subject:"Is your elbow conscious\?"

> On 21 May 2019, at 15:46, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 8:58 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>  
> > (Isn't Hofstadter a joke?)
> 
> Hofstadter wrote the single best book I ever read in my life, "Gödel, Escher, 
> Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid".
>  
> > ” His [Dennett's] position was summarized in an interview in The New York 
> > Times: “The elusive subjective conscious experience—the redness of red, the 
> > painfulness of pain—that philosophers call qualia? Sheer illusion.”
> 
> I sure hope Dennett was misquoted, but if not I'm appalled he would say 
> something so silly. One thing we know for certain about consciousness is that 
> it's a subjective phenomenon; and so is an illusion.

That is a misleading way to describe what happens. The content of a subjective 
phenomenon might be an illusion, but the subjective phenomenon cannot be an 
illusion, because an illusion *is* a subjective phenomenon itself. 

Consciousness is the less illusory thing we can experience, despite all its 
content can be illusory, with the exception of the consciousness experience 
itself, as an illusion requires some consciousness.

I guess you agree with this (from other post you wrote) so I guess this was 
written just too quickly.

In "conscious explained” Dennnet asks himself, in the last chapter 
("consciousness explained or explained away?”) if he is not going too far, and 
if he is not going toward sheer elimination of consciousness, which he did, 
imo. Of course, he does not eliminate consciousness in his “Brainstorm” nor in 
his book with Hofstadter “Mind’s I”. There, Denett almost find the first person 
indeterminacy, but he still missed it.

Bruno

> So all he's saying in the above is subjectivity is sheer subjectivity, and 
> that is certainly true but it is also very silly.
> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1v84_yuMyazLa-Xnjf2j6HKPjxfqyDn5CdYHL71uLRDw%40mail.gmail.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/E2D85A75-1C10-4D9E-8B25-76625709A8B9%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?


> On 21 May 2019, at 15:15, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 9:02 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> In science, we don’t claim truth, especially on the fundamental reality. We 
> only try theories, like plausibly Nature itself, through selection, mutation, 
> etc.
> 
> A good sound instrumentalist position. Instrumentalism is often characterised 
> as an anti-realist philosophy, but I would not agree: instrumentalism is 
> quite consistent with belief in a mind-independent reality -- it just doesn't 
> presume to know what that "reality" consist in.

I agree. Even in metaphysics and theology, when done with the scientific 
attitude, we propose theories on “what really exists” and then manage how to 
verify or refute them. As long as nature confirms the theory, we cannot know if 
they are true, and we can find then very implausible if they repetitively fail 
the tests.

Bruno 




> 
> Bruce 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRD2jjD4yoBwhfcCk7G9cWJXB_Zodjt4JsTSP5vyGACkg%40mail.gmail.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/68B54A80-9FB7-47C4-939D-B6519BB545C4%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?


> On 21 May 2019, at 14:58, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, May 21, 2019 at 6:06:19 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 20 May 2019, at 10:32, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> But I claim that no zillion-processor Intel Core computer (that ultimately 
>> runs programs compiled to Intel machine code) can be conscious. I also claim 
>> God does not exist.
> 
> Which God?
> 
> 
>> 
>> It is this context that [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room 
>>  ] is correct.
>> 
>> "The Chinese room argument holds that an executing program cannot [have] 
>> consciousness, regardless of how intelligently or human-like the program may 
>> make the computer behave.”
> 
> The Chinese room argument is based on a misunderstanding of how a computer 
> work. It has been refuted correctly by Dennett and Hofstadter, since long.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I think in 2019 Dennett may have changed from his previous "consciousness 
> denier" belief, but I'm not sure. (Isn't Hofstadter a joke?)

Hofstadter is the only physicist I know who is 99,9% correct on Gödel’s 
theorems, even if some of its metaphors are a bit stretched and slightly 
inaccurate. Nothing to compare with Penrose, who is dead wrong in his use of 
Gödel against Mechanism.

Hofstadter found the notion of “Henkin virus”, which inspired Solovay “himself” 
to dig on them. I say “Solovay “itself” as Solovay is the major contributor in 
the isolation of the G and G* mathematics, which I use all the time (indeed the 
mathematical theology of the machine exists entirely through the mathematics of 
G*).

Hofstadter is a serious researcher, but his best book is “Gödel, Escher, Bach”, 
and its “metamagical themas”. I am less sure about his studies on metaphor, but 
I have not really studied them, also.



> 
> 
> https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/
> 
> This is how philosophers in the twentieth century came to endorse the Denial, 
> the silliest view ever held in the history of human thought. 
> 
> “When I squint just right,” Dennett writes in 2013, “it does sort of seem 
> that consciousness must be something in addition to all the things it does 
> for us and to us, some special private glow or here-I-am-ness that would be 
> absent in any robot… But I’ve learned not to credit the hunch. I think it is 
> a flat-out mistake, a failure of imagination.” His position was summarized in 
> an interview in The New York Times: “The elusive subjective conscious 
> experience—the redness of red, the painfulness of pain—that philosophers call 
> qualia? Sheer illusion.” If he’s right, no one has ever really suffered, in 
> spite of agonizing diseases, mental illness, murder, rape, famine, slavery, 
> bereavement, torture, and genocide. And no one has ever caused anyone else 
> pain.
> 
> This is the Great Silliness. We must hope that it doesn’t spread outside the 
> academy, or convince some future information technologist or roboticist who 
> has great power over our lives.

Yes, I agree. Eliminating consciousness is silly. Yet, Dennett is valid, given 
that he postulates, well, he even take for granted, the physical universe and 
he accepts Mechanism, and I have shown that this lead to consciousness 
elimination. I prefer to eliminate primitive matter, and keep consciousness and 
mechanist studies further, as the evidences favours mechanism, and are 
inexistent (up to now) for *primitive* matter.

Bruno


> 
> 
> @philipthfift
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/f3741ba7-9bf1-43d6-87ae-795214016101%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/15B97461-A287-4C0D-90EE-71EE2FED1E07%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-21 Thread John Clark

On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 8:58 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

> > *(Isn't Hofstadter a joke?)*
>

Hofstadter wrote the single best book I ever read in my life, "Gödel,
Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid".

> > ” His [Dennett's] position was summarized in an interview in The New
> York Times: “The elusive subjective conscious experience—the redness of
> red, the painfulness of pain—that philosophers call qualia? Sheer illusion.”
>

I sure hope Dennett was misquoted, but if not I'm appalled he would say
something so silly. One thing we know for certain about consciousness is
that it's a subjective phenomenon; and so is an illusion. So all he's
saying in the above is subjectivity is sheer subjectivity, and that is
certainly true but it is also very silly.

John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1v84_yuMyazLa-Xnjf2j6HKPjxfqyDn5CdYHL71uLRDw%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-21 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 9:02 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> In science, we don’t claim truth, especially on the fundamental reality.
> We only try theories, like plausibly Nature itself, through selection,
> mutation, etc.
>

A good sound instrumentalist position. Instrumentalism is often
characterised as an anti-realist philosophy, but I would not agree:
instrumentalism is quite consistent with belief in a mind-independent
reality -- it just doesn't presume to know what that "reality" consist in.

Bruce

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRD2jjD4yoBwhfcCk7G9cWJXB_Zodjt4JsTSP5vyGACkg%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-21 Thread Philip Thrift

On Tuesday, May 21, 2019 at 6:06:19 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 20 May 2019, at 10:32, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
> But I claim that no zillion-processor Intel Core computer (that ultimately 
> runs programs compiled to Intel machine code) can be conscious. I also 
> claim God does not exist.
>
>
> Which God?
>
>
>
> It is this context that [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room ] is 
> correct.
>
> "The Chinese room argument holds that an executing program cannot [have] 
> consciousness, regardless of how intelligently or human-like the program 
> may make the computer behave.”
>
>
> The Chinese room argument is based on a misunderstanding of how a computer 
> work. It has been refuted correctly by Dennett and Hofstadter, since long.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
I think in 2019 Dennett may have changed from his previous "consciousness 
denier" belief, but I'm not sure. (Isn't Hofstadter a joke?)

https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/

This is how philosophers in the twentieth century came to endorse the 
Denial, the silliest view ever held in the history of human thought. 

“When I squint just right,” *Dennett *writes in 2013, “it does sort of seem 
that consciousness must be something in addition to all the things it does 
for us and to us, some special private glow or here-I-am-ness that would be 
absent in any robot… But I’ve learned not to credit the hunch. I think it 
is a flat-out mistake, a failure of imagination.” His position was 
summarized in an interview in The New York Times: “The elusive subjective 
conscious experience—the redness of red, the painfulness of pain—that 
philosophers call qualia? Sheer illusion.” If he’s right, no one has ever 
really suffered, in spite of agonizing diseases, mental illness, murder, 
rape, famine, slavery, bereavement, torture, and genocide. And no one has 
ever caused anyone else pain.

*This is the Great Silliness. We must hope that it doesn’t spread outside 
the academy, or convince some future information technologist or roboticist 
who has great power over our lives.*

@philipthfift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/f3741ba7-9bf1-43d6-87ae-795214016101%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?


> On 20 May 2019, at 19:31, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 10:03:12 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 18 May 2019, at 00:33, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> Isn't  qualia can be reduced to information processing  the unsupported 
>> assertion?
>> 
>> The burden of proof is on those who claim qualia comes out of information 
>> processing.
>> 
>> If that claim were true, then any IP system - like a smartphone that can 
>> execute programs - can have human-type qualia existing inside it.
> 
> It is not because some “information processing” could support consciousness 
> that we can conclude that all information processing can support 
> consciousness. You need at least one reflexive loop. You need two reflexive 
> loop for having self-consciousness (Löbianity).
> 
> But the information processing is not enough, you need a reality, also, be it 
> the arithmetical truth, or a physical phenomenologies which would be Turing 
> universal.
> 
> The arithmetical truth must be understood as something beyond all information 
> processing possible, as we know since Gödel and Tarski.
> 
> The advantage of mechanism is that we do have a theory: computer science (aka 
> Recrusion theory, or Arithmetic).
> 
> That does not make Mechanism true, but it makes the problems amenable to 
> mathematical formulation and testing.
> 
> Bruno
> 
>  
> 
> 
> A smartphone CPU, like Samsung's
> 
> 
> https://www.anandtech.com/show/13599/samsung-announces-8nm-exynos-9820-with-trigroup-cpu-design
>  
> 
> 
> can run any "Turing" program. 

That is correct. Most iPhone are genuine universal computer.



> 
> So I still don't see from your description what exactly is missing for it to 
> produce|execute human qualia?

Nothing. It has qualia, plausibly close to the dissociative consciousness 
experience reported by people using ketamine or salvia diqnorum. It looks like 
“pure consciousness” : like a total amnesia, out of time and space. What the 
Samsung computer missed is long term memory, freedom to express itself, as such 
machines are born and confined in being docile slaves. Nobody want a phone who 
would answer at your place, and do strikes for social security, etc.

Bruno



> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3f18a4a2-43a5-4a9b-b110-494e7e37e12b%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/BF678259-B2D3-44A0-B6B3-186C74542D67%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?


> On 20 May 2019, at 10:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 6:50:48 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sunday, May 19, 2019, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 2:40:04 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 1:21 PM Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 10:13:22 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 5/19/2019 12:19 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 1:50:03 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 5/18/2019 11:25 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> No I can't prove we aren't simulations, or that a simulation running in a 
>>> big computer made of Intel Cores can't be conscious.
>> 
>> Nor can you give a reply to Chalmer's fading consciousness problem.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html  :
>> 
>> for a system to be conscious it must have the right sort of biochemical 
>> makeup; if so, a metallic robot or a silicon-based computer could never have 
>> experiences, no matter what its causal organization 
> 
> A natural suggestion is that when experience arises from a physical system, 
> it does so in virtue of the system's functional organization. On this view, 
> the chemical and indeed the quantum substrates of the brain are not directly 
> relevant to the existence of consciousness, although they may be indirectly 
> relevant. What is central is rather the brain's abstract causal organization, 
> an organization that might be realized in many different physical substrates.
> 
> In this paper I defend this view.
> 
> 
>> 
>> That from David Chalmer's paper is the only good takeaway. 
> 
> Brent
> 
>  
> 
> That was written in 1993. (In 2019, I don't think he himself defends this 
> view.)
> 
> In any case, I read this "defense" like I read papers defending the existence 
> of God.
> 
> 
> A scientist should be thrilled to find something which might show the ideas 
> he or she holds to be wrong, as it offers a chance to adopt a more correct 
> view.  Recently I have seen a lot of people on this list telling others their 
> idea is wrong, but not giving any reason or reasoning to justify that 
> assertion.
> 
> This doesn't helping anyone. Telling someone else they are wrong without 
> providing a reason won't get them to change their mind, if anything failing 
> to provide a reason is just as likely to reinforce their belief. If you see 
> or intuit something that someone else does not, I think it is best to either 
> point out what it is they are missing or remain silent.
> 
> Jason
> 
> 
> 
> Philip,
> 
> I commend you for providing your reasons below. Thank you.
> 
>  
> 
> We know our brains, which we examine in science to be made of a complex 
> configuration of cells, neurons and glial, with complex neurochemistry*, 
> produces consciousness. That is the fact we know to be the case.
> 
> Yes, I agree.
>  
> 
> So it seems reasonable, from both a scientific and engineering stance, that a 
> synthetic intelligence approach - one that combines synthetic-biological 
> assembly with AI information processing to produce outputs that are actually 
> living things - is the road to (synthetic) consciousness.
> 
> The belief that a conventional computer made of a zillion Intel Core chips 
> with the right programming can be conscious is a religious belief, not a a 
> scientific belief.
> 
> 
> You could say it is a hypothesis for which we currently have no direct 
> evidence for.  Is there anything you would consider evidence?  If a synthetic 
> Android claimed to be conscious would this be evidence that would convince 
> you? If not, what evidence could convince you?
>  
> The burden of proof is on those with that belief to prove it, just as the 
> burden of proof is on those with the belief that God exists to prove that.
> 
> 
> I think the burden rests equally on those holding either that "synthetic 
> brains cannot be conscious" as "synthetic brains can be conscious".
> 
> The reason I lean towards the second camp, is that the former leads to very 
> strange situations: pzombies that complain about pain, Androids who argue 
> that they're conscious, planets with zombies (of a different neuro chemistry) 
> who nonetheless write books on consciousness, fading qualia, and qualia that 
> "dance" (disappear and reappear) due to presence or absence of a few 
> synthetic neurons.
> 
> I am not aware of anything quite so strange resulting from a belief in 
> synthetic consciousness. Sure it is strange that a billion Intel chips could 
> be conscious, but no more strange than the idea that a heap of oil droplets 
> squirting ions back and forth could be conscious.
> 
> Anyway that's how I got to where I am.
> 
> Jason
> 
>  
> 
> * neurochemistry like the recently reported role of SATB2-expressing neurons 
> in the processing of taste.
> 
> SATB2: "SATB2 is a 733 amino-acid homeodomain-containing human protein with a 
> molecular weight of 82.5 kDa encoded by

Re: Is your elbow conscious?


> On 19 May 2019, at 22:39, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 2:40:04 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 1:21 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 10:13:22 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 5/19/2019 12:19 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 1:50:03 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 5/18/2019 11:25 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> No I can't prove we aren't simulations, or that a simulation running in a 
>>> big computer made of Intel Cores can't be conscious.
>> 
>> Nor can you give a reply to Chalmer's fading consciousness problem.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html  :
>> 
>> for a system to be conscious it must have the right sort of biochemical 
>> makeup; if so, a metallic robot or a silicon-based computer could never have 
>> experiences, no matter what its causal organization 
> 
> A natural suggestion is that when experience arises from a physical system, 
> it does so in virtue of the system's functional organization. On this view, 
> the chemical and indeed the quantum substrates of the brain are not directly 
> relevant to the existence of consciousness, although they may be indirectly 
> relevant. What is central is rather the brain's abstract causal organization, 
> an organization that might be realized in many different physical substrates.
> 
> In this paper I defend this view.
> 
> 
>> 
>> That from David Chalmer's paper is the only good takeaway. 
> 
> Brent
> 
>  
> 
> That was written in 1993. (In 2019, I don't think he himself defends this 
> view.)
> 
> In any case, I read this "defense" like I read papers defending the existence 
> of God.
> 
> 
> A scientist should be thrilled to find something which might show the ideas 
> he or she holds to be wrong, as it offers a chance to adopt a more correct 
> view.  Recently I have seen a lot of people on this list telling others their 
> idea is wrong, but not giving any reason or reasoning to justify that 
> assertion.
> 
> This doesn't helping anyone. Telling someone else they are wrong without 
> providing a reason won't get them to change their mind, if anything failing 
> to provide a reason is just as likely to reinforce their belief. If you see 
> or intuit something that someone else does not, I think it is best to either 
> point out what it is they are missing or remain silent.
> 
> Jason
> 
> 
> 
> We know our brains, which we examine in science to be made of a complex 
> configuration of cells, neurons and glial, with complex neurochemistry*, 
> produces consciousness. That is the fact we know to be the case.
> 
> So it seems reasonable, from both a scientific and engineering stance, that a 
> synthetic intelligence approach - one that combines synthetic-biological 
> assembly with AI information processing to produce outputs that are actually 
> living things - is the road to (synthetic) consciousness.
> 
> The belief that a conventional computer made of a zillion Intel Core chips 
> with the right programming can be conscious is a religious belief, not a a 
> scientific belief.

Any belief about some reality is a religious belief; to begin with the belief 
that some reality exist.


> 
> The burden of proof is on those with that belief to prove it, just as the 
> burden of proof is on those with the belief that God exists to prove that.

Science never proves anything about reality. It proves propositions in theories 
about that reality, but the theories are not proved. They are given to be 
tested, and if possible refuted or improved.

In science, we don’t claim truth, especially on the fundamental reality. We 
only try theories, like plausibly Nature itself, through selection, mutation, 
etc.

Bruno



> 
> 
> * neurochemistry like the recently reported role of SATB2-expressing neurons 
> in the processing of taste.
> 
> SATB2: "SATB2 is a 733 amino-acid homeodomain-containing human protein with a 
> molecular weight of 82.5 kDa encoded by the SATB2 gene on 2q33."
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e735ca2d-82a7-4b50-a474-c8e6827c950c%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit

Re: Is your elbow conscious?


> On 19 May 2019, at 17:13, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/19/2019 12:19 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 1:50:03 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 5/18/2019 11:25 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> No I can't prove we aren't simulations, or that a simulation running in a 
>>> big computer made of Intel Cores can't be conscious.
>> 
>> Nor can you give a reply to Chalmer's fading consciousness problem.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html  :
>> 
>> for a system to be conscious it must have the right sort of biochemical 
>> makeup; if so, a metallic robot or a silicon-based computer could never have 
>> experiences, no matter what its causal organization 
> 
> A natural suggestion is that when experience arises from a physical system, 
> it does so in virtue of the system's functional organization. On this view, 
> the chemical and indeed the quantum substrates of the brain are not directly 
> relevant to the existence of consciousness, although they may be indirectly 
> relevant. What is central is rather the brain's abstract causal organization, 
> an organization that might be realized in many different physical substrates.

And also in non physical reality, like the elementary arithmetical reality, 
which might not be a physical thing, despite being assumed and used in all 
physical theories. 

Bruno



> 
> In this paper I defend this view.
> 
> 
>> 
>> That from David Chalmer's paper is the only good takeaway. 
> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ae10f21f-9639-4ac1-238a-79050b757f96%40verizon.net
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/E138F497-53B3-4908-9C0E-91A4A65FADF6%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?


> On 19 May 2019, at 03:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/18/2019 12:55 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 2:39:29 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 5/18/2019 6:37 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> A simulated human brain could describe it's back pain in every detail, 
>>> write whole paragraphs about what it's like, while according to the theory 
>>> of substrate dependence, it knows nothing of what it's writing about. Where 
>>> then does this knowledge if pain come from when the AI writes a page about 
>>> the back pain it is in?
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> A simulated human brain could read the Wikipedia article on pain [ 
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pain  ]   
>>>   and integrate this knowledge into its knowledge base, but it 
>>> could not experience pain.
>> 
>> How do you know this so-called fact?
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> My main point is that those who say it can (I say it can't) can't talk about 
>> telepathy, precognition, astral projection etc. being crazy.
> 
> No, but I can talk about them as tested and disproven.

Exactly.

But some people here talk like if they knew the truth, which is unscientific 
and even against any religion not based on literal reading of texst, but on 
experiences, experiments, and reflexion.
Of course, the 1500 years of temporal use (misuse) of theology does not help. 
It trains people in accepting authoritative arguments.

Bruno


> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> @philipthrift
>>  
>> -- 
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
>> .
>> To view this discussion on the web visit 
>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d5c3507b-33e6-4b20-886c-4d11c1428399%40googlegroups.com
>>  
>> .
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/535753f4-9c65-0405-39fd-1c78796b4b25%40verizon.net
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9D12AB20-5B40-4C39-9C32-81B9D805554F%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?



On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 6:19:54 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 2:01 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>  
>
>> *> If a program (multi-core x86 code) running on a zillion-processor 
>> Intel Core computer can be conscious, then the proposition of "Chinese 
>> room" is wrong.*
>>
>
> You want to prove that only wet squishy things can be conscious. You ask 
> that little man (who happens to have a wet squishy brain) in that gigantic 
> room if he is conscious on knowing Chinese and he says no. The only wet 
> squishy thing in that humongous room is in the little man and* you assume* 
> only wet squishy things can be conscious and so *conclude* that there is 
> no consciousness of Chinese in that astronomically large room.
>
> Assuming what you want to prove is not only wrong its STUPID. 
>
> John K Clark 
>


It's already been established how Data's positronics could be conscious. I 
don't know how "wet squishy" Data's positronics are.

https://memory-alpha.fandom.com/wiki/Positronic_matrix

*A positronic matrix was a significant part of an android's positronic 
brain, but could also be adapted for use in conjunction with a humanoid's 
brain.*

*When Data created his "daughter" Lal in 2366, during her development he 
observed some quantum variations, notably her use of contractions. Because 
her neural net was identical to Data's, he began to maintain records on her 
positronic matrix activity, behavioral norms, and verbal patterns. (TNG: 
"The Offspring") Lal subsequently "died" as a result of having an unstable 
positronic matrix.*
* ...*

@philipthrift 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/380b73b7-4344-464e-9896-c3c5dad7c205%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 5:45:55 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 4:40 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 4:10:12 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, May 20, 2019, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>

 On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 10:39:20 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WjCytqku18M 

>>>
>
>

 That was interesting. Data has consciousness or doesn't. It's like 
 being pregnant.

>>>
>>> So what would you say to data, if he existed? That you're not conscious 
>>> because every other conscious being that we know of is biological?
>>>  
>>>
 All examples of consciousness we have exist in living objects. (Us, for 
 example.)

>>> True but that's not evidence
>>>  
>>>
 Can something be a conscious object but not a living object?

>>> Depending on your definition of life, yes, I think so.
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>>
>>  
>>
>> I was only just reading about Data's positronic technology. If 
>> positronics is like biopolymers being used to make synthetic neurons today, 
>> then Data could be conscious.
>>
>> A non-living conscious being seems like a contradiction. I don't think 
>> Data would be both conscious and non-living. Data would be an example of 
>> life made of alternative biochemistry.
>>
>>
> Life usually embodies aspects such as reproduction, metabolism, etc.  A 
> mars rover or a Boltzmann brain would not meet the definition of alive, but 
> could be conscious.
>
> Jason
>

So you read the synthetic biology technology literature? Living things are 
being made in labs today.

*Engineering Microbial Living Therapeutics: The Synthetic Biology Toolbox*

https://www.cell.com/trends/biotechnology/fulltext/S0167-7799(18)30258-0

Living therapeutics have been engineered to diagnose diseases and produce 
and deliver therapeutics in situ. These therapeutics can be equipped with 
devices for sensing inputs, controlling gene expression, building memory, 
and producing and delivering an active compound. Ingenious devices 
responding to stress, temperature, quorum-sensing signals, and other small 
molecules have been built to control the production and delivery of 
therapeutic molecules. To deal with biosafety, some living therapeutics 
carry biocontainment devices based on cell auxotrophy, 
temperature-sensitive regulators, and toxin/antitoxin counteraction. Recent 
advances in synthetic biology greatly expanded the toolbox for engineering 
living therapeutics; however, new parts are still needed to help synthetic 
biologists engineer more diverse and fully functional living therapeutics. 
Microbes can be engineered to act like living therapeutics designed to 
perform specific actions in the human body. From fighting and preventing 
infections to eliminating tumors and treating metabolic disorders, 
engineered living systems are the next generation of therapeutics. In 
recent years, synthetic biologists have greatly expanded the genetic 
toolbox for microbial living therapeutics, adding sensors, regulators, 
memory circuits, delivery devices, and kill switches. These advances have 
paved the way for successful engineering of fully functional living 
therapeutics, with sensing, production, and biocontainment devices. 
However, some important tools are still missing from the box. In this 
review, we cover the most recent biological parts and approaches developed 
and describe the missing tools needed to build robust living therapeutics.

@philipthrift 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/659ec0d7-cf7c-4012-964e-0a0ec96bb533%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-20 Thread John Clark

On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 2:01 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

> *> If a program (multi-core x86 code) running on a zillion-processor Intel
> Core computer can be conscious, then the proposition of "Chinese room" is
> wrong.*
>

You want to prove that only wet squishy things can be conscious. You ask
that little man (who happens to have a wet squishy brain) in that gigantic
room if he is conscious on knowing Chinese and he says no. The only wet
squishy thing in that humongous room is in the little man and* you assume*
only wet squishy things can be conscious and so *conclude* that there is no
consciousness of Chinese in that astronomically large room.

Assuming what you want to prove is not only wrong its STUPID.

John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1g4aKEg5kyi1VqQq5BvCc4yORJRSjEQ2fpm8attwQ2tg%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-20 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 5/20/2019 3:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 4:40 PM Philip Thrift > wrote:

On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 4:10:12 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:

On Monday, May 20, 2019, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 10:39:20 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WjCytqku18M

That was interesting. Data has consciousness or doesn't.
It's like being pregnant.

So what would you say to data, if he existed? That you're not
conscious because every other conscious being that we know of
is biological?

All examples of consciousness we have exist in living
objects. (Us, for example.)

True but that's not evidence

Can something be a conscious object but not a living object?

Depending on your definition of life, yes, I think so.

Jason

I was only just reading about Data's positronic technology. If
positronics is like biopolymers being used to make synthetic
neurons today, then Data could be conscious.

A non-living conscious being seems like a contradiction. I don't
think Data would be both conscious and non-living. Data would be
an example of life made of alternative biochemistry.

Life usually embodies aspects such as reproduction, metabolism, etc.
A mars rover or a Boltzmann brain would not meet the definition of
alive, but could be conscious.

Of course we might eventually send a Mars rover that assembles copies of
itself (with variation) from local materials in order to more thoroughly
explore the planet.

Brent

Jason
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUgM1G8-ys3SpueAhDR88J1-XzL%3DxrnnB5wQLaQQmUNZRw%40mail.gmail.com
.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/29675f62-809a-ca60-e3fc-35f18c2e30ce%40verizon.net.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 4:40 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 4:10:12 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, May 20, 2019, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 10:39:20 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:


>>>  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WjCytqku18M
>>>
>>


>>>
>>> That was interesting. Data has consciousness or doesn't. It's like being
>>> pregnant.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> So what would you say to data, if he existed? That you're not conscious
>> because every other conscious being that we know of is biological?
>>
>>
>>> All examples of consciousness we have exist in living objects. (Us, for
>>> example.)
>>>
>>>
>> True but that's not evidence
>>
>>
>>> Can something be a conscious object but not a living object?
>>>
>>>
>> Depending on your definition of life, yes, I think so.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>
> I was only just reading about Data's positronic technology. If positronics
> is like biopolymers being used to make synthetic neurons today, then Data
> could be conscious.
>
> A non-living conscious being seems like a contradiction. I don't think
> Data would be both conscious and non-living. Data would be an example of
> life made of alternative biochemistry.
>
>
Life usually embodies aspects such as reproduction, metabolism, etc.  A
mars rover or a Boltzmann brain would not meet the definition of alive, but
could be conscious.

Jason

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUgM1G8-ys3SpueAhDR88J1-XzL%3DxrnnB5wQLaQQmUNZRw%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?



On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 4:53:20 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/20/2019 10:46 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
> > All examples of consciousness we have exist in living objects. (Us, 
> > for example.) 
> > 
> > Can something be a conscious object but not a living object? 
>
> So you're going to appeal to the elan' vital as necessary to 
> consciousness? 
>
> Brent 
>



Ghosts are conscious but non-living. (They are immaterial, in fact.)

So there are those, of course.

Consciousness inhabiting a zillion-processor Intel Core computer would 
indeed be like a ghost inhabiting it.

@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/13e82985-e114-4c4f-94d7-d999b410775d%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-20 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List





On 5/20/2019 10:46 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
All examples of consciousness we have exist in living objects. (Us, 
for example.)


Can something be a conscious object but not a living object?


So you're going to appeal to the elan' vital as necessary to consciousness?

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/be819dd9-90bd-098b-f96d-1b017ad9bb2e%40verizon.net.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?



On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 4:10:12 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, May 20, 2019, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 10:39:20 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WjCytqku18M 
>>
>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> That was interesting. Data has consciousness or doesn't. It's like being 
>> pregnant.
>>
>>
>
> So what would you say to data, if he existed? That you're not conscious 
> because every other conscious being that we know of is biological?
>  
>
>> All examples of consciousness we have exist in living objects. (Us, for 
>> example.)
>>
>>
> True but that's not evidence
>  
>
>> Can something be a conscious object but not a living object?
>>
>>
> Depending on your definition of life, yes, I think so.
>
> Jason
>
>  
>

 

I was only just reading about Data's positronic technology. If positronics 
is like biopolymers being used to make synthetic neurons today, then Data 
could be conscious.

A non-living conscious being seems like a contradiction. I don't think Data 
would be both conscious and non-living. Data would be an example of life 
made of alternative biochemistry.

@philipthrift


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/84371e91-fc6c-4af5-9e04-855c8db9e903%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 1:22 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 12:46:13 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 10:39:20 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WjCytqku18M
>>
>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> That was interesting. Data has consciousness or doesn't. It's like being
>> pregnant.
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
> Data (in your video link) apparently is synthesized with positronic links:
>
>https://memory-alpha.fandom.com/wiki/Positronic_link
>
> What is the material composition of Data's positronic links?
>
>
I don't know. It's fictional, but I would say it doesn't matter. Who am I
to tell someone else they are not conscious?

Jason

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUj%3DtU2Y%3DkCQ%3DnyYjxFcJb0jmrBMcP7%3DXabm1Qv%2B_Xa8Jg%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

On Monday, May 20, 2019, Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 10:39:20 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WjCytqku18M
>

>>
>>
>
> That was interesting. Data has consciousness or doesn't. It's like being
> pregnant.
>
>

So what would you say to data, if he existed? That you're not conscious
because every other conscious being that we know of is biological?


>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> There are several alternatives to our biochemistry, of course [
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_types_of_biochemistry ],
>>> even involving silicon*. (This is about the 20th time I have posted this.)
>>>
>>> But I claim that no zillion-processor Intel Core computer (that
>>> ultimately runs programs compiled to Intel machine code) can be conscious.
>>> I also claim God does not exist.
>>>
>>> It is this context that [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room ]
>>> is correct.
>>>
>>
>>> "The Chinese room argument holds that an executing program cannot [have]
>>> consciousness, regardless of how intelligently or human-like the program
>>> may make the computer behave."
>>>
>>>
>> The Chinese Room Argument was thoroughly debunked by over a dozen
>> critiquers before it was published.  It has numerous flaws, none of which
>> were addressed between the time he received the critiques and when Searle
>> published.
>>
>> A few examples:
>>
>>- It confuses the "processor" for the system as a whole.  This would
>>be like confusing the laws of physics for the human brain. The laws of
>>physics is the substrate by which the brain states are processed and
>>updated, but you would not ascribe the consciousness to the laws of 
>> physics.
>>- It assumes there is only one mind in the room, the human operator.
>>But this quickly falls upon closer inspection, if you interview the
>>"chinese speaking mind" you find that the opinions of this other mind are
>>not the opinions of the english speaking human operator.
>>
>>
>>
>>> * Silicon biochemistry
>>> See also: Organosilicon 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Structure of silane , analog of
>>> methane 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Structure of the silicone polydimethylsiloxane
>>>  (PDMS)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Marine diatoms —carbon-based
>>> organisms that extract silicon from sea water, in the form of its oxide
>>> (silica) and incorporate it into their cell walls
>>>
>>> The silicon atom has been much discussed as the basis for an alternative
>>> biochemical system, because silicon has many chemical properties
>>>  similar to those of
>>> carbon and is in the same group of the periodic table
>>> , the carbon group
>>> . Like carbon, silicon can
>>> create molecules that are sufficiently large to carry biological
>>> information.[10]
>>> 
>>>
>>> However, silicon has several drawbacks as an alternative to carbon.
>>> Silicon, unlike carbon, lacks the ability to form chemical bonds with
>>> diverse types of atoms as is necessary for the chemical versatility
>>> required for metabolism, and yet this precise inability is what makes
>>> silicon less susceptible to bond with all sorts of impurities from which
>>> carbon, in comparison, is not shielded. Elements creating organic
>>> functional groups with carbon include hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen,
>>> phosphorus, sulfur, and metals such as iron, magnesium, and zinc. Silicon,
>>> on the other hand, interacts with very few other types of atoms.[10]
>>> 
>>>  Moreover,
>>> where it does interact with other atoms, silicon creates molecules that
>>> have been described as "monotonous compared with the combinatorial universe
>>> of organic macromolecules".[10]
>>> 
>>>  This
>>> is because silicon atoms are much bigger, having a larger mass
>>>  and atomic radius
>>> , and so have difficulty
>>> forming double bonds (the double-bonded carbon is part of the carbonyl
>>>  group, a fundamental motif of
>>> carbon-based bio-organic chemistry).
>>>
>>> Silanes

Re: Is your elbow conscious?



On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 12:46:13 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 10:39:20 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WjCytqku18M 
>

>>
>>
>
> That was interesting. Data has consciousness or doesn't. It's like being 
> pregnant.
>
>  
>
>>
>>
Data (in your video link) apparently is synthesized with positronic links:

   https://memory-alpha.fandom.com/wiki/Positronic_link

What is the material composition of Data's positronic links?

@philipthrift


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/da4974ee-88bb-48dc-aa98-39358814d7ea%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?



On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 11:55:40 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 4:32 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> >*The Chinese room argument holds that an executing program cannot* [blah 
>> blah]
>
>
> Philip, I'd really like to know why you think the Chinese room argument is 
> not imbecilic. I'm also curious why you cut and pasted all that stuff about 
> silicon biochemistry from Wikipedia.
>
>  John K Clark 
>



If a program (multi-core x86 code) running on a zillion-processor Intel 
Core computer can be conscious, then the proposition of "Chinese room" is 
wrong.

@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/965e3909-dae4-4a65-a066-829843d60be8%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?



On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 10:39:20 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WjCytqku18M 

>>>
>
>

That was interesting. Data has consciousness or doesn't. It's like being 
pregnant.

 

>
>
>  
>
>>
>> There are several alternatives to our biochemistry, of course [ 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_types_of_biochemistry ], even 
>> involving silicon*. (This is about the 20th time I have posted this.)
>>
>> But I claim that no zillion-processor Intel Core computer (that 
>> ultimately runs programs compiled to Intel machine code) can be conscious. 
>> I also claim God does not exist.
>>
>> It is this context that [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room ] 
>> is correct. 
>>
>
>> "The Chinese room argument holds that an executing program cannot [have] 
>> consciousness, regardless of how intelligently or human-like the program 
>> may make the computer behave."
>>
>>
> The Chinese Room Argument was thoroughly debunked by over a dozen 
> critiquers before it was published.  It has numerous flaws, none of which 
> were addressed between the time he received the critiques and when Searle 
> published.  
>
> A few examples:
>
>- It confuses the "processor" for the system as a whole.  This would 
>be like confusing the laws of physics for the human brain. The laws of 
>physics is the substrate by which the brain states are processed and 
>updated, but you would not ascribe the consciousness to the laws of 
> physics.
>- It assumes there is only one mind in the room, the human operator. 
>But this quickly falls upon closer inspection, if you interview the 
>"chinese speaking mind" you find that the opinions of this other mind are 
>not the opinions of the english speaking human operator.
>
>  
>
>> * Silicon biochemistry
>> See also: Organosilicon 
>> 
>> 
>> Structure of silane , analog of 
>> methane 
>> 
>> 
>> Structure of the silicone polydimethylsiloxane 
>>  (PDMS)
>> 
>> 
>> Marine diatoms —carbon-based 
>> organisms that extract silicon from sea water, in the form of its oxide 
>> (silica) and incorporate it into their cell walls
>>
>> The silicon atom has been much discussed as the basis for an alternative 
>> biochemical system, because silicon has many chemical properties 
>>  similar to those of 
>> carbon and is in the same group of the periodic table 
>> , the carbon group 
>> . Like carbon, silicon can 
>> create molecules that are sufficiently large to carry biological 
>> information.[10] 
>> 
>>
>> However, silicon has several drawbacks as an alternative to carbon. 
>> Silicon, unlike carbon, lacks the ability to form chemical bonds with 
>> diverse types of atoms as is necessary for the chemical versatility 
>> required for metabolism, and yet this precise inability is what makes 
>> silicon less susceptible to bond with all sorts of impurities from which 
>> carbon, in comparison, is not shielded. Elements creating organic 
>> functional groups with carbon include hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, 
>> phosphorus, sulfur, and metals such as iron, magnesium, and zinc. Silicon, 
>> on the other hand, interacts with very few other types of atoms.[10] 
>> 
>>  Moreover, 
>> where it does interact with other atoms, silicon creates molecules that 
>> have been described as "monotonous compared with the combinatorial universe 
>> of organic macromolecules".[10] 
>> 
>>  This 
>> is because silicon atoms are much bigger, having a larger mass 
>>  and atomic radius 
>> , and so have difficulty 
>> forming double bonds (the double-bonded carbon is part of the carbonyl 
>>  group, a fundamental motif of 
>> carbon-based bio-organic chemistry).
>>
>> Silanes , which are chemical 
>> compounds of hydrogen 
>>  and silicon that are analogous 
>> to the alkane  hydrocarbons 
>>

Re: Is your elbow conscious?



On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 10:03:12 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 May 2019, at 00:33, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
> Isn't  *qualia can be reduced to information processing*  the unsupported 
> assertion?
>
> The burden of proof is on those who claim qualia comes out of information 
> processing.
>
> If that claim were true, then any IP system - like a smartphone that can 
> execute programs - can have human-type qualia existing inside it.
>
>
> It is not because some “information processing” could support 
> consciousness that we can conclude that all information processing can 
> support consciousness. You need at least one reflexive loop. You need two 
> reflexive loop for having self-consciousness (Löbianity).
>
> But the information processing is not enough, you need a reality, also, be 
> it the arithmetical truth, or a physical phenomenologies which would be 
> Turing universal.
>
> The arithmetical truth must be understood as something beyond all 
> information processing possible, as we know since Gödel and Tarski.
>
> The advantage of mechanism is that we do have a theory: computer science 
> (aka Recrusion theory, or Arithmetic).
>
> That does not make Mechanism true, but it makes the problems amenable to 
> mathematical formulation and testing.
>
> Bruno
>
>  


A smartphone CPU, like Samsung's


https://www.anandtech.com/show/13599/samsung-announces-8nm-exynos-9820-with-trigroup-cpu-design

can run any "Turing" program. 

So I still don't see from your description what exactly is missing for it 
to produce|execute human qualia?

@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3f18a4a2-43a5-4a9b-b110-494e7e37e12b%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-20 Thread John Clark

On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 4:32 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>*The Chinese room argument holds that an executing program cannot* [blah
> blah]

Philip, I'd really like to know why you think the Chinese room argument is
not imbecilic. I'm also curious why you cut and pasted all that stuff about
silicon biochemistry from Wikipedia.

 John K Clark

>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2cXTgYGhpVc44Z0k3AgpRdn2MH0eX%3D3To%2BV_anvzBhhQ%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

>
>
>>>
>>>
> We do know that some synthetic-biological objects (SBOs) exist that are
> conscious: Us.
>
> Except here the material synthesis was accomplished via natural selection,
> not bay a team of scientists and engineers.
>

Do you think if a team of engineers in a lab built a human from scratch,
using the same materials, that it would be conscious?




>
> An android that came with a resume outlining its manufacturing via
> sufficiently synthetic-biological processes and said "I am conscious" might
> be believed.
>

What if it were non-biological?




> We could cut it open, but that would not be nice.
>

Your statement reminds me a bit of this:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WjCytqku18M






>
> There are several alternatives to our biochemistry, of course [
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_types_of_biochemistry ], even
> involving silicon*. (This is about the 20th time I have posted this.)
>
> But I claim that no zillion-processor Intel Core computer (that ultimately
> runs programs compiled to Intel machine code) can be conscious. I also
> claim God does not exist.
>
> It is this context that [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room ] is
> correct.
>

> "The Chinese room argument holds that an executing program cannot [have]
> consciousness, regardless of how intelligently or human-like the program
> may make the computer behave."
>
>
The Chinese Room Argument was thoroughly debunked by over a dozen
critiquers before it was published.  It has numerous flaws, none of which
were addressed between the time he received the critiques and when Searle
published.

A few examples:

   - It confuses the "processor" for the system as a whole.  This would be
   like confusing the laws of physics for the human brain. The laws of physics
   is the substrate by which the brain states are processed and updated, but
   you would not ascribe the consciousness to the laws of physics.
   - It assumes there is only one mind in the room, the human operator. But
   this quickly falls upon closer inspection, if you interview the "chinese
   speaking mind" you find that the opinions of this other mind are not the
   opinions of the english speaking human operator.



> * Silicon biochemistry
> See also: Organosilicon 
> 
> 
> Structure of silane , analog of
> methane 
> 
> 
> Structure of the silicone polydimethylsiloxane
>  (PDMS)
> 
> 
> Marine diatoms —carbon-based
> organisms that extract silicon from sea water, in the form of its oxide
> (silica) and incorporate it into their cell walls
>
> The silicon atom has been much discussed as the basis for an alternative
> biochemical system, because silicon has many chemical properties
>  similar to those of
> carbon and is in the same group of the periodic table
> , the carbon group
> . Like carbon, silicon can
> create molecules that are sufficiently large to carry biological
> information.[10]
> 
>
> However, silicon has several drawbacks as an alternative to carbon.
> Silicon, unlike carbon, lacks the ability to form chemical bonds with
> diverse types of atoms as is necessary for the chemical versatility
> required for metabolism, and yet this precise inability is what makes
> silicon less susceptible to bond with all sorts of impurities from which
> carbon, in comparison, is not shielded. Elements creating organic
> functional groups with carbon include hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen,
> phosphorus, sulfur, and metals such as iron, magnesium, and zinc. Silicon,
> on the other hand, interacts with very few other types of atoms.[10]
> 
>  Moreover,
> where it does interact with other atoms, silicon creates molecules that
> have been described as "monotonous compared with the combinatorial universe
> of organic macromolecules".[10]
> 
>  This
> is because silicon atoms are much bigger, having a larger mass
>  and atomic radius
> , and so have difficulty
> forming double bonds (the double-bonded carbon is part of the carbonyl
>  group, a fundamental motif of
>

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-20 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 18 May 2019, at 08:11, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 6:09:18 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 5/17/2019 3:33 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 5:21:41 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 5/16/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:14:46 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>>> 
>>> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 1:48 PM Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> > Information processing absent actual first-class entities of qualia (or 
>>> > experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs information processing 
>>> > operating in a material substrate where those entities are available to 
>>> > be combined and manipulated.
>>> 
>>> So something can behave intelligently but if it is lacking "first-class 
>>> entities of qualia" it can only be a intelligent zombie. But "first-class 
>>> qualia" sounds like  consciousness to me, so you're basically saying only 
>>> conscious things can be conscious. A tautology has the virtue of always 
>>> being true but it involves a unnecessary non-required pointless repetition 
>>> and reiteration of words where you end up at the exact same place you 
>>> started with. And that is typical of all consciousness theories.
>>> 
>>> John K Clark
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> To be clearer: Qualia (the "ingredients" of consciousness) cannot be 
>>> reduced to information processing.
>> 
>> That's nothing but unsupported assertion.  It's not even clear what 
>> "reduced" means in that context.  
>> 
>>> (That is what I mean by "first-class". If qualia could  be reduced to 
>>> information processing, then they would derivative from information, or 
>>> "second-class".)
>> 
>> Is life derivative from chemistry?  Only within a certain environment.  Same 
>> with information processing.  In general it's streams of bits being 
>> processed being changed according to some algorithm.  But it's qualia if the 
>> streams are in some entity whose environment and actions give meaning to the 
>> information, like "I've got a headache and I'm going to lie down."
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Isn't  qualia can be reduced to information processing  the unsupported 
>> assertion?
> 
> No.  It's very well supported.  Interfere with information processing by 
> drugs or electrical stimulus of the brain and qualia are changed or 
> eliminated.
> 
> Brent
> 
> 
> Information processing (IP) is necessary for consciousness, but IP has to 
> occur in a substrate that produces qualia. Stop the IP and you stop 
> consciousness. But the same IP in a different substrate could be 
> consciousnessless.  
> 
> The above substate is the material of the brain: neurons, neurochemistry, 
> glia, ...
> 
> A simulation of gravity running in a smartphone does not produce gravity.

A simulation of gravity+an observer produces the appearance of gravity for that 
observer, or you beg the question (by saying that a simulation of an observer 
does not produce an observer, but there are evidence that this is what a brain 
does, it simulates us already, as, we are definable by our character, beliefs, 
memories, etc.). You would say it is a zombie, but that is only a re-assertion 
of your credo that some matter is needed, and that Mechanism is false.



> 
> 
> 
> People talk of telepathy and precognition as delusional - broadly speaking, 
> it is. But the "IP delusion" (that consciousness is substate-independent IP) 
> is up there.

Or the idea of matter is up there. We really don’t know, but a there are more 
evidence for mechanism than for (primitive) matter (zero evidence until now).

Bruno 



> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/0ee4f338-58ff-4d92-aa7a-25180073b8b1%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/C8853F92-B28B-4451-8D8C-B90973AEFB6E%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-20 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 18 May 2019, at 00:33, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 5:21:41 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 5/16/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:14:46 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>> 
>> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 1:48 PM Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> > Information processing absent actual first-class entities of qualia (or 
>> > experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs information processing 
>> > operating in a material substrate where those entities are available to be 
>> > combined and manipulated.
>> 
>> So something can behave intelligently but if it is lacking "first-class 
>> entities of qualia" it can only be a intelligent zombie. But "first-class 
>> qualia" sounds like  consciousness to me, so you're basically saying only 
>> conscious things can be conscious. A tautology has the virtue of always 
>> being true but it involves a unnecessary non-required pointless repetition 
>> and reiteration of words where you end up at the exact same place you 
>> started with. And that is typical   of all consciousness 
>> theories.
>> 
>> John K Clark
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> To be clearer: Qualia (the "ingredients" of consciousness) cannot be reduced 
>> to information processing.
> 
> That's nothing but unsupported assertion.  It's not even clear what "reduced" 
> means in that context.  
> 
>> (That is what I mean by "first-class". If qualia could  be reduced to 
>> information processing, then they would derivative from information, or 
>> "second-class".)
> 
> Is life derivative from chemistry?  Only within a certain environment.  Same 
> with information processing.  In general it's streams of bits being processed 
> being changed according to some algorithm.  But it's qualia if the streams 
> are in some entity whose environment and actions give meaning to the 
> information, like "I've got a headache and I'm going to lie down."
> 
> Brent
> 
> 
> 
> Isn't  qualia can be reduced to information processing  the unsupported 
> assertion?
> 
> The burden of proof is on those who claim qualia comes out of information 
> processing.
> 
> If that claim were true, then any IP system - like a smartphone that can 
> execute programs - can have human-type qualia existing inside it.

It is not because some “information processing” could support consciousness 
that we can conclude that all information processing can support consciousness. 
You need at least one reflexive loop. You need two reflexive loop for having 
self-consciousness (Löbianity).

But the information processing is not enough, you need a reality, also, be it 
the arithmetical truth, or a physical phenomenologies which would be Turing 
universal.

The arithmetical truth must be understood as something beyond all information 
processing possible, as we know since Gödel and Tarski.

The advantage of mechanism is that we do have a theory: computer science (aka 
Recrusion theory, or Arithmetic).

That does not make Mechanism true, but it makes the problems amenable to 
mathematical formulation and testing.

Bruno




> 
> @philipthrift
>  
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20af5e56-b425-46e4-839a-38c852f67e46%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4C425F51-1C57-4CC0-8F44-14B92500F340%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-20 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 18 May 2019, at 00:21, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 5/16/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:14:46 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>> 
>> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 1:48 PM Philip Thrift > > wrote:
>> 
>> > Information processing absent actual first-class entities of qualia (or 
>> > experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs information processing 
>> > operating in a material substrate where those entities are available to be 
>> > combined and manipulated.
>> 
>> So something can behave intelligently but if it is lacking "first-class 
>> entities of qualia" it can only be a intelligent zombie. But "first-class 
>> qualia" sounds like  consciousness to me, so you're basically saying only 
>> conscious things can be conscious. A tautology has the virtue of always 
>> being true but it involves a unnecessary non-required pointless repetition 
>> and reiteration of words where you end up at the exact same place you 
>> started with. And that is typical of all consciousness theories.
>> 
>> John K Clark
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> To be clearer: Qualia (the "ingredients" of consciousness) cannot be reduced 
>> to information processing.
> 
> That's nothing but unsupported assertion.  It's not even clear what "reduced" 
> means in that context.  

Nor is “information processing”, but I guess it means some 3p number crunching.

With mechanism, qualia are not associated univocally with anything 3p 
describable. The arithmetical reality is full of truth about some machines not 
definable in term accessible by those machines. But the machines already knows 
that.



> 
>> (That is what I mean by "first-class". If qualia could  be reduced to 
>> information processing, then they would derivative from information, or 
>> "second-class".)
> 
> Is life derivative from chemistry?  Only within a certain environment.  Same 
> with information processing.  In general it's streams of bits being processed 
> being changed according to some algorithm.  But it's qualia if the streams 
> are in some entity whose environment and actions give meaning to the 
> information, like "I've got a headache and I'm going to lie down.”


The meaning is the intended environment, but the machine canot decide if it is 
“real”, or a dream. I suspect you are using some magical quality of the 
environment, and it is unclear at this stage if this departs from mechanism or 
not. Nor is it clear if the environment needs to be physical, theological, or 
arithmetical.

A part of your insight makes a lot of sense, and is indeed what makes the 
difference between []p and []p & p, or []p & <>t. “p” add the reference to 
truth, in some meta local manner, and <>t refer to a reality (making the 
machine consistent), which plays the role of the “added” environment. G* proves 
that such nuances are equivalent, but G does not prove this, so the machine 
experiences them very differently ([]p & p imposes intuitionist logic, []p & 
<>t (p sigma_1) imposes quantum logic, etc.

Bruno 



> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/565a39fb-288a-731e-4042-99cd23216091%40verizon.net
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/24A90183-A1DC-4EF6-8119-AD83D0544EF4%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?



On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 6:50:48 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, May 19, 2019, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 2:40:04 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 1:21 PM Philip Thrift  
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 10:13:22 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/19/2019 12:19 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 1:50:03 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/18/2019 11:25 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> No I can't *prove *we aren't simulations, or that a simulation 
>> running in a big computer made of Intel Cores can't be conscious.
>>
>>
>> Nor can you give a reply to Chalmer's fading consciousness problem.
>>
>>
>>
> http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html :
>
>
> *for a system to be conscious it must have the right sort of 
> biochemical makeup; if so, a metallic robot or a silicon-based computer 
> could never have experiences, no matter what its causal organization *
>
>
> *A natural suggestion is that when experience arises from a physical 
> system, it does so in virtue of the system's functional organization. On 
> this view, the chemical and indeed the quantum substrates of the brain 
> are 
> not directly relevant to the existence of consciousness, although they 
> may 
> be indirectly relevant. What is central is rather the brain's abstract 
> causal organization, an organization that might be realized in many 
> different physical substrates.*
>
> *In this paper I defend this view.*
>
>
>
> That from David Chalmer's paper is the only good takeaway. 
>
>
> Brent
>

  

 That was written in 1993. (In 2019, I don't think he himself defends 
 this view.)

 In any case, I read this "defense" like I read papers defending* the 
 existence of God*.


>>> A scientist should be thrilled to find something which might show the 
>>> ideas he or she holds to be wrong, as it offers a chance to adopt a more 
>>> correct view.  Recently I have seen a lot of people on this list telling 
>>> others their idea is wrong, but not giving any reason or reasoning to 
>>> justify that assertion.
>>>
>>> This doesn't helping anyone. Telling someone else they are wrong without 
>>> providing a reason won't get them to change their mind, if anything failing 
>>> to provide a reason is just as likely to reinforce their belief. If you see 
>>> or intuit something that someone else does not, I think it is best to 
>>> either point out what it is they are missing or remain silent.
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>
>>
>>
> Philip,
>
> I commend you for providing your reasons below. Thank you.
>
>  
>
>>
>> We know our brains, which we examine in science to be made of a complex 
>> configuration of cells, neurons and glial, with complex neurochemistry*, 
>> produces consciousness. That is the fact we know to be the case.
>>
>
> Yes, I agree.
>  
>
>>
>> So it seems reasonable, from both a scientific and engineering stance, 
>> that a synthetic intelligence approach - one that combines 
>> synthetic-biological assembly with AI information processing to produce 
>> outputs that are actually living things - is the road to (synthetic) 
>> consciousness.
>>
>> *The belief that a conventional computer made of a zillion Intel Core 
>> chips with the right programming can be conscious is a religious belief, 
>> not a a scientific belief.*
>>
>>
> You could say it is a hypothesis for which we currently have no direct 
> evidence for.  Is there anything you would consider evidence?  If a 
> synthetic Android claimed to be conscious would this be evidence that would 
> convince you? If not, what evidence could convince you?
>  
>
>> The burden of proof is on those with that belief to prove it, just as the 
>> burden of proof is on those with the belief that God exists to prove that.
>>
>>
> I think the burden rests equally on those holding either that "synthetic 
> brains cannot be conscious" as "synthetic brains can be conscious".
>
> The reason I lean towards the second camp, is that the former leads to 
> very strange situations: pzombies that complain about pain, Androids who 
> argue that they're conscious, planets with zombies (of a different neuro 
> chemistry) who nonetheless write books on consciousness, fading qualia, and 
> qualia that "dance" (disappear and reappear) due to presence or absence of 
> a few synthetic neurons.
>
> I am not aware of anything quite so strange resulting from a belief in 
> synthetic consciousness. Sure it is strange that a billion Intel chips 
> could be conscious, but no more strange than the idea that a heap of oil 
> droplets squirting ions back and forth could be conscious.
>
> Anyway that's how I got to where I am.
>
> Jason
>
>  
>
>>
>> * neurochemistry like

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-19 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 5/19/2019 1:39 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
So it seems reasonable, from both a scientific and engineering stance, 
that a synthetic intelligence approach - one that combines 
synthetic-biological assembly with AI information processing to 
produce outputs that are actually living things - is the road to 
(synthetic) consciousness.


It seems reasonable it will produce consciousness.  But that doesn't 
show that consciousness cannot be produced using different materials.




*The belief that a conventional computer made of a zillion Intel Core 
chips with the right programming can be conscious is a religious 
belief, not a a scientific belief.*


That's just your repeated attempt to insult others.  It adds not thing 
to your argument.  You seem to be the one asserting that there is a 
mysterious experiential property of carbon atoms as a matter of faith.




The burden of proof is on those with that belief to prove it, just as 
the burden of proof is on those with the belief that God exists to 
prove that.


And they are working to meet it by producing human level AI using 
electronic computers.  How will you prove their AI is not conscious?


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2a6c3aaa-672d-9f4c-b731-b5746031545e%40verizon.net.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-19 Thread Jason Resch

On Sunday, May 19, 2019, Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 2:40:04 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 1:21 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 10:13:22 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



 On 5/19/2019 12:19 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 1:50:03 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/18/2019 11:25 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> No I can't *prove *we aren't simulations, or that a simulation
> running in a big computer made of Intel Cores can't be conscious.
>
>
> Nor can you give a reply to Chalmer's fading consciousness problem.
>
>
>
 http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html :


 *for a system to be conscious it must have the right sort of
 biochemical makeup; if so, a metallic robot or a silicon-based computer
 could never have experiences, no matter what its causal organization *


 *A natural suggestion is that when experience arises from a physical
 system, it does so in virtue of the system's functional organization. On
 this view, the chemical and indeed the quantum substrates of the brain are
 not directly relevant to the existence of consciousness, although they may
 be indirectly relevant. What is central is rather the brain's abstract
 causal organization, an organization that might be realized in many
 different physical substrates.*

 *In this paper I defend this view.*



 That from David Chalmer's paper is the only good takeaway.


 Brent

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That was written in 1993. (In 2019, I don't think he himself defends
>>> this view.)
>>>
>>> In any case, I read this "defense" like I read papers defending* the
>>> existence of God*.
>>>
>>>
>> A scientist should be thrilled to find something which might show the
>> ideas he or she holds to be wrong, as it offers a chance to adopt a more
>> correct view.  Recently I have seen a lot of people on this list telling
>> others their idea is wrong, but not giving any reason or reasoning to
>> justify that assertion.
>>
>> This doesn't helping anyone. Telling someone else they are wrong without
>> providing a reason won't get them to change their mind, if anything failing
>> to provide a reason is just as likely to reinforce their belief. If you see
>> or intuit something that someone else does not, I think it is best to
>> either point out what it is they are missing or remain silent.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>
>
>
Philip,

I commend you for providing your reasons below. Thank you.



>
> We know our brains, which we examine in science to be made of a complex
> configuration of cells, neurons and glial, with complex neurochemistry*,
> produces consciousness. That is the fact we know to be the case.
>

Yes, I agree.


>
> So it seems reasonable, from both a scientific and engineering stance,
> that a synthetic intelligence approach - one that combines
> synthetic-biological assembly with AI information processing to produce
> outputs that are actually living things - is the road to (synthetic)
> consciousness.
>
> *The belief that a conventional computer made of a zillion Intel Core
> chips with the right programming can be conscious is a religious belief,
> not a a scientific belief.*
>
>
You could say it is a hypothesis for which we currently have no direct
evidence for.  Is there anything you would consider evidence?  If a
synthetic Android claimed to be conscious would this be evidence that would
convince you? If not, what evidence could convince you?


> The burden of proof is on those with that belief to prove it, just as the
> burden of proof is on those with the belief that God exists to prove that.
>
>
I think the burden rests equally on those holding either that "synthetic
brains cannot be conscious" as "synthetic brains can be conscious".

The reason I lean towards the second camp, is that the former leads to very
strange situations: pzombies that complain about pain, Androids who argue
that they're conscious, planets with zombies (of a different neuro
chemistry) who nonetheless write books on consciousness, fading qualia, and
qualia that "dance" (disappear and reappear) due to presence or absence of
a few synthetic neurons.

I am not aware of anything quite so strange resulting from a belief in
synthetic consciousness. Sure it is strange that a billion Intel chips
could be conscious, but no more strange than the idea that a heap of oil
droplets squirting ions back and forth could be conscious.

Anyway that's how I got to where I am.

Jason



>
> * neurochemistry like the recently reported role of SATB2-expressing
> neurons in the processing of taste.
>
> SATB2: "SATB2 is a 733 amino-acid homeodomain-containing human protein
> with a molecular weight of 82.5 kDa encoded by the SATB2 gene on 2q33."
>
> @philipthrift
>
> --
> You received this message because you are

Re: Is your elbow conscious?



On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 2:40:04 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 1:21 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 10:13:22 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/19/2019 12:19 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 1:50:03 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 



 On 5/18/2019 11:25 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:


 No I can't *prove *we aren't simulations, or that a simulation running 
 in a big computer made of Intel Cores can't be conscious.


 Nor can you give a reply to Chalmer's fading consciousness problem.



>>> http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html :
>>>
>>>
>>> *for a system to be conscious it must have the right sort of biochemical 
>>> makeup; if so, a metallic robot or a silicon-based computer could never 
>>> have experiences, no matter what its causal organization *
>>>
>>>
>>> *A natural suggestion is that when experience arises from a physical 
>>> system, it does so in virtue of the system's functional organization. On 
>>> this view, the chemical and indeed the quantum substrates of the brain are 
>>> not directly relevant to the existence of consciousness, although they may 
>>> be indirectly relevant. What is central is rather the brain's abstract 
>>> causal organization, an organization that might be realized in many 
>>> different physical substrates.*
>>>
>>> *In this paper I defend this view.*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That from David Chalmer's paper is the only good takeaway. 
>>>
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>  
>>
>> That was written in 1993. (In 2019, I don't think he himself defends this 
>> view.)
>>
>> In any case, I read this "defense" like I read papers defending* the 
>> existence of God*.
>>
>>
> A scientist should be thrilled to find something which might show the 
> ideas he or she holds to be wrong, as it offers a chance to adopt a more 
> correct view.  Recently I have seen a lot of people on this list telling 
> others their idea is wrong, but not giving any reason or reasoning to 
> justify that assertion.
>
> This doesn't helping anyone. Telling someone else they are wrong without 
> providing a reason won't get them to change their mind, if anything failing 
> to provide a reason is just as likely to reinforce their belief. If you see 
> or intuit something that someone else does not, I think it is best to 
> either point out what it is they are missing or remain silent.
>
> Jason
>



We know our brains, which we examine in science to be made of a complex 
configuration of cells, neurons and glial, with complex neurochemistry*, 
produces consciousness. That is the fact we know to be the case.

So it seems reasonable, from both a scientific and engineering stance, that 
a synthetic intelligence approach - one that combines synthetic-biological 
assembly with AI information processing to produce outputs that are 
actually living things - is the road to (synthetic) consciousness.

*The belief that a conventional computer made of a zillion Intel Core chips 
with the right programming can be conscious is a religious belief, not a a 
scientific belief.*

The burden of proof is on those with that belief to prove it, just as the 
burden of proof is on those with the belief that God exists to prove that.


* neurochemistry like the recently reported role of SATB2-expressing 
neurons in the processing of taste.

SATB2: "SATB2 is a 733 amino-acid homeodomain-containing human protein with 
a molecular weight of 82.5 kDa encoded by the SATB2 gene on 2q33."

@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e735ca2d-82a7-4b50-a474-c8e6827c950c%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-19 Thread Jason Resch

On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 1:21 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 10:13:22 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/19/2019 12:19 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 1:50:03 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/18/2019 11:25 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> No I can't *prove *we aren't simulations, or that a simulation running
>>> in a big computer made of Intel Cores can't be conscious.
>>>
>>>
>>> Nor can you give a reply to Chalmer's fading consciousness problem.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html :
>>
>>
>> *for a system to be conscious it must have the right sort of biochemical
>> makeup; if so, a metallic robot or a silicon-based computer could never
>> have experiences, no matter what its causal organization *
>>
>>
>> *A natural suggestion is that when experience arises from a physical
>> system, it does so in virtue of the system's functional organization. On
>> this view, the chemical and indeed the quantum substrates of the brain are
>> not directly relevant to the existence of consciousness, although they may
>> be indirectly relevant. What is central is rather the brain's abstract
>> causal organization, an organization that might be realized in many
>> different physical substrates.*
>>
>> *In this paper I defend this view.*
>>
>>
>>
>> That from David Chalmer's paper is the only good takeaway.
>>
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
>
> That was written in 1993. (In 2019, I don't think he himself defends this
> view.)
>
> In any case, I read this "defense" like I read papers defending* the
> existence of God*.
>
>
A scientist should be thrilled to find something which might show the ideas
he or she holds to be wrong, as it offers a chance to adopt a more correct
view.  Recently I have seen a lot of people on this list telling others
their idea is wrong, but not giving any reason or reasoning to justify that
assertion.

This doesn't helping anyone. Telling someone else they are wrong without
providing a reason won't get them to change their mind, if anything failing
to provide a reason is just as likely to reinforce their belief. If you see
or intuit something that someone else does not, I think it is best to
either point out what it is they are missing or remain silent.

Jason

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUjayBUVtUSTV5UPCpRLocYhkNU13vGAyyZEauScYa1ZEg%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?



On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 10:13:22 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/19/2019 12:19 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 1:50:03 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/18/2019 11:25 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> No I can't *prove *we aren't simulations, or that a simulation running 
>> in a big computer made of Intel Cores can't be conscious.
>>
>>
>> Nor can you give a reply to Chalmer's fading consciousness problem.
>>
>>
>>
> http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html :
>
>
> *for a system to be conscious it must have the right sort of biochemical 
> makeup; if so, a metallic robot or a silicon-based computer could never 
> have experiences, no matter what its causal organization *
>
>
> *A natural suggestion is that when experience arises from a physical 
> system, it does so in virtue of the system's functional organization. On 
> this view, the chemical and indeed the quantum substrates of the brain are 
> not directly relevant to the existence of consciousness, although they may 
> be indirectly relevant. What is central is rather the brain's abstract 
> causal organization, an organization that might be realized in many 
> different physical substrates.*
>
> *In this paper I defend this view.*
>
>
>
> That from David Chalmer's paper is the only good takeaway. 
>
>
> Brent
>

 

That was written in 1993. (In 2019, I don't think he himself defends this 
view.)

In any case, I read this "defense" like I read papers defending* the 
existence of God*.

@philipthrift
 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/bb9a7586-8bd6-4fb9-9027-c0daedd3760d%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-19 Thread John Clark

On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 11:08 PM 'Brent Meeker' <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>> I am well aware that there are huge sections of DNA that just repeat the
>> same thing for hundreds or even thousands of times,  but I don't see the
>> relevance because if they just repeat the same short phrase over and over
>> then they contain no information.  And there are other DNA sections that
>> once were genes but over the eons have been turned off (such as genes in
>> birds that once produced teeth in their ancestors). These sections don't do
>> anything anymore and the way we know they no longer do anything is that the
>> variation from individual to individual in those sections is much much
>> greater than the variation in the parts that still have a purpose. Because
>> they do nothing Natural Selection can't edit out errors in DNA duplication
>> so they accumulate from generation to generation.
>
>
> *> Right.  So if consciousness just supervenes on intelligent computation,
> natural selection couldn't act on it*
>

Natural Selection couldn't act directly on consciousness but it could do so
indirectly through intelligent behavior.

> *and it could persis*t.
>

Yes, a mutated malfunctioning gene that prevented you from being
intelligent would also prevent you from being conscious. But Natural
Selection wouldn't care if a gene that did nothing but give you
consciousness stopped working or not so the errors in it would keep
increasing from generation to generation and degrading consciousness at the
same time until there were so many errors the gene no longer worked at all
and you have a intelligent zombie. And if that is the case then I must be
astronomically lucky in having so few errors in my consciousness gene that
it still works and it is extremely unlikely any of the other 7.6 billion
people on the planet is as lucky as me.

> > I don't think this is particularly likely.
>

Then you would have no alternative but to conclude it is not particularly
likely Charles Darwin was right.

> *> But I do think there may be different kinds of intelligent computation
> and correspondingly different kinds of consciousness. *
>

Of course there are different types of intelligence, and if your
consciousness was the same as mine then we'd be the same person. But the
bottom line is you can have intelligent behavior without consciousness or
you can't. If you *can* then you must take seriously the idea you are the
only conscious being in the universe, if you *can not* then you must
conclude that a intelligent machine is at least as conscious as you are and
perhaps more so.

John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2jML-zDRPCsA4r5YzrPomY_Toi-7Jv%2BJYSCGDQsSHofw%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-19 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List





On 5/19/2019 1:21 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:


If a smart missile were conscious, It would be committing suicide.


Like a kamikaze.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b39158e6-e07f-cae0-22eb-48756192bfba%40verizon.net.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-19 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 5/19/2019 12:19 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 1:50:03 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 5/18/2019 11:25 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

No I can't *prove *we aren't simulations, or that a simulation
running in a big computer made of Intel Cores can't be conscious.

Nor can you give a reply to Chalmer's fading consciousness problem.

http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html :

*for a system to be conscious it must have the right sort of
biochemical makeup; if so, a metallic robot or a silicon-based
computer could never have experiences, no matter what its causal
organization

/*A natural suggestion is that when experience arises from a physical
system, it does so in virtue of the system's functional organization. On
this view, the chemical and indeed the quantum substrates of the brain
are not directly relevant to the existence of consciousness, although
they may be indirectly relevant. What is central is rather the brain's
abstract causal organization, an organization that might be realized in
many different physical substrates.*//*

*//*
*//*In this paper I defend this view.*/

That from David Chalmer's paper is the only good takeaway.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ae10f21f-9639-4ac1-238a-79050b757f96%40verizon.net.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?



On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 2:19:31 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 1:50:03 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/18/2019 11:25 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> No I can't *prove *we aren't simulations, or that a simulation running 
>> in a big computer made of Intel Cores can't be conscious.
>>
>>
>> Nor can you give a reply to Chalmer's fading consciousness problem.
>>
>>
>>
> http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html :
>
> *for a system to be conscious it must have the right sort of biochemical 
> makeup; if so, a metallic robot or a silicon-based computer could never 
> have experiences, no matter what its causal organization *
>
> That from David Chalmer's paper is the only good takeaway. 
>
> And it's he only thing engineers need to pay attention to, Now AI 
> engineers just want to make smart robots, not conscious robots. But if they 
> did, then that above is all that matters.
>
> (In any case, I don't think Chalmers himself believes in what he wrote in 
> papers 25 years ago, per Philip Goff.)
>
> @philipthrift 
>
 

I should say above, AI engineers want to make functionally-smart robots. 
That's a better word.

Back in the '80s I was working on autonomous smart weapons, or autonomous 
smart missiles, which could "see" on their own and make decisions  (I sort 
of hate say.) That was DARPA's name.

If a smart missile were conscious, It would be committing suicide.

@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/468a71b4-87ca-4c95-b84f-5034afddaf3c%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?



On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 1:50:03 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/18/2019 11:25 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> No I can't *prove *we aren't simulations, or that a simulation running in 
> a big computer made of Intel Cores can't be conscious.
>
>
> Nor can you give a reply to Chalmer's fading consciousness problem.
>
>
>
http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html :

*for a system to be conscious it must have the right sort of biochemical 
makeup; if so, a metallic robot or a silicon-based computer could never 
have experiences, no matter what its causal organization *

That from David Chalmer's paper is the only good takeaway. 

And it's he only thing engineers need to pay attention to, Now AI engineers 
just want to make smart robots, not conscious robots. But if they did, then 
that above is all that matters.

(In any case, I don't think Chalmers himself believes in what he wrote in 
papers 25 years ago, per Philip Goff.)

@philipthrift 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7f7b5d7f-6d01-4c0e-a6df-35b455c80399%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-19 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 5/18/2019 11:25 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 7:51:45 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 5/18/2019 12:19 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 10:47:15 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 5/17/2019 11:11 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 6:09:18 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 5/17/2019 3:33 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 5:21:41 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 5/16/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:14:46 PM UTC-5,
John Clark wrote:


On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 1:48 PM Philip Thrift
 wrote:

/> Information processing absent
actual first-class entities of
*qualia* (or experiences) can only produce
zombies. One needs information processing
operating in a material substrate where
those entities are available to be
combined and manipulated./


//So something can behave intelligently but if
it is lacking "f/irst-class entities of
*qualia*/" it can only be a intelligent
zombie. But "/first-class qualia/" sounds
like  consciousness to me, so you're basically
saying only conscious things can be conscious.
A tautology has the virtue of always being
true but it involves a unnecessary
non-required pointless repetition and
reiteration of words where you end up at the
exact same place you started with. And that is
typical of all consciousness theories.

John K Clark




To be clearer: Qualia (the "ingredients" of
consciousness) cannot be reduced to information
processing.


That's nothing but unsupported assertion.  It's not
even clear what "reduced" means in that context.


(That is what I mean by "first-class". If qualia
could  be reduced to information processing, then
they would derivative from information, or
"second-class".)


Is life derivative from chemistry? Only within a
certain environment. Same with information
processing. In general it's streams of bits being
processed being changed according to some
algorithm.  But it's qualia if the streams are in
some entity whose environment and actions give
meaning to the information, like "I've got a
headache and I'm going to lie down."

Brent




Isn't *qualia can be reduced to information
processing*  the unsupported assertion?


No.  It's very well supported.  Interfere with
information processing by drugs or electrical stimulus
of the brain and qualia are changed or eliminated.

Brent



*Information processing (IP) is necessary for
consciousness*, but IP has to occur in a substrate that
produces qualia. *Stop the IP and you stop consciousness.*
But /the same IP/ *in a different substrate* could be
consciousnessless.

The above substate is the material of the brain: neurons,
neurochemistry, glia, ...


Mere supposition.  It's just the complement of the claim that
machines can never really think.  A pathetic hubris.



A simulation of gravity running in a smartphone does not
produce gravity.


It does in the simulated world.

Brent





People talk of telepathy and precognition as delusional -
broadly speaking, it is. But the "IP delusion" (that
consciousness is substate-independent IP) is up there.

@philipthrift
-- 



The *simulation-reality* idea - that a simulated brain is the
same as a naturally-evolved/material or synthetic/material brain
- is worse even than the*telepathy* idea (which I don't think
exists in any significant way anyway).

The first is really much worse than the second, so the first
cannot throw stones (even simulated ones).


You keeps saying it's a terrible idea...but you never given any
argument to support that.  Simply repeating something isn't
convincing.

Brent


This is exactly like those who say everything is consciousness, and 
telepathy is real, etc.


No, it is not.  That consciousness depends on function of the brain is a 
well supported empirical observation.  That telepathy doesn't exist is a 
well tested and failed proposition.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?



On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 7:51:45 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/18/2019 12:19 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 10:47:15 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/17/2019 11:11 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 6:09:18 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/17/2019 3:33 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 5:21:41 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 



 On 5/16/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:14:46 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: 
>
>
> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 1:48 PM Philip Thrift  
> wrote:
>
> *> Information processing absent actual first-class entities 
>> of qualia (or experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs 
>> information 
>> processing operating in a material substrate where those entities are 
>> available to be combined and manipulated.*
>
>
> So something can behave intelligently but if it is lacking "f*irst-class 
> entities of qualia*" it can only be a intelligent zombie. But 
> "*first-class 
> qualia*" sounds like  consciousness to me, so you're basically saying 
> only conscious things can be conscious. A tautology has the virtue of 
> always 
> being true but it involves a unnecessary non-required pointless 
> repetition and reiteration of words where you end up at the exact 
> same place you started with. And that is typical of all consciousness 
> theories.
>
> John K Clark
>
>
>
>
 To be clearer: Qualia (the "ingredients" of consciousness) cannot be 
 reduced to information processing. 


 That's nothing but unsupported assertion.  It's not even clear what 
 "reduced" means in that context.  

 (That is what I mean by "first-class". If qualia could  be reduced to 
 information processing, then they would derivative from information, or 
 "second-class".)


 Is life derivative from chemistry?  Only within a certain environment.  
 Same with information processing.  In general it's streams of bits being 
 processed being changed according to some algorithm.  But it's qualia if 
 the streams are in some entity whose environment and actions give meaning 
 to the information, like "I've got a headache and I'm going to lie down."

 Brent

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Isn't  *qualia can be reduced to information processing*  the 
>>> unsupported assertion?
>>>
>>>
>>> No.  It's very well supported.  Interfere with information processing by 
>>> drugs or electrical stimulus of the brain and qualia are changed or 
>>> eliminated.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>> *Information processing (IP) is necessary for consciousness*, but IP has 
>> to occur in a substrate that produces qualia. *Stop the IP and you stop 
>> consciousness.* But *the same IP* *in a different substrate* could be 
>> consciousnessless.  
>>
>> The above substate is the material of the brain: neurons, neurochemistry, 
>> glia, ...
>>
>>
>> Mere supposition.  It's just the complement of the claim that machines 
>> can never really think.  A pathetic hubris.
>>
>>
>> A simulation of gravity running in a smartphone does not produce gravity.
>>
>>
>> It does in the simulated world.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> People talk of telepathy and precognition as delusional - broadly 
>> speaking, it is. But the "IP delusion" (that consciousness is 
>> substate-independent IP) is up there.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>> -- 
>>
>>
> The *simulation-reality* idea - that a simulated brain is the same as a 
> naturally-evolved/material or synthetic/material brain - is worse even than 
> the* telepathy* idea (which I don't think exists in any significant way 
> anyway).
>
> The first is really much worse than the second, so the first cannot throw 
> stones (even simulated ones).
>
>
> You keeps saying it's a terrible idea...but you never given any argument 
> to support that.  Simply repeating something isn't convincing.
>
> Brent
>
 

This is exactly like those who say everything is consciousness, and 
telepathy is real, etc.

No I can't *prove *we aren't simulations, or that a simulation running in a 
big computer made of Intel Cores can't be conscious.

All those things: *We are nothing but consciousness. We are simulations. A 
program running in a computer composed of a zillion Intel Core processors 
can be conscious.*

Are are just plain *woo woo*.

People can believe any woo they want, of course.

@philipthrift


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/db8582fa-5195-4fd5-8865-9e34d2495d0f%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-18 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 5/18/2019 5:28 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 7:54 PM 'Brent 
Meeker> wrote:


>>Evolution is unlikely to have stumbled upon a complex method
of achieving intelligence if there was a much simpler basic
procedure to do the same thing


/> You must not have looked at how DNA is use to code for
proteins.  There are huge strecthes DNA that are just unused
copies of other segments./


I am well aware that there are huge sections of DNA that just repeat 
the same thing for hundreds or even thousands of times, but I don't 
see the relevance because if they just repeat the same short phrase 
over and over then they contain no information.  And there are other 
DNA sections that once were genes but over the eons have been turned 
off (such as genes in birds that once produced teeth in 
their ancestors). These sections don't do anything anymore and the 
way we know they no longer do anything is that the variation from 
individual to individual in those sections is much much greater than 
the variation in the parts that still have a purpose. Because they do 
nothing Natural Selection can't edit out errors in DNA duplication so 
they accumulate from generation to generation.


Right.  So if consciousness just supervenes on intelligent computation, 
natural selection couldn't act on it and it could persist.  I don't 
think this is particularly likely.  But I do think there may be 
different kinds of intelligent computation and correspondingly different 
kinds of consciousness.  The octopus may be a natural example.  Their 
behavior is quite intelligent, but 2/3 of their neurons are in their 
tentacles and the tentacles appear to be able to act independently.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a26a5b7e-b401-f345-2908-c3d4b1accc1a%40verizon.net.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-18 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 5/18/2019 3:10 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:


It's not erring, so much as I think it's completely *unuseful* (of no 
practical value, unhelpful).


The contrary, which you advocate, is essentially to assume that however 
intelligent and human-like you make a robot, it has no feelings.  This 
certainly has the "useful" consequence that it should not be granted any 
civil rights.  So the position that a sufficiently human-like robot can 
be treated as an unfeeling slave would certainly be commercially 
useful.  Is that what you mean by the contrary being "unusefull"?


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/940fef38-aad1-7319-1fbf-7aaa25de9ec5%40verizon.net.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-18 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 5/18/2019 12:55 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 2:39:29 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 5/18/2019 6:37 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:

/A simulated human brain could describe it's back pain in every
detail, write whole paragraphs about what it's like, while
according to the theory of substrate dependence, it knows nothing
of what it's writing about. Where then does this knowledge if
pain come from when the AI writes a page about the back pain it
is in?/

A simulated human brain could read the Wikipedia article on pain
[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pain
] and integrate this
knowledge into its knowledge base, but it could not experience pain.

How do you know this so-called fact?

Brent

My main point is that those who say it can (I say it can't) can't talk
about telepathy, precognition, astral projection etc. being crazy.

No, but I can talk about them as tested and disproven.

Brent

@philipthrift
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d5c3507b-33e6-4b20-886c-4d11c1428399%40googlegroups.com
.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/535753f4-9c65-0405-39fd-1c78796b4b25%40verizon.net.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-18 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 5/18/2019 12:19 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 10:47:15 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 5/17/2019 11:11 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 6:09:18 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 5/17/2019 3:33 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 5:21:41 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 5/16/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:14:46 PM UTC-5, John
Clark wrote:

On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 1:48 PM Philip Thrift
wrote:

/> Information processing absent
actual first-class entities of *qualia* (or
experiences) can only produce zombies. One
needs information processing operating in
a material substrate where those entities are
available to be combined and manipulated./

//So something can behave intelligently but if it
is lacking "f/irst-class entities of *qualia*/" it
can only be a intelligent zombie. But "/first-class
qualia/" sounds like consciousness to me, so you're
basically saying only conscious things can be
conscious. A tautology has the virtue of always
being true but it involves a unnecessary
non-required pointless repetition and reiteration
of words where you end up at the exact same place
you started with. And that is typical of all
consciousness theories.

John K Clark

To be clearer: Qualia (the "ingredients" of
consciousness) cannot be reduced to information
processing.

That's nothing but unsupported assertion. It's not even
clear what "reduced" means in that context.

(That is what I mean by "first-class". If qualia could
be reduced to information processing, then they would
derivative from information, or "second-class".)

Is life derivative from chemistry? Only within a
certain environment. Same with information processing.
In general it's streams of bits being processed being
changed according to some algorithm. But it's qualia if
the streams are in some entity whose environment and
actions give meaning to the information, like "I've got
a headache and I'm going to lie down."

Brent

Isn't *qualia can be reduced to information processing* the
unsupported assertion?

No. It's very well supported. Interfere with information
processing by drugs or electrical stimulus of the brain and
qualia are changed or eliminated.

Brent

*Information processing (IP) is necessary for consciousness*, but
IP has to occur in a substrate that produces qualia. *Stop the IP
and you stop consciousness.* But /the same IP/ *in a different
substrate* could be consciousnessless.

The above substate is the material of the brain: neurons,
neurochemistry, glia, ...

Mere supposition. It's just the complement of the claim that
machines can never really think. A pathetic hubris.

A simulation of gravity running in a smartphone does not produce
gravity.

It does in the simulated world.

Brent

People talk of telepathy and precognition as delusional - broadly
speaking, it is. But the "IP delusion" (that consciousness is
substate-independent IP) is up there.

@philipthrift
--

The *simulation-reality* idea - that a simulated brain is the same as
a naturally-evolved/material or synthetic/material brain - is worse
even than the*telepathy* idea (which I don't think exists in any
significant way anyway).

The first is really much worse than the second, so the first cannot
throw stones (even simulated ones).

You keeps saying it's a terrible idea...but you never given any argument
to support that. Simply repeating something isn't convincing.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d6cf3ede-8f03-d125-8115-88a664fc608b%40verizon.net.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 7:54 PM 'Brent Meeker <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>>Evolution is unlikely to have stumbled upon a complex method of achieving
>> intelligence if there was a much simpler basic procedure to do the same
>> thing
>
>
> *> You must not have looked at how DNA is use to code for proteins.  There
> are huge strecthes DNA that are just unused copies of other segments.*
>

I am well aware that there are huge sections of DNA that just repeat the
same thing for hundreds or even thousands of times,  but I don't see the
relevance because if they just repeat the same short phrase over and over
then they contain no information.  And there are other DNA sections that
once were genes but over the eons have been turned off (such as genes in
birds that once produced teeth in their ancestors). These sections don't do
anything anymore and the way we know they no longer do anything is that the
variation from individual to individual in those sections is much much
greater than the variation in the parts that still have a purpose. Because
they do nothing Natural Selection can't edit out errors in DNA duplication
so they accumulate from generation to generation.

John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv3NnZRkvwJg43YgbcG5AzC8-zsT03sd2odddxjrKhHW5Q%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 6:19 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>> It's weird, perhaps it comes from watching too much Star Trek but I
>> don't understand why so many people believe it's inherently more difficult
>> to produce emotion than intelligence when Evolution found the exact
>> opposite to be true.
>>
>
> *> Evolution of humans on Earth combined (synthesized) a very different
> set of materials than that  which computer engineers have used to make what
> is today's conventional computer hardware.*
>

So there is something about the element carbon that makes it conscious that
the element silicon lacks. Well maybe. Any maybe there is something about
men that makes them conscious that women lack.

John K Clark



>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1QAEBs42zHJrEBq59iuDLK90U0SsBHpmLh_sTzMVfucw%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-18 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 5/18/2019 9:32 AM, John Clark wrote:


/Or maybe it has a function in the way human intelligence is
implemented, but it wouldn't have a function is some other
implementation./


Evolution is unlikely to have stumbled upon a complex method of 
achieving intelligence if there was a much simpler basic procedure to 
do the same thing


You must not have looked at how DNA is use to code for proteins.  There 
are huge strecthes DNA that are just unused copies of other segments.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8b5e08d2-9f9d-c2de-5215-2baf7c12130a%40verizon.net.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?



On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 11:44:33 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 9:37 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> *A simulated human brain could read the Wikipedia article on pain [ 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pain  ] 
>> and integrate this knowledge into its knowledge base, but it could not 
>> experience pain.*
>
>
> It's weird, perhaps it comes from watching too much Star Trek but I don't 
> understand why so many people believe it's inherently more difficult  to 
> produce emotion than intelligence when Evolution found the exact opposite 
> to be true. 
>
> John K Clark
>




Evolution of humans on Earth combined (synthesized) a very different set of 
materials than that  which computer engineers have used to make what is 
today's conventional computer hardware.

 @philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/12ee23e0-b983-445b-b37d-3d2f68057d90%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 4:09:51 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 2:56 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 2:39:29 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/18/2019 6:37 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>> *A simulated human brain could describe it's back pain in every detail, 
>>> write whole paragraphs about what it's like, while according to the theory 
>>> of substrate dependence, it knows nothing of what it's writing about. Where 
>>> then does this knowledge if pain come from when the AI writes a page about 
>>> the back pain it is in?*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> A simulated human brain could read the Wikipedia article on pain [ 
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pain ] and integrate this knowledge into 
>>> its knowledge base, but it could not experience pain.
>>>
>>>
>>> How do you know this so-called fact?
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> My main point is that those who say it can (I say it can't) can't talk 
>> about telepathy, precognition, astral projection etc. being crazy.
>>
>>
> Perhaps you could be so kind as to point out where we erred?
>
> Jason 
>

It's not erring, so much as I think it's completely *unuseful* (of no 
practical value, unhelpful).

It's like the simulation hypothesis that comes up surprisingly often in 
science writing:

 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simulation_hypothesis

https://www.businessinsider.com/the-matrix-do-we-live-in-a-simulation-2019-4

*'The Matrix' hit theaters 20 years ago. Many scientists and philosophers 
still think we're living in a simulation.*

That's just one recent example one can find in science news on the 
"simulation hypothesis".

The "simulated brain could be conscious" idea is similar to the "simulation 
hypothesis" idea.

I think both are completely useless (and while there is a lot of critics of 
these, those of the faith in them them are not convinced by their 
arguments).

 Are they wrong? Ultimately one can't say anything is right or wrong.

But they are *useless*, as far as I can see.

@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/74a4a7da-813c-4ab5-835a-0114e401007e%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-18 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List

It's harder in a science lab to produce either, unless we are speaking of the 
researchers themselves. No emotional machine Mr Spok, no great leap forward in 
intelligence, YET. I would harness AI to producing new inventions, much, much, 
faster-if I could? 

-Original Message-
From: John Clark 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Sat, May 18, 2019 12:44 pm
Subject: Re: Is your elbow conscious?

On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 9:37 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

A simulated human brain could read the Wikipedia article on pain [ 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pain ] and integrate this knowledge into its 
knowledge base, but it could not experience pain.

It's weird, perhaps it comes from watching too much Star Trek but I don't 
understand why so many people believe it's inherently more difficult  to 
produce emotion than intelligence when Evolution found the exact opposite to be 
true. 
John K Clark

 -- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv0cyiVEvLpdQzNPxjMeDRXmjXZu5X_9Gg6YiFt6RzAeVA%40mail.gmail.com.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/311069735.2655254.1558216712249%40mail.yahoo.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-18 Thread Jason Resch

On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 2:56 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 2:39:29 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/18/2019 6:37 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>> *A simulated human brain could describe it's back pain in every detail,
>> write whole paragraphs about what it's like, while according to the theory
>> of substrate dependence, it knows nothing of what it's writing about. Where
>> then does this knowledge if pain come from when the AI writes a page about
>> the back pain it is in?*
>>
>>
>>
>> A simulated human brain could read the Wikipedia article on pain [
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pain ] and integrate this knowledge into
>> its knowledge base, but it could not experience pain.
>>
>>
>> How do you know this so-called fact?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
>
> My main point is that those who say it can (I say it can't) can't talk
> about telepathy, precognition, astral projection etc. being crazy.
>
>
Perhaps you could be so kind as to point out where we erred?

Jason

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhbkcjUYXi%2BxuZsJ6nsmM12s8OHSB-vVYohBh9AnfHCOg%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?



On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 2:39:29 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/18/2019 6:37 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
> *A simulated human brain could describe it's back pain in every detail, 
> write whole paragraphs about what it's like, while according to the theory 
> of substrate dependence, it knows nothing of what it's writing about. Where 
> then does this knowledge if pain come from when the AI writes a page about 
> the back pain it is in?*
>
>
>
> A simulated human brain could read the Wikipedia article on pain [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pain ] and integrate this knowledge into 
> its knowledge base, but it could not experience pain.
>
>
> How do you know this so-called fact?
>
> Brent
>



My main point is that those who say it can (I say it can't) can't talk 
about telepathy, precognition, astral projection etc. being crazy.

@philipthrift
 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d5c3507b-33e6-4b20-886c-4d11c1428399%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-18 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 5/18/2019 6:37 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
/A simulated human brain could describe it's back pain in every 
detail, write whole paragraphs about what it's like, while according 
to the theory of substrate dependence, it knows nothing of what it's 
writing about. Where then does this knowledge if pain come from when 
the AI writes a page about the back pain it is in?/




A simulated human brain could read the Wikipedia article on pain [ 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pain ] and integrate this knowledge into 
its knowledge base, but it could not experience pain.


How do you know this so-called fact?

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/061c5849-eb70-aa60-678e-bcd5331b90db%40verizon.net.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?



On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 10:47:15 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/17/2019 11:11 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 6:09:18 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/17/2019 3:33 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 5:21:41 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/16/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:14:46 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: 


 On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 1:48 PM Philip Thrift  
 wrote:

 *> Information processing absent actual first-class entities 
> of qualia (or experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs 
> information 
> processing operating in a material substrate where those entities are 
> available to be combined and manipulated.*


 So something can behave intelligently but if it is lacking "f*irst-class 
 entities of qualia*" it can only be a intelligent zombie. But 
 "*first-class 
 qualia*" sounds like  consciousness to me, so you're basically saying 
 only conscious things can be conscious. A tautology has the virtue of 
 always 
 being true but it involves a unnecessary non-required pointless 
 repetition and reiteration of words where you end up at the exact same 
 place you started with. And that is typical of all consciousness theories.

 John K Clark




>>> To be clearer: Qualia (the "ingredients" of consciousness) cannot be 
>>> reduced to information processing. 
>>>
>>>
>>> That's nothing but unsupported assertion.  It's not even clear what 
>>> "reduced" means in that context.  
>>>
>>> (That is what I mean by "first-class". If qualia could  be reduced to 
>>> information processing, then they would derivative from information, or 
>>> "second-class".)
>>>
>>>
>>> Is life derivative from chemistry?  Only within a certain environment.  
>>> Same with information processing.  In general it's streams of bits being 
>>> processed being changed according to some algorithm.  But it's qualia if 
>>> the streams are in some entity whose environment and actions give meaning 
>>> to the information, like "I've got a headache and I'm going to lie down."
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Isn't  *qualia can be reduced to information processing*  the 
>> unsupported assertion?
>>
>>
>> No.  It's very well supported.  Interfere with information processing by 
>> drugs or electrical stimulus of the brain and qualia are changed or 
>> eliminated.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
> *Information processing (IP) is necessary for consciousness*, but IP has 
> to occur in a substrate that produces qualia. *Stop the IP and you stop 
> consciousness.* But *the same IP* *in a different substrate* could be 
> consciousnessless.  
>
> The above substate is the material of the brain: neurons, neurochemistry, 
> glia, ...
>
>
> Mere supposition.  It's just the complement of the claim that machines can 
> never really think.  A pathetic hubris.
>
>
> A simulation of gravity running in a smartphone does not produce gravity.
>
>
> It does in the simulated world.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
>
> People talk of telepathy and precognition as delusional - broadly 
> speaking, it is. But the "IP delusion" (that consciousness is 
> substate-independent IP) is up there.
>
> @philipthrift
> -- 
>
>
The *simulation-reality* idea - that a simulated brain is the same as a 
naturally-evolved/material or synthetic/material brain - is worse even than 
the* telepathy* idea (which I don't think exists in any significant way 
anyway).

The first is really much worse than the second, so the first cannot throw 
stones (even simulated ones).

@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/69c5c75e-9ff3-4e4f-a312-7662f0cac957%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 9:37 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

*A simulated human brain could read the Wikipedia article on pain [
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pain  ]
> and integrate this knowledge into its knowledge base, but it could not
> experience pain.*

It's weird, perhaps it comes from watching too much Star Trek but I don't
understand why so many people believe it's inherently more difficult  to
produce emotion than intelligence when Evolution found the exact opposite
to be true.

John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv0cyiVEvLpdQzNPxjMeDRXmjXZu5X_9Gg6YiFt6RzAeVA%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 7:12 PM 'Brent Meeker'  <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>> Even if we got super mega ultra lucky and Evolution just happened to
>> produce a mutated gene that gave a being consciousness it would be lost in
>> just a few generations due to genetic drift because however much we may
>> value consciousness natural selection can't see it or hear it or touch it
>> or detect it or be effected by it in any way.
>
>
> * > But that assumes consciousness has some cost in terms of survival and
> reproduction. *
>

Even if  it was neutral and the cost was zero a gene that did nothing but
generate consciousness would soon disappear due to genetic drift; errors in
dupacation always happen and the consciousness gene would accumulate such
errors because they would not reduce the survival chances of the animal
that had them , and after a few generations the gene would have so many
errors it would stop working entirely.

Of course it's possible that I won the lottery and out of the 7.6 billion
people on the planet I have the fewest errors in my consciousness gene, I
have the only one that still works. It could be, but somehow I don't think
so.

* > Maybe it's just a spandrel. *
>

I don't think there is any maybe about it. I am conscious and if I am the
product of Darwinian Evolution then consciousness MUST be a spandrel.

*Or maybe it has a function in the way human intelligence is implemented,
> but it wouldn't have a function is some other implementation.*
>

Evolution is unlikely to have stumbled upon a complex method of achieving
intelligence if there was a much simpler basic procedure to do the same
thing, therefore if we use Occam's razor we must conclude if a robot is
intelligent the best hypothesis is it's conscious too. To put it another
way, it would be harder (probably infinitely harder) to make a brilliant
non-conscious AI than to make a brilliant conscious AI.

John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv01nS_aCR-7bc%3DwtEW-Yz%3Dj%3DWkB4EWs3M6HrZFJeWsWUw%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-18 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 5/17/2019 11:11 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 6:09:18 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 5/17/2019 3:33 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 5:21:41 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 5/16/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:14:46 PM UTC-5, John Clark
wrote:

On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 1:48 PM Philip Thrift
wrote:

/> Information processing absent
actual first-class entities of *qualia* (or
experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs
information processing operating in a material
substrate where those entities are available to be
combined and manipulated./

//So something can behave intelligently but if it is
lacking "f/irst-class entities of *qualia*/" it can only
be a intelligent zombie. But "/first-class qualia/"
sounds like consciousness to me, so you're basically
saying only conscious things can be conscious. A
tautology has the virtue of always being true but it
involves a unnecessary non-required pointless repetition
and reiteration of words where you end up at the exact
same place you started with. And that is typical of all
consciousness theories.

John K Clark

To be clearer: Qualia (the "ingredients" of consciousness)
cannot be reduced to information processing.

That's nothing but unsupported assertion. It's not even
clear what "reduced" means in that context.

(That is what I mean by "first-class". If qualia could be
reduced to information processing, then they would
derivative from information, or "second-class".)

Is life derivative from chemistry? Only within a certain
environment. Same with information processing. In general
it's streams of bits being processed being changed according
to some algorithm. But it's qualia if the streams are in
some entity whose environment and actions give meaning to the
information, like "I've got a headache and I'm going to lie
down."

Brent

Isn't *qualia can be reduced to information processing* the
unsupported assertion?

No. It's very well supported. Interfere with information
processing by drugs or electrical stimulus of the brain and qualia
are changed or eliminated.

Brent

*Information processing (IP) is necessary for consciousness*, but IP
has to occur in a substrate that produces qualia. *Stop the IP and you
stop consciousness.* But /the same IP/ *in a different substrate*
could be consciousnessless.

The above substate is the material of the brain: neurons,
neurochemistry, glia, ...

Mere supposition. It's just the complement of the claim that machines
can never really think. A pathetic hubris.

A simulation of gravity running in a smartphone does not produce gravity.

It does in the simulated world.

Brent

People talk of telepathy and precognition as delusional - broadly
speaking, it is. But the "IP delusion" (that consciousness is
substate-independent IP) is up there.

@philipthrift
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/0ee4f338-58ff-4d92-aa7a-25180073b8b1%40googlegroups.com
.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/726fe5d4-efbc-28a9-d3a8-2d276eff9113%40verizon.net.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-18 Thread Jason Resch

On Saturday, May 18, 2019, Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 8:00:42 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, May 18, 2019, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 6:09:18 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



 On 5/17/2019 3:33 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 5:21:41 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/16/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:14:46 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 1:48 PM Philip Thrift 
>> wrote:
>>
>> *> Information processing absent actual first-class entities
>>> of qualia (or experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs 
>>> information
>>> processing operating in a material substrate where those entities are
>>> available to be combined and manipulated.*
>>
>>
>> So something can behave intelligently but if it is lacking "f*irst-class
>> entities of qualia*" it can only be a intelligent zombie. But 
>> "*first-class
>> qualia*" sounds like  consciousness to me, so you're basically
>> saying only conscious things can be conscious. A tautology has the virtue
>> of always being true but it involves a unnecessary non-required
>> pointless repetition and reiteration of words where you end up at
>> the exact same place you started with. And that is typical of all
>> consciousness theories.
>>
>> John K Clark
>>
>>
>>
>>
> To be clearer: Qualia (the "ingredients" of consciousness) cannot be
> reduced to information processing.
>
>
> That's nothing but unsupported assertion.  It's not even clear what
> "reduced" means in that context.
>
> (That is what I mean by "first-class". If qualia could  be reduced to
> information processing, then they would derivative from information, or
> "second-class".)
>
>
> Is life derivative from chemistry?  Only within a certain
> environment.  Same with information processing.  In general it's streams 
> of
> bits being processed being changed according to some algorithm.  But it's
> qualia if the streams are in some entity whose environment and actions 
> give
> meaning to the information, like "I've got a headache and I'm going to lie
> down."
>
> Brent
>



 Isn't  *qualia can be reduced to information processing*  the
 unsupported assertion?


 No.  It's very well supported.  Interfere with information processing
 by drugs or electrical stimulus of the brain and qualia are changed or
 eliminated.

 Brent

>>>
>>>
>>> *Information processing (IP) is necessary for consciousness*, but IP
>>> has to occur in a substrate that produces qualia. *Stop the IP and you
>>> stop consciousness.* But *the same IP* *in a different substrate* could
>>> be consciousnessless.
>>>
>>
>> Maybe you're the only person in the world with the right gene mutation to
>> synthesize the right protein that is a substrate for consciousness, and all
>> the other philosophers of consciousness who came before you and wrote books
>> on consciousness were pzombies that had no idea about what consciousness
>> was.
>>
>> You might consider this situation ridiculous, but it's exactly what you
>> get when you introduce substrate dependence.  A simulated human brain could
>> describe it's back pain in every detail, write whole paragraphs about what
>> it's like, while according to the theory of substrate dependence, it knows
>> nothing of what it's writing about. Where then does this knowledge if pain
>> come from when the AI writes a page about the back pain it is in?
>>
>>
>>>
>>> The above substate is the material of the brain: neurons,
>>> neurochemistry, glia, ...
>>>
>>> A simulation of gravity running in a smartphone does not produce gravity.
>>>
>>>
>> Simulating the processing of information does produce processed
>> information.  Consciousness might be like multiplication. There's no way to
>> simulate it without actually doing it.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> People talk of telepathy and precognition as delusional - broadly
>>> speaking, it is. But the "IP delusion" (that consciousness is
>>> substate-independent IP) is up there.
>>>
>>> @philipthrift
>>>
>>> --
>>> Y
>>>
>>
> *A simulated human brain could describe it's back pain in every detail,
> write whole paragraphs about what it's like, while according to the theory
> of substrate dependence, it knows nothing of what it's writing about. Where
> then does this knowledge if pain come from when the AI writes a page about
> the back pain it is in?*
>
>
>
> A simulated human brain could read the Wikipedia article on pain [
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pain ] and integrate this knowledge into
> its knowledge base, but it could not experience pain.
>


Let's consider a simulated brain

Re: Is your elbow conscious?



On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 8:00:42 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, May 18, 2019, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 6:09:18 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/17/2019 3:33 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 5:21:41 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 



 On 5/16/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:14:46 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: 
>
>
> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 1:48 PM Philip Thrift  
> wrote:
>
> *> Information processing absent actual first-class entities 
>> of qualia (or experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs 
>> information 
>> processing operating in a material substrate where those entities are 
>> available to be combined and manipulated.*
>
>
> So something can behave intelligently but if it is lacking "f*irst-class 
> entities of qualia*" it can only be a intelligent zombie. But 
> "*first-class 
> qualia*" sounds like  consciousness to me, so you're basically saying 
> only conscious things can be conscious. A tautology has the virtue of 
> always 
> being true but it involves a unnecessary non-required pointless 
> repetition and reiteration of words where you end up at the exact 
> same place you started with. And that is typical of all consciousness 
> theories.
>
> John K Clark
>
>
>
>
 To be clearer: Qualia (the "ingredients" of consciousness) cannot be 
 reduced to information processing. 


 That's nothing but unsupported assertion.  It's not even clear what 
 "reduced" means in that context.  

 (That is what I mean by "first-class". If qualia could  be reduced to 
 information processing, then they would derivative from information, or 
 "second-class".)


 Is life derivative from chemistry?  Only within a certain environment.  
 Same with information processing.  In general it's streams of bits being 
 processed being changed according to some algorithm.  But it's qualia if 
 the streams are in some entity whose environment and actions give meaning 
 to the information, like "I've got a headache and I'm going to lie down."

 Brent

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Isn't  *qualia can be reduced to information processing*  the 
>>> unsupported assertion?
>>>
>>>
>>> No.  It's very well supported.  Interfere with information processing by 
>>> drugs or electrical stimulus of the brain and qualia are changed or 
>>> eliminated.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>> *Information processing (IP) is necessary for consciousness*, but IP has 
>> to occur in a substrate that produces qualia. *Stop the IP and you stop 
>> consciousness.* But *the same IP* *in a different substrate* could be 
>> consciousnessless.  
>>
>
> Maybe you're the only person in the world with the right gene mutation to 
> synthesize the right protein that is a substrate for consciousness, and all 
> the other philosophers of consciousness who came before you and wrote books 
> on consciousness were pzombies that had no idea about what consciousness 
> was.
>
> You might consider this situation ridiculous, but it's exactly what you 
> get when you introduce substrate dependence.  A simulated human brain could 
> describe it's back pain in every detail, write whole paragraphs about what 
> it's like, while according to the theory of substrate dependence, it knows 
> nothing of what it's writing about. Where then does this knowledge if pain 
> come from when the AI writes a page about the back pain it is in?
>  
>
>>
>> The above substate is the material of the brain: neurons, neurochemistry, 
>> glia, ...
>>
>> A simulation of gravity running in a smartphone does not produce gravity.
>>
>>
> Simulating the processing of information does produce processed 
> information.  Consciousness might be like multiplication. There's no way to 
> simulate it without actually doing it.
>
> Jason
>  
>
>>
>>
>> People talk of telepathy and precognition as delusional - broadly 
>> speaking, it is. But the "IP delusion" (that consciousness is 
>> substate-independent IP) is up there.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>> -- 
>> Y
>>
>
*A simulated human brain could describe it's back pain in every detail, 
write whole paragraphs about what it's like, while according to the theory 
of substrate dependence, it knows nothing of what it's writing about. Where 
then does this knowledge if pain come from when the AI writes a page about 
the back pain it is in?*



A simulated human brain could read the Wikipedia article on pain [ 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pain ] and integrate this knowledge into its 
knowledge base, but it could not experience pain.

@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-18 Thread Jason Resch

On Saturday, May 18, 2019, Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 6:09:18 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/17/2019 3:33 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 5:21:41 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/16/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:14:46 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:


 On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 1:48 PM Philip Thrift 
 wrote:

 *> Information processing absent actual first-class entities
> of qualia (or experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs information
> processing operating in a material substrate where those entities are
> available to be combined and manipulated.*


 So something can behave intelligently but if it is lacking "f*irst-class
 entities of qualia*" it can only be a intelligent zombie. But "*first-class
 qualia*" sounds like  consciousness to me, so you're basically saying
 only conscious things can be conscious. A tautology has the virtue of 
 always
 being true but it involves a unnecessary non-required pointless
 repetition and reiteration of words where you end up at the exact same
 place you started with. And that is typical of all consciousness theories.

 John K Clark




>>> To be clearer: Qualia (the "ingredients" of consciousness) cannot be
>>> reduced to information processing.
>>>
>>>
>>> That's nothing but unsupported assertion.  It's not even clear what
>>> "reduced" means in that context.
>>>
>>> (That is what I mean by "first-class". If qualia could  be reduced to
>>> information processing, then they would derivative from information, or
>>> "second-class".)
>>>
>>>
>>> Is life derivative from chemistry?  Only within a certain environment.
>>> Same with information processing.  In general it's streams of bits being
>>> processed being changed according to some algorithm.  But it's qualia if
>>> the streams are in some entity whose environment and actions give meaning
>>> to the information, like "I've got a headache and I'm going to lie down."
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Isn't  *qualia can be reduced to information processing*  the
>> unsupported assertion?
>>
>>
>> No.  It's very well supported.  Interfere with information processing by
>> drugs or electrical stimulus of the brain and qualia are changed or
>> eliminated.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
> *Information processing (IP) is necessary for consciousness*, but IP has
> to occur in a substrate that produces qualia. *Stop the IP and you stop
> consciousness.* But *the same IP* *in a different substrate* could be
> consciousnessless.
>

Maybe you're the only person in the world with the right gene mutation to
synthesize the right protein that is a substrate for consciousness, and all
the other philosophers of consciousness who came before you and wrote books
on consciousness were pzombies that had no idea about what consciousness
was.

You might consider this situation ridiculous, but it's exactly what you get
when you introduce substrate dependence.  A simulated human brain could
describe it's back pain in every detail, write whole paragraphs about what
it's like, while according to the theory of substrate dependence, it knows
nothing of what it's writing about. Where then does this knowledge if pain
come from when the AI writes a page about the back pain it is in?


>
> The above substate is the material of the brain: neurons, neurochemistry,
> glia, ...
>
> A simulation of gravity running in a smartphone does not produce gravity.
>
>
Simulating the processing of information does produce processed
information.  Consciousness might be like multiplication. There's no way to
simulate it without actually doing it.

Jason


>
>
> People talk of telepathy and precognition as delusional - broadly
> speaking, it is. But the "IP delusion" (that consciousness is
> substate-independent IP) is up there.
>
> @philipthrift
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/
> msgid/everything-list/0ee4f338-58ff-4d92-aa7a-25180073b8b1%40googlegroups.
> com
> 
> .
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUiXte%3DLe3MKTg5_V92C8eysOO%3DiOUo0i_3KSHcXtybzYA%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?



On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 6:09:18 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/17/2019 3:33 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 5:21:41 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/16/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:14:46 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 1:48 PM Philip Thrift  
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> *> Information processing absent actual first-class entities 
 of qualia (or experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs information 
 processing operating in a material substrate where those entities are 
 available to be combined and manipulated.*
>>>
>>>
>>> So something can behave intelligently but if it is lacking "f*irst-class 
>>> entities of qualia*" it can only be a intelligent zombie. But "*first-class 
>>> qualia*" sounds like  consciousness to me, so you're basically saying 
>>> only conscious things can be conscious. A tautology has the virtue of 
>>> always 
>>> being true but it involves a unnecessary non-required pointless 
>>> repetition and reiteration of words where you end up at the exact same 
>>> place you started with. And that is typical of all consciousness theories.
>>>
>>> John K Clark
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> To be clearer: Qualia (the "ingredients" of consciousness) cannot be 
>> reduced to information processing. 
>>
>>
>> That's nothing but unsupported assertion.  It's not even clear what 
>> "reduced" means in that context.  
>>
>> (That is what I mean by "first-class". If qualia could  be reduced to 
>> information processing, then they would derivative from information, or 
>> "second-class".)
>>
>>
>> Is life derivative from chemistry?  Only within a certain environment.  
>> Same with information processing.  In general it's streams of bits being 
>> processed being changed according to some algorithm.  But it's qualia if 
>> the streams are in some entity whose environment and actions give meaning 
>> to the information, like "I've got a headache and I'm going to lie down."
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
>
> Isn't  *qualia can be reduced to information processing*  the unsupported 
> assertion?
>
>
> No.  It's very well supported.  Interfere with information processing by 
> drugs or electrical stimulus of the brain and qualia are changed or 
> eliminated.
>
> Brent
>


*Information processing (IP) is necessary for consciousness*, but IP has to 
occur in a substrate that produces qualia. *Stop the IP and you stop 
consciousness.* But *the same IP* *in a different substrate* could be 
consciousnessless.  

The above substate is the material of the brain: neurons, neurochemistry, 
glia, ...

A simulation of gravity running in a smartphone does not produce gravity.



People talk of telepathy and precognition as delusional - broadly speaking, 
it is. But the "IP delusion" (that consciousness is substate-independent 
IP) is up there.

@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/0ee4f338-58ff-4d92-aa7a-25180073b8b1%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-17 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 5/17/2019 3:38 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:06 PM 'Brent Meeker' 
> wrote:

On 5/17/2019 4:56 AM, John Clark wrote:

>> If you somehow knew for a fact a brilliant being was a zombie
then you could immediately make one conclusion about it, the
being could NOT be the product of Darwinian Evolution because
Natural Selection can see intelligence but it can't see
consciousness in others any better than we can, and it can't
select for something it can't see.

/> I don't see how that follows.  If zombies are possible then
evolution could have produced brilliant zombies. It might just be
an accident that evolution took the "consciousness" path at some
point. /

Even if we got super mega ultra lucky and Evolution just happened to 
produce a mutated gene that gave a being consciousness it would be 
lost in just a few generations due to genetic drift because however 
much we may value consciousness natural selection can't see it or hear 
it or touch it or detect it or be effected by it in any way.

But that assumes consciousness has some cost in terms of survival and 
reproduction.  Maybe it's just a spandrel.  Or maybe it has a function 
in the way human intelligence is implemented, but it wouldn't have a 
function is some other implementation.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/fd71b852-ea16-d409-234b-b021f6d9a61a%40verizon.net.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-17 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 5/17/2019 3:33 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 5:21:41 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 5/16/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:14:46 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:


On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 1:48 PM Philip Thrift
 wrote:

/> Information processing absent
actual first-class entities of *qualia* (or experiences)
can only produce zombies. One needs information
processing operating in a material substrate where those
entities are available to be combined and manipulated./


//So something can behave intelligently but if it is lacking
"f/irst-class entities of *qualia*/" it can only be a
intelligent zombie. But "/first-class qualia/" sounds like 
consciousness to me, so you're basically saying only
conscious things can be conscious. A tautology has the virtue
of always being true but it involves a unnecessary
non-required pointless repetition and reiteration of words
where you end up at the exact same place you started with.
And that is typical of all consciousness theories.

John K Clark




To be clearer: Qualia (the "ingredients" of consciousness) cannot
be reduced to information processing.


That's nothing but unsupported assertion.  It's not even clear
what "reduced" means in that context.


(That is what I mean by "first-class". If qualia could  be
reduced to information processing, then they would derivative
from information, or "second-class".)


Is life derivative from chemistry?  Only within a certain
environment.  Same with information processing.  In general it's
streams of bits being processed being changed according to some
algorithm.  But it's qualia if the streams are in some entity
whose environment and actions give meaning to the information,
like "I've got a headache and I'm going to lie down."

Brent




Isn't *qualia can be reduced to information processing* the 
unsupported assertion?


No.  It's very well supported.  Interfere with information processing by 
drugs or electrical stimulus of the brain and qualia are changed or 
eliminated.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/127c65be-7eac-5001-00bd-5595f93c5136%40verizon.net.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-17 Thread John Clark

On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 6:06 PM 'Brent Meeker' <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

On 5/17/2019 4:56 AM, John Clark wrote:
>
>> >> If you somehow knew for a fact a brilliant being was a zombie then
>> you could immediately make one conclusion about it, the being could NOT be
>> the product of Darwinian Evolution because Natural Selection can see
>> intelligence but it can't see consciousness in others any better than we
>> can, and it can't select for something it can't see.
>
>
> * > I don't see how that follows.  If zombies are possible then evolution
> could have produced brilliant zombies.  It might just be an accident that
> evolution took the "consciousness" path at some point. *
>

Even if we got super mega ultra lucky and Evolution just happened to
produce a mutated gene that gave a being consciousness it would be lost in
just a few generations due to genetic drift because however much we may
value consciousness natural selection can't see it or hear it or touch it
or detect it or be effected by it in any way. Genetic Drift is the reason
cave animals have no eyes, their ancestors had eyes but once they got
trapped in pitch dark caves the gene that produced eyes no longer had any
survival value. Outside the cave a mutation that stopped the eye producing
gene from working would be fatal to an animal, but inside the cave it would
be an advantage, expensive resources used to make that eye could be used
for other more productive  things, like having more offspring.

But unlike consciousness natural selection can see and detect and be
effected by behavior, and animals with intelligent behavior get more of
their genes into the next generation than animals with less intelligent
behavior. And it is beyond dispute that random mutation and natural
selection managed to produce a conscious being at least once, and although
unproven it may have done it more than once, perhaps many billions of
times; therefore it is logical for me to conclude that consciousness and
intelligence are linked and consciousness is a unavoidable byproduct of
intelligence, it is just the way data feels like when it is being
processed.

John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2wY6uFYAOMTVBAorj3xLFqEZYK1qZP8Fr3EfS%2B9w6MmQ%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?



On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 5:21:41 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/16/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:14:46 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: 
>>
>>
>> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 1:48 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>> *> Information processing absent actual first-class entities 
>>> of qualia (or experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs information 
>>> processing operating in a material substrate where those entities are 
>>> available to be combined and manipulated.*
>>
>>
>> So something can behave intelligently but if it is lacking "f*irst-class 
>> entities of qualia*" it can only be a intelligent zombie. But "*first-class 
>> qualia*" sounds like  consciousness to me, so you're basically saying 
>> only conscious things can be conscious. A tautology has the virtue of always 
>> being true but it involves a unnecessary non-required pointless 
>> repetition and reiteration of words where you end up at the exact same 
>> place you started with. And that is typical of all consciousness theories.
>>
>> John K Clark
>>
>>
>>
>>
> To be clearer: Qualia (the "ingredients" of consciousness) cannot be 
> reduced to information processing. 
>
>
> That's nothing but unsupported assertion.  It's not even clear what 
> "reduced" means in that context.  
>
> (That is what I mean by "first-class". If qualia could  be reduced to 
> information processing, then they would derivative from information, or 
> "second-class".)
>
>
> Is life derivative from chemistry?  Only within a certain environment.  
> Same with information processing.  In general it's streams of bits being 
> processed being changed according to some algorithm.  But it's qualia if 
> the streams are in some entity whose environment and actions give meaning 
> to the information, like "I've got a headache and I'm going to lie down."
>
> Brent
>



Isn't  *qualia can be reduced to information processing*  the unsupported 
assertion?

The burden of proof is on those who claim qualia comes out of information 
processing.

If that claim were true, then any IP system - like a smartphone that can 
execute programs - can have human-type qualia existing inside it.

@philipthrift
 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20af5e56-b425-46e4-839a-38c852f67e46%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?



On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 5:06:29 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/17/2019 4:56 AM, John Clark wrote:
>
> If you somehow knew for a fact a brilliant being was a zombie then you 
> could immediately make one conclusion about it, the being could NOT be the 
> product of Darwinian Evolution because Natural Selection can see 
> intelligence but it can't see consciousness in others any better than we 
> can, and it can't select for something it can't see.
>
>
> I don't see how that follows.  If zombies are possible then evolution 
> could have produced brilliant zombies.  It might just be an accident that 
> evolution took the "consciousness" path at some point.  It might even vary 
> from species to species...as it might in the future when we develop 
> human-level  in AI-robots.   I can't imagine how an AI could have human 
> level intelligence without the ability to reflect on itself, but I can 
> imagine this reflection being realized in very different ways.  For 
> example, for high reliability in some space vehicles, we have provided 
> three separate computers programmed by different teams to check decisions 
> by majority voting.
>
> Brent
>


Certainly we (AI engineers) can continue to hack together increasingly 
"intelligent" robots out of conventional processing technology. They are 
all zombies (in the sense they are not conscious). A "creative" robot may 
be a challenge.

@philipthrift

@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3e388392-3c27-4004-8506-cdda352a4471%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-17 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 5/16/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:14:46 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:


On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 1:48 PM Philip Thrift > wrote:

/> Information processing absent actual first-class entities
of *qualia* (or experiences) can only produce zombies. One
needs information processing operating in a material
substrate where those entities are available to be combined
and manipulated./


//So something can behave intelligently but if it is lacking
"f/irst-class entities of *qualia*/" it can only be a intelligent
zombie. But "/first-class qualia/" sounds like  consciousness to
me, so you're basically saying only conscious things can be
conscious. A tautology has the virtue of always being true but it
involves a unnecessary non-required pointless repetition and
reiteration of words where you end up at the exact same place you
started with. And that is typical of all consciousness theories.

John K Clark




To be clearer: Qualia (the "ingredients" of consciousness) cannot be 
reduced to information processing.


That's nothing but unsupported assertion.  It's not even clear what 
"reduced" means in that context.


(That is what I mean by "first-class". If qualia could  be reduced to 
information processing, then they would derivative from information, 
or "second-class".)


Is life derivative from chemistry?  Only within a certain environment.  
Same with information processing.  In general it's streams of bits being 
processed being changed according to some algorithm.  But it's qualia if 
the streams are in some entity whose environment and actions give 
meaning to the information, like "I've got a headache and I'm going to 
lie down."


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/565a39fb-288a-731e-4042-99cd23216091%40verizon.net.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-17 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 5/17/2019 4:56 AM, John Clark wrote:
If you somehow knew for a fact a brilliant being was a zombie then you 
could immediately make one conclusion about it, the being could NOT be 
the product of Darwinian Evolution because Natural Selection can see 
intelligence but it can't see consciousness in others any better than 
we can, and it can't select for something it can't see.


I don't see how that follows.  If zombies are possible then evolution 
could have produced brilliant zombies.  It might just be an accident 
that evolution took the "consciousness" path at some point.  It might 
even vary from species to species...as it might in the future when we 
develop human-level  in AI-robots.   I can't imagine how an AI could 
have human level intelligence without the ability to reflect on itself, 
but I can imagine this reflection being realized in very different 
ways.  For example, for high reliability in some space vehicles, we have 
provided three separate computers programmed by different teams to check 
decisions by majority voting.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3390ee67-13f3-5781-6c5b-7a14cd65eb7e%40verizon.net.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-17 Thread Jason Resch

On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 3:20 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 1:51:15 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/16/2019 11:59 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 1:42:41 AM UTC-5, telmo wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But then "panpyschism" does no work.  It's just a hypothetical property
>>> of matter that says if some matter does information processing then that
>>> matter is conscious, otherwise it's not.  But that's already what
>>> materialists thought.
>>>
>>>
>>> Well said.
>>>
>>> Telmo.
>>>
>>
>> But a robot - which is matter - that is doing very advanced, high-level
>> information processing - could be a winner on Jeopardy, and talk to you in
>> a conversation, could be a zombie.
>>
>> Are you a zombie?
>>
>>
>> Not if human-level intelligent behavior is a mark of consciousness.   How
>> do you tell if someone is conscious?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
>
> There is the paper I posted here earlier. Here's the conclusion. Do you
> have something better?
>
>
> *Information and the Origin of Qualia*
> Roger Orpwood
> Centre for Pain Research, Department for Health, University of Bath
>
>
> ...
>

> Despite the overwhelming likelihood that all higher animals experience a
> degree of consciousness, the only animals we can be a 100% certain about
> are humans.
>

I don't see how we can be 100% certain of this, without limiting the domain
of humans to the self.


> Therefore it is necessary ultimately to measure activity in humans that
> underpins conscious experience. For the theory presented here that evidence
> has to come from monitoring the activity of networks of individual cells,
> with sub-millisecond resolution, to see how they behave during conscious
> acts and how that differs to unconscious acts.
>

How do they know what they think are unconscious acts aren't actually
conscious but disconnected from the parts of the brain that can speak?
Like split brain patients having two independently consciousness
hemispheres.

Jason



> Such work would necessarily have to remove co-varying activity relating to
> such things as allocation of attention, activity relating to the reporting
> process, anticipation, etc. Techniques for population monitoring are of
> course developing fast, with the pioneering use of 2-photon calcium
> imaging. At present this technique is not quite fast enough to explore the
> detail firing activity of cells in networks but this is surely not far off.
> In the first instance such techniques can be usefully used with higher
> mammals who are strongly suspected of having conscious experience. Strong
> pointers would result from monitoring local activity such as that described
> in this article as the animal indicated a perception as opposed to not
> indicating a perception. If in parallel with such measurements a signature
> of that activity could be defined using EEG, MEG or ECoG that would enable
> human experiments to look for those signatures. Ultimately though it will
> be necessary to find a technique that can be used in humans, perhaps an
> ethically acceptable form of light imaging, that can detect the local
> activity described and to show that it occurs only with conscious awareness.
>
>
> @philipthrift
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a1bfd406-28ae-4cbb-8e2e-061a4f6bc01f%40googlegroups.com
> 
> .
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUh%3D-iLTMWbWwLYaaEsTqWNBuPTO_Mg5TxSg01Yp-QiOow%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-17 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 5/16/2019 11:59 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 1:42:41 AM UTC-5, telmo wrote:




But then "panpyschism" does no work.  It's just a hypothetical
property of matter that says if some matter does information
processing then that matter is conscious, otherwise it's not. 
But that's already what materialists thought.


Well said.

Telmo.


But a robot - which is matter - that is doing very advanced, 
high-level information processing - could be a winner on Jeopardy, and 
talk to you in a conversation, could be a zombie.


Are you a zombie?


Not if human-level intelligent behavior is a mark of consciousness.   
How do you tell if someone is conscious?


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9559e824-284c-129a-2669-84beec0ae83f%40verizon.net.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?



On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 6:57:35 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 2:51 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>  
>
>> *> But what is information processing?*
>>
>
> It is the process of extracting information from data, and information is 
> the resolution of uncertainty. And my unproven assumption (which will never 
> be proven but is the only thing that prevents me from becoming a solipsist) 
> is that consciousness is the way data feels when it is being processed.
>
> *> a robot - which is matter - that is doing very advanced, high-level 
>> information processing - could be a winner on Jeopardy, and talk to you in 
>> a conversation, could be a zombie.*
>
>
> If you somehow knew for a fact a brilliant being was a zombie then you 
> could immediately make one conclusion about it, the being could NOT be the 
> product of Darwinian Evolution because Natural Selection can see 
> intelligence but it can't see consciousness in others any better than we 
> can, and it can't select for something it can't see. But of course there is 
> no way you could ever know a brilliant being was a zombie or know he was 
> not a zombie either unless a important assumption is made, intelligent 
> behavior implies consciousness.  
>
> *> Are you a zombie?*
>
>
> No. But isn't that what you'd expect a philosophical zombie to say?
>
> > *Now I would just way that the jury is out about qualia ⇨ information.*
>>
>
> The jury is NOT out over the fact that if your consciousness changes the 
> informational processing of your brain changes and if the informational 
> processing of your brain changes your consciousness changes. Regarding all 
> other matters involving consciousness the jury is still out and will remain 
> out until the end of time, and that's why complex consciousness theories 
> are such a complete waste of time.  
>  
>
>> *> If the above paper is right, then it's sort of settled, right?*
>>
>
> The question of consciousness is as settled as it's ever going to be, 
> that's why the field of consciousness research has not moved an inch or 
> even a nanometer in a century. But Artificial *INTELLIGENCE* research is 
> alive and well.
>  
>
>> > *I still think the phenomenologists are right, that quaia is a 
>> different type of entity than information,*
>>
>
> Obviously they're different things but they're intimately related. 
>
> John K Clark
>





I'm not going to 

T*he Science of Consciousness 2019*
 https://www.tsc2019-interlaken.ch/

next month (so Interlaken will be without me), but there is a whole bunch 
of people who think the subject of consciousness is a serious scientific 
endeavor.

As you know I worked in an AI lab in the '80s and '90s

   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Texas_Instruments#Artificial_intelligence

and I have several AI patents from that time. (One of the people I worked 
with there I saw just last week is now working for an AI company making 
software for cars (e.g. self-driving) with computer vision.

AI via information processing (conventional computing) will of course get 
very good. But my sense is that experience processing becomes a matter of 
interest when the "compiled object code" is produced via biocompilers (or 
compilers to bio-like materials).

@philipthrift




 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/f4170dae-18fd-453a-b9da-b338f87967bf%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-17 Thread John Clark

On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 2:51 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

> *> But what is information processing?*
>

It is the process of extracting information from data, and information is
the resolution of uncertainty. And my unproven assumption (which will never
be proven but is the only thing that prevents me from becoming a solipsist)
is that consciousness is the way data feels when it is being processed.

*> a robot - which is matter - that is doing very advanced, high-level
> information processing - could be a winner on Jeopardy, and talk to you in
> a conversation, could be a zombie.*

If you somehow knew for a fact a brilliant being was a zombie then you
could immediately make one conclusion about it, the being could NOT be the
product of Darwinian Evolution because Natural Selection can see
intelligence but it can't see consciousness in others any better than we
can, and it can't select for something it can't see. But of course there is
no way you could ever know a brilliant being was a zombie or know he was
not a zombie either unless a important assumption is made, intelligent
behavior implies consciousness.

*> Are you a zombie?*

No. But isn't that what you'd expect a philosophical zombie to say?

> *Now I would just way that the jury is out about qualia ⇨ information.*
>

The jury is NOT out over the fact that if your consciousness changes the
informational processing of your brain changes and if the informational
processing of your brain changes your consciousness changes. Regarding all
other matters involving consciousness the jury is still out and will remain
out until the end of time, and that's why complex consciousness theories
are such a complete waste of time.

> *> If the above paper is right, then it's sort of settled, right?*
>

The question of consciousness is as settled as it's ever going to be,
that's why the field of consciousness research has not moved an inch or
even a nanometer in a century. But Artificial *INTELLIGENCE* research is
alive and well.

> > *I still think the phenomenologists are right, that quaia is a
> different type of entity than information,*
>

Obviously they're different things but they're intimately related.

John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv02QVjF%2B%3DOkjsZs1_EEJizYPxbTX53Qf08hagBra-72mA%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?


On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:17:59 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>  if you think exhibiting reflexes is the critereon for consciousness, 
> consider the example of someone who has held their breath for fifteen 
> minutes.
>
> Brent
>
>

A reflex (say in an elbow) might be considered an example of the presence 
of proto-experientiality.

@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/cf8138ac-e697-4acd-afc1-69f39017a5a8%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?



On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 1:42:41 AM UTC-5, telmo wrote:
>
>
>
> But then "panpyschism" does no work.  It's just a hypothetical property of 
> matter that says if some matter does information processing then that 
> matter is conscious, otherwise it's not.  But that's already what 
> materialists thought.
>
>
> Well said.
>
> Telmo.
>

But a robot - which is matter - that is doing very advanced, high-level 
information processing - could be a winner on Jeopardy, and talk to you in 
a conversation, could be a zombie.

Are you a zombie?

@philipthrift 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/39e8f52c-06c5-4018-9ffa-853408632543%40googlegroups.com.

Re: Is your elbow conscious?