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Saibal
- Original Message -
From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 08:49 AM
Subject: Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA
Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I don't understand why you consider
Hal Finney writes:
The problem is that there seems to be no basis for judging the validity
of this kind of analysis. Do we die every instant? Do we survive sleep
but not being frozen? Do we live on in our copies? Does our identity
extend to all conscious entities? There are so many
Le 20-juin-06, à 08:47, Hal Finney a écrit :
I'll offer my thoughts on first-person indeterminacy. This is based
on Wei Dai's framework which I have called UD+ASSA.
I guess you mean your UDist here.
I am working on
some web pages to summarize the various conclusions I have drawn
Le 21-juin-06, à 08:49, Hal Finney a écrit (to Saibal Mitra):
snip
and further, since
the UD generates all minds, it means that all minds have equal measure.
Never underestimate the basic fundamental stupidity of the UD. The UD
execution is very redundant and the measure will be relative.
Hal,
Here I agree with everything you say. Functionalism presupposes
computationalism, but computationalism makes computationalism false.
exit functionnalism. Even maudlin makes the confusion. I repeat that
both thought experiments and Godel's incompleteness show that if we are
machine then
Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
OK, I think I'm clear on what you're saying now. But suppose I argue
that I will not survive the next hour, because the matter making up my
synapses will have turned over in this time. To an outside observer the
person taking my place would seem
Bruno raises a lot of good points, but I will just focus on a couple
of them.
The first notion that I am using in this analysis is the assumption that a
first-person stream of consciousness exists as a Platonic object. My aim
is then to estimate the measure of such objects. I don't know
Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
On Tue, Jun 20, 2006 at 09:35:12AM -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
I think that one of the fundamental principles of your COMP hypothesis
is the functionalist notion, that it does not matter what kind of system
instantiates a computation. However I
On Tue, Jun 20, 2006 at 11:11:15PM -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
I am mostly referring to the philosophical literature on the problems of
what counts as an instantiation, as well as responses considered here
and elsewhere. One online paper is Chalmers' Does a Rock Implement
Every Finite-State
Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I don't understand why you consider the measures of the programs that do the
simulations. The ''real'' measure should be derived from the algorithmic
complexity of the laws of physics that describe how the computers/brains
work. If you know for certain
Hal Finney writes:
IshouldfirstmentionthatIdidnotanticipatetheconclusionthat IreachedwhenIdidthatanalysis.Ididnotexpecttoconcludethat teleportationlikethiswouldprobablynotwork(speakingfigurately). Thiswasnotthestartingpointoftheanalysis,buttheconclusion.
Yes, but every theoretical scientist
Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Hal Finney writes:
I should first mention that I did not anticipate the conclusion that
I reached when I did that analysis. I did not expect to conclude that
teleportation like this would probably not work (speaking figurately).
This was not
Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
If computationalism is true, then a person is instantiated by all
equivalent computations. If you change one instantiation to something
inequivalent, then that instantiation no longer instantiates the
person. The person continues to exist, as long as
Hi Hal,
Le Mercredi 21 Juin 2006 19:31, Hal Finney a écrit :
What, after all, do these principles mean? They say that the
implementation substrate doesn't matter. You can implement a person
using neurons or tinkertoys, it's all the same. But if there is no way
in principle to tell whether
On Wed, Jun 21, 2006 at 10:31:16AM -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
If computationalism is true, then a person is instantiated by all
equivalent computations. If you change one instantiation to something
inequivalent, then that instantiation no longer
Hal Finney writes:
Yes,buteverytheoreticalscientisthopesultimatelytobevindicated bytheexperimentalists.I'mnownotsurewhatyoumeanbythesecond sentenceintheabovequote.Whatwouldyouexpecttofindif(classical, destructive)teleportationofasubjectinBrusselstoMoscowand/or Washingtonwereattempted?
I'll offer my thoughts on first-person indeterminacy. This is based
on Wei Dai's framework which I have called UD+ASSA. I am working on
some web pages to summarize the various conclusions I have drawn from
this framework. (Actually, here I am going to in effect use the SSA
rather than the
Bruno writes:
Hal,
It seems to me that you are introducing a notion of physical universe,=20
and then use it to reintroduce a notion of first person death, so that=20
you can bet you will be the one annihilated in Brussels.
I should first mention that I did not anticipate the conclusion
On Tue, Jun 20, 2006 at 09:35:12AM -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
The starting point was the framework I have described previously, which
can be stated very simply as that the measure of an information pattern
comes from the universal distribution of Kolmogorov. I then applied this
analysis to
Subject: Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA
Bruno writes:
Hal,
It seems to me that you are introducing a notion of physical
universe,=20
and then use it to reintroduce a notion of first person death, so
that=20
you can bet you will be the one annihilated in Brussels.
I
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