Tom Caylor writes: On Jan 31, 10:33 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote: OK. But in that case your question is just half of the question, Why
do people have values? If you have values then that mean some things will be
good and some will be bad - a weed is just a flower in a place you
Tom Caylor writes: Brent Meeker It does not matter now that in a
million years nothing we do now will matter. --- Thomas Nagel
We might like to believe Nagel, but it isn't true. Tom That is, it
isn't true that in a million years nothing we do now will matter.Why do you
say
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom Caylor writes:
Brent Meeker
It does not matter now that in a million years nothing we do now
will matter.
--- Thomas Nagel
We might like to believe Nagel, but it isn't true.
Tom
That is, it isn't true that in a million
On Jan 31, 10:33 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
OK. But in that case your question is just half of the question, Why do
people have values? If you have values then that mean some things will be
good and some will be bad - a weed is just a flower in a place you don't want
it.
Tom Caylor writes:
On Jan 31, 10:33 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: OK. But in
that case your question is just half of the question, Why do people have
values? If you have values then that mean some things will be good and some
will be bad - a weed is just a flower in a place
Dear Bruno,
I read with joy your long and detailed 'teaching' reply (Hungarian slogan:
like a mother to her imbecil child) and understood a lot (or so I think).
I am not entusiastic about a sign-language (gesticulated or written) instead
of words, because I did not familiarize myself into its
Dear John,
Le 17-janv.-07, à 18:11, John M a écrit :
Dear Bruno,
may I ask you to spell out your B and D?
in your:
Let D = the proposition God exists, ~ = NOT, B = believes.
Where I think I cannot substitute your ~ for the =NOT - or, if
the entire line is meaning ONE idea, that B believes
Dear Bruno,
may I ask you to spell out your B and D?
in your:
Let D = the proposition God exists, ~ = NOT, B = believes.
Where I think I cannot substitute your ~ for the =NOT - or, if the entire line is
meaning ONE idea, that B believes both the affirmative and the negatory.
Also: the
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
I make the claim that a rock can be conscious assuming that
computationalism is true; it may not be true, in which case neither
a rock nor a computer may be conscious. There is no natural
syntax or semantics for a computer telling us
Brent Meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
I make the claim that a rock can be conscious assuming that
computationalism is true; it may not be true, in which case neither
a rock nor a computer may be conscious. There is no natural
syntax or
Brent Meeker writes:
I make the claim that a rock can be conscious assuming that
computationalism is true; it may not be true, in which case neither
a rock nor a computer may be conscious. There is no natural syntax
or semantics for a computer telling us what should count as a 1 or
.
I skip the rest of the 'rock-physics'.
Regards
John M
- Original Message -
From: Brent Meeker
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Saturday, January 13, 2007 12:24 AM
Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
John Mikes writes
sensitivity (including
response maybe) to information (changes?) from the ambience.
(Not a Shannon-type info).
John
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, January 12, 2007 9:53 PM
Subject: RE: The Meaning of Life
Brent Meeker writes:
I make the claim that a rock can be conscious assuming that computationalism
is true; it may not be true, in which case neither a rock nor a computer may be
conscious. There is no natural syntax or semantics for a computer telling us
what should count as a 1 or a 0,
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life
Date: Sat, 13 Jan 2007 13:12:52 -0500
Stathis:
I will not go that far, nor draw 'magnificent' conclusion about conscious rocks
(I am not talking about the unconscious hysteria
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
I make the claim that a rock can be conscious assuming that
computationalism is true; it may not be true, in which case neither
a rock nor a computer may be conscious. There is no natural syntax
or semantics for a computer telling us
On 1/10/07, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Bruno Marchal writes:
Regarding consciousness being generated by physical activity, would it
help if
I said that if a conventional computer is conscious, then, to be
consistent, a
rock would also have to be conscious?
JM:
John Mikes writes:
Regarding consciousness being generated by physical activity, would it help if
I said that if a conventional computer is conscious, then, to be consistent, a
rock would also have to be conscious?
JM: Bruno:
A rock will not read an article in the Figaro, but that is not
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
John Mikes writes:
Regarding consciousness being generated by physical activity, would it help
if
I said that if a conventional computer is conscious, then, to be consistent,
a
rock would also have to be conscious?
JM: Bruno:
A rock will not read an
Stathis,
I will ask you to be patient until next wednesday because I am busy
right now. I think we agree on many things, and this is an opportunity
to search where exactly we diverge, if we diverge.
For example I disagree with the expression brain are conscious, but I
am read you more
, January 07, 2007 10:46 PM
Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life
John,
My email pgm sometimes (as now) balks at quote/copying
material from emails I'm replying to. So I'll do as best
to reply without having your exact words to refer to.
re Bruno's inquiring about how I link changes
Bruno Marchal writes:
I will ask you to be patient until next wednesday because I am busy
right now. I think we agree on many things, and this is an opportunity
to search where exactly we diverge, if we diverge.
For example I disagree with the expression brain are conscious, but I
am
Mark Peaty writes:
SP: 'Is there anything about how you are feeling to day that makes you sure
that aliens didn't come during the night and replace your body with an exact
copy? Because that is basically what happens naturally anyway, although it
isn't aliens and it takes months rather
Le 07-janv.-07, à 19:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
And does it even have to be very good? Suppose it made a sloppy copy
of me that left out 90% of my memories - would it still be me? How
much fidelity is required for Bruno's argument? I think not much.
The argument does not depend at all
Hi James,
Le 08-janv.-07, à 02:04, James N Rose a écrit :
Bruno,
Please be patient for my reply to your question.
I'll compose an answer soon on inertia and change
of inertia and how I reached the notion of
assigning that as the essential-primitive of
Consciousness.
Take your time. I am
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 07-janv.-07, à 19:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
And does it even have to be very good? Suppose it made a sloppy copy
of me that left out 90% of my memories - would it still be me? How
much fidelity is required for Bruno's argument? I think not much.
The
Le 08-janv.-07, à 14:27, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 07-janv.-07, à 19:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
And does it even have to be very good? Suppose it made a sloppy
copy of me that left out 90% of my memories - would it still be
me? How much fidelity is
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 07-janv.-07, à 19:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
And does it even have to be very good? Suppose it made a sloppy
copy of me that left out 90% of my memories - would it still be
me? How much fidelity is required for Bruno's argument? I think
not much.
The
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 07-janv.-07, à 19:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
And does it even have to be very good? Suppose it made a sloppy copy
of me that left out 90% of my memories - would it still be me? How
much fidelity is required for Bruno's argument? I think not much.
The argument
John Mikes writes:
Friends:
Siding with Mark (almost?G)
just to a 'wider' view of mentality than implied by
physicalistic - physiologistic - even maybe
comp-related frameworks, indicating the domains we did
not even discovered, but love to disregard. Upon Marks
post
--- Stathis Papaioannou
Mark Peaty writes:
SP: 'Getting back to the original question about teleportation experiments, are
you saying that it would be impossible, or just technically very difficult to
preserve personal identity whilst undergoing such a process? As Brent pointed
out, technical difficulty is not an
Brent: 'But *your* infinity is just *really big*. There are only a
finite number of atoms in a person and they have only a finite number of
relations. So how can an exact copy require infinite resources? '
MP: Well yes, perhaps there are only a finite number of relationships,
but these
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Mark Peaty writes:
SP: 'Getting back to the original question about teleportation
experiments, are you saying that it would be impossible, or just
technically very difficult to preserve personal identity whilst
undergoing such a process? As Brent pointed out,
SP: 'The brain manages to maintain identity from moment to moment
without perfect copying or infinite computing power... '
MP: True, up to a point, but I want to quibble about that later [maybe
below, maybe in another posting]. And upon more, [and more, and more,]
mature reflection I can see
Hi, I'm new to this list. Sorry for coming into the conversation
uninvited, but I would like to post some comments on this :) Hope you
don't mind.
Brent Meeker wrote:
And does it even have to be very good? Suppose it made a sloppy copy
of me that left out 90% of my memories - would it still
- Original Message -
From: Brent Meeker
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Saturday, January 06, 2007 8:45 PM
Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life
(MP)... because infinity is infinity.
But *your* infinity is just *really big*. There are only a finite number of
atoms
appreciate the excerpt from your preceding post copied below your
post.
Have a good day, my friend
John
- Original Message -
From: James N Rose
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Friday, January 05, 2007 3:17 AM
Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life
John,
You made
João Silva writes:
Hi, I'm new to this list. Sorry for coming into the conversation
uninvited, but I would like to post some comments on this :) Hope you
don't mind.
Welcome to the list. Everyone is free to barge into every discussion.
Brent Meeker wrote:
And does it even have to be
Mark Peaty writes (in part):
So back to the question: can I be copied? Answer: More or less yes.
Next question: Is the edition of me that gets copied then flushed away
committing suicide? Answer: Yes
Next question: If the copying did not destroy the original of me then who is
the new
Bruno,
Please be patient for my reply to your question.
I'll compose an answer soon on inertia and change
of inertia and how I reached the notion of
assigning that as the essential-primitive of
Consciousness.
James
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this
João Silva wrote:
Hi, I'm new to this list. Sorry for coming into the conversation
uninvited, but I would like to post some comments on this :) Hope you
don't mind.
Brent Meeker wrote:
And does it even have to be very good? Suppose it made a sloppy copy
of me that left out 90% of my
SP: 'Is there anything about how you are feeling to day that makes you
sure that aliens didn't come during the night and replace your body with
an exact copy? Because that is basically what happens naturally anyway,
although it isn't aliens and it takes months rather than overnight:
almost
John,
My email pgm sometimes (as now) balks at quote/copying
material from emails I'm replying to. So I'll do as best
to reply without having your exact words to refer to.
re Bruno's inquiring about how I link changes of inertia
to Csness, I'll do that in a few days.
re Gendankens - I
Friends:
Siding with Mark (almost?G)
just to a 'wider' view of mentality than implied by
physicalistic - physiologistic - even maybe
comp-related frameworks, indicating the domains we did
not even discovered, but love to disregard. Upon Marks
post
--- Stathis Papaioannou (wroteamong more):
SP: 'Getting back to the original question about teleportation
experiments, are you saying that it would be impossible, or just
technically very difficult to preserve personal identity whilst
undergoing such a process? As Brent pointed out, technical difficulty is
not an issue in thought
Mark Peaty wrote:
SP: 'Getting back to the original question about teleportation
experiments, are you saying that it would be impossible, or just
technically very difficult to preserve personal identity whilst
undergoing such a process? As Brent pointed out, technical difficulty is
not an
John,
You made excellent points, which I'm happy to
reply to ..
John M wrote:
--- James N Rose [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
JR:
...
Make it easier -- a coma patient, inert for decades,
re-wakes alone in
a room, registers its situation and in an instant -
dies. Would that
moment qualify
Le 05-janv.-07, à 05:55, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno: If consciousness supervenes on all physical processes a case
can be made that matter could be relevant for consciousness. (I see
Peter Jones makes a similar remark).
Stathis: Except that you could say the same for the Maudlin
Le 04-janv.-07, à 16:37, James N Rose a écrit :
It is -not- complex or human consciousness -- which emerges later.
But it is the primal foundation-presence and qualia on which
emerged forms of consciousness rely - in order for those complex forms
to exist, as they do.
I agree. (if I
Le 04-janv.-07, à 22:51, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I am not sure what Hans Moravec's physical mechanism would be for
the 'teddy bear' example of panpsychism? I have read Mind Children and
Robot thoroughly, am cluless, regarding why Moravec should agree with
Spinoza.
Me too.
Bruno
Brent: 'However, all that is needed for the arguments that appear on
this list is to recreate a rough, functioning copy of the body plus a
detailed reproduction of memory and a brain that functioned
approximately the same. That much might not be too hard. After all, as
Stathis points out,
Mark Peaty wrote:
Brent: 'However, all that is needed for the arguments that appear on
this list is to recreate a rough, functioning copy of the body plus a
detailed reproduction of memory and a brain that functioned
approximately the same. That much might not be too hard. After all, as
Bruno Marchal writes:
Bruno: If consciousness supervenes on all physical processes a case
can be made that matter could be relevant for consciousness. (I see
Peter Jones makes a similar remark).
Stathis: Except that you could say the same for the Maudlin example,
in which it is
Mark Peaty writes:
Brent: 'However, all that is needed for the arguments that appear on this list
is to recreate a rough, functioning copy of the body plus a detailed
reproduction of memory and a brain that functioned approximately the same.
That much might not be too hard. After all, as
Thanks for this Peter: I am still chewing on this, with a view to
ultimate digestion.
I do get a certain kind of Angels and pinheads impression about some of
it though. Hopefully that is just an illusion! :-)
Regards
Mark Peaty CDES
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/
SP: 'So given months or years, you really are like a car in which every
single component has been replaced, the only remaining property of the
original car being the design'
MP: Yes, indeed. For the word design here, I prefer to use 'structure',
with the proviso that the structure/s we are
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Although you have clearly stated that the two ideas - consciousness
supervening on all physical processes and consciousness supervening on
no physical process - are completely different I think they are related
1Z wrote:
Mark Peaty wrote:
SP: 'using the term comp as short for computationalism as something
picked up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism seems quite
sensible: the best theory of consciousness and the most promising
candidate for producing artificial
Le 03-janv.-07, à 16:36, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in more than one
posts) :
Maudlin starts off with the assumption that a recording being
conscious is obviously absurd, hence the need for the conscious
machine to handle counterfactuals. If it were not for this assumption
then there
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Although you have clearly stated that the two ideas - consciousness
supervening on all physical processes and consciousness supervening on
no physical process - are completely
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 03-janv.-07, à 16:36, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in more than one
posts) :
Maudlin starts off with the assumption that a recording being
conscious is obviously absurd, hence the need for the conscious
machine to handle counterfactuals. If it were not for this
Brent: 'Remember that Bruno is a logician.'
MP: :-) Yes, this much is easy to infer. The full scope of what this
might MEAN however, is little short of terrifying ... ;-)
MP: Infinity, infinite, infinitely big or small; these are challenging
concepts at the best of times and made very
Mark Peaty wrote:
Brent: 'Remember that Bruno is a logician.'
MP: :-) Yes, this much is easy to infer. The full scope of what this
might MEAN however, is little short of terrifying ... ;-)
MP: Infinity, infinite, infinitely big or small; these are challenging
concepts at the best of times
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Although you have clearly stated that the two ideas - consciousness
supervening on all physical processes and consciousness supervening on
no
--- James N Rose [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 03-janv.-07, à 16:36, Stathis Papaioannou wrote
(in more than one
posts) :
Maudlin starts off with the assumption that a
recording being
conscious is obviously absurd, hence the need
for the conscious
machine to
I am not sure what Hans Moravec's physical mechanism would be for the
'teddy bear' example of panpsychism? I have read Mind Children and Robot
thoroughly, am cluless, regarding why Moravec should agree with Spinoza.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 03-janv.-07, à 16:36, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in more than one
posts) :
Maudlin starts off with the assumption that a recording being
conscious is obviously absurd, hence the need for the conscious
machine to handle counterfactuals. If it were not for
Le 02-janv.-07, à 13:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Mark Peaty writes:
SP: ' In the end, what is right is an irreducible personal belief,
which you can try to change by appeal to emotions or by example, but
not by appeal to logic or empirical facts. And in fact I feel much
safer that
Le 03-janv.-07, à 03:46, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
It gets cumbersome to qualify everything with given the appearance
of a physical world. As I have said before, I am not entirely
convinced that comp is true,
Nor am I. (Remind that no machine can, from its
Le 03-janv.-07, à 04:00, Mark Peaty a écrit :
SP: 'using the term comp as short for computationalism as
something picked up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism
seems quite sensible: the best theory of consciousness and the most
promising candidate for producing artificial
Le 03-janv.-07, à 05:24, Brent Meeker wrote (to Mark Peaty)
Remember that Bruno is a logician. When he writes infinite he
really means infinite - not really, really big as physicists do.
Almost all numbers are bigger than 10^120, which is the biggest number
that appears in physics (and
Bruno Marchal writes:
which invokes an argument discovered by Bruno and Tim Maudlin
demonstrating that there is a problem with the theory that the mental
supervenes on the physical. It seems that to be consistent you have to
allow either that any computation, including the supposedly
Le 03-janv.-07, à 06:39, Mark Peaty a écrit :
BM: ' (= Bruno Marchal, not Brent Meeker)
OK, except I don't see what you mean by on a number basis. We know
that number have a lot of quantitative interesting relationships, but
after Godel, Solovay etc.. we do know that numbers have
SP: 'Recall that ordinary life does not involve anything like perfect
copying of your brain from moment to moment. Thousands of neurons are
dying all the time and you don't even notice, and it is possible to
infarct a substantial proportion of your brain and finish up with just a
bit of a
Mark Peaty wrote:
SP: 'using the term comp as short for computationalism as something
picked up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism seems quite
sensible: the best theory of consciousness and the most promising
candidate for producing artificial intelligence/consciousness'
What
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Although you have clearly stated that the two ideas - consciousness
supervening on all physical processes and consciousness supervening on
no physical process - are completely different I think they are related in
that in both cases matter is irrelevant to
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 03-janv.-07, à 05:24, Brent Meeker wrote (to Mark Peaty)
Remember that Bruno is a logician. When he writes infinite he
really means infinite - not really, really big as physicists do.
Almost all numbers are bigger than 10^120, which is the biggest number
that
Mark Peaty wrote:
SP: 'You don't actually have to emulate the entire universe, just enough
to fool its inhabitants. For example, you don't need to emulate the
appearance of a snowflake in the Andromeda galaxy except in the unlikely
event that someone went to have a look at it.'
MP: I think
Peter Jones writes:
SP: 'using the term comp as short for computationalism as something
picked up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism seems quite
sensible: the best theory of consciousness and the most promising
candidate for producing artificial intelligence/consciousness'
For my benefit, could you flesh that out in plain English please?
Regards
Mark Peaty CDES
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/
1Z wrote:
Mark Peaty wrote:
SP: 'using the term comp as short for computationalism as something
picked up from Bruno. On the face of it,
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Although you have clearly stated that the two ideas - consciousness
supervening on all physical processes and consciousness supervening on
no physical process - are completely different I think they are related in
that in both cases matter
Le 02-janv.-07, à 08:14, Mark Peaty a écrit :
SP: ' In the end, what is right is an irreducible personal belief,
which you can try to change by appeal to emotions or by example, but
not by appeal to logic or empirical facts. And in fact I feel much
safer that way: if someone honestly
Mark Peaty writes:
SP: ' In the end, what is right is an irreducible personal belief, which you can try to
change by appeal to emotions or by example, but not by appeal to logic or empirical facts. And in
fact I feel much safer that way: if someone honestly believed that he knew what was
Le 02-janv.-07, à 04:20, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 31-déc.-06, à 04:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit (to Tom Caylor):
Of course: questions of personal meaning are not scientific
questions. Physics may show you how to build a nuclear bomb, but it
won't tell
Bruno Marchal writes:
It gets cumbersome to qualify everything with given the appearance of
a physical world. As I have said before, I am not entirely convinced
that comp is true,
Nor am I. (Remind that no machine can, from its first person point of
view, be entirely convinced that
SP: 'using the term comp as short for computationalism as something
picked up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism seems quite
sensible: the best theory of consciousness and the most promising
candidate for producing artificial intelligence/consciousness'
That is what I thought
Mark Peaty wrote:
SP: 'using the term comp as short for computationalism as something
picked up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism seems quite
sensible: the best theory of consciousness and the most promising
candidate for producing artificial intelligence/consciousness'
That
Mark Peaty writes:
SP: 'using the term comp as short for computationalism as something picked
up from Bruno. On the face of it, computationalism seems quite sensible: the best theory of
consciousness and the most promising candidate for producing artificial intelligence/consciousness'
That
Le 30-déc.-06, à 22:32, Tom Caylor a écrit :
snip ... On the other hand, I see many people die because they
judge that life is not worth living. I see others paradoxically
getting killed for the ideas or illusions that give them a reason for
living (what is called a reason for living is
Hi John:
One example of what I am saying would be the way we drill holes in
the earth and pump out oil and oxidize it and the resulting energy
flux soon dissipates, can do little more useful work, and radiates
into space. If the oil was left in place it could be many millions
of years
Le 31-déc.-06, à 04:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit (to Tom Caylor):
Of course: questions of personal meaning are not scientific questions.
Physics may show you how to build a nuclear bomb, but it won't tell
you whether you should use it.
But Physics, per se, is not supposed to answer
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 31-déc.-06, à 04:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit (to Tom Caylor):
Of course: questions of personal meaning are not scientific questions.
Physics may show you how to build a nuclear bomb, but it won't tell
you whether you should use it.
But Physics, per se, is
SP: ' In the end, what is right is an irreducible personal belief,
which you can try to change by appeal to emotions or by example, but not
by appeal to logic or empirical facts. And in fact I feel much safer
that way: if someone honestly believed that he knew what was right as
surely as he
'inanimate').
John M
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2006 10:59 PM
Subject: RE: The Meaning of Life
Tom Caylor writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom Caylor writes (quoting Bruno Marchal
One way to look at life is from the point of view of energy hang-up
barriers - those various facts about the structure of our universe
that slow the dissipation of useful energy concentrations.
Life drills holes in these barriers and thus is on the fastest
system path to maximum entropy.
Subject: Re: The Meaning of Life
One way to look at life is from the point of view of energy hang-up
barriers - those various facts about the structure of our universe
that slow the dissipation of useful energy concentrations.
Life drills holes in these barriers and thus
Tom Caylor wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom Caylor writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
[TC]
My whole argument is that without it our hope eventually runs
out and
we are left with despair, unless we lie to ourselves against the
absence of hope.
[BM]
Here Stathis already give a
Tom Caylor wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom Caylor writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
[TC]
My whole argument is that without it our hope eventually runs
out and
we are left with despair, unless we lie to ourselves against the
absence of hope.
[BM]
Here Stathis already give a
Tom Caylor writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom Caylor writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
[TC]
My whole argument is that without it our hope eventually runs out and
we are left with despair, unless we lie to ourselves against the
absence of hope.
[BM]
Here Stathis already
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