Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On Thursday, February 20, 2014 6:56:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi ghibbsa, On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:19, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Thursday, February 20, 2014 2:59:50 PM UTC, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Bruno, You've said somewhere in this thread that by logic comp cannot be incomplete because it's a religious position. Hmm... OK. Are you saying I got that wrong? No doubt you have your reasons for seeing things this way. But, it doesn't change anything, that you have declared a link in your world view, religious. It is a believe in a technological form of reincarnation, and then related to a form of immortality, with some natural Pythagorean neoplatonist interpretation. It is a religion, with its canonical theology. OK. This means also that you have the right to say no to the doctor, a bit like Jehovah Witness (as we call them here) can (or not, in some country) refuse a sanguine transfusion for their kids. It's not religion part I'm objecting to, but how you used it in context of what the other guy - Nyman I think - had just said to you. He was asking you a question that certainly I would like to know the answer of too. That is, you have consistently fielded points of order from sceptical individuals by telling them they are assuming not-comp. Which is a serious charge, because if they are guilty of that, they are debating your ideas in bad blood, because you make it clear that's the key assumption walking in. Understood, you rarely or never disallow that assuming not-comp was innocent of all that - instead just unrealized logical implication for some messy bits in thinkin. But David, if it was him, asked a really useful question both ways, that answered carefully and thoughtfully can serve either to reveal or refute the implied conjecture that comp needs some housekeeping maybe, is partial still maybe, and maybe that's a way to say no to the doctor while very strongly leaning to something of the fundamental going on in computer workings It needs answering. What it got on this occasion was some line about logical decrees that comp is perfect by necessity, immediately then degraded to religious belief, or apparently so. It's that way you used it that I'm taking exception to, silencing an unanswered question that sits at the heart of quite a few people's thinking here, or so it has seemed to me. If it's religious, it's religious. You can't have science, science, science, religious, science, science That just makes everything equal to, religious. That is a vast subject, but I think we can handle all questions with the scientific attitude, which consists in putting clear cards on the table, and clear means of verification, testing, etc. Even theology. It is just a bad contingencies that theology has not yet come back to non confessional academies. It isn't. In the end it boils down to which way you go on a single question. Was something profound and unique taking place in the new ways that came to be known as science? Or was and is, science nothihng more than another extension - downward - of philosophy? Now, that's the sort of thing I would consider wheeling out religion for an answer. It isn't resolved and so in large part it's about what your intuition - so to others your faith - says. Invoking religion the way you did, says you see science nothing special FWIW I go the other way. When you said it, the other guy was trying on his intuition that something is partial or incomplete in comp, and if that's the case, it's a legitimate position to want more evidence before saying yes to the doctor. Yes, but comp predicts that the soul of the machine will ask for an infinity of evidence, and the honest doctor must say, I don't know, it is your choice. In fact such a skeptic appears in the proof of Solovay theorem. There is guy there asking for a proof that he will not access a cul-de-sac world, before buying its accessibility ticket. All follows from the fact that he will just never buy the ticket. The above two lines are candidates for the kind of trippy vocabularly - that I don't mind - but which don't have a useful place in science, or didn't used to. I mean, I'm all for gratuitously throwing out metaphor. I'm guilty of that. But is that what you are doing? Or are you confusing metaphor for real events in reasoning in t heir final most simplified form? intis that what you are claiming? I'm not sure. Maybe everyone else is. In which case it'll be firing squad at dawn for me, instead of you. And I am not here to defend comp, or even allude that it might be true. I don't know. i just display the consequence I believe you are sincere when you say this, which is a lot, on a regular basis. But I question whether it makes things clearer or murkier? You don't talk about anything else. You won't talk to other
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On Mon, Feb 24, 2014 at 7:42 AM, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, February 20, 2014 6:56:39 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi ghibbsa, On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:19, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, February 20, 2014 2:59:50 PM UTC, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Bruno, You've said somewhere in this thread that by logic comp cannot be incomplete because it's a religious position. Hmm... OK. Are you saying I got that wrong? No doubt you have your reasons for seeing things this way. But, it doesn't change anything, that you have declared a link in your world view, religious. It is a believe in a technological form of reincarnation, and then related to a form of immortality, with some natural Pythagorean neoplatonist interpretation. It is a religion, with its canonical theology. OK. This means also that you have the right to say no to the doctor, a bit like Jehovah Witness (as we call them here) can (or not, in some country) refuse a sanguine transfusion for their kids. It's not religion part I'm objecting to, but how you used it in context of what the other guy - Nyman I think - had just said to you. He was asking you a question that certainly I would like to know the answer of too. That is, you have consistently fielded points of order from sceptical individuals by telling them they are assuming not-comp. Which is a serious charge, because if they are guilty of that, they are debating your ideas in bad blood, because you make it clear that's the key assumption walking in. Understood, you rarely or never disallow that assuming not-comp was innocent of all that - instead just unrealized logical implication for some messy bits in thinkin. But David, if it was him, asked a really useful question both ways, that answered carefully and thoughtfully can serve either to reveal or refute the implied conjecture that comp needs some housekeeping maybe, is partial still maybe, and maybe that's a way to say no to the doctor while very strongly leaning to something of the fundamental going on in computer workings It needs answering. What it got on this occasion was some line about logical decrees that comp is perfect by necessity, immediately then degraded to religious belief, or apparently so. It's that way you used it that I'm taking exception to, silencing an unanswered question that sits at the heart of quite a few people's thinking here, or so it has seemed to me. If it's religious, it's religious. You can't have science, science, science, religious, science, science That just makes everything equal to, religious. That is a vast subject, but I think we can handle all questions with the scientific attitude, which consists in putting clear cards on the table, and clear means of verification, testing, etc. Even theology. It is just a bad contingencies that theology has not yet come back to non confessional academies. It isn't. In the end it boils down to which way you go on a single question. Was something profound and unique taking place in the new ways that came to be known as science? Or was and is, science nothihng more than another extension - downward - of philosophy? Now, that's the sort of thing I would consider wheeling out religion for an answer. It isn't resolved and so in large part it's about what your intuition - so to others your faith - says. Invoking religion the way you did, says you see science nothing special FWIW I go the other way. When you said it, the other guy was trying on his intuition that something is partial or incomplete in comp, and if that's the case, it's a legitimate position to want more evidence before saying yes to the doctor. Yes, but comp predicts that the soul of the machine will ask for an infinity of evidence, and the honest doctor must say, I don't know, it is your choice. In fact such a skeptic appears in the proof of Solovay theorem. There is guy there asking for a proof that he will not access a cul-de-sac world, before buying its accessibility ticket. All follows from the fact that he will just never buy the ticket. The above two lines are candidates for the kind of trippy vocabularly - that I don't mind - but which don't have a useful place in science, or didn't used to. I mean, I'm all for gratuitously throwing out metaphor. I'm guilty of that. But is that what you are doing? Or are you confusing metaphor for real events in reasoning in t heir final most simplified form? intis that what you are claiming? I'm not sure. Maybe everyone else is. In which case it'll be firing squad at dawn for me, instead of you. And I am not here to defend comp, or even allude that it might be true. I don't know. i just display the consequence I believe you are sincere when you say this, which is a lot, on a regular basis. But I question whether it makes things clearer or murkier? You don't talk about anything else. You won't talk to other
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 25 February 2014 01:57, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: MWI cannot be falsified in the Popperian sense because all scientific experiments are necessarily limited to one world. Yet MWI is central to asking the doctor. But there is no scientific experiment that verifies MWI. Indeed, there is no experiment that verifies MWI (or anything else... :) However a suggested falsification from Deutsch is if there is some limit to how much information a quantum computer can handle. If it can handle 500 qubits then according to the MWI that is 2^500 universes being involved in the calculation. Penrose would probably say that the superposition of 500 qubits would collapse the wavefunction (something to do with the difference between superposed worlds exceeding some gravitational threshold, I believe). So that's a falsification test which may become technologically feasible at some point. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 19 Feb 2014, at 21:53, John Mikes wrote: Another silly question: Bruno and List: how on Earth can we talk aboput TOE? (unless we restrict it to the presently knowable inventory of physically identified E). Why should we restrict ourselves to the knowable inventory of physically identified E. We can also assume some principle (like comp) and derive from its both the structure of the knowable and the unknowable. We might be unable to know if the principle is true, but that is the case will *all* theories. And the principle might appear falsifiable, so we might learn in the process. - TOE was so different in the past and assumably: will be so diffeent later on. Perhaps, or not. In my opinion the Pythagorean and Plotinian were close to the correct TOE, but then, after the closure of Plato Academy, we have come back to obscurantism and violence in the fundamental metaphysical or theological science. Your mind (or: being conscious?) begs the question of a live 1p. So the thermostat falls out. Define live? I define life by self-reproduction. Cigarette are alive, for example. They have a complex cycle of reproduction. Easy: a contraption with (your) consciousness (circular). (I presume you do not identify 'conscious' with the biological brain-activity?) I don't define consciousness. I assume we all know what it is. Only zombie does not know. Consciousness is what make pleasure 1p- pleasant, and pain 1p-unpleasant. Then again YOUR (Bruno) 'conscousness' is different from my vocabulary's entry (response to relations). MIND is believed to be an active, functional unit with memory and decisionmaking, I agree. but with comp, you can define mind by the 1p related to the machine. in my belief(?) nonlocal 3p non local? That is assuming a lot of complication. I tend to disbelieve that 3p non-locality can make sense. I like Einstein when he defines insanity by the belief in 3p non-locality. and our brain(functions) is the tool we use to apply MIND(function?) to ourselves (and the 'Everything' if you like). Absolutely. We agree here. Bruno On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 4:43 PM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:54, John Mikes wrote: Bruno, let me use simple words (you seem to overcomplicate my input). JM: What IS the 'mind' you PRESERVE? BM: My consciousness. - It means that I can surivive in the usal clinical sense, the brain digital replacement. I don't need to define my consciousness to say yes to a doctor. No more than I need to define pain to the doctor who look at me. I might need to pray, perhaps, and to hope the doctor is serious. JM:Then again your ref. to the MW duplication is irrelevant for me: I do not duplicate. It goes with my answer NO to the doctor). I am more than knowable within today's inventory. BM: No problem if you believe that comp is false. I don't argue for the truth of comp, I just present a reasoning explaining that if comp is true, then Plato-Plotin gives the right framework for a TOE, and Aristotle is refuted. (his theology and physics). ( Bruno, M Y consciousness is (my) 'response to relations' whatever show up. It includes lots of unknown items (with unknowable qualia?) beside the ones handled WITHIN my brain. So I do not trust the 'doctor's digital contraption to include ME - (total) - only my temporary brainfunction, i.e. knowledge-base of mine as of today. Your true theology is a mystery to me. How true can it be? Devising our physical world is a human effort due to the temporary status of our inventory. To think beyond it is sci-fi (cf my ref. to Liz about Jack Cohen and J. Stewart's Collapse of Chaos and Figment of Reality - the Zarathustrans). John M On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 4:04 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:54, John Mikes wrote: Bruno, let me use simple words (you seem to overcomplicate my input). What IS the 'mind' you PRESERVE? My consciousness. It means that I can surivive in the usal clinical sense, the brain digital replacement. I don't need to define my consciousness to say yes to a doctor. No more than I need to define pain to the doctor who look at me. I might need to pray, perhaps, and to hope the doctor is serious. Then again your ref. to the MW duplication is irrelevant for me: I do not duplicate. (It goes with my answer NO to the doctor). I am more than knowable within today's inventory. No problem if you believe that comp is false. I don't argue for the truth of comp, I just present a reasoning explaining that if comp is true, then Plato-Plotin gives the right framework for a TOE, and Aristotle is refuted. (his theology and physics). I find 'mindcontent' different from 'mind' (what I don't really know) and package it into 'mentality'. . I have no squalm against
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
Hi ghibbsa, On 20 Feb 2014, at 16:19, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, February 20, 2014 2:59:50 PM UTC, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: Hi Bruno, You've said somewhere in this thread that by logic comp cannot be incomplete because it's a religious position. Hmm... OK. No doubt you have your reasons for seeing things this way. But, it doesn't change anything, that you have declared a link in your world view, religious. It is a believe in a technological form of reincarnation, and then related to a form of immortality, with some natural Pythagorean neoplatonist interpretation. It is a religion, with its canonical theology. OK. This means also that you have the right to say no to the doctor, a bit like Jehovah Witness (as we call them here) can (or not, in some country) refuse a sanguine transfusion for their kids. If it's religious, it's religious. You can't have science, science, science, religious, science, science That just makes everything equal to, religious. That is a vast subject, but I think we can handle all questions with the scientific attitude, which consists in putting clear cards on the table, and clear means of verification, testing, etc. Even theology. It is just a bad contingencies that theology has not yet come back to non confessional academies. When you said it, the other guy was trying on his intuition that something is partial or incomplete in comp, and if that's the case, it's a legitimate position to want more evidence before saying yes to the doctor. Yes, but comp predicts that the soul of the machine will ask for an infinity of evidence, and the honest doctor must say, I don't know, it is your choice. In fact such a skeptic appears in the proof of Solovay theorem. There is guy there asking for a proof that he will not access a cul-de-sac world, before buying its accessibility ticket. All follows from the fact that he will just never buy the ticket. And I am not here to defend comp, or even allude that it might be true. I don't know. i just display the consequences. That's a reasonable scientific position if he can say what evidence he wants, and that can be shown to be realistic and resolvable in real time scales by scientific progress. The problem is that there are no evidence at all for non-comp either. I got the comp intuition by reading book of molecular biology, biochemistry, long before reading Gödel. He doesn't have to show where your logic is wrong. It'd be good if he could but he doesn't have to. Not if he can say a standard that is a reasonable scientific expectation for the claims you are making. He has the right to say no. We can give tuns of evidences, be we must warn him that those evidences are not proof. We must encourage him to not brag that he knows that comp is true, in case he uses classical teleportation every day, because, even for him, that is not a proof (although a string 1p evidence). So here's a standard that is reasonable. Show us proto-consciousness in a computer. Show an instance of emergence in a computer system, Show an instance of true evolution in a computer. I think that I describe this, but not at the level you want, but at the level where the physical laws themselves evolve. I show that all Löbian numbers have a rich science and a rich theology. They are conscious, but so different from us, that you have to do some work to trigger the empathy. Also, answer: Let's say, in 20 years a whole new computational paradigm emerges, that totally transforms the hardware and softare paradigm, including totally new technology for hardware based on totally new principles. Let's say that emerges from breakthrough science in brain studies. I Now. Would the reality of that new paradigm be saying no to the doctor? Or, is it impossible that this can ever happen? Is it impossible that the brain and the mysteries of Evolution, have nothing more to tell us, despite us knowing very little about its secrets in empirical terms? In front of a theory you can always speculate on a different theory. I am not sure if I see the point. It looks like you still attribute me some faith in something. I do, but not publicly. I just show the consequence of an hypothesis. You can speculate that Church's thesis is wrong, or that we are non Turing emulable entities, but it is up to you to be a little more constructive. The result can be seen as a non go theorem: you cannot have both materialism and computationalism, but comp provides the means to be tested; so why not look at it. Bruno - these are scientific concerns, and scientific standards. Religion - no problem. If you believe it and you have faith that's all well and good. I never say so. I am a scientist. I just say that if you believe in comp, then there is that reversal Plato/Aristotle, and that it has testable
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
Another silly question: Bruno and List: how on Earth can we talk aboput TOE? (unless we restrict it to the presently knowable inventory of physically identified E).- TOE was so different in the past and assumably: will be so diffeent later on. Your *mind* (or: being conscious?) begs the question of a live 1p. So the thermostat falls out. Define live? Easy: a contraption with (your) consciousness (circular). (I presume you do not identify 'conscious' with the biological brain-activity?) Then again YOUR (Bruno) 'conscousness' is different from my vocabulary's entry (response to relations). MIND is believed to be an active, functional unit with memory and decisionmaking, in my belief(?) nonlocal and our brain(functions) is the tool we use to apply MIND(function?) to ourselves (and the 'Everything' if you like). On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 4:43 PM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:54, John Mikes wrote: *Bruno*, let me use simple words (you seem to overcomplicate my input). *JM: What IS the 'mind' you PRESERVE?* *BM:* My consciousness. - It means that I can surivive in the usal clinical sense, the brain digital replacement. I don't need to define my consciousness to say yes to a doctor. No more than I need to define pain to the doctor who look at me. I might need to pray, perhaps, and to hope the doctor is serious. *JM:Then again your ref. to the MW duplication is irrelevant for me: I do not * *duplicate. It goes with my answer NO to the doctor). I am more than knowable * *within today's inventory.* *BM: *No problem if you believe that comp is false. I don't argue for the truth of comp, I just present a reasoning explaining that if comp is true, then Plato-Plotin gives the right framework for a TOE, and Aristotle is refuted. (his theology and physics). ( Bruno, *M Y consciousness is (my) 'response to relations'* whatever show up. It includes lots of unknown items (with unknowable qualia?) beside the ones handled WITHIN my brain. So I do not trust the 'doctor's digital contraption to include *ME - (total) - o*nly my temporary brainfunction, i.e. knowledge-base of mine as of today. Your true theology is a mystery to me. How true can it be? Devising our physical world is a human effort due to the temporary status of our inventory. To think beyond it is sci-fi (cf my ref. to Liz about Jack Cohen and J. Stewart's Collapse of Chaos and Figment of Reality - the Zarathustrans). John M On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 4:04 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:54, John Mikes wrote: Bruno, let me use simple words (you seem to overcomplicate my input). What IS the *'mind'* you PRESERVE? My consciousness. It means that I can surivive in the usal clinical sense, the brain digital replacement. I don't need to define my consciousness to say yes to a doctor. No more than I need to define pain to the doctor who look at me. I might need to pray, perhaps, and to hope the doctor is serious. Then again your ref. to the MW duplication is irrelevant for me: I do not duplicate. (It goes with my answer NO to the doctor). I am more than knowable within today's inventory. No problem if you believe that comp is false. I don't argue for the truth of comp, I just present a reasoning explaining that if comp is true, then Plato-Plotin gives the right framework for a TOE, and Aristotle is refuted. (his theology and physics). I find 'mindcontent' different from 'mind' (what I don't really know) and package it into 'mentality'. . I have no squalm against arithmetical reality - a notion deduced from (human?) math-thinking. Arithmetical Realism is the idea that human are correct when thinking that the number relation are true even for the non humans. It is not because a human believe in x, that x is necessarily false for non humans. Anyway, it because I can conceive that AR is false, that I politely put it in the bag of the hypotheses. What I mean as 'reality' (if it 'exists' - another 'if' to explain) is a belief that it SHOULD be - as most of us think of the world. No evidence, no facts. Physical World (and whatever pertains to it: like 'physixs') is an up-to-date explanation of yesterday's knowledge of some phenomena we adjusted up to our capabilities in a 'world'-image we derived. Yes, but that is why I do not assume anything being both primitive and physical. You make my point. But I need to start from some assumptions, and I use 2+2=4, and the yes doctor, which links computer science and theology. The physics is then explanied constructively by the theology of the true machine, with true some technical precise sense (due to Tarski). Existence is loosly identified in my vocabulary: whatever we MAY think of DOES exist in our mind (see above). Not necessarily in formats we are (capable of) handling. 3p evidence?
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 02 Feb 2014, at 20:08, meekerdb wrote: On 2/2/2014 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Dear John, On 01 Feb 2014, at 23:29, John Mikes wrote: Dear Bruno, allow me NOT to repeat the entire shabang with only 'interjecing' some remarks. My main problem is the theorem (theory, hypothesis or call it anyway you wish) of which - in myopinion - we CANNOT know all the details EVER. It is a bit fuzzy. I would like to say that I agree with this. But that does not change the validity or non validity of a reasoning made in that theoretical context. But it shows why we place so much credence in a theory that makes a surprising and correct prediction. It means the theory entails details we hadn't thought of. Which makes comp testable, as it explains all physical details. For example Z1* gives all quantum tautologies, and normally it should gives the entire (quantum) probability calculus. Physical theories just failed on the mind-body issues, necessarily so when comp is assumed. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 03 Feb 2014, at 00:19, John Mikes wrote: Bruno wrote (among many others) on Feb 1 in replying to my post of Jan 31: ...mathematical truth is not substituted for reality. i show that the machine's epistemology is already richer than the mathematical truth. Then, yes, for the ontology, IF we assume comp, then the mathematical, even the arithmetical reality, is shown to be complete. But we stay agnostic on this, as we stay agnostic on comp itself. Somehow you seem to be non agnostic on the question of reality. You seem to talk like if you knew that reality is not the arithmetical reality. Then it just means that *your* theory is incompatible with the computationalist hypothesis, and there are no problem with that (especially that you did say recently that you don't say yes to the doctor (which shows also that you are not agnostic on comp: you believe it to be false). Bruno The first 2 par-s are contradictory. ? Let us forget about 'ontology' for now, I consider it our 'figment' of what we BELIEVE is existing around us. What we assume publicly to be existing. I use belief in the sense of rational question, no in the sense of feeling that something is true (which is private and useless in scientific debate). If the 'machine's' epistemology is RICHER than math-truth (allow me to substitute here: math. reality) then the 'overall' (infinite, unknowable whatever REALITY cannot be restricted to the math-reality (which - in your choice seems to be required to be specified (=reduced in context) to mathematical). I know this is hard to understand. But arithmetic seen from inside is bigger than arithmetic. I can use this to get a simple mathematical ontology, which appears to prevent the reductionism on what is real for us, as living being, or experiencing being. I don't feel it like non-agnostic. It is non-agnostic if you derive from your experience that the ontological reality is not arithmetical. Your experience is not arithmetical, but you cannot infer from that an ontology which would be non arithmetical. If you remain open-minded (agnostic) on computationalism, you have to remain open-minded on the possibility that the outer ultimate reality is arithmetical truth. Please keep in mind that after Gödel, we know that arithmetical truth is a non axiomatizable reality. It escapes already all effective theory. It is something big, and if we are machines, we can explain that we are intrisically ignorant on it (even staying in the 3p perspective). The 'infinite(?) reality' (what we just do not know) without specifying restrictions, includes domains like (your) machine epistemology and others from the infinite complexity we have no access to today. I never called my narrative-based views a THEORY. My position - in my opinion - does not state that 'comp' is false: it sais only that it is incomplete and cannot be applied for 'final' conclusions to draw from. I leave open a backdoor for unknowns. For logical reason, comp cannot be incomplete. It is not a theory, but a religious faith. Either you can survive with an artificial brain, of you can't. But then the UDA shows that a tiny part of arithmetic provides, in that hypothetical comp frame, a theory of everything, which is indeed not completeable from inside, and has to refer to non axiomatisable notion (like arithmetical truth). The point, then, is that such a theory has testable consequence (it implies the physical laws, indeed). Nowhere we pretend it is true, nor even personally believed, but it is testable. If true, that gives the true explanation of why there is both consciousness and matter. if false, we will be able to abandon the theory. We cannot improve it, because if comp is false, it is just false. We cannot improve yes doctor, we can just decide to say no to the doctor. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 2/2/2014 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Dear John, On 01 Feb 2014, at 23:29, John Mikes wrote: Dear Bruno, allow me NOT to repeat the entire shabang with only 'interjecing' some remarks. My main problem is the theorem (theory, hypothesis or call it anyway you wish) of which - in my opinion - we CANNOT know *all the details* EVER. It is a bit fuzzy. I would like to say that I agree with this. But that does not change the validity or non validity of a reasoning made in that theoretical context. But it shows why we place so much credence in a theory that makes a surprising and correct prediction. It means the theory entails details we hadn't thought of. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
Bruno wrote (among many others) on Feb 1 in replying to my post of Jan 31: *...mathematical truth is not substituted for reality. i show that the machine's epistemology is already richer than the mathematical truth. * *Then, yes, for the ontology, IF we assume comp, then the mathematical, even the arithmetical reality, is shown to be complete.* *But we stay agnostic on this, as we stay agnostic on comp itself.* *Somehow you seem to be non agnostic on the question of reality. You seem to talk like if you knew that reality is not the arithmetical reality. * *Then it just means that *your* theory is incompatible with the computationalist hypothesis, and there are no problem with that (especially that you did say recently that you don't say yes to the doctor (which shows also that you are not agnostic on comp: you believe it to be false).* *Bruno* The first 2 par-s are contradictory. Let us forget about 'ontology' for now, I consider it our 'figment' of what we BELIEVE is existing around us. If the 'machine's' epistemology is RICHER than math-truth (allow me to substitute here: math. reality) then the 'overall' (infinite, unknowable whatever REALITY cannot be restricted to the math-reality (which - in your choice seems to be required to be specified (=reduced in context) to mathematical). I don't feel it like non-agnostic. The 'infinite(?) reality' (what we just do not know) without specifying restrictions, includes domains like (your) machine epistemology and others from the infinite complexity we have no access to today. I never called my narrative-based views a THEORY. My position - in my opinion - does not state that 'comp' is false: it sais only that it is incomplete and cannot be applied for 'final' conclusions to draw from. I leave open a backdoor for unknowns. John M -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
Brent, lt me skip my frequently written argument about 'mishaps' that happen in our 'correct' predictions (like falling off airplanes from the sky, striking sicknesses with no known reason, failed economical predictions etc. etc..) Allow me to quote an old Hungarian proverb (they are smart in many cases as folk-wisdom): a blind hen also finds grains . That does not mean I opine all the glory of our science-technology as mere luck. John M On Sun, Feb 2, 2014 at 2:08 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/2/2014 2:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Dear John, On 01 Feb 2014, at 23:29, John Mikes wrote: Dear Bruno, allow me NOT to repeat the entire shabang with only 'interjecing' some remarks. My main problem is the theorem (theory, hypothesis or call it anyway you wish) of which - in my opinion - we CANNOT know *all the details*EVER. It is a bit fuzzy. I would like to say that I agree with this. But that does not change the validity or non validity of a reasoning made in that theoretical context. But it shows why we place so much credence in a theory that makes a surprising and correct prediction. It means the theory entails details we hadn't thought of. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
Thanks for the explanation, Richard. Bruno On 26 Jan 2014, at 23:23, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 4:09 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 25 Jan 2014, at 14:05, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 6:22 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 24 Jan 2014, at 23:12, meekerdb wrote: On 1/24/2014 12:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: In your aristotelian theology. But when working on the mind-body problem, it is better to abandon all prejudices on this. Indeed with comp, it is the concrete laptop which appears as an (unconscious preprogrammed) idealization. Of course I'd say reifying arithmetic is a prejudice. No need in reifying it. You need just to believe in their truth. For some people, like Hardy, the number 8 is more concrete that the planets you can count. Our brain makes us believe the contrary, but he uses a complex universal machine to fail us on this. Yes I appreciate this viewpoint. Actually I'm pretty agnostic about what's really real. At any given time it's the ontology of our best theory; where best is not sharply defined but is measured by some mixture of predictive power, consilience, scope, definiteness, and accuracy. OK. Comp is great on scope and maybe on definiteness, but it seems very weak on the other measures. I am not sure. If comp is correct, and if there is no flaw in UDA, comp predicts the existence of physical laws. I don't know of any other theory doing that. And it is constructive, we get already the quantum logic, and they have to define the whole measure, by the UDA. Bruno, In string theory the physical laws and constants depend on how the hyper-EM flux winds thru the (500 or so) topo holes in the Calabi- Yau compact manifolds (ie., particles of 6d space). OK. What is an hyper-EM? (Hyper means ?) That is my way of referring to the electric flux that winds thru the 6d-particles of space: Flux - The fluxes in M Theory is similar to the electric fluxes but have nothing to do with electrons or photons. The presence of fluxes has the effect of holding the manifold's shape in place. The electric fluxes from an enclosed surface is equal to the number of charges within, similarly the fluxes in M Theory also comes with whole numbers of a certain unit (through each hole in the manifold). It drastically increases the complexity of the landscape. Especially when they act on the pointy end of the compactified manifold stretching it into a long, narrow neck. The result is to produce lot of valleys on the landscape with negative vacuum energy (cosmological constant), which is contrary to observation in the real world. Now the brane comes to the rescue. Brane - Similar to the antiparticle in the point approximation, every brane also has its antibrane. Anitbrane has a tendency of attracting to the pointy end and add energy into the valley to make the vacuum energy positive. Thus, by a mix of a little of everything, a point on the landscape turns out to have a small positive cosmological constant - just like the observation in the real world. It is also found that D-brane can stabilize the size as well as the shape of the compactified manifold (like the steel-belt in radial tire) at least in the Type IIB theory. This function is crucial in the superstring theory, otherwise the 6 hidden dimensions would become unwinded and getting infinitely large. Then we would be living in ten dimensional space instead of the usual three http://universe-review.ca/R15-26-CalabiYau02.htm#moduli That may constitute a prediction of the laws and constants except that the relationship between the laws and particular windings in not known (but the same may be true of comp). Interesting. String theory is a physical theory which makes me envisage that number theory might be the measure winner. There are many formal similarities suggesting this, but I can't really judge, and only the theological approach (with G*) preserves the first person/thrid person relation in a way enlightnening for an explanation of the quanta/qualia relation. Bruno Richard It is fuzzy on the precise frontier between geography and physics, but it explains at least the difference, which is not even existing in physics, except by a vague inference. Comp explains the maning of aw in physical laws. That's why I keep hoping you'll be able to come up with some surprising testable prediction. It is really a question of making people understanding the S4Grz, X and Z logics. The math is there. Just technical difficulties, to sum up. It is for the next generation. This is just standard science. It's not some Aristotelean prejudice. It's the same thing we ask of string theory and loop- quantum-gravity. You mention that you think octonion Hilbert space will be found to be more fundamental than complex Hilbert space. Of course many people have
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 26 Jan 2014, at 23:26, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear LizR, You and Bruno have often complained that my postings lack rigor... For a nice formal representation of Heraclitean streams click here and read the bit about hypersets. BTW, this is a concept almost identical to what Lou Kauffman uses in his notion of eigenforms. It is the Dx = xx method. I don't see what is Heraclitean. On the contrary, it is Parmenidian, and the Heraclitean aspect is recovered by the p nuance. More on this later (we need more modal logic). Bruno On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 5:20 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com wrote: Dear LizR, On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 5:14 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 January 2014 23:03, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 25 Jan 2014, at 14:15, David Nyman wrote: On 25 January 2014 09:21, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Maybe the difference in intuition is because she doesn't think about it in Hoyle's universalist way, although ISTM this is implicit in the heuristic (i.e. the guy is the unique and non- simultaneous owner of the experiences in all the pigeon holes). Without the flashlight, I think what people do is think of themselves as situated in some pigeon hole or other and then, as it were, imaginatively select some continuation sequence of pigeon holes from there. Yes. But we can still believe in the universalist view, through the amnesia and the return in the universal baby state, which then can be related to the universal consciousness of the universal person. In that sense we are right now the same person, but relatively amnesic of all particularities which distinguish us. Yes indeed, it is the amnesia that compartmentalises us. But it's the right now that strikes me (and, I presume, struck Hoyle) as something of an an equivocation, at least in the pigeon hole analogy. I gues that's why some people want time, if not present-time, as a primitive. I can understand the feeling, but I think that with comp it is a sort of delusion. Watching Memento gives some idea of what's really going on, by showing what life would be like after a partial breakdown of how the brain fools us into thinking we have continuous existence. It isn't too much of a stretch from imagining living in 5 minute segments to realising that we could equally well live in instants, with all of our memory being what's there right now, what's available to us in that instant, that pgeonhole. After all, logically, given the assumption of locality in physics, that's all we'd expect to be available. 'Because, like all of us in our daily lives, you're stuck with a grotesque and absurd illusion.' 'How's that?' 'The idea of time as an ever-rolling stream. The thing which is supposed to bear all its sons away. There's one thing quite certain in this business: the idea of time as a steady progression from past to future is wrong. I know very well we feel this way about it subjectively. But we're the victims of a confidence trick... Fred Hoyle, October the First is Too Late HA! Hoyle here undermines the idea that we can obtain time merely from the well ordering of integers! I focus on the action, ever- rolling stream, the progression; the ordering of events are the mere products of the stream, not the origin of the streaming. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 27 Jan 2014, at 01:36, Stephen Paul King wrote: Like I have written previously, I am past the point of buying the idea that there is a Reality out there independent of us that we passively come to experience. I am tired of explanations that ask us to believe that change is an illusion that somehow persists. Is that not contradictory? You are asking us to believe in a time independent to us, and to not believe in a reality independent to us. Bruno Can we try a different set of concepts? On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 7:28 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 27 January 2014 12:48, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com wrote: Dear LizR, : the idea of time as a steady progression from past to future is wrong. I know very well we feel this way about it subjectively. But we're the victims of a confidence trick... What other implication does Hoyle's phrasing have? His entire discussion of the pigeon holes is to point out that there is no a priori order of the holes, it is a subjective delusion that we obtain because of our inability to see the whole lot. His implication seems to me to be that the subjective experience of time can be explained as a phenomenon caused by the order of the pigeon holes, together with certain rules linking them together. The rules are basically equivalent to thermodynamics (unsurprisingly, we wouldn't get consciousness in a universe without an entropy gradient). As one of his characters explains... John went on, 'All right, let's come now to the contents of the pigeon holes. Suppose you choose one of them, say the 137th. You find in it a story, as you might find one of those little slips of paper in a Christmas cracker. But you also find statments about the stories you'll find in other pigeon holes. You decide to check up on whether these statements about the stories in the other pigeon holes are right or not. To your surprise you find the statments made about earlier pigeon holes, the 136th, the 135th, and so on, are substantially correct. But when you compare with the pigeon holes on the other side, the 138th, the 139th,...you find things aren't so good. You find a lot of contradictions and discrepancies. This turns out to be the same wherever you happen to look, in every pigeon hole. The statements made about pigeon holes on the other side are at best diffuse and at the worst just plain wrong. Now let's translate this parable into the time problem. We'll call the particular pigeon hole, the one you happen to be examining, the present. The earlier pigeon holes, the ones for which you find substantially correct statements, we call the past. The later pigeon holes, the ones for which there isn't too much in the way of correct statments, we'll call the future. Let me go on a bit further. What I want to suggest is that the actual world is very much like this. Instead of pigeon holes we talk about states.' Note that the description he gives of the 137th hole applies to all the holes - so the present is whichever hole you happen to look in. From the subjective, inside view, all moments are the present when they're being experienced, and we only experience a flow of time because of their contents (a fact which Memento guy illustrates nicely, of course). This is a description of a capsule theory of identity. Hoyle introduces a flashlight, but then shows that the order in which the flashlight is used is irrelevant - the 1st person view from inside the pigeon-holes is of continuous subjective experience. In fact, the existence or nonexistence of the flashlight is irrelevant to the subjective experience. The flashlight was introduced so the characters could think about sampling each pigeon hole, as though they could somehow stand outside time - take the bird's eye view. But of course in reality they can only take the internal, frog's eye view. Hence, imho, Hoyle is saying that it is the order of the boxes and the laws relating their contents that gives rise to the subjective experience of time. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 27 Jan 2014, at 02:55, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear LizR, On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 8:37 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 27 January 2014 13:39, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com wrote: Dear LizR, By that standard we would still be living in caves Teehee. Have you been reading Camille Paglia... No... good to know. I will try not to use that phrase... Personally I think this should be a touchstone for all people with unconventional ideas. Once you can explain them so I understand them, you're definitely onto something! pffft, I have only pitiful excuses. It takes a lot of time and concentration to write this stuff... I have less and less to dedicate for this List. :_( Sorry, knowledge does not come cheaply. :_( It has taken me countless hours of reading to get to where I am.. What is one to do, when trying to explain an idea that is unconventional? I can't seem to just shut up... Look to Bruno as an example, perhaps? He's trying to educate me in modal and predicate logic (I think) so I can better get to grips with comp. I like his pedagogy. I have learned a lot from him as well. It is wonderful to be able to sit at the feet of Masters. I just wish I could figure out how to get him (and you!) to acknowledge that there is a distinction that makes a difference between a thing and its representation. There are rules and principles of distinctions that make a difference... I am still learning of those. Good, because you do confuse often the numbers and their representions. That happens when you argue that 17 is prime is not a truth independent of us. You coinfuse the fact that 17 is prime with the knowledge of that fact, which needs human beliefs and representations. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 27 Jan 2014, at 03:25, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear LizR, George Spencer-Brown's Laws of Form are the place to start... I am not sure. I can appreciate what he did, and what Kauffman did from it, but my experience is that to begin with Spencer Brown makes the study of logic more confusing. It is hard stuff disguised in false simplicity. That's my feeling. Beginners must grasp standard logic first, I think. Bruno On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 9:22 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 27 January 2014 14:55, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com wrote: I just wish I could figure out how to get him (and you!) to acknowledge that there is a distinction that makes a difference between a thing and its representation. There are rules and principles of distinctions that make a difference... I am still learning of those. I am very amenable to acknowledging that distinction. I am not my photograph, or my name, or my image in a mirror. The universe is not the contents of the equations of string theory ... unless it turns out that it is, of course, but if that is the case, then it's an exception. Which is probably why some people think Max Tegmark is a bit of a crackpot. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 27 Jan 2014, at 05:49, meekerdb wrote: On 1/26/2014 7:22 PM, LizR wrote: On 27 January 2014 15:25, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com wrote: Dear LizR, George Spencer-Brown's Laws of Form are the place to start... I'll add that to my reading list. But on which end? :-) If you add all Stephen's links in the list, you risk a memory overflow. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
Dear Bruno, I think that where we differ is in how we think of numbers: I see them as merely representational, Parmenidean, you see them as more. The Heraclitean aspect is far more than p for me. On Mon, Jan 27, 2014 at 4:54 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Jan 2014, at 23:26, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear LizR, You and Bruno have often complained that my postings lack rigor... For a nice formal representation of Heraclitean streams click herehttp://books.google.com/books?id=vurIJEFut8QCpg=PA55lpg=PA55dq=jon+barwise+streams+hypersetssource=blots=eYJKhMJR1-sig=GD2rTwSNtcLpqnm2K3eqE24THNohl=ensa=Xei=Y4rlUu2tCIW-sQSf74HYBwved=0CGMQ6AEwBw#v=onepageq=jon%20barwise%20streams%20hypersetsf=false and read the bit about hypersets. BTW, this is a concept almost identical to what Lou Kauffman uses in his notion of eigenforms. It is the Dx = xx method. I don't see what is Heraclitean. On the contrary, it is Parmenidian, and the Heraclitean aspect is recovered by the p nuance. More on this later (we need more modal logic). Bruno On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 5:20 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com wrote: Dear LizR, On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 5:14 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 January 2014 23:03, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 25 Jan 2014, at 14:15, David Nyman wrote: On 25 January 2014 09:21, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Maybe the difference in intuition is because she doesn't think about it in Hoyle's universalist way, although ISTM this is implicit in the heuristic (i.e. the guy is the unique and non-simultaneous owner of the experiences in all the pigeon holes). Without the flashlight, I think what people do is think of themselves as situated in some pigeon hole or other and then, as it were, imaginatively select some continuation sequence of pigeon holes from there. Yes. But we can still believe in the universalist view, through the amnesia and the return in the universal baby state, which then can be related to the universal consciousness of the universal person. In that sense we are right now the same person, but relatively amnesic of all particularities which distinguish us. Yes indeed, it is the amnesia that compartmentalises us. But it's the right now that strikes me (and, I presume, struck Hoyle) as something of an an equivocation, at least in the pigeon hole analogy. I gues that's why some people want time, if not present-time, as a primitive. I can understand the feeling, but I think that with comp it is a sort of delusion. Watching Memento gives some idea of what's really going on, by showing what life would be like after a partial breakdown of how the brain fools us into thinking we have continuous existence. It isn't too much of a stretch from imagining living in 5 minute segments to realising that we could equally well live in instants, with all of our memory being what's there right now, what's available to us in that instant, that pgeonhole. After all, logically, given the assumption of locality in physics, that's all we'd *expect* to be available. 'Because, like all of us in our daily lives, you're stuck with a grotesque and absurd illusion.' 'How's that?' 'The idea of time as an ever-rolling stream. The thing which is supposed to bear all its sons away. There's one thing quite certain in this business: the idea of time as a steady progression from past to future is wrong. I know very well we feel this way about it subjectively. But we're the victims of a confidence trick... Fred Hoyle, October the First is Too Late HA! Hoyle here undermines the idea that we can obtain time merely from the well ordering of integers! I focus on the action, ever-rolling stream, the progression; the ordering of events are the mere products of the stream, not the origin of the streaming. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use,
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
Dear Bruno, No, time is observer dependent as well as observers supply the measures. Recall that I see time as a local measure of change. Change itself is not observer dependent, it flows eternally as the potential to Be of Becoming. On Mon, Jan 27, 2014 at 5:00 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 27 Jan 2014, at 01:36, Stephen Paul King wrote: Like I have written previously, I am past the point of buying the idea that there is a Reality out there independent of us that we passively come to experience. I am tired of explanations that ask us to believe that change is an illusion that somehow persists. Is that not contradictory? You are asking us to believe in a time independent to us, and to not believe in a reality independent to us. Bruno Can we try a different set of concepts? On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 7:28 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 27 January 2014 12:48, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear LizR, : the idea of time as a steady progression from past to future is wrong. I know very well we feel this way about it subjectively. But we're the victims of a confidence trick... What other implication does Hoyle's phrasing have? His entire discussion of the pigeon holes is to point out that there is no a priori order of the holes, it is a subjective delusion that we obtain because of our inability to see the whole lot. His implication seems to me to be that the subjective experience of time can be explained as a phenomenon caused by the order of the pigeon holes, together with certain rules linking them together. The rules are basically equivalent to thermodynamics (unsurprisingly, we wouldn't get consciousness in a universe without an entropy gradient). As one of his characters explains... John went on, 'All right, let's come now to the contents of the pigeon holes. Suppose you choose one of them, say the 137th. You find in it a story, as you might find one of those little slips of paper in a Christmas cracker http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christmas_cracker. But you also find statments about the stories you'll find in other pigeon holes. You decide to check up on whether these statements about the stories in the other pigeon holes are right or not. To your surprise you find the statments made about earlier pigeon holes, the 136th, the 135th, and so on, are substantially correct. But when you compare with the pigeon holes on the other side, the 138th, the 139th,...you find things aren't so good. You find a lot of contradictions and discrepancies. This turns out to be the same wherever you happen to look, in every pigeon hole. The statements made about pigeon holes on the other side are at best diffuse and at the worst just plain wrong. Now let's translate this parable into the time problem. We'll call the particular pigeon hole, the one you happen to be examining, the present. The earlier pigeon holes, the ones for which you find substantially correct statements, we call the past. The later pigeon holes, the ones for which there isn't too much in the way of correct statments, we'll call the future. Let me go on a bit further. What I want to suggest is that the actual world is very much like this. Instead of pigeon holes we talk about states.' Note that the description he gives of the 137th hole applies to *all*the holes - so the present is whichever hole you happen to look in. From the subjective, inside view, all moments are the present when they're being experienced, and we only experience a flow of time because of their contents (a fact which Memento guy illustrates nicely, of course). This is a description of a capsule theory of identity. Hoyle introduces a flashlight, but then shows that the order in which the flashlight is used is irrelevant - the 1st person view from inside the pigeon-holes is of continuous subjective experience. In fact, the existence or nonexistence of the flashlight is irrelevant to the subjective experience. The flashlight was introduced so the characters could think about sampling each pigeon hole, as though they could somehow stand outside time - take the bird's eye view. But of course in reality they can only take the internal, frog's eye view. Hence, imho, Hoyle is saying that it is the order of the boxes and the laws relating their contents that gives rise to the subjective experience of time. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 27 Jan 2014, at 13:21, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Bruno, I think that where we differ is in how we think of numbers: I see them as merely representational, Parmenidean, you see them as more. But numbers can be used to represent things, like an address, but they are not themselves representational. The Heraclitean aspect is far more than p for me. What more, and how do you prove that? Bruno On Mon, Jan 27, 2014 at 4:54 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Jan 2014, at 23:26, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear LizR, You and Bruno have often complained that my postings lack rigor... For a nice formal representation of Heraclitean streams click here and read the bit about hypersets. BTW, this is a concept almost identical to what Lou Kauffman uses in his notion of eigenforms. It is the Dx = xx method. I don't see what is Heraclitean. On the contrary, it is Parmenidian, and the Heraclitean aspect is recovered by the p nuance. More on this later (we need more modal logic). Bruno On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 5:20 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com wrote: Dear LizR, On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 5:14 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 January 2014 23:03, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 25 Jan 2014, at 14:15, David Nyman wrote: On 25 January 2014 09:21, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Maybe the difference in intuition is because she doesn't think about it in Hoyle's universalist way, although ISTM this is implicit in the heuristic (i.e. the guy is the unique and non- simultaneous owner of the experiences in all the pigeon holes). Without the flashlight, I think what people do is think of themselves as situated in some pigeon hole or other and then, as it were, imaginatively select some continuation sequence of pigeon holes from there. Yes. But we can still believe in the universalist view, through the amnesia and the return in the universal baby state, which then can be related to the universal consciousness of the universal person. In that sense we are right now the same person, but relatively amnesic of all particularities which distinguish us. Yes indeed, it is the amnesia that compartmentalises us. But it's the right now that strikes me (and, I presume, struck Hoyle) as something of an an equivocation, at least in the pigeon hole analogy. I gues that's why some people want time, if not present-time, as a primitive. I can understand the feeling, but I think that with comp it is a sort of delusion. Watching Memento gives some idea of what's really going on, by showing what life would be like after a partial breakdown of how the brain fools us into thinking we have continuous existence. It isn't too much of a stretch from imagining living in 5 minute segments to realising that we could equally well live in instants, with all of our memory being what's there right now, what's available to us in that instant, that pgeonhole. After all, logically, given the assumption of locality in physics, that's all we'd expect to be available. 'Because, like all of us in our daily lives, you're stuck with a grotesque and absurd illusion.' 'How's that?' 'The idea of time as an ever-rolling stream. The thing which is supposed to bear all its sons away. There's one thing quite certain in this business: the idea of time as a steady progression from past to future is wrong. I know very well we feel this way about it subjectively. But we're the victims of a confidence trick... Fred Hoyle, October the First is Too Late HA! Hoyle here undermines the idea that we can obtain time merely from the well ordering of integers! I focus on the action, ever- rolling stream, the progression; the ordering of events are the mere products of the stream, not the origin of the streaming. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use,
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 27 Jan 2014, at 13:24, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Bruno, No, time is observer dependent as well as observers supply the measures. Sorry, I don't understand. Recall that I see time as a local measure of change. As long as you don't give me what you assume and what you derive, this kind of talk is too much precise to be clear. Then, if you assume time or becoming, your theory is incompatible with computationalism. Change itself is not observer dependent, it flows eternally as the potential to Be of Becoming. This does not help. Bruno On Mon, Jan 27, 2014 at 5:00 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 27 Jan 2014, at 01:36, Stephen Paul King wrote: Like I have written previously, I am past the point of buying the idea that there is a Reality out there independent of us that we passively come to experience. I am tired of explanations that ask us to believe that change is an illusion that somehow persists. Is that not contradictory? You are asking us to believe in a time independent to us, and to not believe in a reality independent to us. Bruno Can we try a different set of concepts? On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 7:28 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 27 January 2014 12:48, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com wrote: Dear LizR, : the idea of time as a steady progression from past to future is wrong. I know very well we feel this way about it subjectively. But we're the victims of a confidence trick... What other implication does Hoyle's phrasing have? His entire discussion of the pigeon holes is to point out that there is no a priori order of the holes, it is a subjective delusion that we obtain because of our inability to see the whole lot. His implication seems to me to be that the subjective experience of time can be explained as a phenomenon caused by the order of the pigeon holes, together with certain rules linking them together. The rules are basically equivalent to thermodynamics (unsurprisingly, we wouldn't get consciousness in a universe without an entropy gradient). As one of his characters explains... John went on, 'All right, let's come now to the contents of the pigeon holes. Suppose you choose one of them, say the 137th. You find in it a story, as you might find one of those little slips of paper in a Christmas cracker. But you also find statments about the stories you'll find in other pigeon holes. You decide to check up on whether these statements about the stories in the other pigeon holes are right or not. To your surprise you find the statments made about earlier pigeon holes, the 136th, the 135th, and so on, are substantially correct. But when you compare with the pigeon holes on the other side, the 138th, the 139th,...you find things aren't so good. You find a lot of contradictions and discrepancies. This turns out to be the same wherever you happen to look, in every pigeon hole. The statements made about pigeon holes on the other side are at best diffuse and at the worst just plain wrong. Now let's translate this parable into the time problem. We'll call the particular pigeon hole, the one you happen to be examining, the present. The earlier pigeon holes, the ones for which you find substantially correct statements, we call the past. The later pigeon holes, the ones for which there isn't too much in the way of correct statments, we'll call the future. Let me go on a bit further. What I want to suggest is that the actual world is very much like this. Instead of pigeon holes we talk about states.' Note that the description he gives of the 137th hole applies to all the holes - so the present is whichever hole you happen to look in. From the subjective, inside view, all moments are the present when they're being experienced, and we only experience a flow of time because of their contents (a fact which Memento guy illustrates nicely, of course). This is a description of a capsule theory of identity. Hoyle introduces a flashlight, but then shows that the order in which the flashlight is used is irrelevant - the 1st person view from inside the pigeon-holes is of continuous subjective experience. In fact, the existence or nonexistence of the flashlight is irrelevant to the subjective experience. The flashlight was introduced so the characters could think about sampling each pigeon hole, as though they could somehow stand outside time - take the bird's eye view. But of course in reality they can only take the internal, frog's eye view. Hence, imho, Hoyle is saying that it is the order of the boxes and the laws relating their contents that gives rise to the subjective experience of time. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On Mon, Jan 27, 2014 at 7:24 AM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com wrote: Dear Bruno, No, time is observer dependent as well as observers supply the measures. Recall that I see time as a local measure of change. Change itself is not observer dependent, it flows eternally as the potential to Be of Becoming. Physical change is observer dependent particularly in a multiverse where everything is physical. On Mon, Jan 27, 2014 at 5:00 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 27 Jan 2014, at 01:36, Stephen Paul King wrote: Like I have written previously, I am past the point of buying the idea that there is a Reality out there independent of us that we passively come to experience. I am tired of explanations that ask us to believe that change is an illusion that somehow persists. Is that not contradictory? You are asking us to believe in a time independent to us, and to not believe in a reality independent to us. Bruno Can we try a different set of concepts? On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 7:28 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 27 January 2014 12:48, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear LizR, : the idea of time as a steady progression from past to future is wrong. I know very well we feel this way about it subjectively. But we're the victims of a confidence trick... What other implication does Hoyle's phrasing have? His entire discussion of the pigeon holes is to point out that there is no a priori order of the holes, it is a subjective delusion that we obtain because of our inability to see the whole lot. His implication seems to me to be that the subjective experience of time can be explained as a phenomenon caused by the order of the pigeon holes, together with certain rules linking them together. The rules are basically equivalent to thermodynamics (unsurprisingly, we wouldn't get consciousness in a universe without an entropy gradient). As one of his characters explains... John went on, 'All right, let's come now to the contents of the pigeon holes. Suppose you choose one of them, say the 137th. You find in it a story, as you might find one of those little slips of paper in a Christmas cracker http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christmas_cracker. But you also find statments about the stories you'll find in other pigeon holes. You decide to check up on whether these statements about the stories in the other pigeon holes are right or not. To your surprise you find the statments made about earlier pigeon holes, the 136th, the 135th, and so on, are substantially correct. But when you compare with the pigeon holes on the other side, the 138th, the 139th,...you find things aren't so good. You find a lot of contradictions and discrepancies. This turns out to be the same wherever you happen to look, in every pigeon hole. The statements made about pigeon holes on the other side are at best diffuse and at the worst just plain wrong. Now let's translate this parable into the time problem. We'll call the particular pigeon hole, the one you happen to be examining, the present. The earlier pigeon holes, the ones for which you find substantially correct statements, we call the past. The later pigeon holes, the ones for which there isn't too much in the way of correct statments, we'll call the future. Let me go on a bit further. What I want to suggest is that the actual world is very much like this. Instead of pigeon holes we talk about states.' Note that the description he gives of the 137th hole applies to *all*the holes - so the present is whichever hole you happen to look in. From the subjective, inside view, all moments are the present when they're being experienced, and we only experience a flow of time because of their contents (a fact which Memento guy illustrates nicely, of course). This is a description of a capsule theory of identity. Hoyle introduces a flashlight, but then shows that the order in which the flashlight is used is irrelevant - the 1st person view from inside the pigeon-holes is of continuous subjective experience. In fact, the existence or nonexistence of the flashlight is irrelevant to the subjective experience. The flashlight was introduced so the characters could think about sampling each pigeon hole, as though they could somehow stand outside time - take the bird's eye view. But of course in reality they can only take the internal, frog's eye view. Hence, imho, Hoyle is saying that it is the order of the boxes and the laws relating their contents that gives rise to the subjective experience of time. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 1/26/2014 2:14 PM, LizR wrote: Watching Memento gives some idea of what's really going on, by showing what life would be like after a partial breakdown of how the brain fools us into thinking we have continuous existence. It isn't too much of a stretch from imagining living in 5 minute segments to realising that we could equally well live in instants, with all of our memory being what's there right now, what's available to us in that instant, that pgeonhole. After all, logically, given the assumption of locality in physics, that's all we'd /expect/ to be available. There's a play Random by a local playwright, Michael Perlmutter, in which a psychiatrist is treating a man who claims that he doesn't live his life in order. He remembers segments of his childhood, but also some segments of the future and with gaps in between. Of course each segment has a consistent arrow of time within it. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 27 January 2014 23:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 27 Jan 2014, at 05:49, meekerdb wrote: On 1/26/2014 7:22 PM, LizR wrote: On 27 January 2014 15:25, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear LizR, George Spencer-Brown's Laws of Formhttp://www.lawsofform.org/lof.htmlare the place to start... I'll add that to my reading list. But on which end? :-) If you add all Stephen's links in the list, you risk a memory overflow. :-) I'm starting to appreciate that. Maybe I can just keep a symbolic representation of them... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 28 January 2014 01:21, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear Bruno, I think that where we differ is in how we think of numbers: I see them as merely representational What do they represent? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 28 January 2014 09:42, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/26/2014 2:14 PM, LizR wrote: Watching Memento gives some idea of what's really going on, by showing what life would be like after a partial breakdown of how the brain fools us into thinking we have continuous existence. It isn't too much of a stretch from imagining living in 5 minute segments to realising that we could equally well live in instants, with all of our memory being what's there right now, what's available to us in that instant, that pgeonhole. After all, logically, given the assumption of locality in physics, that's all we'd *expect* to be available. There's a play Random by a local playwright, Michael Perlmutter, in which a psychiatrist is treating a man who claims that he doesn't live his life in order. He remembers segments of his childhood, but also some segments of the future and with gaps in between. Of course each segment has a consistent arrow of time within it. The man's name isn't Billy Pilgrim, perchance? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 1/27/2014 2:20 PM, LizR wrote: On 28 January 2014 09:42, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/26/2014 2:14 PM, LizR wrote: Watching Memento gives some idea of what's really going on, by showing what life would be like after a partial breakdown of how the brain fools us into thinking we have continuous existence. It isn't too much of a stretch from imagining living in 5 minute segments to realising that we could equally well live in instants, with all of our memory being what's there right now, what's available to us in that instant, that pgeonhole. After all, logically, given the assumption of locality in physics, that's all we'd /expect/ to be available. There's a play Random by a local playwright, Michael Perlmutter, in which a psychiatrist is treating a man who claims that he doesn't live his life in order. He remembers segments of his childhood, but also some segments of the future and with gaps in between. Of course each segment has a consistent arrow of time within it. The man's name isn't Billy Pilgrim, perchance? Nope. And I don't believe the play's been performed other than the local run. Perlmutter is shopping it around. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 25 Jan 2014, at 14:05, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 6:22 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 24 Jan 2014, at 23:12, meekerdb wrote: On 1/24/2014 12:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: In your aristotelian theology. But when working on the mind-body problem, it is better to abandon all prejudices on this. Indeed with comp, it is the concrete laptop which appears as an (unconscious preprogrammed) idealization. Of course I'd say reifying arithmetic is a prejudice. No need in reifying it. You need just to believe in their truth. For some people, like Hardy, the number 8 is more concrete that the planets you can count. Our brain makes us believe the contrary, but he uses a complex universal machine to fail us on this. Yes I appreciate this viewpoint. Actually I'm pretty agnostic about what's really real. At any given time it's the ontology of our best theory; where best is not sharply defined but is measured by some mixture of predictive power, consilience, scope, definiteness, and accuracy. OK. Comp is great on scope and maybe on definiteness, but it seems very weak on the other measures. I am not sure. If comp is correct, and if there is no flaw in UDA, comp predicts the existence of physical laws. I don't know of any other theory doing that. And it is constructive, we get already the quantum logic, and they have to define the whole measure, by the UDA. Bruno, In string theory the physical laws and constants depend on how the hyper-EM flux winds thru the (500 or so) topo holes in the Calabi- Yau compact manifolds (ie., particles of 6d space). OK. What is an hyper-EM? (Hyper means ?) That may constitute a prediction of the laws and constants except that the relationship between the laws and particular windings in not known (but the same may be true of comp). Interesting. String theory is a physical theory which makes me envisage that number theory might be the measure winner. There are many formal similarities suggesting this, but I can't really judge, and only the theological approach (with G*) preserves the first person/thrid person relation in a way enlightnening for an explanation of the quanta/qualia relation. Bruno Richard It is fuzzy on the precise frontier between geography and physics, but it explains at least the difference, which is not even existing in physics, except by a vague inference. Comp explains the maning of aw in physical laws. That's why I keep hoping you'll be able to come up with some surprising testable prediction. It is really a question of making people understanding the S4Grz, X and Z logics. The math is there. Just technical difficulties, to sum up. It is for the next generation. This is just standard science. It's not some Aristotelean prejudice. It's the same thing we ask of string theory and loop- quantum-gravity. You mention that you think octonion Hilbert space will be found to be more fundamental than complex Hilbert space. Of course many people have speculated that quaternions or octonions will be more fundamental, but nothing definite has been predicted. So if comp showed that the octonions were necessary that would be quite convincing. Unfortunately my intuition does not come from comp, here. I would have like that too, but now, that would be wishful thinking. But you should understand that we have no choice. If comp is correct, and if we don't put consciousness under the rug, the *whole* of physics is a theorem in arithmetic, concerning what any universal machine can predict from any of its states (even in simulation). Comp gives new strong invariants for physics: the choice of phi_i, and the choice of the observer in the phi_i. That's the main point: an explanation that no theory of consciousness can avoid a derivation of the physical reality appearances from arithmetic or equivalent. It seems from the little I know that comp at most predicts 8 different variations of laws and constants whereas string theory predicts at different variation for every unique winding, which may be as many as 10^1000 different variations. Perhaps that is testable. Richard Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 25 Jan 2014, at 17:51, meekerdb wrote: On 1/25/2014 3:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: And even if they did, why would that cause me to say no to the doctor. By the UDA. If you say yes to the doctor, physics emerges from all computations, and even plausibly from those who do not stop, which have a higher measure than those which stops. I doubt that physics depends on what I say to anyone. Hmm I am of course alluding to the content of the saying. Physics does not depend on what you say to the doctor, but on the possible truth that you might survive with the artificial brain. But the question is, what if materialism is true and I say yes to the doctor. I just don't see how saying yes to the doctor commits me the rest of the argument. Then you died, or you are in a simulation (of materialism, wmaking it true in some local sense) or God is malicious (to be short). And on the question of measure, when I write a computer program that doesn't stop with an answer as I intended it is sometimes because it has entered a loop. Aren't non-stopping programs like that going to dominate the measure of computations by the UD? Probably, not. The winners will be more like the computations of Pi or sqrt(2). No loop, and some exploitation of the random noise, to multiply locally the deep and interesting (in Bennett sense) consistent and co-consistent (sharable) histories. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 25 Jan 2014, at 14:15, David Nyman wrote: On 25 January 2014 09:21, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Maybe the difference in intuition is because she doesn't think about it in Hoyle's universalist way, although ISTM this is implicit in the heuristic (i.e. the guy is the unique and non- simultaneous owner of the experiences in all the pigeon holes). Without the flashlight, I think what people do is think of themselves as situated in some pigeon hole or other and then, as it were, imaginatively select some continuation sequence of pigeon holes from there. Yes. But we can still believe in the universalist view, through the amnesia and the return in the universal baby state, which then can be related to the universal consciousness of the universal person. In that sense we are right now the same person, but relatively amnesic of all particularities which distinguish us. Yes indeed, it is the amnesia that compartmentalises us. But it's the right now that strikes me (and, I presume, struck Hoyle) as something of an an equivocation, at least in the pigeon hole analogy. I gues that's why some people want time, if not present-time, as a primitive. I can understand the feeling, but I think that with comp it is a sort of delusion. I realise that right now is an intrinsically indexical concept Yes. It fits quite well with Galileo, Einstein and Everett sort of relativity, but with a wider scope defined notably by the arithmetical truth. and Hoyle quite definitely means us to understand that each co- existent pigeon hole in his 3p-block concept can indeed be interpreted as its own right now, ... OK ... unchangingly. That might be the word too much imo. Like a number, a computational state, even considered among the computation going through it, does not seem to me to be an object on which change can even be applied. It is out of time and space considerations. The 1p associated to it is related to computations which, from that 1p view, correspond to a dynamical scenario. But the time aspect is a construct from that (set of) number relations. But he also sees that if he leaves it at that, he has not yet explicitly defined any principle that could suffice to break the unchanging symmetry of the co-existing block from the 1p perspective. The problem for me was a bit of the contrary. The theaetetical definition of consciousness or knowledge explain easily the lack of symmetry, because you recover it through it. Bp p does provides the non symmetry, and indeed even an antisymmetry making a 1p-moment irreversible. But, by UDA, we have to recover physics and its core symmetry, notably through something like p-[]p, as I will explain probably in the modal thread. But how to get symmetry from non symmetry? That was the problem. Eventually, the miracle s that when we restrict the p on the sigma_1 p (the computable p), we do extract a symmetry from the antisymmetry, with making the logic of physics collapsing into pure logic (non modal) logic. In this bare scenario, each of us should rather expect our experience, if anything, to be permanently confined to that of a single pigeon hole right now - I don't think so. permanently again introduces time where there is none. Imagine that I stop your (digital, say) brain for some period of time, you will not feel anything. The feeling of time is only brought by the dynamical aspect of the computations, which involves the steps of those computations, which are defined through atemporal number relations. I am not sure why we should expect our experience to be confined in a permanent single pigeon hole. i.e. not momentarily, but unchangingly. Change is intrinsically relative, I think. And what would that be like? Not very much, it might seem. Consequently, he explicitly posits (and purely, I insist, as a sleight of intuition) an unobservable change - the replacement of one pigeon hole by another in the unique context of what must be understood, unequivocally, as a single, universal right now. I think that this introduce a difficulty which is not present in the purely indexical approach. A present moment defines its memorized past, and potential futures. The right now is a particular semantical fixed point. It is probably universal, but just in the sense that all self-reflecting creature can find it by introspection. IOW, Hoyle's contention is that each moment of consciousness can be intuited as the singularised state of a universal solipsist whose successive re-combinations of remembering and forgetting suffice to break the panoptic symmetry. I think that is correct, and indeed an indirect consequence of incompleteness for logic of the first person. The Bp p defines the solipsist or the universal first person, and the breaking of the symmetry. At the least, it seems possible that our experience (i.e. from
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:54, John Mikes wrote: *Bruno*, let me use simple words (you seem to overcomplicate my input). *JM: What IS the 'mind' you PRESERVE?* *BM:* My consciousness. - It means that I can surivive in the usal clinical sense, the brain digital replacement. I don't need to define my consciousness to say yes to a doctor. No more than I need to define pain to the doctor who look at me. I might need to pray, perhaps, and to hope the doctor is serious. *JM:Then again your ref. to the MW duplication is irrelevant for me: I do not * *duplicate. It goes with my answer NO to the doctor). I am more than knowable * *within today's inventory.* *BM: *No problem if you believe that comp is false. I don't argue for the truth of comp, I just present a reasoning explaining that if comp is true, then Plato-Plotin gives the right framework for a TOE, and Aristotle is refuted. (his theology and physics). ( Bruno, *M Y consciousness is (my) 'response to relations'* whatever show up. It includes lots of unknown items (with unknowable qualia?) beside the ones handled WITHIN my brain. So I do not trust the 'doctor's digital contraption to include *ME - (total) - o*nly my temporary brainfunction, i.e. knowledge-base of mine as of today. Your true theology is a mystery to me. How true can it be? Devising our physical world is a human effort due to the temporary status of our inventory. To think beyond it is sci-fi (cf my ref. to Liz about Jack Cohen and J. Stewart's Collapse of Chaos and Figment of Reality - the Zarathustrans). John M On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 4:04 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:54, John Mikes wrote: Bruno, let me use simple words (you seem to overcomplicate my input). What IS the *'mind'* you PRESERVE? My consciousness. It means that I can surivive in the usal clinical sense, the brain digital replacement. I don't need to define my consciousness to say yes to a doctor. No more than I need to define pain to the doctor who look at me. I might need to pray, perhaps, and to hope the doctor is serious. Then again your ref. to the MW duplication is irrelevant for me: I do not duplicate. (It goes with my answer NO to the doctor). I am more than knowable within today's inventory. No problem if you believe that comp is false. I don't argue for the truth of comp, I just present a reasoning explaining that if comp is true, then Plato-Plotin gives the right framework for a TOE, and Aristotle is refuted. (his theology and physics). I find 'mindcontent' different from 'mind' (what I don't really know) and package it into 'mentality'. . I have no squalm against arithmetical reality - a notion deduced from (human?) math-thinking. Arithmetical Realism is the idea that human are correct when thinking that the number relation are true even for the non humans. It is not because a human believe in x, that x is necessarily false for non humans. Anyway, it because I can conceive that AR is false, that I politely put it in the bag of the hypotheses. What I mean as 'reality' (if it 'exists' - another 'if' to explain) is a belief that it SHOULD be - as most of us think of the world. No evidence, no facts. Physical World (and whatever pertains to it: like 'physixs') is an up-to-date explanation of yesterday's knowledge of some phenomena we adjusted up to our capabilities in a 'world'-image we derived. Yes, but that is why I do not assume anything being both primitive and physical. You make my point. But I need to start from some assumptions, and I use 2+2=4, and the yes doctor, which links computer science and theology. The physics is then explanied constructively by the theology of the true machine, with true some technical precise sense (due to Tarski). Existence is loosly identified in my vocabulary: whatever we MAY think of DOES exist in our mind (see above). Not necessarily in formats we are (capable of) handling. 3p evidence? who said so? Eventually we have to look at nature to try to refute the theory. But you are right, it is not 3p evidence, but only (with comp) 1p-plural sharable evidences. Time? I can't walk without crutches. My crutches don't walk alone. ? Axioms? a reversed logic, not the theorems (theories?) are axiom-dependent, the axioms are made to facilitate the theoretical 'dasein' of theorems. Artificially. and so on. ? If you use agnosticism to demolish all theories, you kill science, and will get the authoritative arguments instead, like the pseudo sciences and religions. On the contrary, I think that agnosticism should favor the theoretical approach, as it remains modest and NEVER pretends to provide truth, only light and shadows on the unknown. Bruno John M On Sun, Jan 19, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 17 Jan 2014, at 23:24, John Mikes wrote: Stathis and
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
Dear Folks, I agree with John's most resent remark and his recommendation of the books. Here is a nice review of Collapse of Chaos: http://www.thenewhumanities.net/books/Book%20Reviews44.html On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 4:43 PM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:54, John Mikes wrote: *Bruno*, let me use simple words (you seem to overcomplicate my input). *JM: What IS the 'mind' you PRESERVE?* *BM:* My consciousness. - It means that I can surivive in the usal clinical sense, the brain digital replacement. I don't need to define my consciousness to say yes to a doctor. No more than I need to define pain to the doctor who look at me. I might need to pray, perhaps, and to hope the doctor is serious. *JM:Then again your ref. to the MW duplication is irrelevant for me: I do not * *duplicate. It goes with my answer NO to the doctor). I am more than knowable * *within today's inventory.* *BM: *No problem if you believe that comp is false. I don't argue for the truth of comp, I just present a reasoning explaining that if comp is true, then Plato-Plotin gives the right framework for a TOE, and Aristotle is refuted. (his theology and physics). ( Bruno, *M Y consciousness is (my) 'response to relations'* whatever show up. It includes lots of unknown items (with unknowable qualia?) beside the ones handled WITHIN my brain. So I do not trust the 'doctor's digital contraption to include *ME - (total) - o*nly my temporary brainfunction, i.e. knowledge-base of mine as of today. Your true theology is a mystery to me. How true can it be? Devising our physical world is a human effort due to the temporary status of our inventory. To think beyond it is sci-fi (cf my ref. to Liz about Jack Cohen and J. Stewart's Collapse of Chaos and Figment of Reality - the Zarathustrans). John M On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 4:04 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:54, John Mikes wrote: Bruno, let me use simple words (you seem to overcomplicate my input). What IS the *'mind'* you PRESERVE? My consciousness. It means that I can surivive in the usal clinical sense, the brain digital replacement. I don't need to define my consciousness to say yes to a doctor. No more than I need to define pain to the doctor who look at me. I might need to pray, perhaps, and to hope the doctor is serious. Then again your ref. to the MW duplication is irrelevant for me: I do not duplicate. (It goes with my answer NO to the doctor). I am more than knowable within today's inventory. No problem if you believe that comp is false. I don't argue for the truth of comp, I just present a reasoning explaining that if comp is true, then Plato-Plotin gives the right framework for a TOE, and Aristotle is refuted. (his theology and physics). I find 'mindcontent' different from 'mind' (what I don't really know) and package it into 'mentality'. . I have no squalm against arithmetical reality - a notion deduced from (human?) math-thinking. Arithmetical Realism is the idea that human are correct when thinking that the number relation are true even for the non humans. It is not because a human believe in x, that x is necessarily false for non humans. Anyway, it because I can conceive that AR is false, that I politely put it in the bag of the hypotheses. What I mean as 'reality' (if it 'exists' - another 'if' to explain) is a belief that it SHOULD be - as most of us think of the world. No evidence, no facts. Physical World (and whatever pertains to it: like 'physixs') is an up-to-date explanation of yesterday's knowledge of some phenomena we adjusted up to our capabilities in a 'world'-image we derived. Yes, but that is why I do not assume anything being both primitive and physical. You make my point. But I need to start from some assumptions, and I use 2+2=4, and the yes doctor, which links computer science and theology. The physics is then explanied constructively by the theology of the true machine, with true some technical precise sense (due to Tarski). Existence is loosly identified in my vocabulary: whatever we MAY think of DOES exist in our mind (see above). Not necessarily in formats we are (capable of) handling. 3p evidence? who said so? Eventually we have to look at nature to try to refute the theory. But you are right, it is not 3p evidence, but only (with comp) 1p-plural sharable evidences. Time? I can't walk without crutches. My crutches don't walk alone. ? Axioms? a reversed logic, not the theorems (theories?) are axiom-dependent, the axioms are made to facilitate the theoretical 'dasein' of theorems. Artificially. and so on. ? If you use agnosticism to demolish all theories, you kill science, and will get the authoritative arguments instead, like the pseudo sciences and religions. On the contrary, I think
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
Also see: http://files.meetup.com/1819750/%2313%20-%20Ian%20Stewart%20-%20Figments%20of%20Reality.pdf On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 5:09 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com wrote: Dear Folks, I agree with John's most resent remark and his recommendation of the books. Here is a nice review of Collapse of Chaos: http://www.thenewhumanities.net/books/Book%20Reviews44.html On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 4:43 PM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:54, John Mikes wrote: *Bruno*, let me use simple words (you seem to overcomplicate my input). *JM: What IS the 'mind' you PRESERVE?* *BM:* My consciousness. - It means that I can surivive in the usal clinical sense, the brain digital replacement. I don't need to define my consciousness to say yes to a doctor. No more than I need to define pain to the doctor who look at me. I might need to pray, perhaps, and to hope the doctor is serious. *JM:Then again your ref. to the MW duplication is irrelevant for me: I do not * *duplicate. It goes with my answer NO to the doctor). I am more than knowable * *within today's inventory.* *BM: *No problem if you believe that comp is false. I don't argue for the truth of comp, I just present a reasoning explaining that if comp is true, then Plato-Plotin gives the right framework for a TOE, and Aristotle is refuted. (his theology and physics). ( Bruno, *M Y consciousness is (my) 'response to relations'* whatever show up. It includes lots of unknown items (with unknowable qualia?) beside the ones handled WITHIN my brain. So I do not trust the 'doctor's digital contraption to include *ME - (total) - o*nly my temporary brainfunction, i.e. knowledge-base of mine as of today. Your true theology is a mystery to me. How true can it be? Devising our physical world is a human effort due to the temporary status of our inventory. To think beyond it is sci-fi (cf my ref. to Liz about Jack Cohen and J. Stewart's Collapse of Chaos and Figment of Reality - the Zarathustrans). John M On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 4:04 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:54, John Mikes wrote: Bruno, let me use simple words (you seem to overcomplicate my input). What IS the *'mind'* you PRESERVE? My consciousness. It means that I can surivive in the usal clinical sense, the brain digital replacement. I don't need to define my consciousness to say yes to a doctor. No more than I need to define pain to the doctor who look at me. I might need to pray, perhaps, and to hope the doctor is serious. Then again your ref. to the MW duplication is irrelevant for me: I do not duplicate. (It goes with my answer NO to the doctor). I am more than knowable within today's inventory. No problem if you believe that comp is false. I don't argue for the truth of comp, I just present a reasoning explaining that if comp is true, then Plato-Plotin gives the right framework for a TOE, and Aristotle is refuted. (his theology and physics). I find 'mindcontent' different from 'mind' (what I don't really know) and package it into 'mentality'. . I have no squalm against arithmetical reality - a notion deduced from (human?) math-thinking. Arithmetical Realism is the idea that human are correct when thinking that the number relation are true even for the non humans. It is not because a human believe in x, that x is necessarily false for non humans. Anyway, it because I can conceive that AR is false, that I politely put it in the bag of the hypotheses. What I mean as 'reality' (if it 'exists' - another 'if' to explain) is a belief that it SHOULD be - as most of us think of the world. No evidence, no facts. Physical World (and whatever pertains to it: like 'physixs') is an up-to-date explanation of yesterday's knowledge of some phenomena we adjusted up to our capabilities in a 'world'-image we derived. Yes, but that is why I do not assume anything being both primitive and physical. You make my point. But I need to start from some assumptions, and I use 2+2=4, and the yes doctor, which links computer science and theology. The physics is then explanied constructively by the theology of the true machine, with true some technical precise sense (due to Tarski). Existence is loosly identified in my vocabulary: whatever we MAY think of DOES exist in our mind (see above). Not necessarily in formats we are (capable of) handling. 3p evidence? who said so? Eventually we have to look at nature to try to refute the theory. But you are right, it is not 3p evidence, but only (with comp) 1p-plural sharable evidences. Time? I can't walk without crutches. My crutches don't walk alone. ? Axioms? a reversed logic, not the theorems (theories?) are axiom-dependent, the axioms are made to facilitate the theoretical 'dasein' of theorems. Artificially. and so
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 26 January 2014 23:03, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 25 Jan 2014, at 14:15, David Nyman wrote: On 25 January 2014 09:21, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Maybe the difference in intuition is because she doesn't think about it in Hoyle's universalist way, although ISTM this is implicit in the heuristic (i.e. the guy is the unique and non-simultaneous owner of the experiences in all the pigeon holes). Without the flashlight, I think what people do is think of themselves as situated in some pigeon hole or other and then, as it were, imaginatively select some continuation sequence of pigeon holes from there. Yes. But we can still believe in the universalist view, through the amnesia and the return in the universal baby state, which then can be related to the universal consciousness of the universal person. In that sense we are right now the same person, but relatively amnesic of all particularities which distinguish us. Yes indeed, it is the amnesia that compartmentalises us. But it's the right now that strikes me (and, I presume, struck Hoyle) as something of an an equivocation, at least in the pigeon hole analogy. I gues that's why some people want time, if not present-time, as a primitive. I can understand the feeling, but I think that with comp it is a sort of delusion. Watching Memento gives some idea of what's really going on, by showing what life would be like after a partial breakdown of how the brain fools us into thinking we have continuous existence. It isn't too much of a stretch from imagining living in 5 minute segments to realising that we could equally well live in instants, with all of our memory being what's there right now, what's available to us in that instant, that pgeonhole. After all, logically, given the assumption of locality in physics, that's all we'd *expect* to be available. 'Because, like all of us in our daily lives, you're stuck with a grotesque and absurd illusion.' 'How's that?' 'The idea of time as an ever-rolling stream. The thing which is supposed to bear all its sons away. There's one thing quite certain in this business: the idea of time as a steady progression from past to future is wrong. I know very well we feel this way about it subjectively. But we're the victims of a confidence trick... Fred Hoyle, October the First is Too Late -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
Dear LizR, On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 5:14 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 January 2014 23:03, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 25 Jan 2014, at 14:15, David Nyman wrote: On 25 January 2014 09:21, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Maybe the difference in intuition is because she doesn't think about it in Hoyle's universalist way, although ISTM this is implicit in the heuristic (i.e. the guy is the unique and non-simultaneous owner of the experiences in all the pigeon holes). Without the flashlight, I think what people do is think of themselves as situated in some pigeon hole or other and then, as it were, imaginatively select some continuation sequence of pigeon holes from there. Yes. But we can still believe in the universalist view, through the amnesia and the return in the universal baby state, which then can be related to the universal consciousness of the universal person. In that sense we are right now the same person, but relatively amnesic of all particularities which distinguish us. Yes indeed, it is the amnesia that compartmentalises us. But it's the right now that strikes me (and, I presume, struck Hoyle) as something of an an equivocation, at least in the pigeon hole analogy. I gues that's why some people want time, if not present-time, as a primitive. I can understand the feeling, but I think that with comp it is a sort of delusion. Watching Memento gives some idea of what's really going on, by showing what life would be like after a partial breakdown of how the brain fools us into thinking we have continuous existence. It isn't too much of a stretch from imagining living in 5 minute segments to realising that we could equally well live in instants, with all of our memory being what's there right now, what's available to us in that instant, that pgeonhole. After all, logically, given the assumption of locality in physics, that's all we'd *expect* to be available. 'Because, like all of us in our daily lives, you're stuck with a grotesque and absurd illusion.' 'How's that?' 'The idea of time as an ever-rolling stream. The thing which is supposed to bear all its sons away. There's one thing quite certain in this business: the idea of time as a steady progression from past to future is wrong. I know very well we feel this way about it subjectively. But we're the victims of a confidence trick... Fred Hoyle, October the First is Too Late HA! Hoyle here undermines the idea that we can obtain time merely from the well ordering of integers! I focus on the action, ever-rolling stream, the progression; the ordering of events are the mere products of the stream, not the origin of the streaming. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 4:09 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 25 Jan 2014, at 14:05, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 6:22 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 24 Jan 2014, at 23:12, meekerdb wrote: On 1/24/2014 12:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: In your aristotelian theology. But when working on the mind-body problem, it is better to abandon all prejudices on this. Indeed with comp, it is the concrete laptop which appears as an (unconscious preprogrammed) idealization. Of course I'd say reifying arithmetic is a prejudice. No need in reifying it. You need just to believe in their truth. For some people, like Hardy, the number 8 is more concrete that the planets you can count. Our brain makes us believe the contrary, but he uses a complex universal machine to fail us on this. Yes I appreciate this viewpoint. Actually I'm pretty agnostic about what's really real. At any given time it's the ontology of our best theory; where best is not sharply defined but is measured by some mixture of predictive power, consilience, scope, definiteness, and accuracy. OK. Comp is great on scope and maybe on definiteness, but it seems very weak on the other measures. I am not sure. If comp is correct, and if there is no flaw in UDA, comp predicts the existence of physical laws. I don't know of any other theory doing that. And it is constructive, we get already the quantum logic, and they have to define the whole measure, by the UDA. Bruno, In string theory the physical laws and constants depend on how the hyper-EM flux winds thru the (500 or so) topo holes in the Calabi-Yau compact manifolds (ie., particles of 6d space). OK. What is an hyper-EM? (Hyper means ?) That is my way of referring to the electric flux that winds thru the 6d-particles of space: 1. Flux - The fluxes in M Theory is similar to the electric fluxes but have nothing to do with electrons or photons. The presence of fluxes has the effect of holding the manifold's shape in place. The electric fluxes from an enclosed surface is equal to the number of charges within, similarly the fluxes in M Theory also comes with whole numbers of a certain unit (through each hole in the manifold). It drastically increases the complexity of the landscape. Especially when they act on the pointy end of the compactified manifold stretching it into a long, narrow neck. The result is to produce lot of valleys on the landscape with negative vacuum energy (cosmological constant), which is contrary to observation in the real world. Now the brane comes to the rescue. 2. Brane - Similar to the antiparticle in the point approximation, every brane also has its antibrane. Anitbrane has a tendency of attracting to the pointy end and add energy into the valley to make the vacuum energy positive. Thus, by a mix of a little of everything, a point on the landscape turns out to have a small positive cosmological constant - just like the observation in the real world. It is also found that D-brane can stabilize the size as well as the shape of the compactified manifold (like the steel-belt in radial tire) at least in the Type IIB theory. This function is crucial in the superstring theory, otherwise the 6 hidden dimensions would become unwinded and getting infinitely large. Then we would be living in ten dimensional space instead of the usual three http://universe-review.ca/R15-26-CalabiYau02.htm#moduli That may constitute a prediction of the laws and constants except that the relationship between the laws and particular windings in not known (but the same may be true of comp). Interesting. String theory is a physical theory which makes me envisage that number theory might be the measure winner. There are many formal similarities suggesting this, but I can't really judge, and only the theological approach (with G*) preserves the first person/thrid person relation in a way enlightnening for an explanation of the quanta/qualia relation. Bruno Richard It is fuzzy on the precise frontier between geography and physics, but it explains at least the difference, which is not even existing in physics, except by a vague inference. Comp explains the maning of aw in physical laws. That's why I keep hoping you'll be able to come up with some surprising testable prediction. It is really a question of making people understanding the S4Grz, X and Z logics. The math is there. Just technical difficulties, to sum up. It is for the next generation. This is just standard science. It's not some Aristotelean prejudice. It's the same thing we ask of string theory and loop-quantum-gravity. You mention that you think octonion Hilbert space will be found to be more fundamental than complex Hilbert space. Of course many people have speculated that quaternions or octonions will be more fundamental, but nothing
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
Dear LizR, You and Bruno have often complained that my postings lack rigor... For a nice formal representation of Heraclitean streams click herehttp://books.google.com/books?id=vurIJEFut8QCpg=PA55lpg=PA55dq=jon+barwise+streams+hypersetssource=blots=eYJKhMJR1-sig=GD2rTwSNtcLpqnm2K3eqE24THNohl=ensa=Xei=Y4rlUu2tCIW-sQSf74HYBwved=0CGMQ6AEwBw#v=onepageq=jon%20barwise%20streams%20hypersetsf=false and read the bit about hypersets. BTW, this is a concept almost identical to what Lou Kauffman uses in his notion of eigenforms. On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 5:20 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com wrote: Dear LizR, On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 5:14 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 January 2014 23:03, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 25 Jan 2014, at 14:15, David Nyman wrote: On 25 January 2014 09:21, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Maybe the difference in intuition is because she doesn't think about it in Hoyle's universalist way, although ISTM this is implicit in the heuristic (i.e. the guy is the unique and non-simultaneous owner of the experiences in all the pigeon holes). Without the flashlight, I think what people do is think of themselves as situated in some pigeon hole or other and then, as it were, imaginatively select some continuation sequence of pigeon holes from there. Yes. But we can still believe in the universalist view, through the amnesia and the return in the universal baby state, which then can be related to the universal consciousness of the universal person. In that sense we are right now the same person, but relatively amnesic of all particularities which distinguish us. Yes indeed, it is the amnesia that compartmentalises us. But it's the right now that strikes me (and, I presume, struck Hoyle) as something of an an equivocation, at least in the pigeon hole analogy. I gues that's why some people want time, if not present-time, as a primitive. I can understand the feeling, but I think that with comp it is a sort of delusion. Watching Memento gives some idea of what's really going on, by showing what life would be like after a partial breakdown of how the brain fools us into thinking we have continuous existence. It isn't too much of a stretch from imagining living in 5 minute segments to realising that we could equally well live in instants, with all of our memory being what's there right now, what's available to us in that instant, that pgeonhole. After all, logically, given the assumption of locality in physics, that's all we'd *expect* to be available. 'Because, like all of us in our daily lives, you're stuck with a grotesque and absurd illusion.' 'How's that?' 'The idea of time as an ever-rolling stream. The thing which is supposed to bear all its sons away. There's one thing quite certain in this business: the idea of time as a steady progression from past to future is wrong. I know very well we feel this way about it subjectively. But we're the victims of a confidence trick... Fred Hoyle, October the First is Too Late HA! Hoyle here undermines the idea that we can obtain time merely from the well ordering of integers! I focus on the action, ever-rolling stream, the progression; the ordering of events are the mere products of the stream, not the origin of the streaming. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
Stephen: thanks for your consent and the book review. I have the oher one. John On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 5:09 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com wrote: Dear Folks, I agree with John's most resent remark and his recommendation of the books. Here is a nice review of Collapse of Chaos: http://www.thenewhumanities.net/books/Book%20Reviews44.html On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 4:43 PM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:54, John Mikes wrote: *Bruno*, let me use simple words (you seem to overcomplicate my input). *JM: What IS the 'mind' you PRESERVE?* *BM:* My consciousness. - It means that I can surivive in the usal clinical sense, the brain digital replacement. I don't need to define my consciousness to say yes to a doctor. No more than I need to define pain to the doctor who look at me. I might need to pray, perhaps, and to hope the doctor is serious. *JM:Then again your ref. to the MW duplication is irrelevant for me: I do not * *duplicate. It goes with my answer NO to the doctor). I am more than knowable * *within today's inventory.* *BM: *No problem if you believe that comp is false. I don't argue for the truth of comp, I just present a reasoning explaining that if comp is true, then Plato-Plotin gives the right framework for a TOE, and Aristotle is refuted. (his theology and physics). ( Bruno, *M Y consciousness is (my) 'response to relations'* whatever show up. It includes lots of unknown items (with unknowable qualia?) beside the ones handled WITHIN my brain. So I do not trust the 'doctor's digital contraption to include *ME - (total) - o*nly my temporary brainfunction, i.e. knowledge-base of mine as of today. Your true theology is a mystery to me. How true can it be? Devising our physical world is a human effort due to the temporary status of our inventory. To think beyond it is sci-fi (cf my ref. to Liz about Jack Cohen and J. Stewart's Collapse of Chaos and Figment of Reality - the Zarathustrans). John M On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 4:04 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:54, John Mikes wrote: Bruno, let me use simple words (you seem to overcomplicate my input). What IS the *'mind'* you PRESERVE? My consciousness. It means that I can surivive in the usal clinical sense, the brain digital replacement. I don't need to define my consciousness to say yes to a doctor. No more than I need to define pain to the doctor who look at me. I might need to pray, perhaps, and to hope the doctor is serious. Then again your ref. to the MW duplication is irrelevant for me: I do not duplicate. (It goes with my answer NO to the doctor). I am more than knowable within today's inventory. No problem if you believe that comp is false. I don't argue for the truth of comp, I just present a reasoning explaining that if comp is true, then Plato-Plotin gives the right framework for a TOE, and Aristotle is refuted. (his theology and physics). I find 'mindcontent' different from 'mind' (what I don't really know) and package it into 'mentality'. . I have no squalm against arithmetical reality - a notion deduced from (human?) math-thinking. Arithmetical Realism is the idea that human are correct when thinking that the number relation are true even for the non humans. It is not because a human believe in x, that x is necessarily false for non humans. Anyway, it because I can conceive that AR is false, that I politely put it in the bag of the hypotheses. What I mean as 'reality' (if it 'exists' - another 'if' to explain) is a belief that it SHOULD be - as most of us think of the world. No evidence, no facts. Physical World (and whatever pertains to it: like 'physixs') is an up-to-date explanation of yesterday's knowledge of some phenomena we adjusted up to our capabilities in a 'world'-image we derived. Yes, but that is why I do not assume anything being both primitive and physical. You make my point. But I need to start from some assumptions, and I use 2+2=4, and the yes doctor, which links computer science and theology. The physics is then explanied constructively by the theology of the true machine, with true some technical precise sense (due to Tarski). Existence is loosly identified in my vocabulary: whatever we MAY think of DOES exist in our mind (see above). Not necessarily in formats we are (capable of) handling. 3p evidence? who said so? Eventually we have to look at nature to try to refute the theory. But you are right, it is not 3p evidence, but only (with comp) 1p-plural sharable evidences. Time? I can't walk without crutches. My crutches don't walk alone. ? Axioms? a reversed logic, not the theorems (theories?) are axiom-dependent, the axioms are made to facilitate the theoretical 'dasein' of theorems. Artificially. and so on. ? If you use
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
Dear John, LOL your most welcome. :-) Those books where part of my (on-going)education. It is great to see them mentioned. On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 5:36 PM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Stephen: thanks for your consent and the book review. I have the oher one. John On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 5:09 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com wrote: Dear Folks, I agree with John's most resent remark and his recommendation of the books. Here is a nice review of Collapse of Chaos: http://www.thenewhumanities.net/books/Book%20Reviews44.html On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 4:43 PM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:54, John Mikes wrote: *Bruno*, let me use simple words (you seem to overcomplicate my input). *JM: What IS the 'mind' you PRESERVE?* *BM:* My consciousness. - It means that I can surivive in the usal clinical sense, the brain digital replacement. I don't need to define my consciousness to say yes to a doctor. No more than I need to define pain to the doctor who look at me. I might need to pray, perhaps, and to hope the doctor is serious. *JM:Then again your ref. to the MW duplication is irrelevant for me: I do not * *duplicate. It goes with my answer NO to the doctor). I am more than knowable * *within today's inventory.* *BM: *No problem if you believe that comp is false. I don't argue for the truth of comp, I just present a reasoning explaining that if comp is true, then Plato-Plotin gives the right framework for a TOE, and Aristotle is refuted. (his theology and physics). ( Bruno, *M Y consciousness is (my) 'response to relations'* whatever show up. It includes lots of unknown items (with unknowable qualia?) beside the ones handled WITHIN my brain. So I do not trust the 'doctor's digital contraption to include *ME - (total) - o*nly my temporary brainfunction, i.e. knowledge-base of mine as of today. Your true theology is a mystery to me. How true can it be? Devising our physical world is a human effort due to the temporary status of our inventory. To think beyond it is sci-fi (cf my ref. to Liz about Jack Cohen and J. Stewart's Collapse of Chaos and Figment of Reality - the Zarathustrans). John M On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 4:04 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 23:54, John Mikes wrote: Bruno, let me use simple words (you seem to overcomplicate my input). What IS the *'mind'* you PRESERVE? My consciousness. It means that I can surivive in the usal clinical sense, the brain digital replacement. I don't need to define my consciousness to say yes to a doctor. No more than I need to define pain to the doctor who look at me. I might need to pray, perhaps, and to hope the doctor is serious. Then again your ref. to the MW duplication is irrelevant for me: I do not duplicate. (It goes with my answer NO to the doctor). I am more than knowable within today's inventory. No problem if you believe that comp is false. I don't argue for the truth of comp, I just present a reasoning explaining that if comp is true, then Plato-Plotin gives the right framework for a TOE, and Aristotle is refuted. (his theology and physics). I find 'mindcontent' different from 'mind' (what I don't really know) and package it into 'mentality'. . I have no squalm against arithmetical reality - a notion deduced from (human?) math-thinking. Arithmetical Realism is the idea that human are correct when thinking that the number relation are true even for the non humans. It is not because a human believe in x, that x is necessarily false for non humans. Anyway, it because I can conceive that AR is false, that I politely put it in the bag of the hypotheses. What I mean as 'reality' (if it 'exists' - another 'if' to explain) is a belief that it SHOULD be - as most of us think of the world. No evidence, no facts. Physical World (and whatever pertains to it: like 'physixs') is an up-to-date explanation of yesterday's knowledge of some phenomena we adjusted up to our capabilities in a 'world'-image we derived. Yes, but that is why I do not assume anything being both primitive and physical. You make my point. But I need to start from some assumptions, and I use 2+2=4, and the yes doctor, which links computer science and theology. The physics is then explanied constructively by the theology of the true machine, with true some technical precise sense (due to Tarski). Existence is loosly identified in my vocabulary: whatever we MAY think of DOES exist in our mind (see above). Not necessarily in formats we are (capable of) handling. 3p evidence? who said so? Eventually we have to look at nature to try to refute the theory. But you are right, it is not 3p evidence, but only (with comp) 1p-plural sharable evidences. Time? I can't walk without crutches. My crutches don't walk alone. ?
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 27 January 2014 11:20, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: 'Because, like all of us in our daily lives, you're stuck with a grotesque and absurd illusion.' 'How's that?' 'The idea of time as an ever-rolling stream. The thing which is supposed to bear all its sons away. There's one thing quite certain in this business: the idea of time as a steady progression from past to future is wrong. I know very well we feel this way about it subjectively. But we're the victims of a confidence trick... Fred Hoyle, October the First is Too Late HA! Hoyle here undermines the idea that we can obtain time merely from the well ordering of integers! I focus on the action, ever-rolling stream, the progression; the ordering of events are the mere products of the stream, not the origin of the streaming. Hi Stephen I don't see how Hoyle undermines that idea. His numbered pigeon holes seems very close to it. He indicates that he doesn't consider time an ever-rolling stream and later points out that the metaphorical flashlight isn't an ordering principle, and hints that it may be completely irrelevant to consciousness, which is purely down to the contents of the pigeon holes, which are ordered according to certain physical laws, such as the notes in no 157 being mainly accurate about 156 and earlier, but vague and inaccurate about 158 onwards. He appears to be presenting a capsule theory of identity. Please explain how he undermines the idea that time is something like an ordering principle, if I've correctly understood that to be what you mean, and if you wouldn't mind. Also, I don't understand the significance of your statement the ordering of events are the mere products of the stream, not the origin of the streaming. In the block universe view, the ordering of events is the product of the laws of physics, which determine the shapes of world-lines through 4D spacetime. I'm not sure what the origin of the streaming could mean in this context (the Big Bang?) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 27 January 2014 11:26, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear LizR, You and Bruno have often complained that my postings lack rigor... For a nice formal representation of Heraclitean streams click herehttp://books.google.com/books?id=vurIJEFut8QCpg=PA55lpg=PA55dq=jon+barwise+streams+hypersetssource=blots=eYJKhMJR1-sig=GD2rTwSNtcLpqnm2K3eqE24THNohl=ensa=Xei=Y4rlUu2tCIW-sQSf74HYBwved=0CGMQ6AEwBw#v=onepageq=jon%20barwise%20streams%20hypersetsf=false and read the bit about hypersets. BTW, this is a concept almost identical to what Lou Kauffman uses in his notion of eigenforms. A stream is a possibly infinite sequence of elements. - OK, that doesn't sound too contentious. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
Dear LizR, : the idea of time as a steady progression from past to future is wrong. I know very well we feel this way about it subjectively. But we're the victims of a confidence trick... What other implication does Hoyle's phrasing have? His entire discussion of the pigeon holes is to point out that there is no a priori order of the holes, it is a subjective delusion that we obtain because of our inability to see the whole lot. On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 6:08 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 27 January 2014 11:20, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: 'Because, like all of us in our daily lives, you're stuck with a grotesque and absurd illusion.' 'How's that?' 'The idea of time as an ever-rolling stream. The thing which is supposed to bear all its sons away. There's one thing quite certain in this business: the idea of time as a steady progression from past to future is wrong. I know very well we feel this way about it subjectively. But we're the victims of a confidence trick... Fred Hoyle, October the First is Too Late HA! Hoyle here undermines the idea that we can obtain time merely from the well ordering of integers! I focus on the action, ever-rolling stream, the progression; the ordering of events are the mere products of the stream, not the origin of the streaming. Hi Stephen I don't see how Hoyle undermines that idea. His numbered pigeon holes seems very close to it. He indicates that he doesn't consider time an ever-rolling stream and later points out that the metaphorical flashlight isn't an ordering principle, and hints that it may be completely irrelevant to consciousness, which is purely down to the contents of the pigeon holes, which are ordered according to certain physical laws, such as the notes in no 157 being mainly accurate about 156 and earlier, but vague and inaccurate about 158 onwards. He appears to be presenting a capsule theory of identity. Please explain how he undermines the idea that time is something like an ordering principle, if I've correctly understood that to be what you mean, and if you wouldn't mind. Also, I don't understand the significance of your statement the ordering of events are the mere products of the stream, not the origin of the streaming. In the block universe view, the ordering of events is the product of the laws of physics, which determine the shapes of world-lines through 4D spacetime. I'm not sure what the origin of the streaming could mean in this context (the Big Bang?) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
Dear LizR, Keep going! Don't stop there, hear out the fellow's definition and think about it. On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 6:42 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 27 January 2014 11:26, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear LizR, You and Bruno have often complained that my postings lack rigor... For a nice formal representation of Heraclitean streams click herehttp://books.google.com/books?id=vurIJEFut8QCpg=PA55lpg=PA55dq=jon+barwise+streams+hypersetssource=blots=eYJKhMJR1-sig=GD2rTwSNtcLpqnm2K3eqE24THNohl=ensa=Xei=Y4rlUu2tCIW-sQSf74HYBwved=0CGMQ6AEwBw#v=onepageq=jon%20barwise%20streams%20hypersetsf=false and read the bit about hypersets. BTW, this is a concept almost identical to what Lou Kauffman uses in his notion of eigenforms. A stream is a possibly infinite sequence of elements. - OK, that doesn't sound too contentious. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 27 January 2014 12:48, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear LizR, : the idea of time as a steady progression from past to future is wrong. I know very well we feel this way about it subjectively. But we're the victims of a confidence trick... What other implication does Hoyle's phrasing have? His entire discussion of the pigeon holes is to point out that there is no a priori order of the holes, it is a subjective delusion that we obtain because of our inability to see the whole lot. His implication seems to me to be that the subjective experience of time can be explained as a phenomenon caused by the order of the pigeon holes, together with certain rules linking them together. The rules are basically equivalent to thermodynamics (unsurprisingly, we wouldn't get consciousness in a universe without an entropy gradient). As one of his characters explains... John went on, 'All right, let's come now to the contents of the pigeon holes. Suppose you choose one of them, say the 137th. You find in it a story, as you might find one of those little slips of paper in a Christmas cracker http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christmas_cracker. But you also find statments about the stories you'll find in other pigeon holes. You decide to check up on whether these statements about the stories in the other pigeon holes are right or not. To your surprise you find the statments made about earlier pigeon holes, the 136th, the 135th, and so on, are substantially correct. But when you compare with the pigeon holes on the other side, the 138th, the 139th,...you find things aren't so good. You find a lot of contradictions and discrepancies. This turns out to be the same wherever you happen to look, in every pigeon hole. The statements made about pigeon holes on the other side are at best diffuse and at the worst just plain wrong. Now let's translate this parable into the time problem. We'll call the particular pigeon hole, the one you happen to be examining, the present. The earlier pigeon holes, the ones for which you find substantially correct statements, we call the past. The later pigeon holes, the ones for which there isn't too much in the way of correct statments, we'll call the future. Let me go on a bit further. What I want to suggest is that the actual world is very much like this. Instead of pigeon holes we talk about states.' Note that the description he gives of the 137th hole applies to *all* the holes - so the present is whichever hole you happen to look in. From the subjective, inside view, all moments are the present when they're being experienced, and we only experience a flow of time because of their contents (a fact which Memento guy illustrates nicely, of course). This is a description of a capsule theory of identity. Hoyle introduces a flashlight, but then shows that the order in which the flashlight is used is irrelevant - the 1st person view from inside the pigeon-holes is of continuous subjective experience. In fact, the existence or nonexistence of the flashlight is irrelevant to the subjective experience. The flashlight was introduced so the characters could think about sampling each pigeon hole, as though they could somehow stand outside time - take the bird's eye view. But of course in reality they can only take the internal, frog's eye view. Hence, imho, Hoyle is saying that it is the order of the boxes and the laws relating their contents that gives rise to the subjective experience of time. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 27 January 2014 12:49, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear LizR, Keep going! Don't stop there, hear out the fellow's definition and think about it. It's far too complicated for my little brain. You must have noticed me (slowly and painfully) working out the answers to Bruno's exercises... ...which brings me to Liz's 2nd law: * If a theory can't be explained simply enough that I can understand it, it needs more work :-) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
Dear LizR, Very good points that you make, but they are peripheral What I am trying to draw attention is: How did the order and the relating come to pass? (in the last sentence you wrote.) Is is just sitting there, in eternity, and our consciousness somehow is a reflection of this order and relating? I would buy this explanation iff we have an account of why those particular orders and relations are considered and not all the infinitely many others. Like I have written previously, I am past the point of buying the idea that there is a Reality out there independent of us that we passively come to experience. I am tired of explanations that ask us to believe that change is an illusion that somehow persists. Can we try a different set of concepts? On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 7:28 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 27 January 2014 12:48, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear LizR, : the idea of time as a steady progression from past to future is wrong. I know very well we feel this way about it subjectively. But we're the victims of a confidence trick... What other implication does Hoyle's phrasing have? His entire discussion of the pigeon holes is to point out that there is no a priori order of the holes, it is a subjective delusion that we obtain because of our inability to see the whole lot. His implication seems to me to be that the subjective experience of time can be explained as a phenomenon caused by the order of the pigeon holes, together with certain rules linking them together. The rules are basically equivalent to thermodynamics (unsurprisingly, we wouldn't get consciousness in a universe without an entropy gradient). As one of his characters explains... John went on, 'All right, let's come now to the contents of the pigeon holes. Suppose you choose one of them, say the 137th. You find in it a story, as you might find one of those little slips of paper in a Christmas cracker http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christmas_cracker. But you also find statments about the stories you'll find in other pigeon holes. You decide to check up on whether these statements about the stories in the other pigeon holes are right or not. To your surprise you find the statments made about earlier pigeon holes, the 136th, the 135th, and so on, are substantially correct. But when you compare with the pigeon holes on the other side, the 138th, the 139th,...you find things aren't so good. You find a lot of contradictions and discrepancies. This turns out to be the same wherever you happen to look, in every pigeon hole. The statements made about pigeon holes on the other side are at best diffuse and at the worst just plain wrong. Now let's translate this parable into the time problem. We'll call the particular pigeon hole, the one you happen to be examining, the present. The earlier pigeon holes, the ones for which you find substantially correct statements, we call the past. The later pigeon holes, the ones for which there isn't too much in the way of correct statments, we'll call the future. Let me go on a bit further. What I want to suggest is that the actual world is very much like this. Instead of pigeon holes we talk about states.' Note that the description he gives of the 137th hole applies to *all* the holes - so the present is whichever hole you happen to look in. From the subjective, inside view, all moments are the present when they're being experienced, and we only experience a flow of time because of their contents (a fact which Memento guy illustrates nicely, of course). This is a description of a capsule theory of identity. Hoyle introduces a flashlight, but then shows that the order in which the flashlight is used is irrelevant - the 1st person view from inside the pigeon-holes is of continuous subjective experience. In fact, the existence or nonexistence of the flashlight is irrelevant to the subjective experience. The flashlight was introduced so the characters could think about sampling each pigeon hole, as though they could somehow stand outside time - take the bird's eye view. But of course in reality they can only take the internal, frog's eye view. Hence, imho, Hoyle is saying that it is the order of the boxes and the laws relating their contents that gives rise to the subjective experience of time. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
Dear LizR, By that standard we would still be living in caves Sorry, knowledge does not come cheaply. :_( It has taken me countless hours of reading to get to where I am.. What is one to do, when trying to explain an idea that is unconventional? I can't seem to just shut up... On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 7:31 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 27 January 2014 12:49, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear LizR, Keep going! Don't stop there, hear out the fellow's definition and think about it. It's far too complicated for my little brain. You must have noticed me (slowly and painfully) working out the answers to Bruno's exercises... ...which brings me to Liz's 2nd law: * If a theory can't be explained simply enough that I can understand it, it needs more work :-) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 27 January 2014 13:36, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear LizR, Very good points that you make, but they are peripheral What I am trying to draw attention is: How did the order and the relating come to pass? (in the last sentence you wrote.) This is the question of the origin of the laws of physics. I don't think you can address that by assuming there is something special about time over and above its usual usage as a dimension - it would be better to start with something far more primitive, and see if you can extract time as a dimension from it, imho. (Comp tries to do this, for example.) Is is just sitting there, in eternity, and our consciousness somehow is a reflection of this order and relating? Yes. Although the phrase in eternity is misleading if we assume time is emergent from something more primitive. I would buy this explanation iff we have an account of why those particular orders and relations are considered and not all the infinitely many others. Presumably, assuming there *are *infinitely many others, these ones are considered because an anthropic selection principle places us in a universe that is compatible with our existence. Like I have written previously, I am past the point of buying the idea that there is a Reality out there independent of us that we passively come to experience. I am tired of explanations that ask us to believe that change is an illusion that somehow persists. OK, well if you're fed up with that sort of discussion, all I can advise is don't engage with discussions which make this assumption (which will be most discussions about physics, since it's a standard assumption). You may be right about this, of course - comp comes to the same conclusion - but the reality merchants still have plenty of evidence on their side. The onus is on dissenters to show otherwise. Also, I have to say that if you insist on using phrases like change is an illusion that somehow persists that mainly seem to indicate that you don't understand something (the whole concept of time being a dimension?) - rather than indicating any problem with our existing understanding of physics. So it might be worth you getting to grips with how ideas like the block universe work, and why they are treated as unproblematic by the vast majority of the physics community, before you attempt to demolish them. Can we try a different set of concepts? As long as it's clear which concepts we're assuming, and which are open to discussion. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 27 January 2014 13:39, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear LizR, By that standard we would still be living in caves Teehee. Have you been reading Camille Paglia... Personally I think this should be a touchstone for all people with unconventional ideas. Once you can explain them so I understand them, you're definitely onto something! Sorry, knowledge does not come cheaply. :_( It has taken me countless hours of reading to get to where I am.. What is one to do, when trying to explain an idea that is unconventional? I can't seem to just shut up... Look to Bruno as an example, perhaps? He's trying to educate me in modal and predicate logic (I think) so I can better get to grips with comp. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
Dear LizR, I will let Kevin Knuth answer for me: http://fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/1831 On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 8:33 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 27 January 2014 13:36, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear LizR, Very good points that you make, but they are peripheral What I am trying to draw attention is: How did the order and the relating come to pass? (in the last sentence you wrote.) This is the question of the origin of the laws of physics. I don't think you can address that by assuming there is something special about time over and above its usual usage as a dimension - it would be better to start with something far more primitive, and see if you can extract time as a dimension from it, imho. (Comp tries to do this, for example.) Is is just sitting there, in eternity, and our consciousness somehow is a reflection of this order and relating? Yes. Although the phrase in eternity is misleading if we assume time is emergent from something more primitive. I would buy this explanation iff we have an account of why those particular orders and relations are considered and not all the infinitely many others. Presumably, assuming there *are *infinitely many others, these ones are considered because an anthropic selection principle places us in a universe that is compatible with our existence. Like I have written previously, I am past the point of buying the idea that there is a Reality out there independent of us that we passively come to experience. I am tired of explanations that ask us to believe that change is an illusion that somehow persists. OK, well if you're fed up with that sort of discussion, all I can advise is don't engage with discussions which make this assumption (which will be most discussions about physics, since it's a standard assumption). You may be right about this, of course - comp comes to the same conclusion - but the reality merchants still have plenty of evidence on their side. The onus is on dissenters to show otherwise. Also, I have to say that if you insist on using phrases like change is an illusion that somehow persists that mainly seem to indicate that you don't understand something (the whole concept of time being a dimension?) - rather than indicating any problem with our existing understanding of physics. So it might be worth you getting to grips with how ideas like the block universe work, and why they are treated as unproblematic by the vast majority of the physics community, before you attempt to demolish them. Can we try a different set of concepts? As long as it's clear which concepts we're assuming, and which are open to discussion. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 27 January 2014 14:50, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear LizR, I will let Kevin Knuth answer for me: http://fqxi.org/community/forum/topic/1831 Thanks, I will add that to my reading list. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 27 January 2014 15:25, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear LizR, George Spencer-Brown's Laws of Formhttp://www.lawsofform.org/lof.htmlare the place to start... I'll add that to my reading list. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 1/26/2014 7:22 PM, LizR wrote: On 27 January 2014 15:25, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com mailto:stephe...@provensecure.com wrote: Dear LizR, George Spencer-Brown's Laws of Form http://www.lawsofform.org/lof.html are the place to start... I'll add that to my reading list. But on which end? :-) Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 24 Jan 2014, at 22:26, meekerdb wrote: On 1/23/2014 11:59 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Only the idealized computations of Turing. Computations in my computer always stop. Because you assume that it exists in some ontological sense. That might be possible. My point is that if this was really the case, you can't say yes to the doctor qua computatio. You can say yes to the doctor by invoking some magic. You've written that several times, but I don't understand the point. What difference does it make if all computations stop? Wasn't that part of Turing's definition of a computation - a Turing computer process that stopped. No. That is a successful computation. But in the mathematical space of all computations, many will not stop. If we want all successful computation in a well defined computational space, we have to tolerate all those which do not stop. It is the price of universality. I can prove that again. If all computations stop, then arithmetic is inconsistent. Well, if you believe that there is a biggest natural number, then arithmetic is already inconsistent. There will be some k such that k = k+1, and thus 0 = 1. You are doing the move to a small non robust but real and primitive physical universe. But step 8 is supposed to show how much ad hoc is that move. Just because I note that my computer will always stop and presumably my neurons will stop, doesn't entail that all processes must stop. OK. And even if they did, why would that cause me to say no to the doctor. By the UDA. If you say yes to the doctor, physics emerges from all computations, and even plausibly from those who do not stop, which have a higher measure than those which stops. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 24 Jan 2014, at 23:12, meekerdb wrote: On 1/24/2014 12:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: In your aristotelian theology. But when working on the mind-body problem, it is better to abandon all prejudices on this. Indeed with comp, it is the concrete laptop which appears as an (unconscious preprogrammed) idealization. Of course I'd say reifying arithmetic is a prejudice. No need in reifying it. You need just to believe in their truth. For some people, like Hardy, the number 8 is more concrete that the planets you can count. Our brain makes us believe the contrary, but he uses a complex universal machine to fail us on this. Yes I appreciate this viewpoint. Actually I'm pretty agnostic about what's really real. At any given time it's the ontology of our best theory; where best is not sharply defined but is measured by some mixture of predictive power, consilience, scope, definiteness, and accuracy. OK. Comp is great on scope and maybe on definiteness, but it seems very weak on the other measures. I am not sure. If comp is correct, and if there is no flaw in UDA, comp predicts the existence of physical laws. I don't know of any other theory doing that. And it is constructive, we get already the quantum logic, and they have to define the whole measure, by the UDA. It is fuzzy on the precise frontier between geography and physics, but it explains at least the difference, which is not even existing in physics, except by a vague inference. Comp explains the maning of aw in physical laws. That's why I keep hoping you'll be able to come up with some surprising testable prediction. It is really a question of making people understanding the S4Grz, X and Z logics. The math is there. Just technical difficulties, to sum up. It is for the next generation. This is just standard science. It's not some Aristotelean prejudice. It's the same thing we ask of string theory and loop- quantum-gravity. You mention that you think octonion Hilbert space will be found to be more fundamental than complex Hilbert space. Of course many people have speculated that quaternions or octonions will be more fundamental, but nothing definite has been predicted. So if comp showed that the octonions were necessary that would be quite convincing. Unfortunately my intuition does not come from comp, here. I would have like that too, but now, that would be wishful thinking. But you should understand that we have no choice. If comp is correct, and if we don't put consciousness under the rug, the *whole* of physics is a theorem in arithmetic, concerning what any universal machine can predict from any of its states (even in simulation). Comp gives new strong invariants for physics: the choice of phi_i, and the choice of the observer in the phi_i. That's the main point: an explanation that no theory of consciousness can avoid a derivation of the physical reality appearances from arithmetic or equivalent. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On Sat, Jan 25, 2014 at 6:22 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 24 Jan 2014, at 23:12, meekerdb wrote: On 1/24/2014 12:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: In your aristotelian theology. But when working on the mind-body problem, it is better to abandon all prejudices on this. Indeed with comp, it is the concrete laptop which appears as an (unconscious preprogrammed) idealization. Of course I'd say reifying arithmetic is a prejudice. No need in reifying it. You need just to believe in their truth. For some people, like Hardy, the number 8 is more concrete that the planets you can count. Our brain makes us believe the contrary, but he uses a complex universal machine to fail us on this. Yes I appreciate this viewpoint. Actually I'm pretty agnostic about what's really real. At any given time it's the ontology of our best theory; where best is not sharply defined but is measured by some mixture of predictive power, consilience, scope, definiteness, and accuracy. OK. Comp is great on scope and maybe on definiteness, but it seems very weak on the other measures. I am not sure. If comp is correct, and if there is no flaw in UDA, comp predicts the existence of physical laws. I don't know of any other theory doing that. And it is constructive, we get already the quantum logic, and they have to define the whole measure, by the UDA. Bruno, In string theory the physical laws and constants depend on how the hyper-EM flux winds thru the (500 or so) topo holes in the Calabi-Yau compact manifolds (ie., particles of 6d space). That may constitute a prediction of the laws and constants except that the relationship between the laws and particular windings in not known (but the same may be true of comp). Richard It is fuzzy on the precise frontier between geography and physics, but it explains at least the difference, which is not even existing in physics, except by a vague inference. Comp explains the maning of aw in physical laws. That's why I keep hoping you'll be able to come up with some surprising testable prediction. It is really a question of making people understanding the S4Grz, X and Z logics. The math is there. Just technical difficulties, to sum up. It is for the next generation. This is just standard science. It's not some Aristotelean prejudice. It's the same thing we ask of string theory and loop-quantum-gravity. You mention that you think octonion Hilbert space will be found to be more fundamental than complex Hilbert space. Of course many people have speculated that quaternions or octonions will be more fundamental, but nothing definite has been predicted. So if comp showed that the octonions were necessary that would be quite convincing. Unfortunately my intuition does not come from comp, here. I would have like that too, but now, that would be wishful thinking. But you should understand that we have no choice. If comp is correct, and if we don't put consciousness under the rug, the *whole* of physics is a theorem in arithmetic, concerning what any universal machine can predict from any of its states (even in simulation). Comp gives new strong invariants for physics: the choice of phi_i, and the choice of the observer in the phi_i. That's the main point: an explanation that no theory of consciousness can avoid a derivation of the physical reality appearances from arithmetic or equivalent. It seems from the little I know that comp at most predicts 8 different variations of laws and constants whereas string theory predicts at different variation for every unique winding, which may be as many as 10^1000 different variations. Perhaps that is testable. Richard Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 25 January 2014 09:21, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Maybe the difference in intuition is because she doesn't think about it in Hoyle's universalist way, although ISTM this is implicit in the heuristic (i.e. the guy is the unique and non-simultaneous owner of the experiences in all the pigeon holes). Without the flashlight, I think what people do is think of themselves as situated in some pigeon hole or other and then, as it were, imaginatively select some continuation sequence of pigeon holes from there. Yes. But we can still believe in the universalist view, through the amnesia and the return in the universal baby state, which then can be related to the universal consciousness of the universal person. In that sense we are right now the same person, but relatively amnesic of all particularities which distinguish us. Yes indeed, it is the amnesia that compartmentalises us. But it's the right now that strikes me (and, I presume, struck Hoyle) as something of an an equivocation, at least in the pigeon hole analogy. I realise that right now is an intrinsically indexical concept and Hoyle quite definitely means us to understand that each co-existent pigeon hole in his 3p-block concept can indeed be interpreted as its own right now, unchangingly. But he also sees that if he leaves it at that, he has not yet explicitly defined any principle that could suffice to break the unchanging symmetry of the co-existing block from the 1p perspective. In this bare scenario, each of us should rather expect our experience, if anything, to be permanently confined to that of a single pigeon hole right now - i.e. not momentarily, but unchangingly. And what would that be like? Not very much, it might seem. Consequently, he explicitly posits (and purely, I insist, as a sleight of intuition) an unobservable change - the replacement of one pigeon hole by another in the unique context of what must be understood, unequivocally, as a single, universal right now. IOW, Hoyle's contention is that each moment of consciousness can be intuited as the singularised state of a universal solipsist whose successive re-combinations of remembering and forgetting suffice to break the panoptic symmetry. At the least, it seems possible that our experience (i.e. from the inside) is *not inconsistent*with this intuition. It occurred to me, in passing, that this idea of unobservable but consequential change has some analogy (but no more than that) with the way our vision fixates successive points via saccades which are themselves unobserved. Despite the unobservability of any transition between visual fixations, we can hardly consistently believe that our gaze is merely confined to any one of them. The peculiar consequence of such an intuition is that, from the perspective of David's typing *these very words*, Julius Caesar is no more the owner of an experience right now than David continues to be the owner of the experience of a moment ago. The only experience that obtains right now is what I happen to be aware of, as a proxy for the universal solipsist to whom both I and right now are uniquely applicable. In this way, according to Hoyle, every moment of relative experience is lived out, in mutual exclusion, in due course and in due measure. I suppose, at least, we are asked to see that this multi-solipsistic intuition is no more open to experiential refutation than the mini-solipsism that is the butt of so many philosophical jokes (Why are there so few of us solipsists?). After all, from the perspective of the singular intersection of a universal right now with some element of a 3p-block, we should indeed expect to be confronted, in effect, with a zombie world devoid of directly-observable consciousness: and that is indeed consistent with (and the persistent puzzle of) our experience. But do we, in truth, live out every possible moment, one at a time, in due course and in due measure? Well, somebody, on our behalf, does precisely this, do they not? However, after our many discussions, I suspect that Hoyle's universalist intuition (no doubt unsurprisingly) must be modified in the computationalist view and I think I am gradually starting to appreciate more and more what the differences may be. In fact I've been giving the matter a lot of thought recently. But that is meat for another conversation. In answer to your queries about Hoyle, I've no idea whether he met or knew about Everett, but he certainly considered the multiverse idea. Consider the following excerpt from October the First is Too Late (1965): There could even be completely different universes. Go back to my decaying nucleus. Hook up a bomb which explodes according to whether you have decay of a nucleus or not. Make the bomb so big that it becomes a doomsday machine. Let it be capable - if exploded - of wiping out all life on the Earth. Let the whole thing go for a critical few seconds, you remember we were considering whether a nucleus would decay in a
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 1/25/2014 3:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: And even if they did, why would that cause me to say no to the doctor. By the UDA. If you say yes to the doctor, physics emerges from all computations, and even plausibly from those who do not stop, which have a higher measure than those which stops. I doubt that physics depends on what I say to anyone. But the question is, what if materialism is true and I say yes to the doctor. I just don't see how saying yes to the doctor commits me the rest of the argument. And on the question of measure, when I write a computer program that doesn't stop with an answer as I intended it is sometimes because it has entered a loop. Aren't non-stopping programs like that going to dominate the measure of computations by the UD? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
AFAIK that is the first known statement of quantum suicide (or quantum immortality). If Hoyle wasn't aware of Everett he certainly had similar ideas. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 23 Jan 2014, at 19:42, meekerdb wrote: On 1/23/2014 1:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Jan 2014, at 00:34, meekerdb wrote: On 1/22/2014 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Jan 2014, at 21:33, meekerdb wrote: On 1/21/2014 2:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Only to make the UDA non valid. It works, if Brent meant a mathematical ultrafinitism. But this change comp, like it changes elementary arithmetic (which suppose at least that 0 ≠ s(x), and x ≠ y implies s(x) ≠ s(y), which can't be true in ultrafinitism). Ultrafinitism makes all current physical theories meaningless. How can that be when all current physical theories are tested by computation on finite digital computers and all observations are finite rational numbers? We just bet that physics is well approximated by computations, and indeed all known laws seems to be computable (except the collapse). I guess it makes sense in most case. I'd say the meaning of theories comes in their application - not from an axiom system. Because you reify reality, LOL! I'm reminded of what Sidney Morgenbesser said to B. F. Skinner, Let me see if I understand your thesis. You think we shouldn't athropomorphize people? I meant that the meaning of theories is brought by the theories already present in the brain (generalized or not). If not you reify reality, meaning, and this in a way which, when assuming comp, looks like magic. an put the meaning there. But we can't do that when working on the mind-body problem, so we need a mathematical notion of reality, and the notion of model (in logician sense) plays that role. That's a point where I disagree with you. We can work on the mind body problem by creating intelligent machines and when we have created them we will infer that they have minds just as we infer other people have minds (nobody really believes in p-zombies) and we will learn to engineer those minds. We don't believe in human p-zombie. For robots, many would argue that they are zombie, by construction. Then, the constructing AI and the mind-body problem will be solved by itself, can only solve the easy problem, that is not the mind-body problem, which needs to justify the bodies without assuming them. Note that there were people who tried an axiomatic approach to defining life - and it led nowhere, while people working laboratories with x-ray crystallography and stick-and-ball models discovered the double-helix. Right. defining life does not make sense. Biology is easy. It is not confronted to the hard problem, where the 3p complete explanation seems to evacuate the 1p person. Comp reduces completely this problem by reducing physics to number's psychology/ theology. If not, let us isolate the flaw in the argument. Theorizing has it's place. Molecular biology was really inspired by a lecture that Erwin Schroedinger gave (and later expanded into his book, What is Life) and which pointed to some of the basic characteristic the chemistry and physics of life must have. And one its contributions was to emphasize there was no need for magic, no elan vital. I see computationalism playing a similar role in the study of consciousness. But just like molecular didn't so much solve the problem of life as dissolve it, I expect something similar to happen in the study of consciousness. In the case of consciousness, such dissolution will corresponds to Dennett kind of explaining the subject away. In biology, we can do everything in the 3p (the 1p plural, actually, with comp). But for consciousness, the 1p is not reducible. Now, that problem is solved by ... the oldest solution we have: Theaetetus. The universal and Löbian machine can refute Socrate's refutation of Theaetetus. All critics of that definition contains a confusion of two arithmetical hypostases, in the comp frame. We do have made progresses. That for all x x ≠ x + 1, is NOT an empirical question. It's not an empirical question in Platonia, but in the real world (which I reify :-) ) it is: One raindrop plus one raindrop makes one raindrop. The set of the swim team with cardinality four plus the set of the basketball team with cardinality twelve is a set with cardinality 14. If you believe that 1+1=1, you are in trouble. That one drop added on one drop give one drop is not a refutation of the arithmetical statement that 1+1=2. It is a misapplication of a theory in a context which the theory does not handled. Exactly my point. And the context where is *does* apply, where it is *not* an empirical question, is in our language and Platonia. OK, if you don't put too much metaphysics in Platonia. Comp's platonia is just (N, +, *), a structure simpler than most used by most physicists and mathematicians. You can refute the theory of group by showing that (N +) is not a group. That's bad philosophy, I am afraid, Brent. Come on!
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 23 Jan 2014, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote: On 1/23/2014 2:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Jan 2014, at 00:45, meekerdb wrote: snip What makes you sure that the idea that all programs terminates is not also an idealisation (about a finite universal reality)? Also, if all programs terminate, there is no more real numbers. I guess you will say that there are idealisation. You seem to know that there is a concrete reality, but the comp approach to the mind-body problem asks to, temporarily perhaps, doubt such certainty. Of course I'm not *certain*, all theories are defeasible outside of Platonia. Inside too. But it seems like a well supported theory; at least as certain as you can always add one more. All right. But the you see the conflict. You cannot have both, and that is the point. I don't pretend that we can always add one. I assume that because it is the only way to give sense to comp. You just agree that comp is false, which is out of my topic. Are you equivocating on comp? Is it not just the theory that ones brain could be replaced by a digital computer? You often write the above as though all of your argument follows from that saying yes to the doctor. Together with Church thesis (and thus with the idea that a machine (in Turing sense) stops or not stops. But that is not clear to me. It depends on the context. Only when I explain the consequence of comp, comp is defined by the step 0 (yes doctor + CT). But then, in most discussion, comp means the definition/assumption *and* its consequence. It seems that it *also* assumes arithmetical realism and that you can always add one more. You need that to convince yourself that the set of partial computable function is close for the diagonalization, which is the conceptual reason to trust it. Or just to define the machine in the Turing sense. In (N, +, *) it is just a matter studied in high school to understand that we can always add one more. and that the scope of substitution is not the whole universe. To simplify step 1-6, and most reasoning, but step seven eliminates this. You critics of comp is valid, if you assume that there is a bigger natural number. We do agree. But then, explain me what is the (small) physical universe, where does it come from, and why it hurts? Explain to me why QM is in complex Hilbert space and not real or quaternion. I am not sure of that. I don't insist, because I am a long way to prove that in comp, but I think the comp-QM needs the octonions. you invent a new arithmetic, just to block an explanation. Is that not gross wishful thinking? No, the *new* arithmetic is just a recognition that Peano's arithmetic is an idealization In your aristotelian theology. But when working on the mind-body problem, it is better to abandon all prejudices on this. Indeed with comp, it is the concrete laptop which appears as an (unconscious preprogrammed) idealization. For some people, like Hardy, the number 8 is more concrete that the planets you can count. Our brain makes us believe the contrary, but he uses a complex universal machine to fail us on this. and one that we don't necessarily need to describe the world. After all people used arithmetic for centuries without assuming you could *always* add one more. Not Euler, not the mathematicians. Natural numbers don't make sense without this. People, for millenia used the grounds without assuming a big ball. Science can be counter-intuitive, and indeed, science was born (in occident) from taking some distance with the WYSIWYG animal's belief. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 1/23/2014 11:59 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Only the idealized computations of Turing. Computations in my computer always stop. Because you assume that it exists in some ontological sense. That might be possible. My point is that if this was really the case, you can't say yes to the doctor qua computatio. You can say yes to the doctor by invoking some magic. You've written that several times, but I don't understand the point. What difference does it make if all computations stop? Wasn't that part of Turing's definition of a computation - a Turing computer process that stopped. Just because I note that my computer will always stop and presumably my neurons will stop, doesn't entail that all processes must stop. And even if they did, why would that cause me to say no to the doctor. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 1/24/2014 12:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: In your aristotelian theology. But when working on the mind-body problem, it is better to abandon all prejudices on this. Indeed with comp, it is the concrete laptop which appears as an (unconscious preprogrammed) idealization. Of course I'd say reifying arithmetic is a prejudice. For some people, like Hardy, the number 8 is more concrete that the planets you can count. Our brain makes us believe the contrary, but he uses a complex universal machine to fail us on this. Yes I appreciate this viewpoint. Actually I'm pretty agnostic about what's really real. At any given time it's the ontology of our best theory; where best is not sharply defined but is measured by some mixture of predictive power, consilience, scope, definiteness, and accuracy. Comp is great on scope and maybe on definiteness, but it seems very weak on the other measures. That's why I keep hoping you'll be able to come up with some surprising testable prediction. This is just standard science. It's not some Aristotelean prejudice. It's the same thing we ask of string theory and loop-quantum-gravity. You mention that you think octonion Hilbert space will be found to be more fundamental than complex Hilbert space. Of course many people have speculated that quaternions or octonions will be more fundamental, but nothing definite has been predicted. So if comp showed that the octonions were necessary that would be quite convincing. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On Fri, Jan 24, 2014 at 02:12:57PM -0800, meekerdb wrote: You mention that you think octonion Hilbert space will be found to be more fundamental than complex Hilbert space. Of course many people have speculated that quaternions or octonions will be more fundamental, but nothing definite has been predicted. So if comp showed that the octonions were necessary that would be quite convincing. Indeed - with my derivation of QM, octonions, or more general measure are preferred over the complex. Which naturally leads to the question of why complex. Either octonions make no empirical difference, or a reason will be found why commutativity of the measure is necessary, or some experiment will be devised showing that complex number QM (ie standard QM) is empirically wrong. Any of these three options would be fascinating! Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 1/24/2014 2:58 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Jan 24, 2014 at 02:12:57PM -0800, meekerdb wrote: You mention that you think octonion Hilbert space will be found to be more fundamental than complex Hilbert space. Of course many people have speculated that quaternions or octonions will be more fundamental, but nothing definite has been predicted. So if comp showed that the octonions were necessary that would be quite convincing. Indeed - with my derivation of QM, octonions, or more general measure are preferred over the complex. Which naturally leads to the question of why complex. Either octonions make no empirical difference, or a reason will be found why commutativity of the measure is necessary, Measurements in standard QM is not generally commutative. You mean associativity? Baez and Heurta have written several papers on the relation of the four division algebras to physics. http://arxiv.org/pdf/0909.0551v2.pdf Brent or some experiment will be devised showing that complex number QM (ie standard QM) is empirically wrong. Any of these three options would be fascinating! Cheers -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On Fri, Jan 24, 2014 at 06:35:16PM -0800, meekerdb wrote: On 1/24/2014 2:58 PM, Russell Standish wrote: Indeed - with my derivation of QM, octonions, or more general measure are preferred over the complex. Which naturally leads to the question of why complex. Either octonions make no empirical difference, or a reason will be found why commutativity of the measure is necessary, Measurements in standard QM is not generally commutative. You mean associativity? No I meant commutativity of the measure (which is the complex field of QM). If a more general measure is used - eg quaternions, then the axiom of commutativity is the first to go. Baez and Heurta have written several papers on the relation of the four division algebras to physics. http://arxiv.org/pdf/0909.0551v2.pdf Thanks - I'll take a look, although, superficially it looks like its is dealing with a different question - maybe Lisi's theory? Brent or some experiment will be devised showing that complex number QM (ie standard QM) is empirically wrong. Any of these three options would be fascinating! Cheers -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 23 January 2014 19:39, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/22/2014 10:33 PM, LizR wrote: On 23 January 2014 08:22, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: We need the Becoming that is implicit in the moving flashlight, at least to give us a window of finite duration in time (and bits/space) to have a memory of what I used to be that can be compared to what I experience now. According to JA Wheeler we only need enough duration at any given instant to measure one bit. But in any case, all that is happening in your brain is happening right now. I suspect there is an illusion of an extended present being created, one pigeonhole at a time (let me check with Dan Dennett... yes, looks like there is :) But why illusion? If we're taking consciousness as fundamental then we should take the extended present as part of it; and in that case the extension allows them to overlap and hence provide a time dimension. This comment was made in the context of a block universe. If we're not taking consciousness as fundamental then we need to explain the extended present. Hence the reference to it being an illusion. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 23 January 2014 19:45, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear LizR, With quantum field theory we are still using the idea of a single space-time manifold to glue it all together but this itself could be one of the problems that we have in physics. Yes, that's true. (I'm not sure that introducing an extra time dimension is a step in the right direction though!) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 23 January 2014 19:42, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/22/2014 10:38 PM, LizR wrote: On 23 January 2014 19:35, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/22/2014 10:21 PM, LizR wrote: The real world doesn't add raindrops, or most other things we think of as entities - adding raindrops isn't 1+1, nature is really adding something like 10^25 atoms to another 10^25. But it _does_ add bosons in a BEC. Even when the constituents are indistinguishable, nature can perform simple arithmetic with them. I'd say *we* perform simple arithmetic to describe them - but only when we correctly recognize what is countable and what isn't. So the truth of Ax(x=/=x+1) is in Platonia. Platonia? Where's that, then? In our heads and in our language (and publications of the AMS). So that's where the truth or otherwise of Ax(x=/=x+1) is. OK. I think we're all agreed that's your view on the matter, at least. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 22 Jan 2014, at 19:06, David Nyman wrote: On 22 January 2014 09:45, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: I think I said the fl;ashlight wasn't needed, so it isn't there, and so nothing moves it around. The pigeonholes stand for states of consciousness, so they perceive what it would illuminate, which is their own contents. But they can perceive those without it. Do you really find that you can make intuitive sense of the pigeon hole metaphor without the flashlight? I must admit I've never been able to. From a 3p perspective, the idea is that the relations between pigeon holes map out a multiplicity of implied spatial- temporal trajectories, all there together. From a 1p perspective this would seem to transform to a fixed array of momentary points-of- view, again all there (or illuminated) together. I think that any attempt to intuit a relativised personal history from this metaphor cannot avoid the imaginative association with one or another sequence of pigeon holes. But each state sum up a sequence. This is common in the 1p and 3p perspective. How could a machine distinguish different flashlight sequencing? The logical alternative would seem to be to get stuck, monad-like, in whatever pigeon hole you first thought of. In the 1p perspective, the past sequence is remember, in virtue of the computation and its handling of the self-reference. And the (immediate and long term) future is expected in the same way, and then confirmed in the states which extends the past sequence. If the ordering of the flaslight is changed, or if more than one flashlightning is used, why should any experience change? What Hoyle was suggesting, I think, is that the necessary intuitions of a flow of consciousness can all be collapsed, as it were, into the notion of a unique sequence (in a purely logical sense) of randomly selected pigeon holes. I continue I have difficulty to make sense of this. It looks like projecting he 1p view on the 3p description. Such an absolute sequence must then contain all relativised sequences, with their logical inter-relations and differential measures preserved. Oddly enough, any notion of flow, as entailing the observation of transition between holes, is still unnecessary in this schema; indeed it would be incoherent. The sequencing of pigeon holes carries no relation of next or previous; the spatial- temporal structure of each pigeon hole is already conceived as both dynamic and self-ordering, like Barbour's time capsules. Rather, the purpose of the logical sequence of pigeon holes - i.e. the beam of the flashlight - is to furnish an intuition that avoids the aforementioned monadic catastrophe, by conceiving a unique multiplex of all possible (parallel) relative sequences. The cost of this heuristic is that all the pigeon holes now belong to a sort of universal, solipsistic multiple-personality that lives them (and, by proxy, us) one moment at a time. It's an interesting idea, with more ramifications than might appear at first blush, and thinking in this way often sheds an intriguingly different light on the various thought experiments about identity and succession we love to argue about on this list. Let us take the WM-duplication. Suppose that the guy in Helsinki is told that the randomly chosen unique flaslight sequence will illuminate W just after the duplication (if this makes sense). Should he decide that P(W) = 1 and P(M) = 0? Is the guy in M, which exists (even with just Behavior Mechanism), a zombie? Bruno David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 23 Jan 2014, at 00:34, meekerdb wrote: On 1/22/2014 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Jan 2014, at 21:33, meekerdb wrote: On 1/21/2014 2:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Only to make the UDA non valid. It works, if Brent meant a mathematical ultrafinitism. But this change comp, like it changes elementary arithmetic (which suppose at least that 0 ≠ s(x), and x ≠ y implies s(x) ≠ s(y), which can't be true in ultrafinitism). Ultrafinitism makes all current physical theories meaningless. How can that be when all current physical theories are tested by computation on finite digital computers and all observations are finite rational numbers? We just bet that physics is well approximated by computations, and indeed all known laws seems to be computable (except the collapse). I guess it makes sense in most case. I'd say the meaning of theories comes in their application - not from an axiom system. Because you reify reality, LOL! I'm reminded of what Sidney Morgenbesser said to B. F. Skinner, Let me see if I understand your thesis. You think we shouldn't athropomorphize people? I meant that the meaning of theories is brought by the theories already present in the brain (generalized or not). If not you reify reality, meaning, and this in a way which, when assuming comp, looks like magic. an put the meaning there. But we can't do that when working on the mind-body problem, so we need a mathematical notion of reality, and the notion of model (in logician sense) plays that role. That's a point where I disagree with you. We can work on the mind body problem by creating intelligent machines and when we have created them we will infer that they have minds just as we infer other people have minds (nobody really believes in p-zombies) and we will learn to engineer those minds. We don't believe in human p-zombie. For robots, many would argue that they are zombie, by construction. Then, the constructing AI and the mind-body problem will be solved by itself, can only solve the easy problem, that is not the mind- body problem, which needs to justify the bodies without assuming them. Note that there were people who tried an axiomatic approach to defining life - and it led nowhere, while people working laboratories with x-ray crystallography and stick-and-ball models discovered the double-helix. Right. defining life does not make sense. Biology is easy. It is not confronted to the hard problem, where the 3p complete explanation seems to evacuate the 1p person. Comp reduces completely this problem by reducing physics to number's psychology/theology. If not, let us isolate the flaw in the argument. Theorizing has it's place. Molecular biology was really inspired by a lecture that Erwin Schroedinger gave (and later expanded into his book, What is Life) and which pointed to some of the basic characteristic the chemistry and physics of life must have. And one its contributions was to emphasize there was no need for magic, no elan vital. I see computationalism playing a similar role in the study of consciousness. But just like molecular didn't so much solve the problem of life as dissolve it, I expect something similar to happen in the study of consciousness. In the case of consciousness, such dissolution will corresponds to Dennett kind of explaining the subject away. In biology, we can do everything in the 3p (the 1p plural, actually, with comp). But for consciousness, the 1p is not reducible. Now, that problem is solved by ... the oldest solution we have: Theaetetus. The universal and Löbian machine can refute Socrate's refutation of Theaetetus. All critics of that definition contains a confusion of two arithmetical hypostases, in the comp frame. We do have made progresses. That for all x x ≠ x + 1, is NOT an empirical question. It's not an empirical question in Platonia, but in the real world (which I reify :-) ) it is: One raindrop plus one raindrop makes one raindrop. The set of the swim team with cardinality four plus the set of the basketball team with cardinality twelve is a set with cardinality 14. If you believe that 1+1=1, you are in trouble. That one drop added on one drop give one drop is not a refutation of the arithmetical statement that 1+1=2. It is a misapplication of a theory in a context which the theory does not handled. You can refute the theory of group by showing that (N +) is not a group. That's bad philosophy, I am afraid, Brent. Come on! It is a truth, out of space and time, which is true in all models of RA, or PA, or ZF, etc. Yes, it's a truth of language; Not at all. It has nothing to do with language. A computation stops or not in arithmetic, independently of languages, theories, person and universe. of course you need to agree on the addition table and multiplication table to even just define what a computation is; but
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 23 Jan 2014, at 00:45, meekerdb wrote: On 1/22/2014 1:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Jan 2014, at 01:02, meekerdb wrote: On 1/21/2014 3:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 3:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/21/2014 8:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Why would you want to do that? It seems like an unnecessary extra axiom that doesn't have any purpose or utility. It prevents the paradoxes of undeciability, Cantor diagonalization, and it corresponds more directly with how we actually use arithmetic. I'm not sure it helps. What you may gain from avoiding paradoxes makes many of our accepted proofs false. E.g. Euclids proof of infinite primes. Or Euler's identity. Most of math would be ruined. A circle's circumference would not even be pi*diameter. Would this biggest number be different for different beings in different universes? What is it contingent on? You're taking an Platonic view that there really is an arithmetic and whether there's a biggest number is an empirical question. Ah! I just said that is was not. Somehow you deny the reality of math. Which math? Finite arithmetic, Peano arithmetic, set theory, homotopy theory,...? Or in short, yes. I was thinking of arithmetic. I see your point as a reductio ad absurdo for my case. A long time ago, someone told me that the consequence of comp is so startling that people will come with a critics of even 1+1=2. he advised me to not answer that critics, except by mentioning that it helps to complete the reduction ad absurdo. I'm saying it's an invention. We invented an system in which you can always add 1 because that was convenient; you don't have to think about whether you can or not. So to use this same line of reasoning, would you say there is no definite (a priori) fact of the matter of whether or not a given program terminates, unless we actually build a machine executing that program and observe it terminate? That's kind of mixing categories since 'program' (to you) means something in Platonia and there you don't need a machine to run it. In the physical world there is no question, all programs running on a machine terminate, for one reason or another. Non- terminating programs are the result of over idealization. What makes you sure that the idea that all programs terminates is not also an idealisation (about a finite universal reality)? Also, if all programs terminate, there is no more real numbers. I guess you will say that there are idealisation. You seem to know that there is a concrete reality, but the comp approach to the mind- body problem asks to, temporarily perhaps, doubt such certainty. Of course I'm not *certain*, all theories are defeasible outside of Platonia. Inside too. But it seems like a well supported theory; at least as certain as you can always add one more. All right. But the you see the conflict. You cannot have both, and that is the point. I don't pretend that we can always add one. I assume that because it is the only way to give sense to comp. You just agree that comp is false, which is out of my topic. You critics of comp is valid, if you assume that there is a bigger natural number. We do agree. But then, explain me what is the (small) physical universe, where does it come from, and why it hurts? you invent a new arithmetic, just to block an explanation. Is that not gross wishful thinking? Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 23 Jan 2014, at 07:35, meekerdb wrote: On 1/22/2014 10:21 PM, LizR wrote: The real world doesn't add raindrops, or most other things we think of as entities - adding raindrops isn't 1+1, nature is really adding something like 10^25 atoms to another 10^25. But it _does_ add bosons in a BEC. Even when the constituents are indistinguishable, nature can perform simple arithmetic with them. I'd say *we* perform simple arithmetic to describe them - but only when we correctly recognize what is countable and what isn't. So the truth of Ax(x=/=x+1) is in Platonia. But the truth that 1 raindrop + 1 rain drop gives 1 raindrops might too. The difficultys is to get the relevant definition of raindrop in Platonia, and comp shows how (in principle, given that we don't yet a definition of water, nor of space, etc.). If there is no persistent perception of raindrops in Platonia-seen- from-inside, comp can't be correct. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 23 Jan 2014, at 07:39, meekerdb wrote: On 1/22/2014 10:33 PM, LizR wrote: On 23 January 2014 08:22, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.com wrote: We need the Becoming that is implicit in the moving flashlight, at least to give us a window of finiteduration in time (and bits/space) to have a memory of what I used to be that can be compared to what I experience now. According to JA Wheeler we only need enough duration at any given instant to measure one bit. But in any case, all that is happening in your brain is happening right now. I suspect there is an illusion of an extended present being created, one pigeonhole at a time (let me check with Dan Dennett... yes, looks like there is :) But why illusion? If we're taking consciousness as fundamental But comp asks to not take consciousness as fundamental or primitive. then we should take the extended present as part of it; and in that case the extension allows them to overlap and hence provide a time dimension. OK. If we're not taking consciousness as fundamental then we need to explain the extended present. The relative FPI domain in UD*, or in arithmetic. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 23 Jan 2014, at 07:42, meekerdb wrote: On 1/22/2014 10:38 PM, LizR wrote: On 23 January 2014 19:35, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/22/2014 10:21 PM, LizR wrote: The real world doesn't add raindrops, or most other things we think of as entities - adding raindrops isn't 1+1, nature is really adding something like 10^25 atoms to another 10^25. But it _does_ add bosons in a BEC. Even when the constituents are indistinguishable, nature can perform simple arithmetic with them. I'd say *we* perform simple arithmetic to describe them - but only when we correctly recognize what is countable and what isn't. So the truth of Ax(x=/=x+1) is in Platonia. Platonia? Where's that, then? In our heads and in our language (and publications of the AMS). So, 2+2=4 was meaningless before life appeared on this planet? I can easily imagine that 2+2=4 was meaningless, but I can't conceive that 2+2=4 would be meaningless, if only because Platonia is out of time. It is not related to physics, except that physics is a persistent illusion coming from the machine's inside points of view in Platonia. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 23 January 2014 08:39, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Let us take the WM-duplication. Suppose that the guy in Helsinki is told that the randomly chosen unique flaslight sequence will illuminate W just after the duplication (if this makes sense). Should he decide that P(W) = 1 and P(M) = 0? Is the guy in M, which exists (even with just Behavior Mechanism), a zombie? Oh dear no, that makes no sense whatsoever. I would humbly suggest that this is not at all how Hoyle intended his metaphor to be applied. In my understanding, his idea bears rather on the specific question of personal universality. IOW, in what sense, if any, can we intelligibly conceive of consciousness as the property of some unique, universal person (as, for example, in Hindu or Buddhist theology)? Let us assume that we are to understand person in the sense of the owner of some *particular*logical ordering of conscious moments. Then, if the idea of a universal person is to be made intelligible in some way, it should be as the owner of *all possible* logical orderings of conscious moments. If that be so, the question then arises: How to make sense of the experience of such a universal person? What could it possibly be like? If Hoyle's metaphor, or heuristic, is considered in this way, it should I hope be apparent that it is not any sort of proposal for a second time dimension or indeed any kind of additional machinery. That it is not the former should be manifest in that the flashlight is merely one possible metaphor for the unique consideration of a logical sequence of particularised moments, each to the exclusion of any other. It is redundant - nor does it make any sense - to think of a mere heuristic of this sort as necessarily introducing any supplementary or independent properties of duration, rate or order. Its role is rather to assist us in making some sort of intuitive sense of something that is no doubt much deeper and more complex, without (hopefully) doing it irreparable violence. The mental picture of the logical sequence of the flashlight's random walk should suggest or entail no characteristic other than the momentary filtering out of a *single* perspective. Filtered, that is, from the otherwise panoptic view that we should presumably attribute to a universal personhood. The question then arises: Could the intuition of such a multiplex of random momentary filterings possibly give an adequate account of the myriad, ordered experiential trajectories of each and every one of us? Hoyle's answer, simpliciter, is yes it could. If that be so, it perhaps becomes at least intelligible to reconsider some of our favourite thought experiments as, so to speak, the interleaved dreams of a *single* solipsistic multiple-personality. Such an attempt, I suggest, while often bringing forth exceedingly puzzling questions in itself, can sometimes resolve apparent paradoxes (especially those related to identity) or at least offer some interesting nuances. I know we have discussed these ideas before and each time I have proposed them to you in more or less the same terms as I have just recapitulated. However your question, quoted above, gives me pause that I have as yet failed to communicate the real gist and point while at the same time succeeding in attaching additional, unintended baggage. Nonetheless I don't think we're necessarily too far apart. ISTM that Hoyle's idea must rely on the opacity of 1p personal history to delay, suspension, etc. in the 3p view, that you argue for in UDA 1-6. Where he goes a step further is to generalise this to a universalist perspective (which hasn't been, I assume, any part your own professional goal in this regard), relying on the intuition that no moment is ever simultaneous with any other moment: not yours, not mine. You and me can then be understood as mere proxies for a deeper unification. This might lead us to the remarkable intuition that the universal first-person can indeed be understood in terms of a *unique* first-personal serialisation. That in turn might lead us to wonder what other proxies, with whom we may bear some relation, may be experiencing whilst we are suspended. And so forth and so on. Though I am tempted to provide a more specific rejoinder to your question above, I hope that it may now succeed in answering itself in the light of the foregoing points. If so, we might find ourselves better able to consider some of the more intriguing consequences I had in mind. David David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 1/23/2014 1:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Jan 2014, at 00:34, meekerdb wrote: On 1/22/2014 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Jan 2014, at 21:33, meekerdb wrote: On 1/21/2014 2:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Only to make the UDA non valid. It works, if Brent meant a mathematical ultrafinitism. But this change comp, like it changes elementary arithmetic (which suppose at least that 0 ≠ s(x), and x ≠ y implies s(x) ≠ s(y), which can't be true in ultrafinitism). Ultrafinitism makes all current physical theories meaningless. How can that be when all current physical theories are tested by computation on finite digital computers and all observations are finite rational numbers? We just bet that physics is well approximated by computations, and indeed all known laws seems to be computable (except the collapse). I guess it makes sense in most case. I'd say the meaning of theories comes in their application - not from an axiom system. Because you reify reality, LOL! I'm reminded of what Sidney Morgenbesser said to B. F. Skinner, Let me see if I understand your thesis. You think we shouldn't athropomorphize people? I meant that the meaning of theories is brought by the theories already present in the brain (generalized or not). If not you reify reality, meaning, and this in a way which, when assuming comp, looks like magic. an put the meaning there. But we can't do that when working on the mind-body problem, so we need a mathematical notion of reality, and the notion of model (in logician sense) plays that role. That's a point where I disagree with you. We can work on the mind body problem by creating intelligent machines and when we have created them we will infer that they have minds just as we infer other people have minds (nobody really believes in p-zombies) and we will learn to engineer those minds. We don't believe in human p-zombie. For robots, many would argue that they are zombie, by construction. Then, the constructing AI and the mind-body problem will be solved by itself, can only solve the easy problem, that is not the mind-body problem, which needs to justify the bodies without assuming them. Note that there were people who tried an axiomatic approach to defining life - and it led nowhere, while people working laboratories with x-ray crystallography and stick-and-ball models discovered the double-helix. Right. defining life does not make sense. Biology is easy. It is not confronted to the hard problem, where the 3p complete explanation seems to evacuate the 1p person. Comp reduces completely this problem by reducing physics to number's psychology/theology. If not, let us isolate the flaw in the argument. Theorizing has it's place. Molecular biology was really inspired by a lecture that Erwin Schroedinger gave (and later expanded into his book, What is Life) and which pointed to some of the basic characteristic the chemistry and physics of life must have. And one its contributions was to emphasize there was no need for magic, no elan vital. I see computationalism playing a similar role in the study of consciousness. But just like molecular didn't so much solve the problem of life as dissolve it, I expect something similar to happen in the study of consciousness. In the case of consciousness, such dissolution will corresponds to Dennett kind of explaining the subject away. In biology, we can do everything in the 3p (the 1p plural, actually, with comp). But for consciousness, the 1p is not reducible. Now, that problem is solved by ... the oldest solution we have: Theaetetus. The universal and Löbian machine can refute Socrate's refutation of Theaetetus. All critics of that definition contains a confusion of two arithmetical hypostases, in the comp frame. We do have made progresses. That for all x x ≠ x + 1, is NOT an empirical question. It's not an empirical question in Platonia, but in the real world (which I reify :-) ) it is: One raindrop plus one raindrop makes one raindrop. The set of the swim team with cardinality four plus the set of the basketball team with cardinality twelve is a set with cardinality 14. If you believe that 1+1=1, you are in trouble. That one drop added on one drop give one drop is not a refutation of the arithmetical statement that 1+1=2. It is a misapplication of a theory in a context which the theory does not handled. Exactly my point. And the context where is *does* apply, where it is *not* an empirical question, is in our language and Platonia. You can refute the theory of group by showing that (N +) is not a group. That's bad philosophy, I am afraid, Brent. Come on! It is a truth, out of space and time, which is true in all models of RA, or PA, or ZF, etc. Yes, it's a truth of language; Not at all. It has nothing to do with language. A computation stops or not in arithmetic, independently of languages, theories, person and universe. Only
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 1/23/2014 2:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Jan 2014, at 00:45, meekerdb wrote: On 1/22/2014 1:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Jan 2014, at 01:02, meekerdb wrote: On 1/21/2014 3:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 3:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/21/2014 8:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Why would you want to do that? It seems like an unnecessary extra axiom that doesn't have any purpose or utility. It prevents the paradoxes of undeciability, Cantor diagonalization, and it corresponds more directly with how we actually use arithmetic. I'm not sure it helps. What you may gain from avoiding paradoxes makes many of our accepted proofs false. E.g. Euclids proof of infinite primes. Or Euler's identity. Most of math would be ruined. A circle's circumference would not even be pi*diameter. Would this biggest number be different for different beings in different universes? What is it contingent on? You're taking an Platonic view that there really is an arithmetic and whether there's a biggest number is an empirical question. Ah! I just said that is was not. Somehow you deny the reality of math. Which math? Finite arithmetic, Peano arithmetic, set theory, homotopy theory,...? Or in short, yes. I was thinking of arithmetic. I see your point as a reductio ad absurdo for my case. A long time ago, someone told me that the consequence of comp is so startling that people will come with a critics of even 1+1=2. he advised me to not answer that critics, except by mentioning that it helps to complete the reduction ad absurdo. I'm saying it's an invention. We invented an system in which you can always add 1 because that was convenient; you don't have to think about whether you can or not. So to use this same line of reasoning, would you say there is no definite (a priori) fact of the matter of whether or not a given program terminates, unless we actually build a machine executing that program and observe it terminate? That's kind of mixing categories since 'program' (to you) means something in Platonia and there you don't need a machine to run it. In the physical world there is no question, all programs running on a machine terminate, for one reason or another. Non-terminating programs are the result of over idealization. What makes you sure that the idea that all programs terminates is not also an idealisation (about a finite universal reality)? Also, if all programs terminate, there is no more real numbers. I guess you will say that there are idealisation. You seem to know that there is a concrete reality, but the comp approach to the mind-body problem asks to, temporarily perhaps, doubt such certainty. Of course I'm not *certain*, all theories are defeasible outside of Platonia. Inside too. But it seems like a well supported theory; at least as certain as you can always add one more. All right. But the you see the conflict. You cannot have both, and that is the point. I don't pretend that we can always add one. I assume that because it is the only way to give sense to comp. You just agree that comp is false, which is out of my topic. Are you equivocating on comp? Is it not just the theory that ones brain could be replaced by a digital computer? You often write the above as though all of your argument follows from that saying yes to the doctor. But that is not clear to me. It seems that it *also* assumes arithmetical realism and that you can always add one more. and that the scope of substitution is not the whole universe. You critics of comp is valid, if you assume that there is a bigger natural number. We do agree. But then, explain me what is the (small) physical universe, where does it come from, and why it hurts? Explain to me why QM is in complex Hilbert space and not real or quaternion. you invent a new arithmetic, just to block an explanation. Is that not gross wishful thinking? No, the *new* arithmetic is just a recognition that Peano's arithmetic is an idealization and one that we don't necessarily need to describe the world. After all people used arithmetic for centuries without assuming you could *always* add one more. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 1/23/2014 2:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Jan 2014, at 07:42, meekerdb wrote: On 1/22/2014 10:38 PM, LizR wrote: On 23 January 2014 19:35, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/22/2014 10:21 PM, LizR wrote: The real world doesn't add raindrops, or most other things we think of as entities - adding raindrops isn't 1+1, nature is really adding something like 10^25 atoms to another 10^25. But it _does_ add bosons in a BEC. Even when the constituents are indistinguishable, nature can perform simple arithmetic with them. I'd say *we* perform simple arithmetic to describe them - but only when we correctly recognize what is countable and what isn't. So the truth of Ax(x=/=x+1) is in Platonia. Platonia? Where's that, then? In our heads and in our language (and publications of the AMS). So, 2+2=4 was meaningless before life appeared on this planet? It is part of our best theory describing how things were before life appeared on this planet. Brent I can easily imagine that 2+2=4 was meaningless, but I can't conceive that 2+2=4 would be meaningless, if only because Platonia is out of time. It is not related to physics, except that physics is a persistent illusion coming from the machine's inside points of view in Platonia. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 23 Jan 2014, at 17:05, David Nyman wrote: On 23 January 2014 08:39, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Let us take the WM-duplication. Suppose that the guy in Helsinki is told that the randomly chosen unique flaslight sequence will illuminate W just after the duplication (if this makes sense). Should he decide that P(W) = 1 and P(M) = 0? Is the guy in M, which exists (even with just Behavior Mechanism), a zombie? Oh dear no, that makes no sense whatsoever. I would humbly suggest that this is not at all how Hoyle intended his metaphor to be applied. You reassure me. Not that I did really believe it, but I was trying to illustrate why I think that such a metaphor can be misleading. Of course all metaphor are misleading when taken literally. In my understanding, his idea bears rather on the specific question of personal universality. Where we do cross indeed, recurrently. IOW, in what sense, if any, can we intelligibly conceive of consciousness as the property of some unique, universal person (as, for example, in Hindu or Buddhist theology)? The more I think of this in the comp realm, the more I think this means the consciousness of the universal numbers. All universal number. The Löbian numbers are just more chatty, which is handy for the interviews. Let us assume that we are to understand person in the sense of the owner of some particular logical ordering of conscious moments. All right, but the *particular* here, when defined, will look like an abstract primitive belief, like a type or ordering thought. The universal number fortran might need to have the same consciousness than any other universal numbers. They are the seed of the same histories or consciousness differentiation and dedifferentiation. That universal consciousness has a *particular* which might be like an altered state of consciousness, a moment of insanity, like a confusion between G and G*, perhaps. Then, if the idea of a universal person is to be made intelligible in some way, it should be as the owner of all possible logical orderings of conscious moments. I think that make sense, with the universal machines being the owner of themselves and their capacities, but of course their 1-p diffuse in an large forest of different particulars, although it is not exclude some transfinite complex relation with Truth, which participates in the consciousness of the universal person. The universal first person is the intersection between truth and very basic principles, like addition and multiplication. If that be so, the question then arises: How to make sense of the experience of such a universal person? What could it possibly be like? The 1-p of the universal machine has free will, but no means, nor needs. Yet a lot of choices. A lot is an euphemism. I think it is Vimalakirty's state of the unconceivable freedom. If Hoyle's metaphor, or heuristic, is considered in this way, it should I hope be apparent that it is not any sort of proposal for a second time dimension or indeed any kind of additional machinery. OK. That it is not the former should be manifest in that the flashlight is merely one possible metaphor for the unique consideration of a logical sequence of particularised moments, each to the exclusion of any other. It is redundant - nor does it make any sense - to think of a mere heuristic of this sort as necessarily introducing any supplementary or independent properties of duration, rate or order. Its role is rather to assist us in making some sort of intuitive sense of something that is no doubt much deeper and more complex, without (hopefully) doing it irreparable violence. I think the 8 hypostases explains well how, by incompleteness, all machines selves split in 2, 4, 8, 16, hypostases, and lives them all at once, although the arithmetical interpretation of the boxes and diamond changes at the speed of light. I think you are not so incline to study the math, but I am just explaining the basics to Liz, and it might be an opportunity to take the wagon. In a sense, the 8 hypostases are already given by an interview, well not really of a universal person, but of a universal scientist, which the universal numbers also can own, and that scientist acknowledges the presence of the universal person, and it can tell why she obeys different laws that the scientist laws. The mental picture of the logical sequence of the flashlight's random walk should suggest or entail no characteristic other than the momentary filtering out of a single perspective. You lost me again. I see more the universal person consciousness state as a blisfull peaceful state like the one of the baby in the womb of her/his mother. Then it differentiates. Filtered, that is, from the otherwise panoptic view that we should presumably attribute to a universal personhood. I agree.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 23 January 2014 23:47, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 23 Jan 2014, at 07:42, meekerdb wrote: On 1/22/2014 10:38 PM, LizR wrote: On 23 January 2014 19:35, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/22/2014 10:21 PM, LizR wrote: The real world doesn't add raindrops, or most other things we think of as entities - adding raindrops isn't 1+1, nature is really adding something like 10^25 atoms to another 10^25. But it _does_ add bosons in a BEC. Even when the constituents are indistinguishable, nature can perform simple arithmetic with them. I'd say *we* perform simple arithmetic to describe them - but only when we correctly recognize what is countable and what isn't. So the truth of Ax(x=/=x+1) is in Platonia. Platonia? Where's that, then? In our heads and in our language (and publications of the AMS). So, 2+2=4 was meaningless before life appeared on this planet? I can easily imagine that 2+2=4 was meaningless, but I can't conceive that 2+2=4 would be meaningless, if only because Platonia is out of time. It is not related to physics, except that physics is a persistent illusion coming from the machine's inside points of view in Platonia. This appears to be the fundamental bone of contention between you and Brent. He appears to believe arithmetic is a human invention which relates to reality because, well, (waves hands, and cunningly slips AR hat on) ... it just does, somehow. Or if it doesn't, but is out there in some sense, that fact isn't of any fundamental importance. Hence all the robust discussion over whether there is a biggest number... ...which reminds me of a quote from James Blish's book A Clash of Cymbals (aka The Triumph of Time). I can't recall the exact date on which the universe was due to end (but I'm sure it implied a universal present - Blish's grasp of relativity wasn't the best, as his Haertel overdrive showed, but then it was only SF) - it was in the year 4004 AD (in reference to Archbishop Ussher of Armagh), so say it was the 6th of July for argument's sake. And after that 6th of July there would be no 7th of July, forever and ever. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 1/23/2014 2:40 PM, LizR wrote: This appears to be the fundamental bone of contention between you and Brent. He appears to believe arithmetic is a human invention which relates to reality because, well, (waves hands, and cunningly slips AR hat on) ... it just does, somehow. It relates to reality as we experience it because we invented arithmetic by abstracting and generalizing from that experience. It's not surprising that our ideas relate to what we experience. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 24 January 2014 11:51, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/23/2014 2:40 PM, LizR wrote: This appears to be the fundamental bone of contention between you and Brent. He appears to believe arithmetic is a human invention which relates to reality because, well, (waves hands, and cunningly slips AR hat on) ... it just does, somehow. It relates to reality as we experience it because we invented arithmetic by abstracting and generalizing from that experience. If we abstract and generalise something from experience, I would say the standard usage is to say that we have discovered something, rather than invented it. For example, Isaac Newton invented an equation which he called the law of gravitation. He did so by abstracting and generalising from observations of the world. However, most people (outside philosophy departments) would say that his equation describes (or attempts to describe) a feature of the world that is genuinely out there. Similarly, if we abstracted and generalised in order to invent 2, presumably we did so in order to describe something we discovered, something that is genuinely out there... I would say most people use invented to mean that something had no counterpart in reality, in any sense (abstract or otherwise) until someone brought it into existence. So in that sense, I would claim we didn't invent arithmetic or gravity. Do you agree, or would you say that arithmetic is an invention, in this standard usage? (Or did you have some other sense of invent in mind that I've missed?) It's not surprising that our ideas relate to what we experience. You seem to be trying to have this both ways. Or maybe it's just me not getting quite where you're coming from. Is arithmetic a genuine feature of reality that we have discovered, or is it not? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 1/23/2014 3:42 PM, LizR wrote: On 24 January 2014 11:51, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/23/2014 2:40 PM, LizR wrote: This appears to be the fundamental bone of contention between you and Brent. He appears to believe arithmetic is a human invention which relates to reality because, well, (waves hands, and cunningly slips AR hat on) ... it just does, somehow. It relates to reality as we experience it because we invented arithmetic by abstracting and generalizing from that experience. If we abstract and generalise something from experience, I would say the standard usage is to say that we have discovered something, rather than invented it. For example, Isaac Newton invented an equation which he called the law of gravitation. He did so by abstracting and generalising from observations of the world. However, most people (outside philosophy departments) would say that his equation describes (or attempts to describe) a feature of the world that is genuinely out there. But notice that is failed out there. Elliptical orbits are still true in 1/r potentials, but it turned out those are idealized approximations. Similarly, if we abstracted and generalised in order to invent 2, presumably we did so in order to describe something we discovered, something that is genuinely out there... Sure, it describes a relationship between countable sets. But I don't think that justifies reifying it. Bigger also describes a relationship between objects that is out there, but we don't reify it. I would say most people use invented to mean that something had no counterpart in reality, in any sense (abstract or otherwise) until someone brought it into existence. So in that sense, I would claim we didn't invent arithmetic or gravity. Do you agree, or would you say that arithmetic is an invention, in this standard usage? (Or did you have some other sense of invent in mind that I've missed?) I think we invent theories and descriptions and we may hope and intend that they apply to reality, but we can't know that. And some mathematical inventions were not intended to apply to anything realistic, they were just generalizations that occurred to a mathematician. Of course we may say we discover a relation in something even though we invented it. Just because we invent something (like Peano's axioms) it doesn't follow that we know all the consequences. We certainly invented chess, but nobody knows whether white can always win following a Ruy Lopez opening. It's not surprising that our ideas relate to what we experience. You seem to be trying to have this both ways. Or maybe it's just me not getting quite where you're coming from. Is arithmetic a genuine feature of reality that we have discovered, or is it not? I'd say a finitist form of arithmetic is a good description of some aspects of reality - but don't try to add raindrops or build Hilbert's Hotel. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 24 January 2014 14:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: I'd say a finitist form of arithmetic is a good description of some aspects of reality - but don't try to add raindrops or build Hilbert's Hotel. OK. So are there some fundamental aspects of reality that can't be described by mathematics? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 1/23/2014 5:46 PM, LizR wrote: On 24 January 2014 14:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: I'd say a finitist form of arithmetic is a good description of some aspects of reality - but don't try to add raindrops or build Hilbert's Hotel. OK. So are there some fundamental aspects of reality that can't be described by mathematics? Probably not. Or it might depend on how complete a description is required (notice that not all true sentences of arithmetic can be described). Mathematics is just axiomatized language, a way of making sentences definite and avoiding self-contradicition. There might be something that can only be described fuzzily; poets have lots of candidates. Maybe consciousness is one. But it's like asking is there something science can't investigate. Maybe, but we won't know without trying. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 24 January 2014 16:08, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/23/2014 5:46 PM, LizR wrote: On 24 January 2014 14:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: I'd say a finitist form of arithmetic is a good description of some aspects of reality - but don't try to add raindrops or build Hilbert's Hotel. OK. So are there some fundamental aspects of reality that can't be described by mathematics? Probably not. Or it might depend on how complete a description is required (notice that not all true sentences of arithmetic can be described). Mathematics is just axiomatized language, a way of making sentences definite and avoiding self-contradicition. There might be something that can only be described fuzzily; poets have lots of candidates. Maybe consciousness is one. But it's like asking is there something science can't investigate. Maybe, but we won't know without trying. It's just that so far, after about 500 years, we haven't managed to find *anything* that looks remotely fundamental to the operation of the universe that can't be described to fairly high precision by maths. I guess this is what has led some people to wonder if there's more to it than just a way of making sentences definite and avoiding self-contradicition. (I guess other people think we cherry pick the stuff that's mathy, and there are vast swathes of non-mathematical stuff out there just waiting to be discovered...) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 1/23/2014 7:33 PM, LizR wrote: On 24 January 2014 16:08, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/23/2014 5:46 PM, LizR wrote: On 24 January 2014 14:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: I'd say a finitist form of arithmetic is a good description of some aspects of reality - but don't try to add raindrops or build Hilbert's Hotel. OK. So are there some fundamental aspects of reality that can't be described by mathematics? Probably not. Or it might depend on how complete a description is required (notice that not all true sentences of arithmetic can be described). Mathematics is just axiomatized language, a way of making sentences definite and avoiding self-contradicition. There might be something that can only be described fuzzily; poets have lots of candidates. Maybe consciousness is one. But it's like asking is there something science can't investigate. Maybe, but we won't know without trying. It's just that so far, after about 500 years, we haven't managed to find /anything/ that looks remotely fundamental to the operation of the universe that can't be described to fairly high precision by maths. I guess this is what has led some people to wonder if there's more to it than just a way of making sentences definite and avoiding self-contradicition. I think you're squinting through you math glasses. Everything that we can describe and predict with high precision is described by math (for the reason I gave). So of course whatever we think is the most fundamental theory is going to be described by math - they alternative would to that it was described in say, poetry and metaphor. But then we'd say that's vague and we need precise predictions to test this alternative theory. (I guess other people think we cherry pick the stuff that's mathy, and there are vast swathes of non-mathematical stuff out there just waiting to be discovered...) Sure. It's the part Bruno dismisses as geography: the messy contingent stuff that biologists describe in notebooks or we treat statistically. We *think* it can be explained in terms of the fundamental math (Schrodinger's equation, GR, QFT) and so we tell ourselves we've got the really real equations, and aren't they mathy! But we also know we've thought that before and been wrong, and besides they aren't even consistent with one another (hence Susskind and the firewall debate). Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
Oh well, I will remove my AR hat for now and put on my poet's hat. It's much more becoming in any case. On 24 January 2014 16:46, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/23/2014 7:33 PM, LizR wrote: On 24 January 2014 16:08, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/23/2014 5:46 PM, LizR wrote: On 24 January 2014 14:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: I'd say a finitist form of arithmetic is a good description of some aspects of reality - but don't try to add raindrops or build Hilbert's Hotel. OK. So are there some fundamental aspects of reality that can't be described by mathematics? Probably not. Or it might depend on how complete a description is required (notice that not all true sentences of arithmetic can be described). Mathematics is just axiomatized language, a way of making sentences definite and avoiding self-contradicition. There might be something that can only be described fuzzily; poets have lots of candidates. Maybe consciousness is one. But it's like asking is there something science can't investigate. Maybe, but we won't know without trying. It's just that so far, after about 500 years, we haven't managed to find *anything* that looks remotely fundamental to the operation of the universe that can't be described to fairly high precision by maths. I guess this is what has led some people to wonder if there's more to it than just a way of making sentences definite and avoiding self-contradicition. I think you're squinting through you math glasses. Everything that we can describe and predict with high precision is described by math (for the reason I gave). So of course whatever we think is the most fundamental theory is going to be described by math - they alternative would to that it was described in say, poetry and metaphor. But then we'd say that's vague and we need precise predictions to test this alternative theory. (I guess other people think we cherry pick the stuff that's mathy, and there are vast swathes of non-mathematical stuff out there just waiting to be discovered...) Sure. It's the part Bruno dismisses as geography: the messy contingent stuff that biologists describe in notebooks or we treat statistically. We *think* it can be explained in terms of the fundamental math (Schrodinger's equation, GR, QFT) and so we tell ourselves we've got the really real equations, and aren't they mathy! But we also know we've thought that before and been wrong, and besides they aren't even consistent with one another (hence Susskind and the firewall debate). Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 21 Jan 2014, at 21:16, meekerdb wrote: On 1/21/2014 2:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Jan 2014, at 18:36, meekerdb wrote: On 1/20/2014 12:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Jan 2014, at 22:31, meekerdb wrote: On 1/19/2014 9:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But why should that imply *existence*. It does not. Unless we believe in the axioms, which is the case for elementary arithmetic. But what does believe in the axioms mean. Do we really believe we can *always* add one more? I find it doubtful. It's just a good model for most countable things. So I can believe the axioms imply the theorems and that 17 is prime is a theorem, but I don't think that commits me to any existence in the normal sense of THAT exists. Because you are chosing the physicalist ostensive definition of what exists, like Aristotelians, but you beg the question here. I don't see that you've explained what question I begged. Just because I define things ostensively does not entail that reject explanations of their existence - if that's what you are implying. Fair enough. The point is that, in that case, you should not say yes to the doctor. Why not. The doctor is going install a physical prosthetic. As you've agreed before, it will not be *exactly* like me - but I'm not exactly the same from day to day anyway. But you overlook the UDA here. The UDA is the explanation why if you say yes to the doctor qua computatio, the physical must be recovered from arithmetic, in some special way. But that seems me an example of the misplaced concrete. I have a lot more confidence in the physical functionality of a well tested artificial neuron than I have in the UDA. So I may well say yes to the doctor without accepting arithmetical realism, the mathematical definition of exists, or the running of a UD. Of course. If you really believe in a bigger natural number (that we can't always add one), what you say follows. (personally I have more confidence in the fact that all natural numbers have a successor than in any artificial neuron, even if well tested). So you criticize AR, but without AR, we can't explain Church thesis, and the notion of computer become ambiguous. You reject comp, by rejecting computer science. yes, in that case, even step 8 will not change your mind. Even step seven is no more valid, in that case. You can always add magic of course. This can be used for any theory of physics. I think your critics can be sum up by the belief that step 8 is non valid. I am suspicious that it only proves that a zero-physics simulation is possible in a different world where the physics is simulated too. I don't understand. In other words it's conclusion is only valid if the scope is made arbitrarily large and the MG, in effect, becomes a different world. In which case you say no to the doctor, and we are a long way from saying yes just by trusting the artificial neuron and glial cells, like you suggest to be a reason for saying yes without AR. Bruno Brent But step 8 talks about reality, so it is not purely logical, and step 8 just shows how ad hoc that move is. It is made equivalent to the way creationist reason, except it is done for the creation instead of the creator. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 21 Jan 2014, at 21:25, meekerdb wrote: On 1/21/2014 2:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Jan 2014, at 21:19, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Bruno, Is it possible for a Computation to be a Model also? What is the obstruction? ? Is it possible for an apple to be an orange? Computation are very special abstract, yet of a syntactical nature, relations (between numbers, say, or combinators, lisp expressions, etc.) I have defined them by a sequence phi_i(j)^n, with n = 0, 1, 2, ... Model are structured set (or arrows in some category) satisfying formula. Of course this a quite different meaning than scientists and engineers have in mind when they say model. Yes. It is the root of a common confusion between logician and physicist. Logician uses model like painter, where the model is the reality (the naked man) that the painters theorize about (paints). They mean a theory Yes. which they do not assume to be complete but to only make predictions within some limited domain - and so it may be regarded as a function or a set of possible computations combined with an interpretation, e.g. an elastic model of a structure. OK. I have suggested more than once to use the term theory, and keep model for a possible 'reality'. that would help. Logicians are more sophisticated than physicist, they model both the entire relationship between a theory and its models. So the notion of theory is a modelisation of theory, and the notion of model is a modelization of the notion of reality. That's is useful for the mind- body problem. Bruno Brent Those are quite different things. It does not mean that there are not some relation. Usually the computations can be represented by some object in some model of some Turing complete theory, like RA, PA, or ZF. Models are semantic notions, studied in model theory. Computations are more syntactical objects (finite or infinite, though) studied in recursion or computability theory, or in computation theory. Bruno On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 4:24 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 20 Jan 2014, at 07:27, Stephen Paul King wrote: No! This is not unknown. I am cobbling ideas together, sure, think about it! What are we thinking? If the UD implements or emulates all computations then it implements all worlds, ala Kripke. That would include all models of self-consistent theories. It is not that simple, alas. A computation is not a model. I have try hard to get a relation like that, because this would simplify the relation between UDA and AUDA. I progress on this, but that problem is not yet solved. Bruno On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 1:22 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/19/2014 10:01 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Exactly, what about all the models of all the worlds that follow different axioms? Those can possibly exist, thus they must. What is not impossible, is compulsory! Did you just make that up? :-) Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are notthe intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 21 Jan 2014, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote: On 1/21/2014 2:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Jan 2014, at 02:25, meekerdb wrote: On 1/20/2014 5:00 PM, LizR wrote: On 21 January 2014 06:42, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/20/2014 1:11 AM, LizR wrote: On 20 January 2014 18:51, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: You seem not to appreciate that this dissipates the one essential advantage of mathematical monism: we understand mathematics (because, I say, we invent it). But if it's a mere human invention trying to model the Platonic ding and sich then PA may not be the real arithmetic. And there will have to be some magic math stuff that makes the real arithmetic really real. Surely the real test is whether it works better than any other theory. (The phrase unreasonable effectiveness appears to indicate that it does.) Would it work any less well if there were a biggest number? I don't know. I would imagine so, because that would be a theory with an ad hoc extra clause with no obvious justification, so every calculation would have to carry extra baggage around. If I raise a number to the power of 100, say, I have to check first that the result isn't going to exceed the biggest number, and take appropriate action - whatever that is - if it will... what would be the point of that? Just make it an axiom that the biggest number is bigger than any number you calculate. In other words just prohibit using those ... and so forth in your theorems. Just to be sure, step 8 shows that a physicalist form of ultrafinitism (there is a primitively ontological universe, and it is small) is a red herring. If you assume a mathematical ultrafinitism, then yes, UDA does no more go through. But mathematical ultrafinitism makes it impossible to even define comp, so that is really a stopping at step zero. So, yes, an ultrafinitist *mathematician* can say yes to the doctor (without knowing what it does), and survive, and this is one little universe. But he can't know what it does in an infinitist universe either. Right. I thought that's why you've always emphasized that saying yes to the doctor was a bet, not something one could be certain of. The fact that the ultrafinitist can't know what he is doing, does not entail that the computationalist can know what he is doing. So you are right, but I was not implying the contrary. Bruno Brent If UDA leads to mathematical ultrafinitism, that is enough a reductio ad absurdo to me. God created 0, 1, ... and when getting 10^100, he felt tired and stop. Then he *has* to create a primitive physical universe, if he want see Adam and Eve indeed. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 21 Jan 2014, at 21:33, meekerdb wrote: On 1/21/2014 2:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Only to make the UDA non valid. It works, if Brent meant a mathematical ultrafinitism. But this change comp, like it changes elementary arithmetic (which suppose at least that 0 ≠ s(x), and x ≠ y implies s(x) ≠ s(y), which can't be true in ultrafinitism). Ultrafinitism makes all current physical theories meaningless. How can that be when all current physical theories are tested by computation on finite digital computers and all observations are finite rational numbers? We just bet that physics is well approximated by computations, and indeed all known laws seems to be computable (except the collapse). I guess it makes sense in most case. I'd say the meaning of theories comes in their application - not from an axiom system. Because you reify reality, an put the meaning there. But we can't do that when working on the mind-body problem, so we need a mathematical notion of reality, and the notion of model (in logician sense) plays that role. That for all x x ≠ x + 1, is NOT an empirical question. It is a truth, out of space and time, which is true in all models of RA, or PA, or ZF, etc. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 22 Jan 2014, at 01:02, meekerdb wrote: On 1/21/2014 3:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 3:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/21/2014 8:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Why would you want to do that? It seems like an unnecessary extra axiom that doesn't have any purpose or utility. It prevents the paradoxes of undeciability, Cantor diagonalization, and it corresponds more directly with how we actually use arithmetic. I'm not sure it helps. What you may gain from avoiding paradoxes makes many of our accepted proofs false. E.g. Euclids proof of infinite primes. Or Euler's identity. Most of math would be ruined. A circle's circumference would not even be pi*diameter. Would this biggest number be different for different beings in different universes? What is it contingent on? You're taking an Platonic view that there really is an arithmetic and whether there's a biggest number is an empirical question. Ah! I just said that is was not. Somehow you deny the reality of math. I'm saying it's an invention. We invented an system in which you can always add 1 because that was convenient; you don't have to think about whether you can or not. So to use this same line of reasoning, would you say there is no definite (a priori) fact of the matter of whether or not a given program terminates, unless we actually build a machine executing that program and observe it terminate? That's kind of mixing categories since 'program' (to you) means something in Platonia and there you don't need a machine to run it. In the physical world there is no question, all programs running on a machine terminate, for one reason or another. Non-terminating programs are the result of over idealization. What makes you sure that the idea that all programs terminates is not also an idealisation (about a finite universal reality)? Also, if all programs terminate, there is no more real numbers. I guess you will say that there are idealisation. You seem to know that there is a concrete reality, but the comp approach to the mind- body problem asks to, temporarily perhaps, doubt such certainty. If that is the case, when is it determined (for us) that a certain program terminates? Is it when the first being anywhere in any universe tests it, when someone in our universe tests it, when someone in our past light cone tests it, when you test it yourself or read about someone who did? Would it ever be possible for two beings in two different universes to find different results regarding the same program? If not, then what enforces this agreement? But if it leads to paradoxes or absurdities we should just modify our invention keeping the good part and avoiding the paradoxes if we can. Peano's arithmetic will still be there in Platonia and sqrt(2) will be irrational there. But the diagonal of a unit square may depend on how we measure it or what it's made of. Does this instrumentalist approach prevents one from having a theory of reality? Who said it's instrumentalist? Just because it considers a finite model of reality? When Bruno proposes to base things on arithmetic and leave analysis and set theory alone, does that make him an instrumentalist? Of course not. As the comp hypothesis use a non instrumentalist interpretation of arithmetic. It makes only comp being a finitism (not an ultrafinitism). There is no axiom of infinity at the ontological level. Infinity is a correct illusion from inside, and mainly due to the FPI, and the fact that for all x, s(x) x. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 22 January 2014 15:40, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear LizR, OK, Let us stipulate the Pigeonholes and Flashlight. What moves the flashlight around and what perceives what it illuminates? The present moment contains what is illuminated, sure, but what is doing the action of perceiving that content? I think I said the fl;ashlight wasn't needed, so it isn't there, and so nothing moves it around. The pigeonholes stand for states of consciousness, so they perceive what it would illuminate, which is their own contents. But they can perceive those without it. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
Dear LizR, There is also some kind of continuity relation between the content of the pigeon holes... On Wed, Jan 22, 2014 at 4:45 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 22 January 2014 15:40, Stephen Paul King stephe...@provensecure.comwrote: Dear LizR, OK, Let us stipulate the Pigeonholes and Flashlight. What moves the flashlight around and what perceives what it illuminates? The present moment contains what is illuminated, sure, but what is doing the action of perceiving that content? I think I said the fl;ashlight wasn't needed, so it isn't there, and so nothing moves it around. The pigeonholes stand for states of consciousness, so they perceive what it would illuminate, which is their own contents. But they can perceive those without it. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 22 January 2014 09:45, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: I think I said the fl;ashlight wasn't needed, so it isn't there, and so nothing moves it around. The pigeonholes stand for states of consciousness, so they perceive what it would illuminate, which is their own contents. But they can perceive those without it. Do you really find that you can make intuitive sense of the pigeon hole metaphor without the flashlight? I must admit I've never been able to. From a 3p perspective, the idea is that the relations between pigeon holes map out a multiplicity of implied spatial-temporal trajectories, all there together. From a 1p perspective this would seem to transform to a fixed array of momentary points-of-view, again all there (or illuminated) together. I think that any attempt to intuit a relativised personal history from this metaphor cannot avoid the imaginative association with one or another *sequence* of pigeon holes. The logical alternative would seem to be to get stuck, monad-like, in whatever pigeon hole you first thought of. What Hoyle was suggesting, I think, is that the necessary intuitions of a flow of consciousness can all be collapsed, as it were, into the notion of a *unique* sequence (in a purely logical sense) of randomly selected pigeon holes. Such an absolute sequence must then contain all relativised sequences, with their logical inter-relations and differential measures preserved. Oddly enough, any notion of flow, as entailing the observation of transition between holes, is still unnecessary in this schema; indeed it would be incoherent. The sequencing of pigeon holes carries no relation of next or previous; the spatial-temporal structure of each pigeon hole is already conceived as both dynamic and self-ordering, like Barbour's time capsules. Rather, the purpose of the logical sequence of pigeon holes - i.e. the beam of the flashlight - is to furnish an intuition that avoids the aforementioned monadic catastrophe, by conceiving a unique multiplex of all possible (parallel) relative sequences. The cost of this heuristic is that all the pigeon holes now belong to a sort of universal, solipsistic multiple-personality that lives them (and, by proxy, us) one moment at a time. It's an interesting idea, with more ramifications than might appear at first blush, and thinking in this way often sheds an intriguingly different light on the various thought experiments about identity and succession we love to argue about on this list. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Church thesis = non computable functions exist (Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
Dear David, I have sorely missed your wisdom in this debate! On Wed, Jan 22, 2014 at 1:06 PM, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote: On 22 January 2014 09:45, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: I think I said the fl;ashlight wasn't needed, so it isn't there, and so nothing moves it around. The pigeonholes stand for states of consciousness, so they perceive what it would illuminate, which is their own contents. But they can perceive those without it. Do you really find that you can make intuitive sense of the pigeon hole metaphor without the flashlight? I must admit I've never been able to. From a 3p perspective, the idea is that the relations between pigeon holes map out a multiplicity of implied spatial-temporal trajectories, all there together. From a 1p perspective this would seem to transform to a fixed array of momentary points-of-view, again all there (or illuminated) together. I think that any attempt to intuit a relativised personal history from this metaphor cannot avoid the imaginative association with one or another *sequence* of pigeon holes. The logical alternative would seem to be to get stuck, monad-like, in whatever pigeon hole you first thought of. What Hoyle was suggesting, I think, is that the necessary intuitions of a flow of consciousness can all be collapsed, as it were, into the notion of a *unique* sequence (in a purely logical sense) of randomly selected pigeon holes. Such an absolute sequence must then contain all relativised sequences, with their logical inter-relations and differential measures preserved. Oddly enough, any notion of flow, as entailing the observation of transition between holes, is still unnecessary in this schema; indeed it would be incoherent. The sequencing of pigeon holes carries no relation of next or previous; the spatial-temporal structure of each pigeon hole is already conceived as both dynamic and self-ordering, like Barbour's time capsules. Rather, the purpose of the logical sequence of pigeon holes - i.e. the beam of the flashlight - is to furnish an intuition that avoids the aforementioned monadic catastrophe, by conceiving a unique multiplex of all possible (parallel) relative sequences. The cost of this heuristic is that all the pigeon holes now belong to a sort of universal, solipsistic multiple-personality that lives them (and, by proxy, us) one moment at a time. It's an interesting idea, with more ramifications than might appear at first blush, and thinking in this way often sheds an intriguingly different light on the various thought experiments about identity and succession we love to argue about on this list. I found a problem in Barbour's time capsules, the monadic catastrophe, exactly! Without an implicit before and after relation in the time capsules they collapse into a singleton or become a chaos of 'everything is connected to everything else' equally. Leibniz tried to avoid this by having God compute the Best Possible World prior to the creation of the Monads, but this is impossible. That computation is intractable. It is the equivalent of computing the route of a traveling sales man that visits an uncountable infinity of cities. We need the Becoming that is implicit in the moving flashlight, at least to give us a window of finite duration in time (and bits/space) to have a memory of what I used to be that can be compared to what I experience now. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/TBc_y2MZV5c/unsubscribe. To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this message in error, notify sender immediately and delete this message immediately.” -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 1/22/2014 1:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Jan 2014, at 21:33, meekerdb wrote: On 1/21/2014 2:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Only to make the UDA non valid. It works, if Brent meant a mathematical ultrafinitism. But this change comp, like it changes elementary arithmetic (which suppose at least that 0 ≠ s(x), and x ≠ y implies s(x) ≠ s(y), which can't be true in ultrafinitism). Ultrafinitism makes all current physical theories meaningless. How can that be when all current physical theories are tested by computation on finite digital computers and all observations are finite rational numbers? We just bet that physics is well approximated by computations, and indeed all known laws seems to be computable (except the collapse). I guess it makes sense in most case. I'd say the meaning of theories comes in their application - not from an axiom system. Because you reify reality, LOL! I'm reminded of what Sidney Morgenbesser said to B. F. Skinner, Let me see if I understand your thesis. You think we shouldn't athropomorphize people? an put the meaning there. But we can't do that when working on the mind-body problem, so we need a mathematical notion of reality, and the notion of model (in logician sense) plays that role. That's a point where I disagree with you. We can work on the mind body problem by creating intelligent machines and when we have created them we will infer that they have minds just as we infer other people have minds (nobody really believes in p-zombies) and we will learn to engineer those minds. Note that there were people who tried an axiomatic approach to defining life - and it led nowhere, while people working laboratories with x-ray crystallography and stick-and-ball models discovered the double-helix. Theorizing has it's place. Molecular biology was really inspired by a lecture that Erwin Schroedinger gave (and later expanded into his book, What is Life) and which pointed to some of the basic characteristic the chemistry and physics of life must have. And one its contributions was to emphasize there was no need for magic, no elan vital. I see computationalism playing a similar role in the study of consciousness. But just like molecular didn't so much solve the problem of life as dissolve it, I expect something similar to happen in the study of consciousness. That for all x x ≠ x + 1, is NOT an empirical question. It's not an empirical question in Platonia, but in the real world (which I reify :-) ) it is: One raindrop plus one raindrop makes one raindrop. The set of the swim team with cardinality four plus the set of the basketball team with cardinality twelve is a set with cardinality 14. It is a truth, out of space and time, which is true in all models of RA, or PA, or ZF, etc. Yes, it's a truth of language; a rule we made up about the meaning of successor and equal etc, that is a good theory of countable things. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Edge.org: 2014 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC IDEA IS READY FOR RETIREMENT? The Computational Metaphor
On 1/22/2014 1:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Jan 2014, at 01:02, meekerdb wrote: On 1/21/2014 3:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Jan 21, 2014 at 3:30 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 1/21/2014 8:13 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Why would you want to do that? It seems like an unnecessary extra axiom that doesn't have any purpose or utility. It prevents the paradoxes of undeciability, Cantor diagonalization, and it corresponds more directly with how we actually use arithmetic. I'm not sure it helps. What you may gain from avoiding paradoxes makes many of our accepted proofs false. E.g. Euclids proof of infinite primes. Or Euler's identity. Most of math would be ruined. A circle's circumference would not even be pi*diameter. Would this biggest number be different for different beings in different universes? What is it contingent on? You're taking an Platonic view that there really is an arithmetic and whether there's a biggest number is an empirical question. Ah! I just said that is was not. Somehow you deny the reality of math. Which math? Finite arithmetic, Peano arithmetic, set theory, homotopy theory,...? Or in short, yes. I'm saying it's an invention. We invented an system in which you can always add 1 because that was convenient; you don't have to think about whether you can or not. So to use this same line of reasoning, would you say there is no definite (a priori) fact of the matter of whether or not a given program terminates, unless we actually build a machine executing that program and observe it terminate? That's kind of mixing categories since 'program' (to you) means something in Platonia and there you don't need a machine to run it. In the physical world there is no question, all programs running on a machine terminate, for one reason or another. Non-terminating programs are the result of over idealization. What makes you sure that the idea that all programs terminates is not also an idealisation (about a finite universal reality)? Also, if all programs terminate, there is no more real numbers. I guess you will say that there are idealisation. You seem to know that there is a concrete reality, but the comp approach to the mind-body problem asks to, temporarily perhaps, doubt such certainty. Of course I'm not *certain*, all theories are defeasible outside of Platonia. But it seems like a well supported theory; at least as certain as you can always add one more. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.