Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-21 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 20 Jan 2019, at 19:23, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, January 20, 2019 at 8:52:54 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 15 Jan 2019, at 12:56, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, January 15, 2019 at 5:33:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> > On 14 Jan 2019, at 20:27, Brent Meeker > wrote: 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > On 1/14/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> >> The physics comes from the first person statistical interference between 
>> >> those dreams. 
>> > 
>> > Where can this "person" be to make a statisical inference, if there are 
>> > only the dreams? 
>> > 
>> 
>> That person makes the inference in the dreams, and test them in the mean 
>> (most normal, in the Gaussian sense) consistent extensions where it 
>> consciousness differentiate. 
>> 
>> Those dream are not “nocturnal” type of dream. A dream here is just a 
>> computation supporting a Löbian machine, which itself supports a person ([]p 
>> ). The measure one is given either by []p & p (p sigma_1), or just []p & 
>> <>t. “[]p” alone cannot work, because G adds “cul-de-sac world” at any 
>> transition, and we have to get rid of them, to get the default hypotheses 
>> used in probability or credibility theory. 
>> 
>> We do reverse engineering somehow. We extract the geometry of the universe 
>> (the accessibility relations) from the modal logic of the 
>> observable/predictable, which is derived from the “material variants” of G 
>> (mainly Z). 
>> 
>> With mechanism, there are no other way, unless adding a magical selection 
>> principle, but that would make impossible to trust any digitalist doctors. 
>> Would you say yes to a doctor who says that the transplant needs some 
>> prayer? 
>> 
>> Bruno 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> But what exactly counts as a digital implant?
>> 
>>  Likely, neurosurgeons in the future will be replacing neurons and groups of 
>> neurons in human brains with synthetic neurons made of some sort of 
>> materials, perhaps including silicon, but also biopolymers …
> 
> 
> An implant can be said digital if it is emulable at the relevant substitution 
> level (that we cannot know for sure, that is why it is a sort of bet).
> 
> If the primitive matter plays a role, it has to be non Turing emulable at 
> all, but there are no evidences for this, and some contrary evidences do 
> exist.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Suppose you replace one neuron (e.g. w/[OEBN],


w/[OEBN] ?



> but something of that kind) in a human brain. Everything's fine. The you 
> replace a group of neurons. Everything's fine. Eventually all neurons are 
> replaced. Is the result an emulation?

That would be magic. But if the “artificial neurons” functions with digital 
circuitry, and all is fine, then the consciousness supervene of computation, 
and it is emulated in infinitely many exemplar in the Arithmetical Reality, and 
no machine can feel the difference between a digital emulation done by a 
physical reality, or by a god, or by arithmetic, and so physics has to be 
retrieved on all computations which emulates our digital consistent extensions. 
That explains the quantum aspect of nature (statistical interfering of 
infinities of computations, quantum logic).




> 
> [OEBN] An organic electronic biomimetic neuron enables auto-regulated 
> neuromodulation

Ah! OK.




> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0956566315300610 
> 
> 
> Abstract
> 
> Current therapies for neurological disorders are based on traditional 
> medication and electric stimulation. Here, we present an organic electronic 
> biomimetic neuron, with the capacity to precisely intervene with the 
> underlying malfunctioning signaling pathway using endogenous substances. The 
> fundamental function of neurons, defined as 
> chemical-to-electrical-to-chemical signal transduction, is achieved by 
> connecting enzyme-based amperometric biosensors and organic electronic ion 
> pumps. Selective biosensors transduce chemical signals into an electric 
> current, which regulates electrophoretic delivery of chemical substances 
> without necessitating liquid flow. Biosensors detected neurotransmitters in 
> physiologically relevant ranges of 5–80 µM, showing linear response above 20 
> µm with approx. 0.1 nA/µM slope. When exceeding defined threshold 
> concentrations, biosensor output signals, connected via custom 
> hardware/software, activated local or distant neurotransmitter delivery from 
> the organic electronic ion pump. Changes of 20 µM glutamate or acetylcholine 
> triggered diffusive delivery of acetylcholine, which activated cells via 
> receptor-mediated signalling. This was observed in real-time by single-cell 
> ratiometric Ca2+ imaging. The results demonstrate the potential of the 
> organic electronic biomimetic neuron in therapies involving long-range 
> neuronal signaling by mimicking the function of projection neurons. 
> Alternatively, conversion of 

Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-20 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, January 20, 2019 at 8:52:54 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 15 Jan 2019, at 12:56, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, January 15, 2019 at 5:33:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> > On 14 Jan 2019, at 20:27, Brent Meeker  wrote: 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > On 1/14/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> >> The physics comes from the first person statistical interference 
>> between those dreams. 
>> > 
>> > Where can this "person" be to make a statisical inference, if there are 
>> only the dreams? 
>> > 
>>
>> That person makes the inference in the dreams, and test them in the mean 
>> (most normal, in the Gaussian sense) consistent extensions where it 
>> consciousness differentiate. 
>>
>> Those dream are not “nocturnal” type of dream. A dream here is just a 
>> computation supporting a Löbian machine, which itself supports a person 
>> ([]p ). The measure one is given either by []p & p (p sigma_1), or just 
>> []p & <>t. “[]p” alone cannot work, because G adds “cul-de-sac world” at 
>> any transition, and we have to get rid of them, to get the default 
>> hypotheses used in probability or credibility theory. 
>>
>> We do reverse engineering somehow. We extract the geometry of the 
>> universe (the accessibility relations) from the modal logic of the 
>> observable/predictable, which is derived from the “material variants” of G 
>> (mainly Z). 
>>
>> With mechanism, there are no other way, unless adding a magical selection 
>> principle, but that would make impossible to trust any digitalist doctors. 
>> Would you say yes to a doctor who says that the transplant needs some 
>> prayer? 
>>
>> Bruno 
>>
>>
>>
> But what exactly counts as a digital implant?
>
>  Likely, neurosurgeons in the future will be replacing neurons and groups 
> of neurons in human brains with synthetic neurons made of some sort of 
> materials, perhaps including silicon, but also biopolymers …
>
>
>
> An implant can be said digital if it is emulable at the relevant 
> substitution level (that we cannot know for sure, that is why it is a sort 
> of bet).
>
> If the primitive matter plays a role, it has to be non Turing emulable at 
> all, but there are no evidences for this, and some contrary evidences do 
> exist.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>

Suppose you replace one neuron (e.g. w/[OEBN], but something of that kind) 
in a human brain. Everything's fine. The you replace a group of neurons. 
Everything's fine. Eventually all neurons are replaced. Is the result an 
*emulation*?

[OEBN] *An organic electronic biomimetic neuron enables auto-regulated 
neuromodulation*
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0956566315300610

Abstract

Current therapies for neurological disorders are based on traditional 
medication and electric stimulation. Here, we present an *organic 
electronic biomimetic neuron*, with the capacity to precisely intervene 
with the underlying malfunctioning signaling pathway using endogenous 
substances. The fundamental function of neurons, defined as 
chemical-to-electrical-to-chemical signal transduction, is achieved by 
connecting enzyme-based amperometric biosensors and organic electronic ion 
pumps. Selective biosensors transduce chemical signals into an electric 
current, which regulates electrophoretic delivery of chemical substances 
without necessitating liquid flow. Biosensors detected neurotransmitters in 
physiologically relevant ranges of 5–80 µM, showing linear response above 
20 µm with approx. 0.1 nA/µM slope. When exceeding defined threshold 
concentrations, biosensor output signals, connected via custom 
hardware/software, activated local or distant neurotransmitter delivery 
from the organic electronic ion pump. Changes of 20 µM glutamate or 
acetylcholine triggered diffusive delivery of acetylcholine, which 
activated cells via receptor-mediated signalling. This was observed in 
real-time by single-cell ratiometric Ca2+ imaging. The results demonstrate 
the potential of the organic electronic biomimetic neuron in therapies 
involving long-range neuronal signaling by mimicking the function of 
projection neurons. Alternatively, conversion of glutamate-induced 
descending neuromuscular signals into acetylcholine-mediated muscular 
activation signals may be obtained, applicable for bridging injured sites 
and active prosthetics.

- pt


 

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Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-20 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 15 Jan 2019, at 12:56, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, January 15, 2019 at 5:33:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> > On 14 Jan 2019, at 20:27, Brent Meeker > 
> > wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On 1/14/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >> The physics comes from the first person statistical interference between 
> >> those dreams. 
> > 
> > Where can this "person" be to make a statisical inference, if there are 
> > only the dreams? 
> > 
> 
> That person makes the inference in the dreams, and test them in the mean 
> (most normal, in the Gaussian sense) consistent extensions where it 
> consciousness differentiate. 
> 
> Those dream are not “nocturnal” type of dream. A dream here is just a 
> computation supporting a Löbian machine, which itself supports a person ([]p 
> ). The measure one is given either by []p & p (p sigma_1), or just []p & 
> <>t. “[]p” alone cannot work, because G adds “cul-de-sac world” at any 
> transition, and we have to get rid of them, to get the default hypotheses 
> used in probability or credibility theory. 
> 
> We do reverse engineering somehow. We extract the geometry of the universe 
> (the accessibility relations) from the modal logic of the 
> observable/predictable, which is derived from the “material variants” of G 
> (mainly Z). 
> 
> With mechanism, there are no other way, unless adding a magical selection 
> principle, but that would make impossible to trust any digitalist doctors. 
> Would you say yes to a doctor who says that the transplant needs some prayer? 
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> 
> 
> But what exactly counts as a digital implant?
> 
>  Likely, neurosurgeons in the future will be replacing neurons and groups of 
> neurons in human brains with synthetic neurons made of some sort of 
> materials, perhaps including silicon, but also biopolymers …


An implant can be said digital if it is emulable at the relevant substitution 
level (that we cannot know for sure, that is why it is a sort of bet).

If the primitive matter plays a role, it has to be non Turing emulable at all, 
but there are no evidences for this, and some contrary evidences do exist.

Bruno



> 
> - pt
> 
> -- 
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Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-15 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, January 15, 2019 at 5:33:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> > On 14 Jan 2019, at 20:27, Brent Meeker  > wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On 1/14/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >> The physics comes from the first person statistical interference 
> between those dreams. 
> > 
> > Where can this "person" be to make a statisical inference, if there are 
> only the dreams? 
> > 
>
> That person makes the inference in the dreams, and test them in the mean 
> (most normal, in the Gaussian sense) consistent extensions where it 
> consciousness differentiate. 
>
> Those dream are not “nocturnal” type of dream. A dream here is just a 
> computation supporting a Löbian machine, which itself supports a person 
> ([]p ). The measure one is given either by []p & p (p sigma_1), or just 
> []p & <>t. “[]p” alone cannot work, because G adds “cul-de-sac world” at 
> any transition, and we have to get rid of them, to get the default 
> hypotheses used in probability or credibility theory. 
>
> We do reverse engineering somehow. We extract the geometry of the universe 
> (the accessibility relations) from the modal logic of the 
> observable/predictable, which is derived from the “material variants” of G 
> (mainly Z). 
>
> With mechanism, there are no other way, unless adding a magical selection 
> principle, but that would make impossible to trust any digitalist doctors. 
> Would you say yes to a doctor who says that the transplant needs some 
> prayer? 
>
> Bruno 
>
>
>
But what exactly counts as a digital implant?

 Likely, neurosurgeons in the future will be replacing neurons and groups 
of neurons in human brains with synthetic neurons made of some sort of 
materials, perhaps including silicon, but also biopolymers ...

- pt

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Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 14 Jan 2019, at 20:27, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 1/14/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> The physics comes from the first person statistical interference between 
>> those dreams.
> 
> Where can this "person" be to make a statisical inference, if there are only 
> the dreams?
> 

That person makes the inference in the dreams, and test them in the mean (most 
normal, in the Gaussian sense) consistent extensions where it consciousness 
differentiate. 

Those dream are not “nocturnal” type of dream. A dream here is just a 
computation supporting a Löbian machine, which itself supports a person ([]p 
). The measure one is given either by []p & p (p sigma_1), or just []p & <>t. 
“[]p” alone cannot work, because G adds “cul-de-sac world” at any transition, 
and we have to get rid of them, to get the default hypotheses used in 
probability or credibility theory.

We do reverse engineering somehow. We extract the geometry of the universe (the 
accessibility relations) from the modal logic of the observable/predictable, 
which is derived from the “material variants” of G (mainly Z).

With mechanism, there are no other way, unless adding a magical selection 
principle, but that would make impossible to trust any digitalist doctors. 
Would you say yes to a doctor who says that the transplant needs some prayer?

Bruno





> Brent
> 
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Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-14 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, January 14, 2019 at 5:22:16 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Jan 2019, at 21:08, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> My only link here is to my notebook:  
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/contents/
> 102 notes so far. What I've though of is there somewhere.
>
>
> But in summary I adopt:
>
> - an *unconventional computationalism* (where psychical/experiential 
> modalities are entities of machine operation, vs. just logical/numerical 
> modalities)
>
>
> I can appreciate this. The universal number do appreciate this! The main 
> problem of the use of modal logic in philosophy is that there are too many 
> of them, but then with mechanism, we got a filter on them, and get the 
> imposed (by incompleteness) logics G and G* and their intensional variants, 
> which are very rich, and explains what there is a physical universe that we 
> can observe. Now, that physical universe loses its ontology, so we are back 
> to Plato (versus Aristotle’s materialism, for which there is no evidence at 
> all). 
>
>
>
>
> - a *PLTOS* (program-language-translator/compiler-object-substrate) 
> framework, where conventional PLT - programming language theory - is 
> extended to substrate-dependency, resulting in an (unconventional) UPLT
>
>
> How could a (universal) machine distinguish a substance from an oracle, or 
> from a more complex universal number? That seems as much impossible as to 
> be able to know that we are not dreaming. But we can know that we are 
> “dreaming", and nature confirms that position. “Dreaming” is in quote, 
> because it requires infinitely many brains/representation-in-arithmetic, 
> and is different from one specific dream made by one machine. The physics 
> comes from the first person statistical interference between those dreams.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>


I don't know if goo computers* can solve NP-hard  problems in linear time, 
or if psychical joins physical-informational in programming semantics of 
biocomputers, but we'll see ...


* https://www.popularmechanics.com/science/math/a25686417/amoeba-math/

- pt

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Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-14 Thread Brent Meeker




On 1/14/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The physics comes from the first person statistical interference 
between those dreams.


Where can this "person" be to make a statisical inference, if there are 
only the dreams?


Brent

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Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-14 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 13 Jan 2019, at 21:08, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, January 13, 2019 at 9:22:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 23:36, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 8:41:19 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 12:40, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 5:24:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:03:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, 
 werewolves, that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in 
 computer simulations of stories of them …
>>> 
>>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of 
>>> “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of 
>>> observable, you can infer that either:
>>> 
>>> Mechanism is false, or
>>> You are dreaming, or
>>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
>>> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>>> 
>>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we 
>>> see exactly what mechanism predicts.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer.
>> 
>> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical 
>> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so 
>> low that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the 
>> observable one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also 
>> problematical to me.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta 
>>> as the fundamental elements of nature.
>> 
>> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an 
>> existing theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without 
>> assuming it. What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if 
>> invisible horses pull the car?
>> 
>> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of 
>> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are 
>> not the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, 
>> which is inconsistent with mechanism.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing 
>>> (QuIP) machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
>>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
>> 
>> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary 
>> variant of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would 
>> entail the existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and 
>> makes both consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is 
>> the goal?
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make 
>>> up stories about vampires and werewolves.
>> 
>> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist 
>> hypothesis.
>> 
>> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To 
>> avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a 
>> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, 
>> especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way 
>> (as your use of many links illustrates).
>> 
>> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in 
>> matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts 
>> go in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of 
>> primary matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be 
>> Newtonian, Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + 
>> EPR-Everett saves Mechanism.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would 
>> be a surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)
> 
> 
> When I first made the theory public, 

Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-13 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, January 13, 2019 at 9:22:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Jan 2019, at 23:36, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 8:41:19 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 12:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 5:24:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:03:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, 
>>> werewolves, that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in 
>>> computer simulations of stories of them …
>>>
>>>
>>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of 
>>> “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of 
>>> observable, you can infer that either:
>>>
>>> Mechanism is false, or
>>> You are dreaming, or
>>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
>>> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>>>
>>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we 
>>> see exactly what mechanism predicts.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer. 
>>
>>
>> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical 
>> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so 
>> low 
>> that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the 
>> observable 
>> one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also 
>> problematical 
>> to me.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta 
>> as the fundamental elements of nature. 
>>
>>
>> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an 
>> existing theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without 
>> assuming it. What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if 
>> invisible horses pull the car?
>>
>> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence 
>> of nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are 
>> not the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, 
>> which 
>> is inconsistent with mechanism.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing 
>> (QuIP) machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
>>
>>
>> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary 
>> variant of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would 
>> entail 
>> the existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both 
>> consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who 
>> make up stories about vampires and werewolves.
>>
>>
>> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the 
>> computationalist hypothesis.
>>
>> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. 
>> To avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a 
>> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, 
>> especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way 
>> (as 
>> your use of many links illustrates).
>>
>> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in 
>> matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts 
>> go 
>> in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of 
>> primary 
>> matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, 
>> Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves 
>> Mechanism.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>  
>
> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would 
> be a surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)
>
>
>
> When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from 

Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-13 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 12 Jan 2019, at 02:25, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 1/11/2019 2:36 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> Of course there are math professors (Dr. Z at Rutgers) who teach on the 
>>> evils of Platonism. And "Truth" is like God, as Rorty said.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> That is a good summary of Plato. Hirsschberger sum up Plato by saying that 
>> the God of Plato is Truth. Not the one we make public, but the one we search.
>> 
>> Now, all my life I have got the feeling that Plato is dismissed, and badly 
>> seen, notably in opposition to Aristotle. But Aristotle did not understood 
>> Plato, except in a curious passage of the “metaphysics” where he seems to 
>> suddenly got the point, and seems to come back to Plato without saying (but 
>> that is an optimistic reading of Aristotle’s metaphysics, To be sure I found 
>> some scholars who saw that too, like Gerson.
>> 
>> That "truth is God" makes sense for a computationalist, because “truth” when 
>> encompassing the description of a machine at its correct substitution level, 
>> is no more definable by that machine. Yes, Truth, and semantics, is very 
>> much like the platonician notion of God. You force me to agree with Rorty on 
>> this!
>> 
> 
> At the same time Rorty said,"Truth is like God" he was a "strict atheist”. 

I thought on this. Plato defines God by “Ultimate Truth” with a meliorative 
respectful sense of Truth.

Maybe Rorty said this to dismiss Truth, as much as the “God” of the “naive 
current authoritarian” religion.
But Rorty take some “nature” for granted, and this is the ciment of the current 
Aristotelian quasi imposed paradigm, which is contradicted by the close 
observation of nature, and by the theoretical consequences of Mechanism.




> He was also a pragmatist, meaning he thought the measure of truth was solely 
> whether it worked. 

That is, ITSM, rather more instrumentalism and relativism, than pragmatism, but 
may be that is close.

Bruno


> So I'd gather that Rorty didn't think that "truth" was very useful idea; 
> which is confirmed by him being called an "ironist" by his friends.
> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-13 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 11 Jan 2019, at 23:36, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 8:41:19 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 12:40, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 5:24:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:03:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, 
>>> werewolves, that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in 
>>> computer simulations of stories of them …
>> 
>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of 
>> “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of 
>> observable, you can infer that either:
>> 
>> Mechanism is false, or
>> You are dreaming, or
>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
>> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>> 
>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see 
>> exactly what mechanism predicts.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer.
> 
> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical 
> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so 
> low that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the 
> observable one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also 
> problematical to me.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as 
>> the fundamental elements of nature.
> 
> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an 
> existing theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without 
> assuming it. What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if 
> invisible horses pull the car?
> 
> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of 
> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not 
> the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which 
> is inconsistent with mechanism.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing 
>> (QuIP) machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
> 
> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary 
> variant of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would 
> entail the existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes 
> both consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make 
>> up stories about vampires and werewolves.
> 
> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist 
> hypothesis.
> 
> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To 
> avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a 
> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, 
> especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as 
> your use of many links illustrates).
> 
> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in 
> matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts 
> go in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of 
> primary matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be 
> Newtonian, Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + 
> EPR-Everett saves Mechanism.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
>  
> 
> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would be 
> a surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)
 
 
 When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from 
 physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I 
 do not defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of 
 any universal machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) that 

Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-13 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 11 Jan 2019, at 21:04, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 1/11/2019 3:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Anyway, the question is if it is true or false. In mathematics, mechanism 
>> restricts realism only to finite mathematics, or arithmetic. This is 
>> basically the idea that 2+2=4, and that this is true independently of me.
> 
> But "true"and "exist" are different things.

Yes. True in a model, means satisfied in that model. Now “Ex(x = k)” is true in 
a model, if k exists in the model.

For exemple “Ex(x = s(s(0))” is true in all models of arithmetic, and is true 
in particular in the standard model of arithmetic. The structure/model (N, 0, 
+, x) satisfies “Ex(x = s(s(0))”.





> Mathematics uses "exist" to mean "satisfies some predicate”

Satisfies some formula (build with some predicate or legality). Yes, OK.




> .  But we don't think Waston existed because he satisfied "the companion of 
> Homes”.


It exists in the model satisfying the “axioms” of the “theory”, which we take 
as granted when, for entertaining purpose, we want do some awake dreaming, like 
TV and Novels make possible.

Is our reality a model of that theory? Of course we know that this is fewly 
possible. But we do assume that the reality/model in which Watson and Holmes do 
exist is enough similar to us so that we can be sure that Holmes will not loss 
his pipe all along the history we follow.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-12 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, January 12, 2019 at 4:23:51 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/12/2019 3:06 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 7:25:55 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 1/11/2019 2:36 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
>> >> Of course there are math professors (Dr. Z at Rutgers) who teach on 
>> >> the evils of Platonism. And "Truth" is like God, as Rorty said. 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > That is a good summary of Plato. Hirsschberger sum up Plato by saying 
>> > that the God of Plato is Truth. Not the one we make public, but the 
>> > one we search. 
>> > 
>> > Now, all my life I have got the feeling that Plato is dismissed, and 
>> > badly seen, notably in opposition to Aristotle. But Aristotle did not 
>> > understood Plato, except in a curious passage of the “metaphysics” 
>> > where he seems to suddenly got the point, and seems to come back to 
>> > Plato without saying (but that is an optimistic reading of Aristotle’s 
>> > metaphysics, To be sure I found some scholars who saw that too, like 
>> > Gerson. 
>> > 
>> > That "truth is God" makes sense for a computationalist, because 
>> > “truth” when encompassing the description of a machine at its correct 
>> > substitution level, is no more definable by that machine. Yes, Truth, 
>> > and semantics, is very much like the platonician notion of God. You 
>> > force me to agree with Rorty on this! 
>> > 
>>
>> At the same time Rorty said,"Truth is like God" he was a "strict 
>> atheist".  He was also a pragmatist, meaning he thought the measure of 
>> truth was solely whether it worked.  So I'd gather that Rorty didn't 
>> think that "truth" was very useful idea; which is confirmed by him being 
>> called an "ironist" by his friends. 
>>
>> Brent 
>>
>
> He was called a  "boring" atheist. 
>
>
> By Danny Postel.  But from Habermas:
>
> * His colleague Jürgen Habermas's obituary for Rorty points out that 
> Rorty's contrasting childhood experiences, such as beautiful orchids versus 
> reading a book in his parents' house that defended Leon Trotsky against 
> Stalin, created an early interest in philosophy. He describes Rorty as an 
> ironist:*
>
> *"Nothing is sacred to Rorty the ironist. Asked at the end of his life 
> about the 'holy', the strict atheist answered with words reminiscent of the 
> young Hegel: 'My sense of the holy is bound up with the hope that some day 
> my remote descendants will live in a global civilization in which love is 
> pretty much the only law.'[6]"*
>
> Brent
>
>
>
> http://www.pragmatismtoday.eu/summer2012/Madzia-Richard_Rorty_An_Ethics_for_Today_Finding_Common_Ground_between_Philosophy_and_Religion.pdf
>
>
> *Danny Postel once wrote that Richard Rorty can be*
> *probably best described as a "boring atheist.” Now, can*
> *we hear anything interesting about religion from a*
> *boring atheist? In the case of Rorty, we surely can, at*
> *least in two respects: a) by reading his papers on religion*
> *we can get a picture of his opinions on the role of*
> *religious experience in the lives of human beings that is*
> *far from trivial; b) by using "redescription” as Rorty’s*
> *most powerful weapon in advancing our intellectual and*
> *moral standards, we can reformulate some of his ideas*
> *as being able to enter a conversation with the kind of*
> *thinking known as postmodern Christianity (or weak*
> *theology being its instance). Rorty’s atheism definitely*
> *does not fall into the same category as the atheism of*
> *Richard Dawkins or Daniel Dennett. Rorty seems to*
> *perfectly understand the broadness of religious*
> *experience and its various contexts, although, for*
> *himself, religion is not a live option. His growing*
> *willingness to enter into debate with religion, as we saw*
> *it in the last several years of his life, is supposedly an*
> *inevitable conclusion of contentions published in his*
> *earlier papers where he called religion a "conversationstopper.” *
> *It may well be the case that religion sometimes*
> *is a conversation-stopper, but as Rorty himself holds, it is *
> *our (philosophers’) responsibility to maintain the*
> *discussion even with these sometimes "unwilling” forms*
> *of discourse. Since we know that when discussion*
> *ceases, other forms of persuasion come into play, we*
> *must make sure it will carry on. *
>
>
>
> *Rorty: On Truth*
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CzynRPP9XkY
>
> - pt
>
>
 
"*Ironist, *a term coined by Richard Rorty 
" (in *Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity*)

[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ironism ]

Rorty was the one saying who the Ironists were!

In *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 
*, Rorty 
argues that Proust , Nietzsche 
, Foucault 
, Heidegger 

Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-12 Thread Brent Meeker



On 1/12/2019 3:06 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 7:25:55 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 1/11/2019 2:36 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> Of course there are math professors (Dr. Z at Rutgers) who
teach on
>> the evils of Platonism. And "Truth" is like God, as Rorty said.
>
>
>
>
>
> That is a good summary of Plato. Hirsschberger sum up Plato by
saying
> that the God of Plato is Truth. Not the one we make public, but the
> one we search.
>
> Now, all my life I have got the feeling that Plato is dismissed,
and
> badly seen, notably in opposition to Aristotle. But Aristotle
did not
> understood Plato, except in a curious passage of the “metaphysics”
> where he seems to suddenly got the point, and seems to come back to
> Plato without saying (but that is an optimistic reading of
Aristotle’s
> metaphysics, To be sure I found some scholars who saw that too,
like
> Gerson.
>
> That "truth is God" makes sense for a computationalist, because
> “truth” when encompassing the description of a machine at its
correct
> substitution level, is no more definable by that machine. Yes,
Truth,
> and semantics, is very much like the platonician notion of God. You
> force me to agree with Rorty on this!
>

At the same time Rorty said,"Truth is like God" he was a "strict
atheist".  He was also a pragmatist, meaning he thought the
measure of
truth was solely whether it worked.  So I'd gather that Rorty didn't
think that "truth" was very useful idea; which is confirmed by him
being
called an "ironist" by his friends.

Brent


He was called a  "boring" atheist.


By Danny Postel.  But from Habermas:/

His colleague Jürgen Habermas's obituary for Rorty points out that 
Rorty's contrasting childhood experiences, such as beautiful orchids 
versus reading a book in his parents' house that defended Leon Trotsky 
against Stalin, created an early interest in philosophy. He describes 
Rorty as an ironist://

//
//"Nothing is sacred to Rorty the ironist. Asked at the end of his life 
about the 'holy',*the strict atheist* answered with words reminiscent of 
the young Hegel: 'My sense of the holy is bound up with the hope that 
some day my remote descendants will live in a global civilization in 
which love is pretty much the only law.'[6]"/


Brent


http://www.pragmatismtoday.eu/summer2012/Madzia-Richard_Rorty_An_Ethics_for_Today_Finding_Common_Ground_between_Philosophy_and_Religion.pdf


/Danny Postel once wrote that Richard Rorty can be/
/probably best described as a *"boring atheist.”* Now, can/
/we hear anything interesting about religion from a/
/boring atheist? In the case of Rorty, we surely can, at/
/least in two respects: a) by reading his papers on religion/
/we can get a picture of his opinions on the role of/
/religious experience in the lives of human beings that is/
/far from trivial; b) by using "redescription” as Rorty’s/
/most powerful weapon in advancing our intellectual and/
/moral standards, we can reformulate some of his ideas/
/as being able to enter a conversation with the kind of/
/thinking known as postmodern Christianity (or weak/
/theology being its instance). Rorty’s atheism definitely/
/does not fall into the same category as the atheism of/
/Richard Dawkins or Daniel Dennett. Rorty seems to/
/perfectly understand the broadness of religious/
/experience and its various contexts, although, for/
/himself, religion is not a live option. His growing/
/willingness to enter into debate with religion, as we saw/
/it in the last several years of his life, is supposedly an/
/inevitable conclusion of contentions published in his/
/earlier papers where he called religion a "conversationstopper.” /
/It may well be the case that religion sometimes/
/is a conversation-stopper, but as Rorty himself holds, it is /
/our (philosophers’) responsibility to maintain the/
/discussion even with these sometimes "unwilling” forms/
/of discourse. Since we know that when discussion/
/ceases, other forms of persuasion come into play, we/
/must make sure it will carry on. /
/
/


*Rorty: On Truth*
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CzynRPP9XkY

- pt


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Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-12 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 7:25:55 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/11/2019 2:36 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
> >> Of course there are math professors (Dr. Z at Rutgers) who teach on 
> >> the evils of Platonism. And "Truth" is like God, as Rorty said. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > That is a good summary of Plato. Hirsschberger sum up Plato by saying 
> > that the God of Plato is Truth. Not the one we make public, but the 
> > one we search. 
> > 
> > Now, all my life I have got the feeling that Plato is dismissed, and 
> > badly seen, notably in opposition to Aristotle. But Aristotle did not 
> > understood Plato, except in a curious passage of the “metaphysics” 
> > where he seems to suddenly got the point, and seems to come back to 
> > Plato without saying (but that is an optimistic reading of Aristotle’s 
> > metaphysics, To be sure I found some scholars who saw that too, like 
> > Gerson. 
> > 
> > That "truth is God" makes sense for a computationalist, because 
> > “truth” when encompassing the description of a machine at its correct 
> > substitution level, is no more definable by that machine. Yes, Truth, 
> > and semantics, is very much like the platonician notion of God. You 
> > force me to agree with Rorty on this! 
> > 
>
> At the same time Rorty said,"Truth is like God" he was a "strict 
> atheist".  He was also a pragmatist, meaning he thought the measure of 
> truth was solely whether it worked.  So I'd gather that Rorty didn't 
> think that "truth" was very useful idea; which is confirmed by him being 
> called an "ironist" by his friends. 
>
> Brent 
>

He was called a  "boring" atheist. 

http://www.pragmatismtoday.eu/summer2012/Madzia-Richard_Rorty_An_Ethics_for_Today_Finding_Common_Ground_between_Philosophy_and_Religion.pdf


*Danny Postel once wrote that Richard Rorty can be*
*probably best described as a "boring atheist.” Now, can*
*we hear anything interesting about religion from a*
*boring atheist? In the case of Rorty, we surely can, at*
*least in two respects: a) by reading his papers on religion*
*we can get a picture of his opinions on the role of*
*religious experience in the lives of human beings that is*
*far from trivial; b) by using "redescription” as Rorty’s*
*most powerful weapon in advancing our intellectual and*
*moral standards, we can reformulate some of his ideas*
*as being able to enter a conversation with the kind of*
*thinking known as postmodern Christianity (or weak*
*theology being its instance). Rorty’s atheism definitely*
*does not fall into the same category as the atheism of*
*Richard Dawkins or Daniel Dennett. Rorty seems to*
*perfectly understand the broadness of religious*
*experience and its various contexts, although, for*
*himself, religion is not a live option. His growing*
*willingness to enter into debate with religion, as we saw*
*it in the last several years of his life, is supposedly an*
*inevitable conclusion of contentions published in his*
*earlier papers where he called religion a "conversationstopper.” *
*It may well be the case that religion sometimes*
*is a conversation-stopper, but as Rorty himself holds, it is *
*our (philosophers’) responsibility to maintain the*
*discussion even with these sometimes "unwilling” forms*
*of discourse. Since we know that when discussion*
*ceases, other forms of persuasion come into play, we*
*must make sure it will carry on. *



*Rorty: On Truth*
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CzynRPP9XkY

- pt


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Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-11 Thread Brent Meeker




On 1/11/2019 2:36 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
Of course there are math professors (Dr. Z at Rutgers) who teach on 
the evils of Platonism. And "Truth" is like God, as Rorty said.






That is a good summary of Plato. Hirsschberger sum up Plato by saying 
that the God of Plato is Truth. Not the one we make public, but the 
one we search.


Now, all my life I have got the feeling that Plato is dismissed, and 
badly seen, notably in opposition to Aristotle. But Aristotle did not 
understood Plato, except in a curious passage of the “metaphysics” 
where he seems to suddenly got the point, and seems to come back to 
Plato without saying (but that is an optimistic reading of Aristotle’s 
metaphysics, To be sure I found some scholars who saw that too, like 
Gerson.


That "truth is God" makes sense for a computationalist, because 
“truth” when encompassing the description of a machine at its correct 
substitution level, is no more definable by that machine. Yes, Truth, 
and semantics, is very much like the platonician notion of God. You 
force me to agree with Rorty on this!




At the same time Rorty said,"Truth is like God" he was a "strict 
atheist".  He was also a pragmatist, meaning he thought the measure of 
truth was solely whether it worked.  So I'd gather that Rorty didn't 
think that "truth" was very useful idea; which is confirmed by him being 
called an "ironist" by his friends.


Brent

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Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 8:41:19 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Jan 2019, at 12:40, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 5:24:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:03:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, 
>> werewolves, that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in 
>> computer simulations of stories of them …
>>
>>
>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of 
>> “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of 
>> observable, you can infer that either:
>>
>> Mechanism is false, or
>> You are dreaming, or
>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
>> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>>
>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we 
>> see exactly what mechanism predicts.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer. 
>
>
> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical 
> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so 
> low 
> that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the 
> observable 
> one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical 
> to me.
>
>
>
>
> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta 
> as the fundamental elements of nature. 
>
>
> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an 
> existing theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without 
> assuming it. What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if 
> invisible horses pull the car?
>
> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of 
> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not 
> the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which 
> is 
> inconsistent with mechanism.
>
>
>
>
> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing 
> (QuIP) machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
>
>
> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary 
> variant of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would 
> entail 
> the existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both 
> consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
>
>
>
>
> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make 
> up stories about vampires and werewolves.
>
>
> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the 
> computationalist hypothesis.
>
> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. 
> To avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a 
> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, 
> especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as 
> your use of many links illustrates).
>
> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in 
> matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts 
> go 
> in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary 
> matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, 
> Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves 
> Mechanism.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
  

 I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would 
 be a surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)



 When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from 
 physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I 
 do 
 not defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of any 
 universal machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) that 
 they 
 are universal. Then we can test that theory as it 

Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-11 Thread Brent Meeker




On 1/11/2019 3:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Anyway, the question is if it is true or false. In mathematics, 
mechanism restricts realism only to finite mathematics, or arithmetic. 
This is basically the idea that 2+2=4, and that this is true 
independently of me.


But "true"and "exist" are different things. Mathematics uses "exist" to 
mean "satisfies some predicate".  But we don't think Waston existed 
because he satisfied "the companion of Homes".


Brent

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Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 11 Jan 2019, at 12:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 5:24:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:03:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, werewolves, 
>> that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer 
>> simulations of stories of them …
> 
> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of 
> “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of 
> observable, you can infer that either:
> 
> Mechanism is false, or
> You are dreaming, or
> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
> 
> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see 
> exactly what mechanism predicts.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer.
 
 That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical 
 universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so 
 low that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the 
 observable one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also 
 problematical to me.
 
 
 
 
> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as 
> the fundamental elements of nature.
 
 You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an existing 
 theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without assuming it. 
 What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if invisible horses 
 pull the car?
 
 Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of 
 nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not 
 the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is 
 inconsistent with mechanism.
 
 
 
 
> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing 
> (QuIP) machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
 
 With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary variant 
 of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail the 
 existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both 
 consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
 
 
 
> 
> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up 
> stories about vampires and werewolves.
 
 The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist 
 hypothesis.
 
 Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To 
 avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a 
 conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, 
 especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as 
 your use of many links illustrates).
 
 All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in 
 matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go 
 in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary 
 matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, 
 Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves 
 Mechanism.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
  
 
 I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would be 
 a surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from 
>>> physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I do 
>>> not defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of any 
>>> universal machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) that they 
>>> are universal. Then we can test that theory as it implies the physical laws.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a 
 possible denotational semantics for experiential processing, which takes 
 

Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 5:24:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:03:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, 
> werewolves, that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in 
> computer simulations of stories of them …
>
>
> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of 
> “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of 
> observable, you can infer that either:
>
> Mechanism is false, or
> You are dreaming, or
> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>
> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we 
> see exactly what mechanism predicts.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>

 Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer. 


 That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical 
 universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so 
 low 
 that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the 
 observable 
 one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical 
 to me.




 But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta 
 as the fundamental elements of nature. 


 You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an 
 existing theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without 
 assuming it. What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if 
 invisible horses pull the car?

 Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of 
 nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not 
 the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is 
 inconsistent with mechanism.




 Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing 
 (QuIP) machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
 experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.


 With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary 
 variant of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail 
 the existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both 
 consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?




 The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make 
 up stories about vampires and werewolves.


 The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the 
 computationalist hypothesis.

 Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To 
 avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a 
 conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, 
 especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as 
 your use of many links illustrates).

 All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in 
 matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go 
 in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary 
 matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, 
 Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves 
 Mechanism.

 Bruno



>>>  
>>>
>>> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would 
>>> be a surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from 
>>> physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I do 
>>> not defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of any 
>>> universal machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) that they 
>>> are universal. Then we can test that theory as it implies the physical laws.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a 
>>> possible *denotational semantics* for experiential processing, which *takes 
>>> place in matter*.
>>>
>>>
>>> That seems a bit weird. Denotatotional semantics is OK (although to 

Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:03:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, werewolves, 
> that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer 
> simulations of stories of them …
 
 Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of “bettable”. 
 If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of observable, you can 
 infer that either:
 
 Mechanism is false, or
 You are dreaming, or
 You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
 descendent who want to fail us on reality).
 
 Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see 
 exactly what mechanism predicts.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 
 
 Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer.
>>> 
>>> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical 
>>> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so low 
>>> that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the observable 
>>> one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical 
>>> to me.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as 
 the fundamental elements of nature.
>>> 
>>> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an existing 
>>> theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without assuming it. 
>>> What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if invisible horses 
>>> pull the car?
>>> 
>>> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of 
>>> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not 
>>> the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is 
>>> inconsistent with mechanism.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing (QuIP) 
 machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
 experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
>>> 
>>> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary variant 
>>> of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail the 
>>> existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both 
>>> consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up 
 stories about vampires and werewolves.
>>> 
>>> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist 
>>> hypothesis.
>>> 
>>> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To 
>>> avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a 
>>> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, 
>>> especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as 
>>> your use of many links illustrates).
>>> 
>>> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in 
>>> matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go 
>>> in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary 
>>> matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, 
>>> Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves 
>>> Mechanism.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would be a 
>>> surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)
>> 
>> 
>> When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from 
>> physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I do 
>> not defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of any 
>> universal machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) that they 
>> are universal. Then we can test that theory as it implies the physical laws.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a 
>>> possible denotational semantics for experiential processing, which takes 
>>> place in matter.
>> 
>> That seems a bit weird. Denotatotional semantics is OK (although to rough 
>> for this complex subject), but why assume Matter, when a theory implies it 
>> appearances. If we get a discrepancy between physics and machine’s physics, 
>> it 

Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:03:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift  wrote:


 Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, 
 werewolves, that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in 
 computer simulations of stories of them …


 Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of 
 “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of 
 observable, you can infer that either:

 Mechanism is false, or
 You are dreaming, or
 You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
 descendent who want to fail us on reality).

 Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we 
 see exactly what mechanism predicts.

 Bruno




>>>
>>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer. 
>>>
>>>
>>> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical 
>>> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so low 
>>> that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the observable 
>>> one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical 
>>> to me.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as 
>>> the fundamental elements of nature. 
>>>
>>>
>>> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an 
>>> existing theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without 
>>> assuming it. What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if 
>>> invisible horses pull the car?
>>>
>>> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of 
>>> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not 
>>> the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is 
>>> inconsistent with mechanism.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing 
>>> (QuIP) machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
>>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
>>>
>>>
>>> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary 
>>> variant of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail 
>>> the existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both 
>>> consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make 
>>> up stories about vampires and werewolves.
>>>
>>>
>>> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist 
>>> hypothesis.
>>>
>>> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To 
>>> avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a 
>>> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, 
>>> especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as 
>>> your use of many links illustrates).
>>>
>>> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in 
>>> matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go 
>>> in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary 
>>> matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, 
>>> Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves 
>>> Mechanism.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>  
>>
>> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would be 
>> a surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)
>>
>>
>>
>> When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from 
>> physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I do 
>> not defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of any 
>> universal machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) that they 
>> are universal. Then we can test that theory as it implies the physical laws.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a 
>> possible *denotational semantics* for experiential processing, which *takes 
>> place in matter*.
>>
>>
>> That seems a bit weird. Denotatotional semantics is OK (although to rough 
>> for this complex subject), but why assume Matter, when a theory implies it 
>> appearances. If we get a discrepancy between physics and machine’s physics, 
>> it will make sense to suppose some matter, and mechanism false, but that 
>> is, before having evidences, quite 

Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, werewolves, 
 that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer 
 simulations of stories of them …
>>> 
>>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of “bettable”. 
>>> If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of observable, you can 
>>> infer that either:
>>> 
>>> Mechanism is false, or
>>> You are dreaming, or
>>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
>>> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>>> 
>>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see 
>>> exactly what mechanism predicts.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer.
>> 
>> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical 
>> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so low 
>> that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the observable 
>> one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical to 
>> me.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as 
>>> the fundamental elements of nature.
>> 
>> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an existing 
>> theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without assuming it. 
>> What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if invisible horses 
>> pull the car?
>> 
>> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of 
>> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not 
>> the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is 
>> inconsistent with mechanism.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing (QuIP) 
>>> machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
>>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
>> 
>> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary variant 
>> of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail the 
>> existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both 
>> consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up 
>>> stories about vampires and werewolves.
>> 
>> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist 
>> hypothesis.
>> 
>> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To 
>> avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a 
>> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, 
>> especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as 
>> your use of many links illustrates).
>> 
>> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in matter 
>> and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go in the 
>> opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary matter 
>> that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, Mechanism 
>> would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves Mechanism.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would be a 
>> surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)
> 
> 
> When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from 
> physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I do 
> not defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of any 
> universal machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) that they 
> are universal. Then we can test that theory as it implies the physical laws.
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a 
>> possible denotational semantics for experiential processing, which takes 
>> place in matter.
> 
> That seems a bit weird. Denotatotional semantics is OK (although to rough for 
> this complex subject), but why assume Matter, when a theory implies it 
> appearances. If we get a discrepancy between physics and machine’s physics, 
> it will make sense to suppose some matter, and mechanism false, but that is, 
> before having evidences, quite speculative, and conceptually unclear. It is 
> almost like invoking a god in an explanation, to avoid an explanation. 
> 
> You added: < nature of matter is 

Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, werewolves, 
>>> that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer 
>>> simulations of stories of them …
>>>
>>>
>>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of 
>>> “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of 
>>> observable, you can infer that either:
>>>
>>> Mechanism is false, or
>>> You are dreaming, or
>>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
>>> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>>>
>>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see 
>>> exactly what mechanism predicts.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer. 
>>
>>
>> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical 
>> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so low 
>> that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the observable 
>> one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical 
>> to me.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as 
>> the fundamental elements of nature. 
>>
>>
>> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an 
>> existing theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without 
>> assuming it. What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if 
>> invisible horses pull the car?
>>
>> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of 
>> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not 
>> the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is 
>> inconsistent with mechanism.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing 
>> (QuIP) machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
>>
>>
>> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary 
>> variant of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail 
>> the existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both 
>> consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up 
>> stories about vampires and werewolves.
>>
>>
>> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist 
>> hypothesis.
>>
>> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To 
>> avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a 
>> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, 
>> especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as 
>> your use of many links illustrates).
>>
>> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in 
>> matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go 
>> in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary 
>> matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, 
>> Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves 
>> Mechanism.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>  
>
> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would be 
> a surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)
>
>
>
> When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from 
> physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I do 
> not defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of any 
> universal machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) that they 
> are universal. Then we can test that theory as it implies the physical laws.
>
>
>
>
> At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a 
> possible *denotational semantics* for experiential processing, which *takes 
> place in matter*.
>
>
> That seems a bit weird. Denotatotional semantics is OK (although to rough 
> for this complex subject), but why assume Matter, when a theory implies it 
> appearances. If we get a discrepancy between physics and machine’s physics, 
> it will make sense to suppose some matter, and mechanism false, but that 
> is, before having evidences, quite speculative, and conceptually unclear. 
> It is almost like invoking a god in an explanation, to avoid an 
> explanation. 
>
> You added: < true nature of matter is appreciated.>>*
>
> What is the true nature of matter? By making matter primitive, it looks we 
> 

Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, werewolves, 
>>> that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer 
>>> simulations of stories of them …
>> 
>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of “bettable”. 
>> If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of observable, you can 
>> infer that either:
>> 
>> Mechanism is false, or
>> You are dreaming, or
>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
>> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>> 
>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see 
>> exactly what mechanism predicts.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer.
> 
> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical universe 
> is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so low that we 
> need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the observable one) to 
> get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical to me.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as the 
>> fundamental elements of nature.
> 
> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an existing 
> theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without assuming it. 
> What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if invisible horses 
> pull the car?
> 
> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of nature 
> comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not the 
> metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is 
> inconsistent with mechanism.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing (QuIP) 
>> machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
> 
> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary variant of 
> provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail the existence 
> of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both consciousness and 
> matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up 
>> stories about vampires and werewolves.
> 
> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist 
> hypothesis.
> 
> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To avoid 
> repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a conclusion 
> because we have another theory is not that much interesting, especially when 
> the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as your use of many 
> links illustrates).
> 
> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in matter 
> and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go in the 
> opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary matter 
> that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, Mechanism 
> would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves Mechanism.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
>  
> 
> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would be a 
> surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)


When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from 
physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I do not 
defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of any universal 
machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) that they are 
universal. Then we can test that theory as it implies the physical laws.



> 
> At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a possible 
> denotational semantics for experiential processing, which takes place in 
> matter.

That seems a bit weird. Denotatotional semantics is OK (although to rough for 
this complex subject), but why assume Matter, when a theory implies it 
appearances. If we get a discrepancy between physics and machine’s physics, it 
will make sense to suppose some matter, and mechanism false, but that is, 
before having evidences, quite speculative, and conceptually unclear. It is 
almost like invoking a god in an explanation, to avoid an explanation. 

You added: <>

What is the true nature of matter? By making matter primitive, it looks we 
avoid the question of its “true nature”, which with mechanism is purely 
phenomenological.


Bruno




> 
> (But that still can be a contribution, but it is by no means the complete 
> picture.)
> 
> 
> - pt
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> 

Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-10 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 12:16:33 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, werewolves, 
>>> that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer 
>>> simulations of stories of them …
>>>
>>>
>>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of 
>>> “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of 
>>> observable, you can infer that either:
>>>
>>> Mechanism is false, or
>>> You are dreaming, or
>>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
>>> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>>>
>>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see 
>>> exactly what mechanism predicts.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer. 
>>
>>
>> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical 
>> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so low 
>> that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the observable 
>> one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical 
>> to me.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as 
>> the fundamental elements of nature. 
>>
>>
>> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an 
>> existing theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without 
>> assuming it. What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if 
>> invisible horses pull the car?
>>
>> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of 
>> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not 
>> the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is 
>> inconsistent with mechanism.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing 
>> (QuIP) machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
>>
>>
>> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary 
>> variant of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail 
>> the existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both 
>> consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up 
>> stories about vampires and werewolves.
>>
>>
>> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist 
>> hypothesis.
>>
>> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To 
>> avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a 
>> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, 
>> especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as 
>> your use of many links illustrates).
>>
>> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in 
>> matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go 
>> in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary 
>> matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, 
>> Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves 
>> Mechanism.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>  
>
> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would be 
> a surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)
>
> At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a 
> possible *denotational semantics* for experiential processing, which *takes 
> place in matter*.
>
> (But that still can be a contribution, but it is by no means the complete 
> picture.)
>
>
> - pt
>
>
>
A better way: *Matter does explain consciousness, once the true nature of 
matter is appreciated.*

- pt 

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Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-10 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, werewolves, 
>> that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer 
>> simulations of stories of them …
>>
>>
>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of 
>> “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of 
>> observable, you can infer that either:
>>
>> Mechanism is false, or
>> You are dreaming, or
>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
>> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>>
>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see 
>> exactly what mechanism predicts.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer. 
>
>
> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical 
> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so low 
> that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the observable 
> one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical 
> to me.
>
>
>
>
> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as 
> the fundamental elements of nature. 
>
>
> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an existing 
> theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without assuming it. 
> What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if invisible horses 
> pull the car?
>
> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of 
> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not 
> the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is 
> inconsistent with mechanism.
>
>
>
>
> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing (QuIP) 
> machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
>
>
> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary variant 
> of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail the 
> existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both 
> consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
>
>
>
>
> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up 
> stories about vampires and werewolves.
>
>
> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist 
> hypothesis.
>
> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To 
> avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a 
> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, 
> especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as 
> your use of many links illustrates).
>
> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in 
> matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go 
> in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary 
> matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, 
> Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves 
> Mechanism.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
 

I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would be a 
surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)

At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a 
possible *denotational semantics* for experiential processing, which *takes 
place in matter*.

(But that still can be a contribution, but it is by no means the complete 
picture.)


- pt


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Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-10 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, werewolves, 
>> that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer simulations 
>> of stories of them …
> 
> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of “bettable”. If 
> you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of observable, you can infer 
> that either:
> 
> Mechanism is false, or
> You are dreaming, or
> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
> 
> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see 
> exactly what mechanism predicts.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer.

That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical universe 
is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so low that we need 
to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the observable one) to get “my” 
consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical to me.




> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as the 
> fundamental elements of nature. 

You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an existing 
theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without assuming it. What 
if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if invisible horses pull the 
car?

Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of nature 
comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not the 
metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is 
inconsistent with mechanism.




> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing (QuIP) 
> machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.

With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary variant of 
provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail the existence 
of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both consciousness and 
matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?



> 
> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up 
> stories about vampires and werewolves.

The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist 
hypothesis.

Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To avoid 
repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a conclusion 
because we have another theory is not that much interesting, especially when 
the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as your use of many 
links illustrates).

All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in matter 
and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go in the 
opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary matter that 
I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, Mechanism would be 
judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves Mechanism.

Bruno



> 
> 
> 
> - pt 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
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Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-09 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, werewolves, 
> that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer 
> simulations of stories of them …
>
>
> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of “bettable”. 
> If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of observable, you can 
> infer that either:
>
> Mechanism is false, or
> You are dreaming, or
> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>
> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see 
> exactly what mechanism predicts.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>

Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer. But what if 
there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as the 
fundamental elements of nature. Then the quantum computer - a purely 
quantum information processing (QuIP) machine - needs to be upgraded to a 
qualium(+quantum) experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.

The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up 
stories about vampires and werewolves.



- pt 

-- 
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