Hi Jonathan,
You say that if something and nothing are equivalent, then
the big WHY question is rendered meaningless.
But isn't the big WHY question equivalent to asking WHY does
the integer series -100 to +100 exist? Even though the sum
of the integer series is zero, that doesn't
Stathis: I agree with Lee's and Jonathan's comments, except that I
think there is something unusual about first person
experience/ qualia/ consciousness in that there is an aspect
that cannot be communicated unless you experience it (a blind
man cannot know what it is like to see, no
Le 17-mai-05, à 09:06, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
I agree with Lee's and Jonathan's comments, except that I think there
is something unusual about first person experience/ qualia/
consciousness in that there is an aspect that cannot be communicated
unless you experience it (a blind man
Le 17-mai-05, à 09:56, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
Is it any
stranger that a blind man can not see, than that a description of a
billiard
ball's properties (weight, diameter, colour etc) can not bruise me?
It is different with comp. because a description of you + a description
of billiard ball,
Jonathan,
Your post suggests to me a neat way to define what is special about first
person experience: it is the gap in information between what can be known
from a description of an object and what can be known from being the object
itself. This is a personal thing, but I think it is at least
Hi Jonathan,
You say that Because it is necessarily true is the answer to Why does the
integer series -100 to +100 exist? However, you seem to say that this is
NOT the answer to Why does anything exist? In this latter case, you seem
to say the question is meaningless because the sum of
Norman: You say that Because it is necessarily true is the answer to
Why
does the integer series -100 to +100 exist? However, you
seem to say
that this is NOT the answer to Why does anything exist? In this
latter case, you seem to say the question is meaningless
because the
Stathis: Your post suggests to me a neat way to define what is special
about first person experience: it is the gap in information
between what can be known from a description of an object and
what can be known from being the object itself.
But how can being an object provide any extra
Dear Bruno,
Your claim reminds me of the scene in the movie Matrix: Reloaded where
Neo deactivates some Sentinels all the while believing that he is Unplugged.
This leads to speculations about matrix in a matrix, etc.
http://www.thematrix101.com/reloaded/meaning.php#mwam
There is still
Bruno's claim is a straightforward consequence of Strong AI; that a
simulated mind would behave in an identical way to a real one, and would
experience the same qualia. There's no special interface required here;
the simulated mind and the simulated billiard ball are in the same world,
ie. at the
Norman,
wonder if your opinion will be that no opinion is possible?
not on this list! Sufficiently sophisticated minds can formulate opinions to
ANY question (situation problem).
First: the WHY
I enjoyed the URL, with its contemporary Q-science based views.
Of course in English there is no
Dear Johathan,
I am trying to address the point of how we consider the interactions and
communications between minds, simulated or otherwise. I do not, question the
idea that simulated minds would be indistinguishable from real minds,
especially from a 1st person view. I am asking about how
Jonathan contrasts descriptions and what the descriptions describe:
Stathis: Your post suggests to me a neat way to define what is special
about first person experience: it is the gap in information
between what can be known from a description of an object and
what can be known from
Stathis wrote
[Here is] a neat way to define what is special about first
person experience: it is the gap in information between what can be known
from a description of an object and what can be known from being the object
itself. This is a personal thing, but I think it is at least a
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