In reply to Russell Standish and Juho Pennanen I'd just like to
emphasize the main point, which is really trivial: by definition, a
uniform measure on the possible futures makes all future beginnings of
a given size equally likely. Then regular futures clearly are not any
more likely than the irr
Juergen writes:
> Some seem to think that the weak anthropic principle explains the
> regularity. The argument goes like this: "Let there be a uniform measure
> on all universe histories, represented as bitstrings. Now take the tiny
> subset of histories in which you appear. Although the measure
Charles Goodwin wrote:
>Quick reply as usual 'cos I'm at work! :-)
>
>But surely the level of substitution would be non-fundamental, i.e. above
>the level of matter (Whatever that is or isn't) and hence
>would be a *simulation* of a person? I don't understand how one survives
>through the subst
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