Le 15-sept.-06, à 13:53, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Yes, that's just what I would say. The only purpose served by the rock
is to provide the real world
dynamism part of the computation, even if it does this simply by
mapping lines of code to the otherwise
idle passage of time. The
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
OK, but then you have the situation whereby a very complex, and to
our
mind disorganised, conscious
computer might be designed and built by aliens, then discovered by
us
after the aliens have become
extinct and their design blueprints, programming manuals
Le 16-sept.-06, à 10:10, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
5) Re a fatal test for the Turing machine? Give it exquisite novelty by
asking it to do science on an unknown area of the natural world. Proper
science. It will fail because it does not know there is an outside
world.
And you
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
Q. What is it like to be a human? It is like being a mind. There is
information delivered into the mind by the action of brain material which
bestows on the human intrinsic knowledge about the natural world outside
the humanin the form of phenomenal
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
Q. What is it like to be a human? It is like being a mind. There is
information delivered into the mind by the action of brain material
which
bestows on the human intrinsic knowledge about the natural world outside
the
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
...
COLIN:
Hi a bunch of points...
1) Re paper.. it is undergoing review and growing..
The point of the paper is to squash the solipsism argument ...in
particular the specific flavour of it that deals with 'other minds' and as
it has (albeit tacitly)
Colin Hales writes:
Please consider the plight of the zombie scientist with a huge set of
sensory feeds and similar set of effectors. All carry similar signal
encoding and all, in themselves, bestow no experiential qualities on the
zombie.
Add a capacity to detect regularity in the
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: computationalism and supervenience
Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2006 04:43:54 -0700
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
I'm not sure how the multiverse comes into the discussion, but you
have
made the point several times that a computation depends on an
observer
No, I haven't! I have tried
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees
with me on the list, and
I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd:
every physical system
implements every
Peter Jones writes:
Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees with
me on the list, and
I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd:
every physical system
Peter Jones writes:
What if the computer is built according to some ridiculously complex plan,
plugged in, then all the engineers, manuals,
etc. disappear. If it was conscious to begin with, does it suddenly cease
being conscious because no-one is able to
understand it?
If it was
Brent Meeker writes:
We would understand it in a third person sense but not in a first person
sense, except by analogy with our
own first person experience. Consciousness is the difference between what
can be known by observing an
entity and what can be known by being the entity, or
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: computationalism and supervenience
Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2006 04:43:54 -0700
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees
with me on the list, and
I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd:
every
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
I'm not sure how the multiverse comes into the discussion, but
you have
made the point several times that a computation depends on an
observer
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Colin Hales writes:
Please consider the plight of the zombie scientist with a huge set of
sensory feeds and similar set of effectors. All carry similar signal
encoding and all, in themselves, bestow no experiential qualities on the
zombie.
Add a capacity to
Peter Jones writes:
That is what I mean
when I say that any computation can map onto any physical system.
The physical structure and activity
of computer A implementing program a may be completely different to
that of computer B implementing
program b, but
Brent Meeker writes:
I don't have a clear idea in my mind of disembodied computation except in
rather simple cases,
like numbers and arithmetic. The number 5 exists as a Platonic ideal, and
it can also be implemented
so we can interact with it, as when there is a collection of 5
Brent meeker writes:
We would understand it in a third person sense but not in a first person
sense, except by analogy with our
own first person experience. Consciousness is the difference between what
can be known by observing an
entity and what can be known by being the entity,
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
I don't recall anything about all computations implementing consciousness?
Brent Meeker
OK, this is the basis of our disagreement. I understood computationalism as
the idea that it is the
actual computation that gives rise to
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
I don't have a clear idea in my mind of disembodied computation except in
rather simple cases,
like numbers and arithmetic. The number 5 exists as a Platonic ideal, and it
can also be implemented
so we can interact with it, as when there is
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
We would understand it in a third person sense but not in a first person
sense, except by analogy with our
own first person experience. Consciousness is the difference between what
can be known by observing an
entity and what can be known
be rich.
Stathis Papaioannou
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: computationalism and supervenience
Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2006 09:15:12 -0700
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
I could make
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
If consciousness supervenes on inherent non-interprtation-dependent
features,
it can supervene on features which are binary, either present or
absent.
For instance, whether a programme examines or modifies its own code is
surely
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a
conscious
computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of
computationalism
have used
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
I'm not sure how the multiverse comes into the discussion, but you
have
made the point several times that a computation depends on an observer
No, I haven't! I have tried ot follow through the consequences
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Thanks for the quotes from Dennett's Freedom Evolves. The physiological
experiments are interesting,
but the fact is, even if they can be shown to be flawed in some way, it would
still be entirely consistent
with our behaviour and our subjective experience of
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees with
me on the list, and
I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd: every
physical system
implements every conscious computation, no
Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees with
me on the list, and
I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd: every
physical system
implements every conscious
1Z wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Thanks for the quotes from Dennett's Freedom Evolves. The physiological
experiments are interesting,
but the fact is, even if they can be shown to be flawed in some way, it would
still be entirely consistent
with our behaviour and our subjective
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees with
me on the list, and
I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd: every
physical system
implements every conscious
Brent Meeker wrote:
Didn't what?...decide we had acted freely?...noticed?
if we noticed our decisions at the same time as we made them.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To
Brent meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Like Bruno, I am not claiming that this is definitely the case, just that
it is the case if
computationalism is true. Several philosophers (eg. Searle) have used the
self-evident
Date: Mon, 11 Sep 2006 13:10:52 -0700
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: computationalism and supervenience
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
I think we need to say what it means
Brent meeker writes:
I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a
conscious
computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of
computationalism
have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any
conscious
computation as
Colin Hales writes:
Please consider the plight of the zombie scientist with a huge set of
sensory feeds and similar set of effectors. All carry similar signal
encoding and all, in themselves, bestow no experiential qualities on the
zombie.
Add a capacity to detect regularity in the
Brent meeker writes (quoting SP):
Maybe this is a copout, but I just don't think it is even logically
possible to explain what consciousness
*is* unless you have it.
Not being *logically* possible means entailing a contradiction - I doubt
that. But
anyway you do have it and you
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Now, suppose some more complex variant of 3+2=3 implemented on your
abacus has consciousness associated with it, which is just one of the
tenets of computationalism. Some time later, you are walking
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees with me
on the list, and
I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd: every
physical system
implements every conscious computation, no physical system implements any
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
We should ask ourselves how do we know the thermometer isn't conscious of
the
temperature? It seems that the answer has been that it's state or activity
*could*
be intepreted in
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a
conscious
computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of
computationalism
have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
I could make a robot that, having suitable thermocouples, would quickly
withdraw it's
hand from a fire; but not be conscious of it. Even if I provide the
robot with
feelings, i.e. judgements about good/bad/pain/pleasure I'm not sure
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a
conscious
computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of
computationalism
have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Colin Hales writes:
Please consider the plight of the zombie scientist with a huge set of
sensory feeds and similar set of effectors. All carry similar signal
encoding and all, in themselves, bestow no experiential qualities on the
zombie.
Add a capacity to detect
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes (quoting SP):
Maybe this is a copout, but I just don't think it is even logically possible
to explain what consciousness
*is* unless you have it.
Not being *logically* possible means entailing a contradiction - I doubt
that. But
anyway
1Z wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
We should ask ourselves how do we know the thermometer isn't conscious of the
temperature? It seems that the answer has been that it's state or activity
*could*
be intepreted in
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Like Bruno, I am not claiming that this is definitely the case, just that
it is the case if
computationalism is true. Several philosophers (eg. Searle) have used
1Z wrote:
...
Dennett's idea of stored conscious volition is quite in line with our
theory. Indeed, we would like to extend it in a way that Dennett does
not. We would like to extend it to stored indeterminism. Any decision
we make in exigent situations wher we do nto have the luxury of
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Now, suppose some more complex variant of 3+2=3 implemented on your
abacus has consciousness associated with it, which is just one of
the tenets of computationalism.
Peter Jones writes:
That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees with me
on the list, and
I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd: every
physical system
implements every conscious computation, no physical system implements any
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
I'm not sure how the multiverse comes into the discussion, but you have
made the point several times that a computation depends on an observer
No, I haven't! I have tried ot follow through the consequences of
assuming it must.
It
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Now, suppose some more complex variant of 3+2=3 implemented on your
abacus has consciousness associated with it, which is just one of the
tenets of
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
That's what I'm saying, but I certainly don't think everyone agrees with me
on the list, and
I'm not completely decided as to which of the three is more absurd: every
physical system
implements every conscious computation, no physical system
Brent Meeker:
Colin Hales wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou
snip
Maybe this is a copout, but I just don't think it is even logically
possible to explain what consciousness
*is* unless you have it. It's like the problem of explaining vision to a
blind man: he might be the world's
greatest
Peter Jones writes:
If consciousness supervenes on inherent non-interprtation-dependent
features,
it can supervene on features which are binary, either present or
absent.
For instance, whether a programme examines or modifies its own code is
surely
such a feature.
Even if
Colin Hales wrote:
...
As far as the internal life of the CPU is
concerned...
whatever it is like to be an electrically noisy hot rock, regardless of
the
programalthough the character of the noise may alter with different
programs!
That's like say whatever it is like to be you, it is
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a
conscious
computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of
computationalism
have used the absurdity of the conclusion that
Lennart Nilsson wrote:
...
But my point is that this may come down to what we would mean by a computer
being
conscious. Bruno has an answer in terms of what the computer can prove.
Jaynes (and
probably John McCarthy) would say a computer is conscious if it creates a
narrative
of its
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Like Bruno, I am not claiming that this is definitely the case, just that
it is the case if
computationalism is true. Several philosophers (eg. Searle) have used the
self-evident
absurdity of the idea as an argument demonstrating that
Brent Meeker wrote (through many posts):
I won't insist, because you might be right, but I don't think that is
proven. It may
be that interaction with the environment is essential to continued
consciousness.
Assuming comp, I think that this is a red herring. To make this clear I
Brent Meeker writes:
Why not? Can't we map bat conscious-computation to human
conscious-computation;
since you suppose we can map any computation to any other. But, you're
thinking,
since there a practical infinity of maps (even a countable infinity if you
allow
one-many) there is
Brent Meeker writes:
I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a
conscious
computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of
computationalism
have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any
conscious
computation as
-Original Message-
Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes:
Why not? Can't we map bat conscious-computation to human conscious-
computation;
since you suppose we can map any computation to any other. But,
you're thinking,
since there a practical infinity of maps (even a
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
Why not? Can't we map bat conscious-computation to human
conscious-computation;
since you suppose we can map any computation to any other. But, you're
thinking,
since there a practical infinity of maps (even a countable infinity if you
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a
conscious
computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of
computationalism
have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any
conscious
Brent meeker writes:
I could make a robot that, having suitable thermocouples, would quickly
withdraw it's
hand from a fire; but not be conscious of it. Even if I provide the
robot with
feelings, i.e. judgements about good/bad/pain/pleasure I'm not sure it
would be
conscious.
Stathis Papaioannou
snip
Maybe this is a copout, but I just don't think it is even logically
possible to explain what consciousness
*is* unless you have it. It's like the problem of explaining vision to a
blind man: he might be the world's
greatest scientific expert on it but still have
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
I could make a robot that, having suitable thermocouples, would quickly
withdraw it's
hand from a fire; but not be conscious of it. Even if I provide the
robot with
feelings, i.e. judgements about good/bad/pain/pleasure I'm not sure it
Colin Hales wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou
snip
Maybe this is a copout, but I just don't think it is even logically
possible to explain what consciousness
*is* unless you have it. It's like the problem of explaining vision to a
blind man: he might be the world's
greatest scientific expert on it
Brent Meeker writes:
I could make a robot that, having suitable thermocouples, would quickly
withdraw it's
hand from a fire; but not be conscious of it. Even if I provide the robot
with
feelings, i.e. judgements about good/bad/pain/pleasure I'm not sure it
would be
conscious. But
Peter Jones writes:
I'm not sure how the multiverse comes into the discussion, but you have
made the point several times that a computation depends on an observer
No, I haven't! I have tried ot follow through the consequences of
assuming it must.
It seems to me that some sort of
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Now, suppose some more complex variant of 3+2=3 implemented on your
abacus has consciousness associated with it, which is just one of the
tenets of computationalism. Some time later, you are walking in the
Amazon rain forest
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
With physical supervenience, it is possible for the same person to
supervene on multiple physical objects. What is disallowed is multiple
persons to supervene on the same physical object.
That
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
I could make a robot that, having suitable thermocouples, would quickly
withdraw it's
hand from a fire; but not be conscious of it. Even if I provide the robot
with
feelings, i.e. judgements about good/bad/pain/pleasure I'm not sure it
Brent Meeker writes:
A non-conscious computation cannot be *useful* without the
manual/interpretation,
and in this sense could be called just a potential computation, but a
conscious
computation is still *conscious* even if no-one else is able to figure this
out or
interact with
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
A non-conscious computation cannot be *useful* without the
manual/interpretation,
and in this sense could be called just a potential computation, but a
conscious
computation is still *conscious* even if no-one else is able to figure this
out
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le jeudi 7 septembre 2006 14:14, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 06-sept.-06, à 21:59, 1Z a écrit :
Of course it is not natural, or we would not
have two separate words for possible and actual.
Well, Platonist theories are counter-intuitive.
Brent Meeker wrote:
That's not very interesting for non-conscious computations, because
they are only useful or meaningful if they can be observed or interact with
their
environment. However, a conscious computation is interesting all on its
own. It
might have a fuller life if it
Le 07-sept.-06, à 01:56, Russell Standish a écrit :
This simplest way of addressing this is to use your dovetailer instead
of quantum multiverses, which tends to confuse people, and get
associated with quantum mysticism. The dovetailer is obviously
computable, but not the internal trace of
Le 07-sept.-06, à 03:19, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Why do you disagree that one of the bitstrings is conscious? It seems
to
me that the subcollection of bitstrings that corresponds to the
actions of
a program emulating a person under all possible inputs is a
collection of
multiple
Le 07-sept.-06, à 06:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
This seems to me very close to saying that every conscious
computation is
implemented necessarily in Platonia, as the physical reality seems
hardly
relevant.
It seems to me to be very close to a reductio ad absurdum.
Reductio ad
Le 07-sept.-06, à 14:14, 1Z a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 06-sept.-06, à 21:59, 1Z a écrit :
Of course it is not natural, or we would not
have two separate words for possible and actual.
Well, Platonist theories are counter-intuitive. Aristotle is the one
responsible to make us
Le 07-sept.-06, à 16:42, 1Z a écrit :
Rationalists, and hence everythingists, are no better off because they
still have to appeal to some contingent brute fact, that *onl*
mathemematical
(or computational) entities exist, even if *all* such entities do.
(Platonia
is broad but flat). Since
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes:
A non-conscious computation cannot be *useful* without the
manual/interpretation,
and in this sense could be called just a potential computation, but a
conscious
computation is still *conscious* even if no-one else is able to figure this
out
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
That's not very interesting for non-conscious computations, because
they are only useful or meaningful if they can be observed or interact with
their
environment. However, a conscious computation is interesting all on its own.
It
might have a fuller life if
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 07-sept.-06, à 06:21, Brent Meeker a écrit :
This seems to me very close to saying that every conscious
computation is
implemented necessarily in Platonia, as the physical reality seems
hardly
relevant.
It seems to me to be very close to a reductio ad absurdum.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 07-sept.-06, à 16:42, 1Z a écrit :
Rationalists, and hence everythingists, are no better off because they
still have to appeal to some contingent brute fact, that *onl*
mathemematical
(or computational) entities exist, even if *all* such entities do.
(Platonia
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
That's not very interesting for non-conscious computations, because
they are only useful or meaningful if they can be observed or interact
with their
environment. However, a conscious computation is interesting all on its
own. It
Le 05-sept.-06, à 20:49, 1Z a écrit :
That is the answer Stathis wants, but it doesn't work. Whether a
computation
is self-interpreting or not is itself a matter of interpretation, given
his premises.
He seems to need some sort of interpretation-independently
self-interpreting system
to
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent meeker writes:
Let's not try to define consciousness at all, but agree that we know what it
is
from personal experience. Computationalism is the theory that consciousness
arises
as a result of computer activity: that our brains are just complex
computers,
Russel Standish writes:
Or my point that in a Multiverse, counterfactuals are instantiated
anyway. Physical supervenience and computationalism are not
incompatible in a multiverse, where physical means the observed
properties of things like electrons and so on.
I'd think that in the context
On Wed, Sep 06, 2006 at 12:25:10AM -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
I'd think that in the context of a multiverse, physical supervenience
would say that whether consciousness is instantiated would depend only
on physical conditions here, at this point in the multiverse, and would
not depend on
Le 05-sept.-06, à 00:00, 1Z a écrit :
However, comp may not be the same as computationalism.
In that case there should be an error in the Universal Dovetailer
Argument.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter Jones writes:
[Stathis Papaioannou]
If every computation is implemented everywhere anyway, this is
equivalent to the situation where every
computation exists as a platonic object, or every computation exists
Peter Jones writes:
But if implementing a particular computation depends on an observer,
or
a dicitonary,
or somesuch, it is not the case that everything implements every
computation unless
it can be shown that evey dictionary somehow exists as well.
The
Peter Jones writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Under one mapping, the physical system implements a program which thinks,
I am now experiencing my first second of life. Under a different mapping,
it implements a program which thinks, I am now experiencing my second
second of life.
Le 04-sept.-06, à 16:57, David Nyman a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Either those *specific* physical activities are turing emulable, and
we
are back to 1) and 2), or they are not, and then comp is false.
Recall we assume comp.
I don't follow. I thought Maudlin is proposing a physical
Le 06-sept.-06, à 10:48, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Wed, Sep 06, 2006 at 12:25:10AM -0700, Hal Finney wrote:
I'd think that in the context of a multiverse, physical supervenience
would say that whether consciousness is instantiated would depend only
on physical conditions here, at this
Le 05-sept.-06, à 15:38, 1Z a écrit :
The conscious computations, on the other hand, are there and
self-aware
Not really. They are just possibilities.
even though we cannot interact with them, just as all the statues in
a block of marble would be conscious
if statues were conscious
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