Re: are we in a simulation?
Stephen Paul King wrote: [SPK] Oh, ok. I have my own version of the anthropic principle: The content of a first person reality of an observer is the minimum that is necessary and sufficient for the existence of that observer. I am trying to include observer selection ideas in my definition of anthropy. ;-) I conjecture that the third-person aspect could be defined in terms of a so-called communication principle: An arbitrary pair of observers and only communicate within the overlap or set theoretic intersection of their first person realities. To me, that is too complicated a theory. I think reality is a structure/system that is a set of paths through the plenitude, where those paths exhibit properties like self-consistency, coherence, locality, stability, energy etc. That structure can contain observers that can observe the very structure they are part of, precisely because of those properties of self-consistency, coherence, locality, stability etc that the structure (i.e. those paths through a state-space plenitude) exhibits. Every observer will see the structure from their own limited point of view (from their place and time within it) so there will be disagreements about it, but fundamentally, the observers (those who can observe and communicate with each other) are within the same structure and are viewing parts of the same thing. If that is physicalist I don't know. It still seems purely mathematico-logical to me. But I'm just positing a larger structure that is a commons that is observed by parts of itself. I think this is Tegmarkian anthropy. Look at it this way. The content of reality of an observer is (their limited perspective on) the minimum (self-consistent structure) that is necessary for themselves, and all the other observers they observe, and for the whole sustaining environment for them and the physics that produced it, to exist. I wrote this just before much better and my email client flipped out and killed it. So sorry for the sleepy, angry, more muddled version you got. Eric -- We are all in the gutter, but some of us are looking at the stars. - Oscar Wilde
Re: are we in a simulation?
Dear Eric, - Original Message - From: Eric Hawthorne [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sunday, June 15, 2003 3:02 AM Subject: Re: are we in a simulation? Stephen Paul King wrote: [SPK] Oh, ok. I have my own version of the anthropic principle: The content of a first person reality of an observer is the minimum that is necessary and sufficient for the existence of that observer. I am trying to include observer selection ideas in my definition of anthropy. ;-) I conjecture that the third-person aspect could be defined in terms of a so-called communication principle: An arbitrary pair of observers and only communicate within the overlap or set theoretic intersection of their first person realities. To me, that is too complicated a theory. [SPK] Too, no. Complicated yes. Occam's Razon cuts both ways. We can not fall back on naive realism to save us. I think reality is a structure/system that is a set of paths through the plenitude, where those paths exhibit properties like self-consistency, coherence, locality, stability, energy etc. That structure can contain observers that can observe the very structure they are part of, precisely because of those properties of self-consistency, coherence, locality, stability etc that the structure (i.e. those paths through a state-space plenitude) exhibits. [SPK] I have considered this possibility but it leads nowhere. :_( We must explain within out model exactly how observation can occur such that the properties that we associate with the words self-consistency, coherence, locality, stability, etc., have meaning. Every observer will see the structure from their own limited point of view (from their place and time within it) so there will be disagreements about it, but fundamentally, the observers (those who can observe and communicate with each other) are within the same structure and are viewing parts of the same thing. [SPK] The problem is Eric, that we can not merely hypostatiate the definiteness of properties absent the specification of observers - the to whom it has meaning and definiteness -. How is it that we are sure that we are viewing parts of the same thing? Popper and other philosophers have considered this question. If that is physicalist I don't know. It still seems purely mathematico-logical to me. But I'm just positing a larger structure that is a commons that is observed by parts of itself. I think this is Tegmarkian anthropy. [SPK] I agree with that part, I just balk at naive realism. Look at it this way. The content of reality of an observer is (their limited perspective on) the minimum (self-consistent structure) that is necessary for themselves, and all the other observers they observe, and for the whole sustaining environment for them and the physics that produced it, to exist. [SPK] Ok. I agree, but would like to point out that this content is not pre-specifiable - like Turing Machine is by definition pre-specifiable. I wrote this just before much better and my email client flipped out and killed it. So sorry for the sleepy, angry, more muddled version you got. [SPK] Ah, don't feel bad. I have had many a message tossed into oblivion by a Blue Screen of Death! ;-) Kindest regards, Stephen Eric -- We are all in the gutter, but some of us are looking at the stars. - Oscar Wilde
Re: are we in a simulation?
Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear George, Interleaving, - Original Message - From: George Levy [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, June 13, 2003 4:21 PM Subject: Re: are we in a simulation? HI Stephen Stephen Paul King wrote: [SPK] Does computational complexity (such as NP-Completeness, etc.) and computational power requirements factor into the idea of simulated worlds? [GL] It may. Also important is the issue that Tegmark raised in the Scientific American article about the ordering of an infinite set. The probability of the occurence of an element of any subset (say the even numbers) can be altered depending on how the element of the set (say the natural numbers) are ordered. http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0101077 http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articleID=000F1EDD-B48A-1E90-8EA5809EC588 [SPK] Is this related to what D. Deutsch mentions regarding the measure on the ensemble in his paper It From Qubit U can find it here: http://www.qubit.org/people/david/Articles/ItFromQubit.pdf Deutsch does not discuss the ordering issue. I haven't seen anyone discuss it, but I have not been reviewing much literature on the subject. No one in this group has tackled it to my knowledge. I think ordering in infinite sets is an essential component in the discussion of measure. I do not agree with David's arguements because of its appearent physicalist assumptions I agree with you but he does raise some interesting points to counter those of Tegmark. [SPK] It might also be related to the Burali-Forti paradox? From http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/~cebrown/notes/vonHeijenoort.html : The Burali-Forti paradox deals with the greatest ordinal--which is obtained by assuming the set of ordinals is well-ordered [and, of course, that it is a set!]--which must be a member of the set of ordinals and simultaneously greater than any ordinal in the set. [GL] So if we assume that the multiworlds are an infinite set, to compute the probability of any event we need to know how the multiwords are ordered. I conjecture that the ordering should be anthropy related. [SPK] I have my own version of the anthropic principle: The content of a first person reality of an observer is the minimum that is necessary and sufficient for the existence of that observer. sufficient implies minimum, I think so you may delete minimum from the above sentence. I certainly believe the necessary condition - it is the anthropic principle. The sufficient condition appears to be some from of Occam razor condition. Together, they seem to relate to the mirror idea I discussed earlier. Logically speaking, the world is a mirror of ourselves. However, what do you mean by observer and reality. I think we may have to restrict ourselves to the logical domain, not to specifics such as the earth has one moon, or the name of my cat is Sandy. On the other hand see below I am trying to include observer selection ideas in my definition of anthropy. ;-) I conjecture that the third-person aspect could be defined in terms of a so-called communication principle: An arbitrary pair of observers and only communicate within the overlap or set theoretic intersection of their first person realities Does this make sense? Do you see any way of generalizing it? This relates to my relativistic point of view: observers sharing the same frame or reference experience the same objective reality. By frame of reference I mean logical model not specific mental states like my name is George, and by objective reality I mean physical laws, not specific instances like one moon. Hmmm after some reflection I am now inclined to say that if two observers share the same logical model as well as the same particular mental states, then the objective reality should be the same both in physical laws and in physical instances. Well, I suppose the degree of divergence between two observers should be reflected by divergence in their physical reality. [GL] I also do not understand either the connection between the philosophical concept of the plenitude with the quantum idea of phase and conjugate quantities. [SPK] This should be explained in Everett's original paper on the Relative State interpretation, but I have not seen much discussion of it. :_( [SPK] For one thing, nowhere does there seem to be a place to embed the notion of an observer other than the notion of the observable itself, but we don't have a formal (or even informal!) way of defining the idea of a relation between and observer and observables. Do you have any ideas? [GL] The observer can only observe anthropy related worlds. Each consciousness is the fundamental filter in the selection of what it, itself, observes out of the plenitude. I believe that it is no accident that the world makes sense. The world is rational in exactly the same extent
Re: are we in a simulation?
Dear George, Interleaving, - Original Message - From: George Levy [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, June 13, 2003 4:21 PM Subject: Re: are we in a simulation? HI Stephen Stephen Paul King wrote: [SPK] Does computational complexity (such as NP-Completeness, etc.) and computational power requirements factor into the idea of simulated worlds? [GL] It may. Also important is the issue that Tegmark raised in the Scientific American article about the ordering of an infinite set. The probability of the occurence of an element of any subset (say the even numbers) can be altered depending on how the element of the set (say the natural numbers) are ordered. http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0101077 http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articleID=000F1EDD-B48A-1E90-8EA5809EC588 [SPK] Is this related to what D. Deutsch mentions regarding the measure on the ensemble in his paper It From Qubit? I don't know. I haven't read his paper [SPK] U can find it here: http://www.qubit.org/people/david/Articles/ItFromQubit.pdf I do not agree with David's arguements because of its appearent physicalist assumptions but he does raise some interesting points to counter those of Tegmark. [SPK] It might also be related to the Burali-Forti paradox? From http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/~cebrown/notes/vonHeijenoort.html : The Burali-Forti paradox deals with the greatest ordinal--which is obtained by assuming the set of ordinals is well-ordered [and, of course, that it is a set!]--which must be a member of the set of ordinals and simultaneously greater than any ordinal in the set. [GL] So if we assume that the multiworlds are an infinite set, to compute the probability of any event we need to know how the multiwords are ordered. I conjecture that the ordering should be anthropy related. [SPK] Do you mean entropy? [GL] No, I mean anthropic-principle. I just shortened it out of lazyness to anthropy which I know is not an accepted word. Sorry. On the other hand maybe we should just coin the word. It seems useful. I meant that the ordering of the multiworlds should affect the measure of the world we observe which is itself anthropic-principle related. [SPK] Oh, ok. I have my own version of the anthropic principle: The content of a first person reality of an observer is the minimum that is necessary and sufficient for the existence of that observer. I am trying to include observer selection ideas in my definition of anthropy. ;-) I conjecture that the third-person aspect could be defined in terms of a so-called communication principle: An arbitrary pair of observers and only communicate within the overlap or set theoretic intersection of their first person realities. Does this make sense? Do you see any way of generalizing it? [GL] I don't know how the Burali-Forti paradox comes into play. When I talked about the ordering of the multiworlds, I made a comparison with ordering of a set. However, we don't know if the multiworlds or perhaps more generally, the plenitude, is a set. Probalby not. [SPK] Well, if we want to consider the ability of our observers to speculate about the plenitude we will eventually be forced to deal with this question in a definite manner. I guess this would be a form of meta-metaphysics. ;-) [GL] Let's consider a double slit diffraction experiment. The multiworlds are ordered according to the output diffraction pattern. Since the phases add up to produce this pattern, it seems that the process is linear, (thus simplifying computation) so computational complexity and computational power do seem to be of relevance. [SPK] I am still struggling with my intuitions regarding how to think of the liner superposition of QM states as multiple worlds. [GL] I also do not understand either the connection between the philosophical concept of the plenitude with the quantum idea of phase and conjugate quantities. [SPK] This should be explained in Everett's original paper on the Relative State interpretation, but I have not seen much discussion of it. :_( [SPK] For one thing, nowhere does there seem to be a place to embed the notion of an observer other than the notion of the observable itself, but we don't have a formal (or even informal!) way of defining the idea of a relation between and observer and observables. Do you have any ideas? [GL] The observer can only observe anthropy related worlds. Each consciousness is the fundamental filter in the selection of what it, itself, observes out of the plenitude. I believe that it is no accident that the world makes sense. The world is rational in exactly the same extent that we are (or maybe that we could be in an ideal situation) Logically speaking, the world is a mirror of ourselves. To paraphrase a much earlier saying, We are made in the world's image. [SPK] This is reflected
Re: are we in a simulation?
Hi Stephen, Stephen Paul King wrote: Dear Friends, Does computational complexity (such as NP-Completeness, etc.) and computational power requirements factor into the idea of simulated worlds? It may. Also important is the issue that Tegmark raised in the Scientific American article about the ordering of an infinite set. The probability of the occurence of an element of any subset (say the even numbers) can be altered depending on how the element of the set (say the natural numbers) are ordered. So if we assume that the multiworlds are an infinite set, to compute the probability of any event we need to know how the multiwords are ordered. I conjecture that the ordering should be anthropy related. Let's consider a double slit diffraction experiment. The multiworlds are ordered according to the output diffraction pattern. Since the phases add up to produce this pattern, it seems that the process is linear, (thus simplifying computation) so computational complexity and computational power do seem to be of relevance. George.
Re: are we in a simulation?
Stephen Paul King wrote: Does computational complexity (such as NP-Completeness, etc.) andcomputational "power" requirements factor into the idea of simulated worlds? Yes, I think that's a point I was trying to get accross in my previous post under this heading: That although in a certain sense we are simultaeously in lots of different universes, in some of which we are being 'simulated', we might expect never to find ourselves to be in a simulation if our universe is difficult to simulate. Which universe we are actually 'in' is only decided when we make new quantum mechanial measurements. The results of these measurements correspond to us finding new particles, or correlations between particles; the result of a long enough series of 'measurements' might correspond to our meeting an alien, and a sufficiently longseries of measurements might yield the result that we meet aliens who turn out to be simulating us. Lets say we'd need to make 10^20 bits worth of measurements to have the possibility of finding someone simulating us, and outnof the 2^(10^20) possible results, only one result would show that w4e a re being 'simulated'. Then we would expect to find that we are not being simulated, and our universe would contain more information making it harder to simulate: If the length of the bit chain which we would have to measure to find that we are being simulated (which corresponds to thelog of the amount of information aliens would have to contain to simulate us) increaseslinearly with the number of measurements we have already made, then the total probability if we lived forever, making more and more measurements, of us finding that we a re being simulated would be finite, and could be very small. -JC
Re: Are we in a simulation
My corollaries to: Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic. 1. Any sufficiently detailed and correct reality simulation is indistinguishable from reality. 2. Any artificial consciousness which communicates in all circumstances within the range of communication behaviours of conscious humans, is indistinguishable from a human consciousness. Further to 1. - Because reality may be a set of programs selected from the plenitude of all possible state changes, a programmed simulation of it, if it was really any good, would essentially be reality. In fact, there is perhaps a law that any completely precise simulation of reality is identical to reality, by definition. Further to 2. - The qualia of consciousness (i.e. the feeling or experience of consciousness and how sense data seem to us) are only explainable to other conscious beings through communication and observable behaviour. The only but compelling reason to assume that others experience essentially the same kind of qualia that you do (their red is like your red) etc. is that the simplest theory would say that since our brains are similar, and, since communication assures us that the behaviours of our minds (yours and mine) are similar, then the qualia are also similar. A theory that postulated substantial differences in qualia-experience for different people would be hard pressed to explain why it is different. You don't have to explain why qualia-experience is similar from person to person. That's just the simplest (and thus the default) theory. Since all qualia of consciousness, and all other results of consciousness, are only explainable to or able to be made evident to other conscious beings via communication and other behaviours (i.e. through patterns in I/O), we might be forced to say that it is impossible in principle to prove the existence of anything in human consciousness that is different than the consciousness of an artificial mind that communicated and behaved indistinguishably from a conscious human (in all kinds of circumstances, contexts.) Consciousness's only manifestation outside itself is via I/O. If the I/O patterns are indistinguishable, it is simplest to say that the consciousness processes themselves are essentially equivalent. 8-Count --- I fall twisted. I lie at a strange angle. I stand corrected. The punchline came out of nowhere. Eric -- We are all in the gutter, but some of us are looking at the stars. - Oscar Wilde
Re: are we in a simulation?
Sorry about the graphics... There were'nt any except some italics I think. I'll send this one in plain text.. tell me how it goes. Hal Finney wrote: George Levy writes: !DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN" html head Oh, sorry, I'm supposed to ignore that, aren't I? I guess you had some neat graphics in your message Discreteness may be important in our world for the development of consciousness, but it is certainly not necessary across worlds. I believe therefore that the differences between the simulations is infinitesimal - not discrete - and therefore that the number of simulations is infinite like the continuum. The last part doesn't follow. It could be that the number of simulations is infinite like the rational numbers, which would still allow for the differences between simulations to be infinitesimal. In that case the number of simulations is countably infinite rather than uncountable. Personally I am uncomfortable with the infinity of the continuum, it seems to be a much more troublesome concept than is generally recognized. I would not want to invoke it unless absolutely necessary. I think the rest of your argument works just as well with a countable infinity as an uncountable one. I only invoked the uncountable infinite because I think there is NO ANTHROPIC REASON for using the countable infinite. Again, it's the same philosophical argument that justifies the plenitude: if an existing instance is arbitrary (not justified), then all instances are necessary. This principle applied here goes as follows: If there was an anthropic reason requiring discretness between worlds, then those other worlds would have to be causally linked with ours. This would then be one arbitrary instance of a cluster of linked worlds, which we would imply that many other clusters would also exist. Hence we are led to the uncountable infinite. We're faced with the strange possibility that the consciousness spans an infinite number of simulations distributed over widely different levels. Each individual simulation implementation becomes infinitesimal and unimportant in comparison with the the whole infinite set of implementations that the consciousness covers. A particular simulation that stops operating (for example because the plug is pulled) will hardly affect or be missed by the consciousness as a whole. In fact I rather think of the "simulations" as static states in the plenitude, and consciousness as a locus in the plenitude linking these states in a causally and logically significant manner. We live in the plenitude, not in any particular simulation. Each point in the conscious locus perceives the world that gives it meaning. Richard Miller wrote Of all the attempts to link consciousness with physics, this paradigm makes the most sense to me. Additionally, it offers the only model of consciousness that can be described mathematically (well, topologically)---and it even makes sense if you happen to be a neodissociationist psychologist. I'd like to know if George can supply some references for this model or if he came up with it on his own. I came up with this model myself some time ago as I tried to write a book which has been sitting on my shelf for years, but I think others in this list share this same point of view or may have invented this model independently. We have been talking about this topic for years. Neodissociationist psychologist... phieww, I had trouble typing this one. A really scary term :-) George
Re: are we in a simulation?
Dear Friends, Does computational complexity (such as NP-Completeness, etc.) andcomputational "power" requirements factor into the idea of simulated worlds? Kindest regards, Stephen
Re: are we in a simulation?
George Levy writes: !DOCTYPE html PUBLIC -//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN html head Oh, sorry, I'm supposed to ignore that, aren't I? I guess you had some neat graphics in your message that made all that HTML necessary, along with requiring two copies of the text. Unfortunately for me, I didn't see the special effects, since I am using a text-based mail system. Discreteness may be important in our world for the development of consciousness, but it is certainly not necessary across worlds. I believe therefore that the differences between the simulations is infinitesimal - not discrete - and therefore that the number of simulations is infinite like the continuum. The last part doesn't follow. It could be that the number of simulations is infinite like the rational numbers, which would still allow for the differences between simulations to be infinitesimal. In that case the number of simulations is countably infinite rather than uncountable. Personally I am uncomfortable with the infinity of the continuum, it seems to be a much more troublesome concept than is generally recognized. I would not want to invoke it unless absolutely necessary. I think the rest of your argument works just as well with a countable infinity as an uncountable one. Hal Finney
Re: are we in a simulation?
We exist in an infinite number of simulations. Any arbitrary number of simulations less than infinity would require a reason. We are led to this conclusion by assuming a TOE which by definition has no a-priori reason. (This is the philosophical rationale for postulating the plenitude) Discreteness may be important in our world for the development of consciousness, but it is certainly not necessary across worlds. I believe therefore that the differences between the simulations is infinitesimal - not discrete - and therefore that the number of simulations is infinite like the continuum. Not only is the number of simulations infinite but the number of levels in simulation may also be infinite. The levels are discrete - I cannot imagine how they could be otherwise. Given the above, let's consider one particular conscious being. His awareness of his own states is likely to be uncertain. Another way of saying this is that several states transitions could generate the same consciousness stream. Modeling the state transitions as an algorithm, for example, there may be multiple algorithmic paths that could generate the same output. Hence his consciousness will have "thickness across the multi-worlds," overlapping a set of multi-worlds each slightly differing from the others. How many multi-worlds will it overlap? An infinite number since they differ as in a continuum. Everytime a "measurement" is made, the set of worlds spanned by this consciousness is defined more narrowly, but the number in the set remains infinite. In addition, each simulation in the set need not belong to the same "level." We're faced with the strange possibility that the consciousness spans an infinite number of simulations distributed over widely different levels. Each individual simulation implementation becomes infinitesimal and unimportant in comparison with the the whole infinite set of implementations that the consciousness covers. A particular simulation that stops operating (for example because the plug is pulled) will hardly affect or be missed by the consciousness as a whole. In fact I rather think of the "simulations" as static states in the plenitude, and consciousness as a locus in the plenitude linking these states in a causally and logically significant manner. We live in the plenitude, not in any particular simulation. Each point in the conscious locus perceives the world that gives it meaning. George
Re: are we in a simulation?
Title: Re: are we in a simulation? I agree, by definition no one can cap many-worlds theory with a god somewhere up the ladder without some new extra-dimensional (space*time) theory (unless, does level IV allow this?) A pseudo-many-worlds multiverse can however have a god if it is of the ancestor-simulation design (http://www.simulation-argument.com/). This is of course to ignore, the whole level 1234 multiverse. It is more understandable, and a little creepier-in a believable sort of way when one considers that our universes physics cannot yet be proven to defy advanced computer-science. Ancestor-simulation is a study inwards of our universe. The whole ancestor-simulation phenomenon is certainly being considered by the inhabitants of other level 1, 2, 3 4 universes who cannot defy their mathematical physics. David Kwinter On 6/6/03 5:31 PM, John Collins [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The argument that many-worlds theory implies that we are 'almost certainly' in a computer simulation has been put forward by many people, and there are many similarly themed arguments used to suggest that many-worlds theory is 'obviously not true'; most of these arguments contain well hidden logical inconsistencies which involve switching back and forth between many-world and single world ideas. This leads to a rather strange way of counting the different possible 'classical universes' that we might be part of. The sleight of hand (or honest mistake) used in these arguments lies in the seemingly innocent assumption that a powerful god-like being who builds a simulation of our universe must then be the cause of our existence. This would be true in a single classical universe, but it is not true in many-worlds theory, where we should use a definition of 'causing' or 'implying' involving a correlation between different classical universes, ie. that [god-like being does not simulate us] =(almost always) [we do not exist]. This is discussed in David Deutsch's 'The Fabric of Reality', where he gives the example that no butterflies cause hurricanes by flapping their wings (unless you put one in a human built 'hurricane mahine' with a touch sensitive keyboard).. How we should correctly 'count the universes' in which we live is by starting with what we know exists: Ourselves, the planet Earth, evidence of our ancestry, the surrounding galaxies, etc. and looking at what we can 'append' to this universe: We could have some universes where there is everything we know exists, plus super-intelligient beings who behave as though they are controlling us, but for each of these, one would expect many more universes containing everything we know exists, plus some generic random distribution of (generally non-living) matter, such as some rocks or a cloud.
