Hi Craig Weinberg
Thankls for your help. I will considerI and II asbjective.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/19/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-17, 14:51:40
Subject: Re: The meanings of Peirce's three OBJECTIVE Categories
On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 2:24:20 PM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg
Actually, I may be accused of subtly altering the meanings of
Peirce's categories, for to him all three cats are public,
objective. He refused to subjectively step into the mind of the interpreter,
instead using the word interprant.
This is very hard to understand stuff, and so it is not surprising that we
disagree on
the meanings of I , II, and III. Here's my view of II and III
1) Secondness (II) or thinking is subjective, so not public.
Its dyadic nature comes from the act of comparing 2 mental things. It is the
mental process of subjective recognition of a perceived object (I)
from a set of objects stored in memory.
You might say that III is the meaning of the thing,
the unfolding of I and II, which would give it its ternary status
sign, object, interpretant).
For example,
I = object (apple)
II = sign ("apple")
III = meaning (or interprant= interpreted sign) of "apple" to the observer,
not just the dictionary meaning.
You are directly contradicting the information on that page, which says:
Firstness. Quality of feeling. Ideas, chance, possibility.
Vagueness, "some".
i.e. nothing at all like an apple or object: private subjective experience
Secondness. Reaction, resistance, (dyadic) relation. Brute facts,
actuality. Singularity, discreteness, ?his?.
... "This" is like an apple: public objective realism
Thirdness. Representation, mediation. Habits, laws, necessity.
Generality, continuity, "all".
i.e. the semiotic medium through which private is made universal - language,
gesture, etc.
Craig
This triad is described on
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semiotic_elements_and_classes_of_signs
A sign (or representamen) represents, in the broadest possible sense of
"represents". It is something interpretable as saying something about
something.
It is not necessarily symbolic, linguistic, or artificial.
An object (or semiotic object) is a subject matter of a sign and an
interpretant. It can be anything discussable or thinkable, a thing, event,
relationship, quality, law,
argument, etc., and can even be fictional, for instance Hamlet.[13]
All of those are special or partial objects. The object most accurately is the
universe of discourse to which the partial or special object belongs.
For instance, a perturbation of Pluto's orbit is a sign about Pluto but
ultimately not only about Pluto.
An interpretant (or interpretant sign) is the sign's more or less clarified
meaning or ramification, a kind of form or idea of the difference which
the sign's being true or undeceptive would make. (Peirce's sign theory concerns
meaning in the broadest sense, including logical implication, not
just the meanings of words as properly clarified by a dictionary.) The
interpretant is a sign (a) of the object and (b) of the interpretant's
"predecessor" (the interpreted sign) as being a sign of the same object. The
interpretant is an interpretation in the sense of a product of an
interpretive process or a content in which an interpretive relation culminates,
though this product or content may itself be an act, a state of
agitation, a conduct, etc. Such is what is summed up in saying that
" the sign stands for the object to the interpretant. "
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/17/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-17, 11:15:09
Subject: Re: Peirce's Categories
On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 8:18:26 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categories_%28Peirce%29 everything-list
Peirce's Categories (technical name: the cenopythagorean categories)[8]
Name:Typical characterizaton:As universe of experience:As quantity:Technical
definition:Valence, "adicity":
Firstness.[9]Quality of feeling.Ideas, chance, possibility.Vagueness,
"some".Reference to a ground (a ground is a pure abstraction of a
quality).[10]Essentially monadic (the quale, in the sense of the such,[11]
which has the quality).
Secondness.[12]Reaction, resistance, (dyadic) relation.Brute facts,
actuality.Singularity, discreteness, this .Reference to a correlate (by its
relate).Essentially dyadic (the relate and the correlate).
Thirdness.[13]Representation, mediation.Habits, laws, necessity.Generality,
continuity, "all".Reference to an interpretant*.Essentially triadic (sign,
object, interpretant*).
Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net
10/17/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
These categories are the stages of epistemology.
Firstness is the pure quale or what I would call "inner raw experience".
Subjective. Private. Personal.
Agree.
Secondness is dyadic relation, typical of thinking,which is an activity of
intelligence.
Disagree. Thinking is first person inner raw experience too. It's a different
channel of qualia (not smells, flavors, or colors, but thoughts, ideas,
memeories, etc) which is meta to subordinate qualia, but there is no other
significant difference. Thoughts are higher up on the monochord than other
kinds of sensorimotive activity (according to thoughts, anyways...it may be
relativistic).
The dyad seems to be to me between Firstness and Thirdness.
Thirdness is the objective form of the quale, a description for the experience
of Firstness. Objective. Public.
Public objects are multisensory facts, so they have to be Secondness.
Thirdness is the unfolding relations between Firstness and Secondness - the
capacity for perception to develop an inertial direction. This gets into
numerology really, as three is about expression and character - the beginning
of irreversibility and disambiguation. In four, inertial direction finds its
limit - range or frame. Worlds, games, systems.
Craig
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