Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 22 Jan 2009, at 13:21, Kim Jones wrote: Bruno, I found this an incredibly moving reply. I also see clearly your points. I am glad to have given you an opportunity to state so clearly some profoundly important ideas. Thank you, and let's continue the voyage. OK, thanks. ASAP (I am

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-23 Thread John Mikes
Bruno, thanks for 4z1, I find it an exciting (although not in all details for me followable text) in beautiful French (your language!) which I have to pronounce (silently) to understand (mostly) and did not study all along so far. Also the supporting lit is remarkable - it was decades ago when I

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-23 Thread Kim Jones
On 24/01/2009, at 4:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Have you find the time to take a look on UN-16 UN-24 in http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume1CC/4z1_1sansp.pdf After all, you know some french, isn't it? Take it easy, I will explain all this to you, beginning from zero.

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-22 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 21 Jan 2009, at 05:46, Kim Jones wrote: OK. But keep in mind that consciousness is unique in the sense of knowing that it cannot know its Turing emulability level (yet can bet). Footnote - (parenthetical digression): I know the above thought is native to your schema, and up

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-22 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 21 Jan 2009, at 22:15, Kim Jones wrote: On 22/01/2009, at 3:50 AM, Günther Greindl wrote: Kim, the uncomputability of this issue. Why should the mind be limited to the computable? Clearly it is not. So you deny Step 1 again? You say no to the doctor? In fact I have 'multiple

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-22 Thread Kim Jones
Bruno, I found this an incredibly moving reply. I also see clearly your points. I am glad to have given you an opportunity to state so clearly some profoundly important ideas. Thank you, and let's continue the voyage. I am glad that Penrose was wrong. But then, without somebody as

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-21 Thread Günther Greindl
Kim, the uncomputability of this issue. Why should the mind be limited to the computable? Clearly it is not. So you deny Step 1 again? You say no to the doctor? Could an AI conceive of Platonia? Why not? Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-21 Thread Kim Jones
On 22/01/2009, at 3:50 AM, Günther Greindl wrote: Kim, the uncomputability of this issue. Why should the mind be limited to the computable? Clearly it is not. So you deny Step 1 again? You say no to the doctor? In fact I have 'multiple personality disorder' - from Thursday to

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-20 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 19 Jan 2009, at 13:56, Kim Jones wrote: But Brent was momentarily speaking of materialism - materialism doesn't acknowledge any form of comp immateriality except according to the (probably) false mind/body dualism, where the mind is allowed to be an ethereal emanation of the

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-20 Thread Kim Jones
On 21/01/2009, at 6:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Jan 2009, at 13:56, Kim Jones wrote: But Brent was momentarily speaking of materialism - materialism doesn't acknowledge any form of comp immateriality except according to the (probably) false mind/body dualism, where the mind

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-19 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 18-janv.-09, à 11:32, Kim Jones a écrit : On 18/01/2009, at 4:38 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: I have no doubt that digital mechanism and materialism are incompatible, though. Is that because, under materialism, consciousness depends on causal links? Brent supernatural causal

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-19 Thread Kim Jones
On 19/01/2009, at 9:58 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 18-janv.-09, à 11:32, Kim Jones a écrit : On 18/01/2009, at 4:38 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: I have no doubt that digital mechanism and materialism are incompatible, though. Is that because, under materialism, consciousness depends on

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-18 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2009/1/18 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Jan 2009, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-18 Thread Quentin Anciaux
I should add that in the case of the digital version, as I said earlier, the causal link is in no way the physical computer, but the program and its state. 2009/1/18 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com 2009/1/18 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Jan 2009,

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-18 Thread Kim Jones
On 18/01/2009, at 4:38 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: I have no doubt that digital mechanism and materialism are incompatible, though. Is that because, under materialism, consciousness depends on causal links? Brent supernatural causal links enter the hand wavers Kim

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-18 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 18 Jan 2009, at 06:38, Brent Meeker wrote: Are you stopping at UDA step 1? No. There's a difference between your idea of running a world and making a copy of me within this world. I think the latter will necessarily incur a gap in my consciousness because of the need to gather

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-17 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Jan 2009, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: snip in a computer program. But a

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-16 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 15-janv.-09, à 20:55, Brent Meeker a écrit : Stathis is not wrong but seems unclear on what a computation mathematically is perhaps. Many miss Church thesis. The fact that there is a purely mathematical notion of computation at all. I thought the Church's thesis was that all

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-16 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/1/16 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: But both the electronic and the mechanical computer are implementing a process that is distributed in spacetime and has causal connections. Yes, and my claim is that the causal connections are important only because they give rise to the

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-16 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 15 Jan 2009, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: snip in a computer program. But a computer program requires a computer to run This is

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-16 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 16 Jan 2009, at 14:10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/16 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: But both the electronic and the mechanical computer are implementing a process that is distributed in spacetime and has causal connections. Yes, and my claim is that the causal

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-16 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/16 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: But both the electronic and the mechanical computer are implementing a process that is distributed in spacetime and has causal connections. Yes, and my claim is that the causal connections are important

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-16 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 Jan 2009, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: snip in a computer program. But a

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-16 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2009/1/16 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/16 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: But both the electronic and the mechanical computer are implementing a process that is distributed in spacetime and has causal connections. Yes, and my

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-16 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/1/17 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 16 Jan 2009, at 14:10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/16 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: But both the electronic and the mechanical computer are implementing a process that is distributed in spacetime and has causal connections.

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-16 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/1/17 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: But I think you are assuming something about states that is false - i.e. that they are discrete non-overlapping things. According to our current understanding of physics this is not the case for brain states or computer states. Because they

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/1/15 John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Stathis: (from reply to Brent): I return to my question about what would happen if there were a discontinuity in a sequence of states,... There IS discontinuity if the state transits'(?) from s1 to s2. Do you have any idea how one can observe a

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-15 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/1/15 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: In an actual physical computer the transition rules are represented by the causal links between the states, so that a particular input will reliably give rise to a particular output. But I return to my question about what would happen if

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-15 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/15 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: In an actual physical computer the transition rules are represented by the causal links between the states, so that a particular input will reliably give rise to a particular output. But I return to my question

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-15 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also requires a set of transition rules. So in the same abstract way that the integers are

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-15 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:52, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also requires a set of transition rules.

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-15 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:52, Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-15 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also requires a set of transition rules. So in the same abstract way that the

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-14 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also requires a set of transition rules. So in the same abstract way that the integers are ordered by succession the computational states of a Turing machine are ordered. Whether

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-14 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/1/14 John Mikes jami...@gmail.com: Stathis, common sense, not always applicable to math-related topics is startled before a task on a REGULAR contraption-type Turing machine (binary, electrically driven finite hardware etc.) can emulate ALL the potentials of 11+billion neurons in

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-14 Thread John Mikes
Stathis: (from reply to Brent): I return to my question about what would happen if there were a discontinuity in a sequence of states,... There IS discontinuity if the state transits'(?) from s1 to s2. Do you have any idea how one can observe a changed state by only continuous transitions? Where

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-14 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also requires a set of transition rules. So in the same abstract way that the integers are ordered by succession the computational states of a Turing

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-14 Thread Quentin Anciaux
Hi, 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also requires a set of transition rules. So in the same abstract way that the integers are

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-14 Thread Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: However a Turing machine is not just a

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-14 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-14 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi John, On 14 Jan 2009, at 14:53, John Mikes wrote: Stathis: (from reply to Brent): I return to my question about what would happen if there were a discontinuity in a sequence of states,... There IS discontinuity if the state transits'(?) from s1 to s2. Do you have any idea how one can

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-13 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/1/13 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: In human consciousness, as instantiated by brains, there is a process in which signal/information is not local, it is distributed in spacetime and is connected causally which means, per relativity, that you cannot make any unique spacelike

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-13 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/1/13 Günther Greindl guenther.grei...@gmail.com: Stathis, thinking about this way (which I did when reading Egan's Permutation City) is indeed problematic - because then you would also have to let consciousness supervene on Lucky Alice (the one from MGA), right down to Super Lucky

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-13 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/13 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: In human consciousness, as instantiated by brains, there is a process in which signal/information is not local, it is distributed in spacetime and is connected causally which means, per relativity, that you

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-13 Thread John Mikes
Stathis, common sense, not always applicable to math-related topics is startled before a task on a REGULAR contraption-type Turing machine (binary, electrically driven finite hardware etc.) can emulate ALL the potentials of 11+billion neurons in unrestricted groupings and unlimited connectivities

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-13 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 13 Jan 2009, at 18:44, Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/13 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: In human consciousness, as instantiated by brains, there is a process in which signal/information is not local, it is distributed in spacetime and is connected

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-12 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 11-janv.-09, à 17:55, Brent Meeker a écrit : Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I'm suggesting that running a state is incoherent. A machine running a program goes through a sequence of states. Consider 20 consecutive states, s1 to s20, which

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-12 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: A machine running a program goes through a sequence of states. Consider 20 consecutive states, s1 to s20, which give rise to several moments of consciousness. Would you say that running the sequence s1 to s20 on a single machine m1 will give a

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-12 Thread Günther Greindl
Stathis, thinking about this way (which I did when reading Egan's Permutation City) is indeed problematic - because then you would also have to let consciousness supervene on Lucky Alice (the one from MGA), right down to Super Lucky Alice (Alice which is made anew for every state through

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-12 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: A machine running a program goes through a sequence of states. Consider 20 consecutive states, s1 to s20, which give rise to several moments of consciousness. Would you say that running the sequence s1 to s20 on a

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-11 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I'm suggesting that running a state is incoherent. A machine running a program goes through a sequence of states. Consider 20 consecutive states, s1 to s20, which give rise to several moments of consciousness. Would you say that running the

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-11 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I'm suggesting that running a state is incoherent. A machine running a program goes through a sequence of states. Consider 20 consecutive states, s1 to s20, which give rise to several moments of

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-10 Thread Kim Jones
On 10/01/2009, at 6:37 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: The question is how is the simulated observer made conscious of the passage of (simulated) time. If you just look a momentary machine states, ignoring their causal/temporal relations, how will they create the consciousness of time in

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-10 Thread Brent Meeker
Kim Jones wrote: On 10/01/2009, at 6:37 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: The question is how is the simulated observer made conscious of the passage of (simulated) time. If you just look a momentary machine states, ignoring their causal/temporal relations, how will they create the

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-10 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/1/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: The question is how is the simulated observer made conscious of the passage of (simulated) time. If you just look a momentary machine states, ignoring their causal/temporal relations, how will they create the consciousness of time in the

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-10 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: The question is how is the simulated observer made conscious of the passage of (simulated) time. If you just look a momentary machine states, ignoring their causal/temporal relations, how will they create the

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-09 Thread Günther Greindl
Thomas, (Apropos Günther Greindl's remark: space as the self moving in relation to everything else, time as everything outside the self moving in relation to oneself. it's funny that already in 1895, in his novel The Time Machine, H.G. Wells wrote, There is no difference between time and

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-09 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/1/9 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: But in a block universe, where each frame contains all of the information for a particular time, the order is implicit. What makes it implicit?... increasing entropy? ...conformance to dynamical laws? These are things outside the frames.

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-09 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/9 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: But in a block universe, where each frame contains all of the information for a particular time, the order is implicit. What makes it implicit?... increasing entropy? ...conformance to dynamical laws? These are

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-09 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/1/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Consider a simulation of an observer watching a falling stone, running on a digital computer. Does the observer have any way of knowing whether the simulation is being run serially, in parallel, on how many and what kinds of physical machines,

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-09 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Consider a simulation of an observer watching a falling stone, running on a digital computer. Does the observer have any way of knowing whether the simulation is being run serially, in parallel, on how many and what

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-08 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/7 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com wrote: I would not deny causality in such a universe so long as the logical structure enforces the Life rules (meaning, the next level in the stack is *always* the next

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-08 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/7 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com wrote: I would not deny causality in such a universe so long as the logical structure enforces the Life rules (meaning, the next level in the

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-07 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/1/7 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com wrote: I would not deny causality in such a universe so long as the logical structure enforces the Life rules (meaning, the next level in the stack is *always* the next life-tick, it couldn't be something else... which is true by supposition in the

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-07 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/7 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com wrote: I would not deny causality in such a universe so long as the logical structure enforces the Life rules (meaning, the next level in the stack is *always* the next life-tick, it couldn't be something else... which

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-07 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 06 Jan 2009, at 20:18, Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/6 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com: Thomas, If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience moving in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember the past and not the

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-07 Thread Thomas Laursen
OK, and thanks Bruno. I thought MW more or less presumed a block universe without time, but apparently this is yet uncertain. Abram, If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience moving in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember the past and not the

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-07 Thread Thomas Laursen
PS. If the two-dimensional cartoon man has something to say about mathematics or logic, I would certainly listen, but his intuition, common sense and and experienses I would rather smile at :) Maybe somebody is smiling at me right now? or laughing? I hope not ;-)

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-06 Thread Bruno Marchal
Abram, I agree with Brent. In relativity theory space and time are intermingled in a geometrical way to give the Minkowski structure. Actually you can make it into an Euclidian space by introducing an imaginary time t' = sqr(-1)*t = it. The metrics becomes dx^2 + dy^2 + dz^2 + dt'^2. In

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-06 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
2009/1/6 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com: Thomas, If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience moving in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember the past and not the future? Could a being move in some spatial dimension in the same way we move

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-06 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 06 Jan 2009, at 14:07, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/6 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com: Thomas, If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience moving in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember the past and not the future? Could a being

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-06 Thread Bruno Marchal
Abram, With General Relativity, time is so geometrical that you can make it circular. (Cf the Gödel's solutions to Einstein's GR Equation, which gives hope to some to build a time machine, and even infinite computers!). Give me just a sufficiently massive cylinder ... Bruno On 06 Jan

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-06 Thread Abram Demski
Stathis, I would not deny causality in such a universe so long as the logical structure enforces the Life rules (meaning, the next level in the stack is *always* the next life-tick, it couldn't be something else... which is true by supposition in the block world). Perhaps that still counts as a

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-06 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, This I know... yet I want to say that it doesn't necessarily make time *spatial*. But, I can't say exactly what that would mean. It seems to me that the word spatial becomes less meaningful if time is said to be spatial... --Abram On Tue, Jan 6, 2009 at 1:57 PM, Bruno Marchal

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-06 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/1/6 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com: Thomas, If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience moving in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember the past and not the future? Could a being move in some spatial dimension

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-06 Thread Günther Greindl
Abram, an intuition I have come to concerning time is the following (it is only qualitative and may or may not be helpful in thinking about time): From relativity theory we know that there is no universal now, and that the invariant between two points in the physical universe is spacetime

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-06 Thread Brent Meeker
Lewis Carroll Epstein says the reason we can't go faster than light is that we can't go slower than light, c is our speed along the time axis. Brent Günther Greindl wrote: Abram, an intuition I have come to concerning time is the following (it is only qualitative and may or may not be

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-05 Thread Thomas Laursen
PS. Of course space and time exist, even if only in consciousness, but I guess you know what I mean :) On Jan 5, 1:10 am, Thomas Laursen krimma...@gmail.com wrote: I admit that consciousness is a bit special but what about time as (nothing but) a space dimension? Do you agree on this? (put

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-05 Thread Abram Demski
Thomas, If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience moving in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember the past and not the future? Could a being move in some spatial dimension in the same way we move through time, and in doing so treat time more like we

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-05 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 05 Jan 2009, at 01:10, Thomas Laursen wrote: I admit that consciousness is a bit special but what about time as (nothing but) a space dimension? Do you agree on this? The physicist in me don't know. But he likes the universal equation of the multiverse E = 0, in which physical time

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-05 Thread Brent Meeker
Abram Demski wrote: Thomas, If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience moving in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember the past and not the future? Could a being move in some spatial dimension in the same way we move through time, and in doing

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-04 Thread Thomas Laursen
I admit that consciousness is a bit special but what about time as (nothing but) a space dimension? Do you agree on this? (put aside whether time/space is only in the mind, as you think, or really exist) On Jan 3, 10:39 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I disagree, and your remark

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-03 Thread Bruno Marchal
I disagree, and your remark singles out the problem with the bird's eye/frog view of Tegmark. Those two views remains third person point of views. Consciousness is intrinsically a first person view. You cannot describe it in any third person point of view. This explains why the

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2009-01-02 Thread Thomas Laursen
If I understand the standard MWI right (with my layman brain) Abram Demski's view of time is very much in accordance with it, except that time should be looked at simply as a fourth space dimension. A bird's eye view on the whole universe (= all it's actualized worlds) would be like a static

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2008-12-25 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi Kim, On 25 Dec 2008, at 06:21, Kim Jones wrote: A bit of an end-of-year ramble. For the multi-lingual, illogically- minded, lateral thinkers: My last post was a bit self-destructive ramble as I am able to do once a time. But that's ok. (I hope I am not shocking). It is rather kind of

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2008-12-24 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi Kim and all, On 23 Dec 2008, at 11:50, Kim Jones wrote: Bruno, things are starting to hang together in my new digital brain (bright yellow) Good. you wrote the plan: --- A) UDA (Universal Dovetailer Argument) 1) I explain that if you are a machine, you

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2008-12-23 Thread Bruno Marchal
Abram, On 23 Dec 2008, at 00:23, Abram Demski wrote: I think you are right in calling this view eliminative materialism. I am saying that the I is a convenient fiction. All right. It is a normal tendency for scientist. It is like wanting to see Platonia from outside. It is like deciding

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2008-12-23 Thread Kim Jones
Bruno, things are starting to hang together in my new digital brain (bright yellow) you wrote the plan: --- A) UDA (Universal Dovetailer Argument) 1) I explain that if you are a machine, you are already immaterial. --- Fine. This thought is merely

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2008-12-22 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi Abram, Interesting thought experiment. My initial reaction (from my time skeptic position): --Since my consciousness is relative to a single moment, I take this as a motivation for doing MGA before UDA(1...7), because this does not make sense for me. Consciousness is better attached

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2008-12-22 Thread Bruno Marchal
I wrote: Abram wrote --When I tell you my bet about which movie I will see, I am not minimizing the chance of being condemned to hell, I am minimizing the number of my copies that will be so carried. ? OK. I was distracted. To do this by altruism? And *you* (in your sense) you

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2008-12-22 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, I think you are right in calling this view eliminative materialism. I am saying that the I is a convenient fiction. Hmmm... If you were correct, it seems to me you should say he when you talk about yourself in the future. I love coffee so he will drink coffee. Maybe We love coffee,

KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2008-12-21 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi Abram, Him Kim, Kim, while answering Abram, I realised I was doing the KIM 2.3, you can read it before KIM 2.2 without problem I think, in any case tell me if you have follow the argument. I don't answer the questions, so you or Abram, or anyone else can answer. Abram, The answer to

Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)

2008-12-21 Thread Abram Demski
Bruno, Interesting thought experiment. My initial reaction (from my time skeptic position): --Since my consciousness is relative to a single moment, I can't talk about that same consciousness being carried over to the next moment: the consciousness in the next moment is a different