On 01 Sep 2009, at 18:11, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 16:34, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:53, Flammarion wrote:
That's another version of Platonia and therefore still an
ontological
commitment.
No, it is the same arithmetical truth, but from the
On 1 Sep, 09:49, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
There are two points you make that I'd like to comment specifically
on:
OK. Memory is relevant to consciousness. It is relevant
specifically to access consciousness. it is also easily explained
physically and not therefore part of the
On 1 Sep, 17:29, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 Sep, 09:49, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
There are two points you make that I'd like to comment specifically
on:
OK. Memory is relevant to consciousness. It is relevant
specifically to access consciousness. it is
On 1 Sep, 17:29, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 18:11, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 16:34, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:53, Flammarion wrote:
That's another version of Platonia and therefore still an
ontological
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on the
basis of that assumption. If you prefer a theory of mind based on
real reality, fair
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the computability of
physics.
It may be easy to lose sight, in the flurry of debate, that the
argument is
2009/9/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the computability of
physics.
It may be easy to lose sight, in the
David Nyman wrote:
On 1 Sep, 09:49, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
There are two points you make that I'd like to comment specifically
on:
OK. Memory is relevant to consciousness. It is relevant
specifically to access consciousness. it is also easily explained
physically and
On 1 Sep, 17:09, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
If you don't like this, you have the option of abandoning CTM and with
it the notion of a virtual ontology. This is so clear cut that I
would expect that you would welcome the opportunity either to accept
it or refute it with
On 01 Sep 2009, at 19:08, Brent Meeker wrote:
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the
computability of
physics.
It may be easy to lose sight, in
On 01 Sep 2009, at 18:46, Flammarion wrote:
On 1 Sep, 17:29, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
By comp, mainly by Church thesis only, you (in the third person
sense)
are implemented in the mathematical UD. OK?
The mathemaitcal UD doesn't exist.
Do you agree that it exists
On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the
On 1 Sep, 17:57, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
First, as I understand it, MGA shows that computation realizing
consciousness could be instantiated with almost zero physical
component. Since a reductio argument only entails that something in the
inferences or premises is wrong,
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 1 Sep, 18:14, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/9/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
to show
On 01 Sep 2009, at 18:57, Brent Meeker wrote:
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on
the
basis of that assumption. If you prefer
On 1 Sep, 17:46, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
time capsules are just what I am talking about. Why would you need
anythign more for the specious present than a snapshop some of
which is out of date?
Well, as well as the question of what constitutes the qualitative
character of such
David Nyman wrote:
On 1 Sep, 17:09, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
If you don't like this, you have the option of abandoning CTM and with
it the notion of a virtual ontology. This is so clear cut that I
would expect that you would welcome the opportunity either to accept
it or
On 28 Aug, 21:30, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:
*Is the 'hard problem' and 'outside' factor? Maybe, for the closed inventory
we have in today's conventional sciences. Our interpretations are temporary,
as I call it (after Colin H) our perceived reality (of today), but
different from
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
There's something going on, but I don't know why you would suppose it's
not analyzable in terms of physics.
Well, what I would say is that the temporal psychology of the specious
present is very odd in the face of
2009/9/2 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
I'm afraid that still doesn't work. I realise it's counter intuitive,
but this is the point - to recalibrate the intuitions. 'Standard' CTM
postulates that the mind is a computation implemented by the brain,
and hence in principle
2009/9/2 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
And yet it seems clear nonetheless that there is the experience of
change *within* such capsules. And if we argue that this change isn't
within the capsule, we would have to believe in some integration of
successive capsules through time, and
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/2 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
I'm afraid that still doesn't work. I realise it's counter intuitive,
but this is the point - to recalibrate the intuitions. 'Standard' CTM
postulates that the mind is a computation implemented by the brain,
and hence in
David Nyman wrote:
2009/9/2 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
And yet it seems clear nonetheless that there is the experience of
change *within* such capsules. And if we argue that this change isn't
within the capsule, we would have to believe in some integration of
successive
On 28 Aug, 18:15, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/26 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com:
On 28 Aug, 22:47, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin
On 30 Aug, 07:54, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 29 Aug 2009, at 20:34, Flammarion wrote:
On 28 Aug, 18:02, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Aug 2009, at 17:58, Brent Meeker wrote:
If the physical laws are turing emulable, then whatever is
responsible
On 30 Aug 2009, at 23:21, David Nyman wrote:
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Ok, so you want to solve the hard problem right at the beginning by
taking conscious thoughts as the basic elements of your ontology.
No I don't - that's why I said I'd rather not use the word
On 31 Aug 2009, at 15:47, Flammarion wrote:
On 30 Aug, 07:54, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 29 Aug 2009, at 20:34, Flammarion wrote:
On 28 Aug, 18:02, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Aug 2009, at 17:58, Brent Meeker wrote:
If the physical laws are turing
On 30 Aug, 22:21, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Ok, so you want to solve the hard problem right at the beginning by
taking conscious thoughts as the basic elements of your ontology.
No I don't - that's why I said I'd rather not
On 31 Aug, 00:21, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/28 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
1. It seems reasonable that relations must have relata. However,
relata
need not have a rich set of properties. You could build a physical
universe out
a single type of particle
2009/8/31 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
If the lower level is discarded, the qualia aren't there. So where
are they?
Since you find this mode of thought so uncongenial, let's focus on
this single issue for now. I don't want to say that lower levels are
completely discarded, since that of
On 31 Aug, 17:57, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/31 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
If the lower level is discarded, the qualia aren't there. So where
are they?
Since you find this mode of thought so uncongenial, let's focus on
this single issue for now. I don't
2009/8/31 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
That says nothing about qualia at all.
It would be helpful if we could deal with one issue at a time. Most
of the passage you commented on was intended - essentially at your
provocation - as a contextual exploration of possible conditions for
2009/8/31 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
It's more an attempt to characterise our
metaphysical *situation*: i.e. the intuition that it is enduring,
immediate, self-referential and self-relative. Actually, reflecting
on exchanges with Bruno, I wonder if one might well say that this
On 31 Aug, 15:14, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I would not put AR on the same par as PM(*).
I know that Peter have problem with this, but AR does not commit you
ontologically. It is just the idea that arithmetical propositions are
either true or false.
Yes, I think I finally
2009/8/31 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Peter, surely you must see that in saying abstracta are arrived at by
ignoring irrelevant features of individual objects you are simply
agreeing with Quentin that if everything is reduced to physical
interaction then computations aren't real. His
On 29 Aug 2009, at 20:34, Flammarion wrote:
On 28 Aug, 18:02, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Aug 2009, at 17:58, Brent Meeker wrote:
If the physical laws are turing emulable, then whatever is
responsible
for my consciousness can be Turing emulable at some level (I
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Ok, so you want to solve the hard problem right at the beginning by
taking conscious thoughts as the basic elements of your ontology.
No I don't - that's why I said I'd rather not use the word
consciousness. What I have in mind at this point in
2009/8/28 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
1. It seems reasonable that relations must have relata. However,
relata
need not have a rich set of properties. You could build a physical
universe out
a single type of particle and various relations.
What we're trying to get to here, remember,
2009/8/29 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I actually expect that our consciousness is very crude, compared to
the information theoretic content of our perception and our biological
function, and we could be easily fooled by the doctor. Suppose we get
a brain that makes the sky look
On 28 Aug, 17:07, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Flammarion wrote:
On 28 Aug, 02:27, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Flammarion wrote:
On 21 Aug, 21:01, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Flammarion wrote:
Do you think that if you scanned my brain
Bruno,
what do you call physics?
our figment based upon the old Greek's smart sophistication as THEY saw the
material world, or
the science BEFORE Niels Bohr, or
after QM, the newer (recent?) theories galore, or
the 'scientific' stance that will develop during the next millennia?
(Which still
On 28 Aug, 18:02, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Aug 2009, at 17:58, Brent Meeker wrote:
If the physical laws are turing emulable, then whatever is responsible
for my consciousness can be Turing emulable at some level (I assume
some form of naturalism/materialism or
On 29 Aug 2009, at 18:06, John Mikes wrote:
Bruno,
what do you call physics?
our figment based upon the old Greek's smart sophistication as THEY
saw the material world,
The greeks have discussed many different theories of matter, from
Atomism to more idealistic neoplaonist theories,
On 27 Aug 2009, at 15:04, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/8/27 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
You are right. A simpler example is a dreamer and a rock, and the
whole universe. They have locally the same input and output: none!
So
they are functionally identical, yet very different
2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/26 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com:
This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementation. If I
On 27 Aug, 20:11, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
and hence that it can't
in and of itself tell us anything fundamental about ontology.
I don't think it revelas it sown ontology. OTOH, it must somehow
be taken accounto fi in any
On 28 Aug, 02:20, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
the door is opened to some grander metaphysical speculation
concerning the nature of the world. For example, it is often noted
that physics characterizes its basic entities only extrinsically, in
terms of their relations to
On 27 Aug 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
But you see Brent, here you confirm that materialist are religious in
the way they try to explain, or explain away the mind body problem. I
On 28 Aug, 08:42, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 27 Aug 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
But you see Brent, here you confirm that materialist are religious in
the
On 28 Aug, 02:27, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Flammarion wrote:
On 21 Aug, 21:01, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Flammarion wrote:
Do you think that if you scanned my brain right down to the atomic
level,
you still wouldn't have captured all the
On 28 Aug, 09:50, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On 28 Aug, 07:27, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/26 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com:
This is
On 28 Aug, 07:27, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/26 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com:
This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
On 28 Aug, 12:53, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Aug 2009, at 10:52, Flammarion wrote:
On 28 Aug, 08:42, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 27 Aug 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 22 Aug 2009, at
On 28 Aug 2009, at 10:52, Flammarion wrote:
On 28 Aug, 08:42, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 27 Aug 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
But you see Brent, here you
2009/8/28 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com:
Well, I don't think that it is just words, but it can be difficult to
see this because of the heavy freight of association carried by the
standard vocabulary. At root, if one doesn't intuit the 'personal'
(in the most general sense - e.g. Bruno's
On 28 Aug, 13:51, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
Is functionalism monism, property dualism, or might it even be a form
of substance dualism?
Monism
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Is your experience the same? Do you experience frabjous? If you
put melody for frabjous, you've got synsathesia. I'd say that
functional equivalence is relative to the level. At *some* level
equal-input-output=equal-experience, but not at
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/26 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com:
This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
independant of the (physical or ... virtual)
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Aug 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
But you see Brent, here you confirm that materialist are religious in
the way they try to explain, or explain away the
Flammarion wrote:
On 28 Aug, 02:27, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Flammarion wrote:
On 21 Aug, 21:01, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Flammarion wrote:
Do you think that if you scanned my brain right down to the atomic
level,
you still wouldn't have captured
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Is your experience the same? Do you experience frabjous? If you
put melody for frabjous, you've got synsathesia. I'd say that
functional equivalence is relative to the level. At *some* level
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/26 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com:
This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/26 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com:
This is because if consciousness is a
On 28 Aug 2009, at 17:58, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Aug 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
But you see Brent, here you confirm that materialist are
religious
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/26 David Nyman
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/26 David Nyman
2009/8/29 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin
2009/8/26 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com:
2009/8/26 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com:
With the example of the light, you alter the photoreceptors in the
retina so that they respond the same way when to a blue light that
they would have when exposed to a red light.
Ah, so the
2009/8/27 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Does functionalism mean nothing more than if the same inputs produce
the same outputs then the experience will be the same? I think this
is to simplistic. To reduce it to a really simple example, suppose
your brain functions so that:
You
2009/8/27 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
You are right. A simpler example is a dreamer and a rock, and the
whole universe. They have locally the same input and output: none! So
they are functionally identical, yet very different from the first
person perspective. This is why in comp I
2009/8/27 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com:
There's something trickier here, too. When you say unless you are
the system, this masks an implicit - and dualistic - assumption in
addition to PM monism. It is axiomatic that any properly monistic
materialist account must hold all properties
2009/8/27 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com:
This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementation. If I
perfom the computation on an abacus or within my head or with stones
on the ground... it is the same (from
2009/8/27 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com:
Perhaps not, but it's just words. Materialists use dualism as a term
of abuse, and some materialists will call anyone who thinks a lot
about consciousness a dualist, while some of those who think a lot
about consciousness will do anything to
On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
But you see Brent, here you confirm that materialist are religious in
the way they try to explain, or explain away the mind body problem. I
can imagine that your consciousness supervene
On 26 Aug, 01:00, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
Just so. To recapitulate the (approximate) history of this part of the
discussion, Peter and I had been delving into the question - posed by
him - of whether a complete scan of a brain at the subatomic level
could in principle
On 27 Aug, 01:35, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/27 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
The idea of 'being' somebody (or thing) else already assumes dualism.
It assumes some 'I' that could move to be Stathis or a bat and yet
retain some identity. But on a
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2009/8/26 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com:
2009/8/26 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com:
With the example of the light, you alter the photoreceptors in the
retina so that they respond the same way when to a blue light that
they would have when exposed to a red
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/8/27 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Does functionalism mean nothing more than if the same inputs produce
the same outputs then the experience will be the same? I think this
is to simplistic. To reduce it to a really simple example, suppose
your
On 21 Aug, 16:39, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/21 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
Do you concede that many aspects of mind -- cognition, memory and so
on --
are not part of any Hard Problem?
Yes, absolutely. But I think our basic divergence is that I say you
can't
On 21 Aug, 21:01, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Flammarion wrote:
Do you think that if you scanned my brain right down to the atomic
level,
you still wouldn't have captured all the information?
That's an interesting question and one that I think relates to the
On 21 Aug, 20:40, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 21 Aug 2009, at 17:39, David Nyman wrote:
With UDA alone, of course not.
But AUDA does provides a a theory of qualia which explains why no 1-
person can and will ever explain the qualitative feature of its qualia.
It treats
2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
and hence that it can't
in and of itself tell us anything fundamental about ontology.
I don't think it revelas it sown ontology. OTOH, it must somehow
be taken accounto fi in any succesful ontology because everything
must.
I've considered the
On 26 Aug, 17:58, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 26 Aug 2009, at 17:58, Brent Meeker wrote:
What about lower levels? Surely it doesn't matter whether 10,000 K+
cross the axon membrane or 10,001 cross. So somehow looking at just
the right level matters in the hypothesis of
On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/8/26 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com:
This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementation. If I
perfom the computation on an abacus or within my
David Nyman wrote:
2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com:
and hence that it can't
in and of itself tell us anything fundamental about ontology.
I don't think it revelas it sown ontology. OTOH, it must somehow
be taken accounto fi in any succesful ontology because
Flammarion wrote:
On 21 Aug, 21:01, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Flammarion wrote:
Do you think that if you scanned my brain right down to the atomic
level,
you still wouldn't have captured all the information?
That's an interesting question and one that I think relates
2009/8/26 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com:
On 25 Aug, 14:32, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
Let's say the alien brain in its initial environment produced a
certain output when it was presented with a certain input, such as a
red light. The reconstructed brain is in a
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/8/26 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com:
On 25 Aug, 14:32, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
Let's say the alien brain in its initial environment produced a
certain output when it was presented with a certain input, such as a
red light. The
On 26 Aug 2009, at 17:58, Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/8/26 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com:
On 25 Aug, 14:32, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
snip
I think what I have proposed is consistent with functionalism, which
may or may not be true. A
2009/8/26 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I sometimes have the feeling you're saying something interesting...and
wishing I knew what it was.
Alas, I'm filled with chagrin. On reflection, I share both of those
feelings fairly regularly! I've spent a lot of time over the years -
too
2009/8/26 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com:
To me, 60% of David's posts are intricately worded works of Ciceronian
prose that eloquently make points of great depth and insight...and the
other 40% are intricately worded works of eye-crossingly impenetrable
prose of which I can make neither
2009/8/26 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com:
With the example of the light, you alter the photoreceptors in the
retina so that they respond the same way when to a blue light that
they would have when exposed to a red light.
Ah, so the alien has photoreceptors and retinas? That's an
David Nyman wrote:
2009/8/26 Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com:
With the example of the light, you alter the photoreceptors in the
retina so that they respond the same way when to a blue light that
they would have when exposed to a red light.
Ah, so the alien has photoreceptors and
2009/8/26 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I don't see that. I conjectured that with sufficient knowledge of the
environment in which the alien functioned and input-outputs at the
corresponding level, one could provide and account of the alien's
experience. I was my point that simply
David Nyman wrote:
2009/8/26 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I don't see that. I conjectured that with sufficient knowledge of the
environment in which the alien functioned and input-outputs at the
corresponding level, one could provide and account of the alien's
experience. I was
2009/8/26 Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com:
It seems as though we can comprehend 'mind' only in terms of some
self-instantiating, self-interpreting context, in which meaning
depends always on the self-relating logic of differentiation and
interaction. Hence the 'perspective' of mind is
2009/8/27 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I'm questioning something more subtle here, I think. First, one could
simply decide to be eliminativist about experience, and hold that the
extrinsic PM account is both exhaustive and singular. In this case,
'being' anything is simply an
On 24 Aug 2009, at 18:58, Brent Meeker wrote:
There is no other definition of computation.
Quantum computation are Turing emulable, and beyond this physicists
have not defined or addressed the notion of computation. The Church-
Turing definition is very large. And the Church-Turing
2009/8/25 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I think so, IF the alien brain were given the stimuli it evolved to
interpret - otherwise the alien might just experience noise. But, as
I understand it, the MGA still relies on the context of some external
physics to provide the intuition
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