On 02 Nov 2008, at 01:16, Kory Heath asks (to Brent)
Subjectively, what
should I expect to experience (or feel that I'm most likely to
experience) when I step into a teleporter, and I know that the thing
that's going to come out Receiver A will be 100% me and the thing
that's going to come
I disagree with the first, but I agree with the second. I don't think
qualia (which are conscious by definition) form a system. This seems to
be the case in logical inferences. Each thought follows from the
previous by some rules of inference. And we have abstracted that system
- it's
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2008/11/1 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2008/11/1 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Well if I'm Kory or Bruno, I'm not me...
You distorted my hypothetical. Could you not still be you and simply
have the mistaken
On Nov 2, 2008, at 8:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Assuming comp the answer should be this:
If you agree that you survive (100%) in some car accident where you
lose some 90% of you (third and first person descriptions), then
accepting one halve in the WM perfect duplication, entails P= 1/2
On Nov 1, 2008, at 7:07 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
We can ask how similar each one is to the Kory
that stepped into the teleporter, but there's no fact of the matter
about which one is *really* Kory.
I completely agree with that. But I don't agree with (and don't think
the above implies) the
Kory Heath wrote:
On Nov 1, 2008, at 7:07 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
We can ask how similar each one is to the Kory
that stepped into the teleporter, but there's no fact of the matter
about which one is *really* Kory.
I completely agree with that. But I don't agree with (and don't
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Replies to Jason Resch and Brent Meeker:
On 01 Nov 2008, at 12:26, Jason Resch wrote:
I've thought of an interesting modification to the original UDA
argument which would suggest that one's consciousness is at both
locations simultaneously.
Since the UDA
I've thought of an interesting modification to the original UDA argument
which would suggest that one's consciousness is at both locations
simultaneously.
Since the UDA accepts digital mechanism as its first premise, then it is
possible to instantiate a consciousness within a computer. Therefore
2008/11/1 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Well if I'm Kory or Bruno, I'm not me...
You distorted my hypothetical. Could you not still be you and simply
have the mistaken notion that your name is Kory? If your earliest
childhood memories were replaced by Bruno's, would you cease to exist?
I
This is very close to the starting premise of Greg Egan's Permutation City,
which suggests that since computation take place in increasingly arbitrary
ways, the digital basis of consciousness can be derived from pretty much any
physical substrate and hence all minds are generated by all things.
If you stop thinking of consciousness as a thing that goes here or
there or is duplicated or destroyed and just regard it as a process,
these conundrums disappear.
Brent
Jason Resch wrote:
I've thought of an interesting modification to the original UDA
argument which would suggest that
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2008/11/1 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Well if I'm Kory or Bruno, I'm not me...
You distorted my hypothetical. Could you not still be you and simply
have the mistaken notion that your name is Kory? If your earliest
childhood memories were replaced by
I would agree it is just a process, however I came up with that
thought experiment because a friend of mine expressed fear over the
idea of stepping into a teleporter. He was weary that his
consciousness would be destroyed and the other copy created elsewhere
would not be me.
I began
Kory Heath wrote:
On Oct 31, 2008, at 1:58 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think this problem is misconceived as being about probability of
survival.
In the case of simple teleportation, I agree. If I step into a
teleporter, am obliterated at one end, and come out the other end
What are you calling the process when you've made two copies of it?
Bretn
Michael Rosefield wrote:
But, given that they are processes, then by definition they are
characterised by changing states. If we have some uncertainty
regarding the exact mechanics of that process, or the external
I think there's so many different questions involved in this topic it's
going to be hard to sort them out. There's 'what produces our sense of
self', 'how can continuity of identity be quantified', 'at what point do
differentiated substrates produce different consciousnesses', 'can the
nature of
Michael Rosefield wrote:
I think there's so many different questions involved in this topic
it's going to be hard to sort them out. There's 'what produces our
sense of self', 'how can continuity of identity be quantified', 'at
what point do differentiated substrates produce different
Le 30-oct.-08, à 19:11, Michael Rosefield a écrit :
At some point, doesn't it just become far more likely that the
teleporter just doesn't work? I know that might seem like dodging the
question, but it might be fundamentally impossible to ignore all
possibilities.
In which theory? What
Le 30-oct.-08, à 23:47, Kory Heath a écrit :
On Oct 30, 2008, at 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But ok, perhaps I have make some progress lately, and I will answer
that the probability remains invariant for that too. The probability
remains equal to 1/2 in the imperfect duplication
Le 31-oct.-08, à 10:40, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
2008/10/31 Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
But ok, perhaps I have make some progress lately, and I will answer
that the
probability remains invariant for that too. The probability remains
equal to
1/2 in the imperfect duplication
2008/10/31 Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
I agree that a corpse can be considered as blind, deaf, amnesic and
paralytic. But a corpse does not vehiculate a person.
A blind, deaf, amnesic and paralytic is not necessarily a corpse. It
could vehiculate a person which, although blind, deaf,
2008/10/31 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
But there are many ways for what comes out of the teleporter to *not* be you.
Most of them are puddles of goo, but some of them are copies of Bruno or
imperfect copies of me or people who never existed before.
Suppose it's a copy of you as you were
2008/10/31 Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
But ok, perhaps I have make some progress lately, and I will answer that the
probability remains invariant for that too. The probability remains equal to
1/2 in the imperfect duplication (assuming 1/2 is the perfect one).
But of course you have to
On 31 Oct 2008, at 13:00, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2008/10/31 Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
I agree that a corpse can be considered as blind, deaf, amnesic and
paralytic. But a corpse does not vehiculate a person.
A blind, deaf, amnesic and paralytic is not necessarily a corpse. It
On 30 Oct 2008, at 23:58, Brent Meeker wrote:
Kory Heath wrote:
On Oct 30, 2008, at 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But ok, perhaps I have make some progress lately, and I will answer
that the probability remains invariant for that too. The probability
remains equal to 1/2 in the
On Oct 30, 2008, at 3:58 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Of course the point is that you're not the same you
from moment to moment in the sense of strict identity of information
down to the
molecular level, or even the neuron level.
I agree, but that doesn't change the point I was trying to
Hi,
2008/10/31 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
On Oct 30, 2008, at 3:58 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Of course the point is that you're not the same you
from moment to moment in the sense of strict identity of information
down to the
molecular level, or even the neuron level.
I agree, but
Kory Heath wrote:
On Oct 30, 2008, at 3:58 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Of course the point is that you're not the same you
from moment to moment in the sense of strict identity of information
down to the
molecular level, or even the neuron level.
I agree, but that doesn't change
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
2008/10/31 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
On Oct 30, 2008, at 3:58 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Of course the point is that you're not the same you
from moment to moment in the sense of strict identity of information
down to the
molecular level, or even the
Bruno, your explanations were closer to me than many lately and I found the
crucial point(s) in my not-understanding. Let me try to point to it as
incerted into your text by [JM: .] lines
John
On Thu, Oct 30, 2008 at 4:59 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 30 Oct 2008, at
2008/10/31 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
2008/10/31 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
On Oct 30, 2008, at 3:58 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Of course the point is that you're not the same you
from moment to moment in the sense of strict identity of information
down
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2008/10/31 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
2008/10/31 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
On Oct 30, 2008, at 3:58 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
Of course the point is that you're not the same you
from moment to moment in
I'd love to make a serious comment at this point, but every one I can think
of involves I am Spartacus jokes. Sorry.
2008/11/1 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2008/10/31 Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
2008/10/31 Kory Heath [EMAIL
On Oct 28, 2008, at 12:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Measure theory is the branch of math which has been invented to tackle
those infinities, and those similarity relations.
I don't know much about measure theory. I understand a bit about how
it's supposed to tackle those infinities, but I
On 30 Oct 2008, at 07:51, Kory Heath wrote:
On Oct 28, 2008, at 12:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Measure theory is the branch of math which has been invented to
tackle
those infinities, and those similarity relations.
I don't know much about measure theory. I understand a bit about how
2008/10/30 Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
To make a prediction on the future from the past you have to remember
the past (or at least some relevant part of the past). If you allow
(partial) amnesia, it could depend on many things including the type
of computations allowing the amnesia: it
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2008/10/30 Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
The seven first steps of the UD Argument show this already indeed, if
you accept some Occam Razor. The movie graph is a much subtle
argument
showing you don't need occam razor: not only a machine cannot
distinguish
At some point, doesn't it just become far more likely that the teleporter
just doesn't work? I know that might seem like dodging the question, but it
might be fundamentally impossible to ignore all possibilities.
2008/10/30 Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Oct 30, 2008, at 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But ok, perhaps I have make some progress lately, and I will answer
that the probability remains invariant for that too. The probability
remains equal to 1/2 in the imperfect duplication (assuming 1/2 is
the perfect one).
But of
Kory Heath wrote:
On Oct 30, 2008, at 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But ok, perhaps I have make some progress lately, and I will answer
that the probability remains invariant for that too. The probability
remains equal to 1/2 in the imperfect duplication (assuming 1/2 is
the perfect
On 26 Oct 2008, at 03:38, Kory Heath wrote:
This conclusion has some bearing on the white rabbit problem. Many
people on this list think that the solution to the white rabbit
problem has something to do with measure - in other words, the
reason that I don't see talking white rabbits hopping
On Oct 23, 5:34 pm, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If I am copied to two
locations A and B, with each copy being identical, it seems reasonable
to say that I have a 1/2 probability iof finding myself at A and a 1/2
probability of finding myself at B. But if I am copied perfectly
Kory,
what you wrote makes in ALL probability perfect 'sense', but does it make
sense (human - common that is) at all?
Do we have a 'sense' of infinite? (It is a 'word' in the vocabulary).
I don't see 'probability' either, as a definable concept. Anything can
happen and in any sequence in your
On 23 Oct 2008, at 17:51, John Mikes wrote:
Stathis,
Who told YOU (and the other honored discutants in this thread) that
*THIS* ONE of our existence is the one-and-only basic/original
appearance? We, here and now, may be #37 for you and #49 for me etc.,
-- B U T --
could you
On Oct 22, 2:34 pm, Michael Rosefield [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
Hi,
1) My thoughts are that an act of euthanasia would be more likely to 'push'
the consciousness of the patient to some hitherto unlikely scenario - any
situation where death is probable requires an improbable get-out clause.
The problem you raise is one of personal identity, and can be
illustrated without invoking QTI. If I am copied 100 times so that
copy #1 has 1% of my present memories, copy #2 has 2% of my present
memories, and so on to copy #100 which has 100% of my present
memories, which copy should I
Stathis,
Who told YOU (and the other honored discutants in this thread) that *THIS*
ONE of our existence is the one-and-only basic/original appearance? We,
here and now, may be #37 for you and #49 for me etc.,
-- B U T --
could you please tell me if 'anyone' of this nightmare-topic remembers,
I don't think I follow you. This is the exact feeling I get when I try to
read Pynchon...
OK, I think what you're saying is that when it comes to reconstructing the
body with only knowledge of the mind itself, much of the exact physical
characteristics are ambiguous, in that they don't contribute
I would say time doesn't go forward it is only a subjective illusion that it
moves forward because whatever observer moment you find yourself
experiencing only has memories of past events. Therefore a conscious
observer about to be injected with a poison will forever exist in that
moment, just as
2008/10/24 razihassan [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
And in the case of a skewed probability distribution, I don't see why
you wouldn't expect to end up in the most probable state (from the
frog pov). Maybe I'm missing something?
In what way is the probability skewed? If I am copied to two
locations A
2008/10/24 John Mikes [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Stathis,
Who told YOU (and the other honored discutants in this thread) that *THIS*
ONE of our existence is the one-and-only basic/original appearance? We,
here and now, may be #37 for you and #49 for me etc.,
-- B U T --
could you please tell me
JM:
two contrasting reflections:
1. I do need the sci-fi for material that changes. Matter is a figment of
conventional science upon the (mis)understood so called observations we
assign to 'the world' and our partial information composes the
'mini'solipsism (Colin H) we carry about 'reality' -
2008/10/24 John Mikes [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
JM:
two contrasting reflections:
1. I do need the sci-fi for material that changes. Matter is a figment of
conventional science upon the (mis)understood so called observations we
assign to 'the world' and our partial information composes the
Hi,
1) My thoughts are that an act of euthanasia would be more likely to 'push'
the consciousness of the patient to some hitherto unlikely scenario - any
situation where death is probable requires an improbable get-out clause. The
patient may well find themselves in a world where their suffering
Michael Rosefield wrote:
Hi,
1) My thoughts are that an act of euthanasia would be more likely to
'push' the consciousness of the patient to some hitherto unlikely
scenario - any situation where death is probable requires an improbable
get-out clause. The patient may well find
Michael Rosefield wrote:
Oh, no, more that we can probably define 'mind-space' or
'consciousness-space', in which every point represents a possible
(conscious!) mind-state and has an associated spectrum of possible
physical substrata, and that there is a probability function defined
Dualism, Schmualism
I think I'm an 'abstract perspectivist', or something. Everything is made of
the same substance, but the nature of the thing and the nature of the
substance depend on how you look at it, and as long as you can find an
equivalence between two functional models, then they're
are some of us still sane?John Mikes
On Wed, Oct 22, 2008 at 8:31 AM, razihassan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hi all
First post! I'm happy to have found this list as much of it coincides
with what I've been thinking about in the past few years, esp. after
reading about quantum roulette and
2008/10/22 razihassan [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
2) I'd like to propose a thought experiment. A subject has his brain
cells removed one at a time by a patient assistant using a very fine
pair of tweezers. The brain cell is then destroyed in an incinerator.
Is there a base level of consciousness
Interesting idea. But obviously 'memories' is quite unquantative when you
get down to it: all memories are not equal, some are stored in
longer/shorter-term memories and have differing levels of cross-association
with each other and emotional states, some are being accessed right now, and
personal
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