Does everyone who is following the latest chapter of the book that Hal is evidently writing agree that there is no necessary conflict between it and more-or-less traditional realism? That is, I don't find anything too outre here; it seems to be an interesting but speculative theory about things more fundamental (in some sense) than our perceptions that give rise to our perceptions (and to Everything else).
Lee > -----Original Message----- > From: "Hal Finney" [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2005 10:44 PM > To: everything-list@eskimo.com > Subject: Reality in the multiverse > > > One problem with "reality" in the context of multiverse theories is that > it may mean different things to different people. > > If we assume (for analytical purposes) that some form of multiverse > exists, then ultimately the reality is the multiverse. But it seems that > each person is constrained only to see one universe out of the multiverse. > For him, that universe is all that is real, the rest of the multiverse > is irrelevant. So already there is confusion over whether we should > include the other worlds of the multiverse in "reality". > > I have been exploring the concept that the Universal Distribution exists > and is "real". Reality in this model is every computer program execution, > or equivalently (I would claim, but it is not too important here) every > information pattern. > > This is a sort of "multiverse", in that it includes multiple "universes". > Anything that can be created by a computer program exists, and arguably > universes fall into this category. > > But it also includes other things. Chaotic information patterns > that would not seem to possess most of the properties of a universe > exist as well - without time, or causality, or dimensionality perhaps - > just raw noise. > > And disembodied consciousnesses exist, too. We could each have our > information patterns, the processes that make up our minds, be produced by > programs which do not actually create the rest of the universe but simply > contain hard-coded sense impressions which are delivered by clockwork. > > The UDist framework allows us to theoretically approximate the measure > of these various information objects, so we can say that some are more > "prominent" in the multiverse than others. But all exist, all are real, > in this model. > > One of the points Bruno makes is that in these kinds of models, > the reality for a given observer is pretty complicated. Much of the > multiverse is irrelevant to him, but that doesn't mean he can focus on > just one universe as "real". The observer spans multiple universes and > multiple realities. > > In the UDist framework, I would say it in this way: Many programs > create the information pattern corresponding to a given observer. > Some of those programs create the observer as part of a relatively > straightforward universe that corresponds fairly simply to his sense > impressions. Some programs create the observer within a universe that > has a far more subtle and complex relationship to what the observer > senses. In some universes the observer is part of a simulation a la > The Matrix, being run on artificial machines within that universe, so > that what the observer sees has little relation to the "true reality" > of that universe. And some programs create the information pattern as > I described above, without a real universe at all, so that the observer > in effect hallucinates the entire universe. > > The point is that all of these programs exist, hence all contribute > measure to the observer. From the observer's perspective, all of these > are in a sense "real" to him. However, he can in principle calculate > (at least approximately) the numerical contribution made by each of > these programs, and perhaps it turns out that the vast majority of the > measure comes from just one of them. He might be justified in that case > in largely ignoring the others and saying that only that one is "real" > for him. > > But for full precision he must still take into consideration all of > the programs that could create instances of his information pattern, > and consider all of them to be "real" to some extent. And then, perhaps, > he may choose to accept that the whole multiverse is real, even the parts > which do not affect him. Otherwise he has to say that all programs exist > which happen to include an information pattern corresponding to him, > the observer who is making this claim. That's not a very compelling > theoretical model. > > Hal Finney >
