On Jul 25, 10:08 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
You say the question is meaningless but then answer it in the affirmative.
The answer is as affirmative as it is negative. Consciousness is
partially separable and partially inseparable from brain function.
Not zombie neurons,
On Jul 25, 10:53 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Not zombie neurons, just zombie imitation neurons. A natural neuron
could not be a zombie, but you could make a neuron that you think
should function like a natural neuron and it would not be able to be
well integrated into the
On Jul 26, 4:22 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 25 Jul 2011, at 21:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jul 25, 1:57 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 25 Jul 2011, at 15:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Not exactly. I'm saying that a plane that is crashing might be a sign
In order to understand my position you have to let go of the
fundamental ontological assumption that mechanics drive feeling.
You don't seem to grasp that the assumption is *not* that mechanics
drive feelings. The assumption (one extensively confirmed in
laboratories) is that mechanics
On 26 Jul 2011, at 16:51, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jul 26, 4:22 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 25 Jul 2011, at 21:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jul 25, 1:57 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 25 Jul 2011, at 15:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Not exactly. I'm saying
On 7/26/2011 9:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Not at all. If comp is true, consciousness is not the result of a
computation.
This confuses me. I understand consciousness (according to your theory)
is not the result of computing some function, i.e. one of the infinitely
many programs the UD is
On Jul 26, 12:38 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
In order to understand my position you have to let go of the
fundamental ontological assumption that mechanics drive feeling.
You don't seem to grasp that the assumption is *not* that mechanics
drive feelings. The assumption (one
On Jul 26, 12:50 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
There's a difference between hurtling forward on momentum and having
functioning engines. Just because a chicken runs around for a while
after losing it's head doesn't mean that headless chickens are viable.
But it means that he
On 26 Jul 2011, at 20:26, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/26/2011 9:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Not at all. If comp is true, consciousness is not the result of a
computation.
This confuses me. I understand consciousness (according to your
theory) is not the result of computing some function, i.e.
On 26 Jul 2011, at 21:56, Craig Weinberg wrote:
unless it's made of living biological organisms,
And here you beg the question.
But aren't you saying that it doesn't have to be biological to act
like a brain?
I am neutral on this. I discovered computer science in biology (in the
On 7/26/2011 12:56 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I don't see how I'm begging the question. I'm just saying that feeling
is the interior topology of biological cells, and so a brain made of
non-biological cells won't feel the same.
That's fine. I'm OK with that as an hypothesis. But it means
On 7/26/2011 1:48 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't believe in a granted (primitive) cosmos, nor in any thing
primitively physical. Nor do I believe in their inexistence. I heard
only rumor. I am agnostic on that issue. But I don't believe in the
compatibility of such beliefs with comp.
Why
On Mon, Jul 25, 2011 at 1:48 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jul 24, 9:52 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
It sounds like you do believe that if the neurons in your visual
cortex are replaced you could become blind but not notice that
anything has changed
On Jul 25, 8:32 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
The replacement neurons are integrated so that they interact with the
rest of the brain just as normal brain tissue would. An example is the
one you came up with, neurons without their nucleus, which would
function normally at
On Mon, Jul 25, 2011 at 11:23 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jul 25, 8:32 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
The replacement neurons are integrated so that they interact with the
rest of the brain just as normal brain tissue would. An example is the
one you
On 25 Jul 2011, at 15:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jul 25, 8:32 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
The replacement neurons are integrated so that they interact with the
rest of the brain just as normal brain tissue would. An example is
the
one you came up with, neurons
On Jul 25, 1:57 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 25 Jul 2011, at 15:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
If they can only function for a few minutes, then that function may
not be 'normal' to anything except us as distantly removed observers.
This like saying that a plane which crashes
You've completely missed the point again. Perhaps you could try
reading Chalmers' paper if you haven't already done so:
http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html
Unfortunately some people just don't seem to understand it.
I have read it, and it's a good way of understanding the issue if you
are
On Tue, Jul 26, 2011 at 6:03 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
You've completely missed the point again. Perhaps you could try
reading Chalmers' paper if you haven't already done so:
http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html
Unfortunately some people just don't seem to understand
On Jul 25, 7:44 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
The argument in the paper is independent of any particular theory of
consciousness. It just asks the question of whether consciousness can
be separated from externally observable brain function.
With my theory of consciousness,
On Tue, Jul 26, 2011 at 11:10 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jul 25, 7:44 pm, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
The argument in the paper is independent of any particular theory of
consciousness. It just asks the question of whether consciousness can
be
Not zombie neurons, just zombie imitation neurons. A natural neuron
could not be a zombie, but you could make a neuron that you think
should function like a natural neuron and it would not be able to be
well integrated into the person's consciousness.
That's beside the point. The only
On 7/23/2011 5:36 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jul 23, 12:21 am, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Forensically?? Do we need a Weinberg-English dictionary?
I love forensically for this. It implies tracing a chain of cause
backwards, in a clinical, detached, bloodless way.
It
On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 9:16 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
The argument is
that IF an artificial neuron could be made which would replicate the
behaviour of a biological neuron well enough to slot into position in
a brain unnoticed THEN the consciousness of that brain would be
On Jul 24, 3:11 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
It implies investigation of a crime.
Yes, the approach that is appropriate to the investigation of a crime,
not to establish cosmic fundamentals.
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On Jul 24, 9:52 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
It sounds like you do believe that if the neurons in your visual
cortex are replaced you could become blind but not notice that
anything has changed and continue to behave normally. If this is so,
how do you know that you
On 23 Jul 2011, at 18:05, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jul 23, 5:41 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
It embraces it at many places. First the first person indeterminacy
leads to the taking into account of uncomputable sequences in the
first person experiences. Just iterate the
On 23 Jul 2011, at 18:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jul 23, 5:53 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
A sculpture (non moving, dead)? Or a zombie? (behavior is preserved)
I would not call it 'behavior' unless that is understood to exclude
agency. I'd just call it mechanism. A zombie
On 23 Jul 2011, at 18:50, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Comp explains where the laws of physics come from, and this without
eliminating the person and souls.
Does it explain where comp comes from?
Yes. Comp explains why some machine bet in comp, and why no correct
machine believes rationally in
On Jul 23, 7:22 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sat, Jul 23, 2011 at 6:05 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
I think that electrons are a way of modeling the exterior behavior of
the sensorimotive nature of matter on the molecular level. I'm not
sure that they
On Jul 24, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 23 Jul 2011, at 18:05, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jul 23, 5:41 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I am not sure I understand. The first person indeterminacy does not
involve hypercomplexity, nor does the other notion.
On Jul 24, 3:32 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Craig, I agree with 1Z, it is hard to comment some of your statements
because we don't know what are the assumptions, and what is the
argument.
When you invoke the wetness as a criteria for life, you are indeed
just silicon or
On Jul 24, 9:02 pm, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au
wrote:
artificially. i.e. REPLICATE. Not emulate. Not simulate. You master the
natural version, make it artificially, then you experiment to find out a
theory of it... not the other way around. It's what we did for flight,
fire
@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Craig Weinberg
Sent: Monday, 25 July 2011 11:31 AM
To: Everything List
Subject: Re: bruno list
On Jul 24, 9:02 pm, Colin Geoffrey Hales cgha...@unimelb.edu.au
wrote:
artificially. i.e. REPLICATE. Not emulate. Not simulate. You master the
natural version, make
On 23 Jul 2011, at 03:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jul 22, 7:26 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Comp embraces the non computable. If you study the work you will
understand that both matter and mind arise from the non computable,
with comp.
See the second part of sane04. Ask
On 23 Jul 2011, at 03:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jul 22, 8:40 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
That would just mean that the neuronal level is too much high for
being the substitution level. Better to chose the DNA and metabolic
level.
Right. If you make tweaked real cells out
On 22 Jul 2011, at 17:11, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Unless you believe in zombie, the point is that there *is* enough
phenomenological qualia and subjectivity, and contingencies, in the
realm of numbers. The diffrent 1-views (the phenomenology of mind, of
matter, etc.) are given by the modal
On Jul 23, 12:14 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 7/22/2011 8:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Where does the badness come from? The afferent neurons?
It comes from the diminishing number of real neurons participating in
the network, or, more likely, the unfavorable ration of neurons
On Jul 23, 12:21 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Forensically?? Do we need a Weinberg-English dictionary?
I love forensically for this. It implies tracing a chain of cause
backwards, in a clinical, detached, bloodless way. With each step of
the regression, possibilities are narrowed
On Jul 22, 10:55 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
I'm saying that if you kept randomly replaced neurons it would
eventually look like dementia or some other progressive brain wasting
disease.
Functionally equivalent means functionally equivalence. You
are effectively saying
On Jul 22, 11:05 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
Are you positing a universal substance of resemblance? How does it
work?
No. I am proposing that things have properties, as an objective
fact,and that different things can have the same properties,
also as an objective fact.
On Jul 23, 2:35 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jul 22, 6:25 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But that's contradicting your assumption that the pegs are transparent
to the neural communication:
If the living
cells are able to talk to each other well through the
On Jul 23, 4:52 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
Muscles aren't moved by neurons, muscles move themselves in sympathy
with neuronal motivation.
Says who?
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On Jul 23, 1:27 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 12:14 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 7/22/2011 8:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Where does the badness come from? The afferent neurons?
It comes from the diminishing number of real neurons
On Jul 23, 5:41 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
It embraces it at many places. First the first person indeterminacy
leads to the taking into account of uncomputable sequences in the
first person experiences. Just iterate the Washington-Moscow
experience n times. There will be 2^n
On Jul 23, 5:53 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
A sculpture (non moving, dead)? Or a zombie? (behavior is preserved)
I would not call it 'behavior' unless that is understood to exclude
agency. I'd just call it mechanism. A zombie also is both too somatic
and too necrotic a term.
On Jul 23, 6:49 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 22 Jul 2011, at 17:11, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I believe in zombies as far as it would be possible to simulate a
human presence with a YouTube flip book as I described, or a to
simulate a human brain digitally which would be
On 23.07.2011 18:05 Craig Weinberg said the following:
I was thinking about how a sperm resembles a brain and spinal cord
but that the egg is more like a microcosm of a world. Conception
plays out metaphorically as a miniature sensorimotive self entering a
single life as a sphere which
On Jul 23, 11:11 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 22, 11:05 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
Are you positing a universal substance of resemblance? How does it
work?
No. I am proposing that things have properties, as an objective
fact,and that different things can
On Jul 23, 11:40 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 2:35 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
Think of them like sock puppet/bots multiplying in a closed social
network. If you have 100 actual friends on a social network and their
accounts are progressively replaced
On Jul 23, 11:43 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 4:52 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
Muscles aren't moved by neurons, muscles move themselves in sympathy
with neuronal motivation.
Says who?
That's my theory. It's not as if your neurons climb into your
On Jul 23, 12:02 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 1:27 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 12:14 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 7/22/2011 8:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Where does the badness come from? The afferent neurons?
It
On Sat, Jul 23, 2011 at 12:22 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
On Jul 23, 11:43 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 4:52 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
Muscles aren't moved by neurons, muscles move themselves in sympathy
with neuronal
On Sat, Jul 23, 2011 at 12:17 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
Definitely. Inorganic mega-molecules can do amazing things. Enjoying a
steak dinner isn't one of them though.
This is just racism.
Jason
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On Jul 23, 5:23 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 5:53 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
A sculpture (non moving, dead)? Or a zombie? (behavior is preserved)
I would not call it 'behavior' unless that is understood to exclude
agency.
Does the presence
On Jul 23, 2:04 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
And they apparently sympathize with the desires of electrons, as Galvani
discovered with frog legs.
That's a good point. It's still the muscle tissue contracting itself
even though it's no longer part of a living frog. I wonder how dead
On Jul 23, 5:52 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 11:06 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 22, 10:55 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
I'm saying that if you kept randomly replaced neurons it would
eventually look like dementia or some
On Jul 23, 6:05 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 11:11 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 22, 11:05 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
Are you positing a universal substance of resemblance? How does it
work?
No. I am proposing that
On Jul 23, 6:17 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 11:40 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 2:35 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
Think of them like sock puppet/bots multiplying in a closed social
network. If you have 100 actual
On Jul 23, 6:22 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 11:43 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 4:52 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
Muscles aren't moved by neurons, muscles move themselves in sympathy
with neuronal motivation.
Says
On Jul 23, 6:36 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 12:02 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 1:27 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 12:14 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 7/22/2011 8:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jul 23, 7:04 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
Does the presence or absence of agency make a visible difference?
I wouldn't say a visible difference necessarily, but in a difference
in the overall sense that the aggregate behaviors make. It depends on
how familiar you are with the normal
On Sat, Jul 23, 2011 at 6:05 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
On Jul 23, 2:04 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
And they apparently sympathize with the desires of electrons, as Galvani
discovered with frog legs.
That's a good point. It's still the muscle tissue
On Jul 23, 7:06 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 5:52 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 11:06 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
There are robust counterexamples to that. I can relace an iron key
with a brasskey. The material
isn't important in that
On Sat, Jul 23, 2011 at 6:35 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
On Jul 23, 7:06 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 5:52 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Jul 23, 11:06 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
There are robust counterexamples to that.
On Jul 23, 9:30 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
Okay, but earlier you said functionally identical = materially identical.
While certainly there are differences between brass and iron which mean they
will not function identically in every role, in this case either can serve
in the
On 22 Jul 2011, at 11:24, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Bruno and Craig,
On 7/22/2011 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jul 2011, at 16:08, Craig Weinberg wrote:
if you think molecules are needed, that is, that the level of
substitution includes molecular activity, this too can be
Regardless of what the nerve cells experience individually, if it can't be
communicated it to other nerve cells, it can't be talked about, thought
about, or wondered about.
I think it could be shared between nerve cells, I'm saying it's not
shared with us. We are a political partition of a living
No doubt it would be technically difficult to make an artificial
replacement for a neuron in a different substrate, but there is no
theoretical reason why it could not be done, since there is no
evidence for any magical processes inside neurons.
Subjectivity is the magic processes inside living
Unless you believe in zombie, the point is that there *is* enough
phenomenological qualia and subjectivity, and contingencies, in the
realm of numbers. The diffrent 1-views (the phenomenology of mind, of
matter, etc.) are given by the modal variant of self-reference. This
has been done and this
On 7/22/2011 2:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But what is a world? Also, assuming computationalism, you need only
to believe that you interact with a world/reality, whatever that
is, like in dream. If not you *do* introduce some magic in both
consciousness and world.
So I need to believe some
On 7/22/2011 4:16 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I have already addressed this point - you can have a living person
with a prosthetic limb but you can't replace a person's brain with a
prosthetic and have it still be that person. The limb only works
because there is enough of the body left to
On Jul 22, 3:49 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
There is no objective quality of resemblance without a
subjective intepreter
says who?
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I'm saying that if you kept randomly replaced neurons it would
eventually look like dementia or some other progressive brain wasting
disease. If it were possible to spare certain areas or categories of
neurons then I would expect more of a fragmented subject whose means
of expression are intact,
Are you positing a universal substance of resemblance? How does it
work?
If i see two mounds of dirt they might look the same to me, but maybe
they host two different ant colonies. Is the non-subjective
resemblance more like mine or the ants?
On Jul 22, 4:41 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
On 7/22/2011 2:55 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I'm saying that if you kept randomly replaced neurons it would
eventually look like dementia or some other progressive brain wasting
disease.
But that's contradicting your assumption that the pegs are transparent
to the neural communication:
If
On 22 Jul 2011, at 20:52, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/22/2011 2:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But what is a world? Also, assuming computationalism, you need
only to believe that you interact with a world/reality,
whatever that is, like in dream. If not you *do* introduce some
magic in both
On 22 Jul 2011, at 16:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Bruno has a strong point here. So long as one is dealing with a
system
that can be described such that that description can be turned into a
recipe to represent all aspects of the system, then it is, by
definition
computable!
The recipe is
On 23 Jul 2011, at 00:25, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/22/2011 2:55 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I'm saying that if you kept randomly replaced neurons it would
eventually look like dementia or some other progressive brain wasting
disease.
But that's contradicting your assumption that the pegs are
On Jul 22, 6:25 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But that's contradicting your assumption that the pegs are transparent
to the neural communication:
If the living
cells are able to talk to each other well through the prosthetic
network, then functionality should be retained
Neurological
On Jul 22, 7:26 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Comp embraces the non computable. If you study the work you will
understand that both matter and mind arise from the non computable,
with comp.
See the second part of sane04. Ask question if there are problems.
I know you must
On Jul 22, 8:40 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
That would just mean that the neuronal level is too much high for
being the substitution level. Better to chose the DNA and metabolic
level.
Right. If you make tweaked real cells out of real atoms that are
arranged as an
On 7/22/2011 6:35 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jul 22, 6:25 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But that's contradicting your assumption that the pegs are transparent
to the neural communication:
If the living
cells are able to talk to each other well through the prosthetic
network,
On Jul 22, 10:18 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Well at least we've got the contradiction compressed down into one
sentence: Degradation is preserved with high fidelity.
Is it a contradiction to say that someone is having a bad conversation
over clear telephones?
...A neuron is
On Jul 22, 10:18 pm, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Of course if you
have to model it at the quark level, you might as well make your
artificial neuron out of quarks and it won't be all that artificial.
Actually, I think it would have to be a real quark (if quarks even
'exist'). The
On 7/22/2011 8:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jul 22, 10:18 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Well at least we've got the contradiction compressed down into one
sentence: Degradation is preserved with high fidelity.
Is it a contradiction to say that someone is having a bad
On 7/22/2011 9:05 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Jul 22, 10:18 pm, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Of course if you
have to model it at the quark level, you might as well make your
artificial neuron out of quarks and it won't be all that artificial.
Actually, I think it would
On 21 Jul 2011, at 00:58, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 4:40 AM, Craig Weinberg
whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
Chickens can walk around for a while without a head also. It doesn't
mean that air is a viable substitute for a head, and it doesn't mean
that the head isn't
On 21 Jul 2011, at 00:14, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/20/2011 2:59 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
What does consciousness require?
Interaction with the world.
But what is a world? Also, assuming computationalism, you need only to
believe that you interact with a world/reality, whatever that is,
Sounds like a fancy cash register to me.
Better than magic topology.
A fictive topology explains the desire for magic, but a cash register
has no desire. How complicated does the cash register have to be
before it invents the idea of magic? If the cash register reproduces
itself, would baby
It depends entirely on the degree to which the neurons are modified or
artificial. If you replace some parts of a care with ones made out of
chewing gum or ice, they may work for a while under particular
conditions, temperatures, etc. Think of how simple an artificial heart
is by comparison to
I don't have a problem with living neurological systems extending
their functionality with mechanical prosthetics, it's the other way
around that is more of an issue. People driving cars doesn't mean cars
driving human minds.
On Jul 21, 5:48 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 21 Jul
On 21 Jul 2011, at 00:14, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/20/2011 2:59 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
What does consciousness require?
Interaction with the world.
But what is a world? Also, assuming computationalism, you need only to
believe that you interact with a world/reality, whatever that is,
like in
On 21 Jul 2011, at 12:50, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I don't have a problem with living neurological systems extending
their functionality with mechanical prosthetics, it's the other way
around that is more of an issue. People driving cars doesn't mean cars
driving human minds.
Sure, but we do
On 21 Jul 2011, at 13:02, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On 7/20/2011 2:59 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
What does consciousness require?
Interaction with the world.
But what is a world? Also, assuming computationalism, you need only
to
believe that you interact with a world/reality, whatever
On 7/21/2011 2:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jul 2011, at 00:14, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/20/2011 2:59 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
What does consciousness require?
Interaction with the world.
But what is a world? Also, assuming computationalism, you need only to
believe that you interact
that doesn't need any
complex logic behind it,
Why? This is just like saying we can't explain it. I am OK with
that, but then I look for better definitions and assumptions, with the
goal of at least finding an explanation of why it seems like that, or
why there is no explanation. Without this,
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 5:42 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
There was a lot made of the perceived difference in digital music when
CDs first came out, in the audiophile communities particularly. I do
think that a subtle difference can be detected but hard to know
whether it's
Whether or not a nerve cell in your cochlea fires or not is digital, as is
the number of ions it releases when it fires. Thus, even when listening to
analogue recordings, by the time it reaches your brain the signal has been
digitized. Digital representations today technology may have
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 7:35 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:
I agree there would be a level at which digital recording is
indistinguishable from analog recording, but I think that it's due to
the intentional gating of the sense through the psyche and media path
rather than
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