David Nyman wrote:
On Oct 13, 1:52 am, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
You know you can, of course. But what you are communicating is
information derived from your 'seeing a square' in order for others to
instantiate something analogous, as 1-person experiences of their own.I
On Oct 11, 11:17 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is
ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to.So if I
see a square, I can't communicate it?
You know you can, of course. But what you are communicating is
David Nyman wrote:
On Oct 11, 11:17 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is
ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to.So if I
see a square, I can't communicate it?
You know you can, of course. But what
On Oct 13, 1:52 am, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
You know you can, of course. But what you are communicating is
information derived from your 'seeing a square' in order for others to
instantiate something analogous, as 1-person experiences of their own.I
disagree. Squareness is fully
Le 10-oct.-06, à 16:08, 1Z a écrit :
If your Platonism is about truth, bot existence, you cannot show
that matter is redundant,
Ah! I am glad you see my argument is a redundancy argument. If comp is
true we cannot rely on the hypothesis of primary matter to explain even
just the
Le 11-oct.-06, à 02:26, 1Z a écrit :
David Nyman wrote:
But this conclusion
is, I think, why Bruno thinks that 'matter' has no real explanatory
role in the account of conscious experience. This isn't quite
equivalent to claiming that it can't be the primary reality, but
rather
to claim
Le 10-oct.-06, à 22:41, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Bruno:
you wrote:
...I do believe that 5 is equal to 1+1+1+1+1, ...
Why not 1+1+1+1+1+1+1?
Because it is equal to six.
you had a notion somewhere in your mathemaitcally
instructed mind that you have to stop at exactly the 5th
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 10-oct.-06, à 16:08, 1Z a écrit :
If your Platonism is about truth, bot existence, you cannot show
that matter is redundant,
Ah! I am glad you see my argument is a redundancy argument. If comp is
true we cannot rely on the hypothesis of primary matter to
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 10-oct.-06, à 16:08, 1Z a écrit :
If your Platonism is about truth, bot existence, you cannot show
that matter is redundant,
Ah! I am glad you see my argument is a redundancy argument. If comp is
true we cannot rely on the hypothesis of primary matter to
Bruno Marchal wrote:
That's a redundancy argument, not an incompatibility argument.
Yes.
We somethigists have a redundancy argument of our own.
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Bruno Marchal wrote:
That's a redundancy argument, not an incompatibility argument.
Yes.
We somethigists have a redundancy argument of our own.
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On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are
conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we
don't know how?
It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is
ex-hypothesi
On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are
conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that
we don't know how?
It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is
ex-hypothesi
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are
conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that
we don't know how?
It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person
snip
unless you can eyeball it you're not being scientific).
The subtlety with 'objective scientific evidence' is that ultimately it
is
delivered into the private experiences of indiividual scientists. Only
agreement as to what is evidenced makes it 'objective'. So the privacy
of
David Nyman wrote:
On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are
conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that we
don't know how?
It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person
Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 10:35:05AM -0700, 1Z wrote:
The idea that materialism is not compatible with computationalism
is a bold and startling claim.
Materialism comes in a couple of different flavours. The one that COMP
is incompatible with is eliminative
Le 09-oct.-06, à 23:56, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
...But it's not. Lets talk about the object with this property of five
in
platonia as 5. Here in reality what we are doing is creating a label
I
and interpreting the label as a pointer to storage where the value in
the
storage
On Oct 10, 2:51 am, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
It's a claim of computationalism. I am just explaining how
computationalism is compatible with physicalism. You
are complaining about circularity, not contradiction!
So you're saying that this variety of computationalism merely claims
that
Le 10-oct.-06, à 03:52, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 10:35:05AM -0700, 1Z wrote:
The idea that materialism is not compatible with computationalism
is a bold and startling claim.
Materialism comes in a couple of different flavours. The one that COMP
is incompatible
David Nyman wrote:
On Oct 10, 2:51 am, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
It's a claim of computationalism. I am just explaining how
computationalism is compatible with physicalism. You
are complaining about circularity, not contradiction!
So you're saying that this variety of
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 10-oct.-06, à 03:52, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 10:35:05AM -0700, 1Z wrote:
The idea that materialism is not compatible with computationalism
is a bold and startling claim.
Materialism comes in a couple of different flavours. The
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 09-oct.-06, à 23:56, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
...But it's not. Lets talk about the object with this property of five
in
platonia as 5. Here in reality what we are doing is creating a label
I
and interpreting the label as a pointer to storage where the
On Oct 10, 2:56 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If you aren't in fact
claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the
relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not
generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely a shorthand for
On Oct 10, 2:56 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If you aren't in fact
claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the
relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not
generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely a shorthand for
David Nyman wrote:
On Oct 10, 2:56 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If you aren't in fact
claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the
relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not
generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely
David Nyman wrote:
On Oct 10, 2:56 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If you aren't in fact
claiming this, then your appeal to 'computation' as picking out the
relevant properties can be valid only in the context of *specific*, not
generalised, instantiations, and thus becomes merely
@googlegroups.com
Sent: Monday, October 09, 2006 5:56 PM
Subject: Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical
concept' ;)
LZ:
Colin Hales wrote:
I reached this position independently and you may think I'm nuts... I
can't help what I see... is there something wrong
David Nyman wrote:
On Oct 10, 2:51 am, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
It's a claim of computationalism. I am just explaining how computationalism
is
compatible with physicalism. You are complaining about circularity, not
contradiction!
So you're saying that this variety of
]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 8:06 AM
Subject: Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical
concept' ;)
Le 09-oct.-06, à 23:56, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
...But it's not. Lets talk about the object with this property of five
in
platonia
]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, October 10, 2006 8:06 AM
Subject: Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical
concept' ;)
Le 09-oct.-06, à 23:56, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
...But it's not. Lets talk about the object with this property of five
in
platonia
On Oct 10, 8:31 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In this case, I would have to agree with Bruno
that 'matter' is simply being deployed as a placeholder for relata,That's a
feature, not a bug.
and
has no further explanatory role (except existence, of course - your
sticking point, I
On Oct 10, 9:12 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Then
a calculation of pi is picked out among all instantiations of all
computations - but
it is still possible to calculate pi many different ways on many different
physical
systems. And it is possible by inspection of these
Ah yes - I was confusing my 'isms. Eliminative materialism is an extreme type
of physicalism, but physicalism is broader. What I meant was what you
just stated - COMP is incompatible with physicalism, but not with materialism.
As I understand it, physicalism denies any form of downward
David Nyman wrote:
But this conclusion
is, I think, why Bruno thinks that 'matter' has no real explanatory
role in the account of conscious experience. This isn't quite
equivalent to claiming that it can't be the primary reality, but rather
to claim that it adds nothing to the accounts of
David Nyman wrote:
On Oct 10, 9:12 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Then
a calculation of pi is picked out among all instantiations of all
computations - but
it is still possible to calculate pi many different ways on many different
physical
systems. And it is possible by
-Ursprungligt meddelande-
Från: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] För Brent Meeker
Skickat: den 11 oktober 2006 06:12
Till: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Ämne: Re: The difference between a 'chair' concept and a 'mathematical
concept' ;)
David Nyman wrote
David Nyman wrote:
On Oct 8, 6:29 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Yes. But he says he isn't assuming Platonism, although he must be.
Well, if he is, so what? If we allow him this, what then follows -
isn't this more interesting?
He claims that computationalism is incompatible with
On Oct 9, 6:35 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
What is a computation itself? A process? And algorithm?
Bruno covers what he means by 'comp' pretty comprehensively in his
various posts and papers.
Using supplementary assumptions -- such as only activity counts.
Not sure what you're getting
LZ:
Colin Hales wrote:
I reached this position independently and you may think I'm nuts... I
can't help what I see... is there something wrong with this way of thinking?
I don't see what you think a non-ideal number is.
This deficit of mine includes having trouble with ALL numbers. :-)
For
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
LZ:
Colin Hales wrote:
I reached this position independently and you may think I'm nuts... I
can't help what I see... is there something wrong with this way of thinking?
I don't see what you think a non-ideal number is.
This deficit of mine includes having
1Z wrote:
Whatever properties are picked out by a computation
will be relevant to it as a computation.
Yes, of course. But how are these properties supposed to simultaneously
produce a state of consciousness stably linked to the 'computation'
when this self-same computation could have been
On Mon, Oct 09, 2006 at 10:35:05AM -0700, 1Z wrote:
The idea that materialism is not compatible with computationalism
is a bold and startling claim.
Materialism comes in a couple of different flavours. The one that COMP
is incompatible with is eliminative materialism, also sometimes
known as
David Nyman wrote:
On Oct 7, 1:16 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Numbers that haven't been reified in any sense,
don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any
way.
Forgive me for butting in again, but is there not some way to stop this
particular disagreement from going
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
I reached this position independently and you may think I'm nuts... I
can't help what I see... is there something wrong with this way of
thinking?
I don't see what you think a non-ideal number is.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You
On Oct 8, 6:29 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Yes. But he says he isn't assuming Platonism, although he must be.
Well, if he is, so what? If we allow him this, what then follows -
isn't this more interesting?
He claims that computationalism is incompatible with
materialism. That is not
Bruno Marchal wrote:
There is no need to reify the numbers.
[...]
I don't think so. Once you accept that the number theoretical truth is
independent of you (which I take as a form of humility), then it can be
explained quite precisely why numbers (in a third person view-view)
are
On Oct 7, 1:16 pm, 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Numbers that haven't been reified in any sense,
don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any
way.
Forgive me for butting in again, but is there not some way to stop this
particular disagreement from going round in circles
Johnathan,
Nice one! :-)
As far as I can see there is nothing a-priori which would make these
two hypotheses mutually exclusive; one 'cause' is predator related, the
other is resource related.
I await with interest, but not bated breath, for an ecologist to tell
us of any empirical evidence
Hi Mark,
Le 05-oct.-06, à 20:49, markpeaty a écrit :
Bruno,
I started to read [the English version of] your discourse on Origin of
Physical Laws and Sensations. I will read more later. It is certainly
very interesting and thought provoking. It makes me think of 'Reasons
and Persons' by
Bruno,
I started to read [the English version of] your discourse on Origin of
Physical Laws and Sensations. I will read more later. It is certainly
very interesting and thought provoking. It makes me think of 'Reasons
and Persons' by Derek Parfitt. His book is very dry in places but
mostly very
On Thu, October 5, 2006 11:49, markpeaty wrote:
That said, I read with interest a year or two ago about certain kinds
of insects [I think they are in North America somewhere] which lie
dormant in the earth in some pre-adult stage for a PRIME number of
years, 11, 13, were chosen by different
Le 02-oct.-06, à 18:03, markpeaty a écrit :
I hope you will excuse my butting in here, but I was passing through on
a different mission
and became disturbed by reading some earlier posts of this thread.
You are welcome.
My 2 cents worth:
I tend to think that David Nyman has the more
I hope you will excuse my butting in here, but I was passing through on
a different mission
and became disturbed by reading some earlier posts of this thread.
My 2 cents worth:
I tend to think that David Nyman has the more sceptically acceptable
slant on this. Mathematics and logic are
But why can't it be reduced to classes of specific physical things? How
can you show that it is necessary for anything corresponding to this
description to 'exist' apart from its instantiations as documented
procedures and actual occurrences of their application?
David
I did point out in my last
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But why can't it be reduced to classes of specific physical things? How
can you show that it is necessary for anything corresponding to this
description to 'exist' apart from its instantiations as documented
procedures and actual occurrences of their application?
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I did point out in my last post that there appears to be no simple way
to make such reductions (between math concepts and classes of specific
things). For instance no one has yet succeeded in showing how math
concepts such as infinite sets and transfinite sets
David Nyman wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I did point out in my last post that there appears to be no simple way
to make such reductions (between math concepts and classes of specific
things). For instance no one has yet succeeded in showing how math
concepts such as infinite sets
Peter;
I try to keep out from the ongoing discussions lately
(no succes to report) but sometimes I get carried
away. I will barge in with 2 remarks into your text
below
John M
--- 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
David Nyman wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I did point out in my last
David Nyman wrote:
I fail to see any 'knock-down' character in this argument. Peter says
that mathematical concepts don't refer to anything 'external', and on
one level I agree with him. But they are surely derived from the
contingent characteristics of experience, and AFAICS experience in
But this only shows that mathematical objects exist in the sense that chair
exists;
as a abstraction from chairs. So chair isn't identical with any particular
chair.
Brent Meeker
What follows is actually a very important and profound metaphysical
point, absolutely fundamental for
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
(1) A general mathematical category is not the same as any specific
physical thing
But why can't it be reduced to classes of specific physical things? How
can you show that it is necessary for anything corresponding to this
description to 'exist' apart from its
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But this only shows that mathematical objects exist in the sense that chair
exists;
as a abstraction from chairs. So chair isn't identical with any particular
chair.
Brent Meeker
What follows is actually a very important and profound metaphysical
point,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Mathematical concepts are quite different. The key difference is that
we *cannot* in fact dispense with mathematical descriptions and replace
them with something else. We cannot *eliminate* mathematical concepts
from our theories like we can with say 'chair'
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