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Suppose, as people on this list have sometimes proposed, that we
and the world we perceive is a digital simulation in a computer
vastly more powerful than the ones we've built.
On 25 Feb 2015, at 05:03, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 , LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
What would be a suitable underlying means by which the universe
might operate, that it makes things happen at random?
Huh?? You've got to think what random means, nothing made it
happen, it
, and whatever it
might be
that caused that nucleus to decay now rather than at some other
time, is in-principle unknowable.
MWI simply formalizes the fact that such data are in-principle
unknowable.
It seems to me that the MWI explains, in principle, where the data
come from - from first
On Wednesday, February 25, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, February 25, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
First person indeterminacy is just another name for in-principle
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Feb 2015, at 22:52, Bruce Kellett wrote:
MWI simply formalizes the fact that such data are in-principle
unknowable.
Well, usually we say that the SWE formalizes that fact, and that the MWI
interpret this in term of many world. But I am OK with your statement
On Tue, Feb 24, 2015 at 08:10:35PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Suppose, as people on this list have sometimes proposed, that we
and the world we perceive is a digital simulation in a computer
vastly more powerful than the ones we've built. Suppose this
computer is 1e500 bit machine.
I
that nucleus
to decay now rather than at some other time, is in-principle unknowable.
MWI simply formalizes the fact that such data are in-principle unknowable.
Bruce
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On 24 February 2015 at 14:23, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 2/23/2015 12:58 PM, LizR wrote:
On 24 February 2015 at 09:03, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But then this undermines the idea that the arithmetic existential
quantifier provides the same exists as ostensive
...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Mon, Feb 23, 2015 11:47 am
Subject: Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic
On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:55, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2015 4:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Not as Bruno uses it: That all computations exist Platonically and
instantiate
On 23 Feb 2015, at 20:42, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/23/2015 7:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:01, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2015 3:43 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2015 at 12:32, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:
On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Feb 22,
On 23 Feb 2015, at 20:46, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/23/2015 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2015 at 10:17, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
Computationalism is an extraordinary claim.
The claim that what
On 23 Feb 2015, at 21:03, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/23/2015 8:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:55, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2015 4:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Not as Bruno uses it: That all computations exist Platonically
and instantiate all possible thoughts - and a lot of
On 2/24/2015 5:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2015, at 20:46, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/23/2015 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2015 at 10:17, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 24 Feb 2015, at 17:47, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/24/2015 5:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2015, at 20:46, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/23/2015 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2015 at 10:17, meekerdb
, for
instance, the time of any particular decay, and whatever it might be
that caused that nucleus to decay now rather than at some other
time, is in-principle unknowable.
MWI simply formalizes the fact that such data are in-principle
unknowable.
It seems to me
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, February 25, 2015, Bruce Kellett
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote:
First person indeterminacy is just another name for in-principle
unknowable!
No it's not. It provides an explanation of how the world can be
unknowable. If it is not in-principle unknowable, the
onus is on you to spell out the principles and circumstances in which
the time of the radioactive decay of a particular atom is knowable in
advance.
MWI means, I know it when I see it. :-)
But more seriously, for FPI to apply to radioactive
. If
it is not in-principle unknowable, the onus is on you to spell out the principles and
circumstances in which the time of the radioactive decay of a particular atom is
knowable in advance.
MWI means, I know it when I see it. :-)
But more seriously, for FPI to apply to radioactive decay requires
, for instance, the time of
any particular decay, and whatever it might be that caused that nucleus to
decay now rather than at some other time, is in-principle unknowable.
MWI simply formalizes the fact that such data are in-principle
unknowable.
It seems to me that the MWI explains, in principle
that nucleus to decay now rather than at some other
time, is in-principle unknowable.
MWI simply formalizes the fact that such data are in-principle
unknowable.
It seems to me that the MWI explains, in principle, where the data come
from - from first person indeterminacy. That isn't
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 , LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
What would be a suitable underlying means by which the universe might
operate, that it makes things happen at random?
Huh?? You've got to think what random means, nothing made it happen,
it is a brute fact..I don't find it astounding that
On 22 Feb 2015, at 23:52, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2015 at 10:17, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
Computationalism is an extraordinary claim.
The claim that what goes on inside brains is at some level Turing-
emulable seems not necessarily extraordinary - or do you think it
is? It seems
On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:01, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2015 3:43 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2015 at 12:32, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 3:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:
Computationalism is an extraordinary
On 23 Feb 2015, at 00:32, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 3:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:
On 2/22/2015 9:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Feb 2015, at 02:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/20/2015 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:38, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 5:32 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:
On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 3:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
wrote:
On 2/22/2015 9:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Feb
On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:55, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2015 4:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Not as Bruno uses it: That all computations exist Platonically and
instantiate all possible thoughts - and a lot of other stuff.
That's arithmetical realism, not computationalism. However, to
believe in
, 2015 11:47 am
Subject: Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic
On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:55, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2015 4:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Not as Bruno uses it: That all computations exist Platonically and
instantiate all possible
On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2015 at 10:17, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
Computationalism is an extraordinary claim.
The claim that what goes on inside brains is at some level Turing-
emulable seems not necessarily extraordinary
On 24 February 2015 at 09:03, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
You seem to take the same view as LizR, You're either for my theory or
you're for a contrary theory.
You started it, dear. Since you've already acted many times as though my
agnosticism is really supporting a theory you
On 24 February 2015 at 09:03, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But then this undermines the idea that the arithmetic existential
quantifier provides the same exists as ostensive physical existence.
That is clearly not being suggested by comp. Comp suggests that physical
existence is maya
On 23 Feb 2015, at 09:07, Telmo Menezes wrote:
I would argue that the history of science tells us that humans tend
to err on the side of assuming too much uniqueness in what they
observe.
I agree. Despite even Nature illustrates how much she likes to do
things in the many: many atoms,
On 2/23/2015 7:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:01, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2015 3:43 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2015 at 12:32, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at
On 2/23/2015 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2015 at 10:17, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
Computationalism is an extraordinary claim.
The claim that what goes on
Brent: I am no 'skeptic' I just seek some basis WHY to believe?
JM
On Mon, Feb 23, 2015 at 2:46 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 2/23/2015 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:16, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2015 at
On 2/23/2015 8:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:55, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2015 4:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Not as Bruno uses it: That all computations exist Platonically and
instantiate all
possible thoughts - and a lot of other stuff.
That's arithmetical
On 2/23/2015 11:51 AM, John Mikes wrote:
Brent: I am no 'skeptic' I just seek some basis WHY to believe?
What kind of basis? utility? perception? What would you consider a suitable basis? And
why do you want to believe? Is it more than just deciding how to act?
Brent
--
You received
with experimental results?
I'm similarly dubious of black holes, even though they are clearly implied
by our best theory of spacetime. But that theory is incompatible with QM
and so BHs may not exist in the form implied by GR.
But the MWI has not be shown to be incompatible with any of our main
theories so
On 2/23/2015 12:58 PM, LizR wrote:
On 24 February 2015 at 09:03, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But then this undermines the idea that the arithmetic existential quantifier
provides the same exists as ostensive physical existence.
That is clearly not
On 21 Feb 2015, at 02:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/20/2015 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
QM + collapse is inconsistent (with a great variety of principle,
like computationalism, God does not play dice, no spooky actions,
etc.).
Principles of Platonist faith.
You don't need any faith to
On 23 February 2015 at 10:17, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
Computationalism is an extraordinary claim.
The claim that what goes on inside brains is at some level Turing-emulable
seems not necessarily extraordinary - or do you think it is? It seems like
a fairly standard assumption by many
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 3:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 2/22/2015 9:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Feb 2015, at 02:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/20/2015 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
QM + collapse is inconsistent (with a great variety of principle, like
On 23 February 2015 at 12:32, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 3:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Computationalism is an extraordinary claim.
For it to be extraordinary, it would have to be beyond ordinary.
@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sun, Feb 22, 2015 4:17 pm
Subject: Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic
On 2/22/2015 9:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Feb 2015, at 02:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/20/2015 8:54 AM, Bruno
: Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic
On 2/22/2015 9:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Feb 2015, at 02:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/20/2015 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
QM + collapse is inconsistent (with a great variety of principle, like
computationalism, God does not play dice, no spooky
On 2/22/2015 9:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Feb 2015, at 02:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/20/2015 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
QM + collapse is inconsistent (with a great variety of principle, like
computationalism, God does not play dice, no spooky actions, etc.).
Principles of
On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 3:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 2/22/2015 9:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Feb 2015, at 02:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/20/2015 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
QM
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 5:32 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 3:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 2/22/2015 9:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Feb 2015, at 02:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/20/2015
have no way to analyze the
veracity. As for MWI, it appears inescapable and very strange.
-Original Message-
From: Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sun, Feb 22, 2015 6:01 pm
Subject: Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic
Whether
On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2015 at 10:17, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
Computationalism is an extraordinary claim.
The claim that what goes on inside brains is at some level Turing-emulable seems not
necessarily extraordinary - or do
On 2/22/2015 4:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Not as Bruno uses it: That all computations exist Platonically and
instantiate all
possible thoughts - and a lot of other stuff.
That's arithmetical realism, not computationalism. However, to believe in the notion of
Turing machines or
On 2/20/2015 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
It is a theorem of comp, also. The many worlds, in his relative state formulation, is
already a consequence of computationalism. By church thesis, *all* computations are
emulated in all possible ways in elementary arithmetic, with a typical
On 2/20/2015 8:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
QM + collapse is inconsistent (with a great variety of principle, like computationalism,
God does not play dice, no spooky actions, etc.).
Principles of Platonist faith.
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
On 2/20/2015 7:03 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Fri, Feb 20, 2015 at 1:59 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 2/19/2015 3:52 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thursday, February 19, 2015, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net
On Fri, Feb 20, 2015 at 1:59 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 2/19/2015 3:52 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thursday, February 19, 2015, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I think it's taking the mathematics too seriously (but then I'm not a
Platonist). When QM is integrated
? Is that somehow better than my belief in
God?) is I don't BELIEVE in the evolution (or the MWI) - I
understand the evidence that indicates it may be the correct
description of reality.
Reasons to believe the MWI might include the fact that it answers
important questions, and is the simplest
BELIEVE in the evolution (or the MWI) - I understand the evidence that
indicates it may be the correct description of reality.
Reasons to believe the MWI might include the fact that it answers
important questions, and is the simplest hypothesis (to date) that explains
all the observations of QM
Brent,
What's your position on the MWI?
Best,
Telmo.
On Wed, Feb 18, 2015 at 5:36 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Forwarded Message
In July 2011, participants at a conference on the placid shore of Lake
Traunsee in Austria were polled on what they thought
On Thursday, February 19, 2015, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Forwarded Message
In July 2011, participants at a conference on the placid shore of Lake
Traunsee in Austria were polled on what they thought the meeting was about.
You might imagine that this question
possibility with pre-existing uncountable infinite fungible universes... In
that view, nothing pops up into existence... everything is already there.
But anyway, I was not convinced by the article that MWI is more a fantasy
than the one universe hypotheses.. he does not like MWI, that's sure
I think it's taking the mathematics too seriously (but then I'm not a Platonist). When QM
is integrated with GR something different may emerge.
Brent
On 2/19/2015 2:19 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Brent,
What's your position on the MWI?
Best,
Telmo.
On Wed, Feb 18, 2015 at 5:36 PM, meekerdb
On 2/19/2015 5:34 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Feb 19, 2015 at 6:59 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 2/19/2015 3:52 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thursday, February 19, 2015, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
seriously.
Jason
Brent
On 2/19/2015 2:19 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Brent,
What's your position on the MWI?
Best,
Telmo.
On Wed, Feb 18, 2015 at 5:36 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Forwarded Message
In July 2011, participants at a conference on the placid
On Thu, Feb 19, 2015 at 6:59 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 2/19/2015 3:52 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thursday, February 19, 2015, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I think it's taking the mathematics too seriously (but then I'm not a
Platonist). When QM is integrated
On 2/19/2015 3:52 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thursday, February 19, 2015, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I think it's taking the mathematics too seriously (but then I'm not a Platonist).
When QM is integrated with GR something different may emerge.
So
On 18 Feb 2015, at 17:36, meekerdb wrote:
Forwarded Message
In July 2011, participants at a conference on the placid shore of
Lake Traunsee in Austria were polled on what they thought the
meeting was about. You might imagine that this question would have
been
Forwarded Message
In July 2011, participants at a conference on the placid shore of Lake Traunsee in Austria
were polled on what they thought the meeting was about. You might imagine that this
question would have been settled in advance, but since the broad theme was
Can you provide some examples?
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. We
also remind why multiverse scenarios can be falsified.
it's always been testable. The difficulty is that the ways that it is
testable, always seem to involve mWI failing the test.
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*arXiv:1412.7352* http://arxiv.org/abs/1412.7352 (cross-list from gr-qc) [
*pdf* http://arxiv.org/pdf/1412.7352, *ps* http://arxiv.org/ps/1412.7352,
*other* http://arxiv.org/format/1412.7352]
Title: Testing the Everett Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics with
Cosmology
Authors: *Aurelien
On 08 Nov 2014, at 04:55, LizR wrote:
On 8 November 2014 11:50, zibb...@gmail.com wrote:
Sure, but in the same vein as where Peter goes, photosynthesis in
this universe always finds the most efficient path where there are
many others. I have'n't heard an answer to that yet, that addresses
, like a spontaneous quantum jup of all
the atoms in your body, or similarly possible but
more-than-astronomically-unlikely scenarios. I doubt if photosynthesis has
a 1 in a googolplex chance of working!
I thought there might be a criteria for perhaps a personal falsification
of MWI
On Fri, Nov 7, 2014 at 5:50 PM, zibb...@gmail.com wrote:
photosynthesis in this universe always finds the most efficient
path where there are many others.
That is incorrect. Using natural sunlight the maximum theoretical
efficiency in turning water and CO2 into glucose and free oxygen
On Saturday, November 15, 2014 6:25:37 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Nov 7, 2014 at 5:50 PM, zib...@gmail.com javascript: wrote:
photosynthesis in this universe always finds the most efficient
path where there are many others.
That is incorrect. Using natural sunlight the
On Saturday, November 15, 2014 6:25:37 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Nov 7, 2014 at 5:50 PM, zib...@gmail.com javascript: wrote:
photosynthesis in this universe always finds the most efficient
path where there are many others.
That is incorrect. Using natural sunlight the
On 11/15/2014 10:25 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Nov 7, 2014 at 5:50 PM, zibb...@gmail.com mailto:zibb...@gmail.com
wrote:
photosynthesis in this universe always finds the most efficient path
where there
are many others.
That is incorrect. Using natural sunlight the maximum
On Saturday, November 15, 2014 8:22:37 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
On 11/15/2014 10:25 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Nov 7, 2014 at 5:50 PM, zib...@gmail.com javascript: wrote:
photosynthesis in this universe always finds the most efficient
path where there are many others.
That
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