On Fri, Sep 28, 2012 at 1:49 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
The spark plugs don't fire in response to the will of the driver, the brain
does. This isn't magic, this is the ordinary process by which we participate
in the world in every waking moment of our lives. It is not the
On Saturday, September 29, 2012 2:14:34 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
On Fri, Sep 28, 2012 at 1:49 PM, Craig Weinberg
whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
wrote:
The spark plugs don't fire in response to the will of the driver, the
brain
does. This isn't magic, this is the ordinary process
, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-27, 12:52:30
Subject: Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On 27 Sep 2012, at 15:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06
(was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)
On 27 Sep 2012, at 15:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
You can approximate consciousness by belief in self-consistency.
This has
already a causal efficacy, notably a relative self-speeding
On 26 Sep 2012, at 19:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, September 26, 2012 3:45:09 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 25 Sep 2012, at 19:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, September 25, 2012 4:43:29 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou
On 27 Sep 2012, at 04:24, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
wrote:
If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the
pain
they are experiencing? Is it all coincidental?
There is a sequence of physical events
On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 1:29 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
But can you separate the consciousness from that sequence of physical events
or not? There are multiple levels involved here and you may be missing the
forest for the trees by focusing only on the atoms. Saying the
On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You can approximate consciousness by belief in self-consistency. This has
already a causal efficacy, notably a relative self-speeding ability (by
Gödel length of proof theorem). But belief in self-consistency is pure
3p,
On Thursday, September 27, 2012 1:01:12 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 11:09 PM, Stephen P. King
step...@charter.netjavascript:
wrote:
On 9/26/2012 11:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 9:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
stat...@gmail.comjavascript:
On Thursday, September 27, 2012 9:09:12 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal
mar...@ulb.ac.bejavascript:
wrote:
You can approximate consciousness by belief in self-consistency. This
has
already a causal efficacy, notably a relative self-speeding
On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 7:49 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.comwrote:
On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 1:29 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
But can you separate the consciousness from that sequence of physical
events
or not? There are multiple levels involved here and you may
On 9/27/2012 10:22 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
This is to equate reasoning to automatically following an
algorithm. This implies perfect predictability at some level and
thus the absence of any 1p only aspects. Additionally, the recipe
is some thng that needs explanation. How was it
On 9/27/2012 10:22 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
I think the only difference in what you are saying and what I am
saying, is I say look the zombies can do these things (by their
definition), so they must be conscious and there is the inconsistency,
whereas you say zombies cannot do these things since
On 27 Sep 2012, at 15:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
You can approximate consciousness by belief in self-consistency.
This has
already a causal efficacy, notably a relative self-speeding
ability (by
Gödel length of
On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 11:30 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other
machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws.
Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is
possible but it
On Thursday, September 27, 2012 7:45:07 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 11:30 PM, Craig Weinberg
whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
wrote:
I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other
machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical
On Fri, Sep 28, 2012 at 12:52 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
If physics cannot predict even in theory when the neurons will fire
then *by definition* the neurons behave contrary to physics.
If the neurons fire based on the participation of a personal identity in
response to
On 9/27/2012 10:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Thursday, September 27, 2012 7:45:07 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 11:30 PM, Craig Weinberg
whats...@gmail.com javascript: wrote:
I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or
other
On Thursday, September 27, 2012 11:29:12 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
On Fri, Sep 28, 2012 at 12:52 PM, Craig Weinberg
whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
wrote:
If physics cannot predict even in theory when the neurons will fire
then *by definition* the neurons behave contrary to physics.
On 25 Sep 2012, at 19:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, September 25, 2012 4:43:29 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch jason...@gmail.com
wrote:
Pain is anything but epiphenomenal. The
On Wednesday, September 26, 2012 3:45:09 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Sep 2012, at 19:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, September 25, 2012 4:43:29 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason
On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the pain
they are experiencing? Is it all coincidental?
There is a sequence of physical events from the application of the
painful stimulus to the subject
On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 9:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.comwrote:
On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the pain
they are experiencing? Is it all coincidental?
There is a
On 9/26/2012 11:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 9:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
stath...@gmail.com mailto:stath...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
If it has no causal efficacy,
On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 11:09 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote:
On 9/26/2012 11:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 9:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
stath...@gmail.comwrote:
On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
wrote:
If it has no
On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
wrote:
Pain is anything but epiphenomenal. The fact that someone is able
to talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon.
The behaviour - talking about the pain
On Tuesday, September 25, 2012 4:43:29 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch
jason...@gmail.comjavascript:
wrote:
Pain is anything but epiphenomenal. The fact that someone is able
On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
Pain is anything but epiphenomenal. The fact that someone is able to talk
about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon.
The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained entirely
as a sequence of physical
On Mon, Sep 24, 2012 at 10:45 PM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.comwrote:
On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
wrote:
Pain is anything but epiphenomenal. The fact that someone is able to
talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon.
The behaviour -
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