Re: Santa Klaus does exist!
On 12 Dec 2013, at 06:30, Jesse Mazer wrote: Thanks Bruno. As I understand it step 8's movie-graph argument is making a point similar to the implementation problem chalmers discusses in the paper at http://consc.net/papers/rock.html -- basically the problem is that there seems to be no good way to decide whether a given physical system implements a given abstract computation (Chalmers proposes his own rules for deciding this, but they seem a bit ad hoc to me, depending on dividing a physical system into distinct spatial regions). Hmm... I am not sure I agree with this. rock is a non well defined notion. I think we have already discuss this, when I told you it is more related with Maudlin than with the Chalmers-Putnam-Mallah implementation problem. I guess we will soon or later come back to step 8. It only dimish the use of Occam to get the reversal physics/arithmetic (or physics/ theology). Anyway, even though I tend to agree with you about rejecting the idea of what you call real ontological primitive matter, it seems to me this argument goes too far, because it could easily be modified into an argument that there's no good way to decide whether one abstract computation (including the universal dovetailer) implements another computation as some sort of subroutine of the first one. Consider your movie-graph experiment, where you have a lab with a computer made of optical gates. What if, instead of a real physical lab, we imagine a program A that is running an incredibly complex simulation of the same sort of lab, down to the level of individual atoms and photons and such? And within this simulated lab is the same type of computer made of simulated optical gates, which are supposed to run some simpler program B (we could imagine B is some very simple program, say a 1D cellular automaton consisting of a small number of cells, or we could imagine B as something complicated enough to include a conscious observer, like a large simulated neural network, but still much simpler than the atom-level simulation of the lab). If the notion of one program implementing another as a subroutine has any meaning, then shouldn't this be a case where program A implements program B? Yes. As long as there is an (perhaps unknown) universal numbers relating logically the states, we can say that there is a computation. A computation is really equivalent with the giving of 1) a universal number or system (that is: a number) 2) a data (a number for the program run by the universal number above) 3) two numbers (the beginning and end of the computation. The end does not need to be a stopping state). This is a finite object, and can be codes by a number. But if the simulated lab has a simulated movie projector of the type you describe, then simulated experimenters in the lab could run the experiment you describe of knocking out logic gates and replacing them with a movie of the same gates projected from above, which provide the needed triggers to the remaining light-sensitive gates. If more and more gates are knocked out until all that's left is a simulated movie being projected on an empty table, is there still any meaningful sense that program A is implementing program B? There is no more sense. That would be a confusion between a description of a computation, and a computation. To have a computation, you need the exact logical relationhip between the state. The filmed movie abstracts from them. It only points to the fact that some computation exist, but is not a computation. Personally, I lean towards the idea that since any running of a Turing machine can be represented as a set of logically interconnected propositions in an axiomatic system, to say that program A implements program B can mean that you can map some subset of the propositions about program A to all the propositions about program B, such that all the same logical relationships between the propositions still apply. That seems correct, yes. The computation is in the logical relationship between the numbers, states, etc. Not in their local implementation, which change the measure, and not at all in the descriptions of computation, like the filmed graph, which will not change the measure, unless they are used for some further reimplementations (which would again change the measure). I think we agree on this. OK? And if the physical world follows universal physical laws, then the set of all physical truths about events in spacetime and the causal relationships between them should in principle be representable as a huge set of propositions about events, and propositions about universal laws, with logical relationships between them--in that case physical implementation could be defined in exactly the same way as I suggest defining program A's implementation of program B above. This is the idea I discussed with you a few
Re: Santa Klaus does exist!
Thanks Bruno. As I understand it step 8's movie-graph argument is making a point similar to the implementation problem chalmers discusses in the paper at http://consc.net/papers/rock.html -- basically the problem is that there seems to be no good way to decide whether a given physical system implements a given abstract computation (Chalmers proposes his own rules for deciding this, but they seem a bit ad hoc to me, depending on dividing a physical system into distinct spatial regions). Anyway, even though I tend to agree with you about rejecting the idea of what you call real ontological primitive matter, it seems to me this argument goes too far, because it could easily be modified into an argument that there's no good way to decide whether one abstract computation (including the universal dovetailer) implements another computation as some sort of subroutine of the first one. Consider your movie-graph experiment, where you have a lab with a computer made of optical gates. What if, instead of a real physical lab, we imagine a program A that is running an incredibly complex simulation of the same sort of lab, down to the level of individual atoms and photons and such? And within this simulated lab is the same type of computer made of simulated optical gates, which are supposed to run some simpler program B (we could imagine B is some very simple program, say a 1D cellular automaton consisting of a small number of cells, or we could imagine B as something complicated enough to include a conscious observer, like a large simulated neural network, but still much simpler than the atom-level simulation of the lab). If the notion of one program implementing another as a subroutine has any meaning, then shouldn't this be a case where program A implements program B? But if the simulated lab has a simulated movie projector of the type you describe, then simulated experimenters in the lab could run the experiment you describe of knocking out logic gates and replacing them with a movie of the same gates projected from above, which provide the needed triggers to the remaining light-sensitive gates. If more and more gates are knocked out until all that's left is a simulated movie being projected on an empty table, is there still any meaningful sense that program A is implementing program B? Personally, I lean towards the idea that since any running of a Turing machine can be represented as a set of logically interconnected propositions in an axiomatic system, to say that program A implements program B can mean that you can map some subset of the propositions about program A to all the propositions about program B, such that all the same logical relationships between the propositions still apply. And if the physical world follows universal physical laws, then the set of all physical truths about events in spacetime and the causal relationships between them should in principle be representable as a huge set of propositions about events, and propositions about universal laws, with logical relationships between them--in that case physical implementation could be defined in exactly the same way as I suggest defining program A's implementation of program B above. This is the idea I discussed with you a few years ago in the post at http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@googlegroups.com/msg16244.htmland some of the follow-ups--I used the word causal structure there for this notion of isomorphisms in relations between propositions, although I think logical structure might be better since this could apply to collections of propositions in any axiomatic system, including arithmetic, where we don't normally think of the relationships between propositions as causal ones. Jesse On Tue, Dec 10, 2013 at 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 09 Dec 2013, at 23:03, Jesse Mazer wrote: I don't have institutional access but I was able to read it online, That was what Elsevier (Santa) promised. though not to download it as a PDF Pfftt Santa looks like being a bit shabby those days ... (I just copy-and-pasted all the text for future reference instead). It's great to see each step of the argument laid out in greater detail than I've seen on the list (admittedly I don't consistently read all the posts here)--I still have doubts about step 8, the film-graph argument, hopefully will have time to write up my response soon. Thanks. We can come back on step 8 anytime. It shows that any supplementary assumptions we could add to (Robinson, no induction axioms) Arithmetic will not change anything about the belief we can have on matter, making primitive matter into ether or phlogiston. Step 8 just reduces the amount of occam razor that we should need in step 7, in case we want to stop the argument at that step. Step 8 is not so useful in this list, because most people here are 'everythingers', and so find quite doubtful the idea that we would live in a unique little physical universe,
Re: Santa Klaus does exist!
On 09 Dec 2013, at 23:45, meekerdb wrote: On 12/9/2013 2:03 PM, Jesse Mazer wrote: I don't have institutional access but I was able to read it online, though not to download it as a PDF (I just copy-and-pasted all the text for future reference instead). It's great to see each step of the argument laid out in greater detail than I've seen on the list (admittedly I don't consistently read all the posts here)--I still have doubts about step 8, the film-graph argument, hopefully will have time to write up my response soon. I have similar doubts. I also doubt that numbers exist You need only to believe in the following axioms (which are used in all textbook of physics and math): 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x You can even believe only in: Kxy = x Sxyz = xz(yz) That's all. and that the axiom of infinity is anything but a convenient approximation. No problem. We need it in the derivation of the physical laws, but that appears only at the epistemological level. But I still think there's a lot interesting about Bruno's ideas and I'm glad to see them reach a larger audience. Thanks, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Santa Klaus does exist!
On 09 Dec 2013, at 23:03, Jesse Mazer wrote: I don't have institutional access but I was able to read it online, That was what Elsevier (Santa) promised. though not to download it as a PDF Pfftt Santa looks like being a bit shabby those days ... (I just copy-and-pasted all the text for future reference instead). It's great to see each step of the argument laid out in greater detail than I've seen on the list (admittedly I don't consistently read all the posts here)--I still have doubts about step 8, the film- graph argument, hopefully will have time to write up my response soon. Thanks. We can come back on step 8 anytime. It shows that any supplementary assumptions we could add to (Robinson, no induction axioms) Arithmetic will not change anything about the belief we can have on matter, making primitive matter into ether or phlogiston. Step 8 just reduces the amount of occam razor that we should need in step 7, in case we want to stop the argument at that step. Step 8 is not so useful in this list, because most people here are 'everythingers', and so find quite doubtful the idea that we would live in a unique little physical universe, which is the move you can still do at step 7 to save the idea of real ontological primitive matter (but who needs that?). Step 8 makes primitive matter into a god- of-the-gap explaining nothing, not even the appearance of matter (unless you make it non Turing emulable and playing a role in the brain, but then comp get wrong). UDA 1-7 is purely deductive, but step 8 is supposed to make the link with 'reality', and so we need some use of occam razor. Bruno Jesse On Mon, Dec 9, 2013 at 3:32 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Excellent, Bruno! I'm very glad for you - and for the wider audience that will now read your ideas. However I notice Santa only delivers if you have institutional access. I do. But others on the list may not. Brent On 12/9/2013 2:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi, Santa Klaus exists, and by its magical power seems to have made my last paper (The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body problem) in Progress in biophysics and molecular biology, *freely* available; here: http://elsarticle.com/18AF6PI This offer seems to last up to the 31 january (Santa Klaus seems to have only a *finite* amount of magic). So please download, comment, ask questions, etc. it contains (again!) the two main parts (UDA, AUDA), but also answers to many reviewers' questions in an appendix. I send this also on FOAR, for Gary :) (apology for the doubletons) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Santa Klaus does exist!
Hi, Santa Klaus exists, and by its magical power seems to have made my last paper (The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body problem) in Progress in biophysics and molecular biology, *freely* available; here: http://elsarticle.com/18AF6PI This offer seems to last up to the 31 january (Santa Klaus seems to have only a *finite* amount of magic). So please download, comment, ask questions, etc. it contains (again!) the two main parts (UDA, AUDA), but also answers to many reviewers' questions in an appendix. I send this also on FOAR, for Gary :) (apology for the doubletons) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Santa Klaus does exist!
Excellent, Bruno! I'm very glad for you - and for the wider audience that will now read your ideas. However I notice Santa only delivers if you have institutional access. I do. But others on the list may not. Brent On 12/9/2013 2:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi, Santa Klaus exists, and by its magical power seems to have made my last paper (The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body problem) in /Progress in biophysics and molecular biology/, *freely* available; here: *http://elsarticle.com/18AF6PI http://mail.elsevier-alerts.com/go.asp?/bESJ001/mCGPFMCF/qU7YOMCF/u9PAFWV3/xFO2PNCF/cutf%2D8* This offer seems to last up to the 31 january (Santa Klaus seems to have only a *finite* amount of magic). So please download, comment, ask questions, etc. it contains (again!) the two main parts (UDA, AUDA), but also answers to many reviewers' questions in an appendix. I send this also on FOAR, for Gary :) (apology for the doubletons) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Santa Klaus does exist!
I don't have institutional access but I was able to read it online, though not to download it as a PDF (I just copy-and-pasted all the text for future reference instead). It's great to see each step of the argument laid out in greater detail than I've seen on the list (admittedly I don't consistently read all the posts here)--I still have doubts about step 8, the film-graph argument, hopefully will have time to write up my response soon. Jesse On Mon, Dec 9, 2013 at 3:32 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Excellent, Bruno! I'm very glad for you - and for the wider audience that will now read your ideas. However I notice Santa only delivers if you have institutional access. I do. But others on the list may not. Brent On 12/9/2013 2:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi, Santa Klaus exists, and by its magical power seems to have made my last paper (The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body problem) in *Progress in biophysics and molecular biology*, *freely* available; here: *http://elsarticle.com/18AF6PI http://mail.elsevier-alerts.com/go.asp?/bESJ001/mCGPFMCF/qU7YOMCF/u9PAFWV3/xFO2PNCF/cutf%2D8* This offer seems to last up to the 31 january (Santa Klaus seems to have only a *finite* amount of magic). So please download, comment, ask questions, etc. it contains (again!) the two main parts (UDA, AUDA), but also answers to many reviewers' questions in an appendix. I send this also on FOAR, for Gary :) (apology for the doubletons) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Santa Klaus does exist!
On 12/9/2013 2:03 PM, Jesse Mazer wrote: I don't have institutional access but I was able to read it online, though not to download it as a PDF (I just copy-and-pasted all the text for future reference instead). It's great to see each step of the argument laid out in greater detail than I've seen on the list (admittedly I don't consistently read all the posts here)--I still have doubts about step 8, the film-graph argument, hopefully will have time to write up my response soon. I have similar doubts. I also doubt that numbers exist and that the axiom of infinity is anything but a convenient approximation. But I still think there's a lot interesting about Bruno's ideas and I'm glad to see them reach a larger audience. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
