On Fri, Aug 12, 2005 at 05:21:50PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This is a personal
copy and I would ask you not to redistribute it.
I will try to get some authorization. It will be hard for me not
putting that paper in my webpage. Did you just scanned it. I would
acknowledge the
Le 07-août-05, à 22:20, Hal Finney a écrit :
Rutgers philosopher Tim Maudlin has a paper intended to challenge certain
views about consciousness and computation, which we have discussed
occasionally on this list.
Indeed. Maudlin's paper is without doubt one of the most important paper in
Russell Standish writes:
The take home message I get from Maudlin's experiment is that a
computationalist consciousness is supervenient on a physical process
_spread_ over the multiverse, ie the counterfactuals must really exist
as alternate branches of the Multiverse.
So what does that tell
On Sun, Aug 07, 2005 at 11:35:42PM -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
Russell Standish writes:
The take home message I get from Maudlin's experiment is that a
computationalist consciousness is supervenient on a physical process
_spread_ over the multiverse, ie the counterfactuals must really exist
I speculated:
I guess that you would say that if the unused
counterfactual machinery would actually work if tested, then she is
conscious; but if the counterfactual machines were broken or blocked
such that they wouldn't work (even though they are not used) then she
is unconscious. And
On Mon, Aug 08, 2005 at 09:42:06AM -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
Russell replied:
That is indeed my meaning. What difficulties do you see?
I see a few problems. The first is the concept that the multiverse
will contain copies of the machine that execute the counterfactuals.
While this could
Stephen has a number of fine questions about Hal's paper
(way *too* many, really) and while I am still working on
what one or two questions I may pose, there is one of
Stephen's questions that perhaps I can answer:
I am still worried about how a measure can exist over a set, collection,
Russell said (Hal's paraphrase)
I guess that you would say that if the unused
counterfactual machinery would actually work if tested, then she is
conscious; but if the counterfactual machines were broken or blocked
such that they wouldn't work (even though they are not used) then she
I wrote
P.S. Platonists != UDist-ers != computationalists != COMP
and meant != to have the programming meaning of not equal.
For example, I am a (math) Platonist and also a computationalist,
but don't know enough about (Bruno's) COMP to say anything, and
am skeptical of UDist.
Surely
On Sun, Aug 07, 2005 at 01:20:22PM -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
...
In a nutshell, Maudlin argues that these two common views on the
matter are actually in contradiction. But frankly, although Maudlin's
argument is complicated and involves all kinds of thought experiments and
elaborate,
Hi Hal,
Thank you very much for you work in writing this review and commentary
of the Maulding paper. I have not read it yet, but would like to ask some
questions and interject some comments, even if I end up looking like a fool.
;-)
Interleaving
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