Hi Bruno Marchal There are, as Leibniz said, two types of truth: the a priori truths of necessary reason and the contingent, a posteriori truths, which depend on the test of data verification.
Unfortunately we can not know if a theoretical truth (information theory) is "true" unless it works on real signals (in the contingent world). That would be a pragmatic or contingent truth. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-02, 13:28:06 Subject: Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this beaproblem ? On 02 Nov 2012, at 10:34, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Bruno Marchal > > Thanks. Then the numbers are noit separate but > included in the truth. Losely speaking, OK. Numbers are objects, truth concerns only propositions. > My feeling is that the truth > then may be the truth(s) of information theory. Information theory is just a tiny part of computer science. The word "information" is very dangerous and overused, as people will confuse Shannon information with the meaningful information (best handled by model theory in logic). Note that computer science is essentially a tiny part of arithmetic. You must understand that after G?el, we know that arithmetical truth is *very* big, and if we are machine (comp) then we cannot distinguish arithmetical truth from the outer God (the ONE). Bruno > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 11/2/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-11-01, 11:36:18 > Subject: Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would > this be aproblem ? > > > On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:35, Stephen P. King wrote: > >> On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >>> 1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One). >>> >>> 2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic >>> homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind, >>> then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that >>> other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access >>> (the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse >>> theories ? >>> >>> >>> Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net 10/31/2012 >> Dear Roger, >> >> I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that "numbers >> float in a sea of universal mind (the One)" makes the explanation an >> infinite regress. > > Replace the One by arithmetical truth, and the infinite regress > disappear. > > They reappear *in* arithmetical truth, but have fixed points (some > provably, some non provably). No problem. > > > > > >> That is OK if and only if you allow for the concept of the One to be >> Kaufman and Zuckerman's Quine Atom aka Russell operator, but if not >> it does not work. Why? Because numbers have to be distinguishable >> from to have individual values. The totality of numbers is an >> infinity and thus have the property that their proper parts cannot >> be distinguished from their totality. How does the One accomplish >> this? It seems to me that we have to assume that the One is >> conscious of the numbers and that makes the numbers something >> "different" from the One for 1) to work and this is no different >> from what a finite mind does. My point here is that a mind cannot be >> infinite because it would be incapable of distinguishing it's self >> from any of its proper parts - making it the ultimate solipsist. Do >> there exist maps between the totality of an infinite set to an >> improper part? If yes, what are their necessary properties? > > The One is solipsist, as the one is unique and alone. But I don't see > why it should be conscious. It might be, but I see no evidence for > this. > > Bruno > > > >> >> The idea of 2) seems to be demolished by Dennett's argument >> against the homunculus or else the One is strictly a solipsist as I >> argued above. I suspect that the mapping between wholes and improper >> parts is the same as Bruno's measure problem. >> >> -- >> Onward! >> >> Stephen >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything- >> l...@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >> . >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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