Hi Stephen P. King
There is only one physical world, but only the supreme
monad (supremem in the mental world) sees all and sees
all as it it is, clearly and wholly.
The individual point of view of the phjysical world
that each monad indirectly perceives is called the
phenomenological world.
We (as monads) all see the physical world and the mental world
indirectly (because they have no windows) as "perceptions".
Monads have no windows but their perceptions are constantly
and instantaneously being updated by the supreme monad
according to their individual points of view and individual abilities.
All perceptions of the monads are at best somewhat distorted
and at least the world appears to physical bodies as if the
body is mostly sleep and drunk.
Animals and vegetables can also perceive distorted feelings.
Humans can perceive , in addition, intellectual portions of the rest of
infinite set of monads, each partial and somewhat distorted.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/7/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Stephen P. King
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-07, 07:43:42
Subject: Re: The All
On 9/7/2012 4:11 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> On 06.09.2012 21:03 meekerdb said the following:
>> On 9/6/2012 11:52 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> A too much powerful God leads to inconsistency.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What if reality does not always obey the laws of logic? What if
>>> reality is sometimes inconsistent?
>>
>> This is a confusion of levels. Logic is rules about truth
>> preservation in declarative sentences. Not 'obeying the laws of
>> logic' just means declaring inconsistent sentences. We try to avoid
>> this because such utterances would have no determinate meaning. So a
>> *descriptions* of reality may be inconsistent (and therefore useless)
>> but reality is just whatever it is. It can't be inconsistent because
>> it's not assertions.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> This could work provided we could separate the world into mental and
> physical states. The question remains though if under physicalism one
> says that mental states are actually physical states. Then I do not
> know how to employ such a consideration in this case.
>
> Evgenii
>
Dear Evgenii,
What do you imagine would be the consequence of what may be a pair
of sets of mental states and physical states for one entity does not
match up exactly or even at all with a pair of mental and physical
states for another?
--
Onward!
Stephen
http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
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