Le 13-août-06, à 12:57, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
I know it looks counterintuitive, but an AI can know which computer
is
running and how many they are. It is a consequence of comp, and the
UDA
shows why. The answer is:
the computer which is running are
Russell Standish writes:
Precisely my point!
On Tue, Aug 08, 2006 at 08:42:04AM -0700, 1Z wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
By increasing the measure locally in our universe, are you making no
difference, or only a
small amount of difference to the measure overall in
Russell Standish writes:
Precisely my point!
On Tue, Aug 08, 2006 at 08:42:04AM -0700, 1Z wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
By increasing the measure locally in our universe, are you making no
difference, or only a
small amount of difference to the measure overall in
Bruno Marchal writes:
I know it looks counterintuitive, but an AI can know which computer is
running and how many they are. It is a consequence of comp, and the
UDA
shows why. The answer is:
the computer which is running are the relative universal number which
exist in
Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):
...a controlled
experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving
everything else
the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in
perfect
lockstep.
I think that the idea that a lower measure OM will appear more
Le 10-août-06, à 14:16, Stathis Papaioannou wrote :
Bruno: I am not sure I understand. All real number exist, for
example, and it
is the reason why we can put a measure on it. All computations exist
(this is equivalent with arithmetical realism) yet some are or at
least
could be
Le 08-août-06, à 15:54, W. C. a écrit :
From: Bruno Marchal
...
I just said you were deadly wrong here, but rereading your post I
find it
somehow ambiguous.
Let me comment anyway.
Human classical teleportation, although possible in principle, will
not be
possible in our life time
WC writes:
Classical teleportation cannot copy something exact to the quantum level,
but rather involves making a close enough copy. It is obvious, I think,
that this is theoretically possible, but it is not immediately obvious how
good the copy of a person would have to be (what Bruno
From: W. C.
From: Bruno Marchal
...
Not at all. I mean it in the operational physical sense. Like observing
your hand with a microscope, or looking closely to the path of an
electron.
...
Any microscope (optical or electron type)? What's the min. magnification
resolution to see it?
I
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 07-août-06, à 15:52, W. C. a écrit :
From: Bruno Marchal
...
Comp says that there is a level of description of yourself such that
you
survive through an emulation done at that level. But the UD will
simulate
not only that level but all level belows.
Le Mardi 8 Août 2006 08:00, W. C. a écrit :
Can you tell me why?
Because you are bad faith and don't read correctly what others tell you.
If you have some more stupid questions like this, don't hesitate and go
continue polluting the mailing list.
Quentin
Le 08-août-06, à 10:10, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
Le Mardi 8 Août 2006 08:00, W. C. a écrit :
Can you tell me why?
Because you are bad faith and don't read correctly what others tell
you.
If you have some more stupid questions like this, don't hesitate and go
continue polluting the
Le 08-août-06, à 05:49, W. C. a écrit :
From: Stathis Papaioannou
...
Classical teleportation cannot copy something exact to the quantum
level,
but rather involves making a close enough copy. It is obvious, I
think,
that this is theoretically possible, but it is not immediately
Le 08-août-06, à 08:00, W. C. a écrit :
But I still can't see that matter is the result of a sum on an
infinity
of interfering computations.
Can you tell me why?
My opinion here is that you should (re)read the FOR book. We do have
empirical reasons (quantum mechanics) that physical
Le 08-août-06, à 05:34, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):
...a controlled
experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving
everything else
the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in
perfect
lockstep.
I think that the
On Tue, Aug 08, 2006 at 01:11:19PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Is it still correct to say that a computation running on two physical
computers (that is, what
we think of as physical computers, whatever the underlying reality may be)
has almost twice
the measure as it would have
Russell Standish writes:
Is it still correct to say that a computation running on two physical
computers (that is, what
we think of as physical computers, whatever the underlying reality may be)
has almost twice
the measure as it would have if it were running on one computer?
From: Bruno Marchal
...
I just said you were deadly wrong here, but rereading your post I find it
somehow ambiguous.
Let me comment anyway.
Human classical teleportation, although possible in principle, will not be
possible in our life time (except for those who will succeed in some lucky
Le 08-août-06, à 08:58, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Not at all. I mean it in the operational physical sense. Like
observing
your hand with a microscope, or looking closely to the path of an
electron.
Could you say more about this? If you examine an object more and more
closely you
W. C. wrote:
Thanks for the info. although I still don't think substitution level exists.
If teleportation of human beings is real (I hope I can see it in my life),
I think all biggest questions (such as consciousness, soul? Creator? the
origin of the universe, meaning of life ... etc.)
of
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 08-août-06, à 08:58, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Not at all. I mean it in the operational physical sense. Like
observing
your hand with a microscope, or looking closely to the path of an
electron.
Could you say more about this? If you examine an object
Bruno Marchal wrote:
My opinion here is that you should (re)read the FOR book. We do have
empirical reasons (quantum mechanics) that physical reality is the
result of interfering computable waves.
Quantum weirdness is entirely compatible with
materialism-contingency-empiricism.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 08-août-06, à 05:34, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):
...a controlled
experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving
everything else
the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in
perfect
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
By increasing the measure locally in our universe, are you making no
difference, or only a
small amount of difference to the measure overall in Platonia?
You can't make a difference in Platonia. There is no time there,
no change, and no causality.
Precisely my point!
On Tue, Aug 08, 2006 at 08:42:04AM -0700, 1Z wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
By increasing the measure locally in our universe, are you making no
difference, or only a
small amount of difference to the measure overall in Platonia?
You can't make a
: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Someone called me to task for this posting (I forget who, and I've
lost the posting now). I tried to formulate the notion I expressed
here more precisely, and failed! So I never responded.
What I had in mind was that future observer
Le 07-août-06, à 01:44, W. C. a écrit :
From: Bruno Marchal
...
But it is easy to explain that this is already a simple consequence
of
comp. Any piece of matter is the result of a sum on an infinity of
interfering computations: there is no reason to expect this to be
clonable without
From: Bruno Marchal
...
Comp says that there is a level of description of yourself such that you
survive through an emulation done at that level. But the UD will simulate
not only that level but all level belows. So comp makes the following
prediction: if you look at yourself or at you
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Of course those physicist would believe in the wave collapse will have
more reason than Everett followers to swallow what I say.
Not much more. Physical MWI is a materialist-contingent-empiricst
theory
and therefore just as much opposed to your
From: Bruno Marchal
...
Not at all. I mean it in the operational physical sense. Like observing
your hand with a microscope, or looking closely to the path of an
electron.
...
Any microscope (optical or electron type)? What's the min. magnification
resolution to see it?
I need to find one to
Russell Standish:
On Sun, Aug 06, 2006 at 11:59:42PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
My thought was that if there are twice as many copies of you running in
parallel,
you are in a sense cramming twice as much experience into a given objective
time
period, so maybe this stretches
Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):
...a controlled
experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving
everything else
the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in perfect
lockstep.
I think that the idea that a lower measure OM will appear more
From: Stathis Papaioannou
...
Classical teleportation cannot copy something exact to the quantum level,
but rather involves making a close enough copy. It is obvious, I think,
that this is theoretically possible, but it is not immediately obvious how
good the copy of a person would have to be
Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2006 19:17:21 +1000
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
This is one of those truly cracked ideas that is not wise to air in
polite
02:10:53 +1000
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Someone called me to task for this posting (I forget who, and I've
lost the posting now). I tried to formulate the notion I
On Sun, Aug 06, 2006 at 11:59:42PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
My thought was that if there are twice as many copies of you running in
parallel,
you are in a sense cramming twice as much experience into a given objective
time
period, so maybe this stretches out the time period to
From: Bruno Marchal
...
But it is easy to explain that this is already a simple consequence of
comp. Any piece of matter is the result of a sum on an infinity of
interfering computations: there is no reason to expect this to be
clonable without cloning the whole UD, but this would not
Someone called me to task for this posting (I forget who, and I've
lost the posting now). I tried to formulate the notion I expressed
here more precisely, and failed! So I never responded.
What I had in mind was that future observer moment of my current one
will at some point have a total
CW writes:
c) Accepting a) and b) you assume physical laws making time travel
possible (which is of course controversial; this could be in principle
possible with very special assumption, which could also be false in
principle with other assumption).
Time travel is as possible as
From: Stathis Papaioannou
Not at all. There is a *huge* difference between what is possible in theory
and what is possible practically. A person wearing down a mountain with his
fingers is a practical impossibility, but there is nothing in the laws of
physics making it a theoretical
Le 04-août-06, à 15:18, W. C. a écrit :
I remember other people mentioned before. *Normal* people can't accept
that
there is no physical universe.
Even Buddhists won't say that.
Sorry. I was short. All what I say is that IF we take the comp hyp
seriously enough THEN we can see that
of your life if you are a young
child)
but it's an interesting idea.
Stathis Papaioannou
Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2006 02:10:53 +1000
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin
CW writes:
It's like teleportation. Maybe you can demonstrate with 1 or 2 particles in
QM.
But it's another very different thing when we are talking about human beings
(or simple animals).
Maybe other very knowledgeable prof. (like scerir???) in this list can
provide useful ref.
There
Hi Stathis,
I agree with what you say. Note that quantum information is very
different from classical information. Quantum information in general
cannot be copied or cloned, so that there is no relative local back-up
possible. That is why in quantum teleportation, the annihilation of the
Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2006 02:10:53 +1000
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Someone called me to task for this posting (I forget who, and I've
lost the posting now). I tried
From: Bruno Marchal
All we need to *reason* for getting consequence of comp is that such
substitution is *in principle* possible. Theoreticians does that, in many
fields. I insist that the UDA (Universal Dovetailer Argument) is based on
the notion of generalized brain: you could say that your
CW writes:
From: Stathis Papaioannou
Do you believe that IF you vanished at point A and a copy of you created at
point B who was physically and mentally similar to the original to the same
extent as if you had walked from A to B you would have survived? If you
answer no then you are
Le 04-août-06, à 08:03, W. C. a écrit :
From: Bruno Marchal
All we need to *reason* for getting consequence of comp is that such
substitution is *in principle* possible. Theoreticians does that, in
many
fields. I insist that the UDA (Universal Dovetailer Argument) is
based on
the
From: Bruno Marchal
Are you sure that this is possible, even just in principle? Actually, just
to show me that it could be possible in principle you have to give me your
fundamental assumptions. Actually it looks like you are assuming the
following:
a) there is a physical universe (well, with
Le 02-août-06, à 10:20, C. W. a écrit :
Hi, Bruno,
Sorry for my na鴳e question.
Common people would think that UDA is just imagination since you use the
teleportation
example and teleportation of human beings is still a science fiction.
Nobody can show that the substitution level really exists
: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Le 26-juil.-06, ?13:34, Russell Standish wrote :
Yes, although you do have a different perception of theology to Rees,
and indeed practically all other scientists I know of. I won't comment
on theologians of course, I don't really
Russell Standish writes, regarding http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0607227 :
Thanks for giving a digested explanation of the argument. This paper
was discussed briefly on A-Void a few weeks ago, but I must admit to
not following the argument too well, nor RTFA.
My comment on the observer
Saibal Mitra writes:
From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The real problem is not just that it is a philosophical speculation,
it is that it does not lead to any testable physical predictions.
The string theory landscape, even if finite, is far too large for
systematic exploration. Our
Thanks for giving a digested explanation of the argument. This paper
was discussed briefly on A-Void a few weeks ago, but I must admit to
not following the argument too well, nor RTFA.
My comment on the observer moment issue, is that in a Multiverse, the
measure of older observer moments is less
Danny Mayes writes:
Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
Which approximates my ideas on the nature of reality and the possible role
of intelligence.
Well, no offense to Martin or you, but that's pretty ordinary stuff which
we have been discussing on this list since 1998
Le 26-juil.-06, à 06:29, Danny Mayes quoted Rees:
x-tad-biggerSo I favor peaceful coexistence rather than constructive dialogue between science and theology
/x-tad-bigger
With comp (or just with deep enough introspection) you can understand that science is just modesty, and that it is not
- Original Message -
From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, July 26, 2006 08:28 AM
Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees
The real problem is not just that it is a philosophical speculation
Which
approximates my ideas on the nature of reality and the possible role of
intelligence.
(MARTIN
REES:) This is a really good time to be a cosmologist, because in the last few
years some of the questions we've been addressing for decades have come into
focus. For instance, we can now
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