Re: death

2005-06-19 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
R. Miller writes: (snip) The above mechanism would still work even if, as in my thought experiment, there were 10^100 exact copies running in lockstep and all but one died. Each one of the 10^100-1 copies would experience continuity of consciousness through the remaining copy, so none would

Re: copy method important?

2005-06-19 Thread Eugen Leitl
On Sat, Jun 18, 2005 at 02:02:01PM -0700, Hal Finney wrote: In practice most people believe that consciousness does not depend critically on quantum states, so making a copy of a person's mind would not be affected by these considerations. It is interesting that there is still no publicly

Re: copy method important?

2005-06-19 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
In the thought experiments I have recently proposed, I should have specified *functionally* exact copies. Millions of neurons die in a normal adult brain every day, and generally this loss isn't even noticed, so the sort of detail which would make the uncertainty principle a significant

Re: death

2005-06-19 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Hal Finney writes: God creates someone with memories of a past life, lets him live for a day, then instantly and painlessly kills him. What would you say that he experiences? Would he notice his birth and death? I would generally apply the same answers to the 10^100 people who undergo

Re: death

2005-06-19 Thread Hal Finney
Stathis Papaioannou writes: Yes; hence, everyone is immortal. But leaving that much-debated issue aside for now, I'm not sure that I understand what, if anything, you would accept as a method of surviving the death of your physical body. Would you consider that scanning your brain at the

Time travel in multiple universes

2005-06-19 Thread Ben Goertzel
Hi, I recently wrote a blog entry on time travel http://www.goertzel.org/blog/blog.htm and Tom Buckner followed up with an interesting comment on the potential for time travel in Tegmarkian multiple universes. (You can see it by going to the bottom of the page and clicking where it

Re: death

2005-06-19 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Hal Finney writes: I guess I would say, I would survive death via anything that does not reduce my measure. If I am stopped here, I should be started over there, or back then, or when such-and-such happens. If my measure is conserved then I can be happy. If it can be increased, I will be

Re: Time travel in multiple universes

2005-06-19 Thread Hal Finney
Ben Goertzel writes: I recently wrote a blog entry on time travel http://www.goertzel.org/blog/blog.htm and Tom Buckner followed up with an interesting comment on the potential for time travel in Tegmarkian multiple universes. Those are interesting speculations, but I don't think it really

Re: Dualism and the DA

2005-06-19 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
I have just waved my magic wand, and lo! Jonathan Colvin has been changed body and mind into Russell Standish and placed in Sydney, while Russell Standish has been changed into Jonathan Colvin and placed somewhere on the coastal US. If anyone else covets a particular person's wealth or

RE: Copies Count

2005-06-19 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Hal Finney writes: Consider an experiment where we are simulating someone and can give them either a good or bad experience. These are not replays, they are new experiences which we can accurately anticipate will be pleasant or unpleasant. Suppose we are going to flip a biased quantum coin,

RE: Time travel in multiple universes

2005-06-19 Thread Jonathan Colvin
Hal wrote: Those are interesting speculations, but I don't think it really makes sense to imagine travelling between the worlds of the Tegmark multiverse. There are no causal connections between them of the type that would be necessary for an information packet to travel in the way we