Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
Hi John, Good question: Do I "prefer theunprovable proof or the hypothetical reality?" Unfortunately,an "unprovable proof," or a "hypothetical reality"are, to me at least, self-copntradictory, hence meaningless - (as you meant them to be). However, I suspect that"unprovable proofs" and "hypothetical realities" are acceptable to some.For example, in one versionof an unprovable, unfalsifiable, hypothetical reality, I can't tell if I'm a computer simulation or if I'm in the "real" universe. If it hasn't been proposed before, let me offer the "Norman Hypothesis." It's probably not falsifiable or provable, but I haven't let that slow me down. In the Norman Hypothesis,there is no "real" universe. Turing Machine X simulates Turing Machine Y, which simulates Turing MachineZ, . . ., which simulates Turing Machine X. But seriously, folks, I'm not mockinganybody who reads this list.You people have taught me a lot, and my over-taxed brain is full of sore muscles. I'm grateful, if annoyed I can't understand it with less effort. Norman ~~~- Original Message - From: "John M" [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: "Norman Samish" [EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Friday, September 09, 2005 11:39 AMSubject: Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*Norman, I wonder which one do you prefer:The unprovable proof, or The Hypothetical reality?John M
RE: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
--- Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John writes Computationalism is yet another claim. It's the notion that all of our own thoughts as well could be implemented on a Turing Machine in a way that would deliver to us just as much experiential satisfaction. According to Robert Rosen (who so far identified in the best ways those scanty views about his 'complexity' or my 'wholistic [holistic] thinking') said about a difference between machine and natural system (my wording) that the former is a design within boundaries while the latter is occurring without boundaries in connection with the totality - and eo ipso is not TM-computable. I can't make sense of that. After all, the famous Eliza program was according to this view a machine, of course. It was a specific program. But it was also what you, evidently, would call a natural system because it was open to output from anyone. No effort was made to program in every possible response just as evolution makes no effort to program in to our DNA every possible contingency. Eliza was part of a model: responsive to effects within 'her' program. Within the rules of (possible in 1990 or whatever level)the model of 'physics' with phenomena, forces, events that far discovered. Whatever 'she' was receptive to. Beyond that 'she' can't act, as a limited model, disregarding whatever is missing for the program for receptiveness - outside her boundaries. So while you may consider the side of response 'open' the functioning domain in conditioning is modeled. A TM which can be laid down on *any possible* tape is analogous to a functioning robot that can be presented with any possible environment in which to struggle. And just as the TM may fail to perform in some wished-for way, so too the robot, like ourselves, may simply be inadequate to its new environment. That's life. Both to program in to our DNA every possible contingency and A TM which can be laid down on *any possible tape includes 'possible', a restriction. If a robot, like ourselves - inadequate to its new environment it is a limited model. Wait a second: Speaking about us and our (open to evolution) DNA: brings up the thought that we are also models cut and limited by program potentials of our DNA - not free to 'nature as a total'. That makes us a 'species' and cuts our evolution to 'within' the species model. We do not grow gears and wings to fly. Or gills. Or magnetic resonance receptors. (This is a new idea of a view and I thank you profusely for triggerint that up in me. I have to think about it. We are not so open either to every (possible? or even impossible) effect to respond. Which makes me doubt about the correctness when I opposed the validity of AI's claim to represent 'human' thinking). [Maybe I have to reconsider AI (and also AL?) as the way to imitate the 'model human'??? even 'bio-life'??? The last par is absolutely unchecked, a new idea and a new view. I am not ready to argue it in any ways.] Lee Thanks, anyway John
Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
Hi Norman, Only when you demand that the computations be done in real time there is a problem. My point is that this problem is not relevant. Any TM that you can build will have limitations because of the laws of physics. Suppose that simulating the time evolution of 1 isolated cubic meter of space containing matter for 1 second takes at least 1 billion years for a computer the size of our solar system. Then I would say that I can simulate a few seconds of your consciousness because you only experience simulated time. You may say that because your simulated brain can't interact with the rest of the (real) universe this doesn't qualify as a ''bona fide'' simulation. Saibal - Original Message - From: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2005 05:48 AM Subject: Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not* Hi Saibal, Thanks for your reply. But semantics once again rears its ugly head! Norman - Original Message - From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Monday, September 05, 2005 3:08 PM Subject: Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not* Hi Norman, (SM) A TM in our universe can simulate you living in a virtual universe. If your universe is described by the same laws of physics as ours, then most physicists believe that the TM would have to work in a nonlocal way from your perspective. (NS) What do you mean by nonlocal? Wikipedia says Nonlocality in quantum mechanics, refers to the property of entangled quantum states in which both the entangled states collapse simultaneously upon measurement of one of their entangled components, regardless of the spatial separation of the two states. I don't understand what that has to do with the TM. (SM) Is this a problem? I don't think so, because the TM doesn't exist in your universe, it exists in our universe and it doesn't violate locality here. The TM generates your universe in which locality cannot be violated. So, I don't see the problem. (NS) Are you saying that the universe that the Turing Machine simulates is different from the one that I'm in, and in this simulated universe the speed limits on the speed of the TM don't apply? No - that can't be it. I'm sorry - I guess I don't know what you mean. The problem that I posed is that I don't understand how a finite-speed Turing Machine can simulate a universe, contrary to the assertions of the Church Thesis. Whether or not I'm in the universe to be simulated seem irrelevant. The computation in such a simulation is so immense that it must take a faster-than-light TM, which is not possible. Therefore, it seems to me, computationalism must be false. - Defeat Spammers by launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites: http://www.hillscapital.com/antispam/
RE: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
--- Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Being more specific: intelligences vastly greater than today's might possibly as soon as 2200 A.D. be in a position to design, if they wanted to, a cubic meter of computing material that would simulate the thoughts of everyone currently living in 2005. Fantastic generalization, Lee! My 1st remark goes for a specification of intelligence, different from the etymological 'inter-lego' version. This. too, belongs to it, as starting condition in an 'understanding' chapter, to 'read' what is not written between the lines (words). I take the 'i' word as an ELASTICITY of a well functioning mind (and what is this?) - not plasticity as Paul Churchland proposed long ago. Prerequists are an extended memory (what is it?) with an advancede ordering of knowledge into the appropriate connotative connections (understanding). The cubic m is not big in terms of 1950 computer hardware, but may work if we sub-pass the Planck sizes. (Way below subminiaturizibg). I would further specify: even if your dream works, politicians would require ~1 cubic mm . John Mikes
RE: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
--- Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Norm writes... SNIP Computationalism is yet another claim. It's the notion that all of our own thoughts as well could be implemented on a Turing Machine in a way that would deliver to us just as much experiential satisfaction. Lee Another view: According to Robert Rosen (who so far identified in the best ways those scanty views about his 'complexity' or my 'wholistic thinking') said about a difference between machine and natural system (my wording)that the former is a design within boundaries while the latter is occurring without boundaries in connection with the totality - and eo ipso is not TM-computable. I like the word for such: impredicative as subject to unrestricted (unlimited) number and quality of variables with impact of changes beyond the (snapshot) view we observe. I believe 'our own (present-day) thoughts are that much simplistic that a TM CAN provide 'experiential' satisfaction. Comprehending the wholeness (tatality) is beyond our mind's 2005-level capability. Which does not translate in shoving it under the rug. John Mikes
Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
On 07 Sep 2005, at 06:35, Lee Corbin wrote: Bruno writes [Hal wrote] I wouldn't be surprised if most people who believe that minds can be simulated on TMs also believe that everything can be simulated on a TM. They are wrong. Note that this is just Bruno's opinion. No. It is Bruno's theorem :-) Hal's statement really is true: most people don't agree with Bruno on this. My sad discovery is that many people can hardly follow a deductive argumentation when it goes too much again their (not always conscious) prejudice. But UDA is more easy than many imagine. Also. If minds are turing-emulable then indeed minds cannot perceive something as being provably non-turing-emulable, but minds can prove that 99,999...% of comp-Platonia is not turing-emulable. I don't pretend to understand this at all. You are saying that minds (e.g. we) cannot *perceive* something as being provably non-turing-emulable, yet minds can nonetheless *prove* that something is non-turing-emulable. Russell has given a good answer. More generally: If you accept the use of the excluded middle principle you can prove disjunctions, A V B, without being able to prove neither A nor B. You can prove the existence of a number n having some property without being able to prove, whatever n is, that n has that property. If C represents a modality of proof, you are confusing C(ExP(x)) with ExCP(x). E = it exits quantifier. I (very naively, of course) would have supposed that as soon as a mind proved that X was Y, then that very mind would have perceived that X was provably Y. How confusing. Since Godel, Brouwer ... we know that the notions of formal and informal provability are quite subtle and counter-intuitive notions. That is why modal logic, mainly through Solovay's theorem, is an incredible relief, by axiomatizing soundly and completely (at the propositional level) the logic of provability and their variants. But the simpler UDA argument gives already an intuitive feel of the oddities. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
On 07 Sep 2005, at 06:50, Lee Corbin wrote:Not sure I entirely understand, but it seems to me that we survive in "Harry potter like universes", but only get very little runtime there (i.e. have very low measure in those). What happens is that when you survive in a "Harry Potter like Universe", it will behave like such only a very little "runtime", so that you will survive on the normal extension of the Harry Potter Universe. The harry Potter Universe have Normal extension. What is *very unlikely* is to *stay* in a "Harry Potter universe" which *remains* an "Harry Potter universe".For the computationalist who has already understand UDA (to be careful) it is obvious that the first person death problem is the most difficult problem we could imagine. We don't know, but assuming comp, we can begin to evaluate the difficulty, at least.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
On 07 Sep 2005, at 06:44, Lee Corbin wrote: Bruno writes The accepted *definition* by usage that everyone uses is that it is a *claim* that classical (non-QM) robots could be conscious, that minds could be uploaded into computers. So invent your own term if you don't like how the rest of the world is using of computationalism. I am very glad with the way the rest of the world [uses] the term computationalism, and I use it in the same way [only] abstracted from the result I got which shows their contradictions related to their wanting computationalism married with materialism. Comp is really for Computationalism in a weaker sense than most computationalist use the term, Yes, so you don't use it in quite the same way. In a weaker way! It is ALWAYS a progress when you get results from a weaker hypothesis. It means the theorems are true for all stronger theories. Your sense is indeed weaker because, as you say, the other usage seems to have married materialism to (your weaker) comp. The other usage has just inherited 2300 years of a caricature of Aristotle's theory of mind and nature. I explain all this in a sufficiently precise way as to be refuted. Currently facts are going in the sense that QM confirms comp. Well, I hope for the best for you. If only you looked at what has already been done. I think, Lee, from our last conversation, that you do have understand the first person comp indeterminacy. Could we move on to UDA step 4 ? Cf: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004Slide.pdf Sorry. I can't promise anything. We all have to guess how best to use our time! :-) You believe in comp. You don't believe in a theorem deduced from comp. So you guess (non constructively!) that there is an error in the proof. Why don't you want to help me to catch the error you seem so sure there is. Besides, it seems I have an allergy (as Stephen Paul King would say) to 1st person explanations of any kind! I think I already told you I have the same allergy. I think you are confusing 1st person explanations, which I agree are non scientific, with third person explanations in fields, like cognitive science, which address, as subject matter (no pun!), the notion of 1st person manifestations. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
On 03 Sep 2005, at 20:54, Hal Finney wrote:Okay, I was mostly trying to clarify the terminology. The problem is that sometimes you use "comp" as if it is the same as computationalism, and sometimes it seems to include these additional concepts of the Church Thesis and Arithmetical Realism. Maybe you should come up with a new word for the combination of comp (aka "Yes Doctor") + CT + AR. Then you could make it clear when you are just talking about computationalism, and when you are including the additional concepts. So, just to be clear, I *always* assume Church Thesis and Arithmetical Realism.CT is an important part of comp, because it gives the needed level of generality forthe notion of Universal Machine and the whole of *comp*-uter science.Arithmetical realism is also assumed by all computer scientist.Actually I am even quasi-sure that CT does not make sense without AR, which means that it is not entirely unplausible AR can be suppressed.I tend to believe also that AR does not make sense without CT, but that is more controversial and out of topic, really.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
On 05 Sep 2005, at 19:13, Hal Finney wrote: Bruno writes: I will think about it, but I do think that CT and AR are just making the YD more precise. Also everybody in cognitive science agree explicitly or implicitly with both CT and AR, so to take them away from YD could be more confusing. I think that is probably true about the Church Thesis, which I would paraphrase as saying that there are no physical processes more computationally powerful than a Turing machine, or in other words that the universe could in principle be simulated on a TM. Here I disagree completely. Church Thesis (CT) has nothing to do with physical processes. Note that this is a point where I think David Deutsch is confused with his new version he called Church Turing principle, and which I call Deutsch's Thesis, and which is completely independent of Church Thesis. Church's thesis is just the thesis that all computable function are captured by LISP (or add your favorite universal computer language. It identifies an intuitive notion of computability with a formal one. Now if comp is true, that is: if I am a turing-emulable (LISP- emulable, ALGOL-emulable, etc.) THEN the universe is not Turing emulable a priori. We can come back on this. Note that Nielsen's e^i*omega*t can be considered as a non turing emulable physical process which is physically possible. I wouldn't be surprised if most people who believe that minds can be simulated on TMs also believe that everything can be simulated on a TM. They are wrong. If minds are turing-emulable then indeed minds cannot perceive something as being provably non-turing-emulable, but minds can prove that 99,999...% of comp-Platonia is not turing-emulable. And the UDA shows that physics emerge from that comp-Platonia (arithmetical truth). (I don't see the two philosophical questions as absolutely linked, though. I could imagine someone who accepts that minds can be simulated on TMs, but who believes that naked singularities or some other exotic physical phenomenon might allow for super-Turing computation.) Absolutely. And the UD generates complex things which from the first point of view of machine will be non-turing emulable. But isn't AR the notion that abstract mathematical and computational objects exist, to the extent that the mere potential existence of a computation means that we have to consider the possibility that we are presently experiencing and living within that computation? I don't think that is nearly as widely believed. You are right. But this is exactly the point which follows from the Movie-Graph-Argument (or Maudlin's Olympia). It is highly not obvious at all!!! It is not AR. AR is so obvious that people (who are not professional logician) take time to understand it needs to be assumed. But AR is just the belief that the arithmetical truth is independent of us. Would an asteroid hit Earth and destroy all life on it, would not change the fact that 17 is a prime number, or that Goldbach conjecture is true or false. That simple mathematical objects have a sort of existence is probably unobjectionable, That's AR. but most people probably don't give it too much thought. For most, it's a question analogous to whether a falling tree makes a noise when there's no one there to hear it. Whether the number 3 existed before people thought about it is an abstract philosophical question without much importance or connection to reality, in most people's minds, including computationalists and AI researchers. Because most ignore the difference between first and third, singular and plural, point of views. Mathematically they confused p, Bp, Bp p, Bp Dp, etc. But Godel's B provide counterexamples. To then elevate this question of arithmetical realism to the point where it has actual implications for our own perceptions and our models of reality would, I think, be a new idea for most computationalists. Yes. But they ignore UDA. They ignore the first person indeterminacy. They are bounded by they Aristotelian idea that computationalism and mechanism are allied to materialism, naturalism, physicalism. My work shows comp is incompatible with materialism, naturalism, physicalism. Right here on this list I believe we've had people who would accept the basic doctrines of computationalism, who would believe that it is possible for a human mind to be uploaded into a computer, but who would insist that the computer must be physical! I will come back on this when I will comment your post where you point us to Maudlin's paper. I could also ask you what you mean by physical and then what are you assuming precisely. I do not assume anything physical. A mere potential or abstractly existing computer would not be good enough. I suspect that such views would not be particularly rare among computationalists. You are right, but they are wrong. I can have an
Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
On 06 Sep 2005, at 02:27, Lee Corbin wrote: Bruno writes Well, even at step 0 (Yes doctor), if the doctor is honest it will warn you that the artificial brain is a digital device, and I cannot imagine him explaining what that really means in all generality without invoking Church thesis. That's funny. My doctor never explains even how my blood pressure medication works. On the contrary, the surgeons would definitely *not* bring up CT when/if they replace a bundle of neurons with an electronic cable; their only assurances to the patient are whether works or not, and whether I'll feed any pain (besides the bill). Nor, does it seem, does Microsoft or Intel ever use CT in its promotions of various devices for, say, the military. Everyone already knows what computers do (roughly), and what can be expected of them. OK, but in the case an artificial brain is proposed the doctor should explain to his patient that his survival is hypothetical. If not there will be problems. Well, brain graft surgery is already done and usually the doctor gives more explanation that those who fixe cars or any non directly first person related object. I think that in the USA some hospital or universities give some training to the medicine student so they can remember that their patient are not just third person manipulable bodies, but also Person. (First) Person. The accepted *definition* by usage that everyone uses is that it is a *claim* that classical (non-QM) robots could be conscious, that minds could be uploaded into computers. So invent your own term if you don't like how the rest of the world is using of computationalism. I am very glad with the way the rest of the world (but for some rare exception I can count with one hand) use the term computationalism, and I use it in the same way abstracted from the result I got which shows their contradictions related to their wanting computationalism married with materialism. Comp is really for Computationalism in a weaker sense than most computationalist use the term, and then I give a proof (deductive argument) that if we take comp seriously enough, keeping in mind the 1-3 distinctions, physics can no more stay fundamental. Physical histories and their physical invariant emerges logico- arithmetically from some computer science mathematical structures. I explain all this in a sufficiently precise way as to be refuted. Currently facts are going in the sense that QM confirms comp. I think, Lee, from our last conversation, that you do have understand the first person comp indeterminacy. Could we move on to UDA step 4 ? Cf: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004Slide.pdf Bruno PS Sorry for being slower but I got exams with students and other typical non-holiday stuffs. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
On 06 Sep 2005, at 04:49, Lee Corbin wrote:Why, whyever for? Isn't it true that most people don't object to their *physical* destruction because they realize that they'll continue to live on as abstract machines? For sure, those who believe fully in the Universal Distribution don't really care if they get hit by a truck, because after all, their computation will continue anyway---it will even continue in some other physical universe according to the QTI (Quantum Theory of Immortality). Strictly speaking the hitting by a truck is more frightful for a computationalist.Because the question is not "will I survive"? But "will I suffer". And comp like QM gives evidence that we only survive in normal worlds, i.e. "non Harry Potter like -universe".In those normal worlds: you survive the truck but with a high probability of being wounded.Making that comp (or even just QM) is everything but wishful thinking.Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
At the risk of digressing... Here are two questions to ponder: Can the entire collection of minds (human at least) that exists be simulated as one computer? That is, is it possible to design a computer such that it behaves exactly like the whole of intellectual existence does? conversely, is it possible to bring together currently existing minds to behave exactly like a HUGE computer? (this questin has a much more practical and sinister motive) any takers? -- Aditya Varun Chadha adichad AT gmail.com http://www.adichad.com Mobile: +91 98 400 76411
RE: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
Norm writes You [Hal Finney] say, . . . the Church Thesis, which I would paraphrase as saying that there are no physical processes more computationally powerful than a Turing machine, or in other words that the universe could in principle be simulated on a TM. I wouldn't be surprised if most people who believe that minds can be simulated on TMs also believe that everything can be simulated on a TM. I'm out of my depth here, but this doesn't make sense to me. My understanding is that the Turing Machine is a hypothetical device. Unfortunately, the Turing Machine is often taken to be either one of *two* possibilities. One is, as you say, a device. All the usual paraphernalia of a normal computer is abstracted away, leaving the least possible behavior that could still do computing. Turing, of course, began with the simplest operations that he could conceive of a human computer doing. In this first view, we arrive at the usual picture of a little box on wheels which scans a tape one square at a time, and either writes a zero or a 1, and then moves left or right on the tape depending also on what it scanned. But there is a second meaning to Turing Machine that is also used extensively in the literature. This has utterly nothing to do with devices. Mathematically, a Turing Machine is a set of quintuples (quadruples in many treatments, e.g. Boolos and Jeffrey). These quintuplets have only mathematical or platonic existence. Yet one can see that by their nature were they implemented in the flesh, so to speak, they could accomplish a specific computation as spelled out by the entries in the five slots of each quintuplet. (Four slots, slightly simpler, are composed of two that specify the current state you're in and the current symbol you're reading, and two composed of the output: the symbol you write and the next state you go to.) Sometimes discussions ensue when one party is talking about an actual (though theoretical) device, and the other is talking about the mathematical description. So beware the term Turing Machine, unless it's clear which interpretation is meant. If one could be built that operated at faster-than-light or infinite speed, maybe it could, in principle, simulate the universe. However, this isn't possible. Does this mean that the Church Thesis, hence computationalism, is, in reality, false? No, this doesn't affect Church's Thesis, as probably some here will explain better than I. Sometimes one does encounter Zeno machines in the literature, which can solve a harder class of problems because it's assumed that they can complete an infinite number of steps in finite time. But Church's Thesis merely says that every effective computation (that anyone has been able to think of) can be calculated by a Turing machine. It turns out that this specification of Turing machine is completely equivalent to several other reasonable ways calculations can in principle be done, e.g., Post-production strings, recursive functions, abacus computable functions, and so on. The thesis part is that this whole class of equivalent capability is *all* that a computation can be. Computationalism is yet another claim. It's the notion that all of our own thoughts as well could be implemented on a Turing Machine in a way that would deliver to us just as much experiential satisfaction. Lee
RE: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
Bruno writes [Hal wrote] I wouldn't be surprised if most people who believe that minds can be simulated on TMs also believe that everything can be simulated on a TM. They are wrong. Note that this is just Bruno's opinion. Hal's statement really is true: most people don't agree with Bruno on this. If minds are turing-emulable then indeed minds cannot perceive something as being provably non-turing-emulable, but minds can prove that 99,999...% of comp-Platonia is not turing-emulable. I don't pretend to understand this at all. You are saying that minds (e.g. we) cannot *perceive* something as being provably non-turing-emulable, yet minds can nonetheless *prove* that something is non-turing-emulable. I (very naively, of course) would have supposed that as soon as a mind proved that X was Y, then that very mind would have perceived that X was provably Y. How confusing. Lee
RE: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
Bruno writes The accepted *definition* by usage that everyone uses is that it is a *claim* that classical (non-QM) robots could be conscious, that minds could be uploaded into computers. So invent your own term if you don't like how the rest of the world is using of computationalism. I am very glad with the way the rest of the world [uses] the term computationalism, and I use it in the same way [only] abstracted from the result I got which shows their contradictions related to their wanting computationalism married with materialism. Comp is really for Computationalism in a weaker sense than most computationalist use the term, Yes, so you don't use it in quite the same way. Your sense is indeed weaker because, as you say, the other usage seems to have married materialism to (your weaker) comp. I explain all this in a sufficiently precise way as to be refuted. Currently facts are going in the sense that QM confirms comp. Well, I hope for the best for you. I think, Lee, from our last conversation, that you do have understand the first person comp indeterminacy. Could we move on to UDA step 4 ? Cf: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004Slide.pdf Sorry. I can't promise anything. We all have to guess how best to use our time! :-) Besides, it seems I have an allergy (as Stephen Paul King would say) to 1st person explanations of any kind! Bruno PS Sorry for being slower but I got exams with students and other typical non-holiday stuffs. Yes. To be expected. :-)
RE: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
Bruno writes On 06 Sep 2005, at 04:49, Lee Corbin wrote: Why, whyever for? Isn't it true that most people don't object to their *physical* destruction because they realize that they'll continue to live on as abstract machines? For sure, those who believe fully in the Universal Distribution don't really care if they get hit by a truck, because after all, their computation will continue anyway---it will even continue in some other physical universe according to the QTI (Quantum Theory of Immortality). Yes, but of course, as you know, I had given in to the impulse to wax sarcastic. I do believe that any theory that doesn't say that it's a bad thing to die (forget about extensive hospital stays!) is a useless theory. So replace being hit by a truck by being next to a 20 megaton H-bomb when it detonates. Strictly speaking the hitting by a truck is more frightful for a computationalist. Because the question is not will I survive? But will I suffer. And comp like QM gives evidence that we only survive in normal worlds, i.e. non Harry Potter like -universe. In those normal worlds: you survive the truck but with a high probability of being wounded. Making that comp (or even just QM) is everything but wishful thinking. Not sure I entirely understand, but it seems to me that we survive in Harry potter like universes, but only get very little runtime there (i.e. have very low measure in those). Lee
Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
On Tue, Sep 06, 2005 at 09:35:02PM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote: Bruno writes If minds are turing-emulable then indeed minds cannot perceive something as being provably non-turing-emulable, but minds can prove that 99,999...% of comp-Platonia is not turing-emulable. I don't pretend to understand this at all. You are saying that minds (e.g. we) cannot *perceive* something as being provably non-turing-emulable, yet minds can nonetheless *prove* that something is non-turing-emulable. I (very naively, of course) would have supposed that as soon as a mind proved that X was Y, then that very mind would have perceived that X was provably Y. How confusing. Lee I think what Bruno is saying is that the set of noncomputable strings is of measure 1 within the UD output (ie comp-Platonia), even if it is impossible to ascertain whether any particular string is noncomputable. (Some strings are provably computable, of course). Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 pgpDjw31iHltX.pgp Description: PGP signature
RE: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
Aditya writes At the risk of digressing... I don't think that that's possible on the Everything list by definition! Here are two questions to ponder: Can the entire collection of minds (human at least) that exists be simulated as one computer? That is, is it possible to design a computer such that it behaves exactly like the whole of intellectual existence does? If we limit intellectual existence to everything in the Earth's noosphere (Pere de Chardin's term for all human thought), then the answer is yes, but not yet. The crust of the Earth contains vast, vast amounts of material necessary for fabricating computers, possibly even computronium. (I'm sure wikipedia or someone discusses computronium on-line if you've not seen those discussions.) Hence in future centuries all human thought circa 2005 will be emulable on a computer. It's supposed that compute-densities will be reached that will be so great that a mere cubic meter of material may suffice! Being more specific: intelligences vastly greater than today's might possibly as soon as 2200 A.D. be in a position to design, if they wanted to, a cubic meter of computing material that would simulate the thoughts of everyone currently living in 2005. conversely, is it possible to bring together currently existing minds to behave exactly like a HUGE computer? (this question has a much more practical and sinister motive) So you're saying... that if everyone gets on the net... and is GE enhanced enough to be of IQ 200 or so... then the entire 8 billion of us might constitute the thinking of a single great being... Nah. I tried, but I couldn't quite believe it. I love the part about this being a sinister idea, though. Would you care to elaborate? Lee
Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
On 03 Sep 2005, at 20:54, Hal Finney wrote:Okay, I was mostly trying to clarify the terminology. The problem isthat sometimes you use "comp" as if it is the same as computationalism,and sometimes it seems to include these additional concepts of the ChurchThesis and Arithmetical Realism. Maybe you should come up with a newword for the combination of comp (aka "Yes Doctor") + CT + AR. Then youcould make it clear when you are just talking about computationalism,and when you are including the additional concepts. I will think about it, but I do think that CT and AR are just making the YD more precise. Also everybody in cognitive science agree explicitly or implicitly with both CT and AR, so to take them away from YD could be more confusing.Would I meet a computationalist supporting explicitly some negation of CT or AR, I think it is up to him to make that clear because by default CT and AR are accepted. It is just that my conclusion are "enormous" so that I make the assumptions explicit. But actually I have never met someone against CT and AR, at least before I try to communicate the argument.Too much vocabulary can also be confusing. But I will think about it. I use "comp" since 1998. Before, I was using instead "indexical digital mechanism" (indexical for the "I" in "I am a machine" or "I say yes to the doctor").Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
Bruno writes: I will think about it, but I do think that CT and AR are just making the YD more precise. Also everybody in cognitive science agree explicitly or implicitly with both CT and AR, so to take them away from YD could be more confusing. I think that is probably true about the Church Thesis, which I would paraphrase as saying that there are no physical processes more computationally powerful than a Turing machine, or in other words that the universe could in principle be simulated on a TM. I wouldn't be surprised if most people who believe that minds can be simulated on TMs also believe that everything can be simulated on a TM. (I don't see the two philosophical questions as absolutely linked, though. I could imagine someone who accepts that minds can be simulated on TMs, but who believes that naked singularities or some other exotic physical phenomenon might allow for super-Turing computation.) But isn't AR the notion that abstract mathematical and computational objects exist, to the extent that the mere potential existence of a computation means that we have to consider the possibility that we are presently experiencing and living within that computation? I don't think that is nearly as widely believed. That simple mathematical objects have a sort of existence is probably unobjectionable, but most people probably don't give it too much thought. For most, it's a question analogous to whether a falling tree makes a noise when there's no one there to hear it. Whether the number 3 existed before people thought about it is an abstract philosophical question without much importance or connection to reality, in most people's minds, including computationalists and AI researchers. To then elevate this question of arithmetical realism to the point where it has actual implications for our own perceptions and our models of reality would, I think, be a new idea for most computationalists. Right here on this list I believe we've had people who would accept the basic doctrines of computationalism, who would believe that it is possible for a human mind to be uploaded into a computer, but who would insist that the computer must be physical! A mere potential or abstractly existing computer would not be good enough. I suspect that such views would not be particularly rare among computationalists. Hal Finney
Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
Hal Finney, You say, . . . the Church Thesis, which I would paraphrase as saying that there are no physical processes more computationally powerful than a Turing machine, or in other words that the universe could in principle be simulated on a TM. I wouldn't be surprised if most people who believe that minds can be simulated on TMs also believe that everything can be simulated on a TM. I'm out of my depth here, but this doesn't make sense to me. My understanding is that the Turing Machine is a hypothetical device. If one could be built that operated at faster-than-light or infinite speed, maybe it could, in principle, simulate the universe. However, this isn't possible. Does this mean that the Church Thesis, hence computationalism, is, in reality, false? Norman Samish
Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
Hi Norman, A TM in our universe can simulate you living in a virtual universe. If your universe is described by the same laws of physics as ours, then most physicists believe that the TM would have to work in a nonlocal way from your perspective. Is this a problem? I don't think so, because the TM doesn't exist in your universe, it exists in our universe and it doesn't violate locality here. The TM generates your universe in which locality cannot be violated. So, I don't see the problem. Saibal - Original Message - From: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Monday, September 05, 2005 08:44 PM Subject: Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not* Hal Finney, You say, . . . the Church Thesis, which I would paraphrase as saying that there are no physical processes more computationally powerful than a Turing machine, or in other words that the universe could in principle be simulated on a TM. I wouldn't be surprised if most people who believe that minds can be simulated on TMs also believe that everything can be simulated on a TM. I'm out of my depth here, but this doesn't make sense to me. My understanding is that the Turing Machine is a hypothetical device. If one could be built that operated at faster-than-light or infinite speed, maybe it could, in principle, simulate the universe. However, this isn't possible. Does this mean that the Church Thesis, hence computationalism, is, in reality, false? Norman Samish - Defeat Spammers by launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites: http://www.hillscapital.com/antispam/
RE: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
Bruno writes Well, even at step 0 (Yes doctor), if the doctor is honest it will warn you that the artificial brain is a digital device, and I cannot imagine him explaining what that really means in all generality without invoking Church thesis. That's funny. My doctor never explains even how my blood pressure medication works. On the contrary, the surgeons would definitely *not* bring up CT when/if they replace a bundle of neurons with an electronic cable; their only assurances to the patient are whether works or not, and whether I'll feed any pain (besides the bill). Nor, does it seem, does Microsoft or Intel ever use CT in its promotions of various devices for, say, the military. Everyone already knows what computers do (roughly), and what can be expected of them. The accepted *definition* by usage that everyone uses is that it is a *claim* that classical (non-QM) robots could be conscious, that minds could be uploaded into computers. So invent your own term if you don't like how the rest of the world is using of computationalism. Lee
RE: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
Hal writes That simple mathematical objects have a sort of existence is probably unobjectionable, but most people probably don't give it too much thought. For most, it's a question analogous to whether a falling tree makes a noise when there's no one there to hear it. Whether the number 3 existed before people thought about it is an abstract philosophical question without much importance or connection to reality, in most people's minds, including computationalists and AI researchers. It's true. Most AI researchers and those who (if they were familiar with the term) would consider themselves computationalists do *not* concern themselves with questions about the existence of numbers. To then elevate this question of arithmetical realism to the point where it has actual implications for our own perceptions and our models of reality would, I think, be a new idea for most computationalists. That's for sure. Right here on this list I believe we've had people who would accept the basic doctrines of computationalism, who would believe that it is possible for a human mind to be uploaded into a computer, but who would insist that the computer must be physical! Why, whyever for? Isn't it true that most people don't object to their *physical* destruction because they realize that they'll continue to live on as abstract machines? For sure, those who believe fully in the Universal Distribution don't really care if they get hit by a truck, because after all, their computation will continue anyway---it will even continue in some other physical universe according to the QTI (Quantum Theory of Immortality). A mere potential or abstractly existing computer would not be good enough. I suspect that such views would not be particularly rare among computationalists. Well, I guess they're just not familiar enough with the QTI. But even without QTI, can't Bruno prove that the bitstrings that make you up arithmetically are unaffected by mere trucks? Lee
Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
On 03 Sep 2005, at 07:45, Hal Finney wrote: Bruno wrote: Of course the reversal result introduces ambiguity in expressions like mental activity. That is why I sum up comp by YD + CT + AR. (Yes doctor + Church Thesis + Arithmetical realism). But if comp is computationalism, that is the doctrine that our mental processes can be modelled/reproduced by computational activity. This would seem to correspond to Bruno's Yes Doctor. That is, you say yes to a doctor who wants to replace your mind with a computer, at least if it is done carefully and correctly. If you believe in computationalism, then you should believe that a computer could reproduce and substitute for the activity of your mind. (Some people have qualms about the details of the transfer process from the mind to the computer, but they are often satisfied if the change is done slowly, perhaps one neuron at a time.) Likewise if you would accept that your mind could be substituted by a computer, you are a computationalist. So where do the Church Thesis and Arithmetical realism come into play as part of the DEFINITION of comp? I don't understand this. This is just because I make a deductive reasoning from YD, at first, but at the step 7 I need the universal dovetailer to be enough general, that is really universal, and this is made simple by CT. Well, even at step 0 (Yes doctor), if the doctor is honest it will warn you that the artificial brain is a digital device, and I cannot imagine him explaining what that really means in all generality without invoking Church thesis. Church thesis also simplifies considerably many reasoning with comp. The conceptual explanation is given in my two diagonalization posts. We can come back on this. Arithmetical realism is a much weaker assumption. I have introduce it in comp to provide a way out for those who believes in YD and in Church thesis (quasi all computer scientist I met) but still doesn't not believe in the conclusion although agreeing with most of the steps. looking in the detail it is the arithmetical realist assumption which they find the most weak. But I agree with Godfrey that CT and AR are really bodyguard for YD. But then, with the interview of the lobian machine, the physics is derived from CT and AR alone! To sum up: comp is essentially YD, if only to provide a picture of the first person comp indeterminacy. But CT is used to give a range for that indeterminacy (the UD*, the trace of the UD). It is by CT that the UD is really comp-universal, and it is a consequence of CT that this forces it to dovetail, and to dovetail on an incredibly redundant structures (providing non trivial relative measures). AR is used to just accept the notion of UD* and other infinite mathematical structures, and for justifying the use of the excluded middle principle. Given the apparent enormity of the reversal conclusion, I have no choice than to put all the card on the table. A referee of my french PhD thesis has try to convince me that the use of CT can be avoided in UDA. I am not convinced, and then I know it is unavoidable in the UDA lobian translation. Hope that helps, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
Bruno writes: To sum up: comp is essentially YD, if only to provide a picture of the first person comp indeterminacy. But CT is used to give a range for that indeterminacy (the UD*, the trace of the UD). It is by CT that the UD is really comp-universal, and it is a consequence of CT that this forces it to dovetail, and to dovetail on an incredibly redundant structures (providing non trivial relative measures). AR is used to just accept the notion of UD* and other infinite mathematical structures, and for justifying the use of the excluded middle principle. Okay, I was mostly trying to clarify the terminology. The problem is that sometimes you use comp as if it is the same as computationalism, and sometimes it seems to include these additional concepts of the Church Thesis and Arithmetical Realism. Maybe you should come up with a new word for the combination of comp (aka Yes Doctor) + CT + AR. Then you could make it clear when you are just talking about computationalism, and when you are including the additional concepts. Hal Finney
