On Wed, Sep 06, 2006 at 01:44:35PM -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
Russell Standish writes:
Why do you say this? Surely physical supervenience is simply
supervenience on some physical object. Physical objects are spread
across the multiverse, and are capable of reacting to all
counterfactuals
Peter Jones writes:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 05-sept.-06, à 15:38, 1Z a écrit :
The conscious computations, on the other hand, are there and
self-aware
Not really. They are just possibilities.
even though we cannot interact with them, just as all the statues in
a
On Wed, Sep 06, 2006 at 12:25:53PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 06-sept.-06, à 10:48, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Wed, Sep 06, 2006 at 12:25:10AM -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
I'd think that in the context of a multiverse, physical supervenience
would say that whether consciousness is
Russell Standish writes:
With physical supervenience, it is possible for the same person to
supervene on multiple physical objects. What is disallowed is multiple
persons to supervene on the same physical object.
That is what is usually understood, but there is no logical reason why
the
Russell Standish writes:
In fact lets go one further and write a program that prints out all
combinations of 10^{30} bits in Library of Babel style. This is more
than enough information to encode all possible histories of neuronal
activity of a human brain, so most of us would bet this level
On Thu, Sep 07, 2006 at 11:19:47AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Russell Standish writes:
In fact lets go one further and write a program that prints out all
combinations of 10^{30} bits in Library of Babel style. This is more
than enough information to encode all possible
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
If every computation is implemented everywhere anyway, this is equivalent
to the situation where every computation exists as a platonic object, or
every computation exists implemented on some computer or brain in a
material multiverse.
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
But if implementing a particular computation depends on an observer, or
a dicitonary, or somesuch, it is not the case that everything implements
every computation unless it can be shown that evey dictionary somehow
exists as well.
The
Stathis,
According to Wikipedia, "Platonia" is a tree. That isn't
what you mean. Could you furnish a definition? Thank
you,
Norman Samish ~~~- Original
Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
. . . Computationalism is the theory that
Le 04-sept.-06, à 06:30, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
It is the association of any conscious experience with any physical
process
which links the Putnam/Searle/Chalmers/Egan/Mallah/Moravec (and me, and
probably many others independently) argument with the Maudlin/Marchal
argument. There
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
If every computation is implemented everywhere anyway, this is
equivalent to the situation where every
computation exists as a platonic
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
[Stathis Papaioannou]
If every computation is implemented everywhere anyway, this is
equivalent to the situation where every
computation exists as a platonic object, or every computation exists
implemented on some computer or
On 9/5/06, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
[Stathis Papaioannou]
If every computation is implemented everywhere anyway, this is
equivalent to
the situation where every computation exists as a platonic
the calculations, do not need external
interpretation, do not interfere with each other, and link up as appropriate
due to their internal information content.
Stathis Papaioannou
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: computationalism and supervenience
Date: Tue, 5
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Under one mapping, the physical system implements a program which thinks, I
am now experiencing my first second of life. Under a different mapping, it
implements a program which thinks, I am now experiencing my second second of
life.
And who is doing all the
On 9/5/06, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Under one mapping, the physical system implements a program which thinks,
I am now experiencing my first second of life. Under a different mapping,
it implements a program which thinks, I am now experiencing my second
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
On 9/5/06, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Under one mapping, the physical system implements a program which thinks,
I am now experiencing my first second of life. Under a different
mapping, it implements a program which thinks, I
I am sorry that I have not been able to keep up with the list lately.
I can only peek in occasionally.
My interpretation of the question of computationalism vs supervenience
can be put succinctly. Computationalism says that consciousness depends
both on actual behavior and on counterfactuals.
On Tue, Sep 05, 2006 at 05:02:59PM -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
I am sorry that I have not been able to keep up with the list lately.
I can only peek in occasionally.
My interpretation of the question of computationalism vs supervenience
can be put succinctly. Computationalism says that
Brent Meeker writes:
You don't have to go as far as saying that *computation* is structural
rather than
semantic. You only need to say that *consciousness* is structural, and hence
non-computational. That's what some cognitive scientists have done, eg.
Penrose,
Searle, Maudlin.
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
If every computation is implemented everywhere anyway, this is equivalent
to the situation where every
computation exists as a platonic object, or every computation exists
implemented on some computer or
brain in a material
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
If every computation is implemented everywhere anyway, this is equivalent
to the situation where every
computation exists as a platonic object, or every computation exists
implemented on some computer
Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
[Stathis Papaioannou]
No, it follows from the idea that anything can be a computation. I think
this
is trivially obvious, like saying any string of apparently random
characters
is a translation of any
Le 04-sept.-06, à 01:45, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Sun, Sep 03, 2006 at 03:03:02PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Then Maudlin reintroduces the unused parts, the Klaras, which
reintroduces the counterfactual correctness, WITHOUT ADDING any comp
relevant physical activity (if not, it would
Le 03-sept.-06, à 17:18, David Nyman a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Maudlin build first a digital machine, let us call it M, which do a
computation PI (Maudlin's name for it) which we suppose does
correspond
to a genuine consciousness experience (for example some remembering of
the
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Either those *specific* physical activities are turing emulable, and we
are back to 1) and 2), or they are not, and then comp is false.
Recall we assume comp.
I don't follow. I thought Maudlin is proposing a physical machine
running the consciousness program, not a
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
If every computation is implemented everywhere anyway, this is equivalent to
the situation where every computation exists as a platonic object, or every
computation exists implemented on some computer or brain
David Nyman wrote:
Why talk of zombies? A zombie is a being that is supposedly conceivable
(though not to me) as being 'unconscious' despite apparently possessing
the structural/ behavioural prerequisites of consciousness. I was
referring to the issue that, if the characteristics of
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
If every computation is implemented everywhere anyway, this is
equivalent to the situation where every
computation exists as a platonic object, or every computation exists
Peter Jones writes:
[Stathis Papaioannou]
If every computation is implemented everywhere anyway, this is equivalent
to the situation where every
computation exists as a platonic object, or every computation exists
implemented on some computer or
brain in a material multiverse.
On Mon, Sep 04, 2006 at 03:33:33PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't understand this, for in a Multiverse Klara is no longer an
inert system. Maudlin's argument relies on Klara being inert, or so I
thought.
You are right. But in a multiverse Klara can be made inert too. Maudlin
Brent Meeker writes:
If every computation is implemented everywhere anyway, this is equivalent
to
the situation where every computation exists as a platonic object, or
every
computation exists implemented on some computer or brain in a material
multiverse.
But if implementing
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
[Stathis Papaioannou]
No, it follows from the idea that anything can be a computation. I think
this
is trivially obvious, like saying any string of apparently random
characters
is a translation of any English sentence of similar or
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
The requirement that computations require counterfactuals isn't
ad hoc, it comes from the observation that computer programmes
include if-then
Brent meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
[Stathis Papaioannou]
No, it follows from the idea that anything can be a computation. I think
this
is trivially obvious, like saying any string of apparently random
characters
is a translation of any
Le 03-sept.-06, à 05:07, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
The dynamism part can be provided by a simple physical system such as
the idle passage of time.
If you allow for parallel processing you don't need much time either.
This leads to a situation whereby
every computation is implemented
Le 03-sept.-06, à 12:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Sure, the computation is the same (although I find it much harder to
imagine the computation as a pure Platonic
object than I do numbers), but its expression and implementation are
infinitely variable.
With CT you can see all the
Hi Stathis,
Le 03-sept.-06, à 15:03, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
I think you mix the Mallah Putnam implementation problem, related to
the idea that any piece of matter could compute, and Maudlin's thought
experiment showing the incompatibility of the physical supervenience
thesis (that
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Maudlin build first a digital machine, let us call it M, which do a
computation PI (Maudlin's name for it) which we suppose does correspond
to a genuine consciousness experience (for example some remembering of
the taste of cocoa).
At this point we don't know whether
On Sun, Sep 03, 2006 at 03:03:02PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Then Maudlin reintroduces the unused parts, the Klaras, which
reintroduces the counterfactual correctness, WITHOUT ADDING any comp
relevant physical activity (if not, it would mean the level is
incorrect(*)). So comp + physical
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
If every computation is implemented everywhere anyway, this is equivalent to
the situation where every
computation exists as a platonic object, or every computation exists
implemented on some computer or
brain in a material multiverse.
But if implementing a
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 03-sept.-06, à 05:07, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
The dynamism part can be provided by a simple physical system such as
the idle passage of time.
If you allow for parallel processing you don't need much time either.
This leads to a situation whereby
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
I'm not necessarily talking about every possible computation being
implemented by
every physical system, just (at least) the subset of finite
computations implemented by
a physical computer or brain. I
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
I'm not necessarily talking about every possible computation being
implemented by every physical system, just (at least) the subset of finite
computations implemented by a physical
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
The requirement that computations require counterfactuals isn't
ad hoc, it comes from the observation that computer programmes
include if-then statements.
The idea that
Brent Meeker writes:
[Stathis Papaioannou]
No, it follows from the idea that anything can be a computation. I think
this
is trivially obvious, like saying any string of apparently random
characters
is a translation of any English sentence of similar or shorter length,
and if
Peter Jones writes:
Computer always have counterfactuals, because there changing
one part of them (whether data or programme) has an effect on
the overall behaviour. Changing one part of a recording (e.g splicing
a film) changes only *that* part.
I don't think you can distinguish
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Russell Standish writes:
On Sun, Aug 27, 2006 at 09:31:15PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It seems to me that the idea of a deterministic machine being conscious
is
assumed to be preposterous, for no good
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Computer always have counterfactuals, because there changing
one part of them (whether data or programme) has an effect on
the overall behaviour. Changing one part of a recording (e.g splicing
a film) changes only *that* part.
Le 29-août-06, à 13:14, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
I'm not necessarily talking about every possible computation being
implemented by
every physical system, just (at least) the subset of finite
computations implemented by
a physical computer or brain. I think this is another way of
Peter Jones writes:
I'm not necessarily talking about every possible computation being
implemented by
every physical system, just (at least) the subset of finite computations
implemented by
a physical computer or brain. I think this is another way of saying that a
recording, or
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes (quoting Russell Standish and SP):
It is true that Maudlin's argument depends on the absurdity of a
recording being conscious. If you can accept a recording as being
conscious, then you would have trouble in accepting the conclusion
Peter Jones writes:
[quoting Quentin Anciaux]
I didn't claim that, I simply asked more explanation on the following answer
you give to Stathis:
Stathis: For example, the version of me alive
in the multiverse branches where he has won the lottery every week for a
year
has much
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
I'm not necessarily talking about every possible computation being
implemented by
every physical system, just (at least) the subset of finite computations
implemented by
a physical computer or brain. I think this is another way of
1Z wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Russell Standish writes:
On Sun, Aug 27, 2006 at 09:31:15PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It seems to me that the idea of a deterministic machine being conscious is
assumed to be preposterous, for no good reason. I believe that I could have
Russell Standish writes:
On Sun, Aug 27, 2006 at 09:31:15PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It seems to me that the idea of a deterministic machine being conscious is
assumed to be
preposterous, for no good reason. I believe that I could have acted
differently even with
Papaioannou
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: computationalism and supervenience
Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2006 15:38:23 +0200
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Le 28-août-06, à 07:42, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno marchal writes:
Le 26
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Russell Standish writes:
On Sun, Aug 27, 2006 at 09:31:15PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It seems to me that the idea of a deterministic machine being conscious
is assumed to be
preposterous, for no good reason. I believe that I could have acted
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I'm not necessarily talking about every possible computation being
implemented by
every physical system, just (at least) the subset of finite computations
implemented by
a physical computer or brain. I think this is another way of saying that a
recording, or
Hi,
Le Tuesday 29 Août 2006 16:41, 1Z a écrit :
I think we
can still say this if the multiverse is run in Platonia, which does not
allow the removal of multiverse branches in the same way possible with a
computer model. For example, the version of me alive in the multiverse
branches
Le Tuesday 29 Août 2006 16:46, 1Z a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I'm not necessarily talking about every possible computation being
implemented by every physical system, just (at least) the subset of
finite computations implemented by a physical computer or brain. I think
this is
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Tuesday 29 Août 2006 16:46, 1Z a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I'm not necessarily talking about every possible computation being
implemented by every physical system, just (at least) the subset of
finite computations implemented by a physical computer
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
If it was the case, then any sufficiently rich people in this reality should
be less conscious than me... Imagine poor Bill Gates, the richest man, but
the less conscious... Because if rich people of this reality are not in lower
measure state than common people...
Le Tuesday 29 Août 2006 17:32, 1Z a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
If it was the case, then any sufficiently rich people in this reality
should be less conscious than me... Imagine poor Bill Gates, the richest
man, but the less conscious... Because if rich people of this reality are
not
Le Tuesday 29 Août 2006 17:30, 1Z a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Tuesday 29 Août 2006 16:46, 1Z a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I'm not necessarily talking about every possible computation being
implemented by every physical system, just (at least) the subset of
finite
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Tuesday 29 Août 2006 17:32, 1Z a écrit :
t be of a large measure... till there is one !
We are all individuals, and as such have the same measure..
What do you mean by that ? measure is about an OM.
OM's are even more individual than observers.
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Tuesday 29 Août 2006 20:23, 1Z a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Tuesday 29 Août 2006 17:32, 1Z a écrit :
t be of a large measure... till there is one !
We are all individuals, and as such have the same measure..
What do you mean by that ?
Le Tuesday 29 Août 2006 20:48, 1Z a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Tuesday 29 Août 2006 20:23, 1Z a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Tuesday 29 Août 2006 17:32, 1Z a écrit :
t be of a large measure... till there is one !
We are all individuals, and as such have the
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Tuesday 29 Août 2006 20:48, 1Z a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Tuesday 29 Août 2006 20:23, 1Z a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Tuesday 29 Août 2006 17:32, 1Z a écrit :
t be of a large measure... till there is one !
We are all
Peter Jones writes (quoting Russell Standish and SP):
It is true that Maudlin's argument depends on the absurdity of a
recording being conscious. If you can accept a recording as being
conscious, then you would have trouble in accepting the conclusion
that counterfactuals are
Bruno wrote...
KURTZ S. A., 1983, On the Random Oracle Hypothesis, Information and
Control, 57, pp. 40-47.
I recall reading this paper, and the followup entitled The Random
Oracle Hypothesis is False by Chang et al.
From recollection though, the claim was of superior algorithmic
Brent Meeker writes:
This may be coincidental, but I think not. Your PC is engineered to
avoid the effects of chaos to prevent this very thing occurring. Why
wouldn't nature do the same thing unless it were deliberately trying
to exploit randomness?
In nature there's no reason to depend
Le 27-aot-06, 17:49, 1Z a crit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 25-aot-06, 02:31, 1Z a crit :
Of course it can. Anything can be attached to a bare substrate.
It follows from the UDA that you cannot do that, unless you put
explicitly actual infinite in the bare substrate,
I don't see
Le 27-août-06, à 19:56, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Come on, I have already insist on this. Understanding what really
means
surviving through the yes doctor = understanding that, in *that*
case, we survive without doctor.
Without the doctor is computationalism+Platonism, not
Le 28-août-06, à 05:37, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
It *has* been proved (by diagonalization) that there exist some
problem
in number theory which are soluble by a machine using a random oracle,
although no machine with pseudorandom oracle can sole the problem.
That's interesting:
Le 27-août-06, à 12:43, Russell Standish a écrit :
I recall reading this paper, and the followup entitled The Random
Oracle Hypothesis is False by Chang et al.
Have you the reference? Do you know if Chang has found a math error, or
a conceptual mishandling? I would be interested to know.
Le 28-août-06, à 07:42, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno marchal writes:
Le 26-août-06, à 16:35, 1Z a écrit :
And since the computer may be built and programmed in an arbitrarily
complex way, because any physical
system can be mapped onto any computation with the appropriate
On Mon, Aug 28, 2006 at 03:41:00PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 27-août-06, à 12:43, Russell Standish a écrit :
I recall reading this paper, and the followup entitled The Random
Oracle Hypothesis is False by Chang et al.
Have you the reference? Do you know if Chang has found
Russell Standish writes:
On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 10:01:36PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a true
random
number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, only the
former
could possibly be
Brent Meeker writes (quoting Russell Standish):
This may be coincidental, but I think not. Your PC is engineered to
avoid the effects of chaos to prevent this very thing occurring. Why
wouldn't nature do the same thing unless it were deliberately trying
to exploit randomness?
In
Le 25-août-06, à 02:31, 1Z a écrit :
Of course it can. Anything can be attached to a bare substrate.
It follows from the UDA that you cannot do that, unless you put
explicitly actual infinite in the bare substrate, an then attach your
mind to it (how?).
If it
were impossible to attach
Le 25-août-06, à 10:09, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
You would if it were the non-miraculous branches that were selectively
pruned, although I guess that it is just this sort of pruning people
would
be asking of God (you would hardly need to pray that your coffee remain
coffee).
Le 26-août-06, à 14:01, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Peter Jones writes:
That doesn't follow. Comutationalists don't
have to believe any old programme is conscious.
It might be the case that only an indeterministic
one will do. A deterministic programme could
be exposed as a programme
Le 26-août-06, à 16:35, 1Z a écrit :
And since the computer may be built and programmed in an arbitrarily
complex way, because any physical
system can be mapped onto any computation with the appropriate
mapping rules,
That is not a fact.
It would make sense, indeed, only if the map
Le 26-août-06, à 17:39, Russell Standish a écrit :
A non-computationalist will believe that the Multiverse contains
conscious processes (if they believe in a Multiverse at all). However,
they may disagree that the Multiverse is Turing emulable.
No. A computaionalist has no reason to
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 25-août-06, à 02:31, 1Z a écrit :
Of course it can. Anything can be attached to a bare substrate.
It follows from the UDA that you cannot do that, unless you put
explicitly actual infinite in the bare substrate,
I don't see why.
an then attach your
mind to it
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Russell Standish writes:
On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 10:01:36PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a
true random
number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, only the
Russell Standish wrote:
On Fri, Aug 25, 2006 at 04:48:01PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The UD is
quite possibly enough to emulate the full Multiverse (this is sort of
where
Bruno's partail results are pointing), which we know contain conscious
processes.
Of course a
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Come on, I have already insist on this. Understanding what really means
surviving through the yes doctor = understanding that, in *that*
case, we survive without doctor.
Without the doctor is computationalism+Platonism, not
computationalism.
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes (quoting Russell Standish):
This may be coincidental, but I think not. Your PC is engineered to
avoid the effects of chaos to prevent this very thing occurring. Why
wouldn't nature do the same thing unless it were deliberately trying
to exploit
On Sun, Aug 27, 2006 at 09:31:15PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It seems to me that the idea of a deterministic machine being conscious is
assumed to be
preposterous, for no good reason. I believe that I could have acted
differently even with
identical environmental inputs, which is
Bruno Marchal writes:
Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a
true random
number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, only
the former
could possibly be conscious? I suppose it is possible, but I see no
reason to believe
that it
Bruno marchal writes:
Le 26-août-06, à 16:35, 1Z a écrit :
And since the computer may be built and programmed in an arbitrarily
complex way, because any physical
system can be mapped onto any computation with the appropriate
mapping rules,
That is not a fact.
It would
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jone swrites:
What I meant was, if a computer program can be associated with
consciousness, then a rigid and deterministic computer program can also
be associated with consciousness -
That doesn't follow. Comutationalists don't
have to believe
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
[quoting Russell Standish]
The Game of Life is known to be Turing complete. However, I do not
think any arrangement of dots in GoL could be conscious. Rather there
is an arrangement that implements a universal dovetailer. The UD is
Brent Meeker writes:
What I meant was, if a computer program can be associated with
consciousness, then a rigid and deterministic computer program can also
be associated with consciousness - leaving aside the question of how
exactly the association occurs. For example, suppose I have
Brent Meeker writes:
I'm responsible for a misunderstanding if you thought I meant recording
in the usual sense of the word, i.e. a copy of a limited subset (sound or
video, for example) of a subject's attributes over a period of time. What
I intended was a copy of all of the
Peter Jones writes:
That doesn't follow. Comutationalists don't
have to believe any old programme is conscious.
It might be the case that only an indeterministic
one will do. A deterministic programme could
be exposed as a programme in a Turing Test.
Then you're saying
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It was never conscious, and if anyonw concludede it was on
the first run, they were mistaken. The TT is a rule-of-thumb for
detecting,
it does not magically endow consciousness.
Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a true
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
This does not necessarily mean that the consciousness is caused by or
supervenes on the pattern of dots, any more that the number 3 is caused
by or supervenes
on a collection of 3 objects. If anything, it could be the other way
around: the
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