And where you say:
Any way, I don't defend comp, I just show that comp makes physics
derivable in arithmetic, and that if you do it in some way, (using the
logic of self-reference) you can extract a general theory of qualia,
with its quanta part that you can compare with nature, and so
On 12 Oct 2013, at 07:33, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
Sorry to resurrect such an old thread, but I think I'd like to
respond here:
On Saturday, November 10, 2012 4:32:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Nov 2012, at 10:11, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
Hey all on the list,
Bruno, I must
On 12 Oct 2013, at 09:24, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
And where you say:
Any way, I don't defend comp, I just show that comp makes physics
derivable in arithmetic, and that if you do it in some way, (using the
logic of self-reference) you can extract a general theory of qualia,
with its quanta
Sorry to resurrect such an old thread, but I think I'd like to respond
here:
On Saturday, November 10, 2012 4:32:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Nov 2012, at 10:11, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
Hey all on the list,
Bruno, I must say, thinking of the UDA. The key assumption is
On 13 Nov 2012, at 19:34, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/13/2012 11:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Nov 2012, at 00:48, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/12/2012 12:50 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Nov 2012, at 17:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Nov 2012, at 21:16, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12 Nov 2012, at 20:27, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/12/2012 11:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Nov 2012, at 21:16, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/10/2012 10:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 13 Nov 2012, at 00:48, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/12/2012 12:50 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Nov 2012, at 17:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Nov 2012, at 21:16, Stephen P. King wrote:
This is what I wish to know and understand as well! AFAIK, comp
seems to only define a single
On 11/13/2012 11:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Nov 2012, at 00:48, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/12/2012 12:50 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Nov 2012, at 17:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Nov 2012, at 21:16, Stephen P. King wrote:
This is what I wish to know and understand as
the following content -
From: Russell Standish
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-11-10, 23:00:23
Subject: Re: Doesn't UDA simply imply that teleportation is impossible?
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 07:02:04PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
I think
On 11 Nov 2012, at 20:46, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/10/2012 8:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions: (MAT is weak
materialism: the doctrine
On 11 Nov 2012, at 21:16, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/10/2012 10:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions:
On 12 Nov 2012, at 00:33, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/11/2012 12:20 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Nov 2012, at 05:00, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 07:02:04PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
I think the argument is that
On 12 Nov 2012, at 01:13, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
So why the big fuss over teleportation when the UDA is really all
about establishing that comp is consistent and implies computational/
machine metaphysics rather than materialism? Well, it would seem to
me the entire argument stands or
On 12 Nov 2012, at 17:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Nov 2012, at 21:16, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/10/2012 10:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No
On 11/12/2012 11:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Nov 2012, at 21:16, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/10/2012 10:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No
On 11/12/2012 12:50 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 12 Nov 2012, at 17:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Nov 2012, at 21:16, Stephen P. King wrote:
This is what I wish to know and understand as well! AFAIK, comp
seems to only define a single conscious mind!
?
That is contradicted by step
On 11 Nov 2012, at 02:14, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions: (MAT is weak
materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical reality)
COMP - NOT MAT
MAT - NOT COMP
NOT MAT or NOT COMP
I keep COMP as
On 11 Nov 2012, at 02:44, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions: (MAT is weak
materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical
reality)
COMP
On 11 Nov 2012, at 05:00, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 07:02:04PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
anti-solipsism
On 11/10/2012 8:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions: (MAT is weak
materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical
reality)
COMP -
On 11/10/2012 10:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions: (MAT is weak
materialism: the doctrine that there is
On 11/10/2012 11:43 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 8:00 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 07:02:04PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity
On 11/11/2012 12:24 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 08:43:29PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 8:00 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
I'm not sure how Bruno argues for it, but my version goes something
like:
1) Self-awareness is a requirement for consciousness
2) We expect
On 11/11/2012 11:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Nov 2012, at 02:14, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions: (MAT is weak
materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical reality)
COMP - NOT MAT
MAT -
On 11/11/2012 12:20 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Nov 2012, at 05:00, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 07:02:04PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for
On Saturday, November 10, 2012 3:00:33 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 11/10/2012 1:11 AM, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
Hey all on the list,
Bruno, I must say, thinking of the UDA. The key assumption is this
teleportation
business, and wouldn't it really be quite Ockham's Razorish to
On Sun, Nov 11, 2012 at 04:13:38PM -0800, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
On Saturday, November 10, 2012 3:00:33 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 11/10/2012 1:11 AM, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
but rather the less appealing conclusion that, perhaps, the
teleportation required in
your entire
On 11/11/2012 4:13 PM, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
On Saturday, November 10, 2012 3:00:33 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 11/10/2012 1:11 AM, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
Hey all on the list,
Bruno, I must say, thinking of the UDA. The key assumption is this
teleportation
On 11/11/2012 4:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
And many good reasons for thinking it is possible in a Multiverse, as
pointed out by David Deutsch. Time travel into the past is simply
equivalent to going somewhere else in the Multiverse, or to use the
Borge Library of Babel analogy, selecting a
On Sun, Nov 11, 2012 at 09:54:10PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/11/2012 4:45 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
And many good reasons for thinking it is possible in a Multiverse, as
pointed out by David Deutsch. Time travel into the past is simply
equivalent to going somewhere else in the Multiverse,
Dear Dan,
you make a lot of sense. Not so surprizing, though: thought experiments
are created for handling impossible (and NOT knowable) circumstances in the
tenets of (possible? believed?) scientific figments. Like e.g. the EPR.
Or: teleportation (a decade-long bore for me - sorry, Fellows).
My
On 11/10/2012 1:11 AM, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
Hey all on the list,
Bruno, I must say, thinking of the UDA. The key assumption is this teleportation
business, and wouldn't it really be quite Ockham's Razorish to simply conclude from the
entire argument that the correct substitution level is,
On 10 Nov 2012, at 10:11, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
Hey all on the list,
Bruno, I must say, thinking of the UDA. The key assumption is this
teleportation business, and wouldn't it really be quite Ockham's
Razorish to simply conclude from the entire argument that the
correct substitution
On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions: (MAT is weak materialism: the
doctrine that there is a primitive physical reality)
COMP - NOT MAT
MAT - NOT COMP
NOT MAT or NOT COMP
I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions: (MAT is weak
materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical
reality)
COMP - NOT MAT
MAT - NOT COMP
NOT MAT or NOT COMP
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 07:02:04PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
anti-solipsism requirement.
But how does the requirement for
On 11/10/2012 8:00 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 07:02:04PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
anti-solipsism
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 08:43:29PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 8:00 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
I'm not sure how Bruno argues for it, but my version goes something
like:
1) Self-awareness is a requirement for consciousness
2) We expect to find ourselves in an environment
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