Re: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
Hi Stephen P. King Infinity is not communicable. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/15/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 12:33:49 Subject: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic On 11/3/2012 9:13 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Necessary truths are/were/shall be always true. They can't be invented, they have to be discovered. Numbers are such. Yes, but not just discovered, they must be communicable. Arithmetic or had to exist before man or the Big Bang woujld not have worked. I do not restrict entities with 1p to humanity. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
Hi Stephen P. King Then you will get an incorrect motion, which indeed would be very,very interesting. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/10/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-09, 13:22:37 Subject: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic On 11/9/2012 11:17 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King In idealism, physics is conceptual, so things must happen as they're supposed to. Hi Roger, And this happens without an expectation of an explanation as to how it is the case? You see, I reject this idea because there is an entity that is being tacitly assumed to exist whose sole purpose is to determine what 'is supposed to happen'. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
Hi Stephen P. King In idealism, physics is conceptual, so things must happen as they're supposed to. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/9/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-08, 08:36:43 Subject: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic On 11/8/2012 6:29 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King You don't need to throw anything. Parabolas are completely described mathematically. OK, what is the connection between the particular case of throwing and a mathematical description? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-07, 19:42:25 Subject: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic On 11/7/2012 12:46 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Nov 2012, at 17:16, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/7/2012 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Nov 2012, at 17:05, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/6/2012 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: snip This is not convincing as we can make statical interpretation of actions. In physics this is traditionally done by adding one dimension. The action of throwing an apple (action) can easily be associated to a parabola in space-time. This invalidate your point, even if you say that such parabola does not exist, as you will need to beg on the real action to make your point. Dear Bruno, So do you agree that the relation goes both ways, which is to say that the relation is symetrical? If the action of throwing an apple implies a parabola, does the existence of the parabola alone define the particular act of throwing the apple? Throwing an apple === a parabola But throwing a banana a parabola, too. Dear Bruno, Can you not see that these two relations are not in a symmetrical one-to-one relation? There are many actions that can be represented by one and the same parabola. Then why do you ask me if it is symmetrical. You make my point here. Hi Bruno, That is not my question. If you agree that the relation is not symmetrical, then how can you use the existence of the parabola to necessitate the particular case (throwing an apple) without further explanation as to how that one special case is selected? We can show the existence of a general class of entities far easier than the existence of a particular entity! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/9/2012 11:17 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King In idealism, physics is conceptual, so things must happen as they're supposed to. Hi Roger, And this happens without an expectation of an explanation as to how it is the case? You see, I reject this idea because there is an entity that is being tacitly assumed http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tacit_assumption to exist whose sole purpose is to determine what 'is supposed to happen'. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 08 Nov 2012, at 01:42, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/7/2012 12:46 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Nov 2012, at 17:16, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/7/2012 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Nov 2012, at 17:05, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/6/2012 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: snip This is not convincing as we can make statical interpretation of actions. In physics this is traditionally done by adding one dimension. The action of throwing an apple (action) can easily be associated to a parabola in space-time. This invalidate your point, even if you say that such parabola does not exist, as you will need to beg on the real action to make your point. Dear Bruno, So do you agree that the relation goes both ways, which is to say that the relation is symetrical? If the action of throwing an apple implies a parabola, does the existence of the parabola alone define the particular act of throwing the apple? Throwing an apple === a parabola But throwing a banana a parabola, too. Dear Bruno, Can you not see that these two relations are not in a symmetrical one-to-one relation? There are many actions that can be represented by one and the same parabola. Then why do you ask me if it is symmetrical. You make my point here. Hi Bruno, That is not my question. If you agree that the relation is not symmetrical, then how can you use the existence of the parabola to necessitate the particular case (throwing an apple) without further explanation as to how that one special case is selected? The parabola is only one feature of a complex event. But my code saved by the doctor does contains all the relevant information for my survival, in the comp theory. And the computation in arithmetic does singularize my mind from the 3p view. Then form the 1p view I have to take into account all computation. Your analogy simply does not work. We can show the existence of a general class of entities far easier than the existence of a particular entity! Just what I said to say that the MWI assumes less than non-Everett QM. And comp assumes still less than Everett as it forces to derived QM (the SWE) from arithmetic, in a precise way (if we want exploits the G/ G* distinction to get both qualia and quanta). Bruno -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
Hi Stephen P. King You don't need to throw anything. Parabolas are completely described mathematically. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-07, 19:42:25 Subject: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic On 11/7/2012 12:46 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Nov 2012, at 17:16, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/7/2012 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Nov 2012, at 17:05, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/6/2012 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: snip This is not convincing as we can make statical interpretation of actions. In physics this is traditionally done by adding one dimension. The action of throwing an apple (action) can easily be associated to a parabola in space-time. This invalidate your point, even if you say that such parabola does not exist, as you will need to beg on the real action to make your point. Dear Bruno, So do you agree that the relation goes both ways, which is to say that the relation is symetrical? If the action of throwing an apple implies a parabola, does the existence of the parabola alone define the particular act of throwing the apple? Throwing an apple === a parabola But throwing a banana a parabola, too. Dear Bruno, Can you not see that these two relations are not in a symmetrical one-to-one relation? There are many actions that can be represented by one and the same parabola. Then why do you ask me if it is symmetrical. You make my point here. Hi Bruno, That is not my question. If you agree that the relation is not symmetrical, then how can you use the existence of the parabola to necessitate the particular case (throwing an apple) without further explanation as to how that one special case is selected? We can show the existence of a general class of entities far easier than the existence of a particular entity! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/8/2012 6:29 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King You don't need to throw anything. Parabolas are completely described mathematically. OK, what is the connection between the particular case of throwing and a mathematical description? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-07, 19:42:25 Subject: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic On 11/7/2012 12:46 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Nov 2012, at 17:16, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/7/2012 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Nov 2012, at 17:05, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/6/2012 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: snip This is not convincing as we can make statical interpretation of actions. In physics this is traditionally done by adding one dimension. The action of throwing an apple (action) can easily be associated to a parabola in space-time. This invalidate your point, even if you say that such parabola does not exist, as you will need to beg on the real action to make your point. Dear Bruno, So do you agree that the relation goes both ways, which is to say that the relation is symetrical? If the action of throwing an apple implies a parabola, does the existence of the parabola alone define the particular act of throwing the apple? Throwing an apple === a parabola But throwing a banana a parabola, too. Dear Bruno, Can you not see that these two relations are not in a symmetrical one-to-one relation? There are many actions that can be represented by one and the same parabola. Then why do you ask me if it is symmetrical. You make my point here. Hi Bruno, That is not my question. If you agree that the relation is not symmetrical, then how can you use the existence of the parabola to necessitate the particular case (throwing an apple) without further explanation as to how that one special case is selected? We can show the existence of a general class of entities far easier than the existence of a particular entity! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 06 Nov 2012, at 17:05, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/6/2012 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Nov 2012, at 17:31, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/5/2012 11:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Bruno, I am using the possibility of a claim to make my argument, not any actual instance of a claim. There is a difference. In comp there are claims that such and such know or believe or bet. I am trying to widen our thinking of how the potentials of acts is important. I don't understand how you reason. I try to obey the rules of grammar in communication. If a word implies an action, such as run or implement or interview, then there should be some action involved in the referent of the word. Or else it does not imply an action and it an object. Simple logical consistency in semiotics. This is not convincing as we can make statical interpretation of actions. In physics this is traditionally done by adding one dimension. The action of throwing an apple (action) can easily be associated to a parabola in space-time. This invalidate your point, even if you say that such parabola does not exist, as you will need to beg on the real action to make your point. Dear Bruno, So do you agree that the relation goes both ways, which is to say that the relation is symetrical? If the action of throwing an apple implies a parabola, does the existence of the parabola alone define the particular act of throwing the apple? Throwing an apple === a parabola But throwing a banana a parabola, too. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 07 Nov 2012, at 17:16, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/7/2012 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Nov 2012, at 17:05, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/6/2012 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: snip This is not convincing as we can make statical interpretation of actions. In physics this is traditionally done by adding one dimension. The action of throwing an apple (action) can easily be associated to a parabola in space-time. This invalidate your point, even if you say that such parabola does not exist, as you will need to beg on the real action to make your point. Dear Bruno, So do you agree that the relation goes both ways, which is to say that the relation is symetrical? If the action of throwing an apple implies a parabola, does the existence of the parabola alone define the particular act of throwing the apple? Throwing an apple === a parabola But throwing a banana a parabola, too. Dear Bruno, Can you not see that these two relations are not in a symmetrical one-to-one relation? There are many actions that can be represented by one and the same parabola. Then why do you ask me if it is symmetrical. You make my point here. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/7/2012 12:46 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Nov 2012, at 17:16, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/7/2012 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Nov 2012, at 17:05, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/6/2012 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: snip This is not convincing as we can make statical interpretation of actions. In physics this is traditionally done by adding one dimension. The action of throwing an apple (action) can easily be associated to a parabola in space-time. This invalidate your point, even if you say that such parabola does not exist, as you will need to beg on the real action to make your point. Dear Bruno, So do you agree that the relation goes both ways, which is to say that the relation is symetrical? If the action of throwing an apple implies a parabola, does the existence of the parabola alone define the particular act of throwing the apple? Throwing an apple === a parabola But throwing a banana a parabola, too. Dear Bruno, Can you not see that these two relations are not in a symmetrical one-to-one relation? There are many actions that can be represented by one and the same parabola. Then why do you ask me if it is symmetrical. You make my point here. Hi Bruno, That is not my question. If you agree that the relation is not symmetrical, then how can you use the existence of the parabola to necessitate the particular case (throwing an apple) without further explanation as to how that one special case is selected? We can show the existence of a general class of entities far easier than the existence of a particular entity! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 05 Nov 2012, at 17:31, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/5/2012 11:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Bruno, I am using the possibility of a claim to make my argument, not any actual instance of a claim. There is a difference. In comp there are claims that such and such know or believe or bet. I am trying to widen our thinking of how the potentials of acts is important. I don't understand how you reason. I try to obey the rules of grammar in communication. If a word implies an action, such as run or implement or interview, then there should be some action involved in the referent of the word. Or else it does not imply an action and it an object. Simple logical consistency in semiotics. This is not convincing as we can make statical interpretation of actions. In physics this is traditionally done by adding one dimension. The action of throwing an apple (action) can easily be associated to a parabola in space-time. This invalidate your point, even if you say that such parabola does not exist, as you will need to beg on the real action to make your point. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/6/2012 8:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Nov 2012, at 17:31, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/5/2012 11:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Bruno, I am using the possibility of a claim to make my argument, not any actual instance of a claim. There is a difference. In comp there are claims that such and such know or believe or bet. I am trying to widen our thinking of how the potentials of acts is important. I don't understand how you reason. I try to obey the rules of grammar in communication. If a word implies an action, such as run or implement or interview, then there should be some action involved in the referent of the word. Or else it does not imply an action and it an object. Simple logical consistency in semiotics. This is not convincing as we can make statical interpretation of actions. In physics this is traditionally done by adding one dimension. The action of throwing an apple (action) can easily be associated to a parabola in space-time. This invalidate your point, even if you say that such parabola does not exist, as you will need to beg on the real action to make your point. Dear Bruno, So do you agree that the relation goes both ways, which is to say that the relation is symetrical? If the action of throwing an apple implies a parabola, does the existence of the parabola alone define the particular act of throwing the apple? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
Hi Stephen, I wouldn't be too hard on Russell, at least as far as logic goes. He had no way of knowing of Godel's proof. And Whitehead had joined him in the principia project. Certainly two of the brightest minds that ever lived. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-04, 12:51:59 Subject: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic On 03 Nov 2012, at 19:27, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 8:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Bertrand Russell was a superb logician but he was not infallible with regard to metaphysics. He called Leibniz's metaphysics an enchanted land and confessed that he hadn't a clue to what the meaning of pragmatism is. Hi Roger, Yeah, his star fell today, for me. Why. because he was wrong? But all serious people are wrong. To be wrong is a chance, and to be shown wrong is an even bigger chance. Russell was not annoyed by that, because his platonist intuition was preserved. he just learned that reason needed to learn modesty with respect to truth seeking, even on arithmetic and machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
Hi Stephen P. King Science is based on and produces facts. I don't think you would want to call these facts opinions unless they referred to global warming. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-04, 11:37:58 Subject: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic On 11/4/2012 12:37 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 11/3/2012 11:06 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 10:35 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 11/3/2012 8:11 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 8:21 PM, meekerdb wrote: Horsefeathers! How is the truth of an arithmetic statement separable from any claim of that truth? What is the possible value of a statement that we can make no claims about? You are causing confusion by asking how the truth of a statement is separable from any claim of that truth. But claims and statements are the same thing - so of course they are not seperable. Bruno is saying that the claim/statement is NOT the same as the fact that makes it true. 1+1=2 is a claim; it's the claim that 1+1=2. And that's a true claim; it's true that 1+1=2 whether you claim it or not. It is not about me or any other single individual, it is about the mutual agreement on the claim by many individuals, any one of which is irrelevant to the truth of a claim. Realism (arithmetical or other) is the position that the claim by EVERY one of which is irrelevant; the truth of the claim depends only whether it corresponds to a fact. Brent It your claim is true then truth is unknowable, I don't see how that follows. When everyone claimed the Earth was flat did that make it unknowable that it was round? If so how did anyone ever come know it? as facts become meaningless. Fact require independent verification to exist. That's directly contrary to the meaning of 'fact'. I think you want the word 'opinion'. Brent Dear Brent, Try reasoning about this in a way that is not limited to the assumption that observations are not just what humans do or think about. Reality is not just people populated. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
Hi Stephen P. King Do you know of any comp outputs that we could examine ? I myself worship data. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-04, 11:55:27 Subject: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic On 11/4/2012 9:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Nov 2012, at 13:06, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 6:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Dear Bruno, No, that cannot be the case since statements do not even exist if the framework or theory that defines them does not exist, therefore there is not 'truth' for a non-exitence entity. Brent already debunked this. The truth of a statement does not need the existence of the statement. You confuse again the truth of 1+1=2, with a possible claim of that truth, like 1+1=2. Horsefeathers! How is the truth of an arithmetic statement separable from any claim of that truth? Explain me how the truth of an arithmetical truth depends on its being claimed or not. Hi Bruno, I am using the possibility of a claim to make my argument, not any actual instance of a claim. There is a difference. In comp there are claims that such and such know or believe or bet. I am trying to widen our thinking of how the potentials of acts is important. What is the possible value of a statement that we can make no claims about? We can make claim about them, but we don't need to do that for them being true or false. Who are the we that you refer to? Bruno -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/5/2012 7:58 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen, I wouldn't be too hard on Russell, at least as far as logic goes. He had no way of knowing of Godel's proof. And Whitehead had joined him in the principia project. Certainly two of the brightest minds that ever lived. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen Hi Roger, Yes, we must never forget that we are fallible! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/5/2012 8:50 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Science is based on and produces facts. I don't think you would want to call these facts opinions unless they referred to global warming. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen Hi Roger, I would state it differently but it doesn't matter so much as long as we understand that facts are not what we individually might choose to be true, they are that is necessarily true for all that can interact with each other. If we where free to choose our own facts we would not be able to know anything. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/5/2012 8:53 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Do you know of any comp outputs that we could examine ? I myself worship data. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen Hi Roger, Ask Bruno. I think that he has some code of programs that he can repost. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 04 Nov 2012, at 17:55, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/4/2012 9:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Nov 2012, at 13:06, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 6:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Dear Bruno, No, that cannot be the case since statements do not even exist if the framework or theory that defines them does not exist, therefore there is not 'truth' for a non-exitence entity. Brent already debunked this. The truth of a statement does not need the existence of the statement. You confuse again the truth of 1+1=2, with a possible claim of that truth, like 1+1=2. Horsefeathers! How is the truth of an arithmetic statement separable from any claim of that truth? Explain me how the truth of an arithmetical truth depends on its being claimed or not. Hi Bruno, I am using the possibility of a claim to make my argument, not any actual instance of a claim. There is a difference. In comp there are claims that such and such know or believe or bet. I am trying to widen our thinking of how the potentials of acts is important. I don't understand how you reason. What is the possible value of a statement that we can make no claims about? We can make claim about them, but we don't need to do that for them being true or false. Who are the we that you refer to? The universal numbers, or better the Löbian one. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/5/2012 11:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Bruno, I am using the possibility of a claim to make my argument, not any actual instance of a claim. There is a difference. In comp there are claims that such and such know or believe or bet. I am trying to widen our thinking of how the potentials of acts is important. I don't understand how you reason. I try to obey the rules of grammar in communication. If a word implies an action, such as run or implement or interview, then there should be some action involved in the referent of the word. Or else it does not imply an action and it an object. Simple logical consistency in semiotics. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/5/2012 11:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: What is the possible value of a statement that we can make no claims about? We can make claim about them, but we don't need to do that for them being true or false. Who are the we that you refer to? The universal numbers, or better the Löbian one. Bruno Hi Bruno, Are there many Löbian numbers? What is that which makes a difference between them? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
Hi Stephen P. King Hmm, it's a fine point, but communicability implies symbols. I believe that there were numbers before there were symbols for them. There have to be symbols if they are used to think with, but IMHO they were there before that in order for creation to happen systematically, according to some plan, and to have design. I think that the One can do such things spontaneously or else the One would be subservient to numbers. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/5/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 13:33:49 Subject: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic On 11/3/2012 9:13 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Necessary truths are/were/shall be always true. They can't be invented, they have to be discovered. Numbers are such. Yes, but not just discovered, they must be communicable. Arithmetic or had to exist before man or the Big Bang woujld not have worked. I do not restrict entities with 1p to humanity. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 03 Nov 2012, at 13:06, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 6:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Dear Bruno, No, that cannot be the case since statements do not even exist if the framework or theory that defines them does not exist, therefore there is not 'truth' for a non-exitence entity. Brent already debunked this. The truth of a statement does not need the existence of the statement. You confuse again the truth of 1+1=2, with a possible claim of that truth, like 1+1=2. Horsefeathers! How is the truth of an arithmetic statement separable from any claim of that truth? Explain me how the truth of an arithmetical truth depends on its being claimed or not. What is the possible value of a statement that we can make no claims about? We can make claim about them, but we don't need to do that for them being true or false. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/4/2012 12:37 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 11/3/2012 11:06 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 10:35 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 11/3/2012 8:11 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 8:21 PM, meekerdb wrote: Horsefeathers http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/horsefeathers! How is the truth of an arithmetic statement separable from any claim of that truth? What is the possible value of a statement that we can make no claims about? You are causing confusion by asking how the truth of a statement is separable from any claim of that truth. But claims and statements are the same thing - so of course they are not seperable. Bruno is saying that the claim/statement is NOT the same as the fact that makes it true. 1+1=2 is a claim; it's the claim that 1+1=2. And that's a true claim; it's true that 1+1=2 whether you claim it or not. It is not about me or any other single individual, it is about the mutual agreement on the claim by many individuals, any one of which is irrelevant to the truth of a claim. Realism (arithmetical or other) is the position that the claim by EVERY one of which is irrelevant; the truth of the claim depends only whether it corresponds to a fact. Brent It your claim is true then truth is unknowable, I don't see how that follows. When everyone claimed the Earth was flat did that make it unknowable that it was round? If so how did anyone ever come know it? as facts become meaningless. Fact require independent verification to exist. That's directly contrary to the meaning of 'fact'. I think you want the word 'opinion'. Brent Dear Brent, Try reasoning about this in a way that is not limited to the assumption that observations are not just what humans do or think about. Reality is not just people populated. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/4/2012 9:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Nov 2012, at 13:06, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 6:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Dear Bruno, No, that cannot be the case since statements do not even exist if the framework or theory that defines them does not exist, therefore there is not 'truth' for a non-exitence entity. Brent already debunked this. The truth of a statement does not need the existence of the statement. You confuse again the truth of 1+1=2, with a possible claim of that truth, like 1+1=2. Horsefeathers http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/horsefeathers! How is the truth of an arithmetic statement separable from any claim of that truth? Explain me how the truth of an arithmetical truth depends on its being claimed or not. Hi Bruno, I am using the possibility of a claim to make my argument, not any actual instance of a claim. There is a difference. In comp there are claims that such and such know or believe or bet. I am trying to widen our thinking of how the potentials of acts is important. What is the possible value of a statement that we can make no claims about? We can make claim about them, but we don't need to do that for them being true or false. Who are the we that you refer to? Bruno -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 03 Nov 2012, at 19:27, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 8:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Bertrand Russell was a superb logician but he was not infallible with regard to metaphysics. He called Leibniz's metaphysics an enchanted land and confessed that he hadn't a clue to what the meaning of pragmatism is. Hi Roger, Yeah, his star fell today, for me. Why. because he was wrong? But all serious people are wrong. To be wrong is a chance, and to be shown wrong is an even bigger chance. Russell was not annoyed by that, because his platonist intuition was preserved. he just learned that reason needed to learn modesty with respect to truth seeking, even on arithmetic and machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/4/2012 12:51 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Nov 2012, at 19:27, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 8:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Bertrand Russell was a superb logician but he was not infallible with regard to metaphysics. He called Leibniz's metaphysics an enchanted land and confessed that he hadn't a clue to what the meaning of pragmatism is. Hi Roger, Yeah, his star fell today, for me. Why. because he was wrong? But all serious people are wrong. To be wrong is a chance, and to be shown wrong is an even bigger chance. Russell was not annoyed by that, because his platonist intuition was preserved. he just learned that reason needed to learn modesty with respect to truth seeking, even on arithmetic and machine. Dear Bruno, I had hoped that he would could not be saved posthumously from Platonism. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 02 Nov 2012, at 22:03, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/2/2012 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:42, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/1/2012 11:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Enumerate the programs computing functions fro N to N, (or the equivalent notion according to your chosen system). let us call those functions: phi_0, phi_1, phi_2, ... (the phi_i) Let B be a fixed bijection from N x N to N. So B(x,y) is a number. The number u is universal if phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y). And the equality means really that either both phi_u(B(x,y)) and phi_x(y) are defined (number) and that they are equal, OR they are both undefined. In phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y), x is called the program, and y the data. u is the computer. u i said to emulate the program (machine, ...) x on the input y. OK, but this does not answer my question. What is the ontological level mechanism that distinguishes the u and the x and the y from each other? The one you have chosen above. But let continue to use elementary arithmetic, as everyone learn it in school. So the answer is: elementary arithmetic. Dear Bruno,' If there is no entity to chose the elementary arithmetic, how is it chosen or even defined such that there exist arithmetic statements that can possibly be true or false? Nobody needs to do the choice, as the choice is irrelevant for the truth. If someone choose the combinators, the proof of 1+1= 2 will be very long, and a bit awkward, but the proof of KKK = K, will be very short. If someone chose elementary arithmetic, the proof of 1+1=2 will be very short (Liz found it on FOAR), but the proof that KKK = K, will be long and a bit awkward. The fact is that 1+1=2, and KKK=K, are true, independently of the choice of the theory, and indeed independently of the existence of the theories. Dear Bruno, No, that cannot be the case since statements do not even exist if the framework or theory that defines them does not exist, therefore there is not 'truth' for a non-exitence entity. Brent already debunked this. The truth of a statement does not need the existence of the statement. You confuse again the truth of 1+1=2, with a possible claim of that truth, like 1+1=2. We can assume some special Realm or entity does the work of choosing the consistent set of arithmetical statements or, as I suggest, we can consider the totality of all possible physical worlds As long as you make your theory clearer, I can't understand what you mean by physical world, possible, totality, etc. I use the same definitions as other people use. In philosophy of mind and matter, you can't take a term like physical world for granted. Still less totalility of what exist etc. This is especially true in a context where someone pretend to have found a flaw in the Aristotle theology, which is used by most scientist today (in occident at least). I am not claiming a private language and/or set of definitions, even if I have tried to refine the usual definition more sharply than usual. In findamental science all terms need to be redefined semi- axiomatically. Even and, or,not, etc. That is why we use logic which provides tools for doing this and it makes it possible to avoid *all* metaphysical baggage. Physical world: http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/physical?q=Physical adjective 1) relating to the body as opposed to the mind: a range of physical and mental challenges 2) relating to things perceived through the senses as opposed to the mind; tangible or concrete: the physical world 3) relating to physics or the operation of natural forces generally: physical laws http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Possible_world Those theorists who use the concept of possible worlds consider the actual world to be one of the many possible worlds. For each distinct way the world could have been, there is said to be a distinct possible world; the actual world is the one we in fact live in. Among such theorists there is disagreement about the nature of possible worlds; their precise ontological status is disputed, and especially the difference, if any, in ontological status between the actual world and all the other possible worlds. Totality: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/totality 1: an aggregate amount : sum, whole 2 a : the quality or state of being total : wholeness as the implementers of arithmetic statements and thus their provers. Possible physical worlds, taken as a single aggregate, is just as timeless and non-located as the Platonic Realm and yet we don't need any special pleading for us to believe in them. ;-) ? I refuse to believe that you cannot make sense of what I wrote. Does someone else makes sense? Ask her/him to explain. Can you understand that I find your interpretation of Plato's Realm of Ideals to be incorrect? You seem to have read one book or
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/3/2012 6:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Dear Bruno, No, that cannot be the case since statements do not even exist if the framework or theory that defines them does not exist, therefore there is not 'truth' for a non-exitence entity. Brent already debunked this. The truth of a statement does not need the existence of the statement. You confuse again the truth of 1+1=2, with a possible claim of that truth, like 1+1=2. Horsefeathers http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/horsefeathers! How is the truth of an arithmetic statement separable from any claim of that truth? What is the possible value of a statement that we can make no claims about? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/3/2012 6:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Russell is still a pregödelian philosophers. Gödel refutes his general philosophy of math in a precise way. Any idea in what book or paper is Gödel's refutation? I wish to read this! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
Hi Stephen P. King Bertrand Russell was a superb logician but he was not infallible with regard to metaphysics. He called Leibniz's metaphysics an enchanted land and confessed that he hadn't a clue to what the meaning of pragmatism is. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-02, 17:03:42 Subject: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic On 11/2/2012 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:42, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/1/2012 11:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Enumerate the programs computing functions fro N to N, (or the equivalent notion according to your chosen system). let us call those functions: phi_0, phi_1, phi_2, ... (the phi_i) Let B be a fixed bijection from N x N to N. So B(x,y) is a number. The number u is universal if phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y). And the equality means really that either both phi_u(B(x,y)) and phi_x(y) are defined (number) and that they are equal, OR they are both undefined. In phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y), x is called the program, and y the data. u is the computer. u i said to emulate the program (machine, ...) x on the input y. OK, but this does not answer my question. What is the ontological level mechanism that distinguishes the u and the x and the y from each other? The one you have chosen above. But let continue to use elementary arithmetic, as everyone learn it in school. So the answer is: elementary arithmetic. Dear Bruno,' If there is no entity to chose the elementary arithmetic, how is it chosen or even defined such that there exist arithmetic statements that can possibly be true or false? Nobody needs to do the choice, as the choice is irrelevant for the truth. If someone choose the combinators, the proof of 1+1= 2 will be very long, and a bit awkward, but the proof of KKK = K, will be very short. If someone chose elementary arithmetic, the proof of 1+1=2 will be very short (Liz found it on FOAR), but the proof that KKK = K, will be long and a bit awkward. The fact is that 1+1=2, and KKK=K, are true, independently of the choice of the theory, and indeed independently of the existence of the theories. Dear Bruno, No, that cannot be the case since statements do not even exist if the framework or theory that defines them does not exist, therefore there is not 'truth' for a non-exitence entity. We can assume some special Realm or entity does the work of choosing the consistent set of arithmetical statements or, as I suggest, we can consider the totality of all possible physical worlds As long as you make your theory clearer, I can't understand what you mean by physical world, possible, totality, etc. I use the same definitions as other people use. I am not claiming a private language and/or set of definitions, even if I have tried to refine the usual definition more sharply than usual. Physical world: http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/physical?q=Physical adjective 1) relating to the body as opposed to the mind: a range of physical and mental challenges 2) relating to things perceived through the senses as opposed to the mind; tangible or concrete: the physical world 3) relating to physics or the operation of natural forces generally: physical laws http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Possible_world Those theorists who use the concept of possible worlds consider the actual world to be one of the many possible worlds. For each distinct way the world could have been, there is said to be a distinct possible world; the actual world is the one we in fact live in. Among such theorists there is disagreement about the nature of possible worlds; their precise ontological status is disputed, and especially the difference, if any, in ontological status between the actual world and all the other possible worlds. Totality: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/totality 1: an aggregate amount : sum, whole 2a : the quality or state of being total : wholeness as the implementers of arithmetic statements and thus their provers. Possible physical worlds, taken as a single aggregate, is just as timeless and non-located as the Platonic Realm and yet we don't need any special pleading for us to believe in them. ;-) ? I refuse to believe that you cannot make sense of what I wrote. Can you understand that I find your interpretation of Plato's Realm of Ideals to be incorrect? You seem to have read one book or taken one lecture on the subject and not read any more philosophical discussion of the ideas involved. I have asked you repeatedly to merely read Bertrand Russell's small book on philosophy - with is available on-line here http://www.ditext.com/russell/russell.html, but you seem unwilling to do that. Why
Re: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
Hi Stephen P. King Contingent truths (facts) are not always true. They are constructed by inference or induction by man (a la Francis Bacon). Quantities are such. Necessary truths are/were/shall be always true. They can't be invented, they have to be discovered. Numbers are such. Arithmetic or had to exist before man or the Big Bang woujld not have worked. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 11/3/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-03, 08:06:59 Subject: Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic On 11/3/2012 6:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Dear Bruno, No, that cannot be the case since statements do not even exist if the framework or theory that defines them does not exist, therefore there is not 'truth' for a non-exitence entity. Brent already debunked this. The truth of a statement does not need the existence of the statement. You confuse again the truth of 1+1=2, with a possible claim of that truth, like 1+1=2. Horsefeathers! How is the truth of an arithmetic statement separable from any claim of that truth? What is the possible value of a statement that we can make no claims about? -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 4:03 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: Dear Bruno, No, that cannot be the case since statements do not even exist if the framework or theory that defines them does not exist, therefore there is not 'truth' for a non-exitence entity. Stephen, in your philosophy do you believe the Milky way existed before there was life to see it? Can things not happen or be true in the absence of observers? Can a universe devoid of internal observers be said to exist? If so, in what sense would you say it exists? Thanks, Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/3/2012 8:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Bertrand Russell was a superb logician but he was not infallible with regard to metaphysics. He called Leibniz's metaphysics an enchanted land and confessed that he hadn't a clue to what the meaning of pragmatism is. Hi Roger, Yeah, his star fell today, for me. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/3/2012 9:13 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Necessary truths are/were/shall be always true. They can't be invented, they have to be discovered. Numbers are such. Yes, but not just discovered, they must be communicable. Arithmetic or had to exist before man or the Big Bang woujld not have worked. I do not restrict entities with 1p to humanity. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/3/2012 1:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Fri, Nov 2, 2012 at 4:03 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: Dear Bruno, No, that cannot be the case since statements do not even exist if the framework or theory that defines them does not exist, therefore there is not 'truth' for a non-exitence entity. Stephen, in your philosophy do you believe the Milky way existed before there was life to see it? Hi Jason, Why are you assuming that life has a small set of possible instances? I see life as a very broad spectrum. In my thinking, instances life occurs when ever an entropy flow http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/life.html can be harnessed to sustain autopoiesis http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autopoiesis. Can things not happen or be true in the absence of observers? No, there is no meaning to things or true in the absence of observers, as they are properties that observers agree upon. Can a universe devoid of internal observers be said to exist? Yes. Existence is not dependent or contingent. If so, in what sense would you say it exists? It is a necessary possibility thus it exists. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/3/2012 7:06 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 6:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Dear Bruno, No, that cannot be the case since statements do not even exist if the framework or theory that defines them does not exist, therefore there is not 'truth' for a non-exitence entity. Brent already debunked this. The truth of a statement does not need the existence of the statement. You confuse again the truth of 1+1=2, with a possible claim of that truth, like 1+1=2. Horsefeathers http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/horsefeathers! How is the truth of an arithmetic statement separable from any claim of that truth? What is the possible value of a statement that we can make no claims about? You are causing confusion by asking how the truth of a statement is separable from any claim of that truth. But claims and statements are the same thing - so of course they are not seperable. Bruno is saying that the claim/statement is NOT the same as the fact that makes it true. 1+1=2 is a claim; it's the claim that 1+1=2. And that's a true claim; it's true that 1+1=2 whether you claim it or not. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/3/2012 8:21 PM, meekerdb wrote: Horsefeathers http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/horsefeathers! How is the truth of an arithmetic statement separable from any claim of that truth? What is the possible value of a statement that we can make no claims about? You are causing confusion by asking how the truth of a statement is separable from any claim of that truth. But claims and statements are the same thing - so of course they are not seperable. Bruno is saying that the claim/statement is NOT the same as the fact that makes it true. 1+1=2 is a claim; it's the claim that 1+1=2. And that's a true claim; it's true that 1+1=2 whether you claim it or not. It is not about me or any other single individual, it is about the mutual agreement on the claim by many individuals, any one of which is irrelevant to the truth of a claim. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/3/2012 8:11 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 8:21 PM, meekerdb wrote: Horsefeathers http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/horsefeathers! How is the truth of an arithmetic statement separable from any claim of that truth? What is the possible value of a statement that we can make no claims about? You are causing confusion by asking how the truth of a statement is separable from any claim of that truth. But claims and statements are the same thing - so of course they are not seperable. Bruno is saying that the claim/statement is NOT the same as the fact that makes it true. 1+1=2 is a claim; it's the claim that 1+1=2. And that's a true claim; it's true that 1+1=2 whether you claim it or not. It is not about me or any other single individual, it is about the mutual agreement on the claim by many individuals, any one of which is irrelevant to the truth of a claim. Realism (arithmetical or other) is the position that the claim by EVERY one of which is irrelevant; the truth of the claim depends only whether it corresponds to a fact. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/3/2012 10:35 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 11/3/2012 8:11 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 8:21 PM, meekerdb wrote: Horsefeathers http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/horsefeathers! How is the truth of an arithmetic statement separable from any claim of that truth? What is the possible value of a statement that we can make no claims about? You are causing confusion by asking how the truth of a statement is separable from any claim of that truth. But claims and statements are the same thing - so of course they are not seperable. Bruno is saying that the claim/statement is NOT the same as the fact that makes it true. 1+1=2 is a claim; it's the claim that 1+1=2. And that's a true claim; it's true that 1+1=2 whether you claim it or not. It is not about me or any other single individual, it is about the mutual agreement on the claim by many individuals, any one of which is irrelevant to the truth of a claim. Realism (arithmetical or other) is the position that the claim by EVERY one of which is irrelevant; the truth of the claim depends only whether it corresponds to a fact. Brent It your claim is true then truth is unknowable, as facts become meaningless. Fact require independent verification to exist. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/3/2012 11:06 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 10:35 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 11/3/2012 8:11 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/3/2012 8:21 PM, meekerdb wrote: Horsefeathers http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/horsefeathers! How is the truth of an arithmetic statement separable from any claim of that truth? What is the possible value of a statement that we can make no claims about? You are causing confusion by asking how the truth of a statement is separable from any claim of that truth. But claims and statements are the same thing - so of course they are not seperable. Bruno is saying that the claim/statement is NOT the same as the fact that makes it true. 1+1=2 is a claim; it's the claim that 1+1=2. And that's a true claim; it's true that 1+1=2 whether you claim it or not. It is not about me or any other single individual, it is about the mutual agreement on the claim by many individuals, any one of which is irrelevant to the truth of a claim. Realism (arithmetical or other) is the position that the claim by EVERY one of which is irrelevant; the truth of the claim depends only whether it corresponds to a fact. Brent It your claim is true then truth is unknowable, I don't see how that follows. When everyone claimed the Earth was flat did that make it unknowable that it was round? If so how did anyone ever come know it? as facts become meaningless. Fact require independent verification to exist. That's directly contrary to the meaning of 'fact'. I think you want the word 'opinion'. Brent -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 8.5.455 / Virus Database: 271.1.1/5370 - Release Date: 11/02/12 19:34:00 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:42, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/1/2012 11:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Enumerate the programs computing functions fro N to N, (or the equivalent notion according to your chosen system). let us call those functions: phi_0, phi_1, phi_2, ... (the phi_i) Let B be a fixed bijection from N x N to N. So B(x,y) is a number. The number u is universal if phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y). And the equality means really that either both phi_u(B(x,y)) and phi_x(y) are defined (number) and that they are equal, OR they are both undefined. In phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y), x is called the program, and y the data. u is the computer. u i said to emulate the program (machine, ...) x on the input y. OK, but this does not answer my question. What is the ontological level mechanism that distinguishes the u and the x and the y from each other? The one you have chosen above. But let continue to use elementary arithmetic, as everyone learn it in school. So the answer is: elementary arithmetic. Dear Bruno,' If there is no entity to chose the elementary arithmetic, how is it chosen or even defined such that there exist arithmetic statements that can possibly be true or false? Nobody needs to do the choice, as the choice is irrelevant for the truth. If someone choose the combinators, the proof of 1+1= 2 will be very long, and a bit awkward, but the proof of KKK = K, will be very short. If someone chose elementary arithmetic, the proof of 1+1=2 will be very short (Liz found it on FOAR), but the proof that KKK = K, will be long and a bit awkward. The fact is that 1+1=2, and KKK=K, are true, independently of the choice of the theory, and indeed independently of the existence of the theories. We can assume some special Realm or entity does the work of choosing the consistent set of arithmetical statements or, as I suggest, we can consider the totality of all possible physical worlds As long as you make your theory clearer, I can't understand what you mean by physical world, possible, totality, etc. as the implementers of arithmetic statements and thus their provers. Possible physical worlds, taken as a single aggregate, is just as timeless and non-located as the Platonic Realm and yet we don't need any special pleading for us to believe in them. ;-) ? Bruno My thinking here follows the reasoning of Jaakko Hintikka. Are you familiar with it? Game theoretic semantics for Proof theory -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the ontological status of elementary arithmetic
On 11/2/2012 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:42, Stephen P. King wrote: On 11/1/2012 11:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Enumerate the programs computing functions fro N to N, (or the equivalent notion according to your chosen system). let us call those functions: phi_0, phi_1, phi_2, ... (the phi_i) Let B be a fixed bijection from N x N to N. So B(x,y) is a number. The number u is universal if phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y). And the equality means really that either both phi_u(B(x,y)) and phi_x(y) are defined (number) and that they are equal, OR they are both undefined. In phi_u(B(x,y)) = phi_x(y), x is called the program, and y the data. u is the computer. u i said to emulate the program (machine, ...) x on the input y. OK, but this does not answer my question. What is the ontological level mechanism that distinguishes the u and the x and the y from each other? The one you have chosen above. But let continue to use elementary arithmetic, as everyone learn it in school. So the answer is: elementary arithmetic. Dear Bruno,' If there is no entity to chose the elementary arithmetic, how is it chosen or even defined such that there exist arithmetic statements that can possibly be true or false? Nobody needs to do the choice, as the choice is irrelevant for the truth. If someone choose the combinators, the proof of 1+1= 2 will be very long, and a bit awkward, but the proof of KKK = K, will be very short. If someone chose elementary arithmetic, the proof of 1+1=2 will be very short (Liz found it on FOAR), but the proof that KKK = K, will be long and a bit awkward. The fact is that 1+1=2, and KKK=K, are true, independently of the choice of the theory, and indeed independently of the existence of the theories. Dear Bruno, No, that cannot be the case since statements do not even exist if the framework or theory that defines them does not exist, therefore there is not 'truth' for a non-exitence entity. We can assume some special Realm or entity does the work of choosing the consistent set of arithmetical statements or, as I suggest, we can consider the totality of all possible physical worlds As long as you make your theory clearer, I can't understand what you mean by physical world, possible, totality, etc. I use the same definitions as other people use. I am not claiming a private language and/or set of definitions, even if I have tried to refine the usual definition more sharply than usual. Physical world: http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/physical?q=Physical adjective 1) relating to the body as opposed to the mind: /a range of physical and mental challenges/ 2) relating to things perceived through the senses as opposed to the mind; tangible or concrete: the physical world 3) relating to physics or the operation of natural forces generally: /physical laws/ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Possible_world Those theorists who use the concept of possible worlds consider the actual world to be one of the many possible worlds. For each distinct way the world could have been, there is said to be a distinct possible world; the actual world is the one we in fact live in. Among such theorists there is disagreement about the nature of possible worlds; their precise ontological status is disputed, and especially the difference, if any, in ontological status between the actual world and all the other possible worlds. Totality: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/totality * 1:*an aggregate amount*:*sum http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sum,whole http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/whole 2 /a/*:*the quality or state of beingtotal http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/total*:*wholeness http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/wholeness as the implementers of arithmetic statements and thus their provers. Possible physical worlds, taken as a single aggregate, is just as timeless and non-located as the Platonic Realm and yet we don't need any special pleading for us to believe in them. ;-) ? I refuse to believe that you cannot make sense of what I wrote. Can you understand that I find your interpretation of Plato's Realm of Ideals to be incorrect? You seem to have read one book or taken one lecture on the subject and not read any more philosophical discussion of the ideas involved. I have asked you repeatedly to merely read Bertrand Russell's small book on philosophy - with is available on-line here http://www.ditext.com/russell/russell.html, but you seem unwilling to do that. Why? Bruno My thinking here follows the reasoning of Jaakko Hintikka. Are you familiar with it? Game theoretic semantics for Proof theory http://www.hf.uio.no/ifikk/forskning/publikasjoner/tidsskrifter/njpl/vol4no2/gamesem.pdf -- How about considering that there are alternatives to your idea of timeless Truths? Jaakko Hintikka does a nice job exploring one of
