[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges Quénot wrote:
[...]
I see. So from you viewpoint the distinction between physics
and mathematics appears as natural
It is grounded in the logical distinction between necessity and
contingency.
This distinction is a matter of viewpoint.
Contingency is
A few comments:
IMO it is necessary to make a distinction between existence, reality,
and physical reality.
My latest model:
Existence: A property that should be reserved for the basis of the
specific everything model such as numbers.
Reality: A property of any entity derived from the
Georges Quénot wrote:
There might be universes interacting one with each other
(though from my viewpoint I would tend to consider a set
of interactive universes as a single universe) but it
might also be that the one in which we live is among
the ones that are not causally connected to any
George,
You got it very decently, thank you. One question:
what do you mean by a 'simulated character'?
Then again IMO no person can differentiate whether he
sees the 'reality' or has an illusion. (I mean: the
perception of reality, of course).
Illusion is usually a wake-phenomenon, dream:
HAL, it was interesting to read your version of some
concepts. It is much more involved than just to reply
ny pushing the button when reading.
Glossarymaking is a sweaty work, more than a
vocabulary or a thesaurus. I for one identify
'existence' as some difference - without which
nothing can
--- Georges Quénot [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
John M wrote:
[...]
Don't be a sourpus, I was not attacking YOU.
Well. I do not know exactly why I felt concerned.
I probably missed your point.
[...]
By George! (not Georges) don't you imply such
things
into my mind after my
John M wrote:
--- Georges Quénot [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
John M wrote:
[...]
Don't be a sourpus, I was not attacking YOU.
Well. I do not know exactly why I felt concerned.
I probably missed your point.
[...]
By George! (not Georges) don't you imply such things
into my mind after my
Le Samedi 18 Mars 2006 01:58, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Ground them operationally, then. Real things have real properties and
unreal
things don't. Real properties can be observed empirically. Primeness
then is not
a real property.
I have to ask you one more time, but I'll reverse the
Le Samedi 18 Mars 2006 01:58, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Ground them operationally, then. Real things have real properties and
unreal
things don't. Real properties can be observed empirically. Primeness
then is not
a real property.
I'll take another stupid example to try to explain my
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges Quénot wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is
mathematical,
I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that
you do not adopt it (and whatever your reasons I have to
respect the fact). By the way I am
Georges Quénot wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges Quénot wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is
mathematical,
I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that
you do not adopt it (and whatever your reasons I have to
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Samedi 18 Mars 2006 01:58, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Ground them operationally, then. Real things have real properties and
unreal
things don't. Real properties can be observed empirically. Primeness
then is not
a real property.
I have to ask you one
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges Quénot wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges Quénot wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is
mathematical,
I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that
you do not adopt it (and whatever your
Georges Quénot wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges Quénot wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges Quenot wrote:
That [The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the
other mathematical objects which are only abstract. is what
I called a dualist view.
Dualism says
Brent Meeker wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges Quénot wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical
object
real and others abstract...
A non-mathematical property. Hence mathematics alone is
Georges Quénot wrote:
1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of
equations of which a Harry Potter universe includes
a counterpart of you.
I meant:
1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of
equations of which a Harry Potter universe including
a
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges Quénot wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges Quénot wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges Quenot wrote:
That [The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the
other mathematical objects which are only abstract. is what
I called a dualist view.
Le 17-mars-06, à 16:32, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I don't agree. I think you slip from minds can be implemented on more
than one kind of hardware to minds do not need any kind of hardware.
I slip? Where ?
I take care of precisely not doing that, mainly through UDA *plus* the
movie graph
Le 15-mars-06, à 17:51, Georges Quenot a écrit :
*If* comp is true. I am not sure of that.
Me too. But it is the theory I am studying. Also comp provides some
neat etalon philosophy to compare with other theories. The advantage
of comp (which I recall includes Church thesis) is that, at
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Samedi 18 Mars 2006 01:58, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Ground them operationally, then. Real things have real properties and
unreal
things don't. Real properties can be observed empirically. Primeness
then is not
a real property.
I have to ask
Georges Quénot wrote:
Georges Quénot wrote:
1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of
equations of which a Harry Potter universe includes
a counterpart of you.
I meant:
1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of
equations of which a Harry Potter
George Levy wrote:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Samedi 18 Mars 2006 01:58, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Ground them operationally, then. Real things have real properties and
unreal
things don't. Real properties can be observed empirically. Primeness
then is not
a real property.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges Quénot wrote:
1. It is not so sure that there actually exist sets of
equations of which a Harry Potter universe including
a counterpart of you would be a solution.
1) Any configuration of material bodies can be represented as a some
very long
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges Quenot wrote:
Norman Samish wrote:
Where could the executive program have come from? Perhaps one could call
it God. I can think of no possibility other than It was always there,
and eternal existence is a concept I can't imagine. Are there any other
Le 17-mars-06, à 00:10, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Dualism says there are two really existing realms or substances.
This is Descartes' dualism between mind and body.
Saying the physical realm is concrete and real and the mathematical
realm is abstract and unreal is not dualism.
Well,
To brent... (sorry I do not have the mail in my mailbox to reply to it).
So reality is what kicks back... Ok, but that was not the question (really), I
want to know what distinction you do between abstract thing and real thing ?
You would say real things are things when throw at you, hurt you
Le 17-mars-06, à 00:14, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
The argument does not show the the
physical universe can only emerge on an infinity of overlapping
computations, as such. It might show this given a series of
assumptions-- that we are nothing but hardwareless computations,
that the
to more recent posts:
1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism? (Our
stupidity may allow also all the bad things that
happen.)
2. Is reasonable or rational thinking exclusive for
ONLY those, who live in a 'numbers' obsession?
or is it an elitist heaughtiness to look down to all,
who do
John M a écrit :
to more recent posts:
1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism?
I am not sure to understand what you mean by REAL here.
There are arguments against solipsism. Wittgenstein for
instance produced some. None of them is lilkey to be
decisive. They may work with some
Le 16-mars-06, à 22:52, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Is isomorphism or a one-to-one correspondence a mathematical concept or
a metamathematical (or metaphysical? another complication in the
discussion) concept? I take them as mathematical concepts, so that
speculating about isomorphisms of
John M wrote:
to more recent posts:
1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism? (Our
stupidity may allow also all the bad things that
happen.)
2. Is reasonable or rational thinking exclusive for
ONLY those, who live in a 'numbers' obsession?
or is it an elitist heaughtiness to
Le 16-mars-06, à 23:46, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
is it ? we might be able to ground meaning in causal interactions,
for instance, but can we ground causal interactions in the
timeless world of maths ?
I think Hal Finney just gave a nice answer through the notion of block
universe.
I do
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 16-mars-06, à 23:46, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
is it ? we might be able to ground meaning in causal interactions,
for instance, but can we ground causal interactions in the
timeless world of maths ?
I think Hal Finney just gave a nice answer through the
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 16-mars-06, à 22:52, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Is isomorphism or a one-to-one correspondence a mathematical concept or
a metamathematical (or metaphysical? another complication in the
discussion) concept? I take them as mathematical concepts, so that
Georges Quénot wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges Quenot wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges wrote:
- The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object,
This has to be saying simply that the multiverse IS a mathematical
object.
Otherwise
Bruno Marchal wrote:
This means you miss the point. The only assumption is comp by which I
mean the yes doctor hypothesis together with Church's thesis and a
minimal amount of arithmetical realism (AR: just the idea that
elementary arithmetical truth is independent of me, you ...This is
Hal Finney wrote:
The first is that numbers are really far more complex than they seem.
When we think of numbers, we tend to think of simple ones, like 2, or 7.
But they are not really typical of numbers. Even restricting ourselves to
the integers, the information content of the average
Le 17-mars-06, à 06:48, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Yes, I was assuming that the descriptions lose information, or generalize, just as mammal is a generalization, and just as Bruno's duplication loses information. Otherwise, I would call it a re-representation of *ALL* the details of something,
Le 17-mars-06, à 13:42, John M a écrit :
to more recent posts:
1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism? (Our
stupidity may allow also all the bad things that
happen.)
There is no REAL argument against solipsism. Nevertheless it is false,
imo.
So solipsism is false but
Georges Quénot wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges Quenot wrote:
Norman Samish wrote:
Where could the executive program have come from? Perhaps one could call
it God. I can think of no possibility other than It was always
there,
and eternal existence is a concept I
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
To brent... (sorry I do not have the mail in my mailbox to reply to it).
So reality is what kicks back... Ok, but that was not the question (really),
I
want to know what distinction you do between abstract thing and real thing ?
You would say real things are
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 17-mars-06, à 01:31, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Hmmm... okay, so last questions what is an abstract thing ? what does
it means
to be abstract ? what render a thing real ? what does it means for it
to be
real ? what does it means to be real ?
If you kick it, it kicks
--- Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Le 17-mars-06, à 13:42, John M a écrit :
to more recent posts:
1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism?
(Our stupidity may allow also all the bad things
that happen.)
There is no REAL argument against solipsism.
--- Georges Quenot [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
John M a écrit :
to more recent posts:
1. do we have a REAL argument against solipsism?
I am not sure to understand what you mean by REAL
hereSKIP...
Arguments are just arguments.
(See my post to Bruno: I don't hold Wittgenstein
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges Quénot wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges Quenot wrote:
That [The universe] has real existence, as opposed to the
other mathematical objects which are only abstract. is what
I called a dualist view.
Dualism says there are two really existing
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is
mathematical,
I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that
you do not adopt it (and whatever your reasons I have to
respect the fact). By the way I am not sure I really :-)
adopt it either.
But can you
John M wrote:
[...]
Don't be a sourpus, I was not attacking YOU.
Well. I do not know exactly why I felt concerned.
I probably missed your point.
[...]
By George! (not Georges) don't you imply such things
into my mind after my decade under nazis and two under
commis, now 3+ in the
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
...
Errmm..but if the universe is the set of all real
things, then they all share the property of realness.
Perhaps you mean: what is the difference between real
things and unreal things? Well, the difference is that
real things have properties and unreal things
Georges Quénot wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Since I don't adopt the premise that everything is
mathematical,
I would like to clarify just that point. I understood that
you do not adopt it (and whatever your reasons I have to
respect the fact). By the way I am not sure I really :-)
Brent Meeker wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
...
Errmm..but if the universe is the set of all real
things, then they all share the property of realness.
Perhaps you mean: what is the difference between real
things and unreal things? Well, the difference is that
real things have
Georges Quénot wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical object
real and others abstract...
A non-mathematical property. Hence mathematics alone is not sufficient
to explain the world. QED.
This
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges Quénot wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical object
real and others abstract...
A non-mathematical property. Hence mathematics alone is not sufficient
to explain the
Hi,
Le Jeudi 16 Mars 2006 14:46, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges wrote:
- The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object,
This has to be saying simply that the multiverse IS a mathematical
object.
Otherwise it is nonsense.
No, because all
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges wrote:
- The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object,
This has to be saying simply that the multiverse IS a mathematical
object.
Otherwise it is nonsense.
No, because all mathematical objects, as mathematical objects
Le 16-mars-06, à 14:46, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
No, because all mathematical objects, as mathematical objects
exist (or don't exit) on an equal basis. Yet the universe is only
isomorphic to one of them. It has real existence, as opposed
to the other mathematical objects which are only
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 16-mars-06, à 14:46, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
No, because all mathematical objects, as mathematical objects
exist (or don't exit) on an equal basis. Yet the universe is only
isomorphic to one of them. It has real existence, as opposed
to the other mathematical
Hi Norman,
Le 15-mars-06, à 17:32, Norman Samish a écrit :
( Norman Samish) I don't see how a list of numbers could, by itself, contain any meaningful information. Sure, a list of numbers could be an executable program, but there has to be an executive program to execute the executable
Le 16-mars-06, à 17:27, Georges Quénot a écrit :
Eeh... Who are you replying to exactly?
Oops. I guess it was Tom. Sorry.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
... or Peter D Jones.
Really sorry. I will try to correct that issue tomorrow.
I should not answer posts and teaching at the same time! I will try to
remember that lesson.
B.
Le 16-mars-06, à 18:44, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
Le 16-mars-06, à 17:27, Georges Quénot a écrit :
Eeh... Who are
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical object
real and others abstract...
A non-mathematical property. Hence mathematics alone is not sufficient
to explain
the world. QED.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You
Le Jeudi 16 Mars 2006 21:27, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical
object real and others abstract...
A non-mathematical property. Hence mathematics alone is not sufficient
to explain
the world. QED.
Message-
From: Quentin Anciaux [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thu, 16 Mar 2006 22:05:17 +0100
Subject: Re: Numbers
Le Jeudi 16 Mars 2006 21:27, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
What properties of the multiverse would render only one
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Is isomorphism or a one-to-one correspondence a mathematical concept or
a metamathematical (or metaphysical? another complication in the
discussion) concept?
It is not mathematical in the sense tha both of objects have
to be mathematical and nothing but mathematical
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 16-mars-06, à 14:46, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
No, because all mathematical objects, as mathematical objects
exist (or don't exit) on an equal basis. Yet the universe is only
isomorphic to one of them. It has real existence, as opposed
to the other
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Jeudi 16 Mars 2006 21:27, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical
object real and others abstract...
A non-mathematical property. Hence mathematics alone is not sufficient
to explain
the
Yes, Iwas assuming that the descriptions "lose information", or
generalize, just as "mammal" is a generalization, and just as Bruno's
duplicationloses information. Otherwise, I would call it a
re-representation of*ALL* the details of something, *as seen from a
certain perspective*, into
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
What properties of the multiverse would render only one mathematical object
real and others abstract...
A non-mathematical property. Hence mathematics alone is not sufficient
to explain the world. QED.
This looks *very* similar to;
]]
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges Quenot wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Georges wrote:
- The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object,
This has to be saying simply that the multiverse IS a mathematical
object.
Otherwise it is nonsense.
No, because all
[EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Georges wrote:
- The multiverse is isomorphic to a mathematical object,
Context: this is a conjecture/speculation.
This has to be saying simply that the multiverse IS a mathematical
object.
Otherwise it is nonsense.
In
Le 14-mars-06, à 17:28, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Tom) wrote:
Another note about numbering. It seems to be that if you repeatedly
make descriptions of descriptions, you eventually end up with all 0's
or all 1's, showing that numbers describing numbers is meaningless.
I don't understand. In
Le 15-mars-06, à 10:46, Georges Quenot a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 14-mars-06, à 10:31, Georges Quenot wrote:
[...]
I feel that the computational approach is a wrong direction
for the question of existence.
The question is whether comp is true or not. If comp is false then it
(Norman Samish)I don't see how a list
of numbers could, by itself, contain anymeaningful information.
Sure, a list of numbers could be an executable program,but there has to be
an executive program to execute the executableprogram. The
multiverse has to therefore consist of more than a
Bruno,
this is not the reply I am still thinking about, this
is a question. Below is a post of last week, a
suggestion whether I figure a 'mathematical object'
right or wrong? It seems to me that the whole problem
is about nomencalture, CALLED mathematical, since we
cannot 'realize' the
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:"Another note about
numbering. It seems to be that if you repeatedly make descriptions of
descriptions, you eventually end up with all 0's or all 1's, showing that
numbers describing numbers is meaningless. Does this also prove
that numbers do not have a
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
But whatever you do with numbers can be encoding with numbers, as such
assuming platonic existence, numbers are the only requirements, because
operation on them, discourse about them, description on them are numbers too.
Hmm. You can hardly claim that the meaning is
Hi,
Le Lundi 13 Mars 2006 14:23, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
But whatever you do with numbers can be encoding with numbers, as such
assuming platonic existence, numbers are the only requirements, because
operation on them, discourse about them, description on them
Quentin, about those darn numbers:
Although I am not FOR their omnipotence/science and
have some reservations - as I explained partially -
I have a different notion HOW a number can mean
whatever.
*
Older members who still went to libraries (before the
computer only generation G) may remember
Hi Quentin:
While numbers may contain the ability to have a
discourse about themselves such as via Godel
numbering it seems to me a substantial leap to
say that they can have any discourse about
anything else let alone a discourse to a degree
that brings these other things into some level
there,
and eternal existence is a concept I can't imagine. Are there any other
possibilities?
Norman
~~~
- Original Message -
From: Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Monday, March 13, 2006 5:29 PM
Subject: Re: Numbers
Hi Quentin
Le 11-mars-06, à 10:59, Georges Quénot wrote (to John):
snip
Yes also and indeed, the way of thinking I presented
fits within a reductionist framework. Nobody is required
to adhere to such a framework (and therefore to the way
of thinking I presented). If one rejects the reductionist
Lists and numbers:
My model's only assumption [I think] is a countably infinite list of
possible properties of objects. Dividing the list defines two
objects. There would be an uncountably infinite number of such
divisions of the list. No operator is necessary but different
divisions of
Hi,
Le Dimanche 12 Mars 2006 20:11, Hal Ruhl a écrit :
Lists and numbers:
My model's only assumption [I think] is a countably infinite list of
possible properties of objects.
For a list to have the property of being countably infinite require that
natural numbers exist before... because
John M wrote:
Georges,
this is to your reflections to my remarks. It starts
to look like a private discussion on-list,
Not completely. And some may also follow the discussion
an find it interesting even if they do not participate
(as I often do for other threads).
but I love it.
So do I.
Thanks, the 'truncation' occurs in the process of
Reply B U T it happens frequently in this
awful Yahoo!-mail maze that when I try ANYTHING while
writing a reply (or compose a mail) the text
disappears without recall. I wrote to Bruno a pretty
well thought-through reply to his post
Hi Quentin:
I do not see that at all. All that has been
demonstrated is that a list can be so mapped not
that such a mapping must exist. The list can still be first.
Hal Ruhl
At 02:37 PM 3/12/2006, you wrote:
Hi,
Le Dimanche 12 Mars 2006 20:11, Hal Ruhl a écrit :
Lists and numbers:
John M wrote:
Georges: please, have merci on me! 'my' English is
the 5th of my acquired languages, so to read - and
realize what it stands for - that long a post is
(almost) beyond my mental endurance.
I understand that but the point is highly unusual
and unintuitive and I felt that a
John M wrote:
Unfortunately my mailbox did not take more and wrote:
== message truncated ===
Here follows a copy of the remainder:
...
Last but not least: this view has the advantage that we no
longer have to wonder how it comes that particles follows the
rules, how can a particle
Georges,
this is to your reflections to my remarks. It starts
to look like a private discussion on-list, but I love
it. We are not on 'opposite' sides, just think
differently.
Or just express ourselves differently. -
--- Georges Qu�not [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
(among others):
John M wrote:
Georges: please, hgave merci on me! 'my' English is
the 5th of my acquired languages, so to read - and
realize what it stands for - that long a post is
(almost) beyond my mental endurance.
I try to pick some of your remarks as non-conform to
how I feel. Consider please the rest as agreed. (At
You just proved my point.
Thanks
John
--- Quentin Anciaux [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
Hi John,
Le Mercredi 8 Mars 2006 18:14, John M a �crit�:
- This is my fundamental objection to the 'hard'
number theory making numbers (and their
manipulations)
the basis of them all (I don't
Georges, your post is on the level, I am not G
I am still in common sense with my feeble
thinking-tool.
Which leaves me with a question - please see inserted.
(I erase the rest of the lengthu discussion)
John M
--- Georges Quenot [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
John M a écrit :
Bruno wrote:
Le 08-mars-06, à 18:14, John M a écrit :
Bruno wrote:
What can be said about numbers is that it is
impossible to explain what numbers are to someone who
does not already knows what they are...
I will talk about what numbers do, not 'are'
..If a TOE does not implicitly or explicitly
--- Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Le 08-mars-06, à 18:14, John M a écrit :
Bruno wrote:
What can be said about numbers is that it is
impossible to explain what numbers are to someone
who
does not already knows what they are...
I will talk about what numbers do,
John M wrote:
Georges, your post is on the level, I am not G
I am still in common sense with my feeble
thinking-tool.
Sorry, I am not a native english speaker, I don't understand
what on the level can mean (and especially with quotes).
In don't understand either what you mean by G.
I
Hi John,
Le Mercredi 8 Mars 2006 18:14, John M a écrit :
- This is my fundamental objection to the 'hard'
number theory making numbers (and their manipulations)
the basis of them all (I don't dare: nature, world,
existence, etc. as very loaded words over here).
Numbers do NOT add, subtract,
501 - 595 of 595 matches
Mail list logo
