On 08 Oct 2013, at 20:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Why isn't computationalism the consequence of quanta though?
Human computationalism does.
But I want the simplest
On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 3:18:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2013, at 20:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Why isn't computationalism the consequence of
On 09 Oct 2013, at 15:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 3:18:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2013, at 20:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 11:18:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Oct 2013, at 15:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 3:18:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2013, at 20:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4,
On Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 8:39 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 11:18:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Oct 2013, at 15:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 3:18:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2013, at
On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 4:56:45 PM UTC-4, Platonist Guitar Cowboy
wrote:
On Wed, Oct 9, 2013 at 8:39 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote:
On Wednesday, October 9, 2013 11:18:03 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Oct 2013, at 15:43, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On
On 07 Oct 2013, at 17:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation to all other
experiences; specific experiences which directly relate,
On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:00 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The argument is simply
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 3:40:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Oct 2013, at 17:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Qualia is experience which contains the felt relation
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 10:10:25 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:00 PM, Craig Weinberg
whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
wrote:
On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5
On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 3:40:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Oct 2013, at 17:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Qualia
On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 11:18 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 10:10:25 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
On Sun, Oct 6, 2013 at 3:00 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote:
On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:41:26 PM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
Craig,
I agree with you that there is some building up required to create a
full and rich human experience, which cannot happen in a single instance or
with a single CPU instruction being executed. However, where I disagree
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 12:34:57 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Oct 2013, at 17:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 8, 2013 3:40:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Oct 2013, at 17:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno
On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible
On Monday, October 7, 2013 3:56:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Oct 2013, at 22:00, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal
On Craig’s use of the term “Aesthetic”.
One of the hindrances preventing me from understanding Craig’s statements
is the pluralistic use of the term “aesthetics”. Sorry for not being able
to produce a proper account but the following conflicts will just be stream
of consciousness for 15 minutes:
I can understand why it seems that my use of 'aesthetic' (and sense) is all
over the place, and part of that is because I am trying to prompt others to
make a connection between all of the different uses of the word. What I
like about aesthetic is:
Anesthetic is used to refer to both general
On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for
God
to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has
different qualia. This is a proof
On Sunday, October 6, 2013 5:06:31 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Oct 2013, at 03:17, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be javascript:
wrote:
The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for
God
to make a
On 04 Oct 2013, at 20:06, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/4/2013 7:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
When a consciousness is not manifested, what is it's content?
Good question. Difficult. Sometimes ago, I would have said that
consciousness exists only in manifested form.
That's what I would say.
I
On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a
functional equivalent will change the qualia the system experiences
without changing the behaviour. I don't think this is possible, for if
the qualia change the subject
On 10/5/2013 5:38 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a
functional equivalent will change the qualia the system experiences
without changing the behaviour. I don't think this is
On 6 Oct 2013, at 7:03 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/5/2013 5:38 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a
functional equivalent will change the qualia the
On 10/5/2013 1:25 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 6 Oct 2013, at 7:03 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/5/2013 5:38 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 5 October 2013 15:25, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
The question is whether swapping out part of the system for a
On 6 October 2013 08:13, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
So you agree that there could be minor or subtle changes that went
unnoticed?
Yes, but it makes no difference to the argument, since subtle changes
may be missed with a normal brain. To disprove functionalism you would
have to show
On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for God
to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has
different qualia. This is a proof of comp,
Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can
On Thursday, October 3, 2013 11:48:40 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/3/2013 4:36 PM, Pierz wrote:
The universe doesn't seem to be too fussed about immense and inescapable
redundancy.
Of course the universe doesn't care when the immense and inescapable
redundancy is in our
On 02 Oct 2013, at 20:48, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/2/2013 2:04 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 10:09:03AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be
misleading. A computation has no qualia,
On 02 Oct 2013, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/2/2013 6:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:09, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be
misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly
On 02 Oct 2013, at 22:12, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/2/2013 9:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I agree with Brent though on this. Your UDA proceeds on the basis
that a computer in a single reality (not an infinite sum of
calculations - that comes later) can have a 1p.
Yes. It has 1p, it is not a
On 03 Oct 2013, at 02:23, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 2 October 2013 00:46, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote:
Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could*
reproduce
the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they
On Friday, October 4, 2013 10:39:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Oct 2013, at 19:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:26:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Oct 2013, at 06:56, Pierz wrote:
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:46:17 AM
On 10/4/2013 7:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I
On Friday, October 4, 2013, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/3/2013 5:07 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
You seem to be agreeing with Craig that each neuron alone is conscious.
The experiment relates to replacement of neurons which play some
On 5 October 2013 12:53, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/4/2013 7:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I
On Friday, October 4, 2013, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/3/2013 5:07 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
You seem to be agreeing with Craig that each neuron alone is conscious.
The
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 6:26 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 17:09, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 1:13 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig:
The comp assumption that computations have
On Thursday, October 3, 2013 9:30:13 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 6:10 PM, Craig Weinberg
whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
wrote:
I think that evil continues to flourish, precisely because science has
not
integrated privacy into an authoritative worldview.
On Friday, October 4, 2013 4:10:02 AM UTC+10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, October 3, 2013 9:30:13 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 6:10 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com
wrote:
I think that evil continues to flourish, precisely because science has
On Thursday, October 3, 2013 4:59:17 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 10/1/2013 11:49 PM, Pierz wrote:
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 3:15:01 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 10/1/2013 9:56 PM, Pierz wrote:
Yes, I understand that to be Chalmer's main point. Although, if the
qualia can be
On 3 October 2013 10:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 10/2/2013 5:15 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 1 October 2013 23:31, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce
the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail
On Thursday, October 3, 2013 7:36:10 PM UTC-4, Pierz wrote:
On Friday, October 4, 2013 4:10:02 AM UTC+10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, October 3, 2013 9:30:13 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 6:10 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com
wrote:
I think
On 3 October 2013 14:40, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for God
to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has
different qualia. This is a proof of comp, provided that brain physics
is computable,
On 10/3/2013 4:36 PM, Pierz wrote:
The universe doesn't seem to be too fussed about immense and inescapable
redundancy.
Of course the universe doesn't care when the immense and inescapable redundancy is in our
model of it.
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to
On 10/3/2013 5:07 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
You seem to be agreeing with Craig that each neuron alone is conscious.
The experiment relates to replacement of neurons which play some part
in consciousness. The 1% remaining neurons are part of a system which
will notice that the qualia are
On 10/3/2013 4:53 PM, Pierz wrote:
On Thursday, October 3, 2013 4:59:17 AM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 10/1/2013 11:49 PM, Pierz wrote:
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 3:15:01 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 10/1/2013 9:56 PM, Pierz wrote:
Yes, I understand that to be
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 10:09:03AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be
misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a
person supported by an infinity of computation can be said to
On 01 Oct 2013, at 18:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, October 1, 2013 7:13:17 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig:
The comp assumption that computations have
qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my
view.
On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:09, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be
misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a
person supported by an infinity of computation can be said to have
qualia,
On 02 Oct 2013, at 06:56, Pierz wrote:
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:46:17 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote:
Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could*
reproduce the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they
say.
On 02 Oct 2013, at 11:04, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 10:09:03AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be
misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a
person
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:26:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Oct 2013, at 06:56, Pierz wrote:
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:46:17 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Then the reasoning shows (at a meta-level, made possible with the
assumption used) how consciousness and
On 10/2/2013 2:04 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 10:09:03AM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be
misleading. A computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a
person supported by
On 10/1/2013 11:49 PM, Pierz wrote:
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 3:15:01 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 10/1/2013 9:56 PM, Pierz wrote:
Yes, I understand that to be Chalmer's main point. Although, if the
qualia can be
different, it does present issues - how much and in what way
On 10/2/2013 6:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 19:09, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be misleading. A
computation has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a person supported by an infinity
of
On 10/2/2013 9:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I agree with Brent though on this. Your UDA proceeds on the basis that a computer in a
single reality (not an infinite sum of calculations - that comes later) can have a 1p.
Yes. It has 1p, it is not a zombie. But that 1p, for him, is really defined
Brent:
***But no matter how smart I make it, it won't experience lust.*
*
*
1. lust is not the universal criterion that makes us human, it is only
one of our humanly circumscribed paraphernalia we apply in HUMAN thinking
and HUMAN complexity with HUMAN language. Can you apply a similar criterion
On 10/2/2013 2:06 PM, John Mikes wrote:
Brent:
*//*/But no matter how smart I make it, it won't experience lust./
/
/
1. lust is not the universal criterion that makes us human, it is only one of our
humanly circumscribed paraphernalia we apply in HUMAN thinking and HUMAN complexity with
On 1 October 2013 23:31, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce the
brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a challenge to
Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It seems to me that Bruno has
On 2 October 2013 00:46, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote:
Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce
the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a
challenge to Chalmer's position has occurred
On 10/2/2013 5:15 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 1 October 2013 23:31, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce the
brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a challenge to
Chalmer's position has occurred
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 2:59:17 PM UTC-4, Brent wrote:
On 10/1/2013 11:49 PM, Pierz wrote:
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 3:15:01 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 10/1/2013 9:56 PM, Pierz wrote:
Yes, I understand that to be Chalmer's main point. Although, if the
qualia can be
On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 8:23:36 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
On 2 October 2013 00:46, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.be javascript:
wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote:
Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could*
reproduce
the brain's behaviour.
On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 3:44 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Monday, September 30, 2013 6:12:45 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
On Fri, Sep 27, 2013 at 7:49 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com
wrote:
On Friday, September 27, 2013 8:00:11 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes
Hi Liz,
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 12:30 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 October 2013 08:44, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 9/30/2013 5:05 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Even under functionalist assumptions, I still find the Turing test to
be misguided because it require the machine
On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig:
The comp assumption that computations have
qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view.
I have the same problem.
The solution is in the fact that all machines have that problem. More
exactly: all persons
On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:00, Pierz wrote:
Yes indeed, and it is compelling. Fading qualia and all that. It's
the absurdity of philosophical zombies. Those arguments did have an
influence on my thinking. On the other hand the idea that we *can*
replicate all the brain's outputs remains an
Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce the
brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a challenge to
Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It seems to me that Bruno has
convincingly argued that *if* comp holds, then consciousness
Sorry, this list behaves strangely on my iPad. I can't reply to individual
posts. The post above was meant to be a reply to stathis and his remark that
it is possible to prove that it is impossible to replicate its observable
behaviour (a brain's) without also replicating its consciousness.
On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote:
Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could*
reproduce the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they
say. But a challenge to Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It
seems to me that Bruno has convincingly argued that
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 1:13 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig:
The comp assumption that computations have
qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view.
I have the same problem.
The solution is in
On 01 Oct 2013, at 17:09, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 1:13 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig:
The comp assumption that computations have
qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view.
I had a similar thought about a chameleon brain (I call a p-Zelig instead
of a p-zombie), which would impersonate behaviors of whatever environment
it was placed into. Unlike a philosophical zombie, which would have no
personal qualia but seem like it does from the outside, the chameleon brain
On Tuesday, October 1, 2013 7:13:17 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig:
The comp assumption that computations have
qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view.
I have the same problem.
The solution is in
On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be misleading. A computation
has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a person supported by an infinity of computation
can be said to have qualia, or to live qualia.
Why an infinity of
On 01 Oct 2013, at 18:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Bruno's UDA eventually removes the requirement for a copy being
primitively real. That's one of the things that impressed me about the
argument. I think your position requires that you find a way to refute
the UDA.
I think that it does so by
On 10/1/2013 9:56 PM, Pierz wrote:
Yes, I understand that to be Chalmer's main point. Although, if the qualia can be
different, it does present issues - how much and in what way can it vary?
Yes, that's a question that interests me because I want to be able to build intelligent
machines and
On Fri, Sep 27, 2013 at 7:49 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Friday, September 27, 2013 8:00:11 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 9:28 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com
wrote:
On Thursday, September 26, 2013 11:49:29 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes
Yes indeed, and it is compelling. Fading qualia and all that. It's the
absurdity of philosophical zombies. Those arguments did have an influence
on my thinking. On the other hand the idea that we *can* replicate all the
brain's outputs remains an article of faith. I remember that almost the
On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 3:36 AM, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
If I might just butt in (said the barman)...
The more the merrier!
It seems to me that Craig's insistence that nothing is Turing emulable,
only the measurements are expresses a different ontological assumption from
the one that
On 30 September 2013 22:00, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
Yes indeed, and it is compelling. Fading qualia and all that. It's the
absurdity of philosophical zombies.
The absurd thing is not philosophical zombies, which are at least
conceivable, it is partial zombies.
Those arguments did have
Stathis
Could you provide the proof or a link to it?
Richard
On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 9:00 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.comwrote:
On 30 September 2013 22:00, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
Yes indeed, and it is compelling. Fading qualia and all that. It's the
absurdity of
On 30 Sep 2013, at 11:07 pm, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:
Stathis
Could you provide the proof or a link to it?
Richard
It's the Chalmers Fading Qualia paper cited before. The paper refers to
computer chips replacing neurons. The objection could be made that we do not
know
On Sunday, September 29, 2013 9:36:28 PM UTC-4, Pierz wrote:
If I might just butt in (said the barman)...
It seems to me that Craig's insistence that nothing is Turing emulable,
only the measurements are expresses a different ontological assumption
from the one that computationalists
On Monday, September 30, 2013 8:00:11 AM UTC-4, Pierz wrote:
Yes indeed, and it is compelling. Fading qualia and all that. It's the
absurdity of philosophical zombies. Those arguments did have an influence
on my thinking. On the other hand the idea that we *can* replicate all the
brain's
On 30 Sep 2013, at 03:36, Pierz wrote:
If I might just butt in (said the barman)...
It seems to me that Craig's insistence that nothing is Turing
emulable, only the measurements are expresses a different
ontological assumption from the one that computationalists take for
granted. It's
On 9/30/2013 5:05 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Even under functionalist assumptions, I still find the Turing test to
be misguided because it require the machine to lie, while a human can
pass it by telling the truth.
Actually Turing already thought of this. If you read his paper you find that the
On 1 October 2013 08:44, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 9/30/2013 5:05 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Even under functionalist assumptions, I still find the Turing test to
be misguided because it require the machine to lie, while a human can
pass it by telling the truth.
Actually
If I might just butt in (said the barman)...
It seems to me that Craig's insistence that nothing is Turing emulable,
only the measurements are expresses a different ontological assumption
from the one that computationalists take for granted. It's evident that if
we make a flight simulator, we
Fascinating post. The illusion of qualia is perhaps something like the
illusion of consciousness - who is being fooled? (Who is the Master who
makes the grass green?)
My 2c on the Turing Test is that ELIZA passed it, so if you're being
pernickety that was solved in the 60s (I think it was) - but
On 30 September 2013 11:36, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
If I might just butt in (said the barman)...
It seems to me that Craig's insistence that nothing is Turing emulable,
only the measurements are expresses a different ontological assumption from
the one that computationalists take for
On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 9:28 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thursday, September 26, 2013 11:49:29 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 2:38 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com
wrote:
On Thursday, September 26, 2013 6:17:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes
On Thursday, September 26, 2013 6:17:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
Hi Craig (and all),
Now that I have a better understanding of your ideas, I would like to
confront you with a thought experiment. Some of the stuff you say
looks completely esoteric to me, so I imagine there are
On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 2:38 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thursday, September 26, 2013 6:17:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
Hi Craig (and all),
Now that I have a better understanding of your ideas, I would like to
confront you with a thought experiment. Some of the
On Thursday, September 26, 2013 11:49:29 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 2:38 PM, Craig Weinberg
whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
wrote:
On Thursday, September 26, 2013 6:17:04 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
Hi Craig (and all),
Now that I have a
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