Re: A possible solution to the incomputability of experience

2012-08-15 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi Roger,


On 14 Aug 2012, at 18:14, Roger wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

Penrose's noncomputability argument is based on Godel's theorem,
which along these lines,


In his first book, Penrose is simply invalid. In the second book, he  
corrected the error, but don't take into account.
From Gödel (or Löb)'s theorem you can prove that IF we are machine  
(and correct) then we cannot know which machine we are. But you can't  
derive from Gödel that we are not machine, or that machine cannot  
think, or that we are superior to machines, etc.





IMHO also makes rational thinking leaky.


Well, just incomplete, and indeed you can use formally Gödel's theorem  
to show that machine looking inward develop an intuition which they  
cannot describe formally. But again, this shows that Gödel's theorem  
is a chance for mechanism, not a problem. It makes universal machine  
as ignorant and aware of their ignorance as us. Judson Webb wrote a  
nice book on that subject (and me too in french, but this my papers in  
english for concise yet complete description of the reasoning.


Bruno





Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-12, 05:20:56
Subject: Re: A possible solution to the incomputability of experience


On 11 Aug 2012, at 13:22, Roger wrote:


Hi Stephen P. King

Personally I go with Roger Penrose and his conjecture that, as
I personally understand it, conscious experience is noncomputable.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yFbrnFzUc0U


Penrose is right, but with a wrong argument. The fact that  
consciousness is not computable, nor even definable, is a  
consequence of mechanism. It does not refute mechanism, it confirms  
it.


Bruno





Which is not to say that IMHO experience can be understood through
Leibniz's metaphysics of substances (using category theory).
IMHO, that's the only way.


?

Bruno





Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/11/2012


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Re: A possible solution to the incomputability of experience

2012-08-14 Thread Roger
Hi Bruno Marchal 

Penrose's noncomputability argument is based on Godel's theorem,
which along these lines, IMHO also makes rational thinking leaky.


Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012 
- Receiving the following content - 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-12, 05:20:56
Subject: Re: A possible solution to the incomputability of experience




On 11 Aug 2012, at 13:22, Roger wrote:


Hi Stephen P. King 

Personally I go with Roger Penrose and his conjecture that, as 
I personally understand it, conscious experience is noncomputable. 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yFbrnFzUc0U


Penrose is right, but with a wrong argument. The fact that consciousness is not 
computable, nor even definable, is a consequence of mechanism. It does not 
refute mechanism, it confirms it.


Bruno







Which is not to say that IMHO experience can be understood through
Leibniz's metaphysics of substances (using category theory). 
IMHO, that's the only way.


?


Bruno






Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/11/2012
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: A possible solution to the incomputability of experience

2012-08-12 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 11 Aug 2012, at 13:22, Roger wrote:


Hi Stephen P. King

Personally I go with Roger Penrose and his conjecture that, as
I personally understand it, conscious experience is noncomputable.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yFbrnFzUc0U


Penrose is right, but with a wrong argument. The fact that  
consciousness is not computable, nor even definable, is a consequence  
of mechanism. It does not refute mechanism, it confirms it.


Bruno





Which is not to say that IMHO experience can be understood through
Leibniz's metaphysics of substances (using category theory).
IMHO, that's the only way.


?

Bruno





Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/11/2012


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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A possible solution to the incomputability of experience

2012-08-11 Thread Roger
Hi Stephen P. King 

Personally I go with Roger Penrose and his conjecture that, as 
I personally understand it, conscious experience is noncomputable. 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yFbrnFzUc0U

Which is not to say that IMHO experience can be understood through
Leibniz's metaphysics of substances (using category theory). 
IMHO, that's the only way.


Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/11/2012 

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